

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AFRICA

General Editors: J. D. FAGE and ROLAND OLIVER

Volume 7

from 1905 to 1940



SHOUT
SHARE **IT**

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AFRICA

- 1 From the earliest times to c. 500 B.C.**
edited by J. Desmond Clark
- 2 From c. 500 B.C. to A.D. 1050**
edited by J. D. Fage
- 3 From c. 1050 to c. 1600**
edited by Roland Oliver
- 4 From c. 1600 to c. 1790**
edited by Richard Gray
- 5 From c. 1790 to c. 1870**
edited by John Flint
- 6 From 1870 to 1905**
edited by Roland Oliver and G. N. Sanderson
- 7 From 1905 to 1940**
edited by A. D. Roberts
- 8 From c. 1940 to c. 1975**
edited by Michael Crowder

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AFRICA

Volume 7
from 1905 to 1940

edited by
A. D. ROBERTS



PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, VIC 3166, Australia
Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain
Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa
<http://www.cambridge.org>

© Cambridge University Press 1986

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1986
Reprinted 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001

Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data

The Cambridge history of Africa.

Vol 7: from 1905 to 1940

1. Africa – History

I. Roberts, A.D.

960 DT20

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

The Cambridge history of Africa

Includes bibliographies and indexes.

Contents: v. I. From earliest times to

c.500BC / edited by J. Desmond Clark, 1982. – v.

2. From c.500BC to AD1050 / edited by J. D. Fage

1979. – (etc.) – v. 7. From 1905 to 1940 / edited by

A. D. Roberts.

1. Africa–History–Collected works. I. Fage, J.D.

II. Oliver, Roland Anthony.

DT20.C28 960 76–2261

ISBN 0 521 22505 1 (v. 7)

CONTENTS

<i>List of maps</i>	<i>page</i> x
<i>List of figures</i>	xi
<i>List of tables</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xiii
<i>A note on money values</i>	xvii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xx
Introduction	i
by ANDREW ROBERTS, <i>Reader in the History of Africa, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London</i>	
1 The imperial mind	24
by ANDREW ROBERTS	
1905–1914	26
1914–1930	41
1930–1940	62
2 Aspects of economic history	77
by C. C. WRIGLEY, <i>Formerly Reader in History, University of Sussex</i>	
Foundations of the colonial export economy	77
Production for export	87
Trade and finance	113
Land and labour	121
The course of change	129

CONTENTS

3	Christianity	140
	by RICHARD GRAY, <i>Professor of the History of Africa, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London</i>	
	Protestant pioneers	141
	'Ethiopians', enthusiasts and prophets	148
	Catholic strategy and practice	158
	Missions and secular rulers: indigenous and colonial	170
	African initiatives during the First World War and in the towns	174
	Catholic hierarchies and colonial powers	179
	Trusteeship and education	182
4	Islam	191
	by C. C. STEWART, <i>Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Illinois, Urbana</i>	
	Resistance	194
	Colonial policies	202
	Expansion	208
5	African cross-currents	223
	by ANDREW ROBERTS	
	The movement of people	224
	The means of expression	231
	The critique of colonialism	247
	Ideologies of liberation	254
6	The Maghrib	267
	by MICHAEL BRETT, <i>Lecturer in the History of Africa, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London</i>	
	1905–1914	268
	The First World War and its aftermath	288
	1922–1930	297
	1930–1940	315

CONTENTS

7	French black Africa	329
	by CATHERINE COQUERY-VIDROVITCH, <i>Directeur du Laboratoire associé au CNRS</i> <i>'Tiers-Monde – Afrique', University of Paris</i> , translated by ELIZABETH EDWARDS and ANDREW ROBERTS	
	1905–1914	330
	The First World War	351
	The boom of the 1920s	360
	The depression of the 1930s	379
	Conclusion	392
	Madagascar	393
	by J. FREMIGACCI, <i>Maître-assistant d'Histoire,</i> <i>University of Madagascar</i> , translated by ELIZABETH EDWARDS and ANDREW ROBERTS	
8	British West Africa and Liberia	399
	by D. C. DORWARD, <i>Senior Lecturer in History,</i> <i>La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia</i>	
	British West Africa, 1905–1914	402
	German West Africa, 1905–1914	415
	The First World War and its effects	422
	British West Africa, 1919–1929	430
	British West Africa, 1929–1940	443
	The Republic of Liberia	454
9	Belgian Africa	460
	by B. JEWSIEWICKI, <i>Professor of History, Laval</i> <i>University, Quebec</i> , translated by YVONNE BRETT and ANDREW ROBERTS	
	1908–1920: reform and war	461
	1920–1930: Belgian assertion and economic growth	473
	1930–1940: depression and compulsion	482
	Conclusion	492

CONTENTS

10	Portuguese Africa	494
	by ANDREW ROBERTS	
	The metropolitan background	494
	Mozambique	501
	Angola	520
	São Tomé and Príncipe	532
	Portuguese Guinea	533
	The Cape Verde islands	536
	Spanish Equatorial Guinea	537
	by W. G. CLARENCE-SMITH, <i>Lecturer in the History of Africa, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London</i>	
11	Southern Africa	544
	by A. P. WALSH, <i>Professor, Department of Government and International Studies, University of Notre Dame, Indiana</i>	
	and ANDREW ROBERTS	
	1910–1914	545
	1914–1924	560
	1924–1940	576
12	British Central Africa	602
	by JOHN MCCrackEN, <i>Senior Lecturer in History, University of Stirling</i>	
	The making of the colonial economy, 1905–1914	605
	Class, race and politics, 1905–1914	612
	The pressures of war	620
	White politics and economic growth, 1918–1940	623
	Tribal identity and the growth of modern politics, 1920–1940	633
13	East Africa	649
	by ANDREW ROBERTS	
	Colonial construction, 1905–1914	651
	The First World War, 1914–1918	664
	Territorial contrasts, 1918–1930	670
	Depression and strain, 1930–1940	687

CONTENTS

14	Ethiopia and the Horn	702
	by the late RICHARD CAULK, <i>formerly Associate Professor, History Department, Camden College, Rutgers University</i>	
	Ethiopia, 1905–1920	707
	The Horn of Africa, 1905–1920	715
	Ethiopia, 1920–1930	720
	The coastal territories	724
	Ethiopia, 1930–1936	730
	Italian East Africa, 1936–1941	736
15	Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	742
	Egypt	742
	by M. W. DALY, <i>Assistant Professor of History, Arkansas State University</i>	
	Political change	742
	Economic change	750
	The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	755
	by G. N. SANDERSON, <i>formerly Professor of Modern History, Royal Holloway College, University of London</i>	
	The Wingate era, c. 1905–1919	755
	Political tensions after 1919	765
	Economic and political conditions in the 1930s	775
	Conclusion	784
	<i>Bibliographical essays</i>	788
	<i>Bibliography</i>	880
	<i>Index</i>	995

MAPS

1	Africa in 1914	<i>page</i> 4
2	Africa in 1939	5
3	Africa: mining areas, railways and waterways, 1937	82
4	Africa: major vegetation zones	98
5	Algeria and Tunisia, 1938	270
6	Morocco, 1938	281
7	Libya, 1940	286
8	French West Africa, 1930	332
9	French Equatorial Africa and Cameroun, 1939	341
10	West Africa from Senegal to Dahomey, 1935	384-5
11	Madagascar, 1939	394
12	Nigeria and Cameroons, 1935	408
13	Belgian Africa, 1939	464-5
14	Belgian Congo: administrative divisions, 1926 and 1933	468
15	Mozambique, 1937	502
16	Angola, 1939	522
17	Cape Verde islands and Portuguese Guinea	534
18	Spanish Guinea	538
19	South Africa, South West Africa and the Protectorates, 1920	546
20	South Africa, 1937	550
21	The Rhodesias and Nyasaland, 1935	603
22	East-Central Africa, 1935	608
23	East Africa, 1935	650
24	The East African campaign, 1914-18	665
25	Kenya: the White Highlands, 1935	680
26	Ethiopia and Eritrea, <i>c.</i> 1930	703
27	The Horn of Africa, <i>c.</i> 1930	717
28	Egypt, 1939	743
29	The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1937	758

FIGURES

1	Wholesale prices, 1913–1938/9	<i>page</i> xviii
2	Copper production, Belgian Congo, Northern Rhodesia and USA	93
3	Exports of palm-oil, palm kernels, groundnuts and groundnut oil	99
4	Exports of cocoa, coffee and cotton	102
5	Capital investment in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa	343
6	Receipts from African customs dues and poll-tax in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa	369
7	Ivory Coast: imports and exports	374

TABLES

1	Trade with parts of Africa as percentages of British external trade	<i>page</i> 25
2	Gold output from various countries, 1913–38	91
3	South African elections and governments, 1910–38	548
4	South Africa: population	588
5	Kings of Shoa and emperors of Ethiopia	706

PREFACE

In the English-speaking world, the Cambridge histories have since the beginning of the century set the pattern for multi-volume works of history, with chapters written by experts on a particular topic, and unified by the guiding hand of volume editors of senior standing. *The Cambridge Modern History*, planned by Lord Acton, appeared in sixteen volumes between 1902 and 1912. It was followed by *The Cambridge Ancient History*, *The Cambridge Medieval History*, *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, and Cambridge Histories of India, of Poland, and of the British Empire. The original *Modern History* has now been replaced by *The New Cambridge Modern History* in fourteen volumes. *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe* and *The Cambridge Economic History of India* are complete. Other Cambridge Histories recently undertaken include a history of Islam, of Arabic literature, of the Bible treated as a central document of and influence on Western civilisation, and of Iran, China and Latin America.

It was during the later 1950s that the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press first began to explore the possibility of embarking on a Cambridge History of Africa. But they were then advised that the time was not yet ripe. The serious appraisal of the past of Africa by historians and archaeologists had hardly been undertaken before 1948, the year when universities first began to appear in increasing numbers in the vast reach of the African continent south of the Sahara and north of the Limpopo, and the time too when universities outside Africa first began to take some notice of its history. It was impressed upon the Syndics that the most urgent need of such a young, but also very rapidly advancing branch of historical studies, was a journal of international standing through which the results of ongoing research might be disseminated. In 1960, therefore, the Cambridge University Press launched *The Journal of African History*, which gradually demonstrated the amount of work being undertaken to establish the past

PREFACE

of Africa as an integrated whole rather than – as it had usually been viewed before – as the story of a series of incursions into the continent by peoples coming from outside, from the Mediterranean basin, the Near East or western Europe. This movement will of course continue and develop further, but the increasing facilities available for its publication soon began to demonstrate a need to assess both what had been done, and what still needed to be done, in the light of some general historical perspective for the continent.

The Syndics therefore returned to their original charge, and in 1966 the founding editors of *The Journal of African History* accepted a commission to become the general editors of a *Cambridge History of Africa*. They found it a daunting task to draw up a plan for a co-operative work covering a history which was in active process of exploration by scholars of many nations, scattered over a fair part of the globe, and of many disciplines – linguists, anthropologists, geographers and botanists, for example, as well as historians and archaeologists.

It was thought that the greatest problems were likely to arise with the earliest and latest periods: the earliest, because so much would depend on the results of long-term archaeological investigation, and the latest, because of the rapid changes in historical perspective that were occurring as a consequence of the ending of colonial rule in Africa. Therefore when, in 1967, the general editors presented their scheme to the Press and notes were prepared for contributors, only four volumes – covering the periods 500 B.C. to A.D. 1050, A.D. 1050 to 1600, 1600–1790, and 1790–1870 – had been planned in any detail, and these were published as volumes 2–5 of the *History* between 1975 and 1978.

So far as the prehistoric period was concerned, the general editors were clear from the outset that the proper course was to entrust the planning as well as the actual editing of what was necessary entirely to a scholar who was fully experienced in the archaeology of the African continent. In due course, in 1982, Volume 1, 'From the earliest times to c. 500 B.C.', appeared under the distinguished editorship of Professor J. Desmond Clark. As for the colonial period, it was evident by the early 1970s that this was being rapidly brought to its close, so that it became possible to plan to complete the *History* in three further volumes. The first, Volume 6, is designed to cover the European partition of the

PREFACE

continent, and the setting up of the colonial structures between c. 1870 and c. 1905; the second, Volume 7, is devoted to the 'classical' colonial period running from c. 1905 to c. 1940; while the focus of the third, Volume 8, is on the period of rapid change which led from about the time of the Second World War to the ending of formal control from Europe with the dramatic final collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1975.

When they started their work, the general editors quickly came to the conclusion that the most practical plan for completing the *History* within a reasonable period of time was likely to be the simplest and most straightforward. Each volume was therefore entrusted to a volume editor who, in addition to having made a substantial contribution to the understanding of the period in question, was someone with whom the general editors were in close touch. Within a volume, the aim was to keep the number of contributors to a minimum. Each of them was asked to essay a broad survey of a particular area or theme with which he was familiar for the whole of the period covered by the volume. In this survey, his purpose should be to take account not only of all relevant research done, or still in progress, but also of the gaps in knowledge. These he should try to fill by new thinking of his own, whether based on new work on the available sources or on interpolations from congruent research.

It should be remembered that this basic plan was devised nearly twenty years ago, when little or no research had been done on many important topics, and before many of today's younger scholars – not least those who now fill posts in the departments of history and archaeology in the universities and research institutes in Africa itself – had made their own deep penetrations into such areas of ignorance. Two things follow from this. If the general editors had drawn up their plan in the 1970s rather than the 1960s, the shape might well have been very different, perhaps with a larger number of more specialised, shorter chapters, each centred on a smaller area, period or theme, to the understanding of which the contributor would have made his own individual contribution. To some extent, indeed, it has been possible to adjust the shape of the last three volumes in this direction. Secondly, the sheer volume of new research that has been published since many contributors accepted their commissions has often led them to undertake very substantial revisions in their

PREFACE

work as it progressed from draft to draft, thus protracting the length of time originally envisaged for the preparation of these volumes.

However, histories are meant to be read, and not to be commented on and analysed by their general editors, and we therefore present to the reader this further volume of our enterprise.

March 1985

J. D. FAGE
ROLAND OLIVER

A NOTE ON MONEY VALUES

The years between 1905 and 1940 witnessed great fluctuations in the value of the chief currencies used in Africa: the pound sterling, the French franc, the Belgian franc, the Italian lira and the Portuguese escudo. It is essential to bear this in mind when considering references in this volume to money values.

Fig. 1 compares some relevant fluctuations in wholesale prices. Official British and French wholesale price indices indicate the following changes in the purchasing power of the pound sterling and the French franc, expressed as a percentage of purchasing power in 1914:

	1914	1918	1920	1922	1930	1935	1938
Pound sterling	100	45	32	62	81	92	80
French franc	100	30	20	31	19	30	16

The main disruption was caused by the First World War. In both countries, prices rose steeply up to 1920. By 1922 British prices had fallen sharply and continued to fall, more slowly, until 1933, when they began to rise again. These movements are reflected in evidence from African countries within the sterling area. Movements in the prices of imports in the Gold Coast correspond closely to movements in wholesale prices in Egypt and South Africa. (Indices of consumer prices are available for the latter two countries and show a more moderate degree of inflation.) The French franc was more volatile. Wartime and post-war inflation was steeper than in Britain, and though prices briefly subsided after 1920 they rose to new peaks in the late 1920s; they then began to fall, but the Popular Front government initiated a new inflationary phase. After 1923 the French franc was worth less than a third, and usually less than a fifth, of the pre-war franc.




Fig. 1. Wholesale prices in various countries, 1913–1938/9 (1913 = 100)

Unfortunately, the earliest available price indices from French Africa (for Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Madagascar) date only from 1938–9. The Belgian franc moved broadly in line with the French franc; in 1927–31 the Belgian franc was worth one-seventh of its 1914 value in terms of wholesale prices. (This pattern was reflected in similar, but still more pronounced, trends in import prices in the Belgian Congo.) A similar pattern is apparent for Italy, where in terms of wholesale prices the lira throughout the 1920s was worth less than a quarter of its 1914 value; by 1933 it had risen to one-third but by 1937 had fallen again to a quarter.

The value of the Portuguese escudo, introduced in 1910, changed dramatically in our period. In terms of the pound sterling, it was by 1924 worth only about 3.5 per cent of its original value. A cost-of-living index for Luanda, Angola, suggests that in terms of its purchasing power there in 1914 the escudo was worth only 16 per cent by 1920 and a mere 2.5 per cent by 1924. By 1930 it was worth about 4 per cent and remained at around this value for the rest of the decade.

In the decade ending in 1914 the pound sterling was usually worth about 25 French or Belgian francs or Italian lire, 20 German marks and 5 US dollars. Before the pound was decimalised in 1971, it comprised twenty shillings, and there were twelve pennies in a shilling; thus fractions of the pound are cited in this volume in the form 3s. 4d.

Sources for Note and Fig. 1:

B. R. Mitchell, *European historical statistics, 1750–1975* (London, second ed., 1980), 774–5; *idem*, *International historical statistics: Africa and Asia* (London, 1982), 674–5, 679–80; G. Kay and S. Hymer, *The political economy of colonialism in Ghana* (Cambridge, 1972), 332–3; A. Huybrechts, *Transports et structures de développement au Congo* (Paris, 1970), 311.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editor gratefully acknowledges the work of Mrs Marion Johnson in compiling the index, and of Mr Reginald Piggott in preparing final versions of the maps.

INTRODUCTION

The period surveyed in this volume spanned the culmination of European power in Africa; it was also a crucial phase in the tutelage of Africans. In 1905 the subjection of Africa to alien rule was almost complete; in the 1940s, opposition to colonial rule gathered pace so fast, both within and outside Africa, that the Second World War can well be regarded as opening a new period. Between these dates, the history of Africa was more obviously being made by Europeans than by Africans. In retrospect, our period might seem to mark a pause between power-struggles, significant mainly as a prelude to Africa's coming-of-age. It is hoped that this volume will reveal more arresting perspectives; it has been written in the belief that the economic, social and cultural changes of the period are intrinsically as important and interesting as any in the history of Africa. Yet it remains true that these changes were due above all to external initiatives which greatly enlarged the fields of action and communication within Africa.

This consideration has determined the plan of this volume. Two-thirds consist of chapters devoted to the history of various regions, and these have been defined in terms of imperial frontiers. For English-speaking and French-speaking Africa such definition is relatively straightforward. The Portuguese territories were widely separated and closely involved with adjacent parts of other empires, but the distinctive nature of Portugal's relationship to Africa makes it analytically useful, as well as convenient, to discuss them within a common framework. Germany, however, lost its colonies in the First World War; they became international mandates, and they are treated in the chapters dealing with adjacent territories under the control of the relevant mandatory power. Nor has Italy's empire in Africa been treated in a single chapter: Libya is grouped with French-speaking North Africa, while the Italian colonies in East Africa are considered alongside

INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia, which briefly became one. Spain's few African possessions are dealt with in the chapters on the Maghrib and Portuguese Africa.

The regional section is preceded by five chapters which survey various dimensions of change that concerned Africa on a more or less continental scale and which owed much of their impetus to sources outside Africa. Chapter 1 considers the intellectual and administrative background to colonial rule. The main emphasis is on Britain, in order to provide metropolitan focus for the four regional chapters on English-speaking Africa; for the same sort of reason there is some consideration here of Germany, though regrettably it has not been possible to give adequate attention to Italy. For France, Belgium and Portugal, however, the metropolitan background could be incorporated in the appropriate regional chapters without involving undue repetition. This is also why the second chapter mainly deals with British Africa in analysing the impulses to economic change, its organisation and direction. The chapters on Christianity and Islam examine patterns of religious change common to many parts of Africa, while also showing how these world religions were furthered by institutions which straddled the borders of political regions or were based outside Africa. Finally, chapter 5 seeks to show how African thought and leadership were altered by the growth of intellectual communications both within Africa and between Africa and the outside world, especially that part of it affected by the African diaspora. The scope is confined to Africa south of the Sahara: the cultural history of Mediterranean Africa followed rather different lines and may be traced in the chapters on Islam and the Maghrib.

This scheme is intended to achieve an appropriate balance in the treatment of indigenous and exotic factors in African history. It remains to indicate the salient characteristics of the period. Two points will be elaborated here. First, there were important shifts in the distribution of power, even though in colonial Africa there was little fundamental political change. These shifts reflected larger patterns of change in international politics and trade which have hitherto been unduly neglected by historians of Africa. On the other hand, the course of economic and social change within Africa has been much illuminated by recent research: indeed, the period here surveyed lends itself well, in terms both of problems and evidence, to the study of social history in the comprehensive


INTRODUCTION

sense in which this has been developed for parts of Europe and the Americas.

By 1905 most of Africa had been shared out among half a dozen countries in Western Europe: Britain, France, Germany, Belgium (in the person of its king), Italy and Portugal; Spain had a few toe-holds. In 1908 Belgium acquired the Congo Independent State from Leopold II; in 1912 Morocco and Libya were taken over by France and Italy respectively. Nonetheless, Britain was clearly the most important imperial power in Africa, and not only in terms of land and population; in 1907 its territories accounted for four-fifths of African trade south of the Sahara. Two African countries had remained independent. The ancient empire of Ethiopia had preserved and indeed extended its sovereignty, while on the other side of Africa a different kind of black imperialism was exercised in Liberia by the descendants of freed slaves from the USA. In the far south, in 1910, former Boer republics and British colonies joined to form the Union of South Africa, a virtually autonomous Dominion of the British Empire. With these exceptions, final responsibility for governing Africa had been transferred to European capitals. South of the Sahara, major efforts of armed resistance had been suppressed in German South West Africa, German East Africa and Natal, between 1904 and 1907. In tropical Africa, there were signs of a shift away from the 'rip-off' economies so common in the later nineteenth century and towards more systematic and far-sighted methods of tapping the wealth of Africa. Its manpower, once exported for use overseas, was now being applied to production within Africa. The hunting and gathering of ivory or wild rubber yielded to the husbandry of pastures, fields and plantations. The search for quick profits by under-capitalised loggers or strip-miners was gradually being replaced by large-scale investment designed to yield assured returns over the long term. The infrastructures needed to attract such enterprise were taking shape. Railways reached Bamako in 1905 and Katanga in 1910, Kano in 1911, Tabora in 1912. Taxes were generally paid in cash, and the main clusters of population had almost all been brought under some sort of white administration.


However, the Scramble for Africa was by no means over. The two oldest empires on the continent, those of Ethiopia and

INTRODUCTION



1 Africa in 1914

INTRODUCTION



2 Africa in 1939

INTRODUCTION

Portugal, had indeed survived it, but greater powers doubted their durability and made plans to share them out if they should fall apart. Already, France controlled Ethiopia's rail access to the outside world, while the greater part of Portuguese East Africa was in the hands of chartered companies in which British interests were paramount. In the event, it was the German Empire which collapsed, following Germany's defeat by the Allied powers in the First World War. German Africa was redistributed between Britain, France, Belgium and South Africa, who ruled their new accretions on behalf of the League of Nations. South Africa, indeed, became an imperialist force in its own right. Its economic power came to be felt throughout a field of mining and labour migration which extended as far north as Tanganyika. In political terms, South African influence was due less to public policy than to the private vision of General Smuts, who had been prominent in the British imperial war cabinet. Early in 1919, Smuts argued that since the British Empire was 'specially poor in copper' it should acquire parts of Portuguese and Belgian Africa.¹ This idea came to nothing; instead, both Belgium and Portugal took steps over the next decade or so to strengthen their links with their African possessions and reduce the influence of alien capital and residents. Nonetheless, Smuts had important friends in Britain who, like him, hoped to see the whole of eastern Africa, from the Cape to the borders of Ethiopia, ruled by white colonists as a major bastion of the British Empire. This trend was countered by another 'sub-imperialism' in Africa: that of British India, to whose interests the British presence in eastern Africa had originally been dedicated. The Government of India defended Indian immigrants in East and South Africa against the wilder demands of white colonists; moreover, it supplied the British with expertise in the ruling of alien peoples which was found increasingly relevant to Africa in the 1930s.

While the Scramble continued, so too did opposition to white intrusion. The First World War not only set white against white in Africa; it also stiffened the determination of white rulers to subdue those parts of their territories which still remained free.

¹ Memorandum, 'The Mozambique Province', n.d., Smuts Papers (cited by W. R. Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's lost colonies, 1914-1919* (Oxford, 1967), 159; this document is omitted from W. K. Hancock and J. van der Poel (eds.), *Selections from the Smuts Papers*, IV [1918-1919] (Cambridge, 1966).

INTRODUCTION

Wars of resistance were fought in eastern Angola; by the Barwe of Mozambique; the Luba in the Belgian Congo; the Somali; the Turkana in north-western Kenya; the Darfur sultanate in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; and the Tuareg of Niger. Even then, there were other areas which by 1920 had yet to pay colonial taxes. Most succumbed over the next few years without major violence: Moxico in Angola; the southern Kwango, Dekese and northern Kivu in the Belgian Congo; Buha in Tanganyika; Karamoja in Uganda; the territories of the Zande and Nuba in the Sudan. It was also about this time that Kaffa, in south-western Ethiopia, began paying taxes to the emperor's agents, if not to the imperial treasury. Elsewhere, the postwar decade witnessed further and often prolonged resistance to the colonial powers. In Egypt, a nationalist revolt in 1919 led to a sort of independence in 1922. In Morocco, there was rebellion in the Rif; the Sanūsī harried the Italians in Cyrenaica; and Italy first conquered north-eastern Somaliland. In French Equatorial Africa there was insurrection in eastern Gabon and among the Baya.

In the 1930s the Fascist regime in Italy introduced the last phase of the Scramble. From 1932 Mussolini began to make grandiose claims against France in Africa; in January 1935 he concluded an agreement with France to adjust frontiers in the Sahara which emboldened him to prepare for the invasion of Ethiopia. His conquest, in 1935–6, of this 'remote and unfamiliar' country² brought Africa briefly back into the mainstream of world politics, for it exposed the impotence of the League of Nations and in that sense marked the point when a second world war began to seem inevitable. British leaders wondered if Hitler could be bought off with the return of Germany's former colonies in West Africa, or by the surrender of Belgian or Portuguese Africa, but he was not to be thus deflected from his aims in Europe.

It is only recently that historians have begun to look analytically at the use of force by the colonial powers to extend and maintain their control in Africa. One obvious feature of our period is the introduction of air power, of special value in remote and difficult terrain. Aeroplanes were used for military operations in Libya in 1911 and Morocco in 1912. Egyptian planes were used against Darfur in 1916; planes of the RAF were used in 1920 against the

² Neville Chamberlain, *Hansard*, 19 December 1935, cited by F. Hardie, *The Abyssinian crisis* (London, 1974), 8.

INTRODUCTION

Nuer, in the Sudan, and in the final defeat of Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh Hasan in Somaliland; and against the Nuer and Nuba in 1927–9. South Africa used planes against rebels in South West Africa in 1922 and 1925. The Fascists’ bombing of Ethiopia in 1935–6 achieved instant notoriety, but it is also worth noting that in 1937 the RAF was the main instrument of Britain’s last campaign of imperial conquest, in the Hadramaut of southern Arabia. The growing importance to the British of air power in Africa, especially as relations with Italy worsened, was demonstrated by the use of Nairobi as an RAF bomber base from 1936 and the appointment of an air vice-marshal as governor of Kenya in 1937. British strategy was also served by the annual cruise of RAF planes between Cape Town and Cairo which in 1935 enabled troops from Southern Rhodesia to be flown to the copper-mines in Northern Rhodesia to cope with African strikers. This incident demonstrated that imperial strength lay in mobility as well as firepower; the relatively very small size of colonial armies was a misleading index of the role of force in sustaining colonial power.

There was certainly a notable increase during our period in the power of the colonial state. To some extent this simply reflected the first stages of setting up government and fostering external trade. By 1914 most British administrations in Africa were paying their way: they no longer depended on grants from the British Treasury to balance their budgets. Moreover, private companies which during the Scramble had been entrusted with powers of government gradually yielded them up, as charters expired or were revoked in the Rhodesias in 1923–4, in Portuguese East Africa in 1929–30 and in parts of French Equatorial Africa. In the view of the colonial powers, the rule of law rapidly advanced within their territories, though how far Africans concurred is a matter for further research. The range of government activity was also deliberately extended, in response to African conditions as much as to changing practice in Europe. Where the cash nexus was still very patchy, government was liable to take a leading role not only in creating economic infrastructures, such as railways, but in regulating production through controls over labour and marketing. This trend was reinforced by policy, whether paternalist or openly segregationist. Africans were either prevented from competing with whites or, more deviously, protected from the cold winds of the free market. And in the virtual absence of

INTRODUCTION

an indigenous middle class, as in much of tropical Africa, government was bound to take initiatives in education and medicine if their provision was not to be limited by the aims and resources of missionary societies. Furthermore, the flow of goods and currencies within and outside Africa was increasingly directed by colonial governments into channels intended to protect metropolitan interests. There was, in short, a general hardening of colonial frontiers: what had often been artificial borders came to define arenas of political, economic and cultural activity. This process was most evident in the Belgian Congo: as Belgium's only colony, it was the object of greater metropolitan interest than any other African territory, yet special efforts had to be made to secure Belgian economic and cultural hegemony.

In some senses, then, European power was on the increase in Africa throughout our period, and the constraints of armies and administrators were reinforced by those of the labour market as capitalist enterprise expanded. But there is another, perhaps more important, sense in which European power in Africa was already in decline. The extent of empire, in the sense of political overrule, was related in no simple way to metropolitan strength. This was especially true after the First World War, which had much inflated the empires of Britain and France, in the Middle East as well as Africa. The home bases of European empires were gravely enfeebled, first by the war itself and then by the world-wide economic depression of the 1930s. It has been reckoned that industrial development in Europe was set back eight years by the First World War, while it forged ahead in the USA. Warfare caused the deaths of over twenty million people in Europe (excluding Russia), a mortality rate of about 7 per cent.³ The influenza pandemic of 1918–19 struck heavily in Europe, as in Africa and Asia, and like the war it took a specially heavy toll of young adults. Germany, by losing the war, not only lost its colonies but itself became, for a time, a kind of colony, deprived of its navy and airforce and precariously dependent for industrial growth in the late 1920s on short-term loans from US firms. France lost over two-thirds of its foreign investments as a result of the war, and at home it had suffered great physical damage as well as loss of life. The most impressive work of French

³ Asa Briggs, 'The world economy', in C. L. Mowat (ed.), *New Cambridge modern history*, XII (Cambridge, 1968), 54.

INTRODUCTION

colonisation in the 1920s was not overseas but in war-scarred north-eastern France. By 1925 some £700m had been spent on reconstruction there, and since French youth had been decimated much of the work was done by immigrants — mostly Poles, Italians and Kabyles from Algeria: indeed, with a total foreign population at this time of around three million, France supplanted the USA as the main host-country for immigrants.⁴ The depression of the 1930s sharply checked France's recovery: from 1931 the annual value of its external trade was less, in real terms, than it had been in 1913. In Britain, war and depression compounded economic problems of long standing. Foreign competition continued to undermine industries on which British hegemony had rested in the mid-nineteenth century: textiles, coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding. Between 1919 and 1939 the volume of British exports was never more than two-thirds that of 1913; and throughout the 1930s Britain was a net importer of capital.⁵ Real wages increased more slowly between the 1900s and 1930s than during any other such interval between the 1850s and 1960s.⁶ In 1935, 62 per cent of British volunteers for military service were rejected as physically unfit, and the infant death-rate in Jarrow, a Tyneside town which no longer built ships, was nearly three times that in south-east England.⁷

It is true that despite such symptoms of national decline British preponderance in Africa remained very considerable. By 1935 the share of 'British Africa' (including South Africa) in the trade of sub-Saharan Africa was 84.7 per cent and in 1937 Britain accounted for 77 per cent of investments in this region. On the other hand, Britain's own share in African trade declined; whereas in 1920 it had still accounted for two-thirds of the trade of British Africa, by 1937 the proportion was well under half. In part, this was due to the economic revival of Germany: between 1935 and 1938 German trade with sub-Saharan Africa increased by a half (while Germany replaced France as Egypt's second-best trading partner). It was also due to the advances of US and Japanese

⁴ D. W. Brogan, *The development of modern France* (second edition: London, 1967), 599, 609.

⁵ D. H. Aldcroft, *The inter-war economy: Britain 1919–1939* (London, 1970), 246, 264; Briggs, *loc. cit.*, 79.

⁶ S. Pollard, 'Labour in Great Britain', in P. Mathias and M. M. Postan (eds.), *The Cambridge economic history of Europe*, VII, part 1 (Cambridge, 1978), 171.

⁷ Theo Barker (ed.), *The long march of Everyman* (London, 1975), 201–2.

INTRODUCTION

industry into African markets between the wars. US products ranked second or third among the imports of British Africa in the 1930s. By 1929 Japan had replaced Britain as chief supplier of cotton goods to East Africa and by 1938 enjoyed 93 per cent of this market. In South Africa the Japanese were officially regarded as 'honorary whites' from 1930 and in the later 1930s Japan overtook France and Belgium to become South Africa's fourth-best trading partner; in 1936-7 only Germany bought more South African wool than Japan. Such shifts in trading patterns must of course be seen in a broader perspective; the trade of sub-Saharan Africa still played too small a part in the trade of the major imperial powers to affect their national economies very significantly.⁸ These changing patterns were important for Africa not so much for their own sake as because they were symptoms of profounder shifts in power which would soon have far-reaching effects on the continent.⁹

Relations between the USA and Africa during our period are a neglected subject, despite the scale on which Africa has been studied by Americans in recent years. The USA did not see itself as a power in Africa. It had no colonies there, and nothing came of British suggestions in 1918 that it might take over German East Africa or the Belgian Congo and Angola.¹⁰ In Liberia, however, the US did enjoy a decisive, if informal, hegemony. Through a series of loan agreements it controlled Liberian finance; it did not exert the crude compulsion evident in its own 'back-yard', the

⁸ Percentage of metropolitan power's external trade with its territories south of the Sahara, 1935: Britain, 2.7 (trade with South Africa, 4.0); France, 5.0 (including Madagascar); Belgium, 3.3; Portugal, 9.4 (Angola and Mozambique only). In 1934-7 Japan derived 4.0 per cent of its export earnings from sub-Saharan Africa, and 3.6 from North Africa; 4.1 per cent of its imports came from Africa. In 1935 Germany derived 2.1 per cent of its external trade from sub-Saharan Africa (and 2.5 in 1938). In 1930-4 Italy derived 1 per cent of its imports from its colonies. (*Sources*: as cited on p. xix above; also *Japan year book 1938-9*, 397, 409; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The colonial problem* (London, 1937), 411.)

⁹ Percentage distribution of world exports of manufactured goods:

	UK	Germany	USA	Japan	France	Belgium
1913	29.9	26.4	12.6	2.4	12.9	4.9
1929	23.6	21.0	20.7	3.9	11.2	5.5
1937	22.4	22.4	19.6	7.2	6.4	5.9

Source: Aldcroft: *Inter-war economy*, 22.

¹⁰ Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's lost colonies*, 110-13, 115, 125.

INTRODUCTION

republics of Central America, but from 1927 it did protect a locally dominant economic interest: the holdings of Firestone Rubber. Elsewhere in Africa, US investment was less conspicuous but more important. American finance and technical expertise played a considerable role in mining. In 1906 Ryan and Guggenheim helped to initiate diamond-mining in Kasai; in 1917 J. P. Morgan and Newmont helped set up the Anglo American Corporation in South Africa. In 1927–8 Newmont, Kennecott and the American Metal Company acquired substantial interests in the development of large-scale copper-mining in Northern Rhodesia. When yet another US firm planned to join them early in 1929, it seemed likely that Northern Rhodesia's copper would pass into American hands at a time when the United States already controlled three-quarters of world copper production. Baldwin, the British prime minister, regarded this as strategically undesirable and would appear to have prompted the large injection of British and South African capital which checked this American threat. Nonetheless links with mining in the US were strengthened when in 1930 the American Metal Company took over the Copperbelt interests of Chester Beatty's Selection Trust.¹¹ American producers also dominated two sectors of the African market which rapidly expanded between the wars: films and automobiles. (Trucks and cars designed to meet the exacting demands of farmers and traders in middle America stood up far better than British vehicles to African soils and distances.) African goods were a tiny proportion of total US imports, but by 1934 the USA was the chief customer for African cocoa.

The USA also played a major part both in the cultural transformation of Africa and in the promotion of knowledge about the continent. One in ten US citizens were themselves of African descent, so the welfare of Africans, and especially their education, was a natural object of American philanthropy. In parts of Africa, notably the Witwatersrand, the Belgian Congo and Angola, Americans took a leading role in missionary work; such experience led in 1924 to a Wisconsin sociologist being commissioned to report on labour conditions in Portuguese Africa. Americans also funded most of the research into Africa's social problems between the wars, though little of this was done

¹¹ A. D. Roberts, 'Notes towards a financial history of copper mining in Northern Rhodesia', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1982, 16, 2, 348–9.

INTRODUCTION

by Americans. A small but growing number of Africans found their way to American colleges and universities. Ethiopia exercised a particular hold on the imagination of black Americans, especially after Mussolini's invasion; the US government kept aloof from the dispute, but some of its nationals had been doing important work in the country. The Second World War gave the US government, for the first time, a direct interest in the fortunes of Africa. The American commitment to the defence and recovery of Western Europe involved a commitment to Africa insofar as the West increasingly depended on its African colonies. The decision-making of the imperial powers began to be influenced by American priorities, with consequences for both development and decolonisation.¹²

Within Africa, two further kinds of shift in power deserve consideration. One is so obvious that it is easy to overlook. It was during our period that tropical Africa began to constitute a significant economic counterweight to North and South Africa. In the latter regions, production had been stimulated in the course of the nineteenth century by white immigration and the investment of European capital. In 1907, North and South Africa each contributed twice as much as tropical Africa to the continent's total exports (including gold and diamonds). By 1928 the extension of colonial rule and capitalist networks had contrived to raise the share of tropical Africa almost to the South African level, while that of North Africa was scarcely affected. Ten years later, the picture had changed yet again: three-quarters of Africa's exports now came from the tropics and South Africa, in roughly equal proportions.¹³ This was partly due to world demand, despite the

¹² W. R. Louis, *Imperialism at bay: the United States and the decolonisation of the British Empire, 1941-1945* (Oxford, 1977).

¹³ Percentage of regional contributions to the value of African exports (including gold and diamonds):

	1907	1928	1938
North Africa	40	37.5	26.6
Tropical Africa	19	30.0	34.6
South Africa	41	32.5	38.8

Sources: S. H. Frankel, *Capital investment in Africa* (London, 1938), 198-9 (1907, 1928); M. J. Herskovits and M. Harwitz (eds.), *Economic transition in Africa* (London, 1964), 29-30 (1938); B. R. Mitchell, *International historical statistics: Africa and Asia* (London, 1982), 373-8 (North Africa). Ethiopia has been omitted from these calculations.

INTRODUCTION

depression of the 1930s, for certain commodities which in parts of tropical Africa were first produced on a large scale in this decade: copper from Northern Rhodesia, tin and coffee from the Belgian Congo, coffee from Uganda, the Ivory Coast and Madagascar. (Up to 1935 almost half the tonnage of Africa's coffee came from Ethiopia and Angola; in 1936–9 the leading producer by weight was Madagascar.) But the main cause of rising export values in sub-Saharan Africa was the rising price of gold, which favoured not only the Union but the Belgian Congo and several territories in French as well as British tropical Africa. North Africa had no gold; besides, its trade was heavily dependent on the French economy, which suffered particularly during the depression. It is hard to make comparisons across space and time between different monetary zones during a period of fluctuating money values, but it would seem that the depression affected government revenues more severely in Algeria than anywhere else in Africa.

Economic power also shifted as between local and overseas capital, and white settlers and African cultivators. Before 1914, it was widely supposed in ruling circles that except in West Africa long-term economic growth in colonial Africa would depend on white settlement. In the 1920s this assumption was disproved by Africans in Uganda and Nyasaland, and came under strain in Tanganyika. In the 1930s the depression usually tilted the balance further in favour of Africans. In Algeria, Kenya and Madagascar, local white enterprise fought an uphill struggle against the larger resources of overseas capital and the lower costs of African peasant production. In South Africa, by contrast, the protection of white farmers and workers against African competition was not checked but intensified in the 1930s. The gold boom greatly improved the government's capacity to subsidise white business and labour, and thus to provide an economic underpinning both for industrialisation and for the legal structures of racial segregation. Prosperity also enabled white South Africans to advance towards another sort of mastery. No longer was the mining industry essentially an enclave of foreign capital; by the end of our period, one-third of its share capital may have been in South African hands.

Our period, then, was characterised by important changes in the distribution of power, both short-term and long-term.

INTRODUCTION

Nonetheless, it remains true that, outside Egypt, there was little change in the capacity of Africans under white rule to participate in politics; insofar as they were involved in the structure of colonial government, it was, with very few exceptions, at the level of chieftdom or district. This has influenced the priorities of scholarship. When academic interest in African history burgeoned in the 1950s and 1960s, it was animated by a concern to demonstrate the essential autonomy of pre-colonial Africa and to examine the roots of African protest against colonial rule, which by then was changing the political face of the continent. In this perspective, much of African politics in the earlier twentieth century was deficient in incident and of interest mainly as 'background'. The aftermath of decolonisation widened perspectives of colonial Africa. African wealth and poverty could no longer be attributed simply to racial divisions; they had to be explained as a consequence of enduring relations between African countries and the developed world, and also of conflict within African communities. The evident fragility of African nations cast doubt on the value of explaining African political activity in terms of nationalism. New solidarities based on regional or economic divisions seemed at least as significant. These in turn provoked questions about the terms on which colonial Africa traded with the rest of the world.

Such questions had not indeed been altogether neglected; in economic history, valuable work had been done which was insufficiently recognised. But the new perspectives of Africanists were reinforced both by the increasing accessibility of colonial archives and by new ideas and priorities among historians at large. These can be summarised as a preoccupation with 'social history' transcending rather than merely supplementing the too-often self-contained categories of political and economic history. Social history in this sense has commonly been strongly materialist, if not necessarily Marxist, in approach. It has given particular stimulus to the study of southern Africa, where the processes of industrialisation, capital accumulation and class formation have gone further than elsewhere on the continent. More generally, it has become possible to conceive of the history of Africa in the twentieth century as social history in a particular geographical setting rather than as belonging to a distinctive genre, 'colonial history'. The historian who studies Africa, whether urban,

INTRODUCTION

industrial or rural, finds much in common with the history of modern Europe or the USA.¹⁴ The cultural differences stressed by white colonists and officials begin to seem less remarkable than the similarities. White sentiments about race do not seem far removed from the attitudes of ruling élites in Europe to the *Lumpenproletariat* of London's East End, or the mostly illiterate Polish and Russian workers controlled by pass-laws in eastern Germany before 1914.¹⁵ An emphasis on Africa's essential distinctiveness was much more characteristic of the British than the French: it may be relevant that by 1939 less than 1 in 17 people in Britain worked on the land, whereas in France the proportion was 1 in 3. In terms of popular beliefs, rituals and diversions there were striking resemblances between Africa and parts of rural France in the 1930s.¹⁶ And as historians of Africa begin to examine popular responses to colonial legal systems, it is important to recall that in France the rule of law was by no means universal at the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁷

For the historian of African population, our period was crowded with incident. Much remains, and indeed is bound to remain, obscure, but some trends are becoming reasonably clear. The initial impact of white intrusion in tropical Africa was often disastrous. Resistance in German territories provoked massive slaughter and destruction; less well known are the innumerable small-scale actions whereby white rule was extended. Working on mines, plantations and railways meant disease and high death-rates; in large part, this was due to neglect that had parallels in the industrial world, but the more men moved the faster they spread infection, of which the most lethal was sleeping-sickness in Uganda. The First World War prolonged such tribulations. In Europe, 65,000 men from French North and West Africa died on active service; in East Africa over 100,000 men died, and nearly all were carriers killed by disease rather than armaments. Conscription crippled agriculture, yet in places special efforts were made to increase production for military purposes. For non-white

¹⁴ Cf. Paul Thompson (ed.), *Our common history: the transformation of Europe* (London, 1982).

¹⁵ John Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German rule, 1905-1912* (Cambridge, 1969), 67.

¹⁶ Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848-1945: ambition and love* (Oxford, 1979), 171; *idem*, *Taste and corruption* (Oxford, 1980), 52-8, 310-11, 350-1.

¹⁷ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernisation of rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, 1977), 50-66.

INTRODUCTION

wage-earners, wartime price inflation reduced already meagre real incomes by as much as one half. The damage done by the war rendered Africans highly vulnerable to the influenza pandemic of 1918–19: perhaps 2 per cent succumbed. Climatic change was probably yet another burden upon Africa; for there is reason to suppose that the present century has been unusually dry. This has mattered most in the semi-arid lands fringing the Sahara, but severe drought struck much of eastern and southern Africa in the early 1930s. In southern Africa, the ruthlessness with which labour continued to be mobilised damaged African health on a scale which far outweighed any local amelioration by western medicine. By the 1930s tuberculosis was rife in rural South Africa among returned mine-workers, while railway-building and work on sugar-plantations had spread malaria through Natal and Zululand. In tropical Africa, however, colonial regimes were by the end of our period on balance a positive rather than negative influence on population. For many people, the growth of trade meant somewhat better food and clothing, while the growth of government and motor transport made possible famine relief and rural medical services. The life-chances of Africans were not particularly good, but in many areas they were beginning to improve. In retrospect, one may discern in much of Africa a period of relative calm and rising hopes between the violence of the earlier twentieth century and the wars which have been either cause or consequence of decolonisation.

Movements of people were as much a feature of this period as of any earlier phase in Africa's past. Most moved to work for wages, in mines, plantations and towns. In 1910 about 2.5 million people in Africa were living in cities whose population exceeded 100,000; this number had roughly doubled by 1936, when 2.1m were in Egypt, 1.4m elsewhere in North Africa, and 1.3m in South Africa (where one in six Africans were living in towns). In tropical Africa, large towns were still exceptional: the biggest were Ibadan (318,000) and Lagos (167,000). But old seaports took on new life and new ports were developed, while in the far interior new towns grew from next to nothing. In 1936 there were populations of between 50,000 and 100,000 in Dakar, Luanda and Lourenço Marques (Maputo), and also in Nairobi, Salisbury (Harare) and Elisabethville (Lubumbashi). Many urban dwellers were short-stay migrants, like most workers on mines or plantations; it was

INTRODUCTION

not only in South Africa that urban authorities discouraged Africans from settling in towns. But many people came to town less because they could count on finding work there than because they had given up hope of making a living on the land. This was specially true of the poorer whites in South Africa, but during the depression in the 1930s it was also true of whites in Algeria and some Africans in French West Africa.

Other patterns of migration were also important. It was not only white employers who relied on hiring short-stay migrants; so too did African farmers in Uganda, the Sudan and West Africa (where there was widespread demand for seasonal labour at harvest time). Many African communities were uprooted to make room for whites — whether planters, as in the Ivory Coast, or farmers, as in the Rhodesias and Kenya (where the Masai were moved *en masse* before 1914). Campaigns against sleeping-sickness, as in Tanganyika, could involve forced resettlement in tsetse-free zones. Sometimes it was Africans who chose to move. Attempts by colonial governments to compel the cultivation of cash-crops (usually cotton) for very low returns induced families to escape across colonial frontiers: from Upper Volta to the Gold Coast; from Dahomey to Nigeria; from Mozambique to Nyasaland and Tanganyika; from Angola to Northern Rhodesia. Nor did the export of African slaves entirely cease; though it had now been driven underground, a sporadic traffic in slaves persisted across middle Africa, from the Niger bend to the Red Sea.

The growth of the cash economy had far-reaching effects on relations between men and women, between young and old, and between groups of kin. This is a subject which historians of Africa have only recently begun to explore, but some generalisations may be ventured. Wage-earning could expand the opportunities for young men to earn incomes; in accumulating bridewealth (payments by a husband to his wife's relations), a young man seeking a first wife might thus enjoy an advantage over older men seeking a second or third, especially when bridewealth began to take the form of cash rather than cattle. It is even possible that earlier marriage may in places have contributed to population growth. At the same time, the production of cash-crops increased the agricultural burdens of women. They had long planted and harvested food for their own households but were now liable to have to grow crops for sale as well; indeed, children too were

INTRODUCTION

under pressure to become farm-hands. Where men went off to work for wages, women were often left to support children and elderly relations. Separation strained marriages, and some women moved to town, not to join a husband but in search of economic independence. Inheritance in the female line (common in Central Africa and parts of the Gold and Ivory Coasts) tended to yield to patrilineal inheritance; not only was this often favoured by colonial officials but as property acquired cash value individual claims to it challenged those of lineage groups, and fathers favoured their own sons. In all these ways, colonial economies caused change in the structure and functions of African families, and thus in the closest personal relationships.¹⁸

The economic changes of the period greatly increased the scale and variety of social differentiation. Geographical contrasts were sharpened: outside the white-run sectors of mines and plantations there were areas of export-crop production, food supply or labour supply. (If nomadic pastoralists roamed on the fringes of the colonial economy, this was often due less to any sentimental attachment to livestock than to official quarantine regulations.) In practice, such functional specialisation was a good deal modified: households developed strategies for earning incomes from a variety of occupations. All the same, distinctions in terms of economic class became more evident in the course of the period. Most Africans still grew their own food, but dependence on wage-earning greatly increased. In the countryside, a small minority of African farmers (including some colonially approved chiefs) applied capital as well as labour to the land, which in turn began to constitute transferable capital: by the 1930s a kind of incipient African landlordism could be observed in parts of the Gold Coast, Kenya and Natal. In towns and mines, a minority of workers became proletarians, in that they developed a long-term commitment to wage-earning, raised children where they worked, and ceased to regard the countryside as a source of livelihood unless perhaps for retirement. Most African labour was still too mobile for trade unions to make much headway in our period, but there was a marked increase in strike action during the 1930s, especially in ports. Meanwhile, a new African élite had been called into existence by the needs of government, business and missions

¹⁸ See *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 2 (special issue on the history of the family in Africa).

INTRODUCTION

for literate African assistants: clerks, interpreters, storekeepers, trading agents, teachers, clergymen. Along the West African coast and in South Africa, a middle class of this kind had been formed in the course of the nineteenth century and soon developed a strong sense of cultural superiority and corporate identity.

Ethnic identity was a further dimension of social differentiation. There is an important sense in which some African tribes, so far from being primordial units of social organisation, were first created during the period covered in this volume. Tribal affiliation is usually assumed to rest on an awareness of shared yet distinctive cultural habits, notably language: thus the strength and scope of tribal sentiment reflect changing perceptions of cultural difference. In the nineteenth century, the expanding scale of trade and warfare greatly extended African experience of African strangers, and increased the need for new names to signify new degrees of strangeness or solidarity. Under colonial rule, this process was intensified. Migrants far from home looked for material and moral support to those least unlike themselves. Colonial authorities used tribal labels in order to accommodate Africans within bureaucratic structures of control: such labels not only served to attach people to particular places or chiefs; they were taken to indicate temperaments and aptitudes. In local government, tribal distinctions were made to matter as never before: in the southern Sudan, vain efforts were made to sever ties between Nuer and Dinka. Meanwhile, the survival, or memory, of pre-colonial kingdoms gave an ethnic focus to political competition within the colonial system. In Uganda, tribal identities were sharpened by the desire to emulate the privileged kingdom of Buganda; in southern Rhodesia, attempts to resuscitate the defeated Ndebele kingdom put a new premium on distinctions between Ndebele and non-Ndebele or 'Shona'. The spread of literacy gave new significance to ethnic difference: the reduction of African languages to writing meant favouring some languages and dialects over others, thus redefining ethnic frontiers while moulding new channels of communication. Ibo and Tumbuka became articulate ethnicities, as well as Yoruba, Ngoni or Zulu. Moreover, sentiments of ethnic identity were explored and developed by African writers concerned to assert the strength and value of African cultures against alien encroachment. In all these ways, linguistic usage, educational advantage and political aspiration were shaping

INTRODUCTION

aggregations of a kind which in Europe had long been labelled 'nations'.¹⁹

Changing social horizons were both cause and effect of changes in religious affiliation (which were partly made possible by increased wealth). Whether helped or hindered by colonial regimes, Islam and Christianity made great advances in our period; by 1940 a majority of Africans adhered to one or other faith. Both offered universal perspectives on human existence which were more congruent with the enlarged scale of political and economic life under colonial rule than indigenous religions tied to specific groups and places: in this sense, both were modernising forces. Mediterranean Africa had long been very largely Muslim, but by the 1930s there were probably as many Muslims (around thirty million) in tropical Africa, mostly in the countries between Senegal and Somaliland. The expansion of Islam was promoted by proselytising Sufi brotherhoods, but it was greatly facilitated by urbanisation and the growth of trade and transport, and Muslim Africa was receptive to both fundamentalist and modernist trends in contemporary Islamic thought. South of the Sahara, there were probably as many Christians as Muslims by the end of our period; since it opened, the Christian population of Africa may have increased fivefold. European missionaries were in general far less hospitable than Muslim shaykhs to African social and cultural traditions, and contradictions between African and European (especially Protestant) interpretations of Christianity gave rise to a great many independent churches. But there were few areas in which there was a real choice between Christianity and Islam, and with few exceptions it was only the schools of Christian missions which could open doors to such opportunities as the colonial order offered literate Africans. In the short term, the paternalism of Christian missions frustrated African aspirations to leadership; in the longer term, the missions did much to determine where and when Africans south of the Sahara gained enough knowledge and experience to challenge white monopolies of power.

Throughout our period, the great majority of Africans remained illiterate, but those few who did learn to read and write, especially in European languages, wielded an influence out of all proportion

¹⁹ Cf. John Flint in J. E. Flint (ed.), *Cambridge history of Africa*, V (Cambridge, 1976), 4.

INTRODUCTION

to their numbers. Social horizons were widened by travel in pursuit of education, both within Africa and abroad, in Europe and the USA. By 1940 a few hundred black Africans, mostly in West and South Africa, had obtained university degrees; perhaps around 200 West Africans had qualified in London as barristers. Africans wrote for publication, chiefly in newspapers but also in books and pamphlets. African writers discussed what they had learned from the white man, what more they wanted from him, and what they wished to preserve from their own cultures. Men and women who had made great efforts to acquire what whites called civilisation found that so far from being welcomed as partners they were liable to be feared as threats to white vested interests. Contacts overseas with blacks of the diaspora, and with white critics of empire, encouraged some Africans to question not just the details but the moral justification of colonial rule. There was growing tension between literate, urban-based élites and the chiefs or other African agents of colonial rule in the countryside. In French-speaking Africa, both north and south of the Sahara, literate Africans began to lose patience with the official doctrine of political emancipation through assimilation into French culture. In the cities of Algeria and Tunisia there was agitation in the 1930s for independence, a goal which was beginning to be discussed on the coast of British West Africa. In these places at least, nationalism was coming to refer less to a sense of ethnic identity than to still embryonic nations united only by common experience of a particular colonial regime.

Thought of this kind was still quite exceptional. It was virtually unknown in the interior of tropical Africa, where the heirs of many pre-colonial rulers still exercised considerable authority, as in Uganda or northern Nigeria. In East and Central Africa, African political discussion was still framed largely in ethnic terms; in the Belgian Congo, white control was for the time being so complete that such discussion scarcely existed, and it was severely checked in Portuguese Africa. In South Africa, black opinion was highly articulate but almost wholly excluded from the country's formal political structures. All the same, the speed with which Africans had adopted European idioms and aspirations confounded prevailing white assumptions about the manipulation of social change among black peoples. Most colonial powers paid lip-service to the idea that in due course Africans should play a

INTRODUCTION

larger part in managing their own affairs, but they agreed that there was no question of Africans taking over the government of their own countries in the foreseeable future: those who called for this were given no official hearing. Yet while whites were educating Africans, some at least were being educated by them, even if African lessons often had to take the form of the strike or trade boycott. In Britain, the African Research Survey directed by Lord Hailey prompted efforts as our period ended both to invest in African welfare and to enlarge the political scope of the African intelligentsia. The Second World War was to strengthen the arguments for such strategies; it remained to be seen how far Britain, or any other colonial power, could retain control over the pace of reform as the rate of social change continued to increase.

CHAPTER 1

THE IMPERIAL MIND

For the period under review in this volume, explanations of much that happened in Africa must be sought in Europe. It is necessary to examine the impact of Africa upon the colonial powers if we are to understand the process by which these powers tried to mould Africa for imperial purposes.¹ The acquisition of African empire gave new point to questions about the aims and methods of white enterprise on the continent. How should Africa be governed, and to what end? How far should metropolitan governments intervene? Could the ambitions of governor, capitalist and missionary be reconciled? What steps should be taken to reduce African ignorance of the white man's techniques, and white ignorance of Africa? What use should be made of contemporary advances in knowledge? What part should Africans play in the colonial social order?

Even to list such questions, however, gives an exaggerated impression of the urgency with which they were usually regarded. The imperial mind, whatever its quality, was not in general much concerned with Africa during our period. The speed with which so much of Africa had formally been placed under European control should not be taken to be a measure of its importance to the invaders. Much of the Scramble had been motivated by the negative aim of excluding rival powers: it was not a defence of present interests so much as speculation in possible, but quite unproven, benefits. South Africa, certainly, was important to Britain: by 1911 (when it had just ceased to be a British responsibility), British investment there amounted to £351m; this was on much the same scale as British investment in India or Canada, or Australia and New Zealand combined; it was half the sum invested in the USA and a good deal more than that in

¹ For reasons explained in the Introduction, this chapter gives disproportionate attention to Britain, especially in discussing the 1930s; for France, Belgium and Portugal the reader is asked to consult chapters 6, 7, 9 and 10.

Table 1. *Trade with parts of Africa as percentages of British external trade (excluding gold and diamonds).*

	1905	1913	1920	1930	1935	1938
Egypt	2.5	2.4	3.4	1.5	1.7	1.5
British possessions*	0.6	1.0	2.2	2.4	2.7	3.1
South Africa	2.5	2.6	2.1	2.9	4.0	3.9
Rest of Africa	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.8
Total	6.6	7.0	8.8	7.6	9.3	9.3

*Including Mandates, Southern Rhodesia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Note: For the sake of internal consistency, these calculations are based throughout on statistics for British domestic exports and for total British imports (including re-exports). For 1905 and 1913, the trade of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan is credited to Egypt, and up to 1930 part of the trade of the Rhodesias is credited to Mozambique.

Source: *Annual statements of the trade of the United Kingdom.*

Argentina.² In 1913, Africa as a whole accounted for about 7 per cent and 10 per cent respectively of the external trade (excluding gold) of Britain and France. But this was mostly with Egypt, South Africa or Algeria. Tropical Africa contributed less than 2 per cent to Britain's trade, and less than 1 per cent to that of France (which owed much more to British India, Egypt and China). The Belgian Congo in 1912 contributed only 1 per cent of Belgian trade, and in 1910 Germany's African colonies had accounted for less than 1 per cent of German external trade, while returns on investment were meagre, except from diamonds in South West Africa.³

There is, then, an obvious sense in which colonial Africa was largely peripheral to Europe in the early twentieth century. Most politicians and businessmen who looked overseas at all were looking elsewhere, and this remained true throughout our period. All the same, trade with colonial Africa did become more important to its rulers, and substantial investments were made with long-term ends in view. Though few in Europe might think about Africa, those who did thought a good deal about the way

² L. H. Gann and P. Duignan, *The rulers of British Africa, 1870-1914* (Stanford, 1978), 371 (based on Paish).

³ Cf. table 1; see also Marc Michel, *L'Appel à l'Afrique* (Paris, 1982), 139-40.

in which its resources, natural and human, might be turned to account, and about the moral responsibilities entailed in African empire. Much of the debate was conducted among those who had work in Africa — whether in government, business or the churches. In the course of our period, and especially in the 1930s, serious interest in Africa spread more widely into political and academic circles, and clusters of informal opinion began to exert pressure on those in a position to act. But it is with governments that we should begin.

1905–1914

By and large, the overriding concern of the colonial powers was to prevent their colonial possessions becoming financial burdens to the metropolis. Imperialism was not so popular in Europe that tax-payers, who were also voters, were ready to pay its bills. In much of Africa, invasion and administration had thus been left to chartered companies, but many failed. In some regions, notably the Rhodesias, most of Mozambique and parts of French Equatorial Africa, private companies continued to exercise powers of government well into the twentieth century, but in 1908 Belgium had to take over the Congo Independent State. By then, other metropolitan governments had more or less reluctantly committed themselves to governing Africa; they had at least created departments specifically concerned with this task and were beginning to regularise recruitment to their local administrations.

In France, a colonial ministry had been created in 1894, but its responsibilities in Africa were confined to West Africa, Equatorial Africa, French Somaliland and Madagascar. The French ministry of foreign affairs handled Tunisia and Morocco, while Algeria, formally a part of France, was watched over by the ministry of the interior. Italy created a separate colonial ministry in 1912, following the conquest of Libya. In Germany, as in Britain, it was the Foreign Office which had not only taken the lead in the Scramble for Africa but had supervised its 'effective occupation'. It was the reappraisal following expensive and extremely bloody wars of repression in German East and South West Africa which in 1907 led to the creation in Berlin of a separate Colonial Office.

Britain, of course, had long had a Colonial Office, but its historic function had been to supervise colonies of settlement, which in Africa meant the Cape, Natal and Sierra Leone; its

original responsibilities in the Gambia, on the Gold Coast and at Lagos were mere afterthoughts. Once the Scramble had subsided, however, there was no reason for the Foreign Office to concern itself with African administration, and it began to transfer to the Colonial Office the care of its numerous African protectorates: in 1900, those which were now styled Southern and Northern Nigeria; in 1904, Nyasaland; in 1905, Uganda, the East African Protectorate (later Kenya) and Somaliland; in 1914, Zanzibar. In South Africa, the end of the Anglo-Boer War meant that in 1902–3 the Colonial Office also took charge of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Swaziland. This rapid expansion of scope transformed the Colonial Office: the administration of indigenous peoples began to loom larger than relations with progressively independent white settlers. In 1907 a special Dominions Department was created within the Colonial Office to look after relations with Canada, Australia and New Zealand; in 1910 the new Union of South Africa was added to these. The British High Commissioner in South Africa continued to be responsible for the protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, and for supervising the administration of the Rhodesias by the British South African Company. Elsewhere in British Africa, the Colonial Office exercised direct control over the local administrations, though the Foreign Office remained the ultimate authority for the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan since this was, at least in theory, an international condominium.

None of the colonial ministries exercised very much power. The ministers themselves did not rank highly in their own governments, and they presided over relatively small bureaucracies. Most officials in the British Colonial Office saw their role as being to supervise rather than to initiate policy. Winston Churchill, as parliamentary under-secretary, toured East Africa in 1907, but no civil servants in the Colonial Office had visited tropical Africa by 1914. Officials in Paris and Berlin aspired to rather more direct intervention. French territories were periodically visited by members of a specialised inspectorate that was responsible only to the colonial minister himself. The German colonial secretary, Dernburg, visited East Africa in 1907; in 1908 he visited South West Africa, as did his successor, Solf, in 1912. But despite such tours, and the extension of telegraph cables, metropolis and colonial capital remained in practice far apart.

The main cause of friction between colonial governors and their masters in Europe was the cost of colonial rule. Governors might seek fame by increasing the quantity and quality of government, but their schemes seldom found favour in the metropolis, where many senior officials conceived of policy-making chiefly in terms of budgetary control. This was, after all, a period in which the states of western Europe were concentrating public investment in their own labour force: in Britain, the percentage of the budget devoted to social services rose from 18 in 1900 to 33 in 1913. But officials in metropolis and colony were also estranged by social distance. Metropolitan officials were career civil servants, and most had been recruited by competitive examination. In France and Germany, at least, they belonged to a bureaucratic élite in which financial expertise was highly regarded. In Britain, between 1904 and 1911, the two permanent under-secretaries of state for the colonies had previously served in the Crown Agents (a government procurement agency) and the Board of Trade. Such mandarins considered themselves far superior to the 'men on the spot'. The latter had mostly been recruited much more haphazardly, largely indeed for reasons of economy. In Britain, before 1914, the demand for officials to serve in the colonies 'was moderate in scale both in respect of the numbers and the qualifications required'.⁴ Portugal created an *Escola Colonial* in 1906; Belgium created an *École Coloniale* in 1911, and France had had one since 1890, but by 1907 it had supplied only 70 of the nearly 500 senior officials in French Africa. As in British and German Africa, many of the rest were drawn from the armed forces: skill at arms and on the parade ground were often deemed qualification enough for the ruler of large numbers of people. Some recruits to German colonial administrations belonged to the home civil service and had received specialist training in Germany, but many were simply young men in search of adventure, and their terms of service were not standardised until 1910. It should moreover be noted that in both French and Belgian Africa Europeans were employed in a variety of subordinate jobs, both within and outside government, which in British West Africa or German Africa were likely to be performed by Africans, and in East Africa by Indians.

⁴ R. Furse, *Ancuparius* (London, 1962), 18.

Final responsibility for colonial rule lay with the legislatures in the imperial capitals. In Britain the Liberal government formed in 1905 enjoyed an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons, though 53 Labour members had also been elected. The chief African causes of debate in the decade before 1914 were the Congo scandals and the South African constitution. Parliamentary approval was needed for grants-in-aid to balance colonial budgets, but the sums were small and usually shrinking. The 'left' in Liberal and Labour ranks began to move away from doctrinaire condemnation of empire *per se* towards discussion of how it should be managed, but it could not be said that African issues mattered much in British politics during these years. In France, parliamentary concern was concentrated on Algeria, which was represented by three senators and six deputies. Africa was of some consequence in German politics. Not only did Africa loom larger in the overseas empire of Germany than in those of Britain and France; the Reichstag (parliament) had full control over colonial budgets. Since in other respects its financial control was very limited, debate on colonial affairs became an important field for political manoeuvres which were really concerned with the government of Germany. Conflicts between those with direct interests in the colonies — soldiers, settlers, businessmen, missionaries — could be manipulated by liberal, Catholic or socialist politicians to improve their own bargaining positions. This was to have a considerable effect on colonial policy.⁵

Imperial bureaucrats might consider parsimony essential to the achievement of financial self-sufficiency in the colonies, but it was clearly not enough. The revenue base of colonial governments had to be increased, which meant expanding trade. Opinions differed as to how this could be done. William Ponty, governor-general of French West Africa from 1908 to 1915, valued close cooperation between commerce and administration but considered that agricultural production was best left to Africans. He remarked in 1908 that French West Africa 'was not established to facilitate the emigration of white workers. The blacks...make perfect settlers.'⁶

⁵ A colonial advisory council, founded in 1891, had represented colonial interest groups, but it was abolished in 1908.

⁶ Quoted by G. Wesley Johnson, 'William Ponty and republican paternalism in French West Africa', in L. H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds.), *African proconsuls* (New York, 1978), 141.

This view was confirmed by experience: Africans were clearly able to supply what were then expanding markets for tropical products, and Ponty could see no merit in entrusting production to concessionary companies. In French Equatorial Africa, however, government expense was reduced to a bare minimum by handing over huge areas to companies with concessions of monopoly rights to the purchase of local produce. Such empire often proved very profitable as well as cheap; it also gave rise to abuses such as had made Leopold's Congo infamous. In German Kamerun, concessionary companies were also prominent, while in German East and South West Africa white settlement had been encouraged.

In British West Africa this was never a serious proposition. True, the mines in the Gold Coast employed more whites than the government did up to 1914, but otherwise, as in Nigeria, whites were engaged in trade and business, and in 1910 African land rights in Nigeria were firmly protected by legislation directed against expatriates. In 1911 the Colonial Office resisted demands from mining companies in the Gold Coast and Nigeria for controls on labour which would have threatened African cocoa production. In the same year William Lever, the soap magnate, was thwarted by the Colonial Office's rooted objection to monopoly concessions. Harcourt, the British colonial secretary from 1910 to 1915, extolled in 1913 the expansion of exports grown by Africans; this pleased him both as an improving landowner himself and as the member for a Lancashire cotton-mill constituency.

Yet the Colonial Office could not easily override the vested interests of Europeans when these were backed by governors, as they were in 1914 by Lugard (over the Nigerian tin industry) and by Clifford (over land in the Gold Coast). And in other parts of British Africa the issues were still less clear-cut. The highlands of Kenya (then called British East Africa) had for some time been widely regarded in Britain as a natural field for white settlement, which was keenly promoted by Charles Eliot, commissioner from 1900 to 1904. Both Kenya and Northern Rhodesia attracted a modest flow of white immigrants, chiefly from South Africa, while Southern Rhodesia had from the 1890s been developed by the British South Africa Company as a colony of white settlement. In Uganda and Nyasaland, white settlers comprised only a few

dozen planters, but their aspirations echoed those of their more influential neighbours.

In the eyes of metropolitan officials, white settlers were both an asset and a liability. In theory, they had the techniques and resources to initiate large-scale production; they were cheaper to employ in colonial administration than recruits from the metropolis; and they opened up the prospect of devolving both the responsibility and the cost of government, as in South Africa. But in practice settlers often needed special help from government if they were to compete successfully with African producers. Settlers were therefore liable to involve government in conflict with Africans which called for expensive military expeditions. In Kenya, the violence of 'pacification' in 1905–8 caused much concern in the Colonial Office, where one official advised that the settlers be repatriated.⁷ The governor, Hayes Sadler, balked at so radical a proposal, but in 1909 the Colonial Office replaced him by Girouard, whose Nigerian experience was thought a timely counterweight. In fact, Girouard promoted settler interests to the extent of initiating a mass removal of Masai herdsmen: this shocked the Colonial Office into requiring his resignation. In 1907 the Colonial Office interfered in Swaziland, where chiefs had alienated great tracts of land to settlers and speculators: one-third of this land now reverted to African ownership. In 1908 the colonial secretary, Lord Crewe, disallowed a Southern Rhodesian ordinance, already approved by the high commissioner, to restrict Indian immigration. Both here and elsewhere, however, there were practical limits to the effectiveness of metropolitan disapproval. Settler ambitions were sometimes thwarted, but not to the point of provoking disaffection: the Masai move in Kenya was not reversed.

There was comparable debate in Germany. The great African rebellions in 1904–5 in East and South West Africa had compelled reappraisal not only of administrative organisation but of economic strategy. More attention was now paid to those who argued that Africans were capable of 'rational' economic behaviour and could, given due incentives, produce certain crops more cheaply than whites. This view was shared by three new colonial governors: Zech (Togo, 1905–10), Seitz (Kamerun, 1907–10) and Rechenberg (East Africa, 1906–11). It was Rechenberg who

⁷ Advice repeated in 1942 by Harold Macmillan, when he was briefly under-secretary of state for the colonies.

encountered most resistance from local whites. At first he seemed to have the ear of the colonial secretary, Dernburg, but arguments about African labour were soon woven into the shifting alignments of parties in the Reichstag. The settlers' friends proved to have more political weight in Berlin, and when Rechenberg left the settlers seemed more firmly entrenched than ever.

The most obvious measure of settler strength was their membership of representative institutions in the colonies. In French black Africa these were comparatively insignificant, since outside Senegal they never acquired legislative powers. For German settlers, as we have just seen, it was specially important to be able to exert influence in Berlin, but they also made constitutional advances in the colonies. In South West Africa, where they were most numerous, they obtained control in 1909 of local government in their own areas, and they had as many votes as officials did on the new territorial council, which was given limited budgetary powers in 1913. In German East Africa, settlers were granted a majority on the governor's advisory council in 1912, and in 1914 were able to elect councils in two coastal towns. In the British Empire, there was a long tradition of sharing power with local residents through legislative councils. As these created a body of local law, so British statute law took on a mainly residual importance. In the former colonies of white settlement — Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Cape and Natal — the councils had originally comprised a majority of officials sitting alongside a minority of government-nominated representatives of colonial society; in the course of time, settlers gained the right to elect their own representatives, who eventually became a self-governing majority. In tropical Africa, settler populations were tiny, and it was not at all clear how far this pattern could be developed. Settlers were most numerous in Southern Rhodesia, which in any case was run by a chartered company, and elected council members were in a majority by 1907. In the same year, legislative councils were created in Nyasaland and Kenya; they included a few nominated non-officials. White settlers in Kenya were inclined to regard this as opening the way towards white self-government, but this ambition was challenged by the much larger number of Indian immigrants. And in British West Africa the institution of legislative councils at once raised the question of African political status.

Superficially, the councils in West Africa resembled those in

British territories of white settlement. In Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Lagos the settlers happened to be black: there were substantial minorities of English-speaking, mostly literate and Christian blacks, some of whom were descended from repatriated slaves. These territories were termed ‘colonies’, which meant that all their inhabitants were British subjects, and thus enjoyed an innate right of appeal to the Privy Council, unlike the indigenous inhabitants of ‘protectorates’. In each West African colony, the governor was advised by a legislative council, and by 1906 each council included one or more Africans among its nominated unofficial members. However, the scope of these councils varied. By the end of the nineteenth century the hinterland of each colony had come under British rule but was administered as a ‘protectorate’ distinct from the coast-based colony. In Sierra Leone, the power of the legislative council was extended over the protectorate. Elsewhere, the legislative councils were confined to the colony (except for an extension from Lagos to Southern Nigeria from 1906 to 1914 and again in 1922). Thus with the expansion of British power in the Gold Coast and Nigeria the relative importance of the legislative council declined.

This was part of a more general British trend to restrict African participation in central government. It was one thing to allow this to loyal ‘black Englishmen’ within the original colony. It was a very different matter to allow such men a share, however slight, in ruling the newly-subdued peoples of the protectorates: what might be allowed to white settlers in East Africa could not be allowed to blacks in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. So while educated West Africans lost ground at the centre of the political stage, they were also gradually excluded from the colonial administrative service. In the nineteenth century this had for a time made much use of anglicised blacks, but the recruitment of whites at their expense was encouraged both by medical advances⁸ and by late-Victorian racial theory.⁹ By 1900 Africans were debarred from the administrative (or ‘political’) branches of colonial government. They could at best hope to serve in the

⁸ Among white officials in West Africa, the death-rate per thousand fell from 20.6 in 1903 to 11.8 in 1913. (Cmd. 920. *West Africa. Vital statistics of non-native officials. Returns for 1919*, 4.) By 1935 the rate had been reduced to 5.1, which for British colonial Africa was not exceptional.

⁹ Cf. R. Symonds, *The British and their successors: a study in the development of the government services in the new states* (London, 1966), 119–26.

ancillary technical services, and even there, in 1914, a move by the Colonial Office to increase African recruitment to the medical services in West Africa was thwarted by local white opposition.

Thus as the British set about the task of governing not mere outposts but vast regions of tropical Africa, they began to think in terms of collaboration not with coastal élites but with indigenous rulers. Economy was certainly an important consideration in developing what later became known as 'indirect rule'. But both in London and Africa officials were keen to strengthen the powers of chiefs as a way of restricting the influence of educated Africans. Official nervousness, indeed, was such that in 1913 Lugard, in Nigeria, was allowed to discourage schools from teaching the Stuart period of English history, since this might foster 'disrespect for authority'.¹⁰ African rulers by divine right were judiciously cultivated. In the sphere of civil law, African custom was upheld insofar as it was not 'repugnant' to British notions of justice and morality; to varying degrees, African authorities were also allowed to deal with minor criminal offences. Harcourt admired the 'civilised cohesion of Muslim Northern Nigeria'; so too did his German counterpart Solf, who actually paid it a visit in 1913 and congratulated Lugard on his work in preserving African institutions.

In southern Africa, imperial expansion had likewise undermined the position of middle-class blacks. The Act of Union put at risk the former Cape Colony's policy that 'civilisation', not race, should be the test of fitness for political rights. In support of this principle, the high commissioner, Selborne, disallowed a Southern Rhodesian bill in 1906 which would have excluded blacks from the common voting roll, but in 1912 Harcourt approved new franchise qualifications which had virtually the same effect. Rhodes's high-sounding principle of 'equal rights for all civilised men' was degraded to a Jim Crow tactic for ensuring racial hegemony.

In some ways French official attitudes were rather different, yet they can be seen to have traversed a somewhat similar course. The old communes of Senegal were actually a part of France, insofar as they elected a deputy to the National Assembly. This was the birthright of all men who were native to the communes. But it

¹⁰ P. H. S. Hatton, 'British colonial policy in Africa, 1910-1914' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1971), 181.

was wholly exceptional: no more than the Lagos colony did the four communes provide a precedent for the extension of colonial government. True, the elected council which helped run the communes was extended in 1920 to represent the whole of Senegal, but this served to boost chiefs at the expense of the communes and in any case the council's powers were reduced to insignificance: indeed, it closely resembled the superfluous Nigerian Council created by Lugard in 1913. The notion that black Africa might be part of France was not wholly abandoned: from 1912 French citizenship was made available to Africans throughout French West Africa. Yet the qualifications required were about as hard to obtain as those for Africans who wished to vote in Southern Rhodesia; outside the communes of Senegal there were only 94 black French citizens in West Africa by 1922 and about 2,000 in 1937. All other Africans were defined as French subjects, bound by local law and custom as approved by white officials and by a severe penal code introduced in 1907–9. A somewhat similar distinction obtained in Algeria, where a majority subject to Muslim law but also to a severe penal code contrasted with a minority consisting of French citizens subject to French law. It was possible for Muslims to apply for French citizenship, but this involved losing their status in Muslim law, and even by 1936 there were only 8,000 French citizens of Muslim origin in Algeria.

In German Africa, the question of citizenship or voting rights for Africans never arose. Among the literate élites of the coastal towns, German culture was by no means universal. Many such Africans, in both East and West Africa, had been educated by English-speaking missions. German colonial governments did much more than the British at this period to promote African education, if only because mission schools did not satisfy their needs for clerical staff. But in East Africa Swahili seemed the most useful language for government clerks. There was more consistent emphasis on teaching German to Africans in Togo and Kamerun, whence by 1914 two missionary societies had sent a number of Africans to Germany for training. But no amount of German culture could qualify an African for equal status with whites. From 1908 two Togolese could advise on the administration of Lomé, but an African petition for legal equality in 1913 was ignored, while black entrepreneurs were prevented from competing with

white traders. In Kamerun, Seitz argued in vain for African representation on his advisory council, and after his departure the rights of African proprietors in Duala were set aside.

Ruling the new empires in Africa involved cultivating local allies, whether white settlers, the black bourgeoisie or black chiefs. It also involved learning about Africa and Africans. European knowledge of the continent's languages, cultures and natural resources was still fragmentary, and filling the gaps could benefit both government and trade. At this early stage, administrators in the field played a leading part in extending knowledge about Africans. In 1905 officials in French West Africa were urged to study traditional law, and in 1909 Maurice Delafosse initiated work on a code of civil law for use in 'native' courts. Knowledge of Islam in black Africa was furthered by a special department of Muslim affairs, in which Paul Marty made numerous regional studies. In German Africa, attempts were also made to collate customary law,¹¹ a particular interest of Zech in Togo, while in Italian Eritrea important work in this field was done by Conti Rossini.

Germans led the way in applying science to agriculture and forestry in Africa, at research stations in East Africa (Amani) and Kamerun (Victoria). The British obtained plants and expertise from the botanical gardens at Kew. Like the Germans, they soon established agricultural departments in their African territories, though that in the Gold Coast was for long concerned with quality control in the cocoa trade rather than with experimental production. Surveying advanced very unevenly. Private expeditions from Europe did valuable work in the Ruwenzori mountains, Ethiopia and southern Angola; French officers greatly improved maps of the Sahara. But outside South Africa little geodetic triangulation had been done before 1914, and not much more by 1940; even then it was concentrated on the frontiers dividing the colonial powers. Again, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were the only countries with an official geological survey before 1914, though there was a mineral survey in Nigeria. Medical knowledge grew rather faster, due partly to the advent of doctors, even if they were still much preoccupied with the health of

¹¹ This belatedly bore fruit in E. Schultz-Ewerth and L. Adam, *Das Eingeborenenrecht*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1929–30).

whites.¹² Indeed, the range of European professional expertise exposed to African problems had increased substantially. By 1914 the senior government staff in the seven African territories under the British Colonial Office included 258 medical officers and almost 600 other technical officers, as against only 540 administrators.

What was learned in the field was, at least in part, pooled and disseminated in the metropolis. In Britain, the Imperial Institute had been established in 1887 to promote the exchange of scientific knowledge within the Empire. In 1906 the Colonial Office took the initiative in enabling the Institute to extend its network to tropical Africa. In 1899 schools of tropical medicine had been founded in Liverpool and London; the foundation of the London school was instigated by the then colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, and the Imperial Bureau of Entomology, created in 1913, grew from a suggestion by H. J. Read, then in charge of the East African department of the Colonial Office. Meanwhile, the Colonial Office kept in touch with outside knowledge and experience through newly-established advisory committees on medicine, entomology, sanitation and surveys. In Paris, the Pasteur Institute became a centre for teaching and research in tropical medicine; in Hamburg an institute for these purposes was founded in 1899 and in Brussels a school of tropical medicine was opened in 1910. The Colonial Economic Committee in Germany, set up in 1896, both initiated colonial research and circulated its results among interested businessmen. Germany pioneered the academic study of African languages, which had been taught in the Oriental Seminar at Berlin since 1887. In 1909 Delafosse

¹² Between 1905 and 1940 about 60 dissertations on African topics were accepted at British universities for the MD degree. Some doctors made notable contributions in other fields, e.g. Norman Leys, Meredith Sanderson and H. S. Stannus, all of whom worked in Nyasaland before 1914. Doctoral theses were presented to French universities (including that of Algiers) between 1905 and 1940 as follows:

Area studied	Medicine	Pharmacy	Veterinary medicine
French N. Africa	237 ¹	38	57
Sub-Saharan Africa	23	4	13
Madagascar	16 ²	3	9

¹ including 22 by Arab authors

² including 11 by Malagasy authors

introduced African language teaching at the École Coloniale in Paris, along with a new emphasis on the study of African history and institutions (in contrast to the earlier, assimilationist, focus on Roman law).

Scholarly interest in the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa was very unevenly distributed in Europe. It was most evident before 1914 in the German-speaking world, where ethnology and its ancillary craft, ethnography, were well established, even if their practitioners were not always conspicuous for logical rigour. Between 1905 and 1914 ten ethnographic expeditions under German leadership visited most parts of tropical Africa; their sources of support included the government and universities as well as museums seeking to expand collections. Elsewhere, few such initiatives were taken. Belgium despatched Captain Hutereau to study the Zande, and Belgian sociologists devised a questionnaire to elicit a series of ethnographies from missionaries and others. Marty's work on Islam in French West Africa has been mentioned. The few professional ethnologists in Britain made a very limited contribution to knowledge of Africa at this period. This was not for want of interest on their part. In 1896 and again in 1908 they vainly urged the government to form an Imperial Bureau of Ethnology (following American example); they had also vainly appealed in 1900 for funds to record native custom in South Africa. Two academic enquiries were undertaken. The Sudan government commissioned ethnographic surveys in 1909–12 from C. G. Seligman, who in 1913 became professor of ethnology in London. The Colonial Office appointed Northcote Thomas to make a series of ethnographic studies in Southern Nigeria (1909–10) and Sierra Leone. In addition, the Hungarian Emil Torday's expedition to the Congo in 1907–9 was sponsored by the British Museum, whose ethnographic collections had been compared unfavourably to those of the Berlin Museum.¹³

By and large, the study of African peoples was left by the British to those already on the spot. Nevertheless, laymen as well as academics were influenced by ideas of mainly German origin: there was a widespread assumption that preliterate peoples could be classified in terms of 'races' and 'tribes'. Between 1905 and

¹³ Cf. Thomas's complaint in his preface to Alice Werner, *The natives of British Central Africa* (London, 1906), a volume in a series edited by Thomas on 'The native races of the British Empire'.

1914 there were published in Europe about eighty books of African ethnography; most were devoted to particular African peoples and most were written by serving administrators. This kind of work became the dominant genre in serious European writing about Africa, supplanting the detailed travel journals characteristic of the nineteenth century.

The social problems of sub-Saharan Africa received no more academic attention than its ethnography. In Brussels lectures on colonial studies were given by Henri Rolin, a lawyer with socialist sympathies who served on the Colonial Council from 1910 to 1922. In 1911–12 Rolin visited Katanga and the Rhodesias, but as a detached and sceptical witness to early colonial enterprise and administration in Africa he was almost alone. British opinion on Africa was largely articulated through societies which, as in other imperial capitals, brought together those who had been employed in colonial territories. The few available works of reference were mostly written by officials or ex-officials. The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society ventilated concern about the appropriation of African land and labour, and the South African Native Races Committee, led by lawyers and clergymen, published careful reports in 1901 and 1908. Otherwise, almost the only extended critical comment in Britain on African conditions in South Africa came in 1906 from Sydney Olivier, who then worked in the West African department of the Colonial Office and was an active Fabian. From 1905 Oxford University had a chair in colonial history, bequeathed by Alfred Beit, the mining magnate, but its first incumbent, who came straight from the Colonial Office, had no special interest in Africa; its colonial history received much more attention from French and Belgian writers. In Britain, informed journalism on sub-Saharan Africa came only from H. W. Nevinson, who wrote a scathing report on his visit to Angola in 1904–5, and E. D. Morel (founder of the Congo Reform Association and friend of the Liverpool trader John Holt), who visited Nigeria in 1910. The most far-reaching critique of British colonial rule at this period, including a long discussion of Natal, was produced by T. E. S. Scholes, a black Jamaican-born freelance writer who had worked as a mission doctor in West Africa and viewed with alarm signs of growing white racial solidarity.

Popular images of Africa were still coloured by tales of small

wars in desert or jungle against veiled fanatics or naked savages. Rider Haggard's romances of the 1880s were superior examples of a genre much favoured by boys' magazines, both in Britain and on the Continent. The Anglo-Boer War brought many British families hard up against South African reality, but that was a war between whites. Yet post-war reconstruction, and the rebellion in Natal in 1906, inspired a boys' adventure story with a difference. John Buchan had worked on Milner's staff in the Transvaal; in *Prester John* (1910) he portrayed an educated African king, John Laputa, whom whites must both admire and fear. By witnessing the relapse of this African leader from 'civilisation' to 'savagery', the young white narrator learns 'the meaning of the white man's duty' and also 'the difference between white and black, the gift of responsibility'. The tale nourished imperial self-righteousness; yet it also raised awkward questions which would be taken up by metropolitan policy-makers ten years later. The defeat of Laputa's rising was crowned by the creation of a 'great native college...no factory for making missionaries and black teachers, but an institution for giving the Kaffirs the kind of training which fits them to be good citizens of the state. There you will find every kind of technical workshop, and the finest experimental farms, where the blacks are taught modern agriculture.' Two very different exemplars of this ideal could be found in contemporary Nyasaland. The one was strictly run by the Scots missionaries of Livingstonia; its aims were already being subverted by labour migration. The other was led by an African, John Chilembwe; ironically, he was himself to play the part of a Laputa by leading a rising in 1915. It is also curious that Buchan observes of the stone walling at Great Zimbabwe, 'now it is believed that it was built by natives'. For this alludes to MacIver's work in Rhodesia in 1905, the first by a professional archaeologist, which proved to those open to reason that the stone buildings were the work, not of exotic intruders, but of people ancestral to the present inhabitants. 'A corner is lifted of that veil which has surrounded the forgotten but not irrecoverable past of the African negro.'¹⁴ At the time, however, few if any of Buchan's readers can have recognised his reference to scholarship which challenged prevailing white notions of African abilities, and over the next half-century very few archaeologists would follow MacIver's lead.

¹⁴ D. Randall MacIver, *Mediaeval Rhodesia* (London, 1906), 87.

1914-1930

1914-1930

The First World War caused important changes in the way in which Africa was regarded by its white rulers. War compelled them to take new account of the resources of Africa, human and material. France chose to use men. Her trade with black Africa (which was mostly with Senegal) was scarcely 1 per cent of all French trade in 1913, and even less by the end of the war, but this was largely because potential African producers were conscripted south as well as north of the Sahara to bear arms on the Western Front, thus easing demands on French manpower which would otherwise have crippled industrial production. In Britain, the Colonial Office strenuously resisted War Office pressure to use African fighting troops in Europe, but they played a major part in the East African campaign, while huge numbers of men served in it as carriers and suffered still higher death-rates. Britain also increased her dependence on African produce during the war: the proportion of total British imports (excluding gold and diamonds) derived from sub-Saharan Africa rose from 2.8 per cent in 1909-13 to 4.3 per cent in 1919-23. These figures reflect a rapid growth in the relative value of raw materials from British colonial Africa, even if their absolute value, in real terms, changed little. Besides, colonial governments helped in a small way to pay for the war: not only did they contribute to the costs of African campaigns; they also made 'war contributions' to the metropolis.

The war revealed the value of Africans as servants of empire, and the scale of their efforts quickened in at least some of their rulers a sense of obligation; more generally the appalling experience of trench warfare could strengthen commitment to the service of an ideal — and scepticism towards higher authority.¹⁵ But if the war helped to bring some whites and Africans closer together, it also sowed new seeds of white doubt and fear. Little weight need be given to the view that war between whites had tarnished white prestige: this says more about white anxiety and vanity than African deference. But it did matter that the pressures of war much increased the burdens imposed by colonial regimes. Here and there, especially in West Africa, Africans offered

¹⁵ Cf. F. H. Melland, *In witchbound Africa* (London, 1923), 26-7; R. E. Wraith, *Guggisberg* (London, 1967), 69-70; W. B. Cohen, 'Robert Delavignette', in Gann and Duignan, *African proconsuls*, 186.

resistance to these burdens, and began to use new forms of organisation, such as the trade boycott. In March 1919 Sir Harry Johnston, a veteran explorer and pioneer pro-consul, told the African Society that the war had seen the 'beginning of revolt against the white man's supremacy.'¹⁶ Already this supremacy was beginning to give way. Between 1919 and 1922 nationalists in Egypt compelled Britain to concede internal self-government, even if Britain hoped thereby to strengthen her grip on Egypt's external relations. And in 1917 the British government committed itself to 'the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire'.¹⁷ This was bound to have implications, sooner or later, for Africa as well.

In Britain, converging thoughts about the opportunities, obligations and hazards of empire were crystallised in the word 'trusteeship'. The aftermath of war gave this a special significance. Germany had been defeated and her colonies occupied by the Allies, while Turkey had been shorn of the Ottoman empire. The future of these spoils of war was a major concern of the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. The USA, traditionally mistrustful of European imperialism, wished these occupied empires to become an international responsibility, a goal that was shared by pressure groups in France and Britain. The conference agreed that they should be governed by the victorious Allied powers, but as mandates of the League of Nations. The final distribution of mandates was not complete until 1922, but meanwhile the League had to determine the responsibilities of those to whom mandates were assigned. The African mandates were adjudged to be territories whose peoples were 'not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world'; their well-being and development was 'a sacred trust of civilisation'. Thus the African mandates required the mandatory powers to suppress slavery and the slave trade, and the use of forced labour for private gain, and forbade them to use African manpower to strengthen their own armed forces. The mandatory powers were further enjoined to maintain an open door to Christian missions and (except in South West Africa) to the trade of other League members; they were forbidden to grant monopolistic concessions.

¹⁶ H. H. Johnston, 'The Africa of the immediate future', *Journal of the African Society*, 1919, 18, no. 71, 163.

¹⁷ Kenneth Robinson, *The dilemmas of trusteeship* (London, 1965), 4.

Finally, the mandatory powers were urged to 'promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants'.¹⁸

These goals were left conveniently vague, and although a Permanent Mandates Commission was set up in 1921 to monitor the performance of the mandatory powers, it was never given the means to interfere. Nonetheless, the code of behaviour expressed in the mandates was an implicit critique of earlier phases in colonial history. It represented a reassertion of the international conscience which had animated the anti-slavery conference at Brussels in 1890 and the campaign against the Congo Independent State. True, the code did not oblige Britain to change its ways; Britain, after all, had taken a lead in framing it. Yet there lay its main significance: as a formal statement of what Britain's rulers expected of a colonial administration. Indeed, the junior minister for the colonies, Leo Amery, had in July 1919 declared that parliament was 'in the position of trustee' to the peoples of the colonial empire in general. And in 1922 Lord Lugard, who had retired from Nigeria in 1918, published *The dual mandate in British tropical Africa*. This developed Joseph Chamberlain's view that the welfare of Europe and that of Africa were essentially interdependent, but Lugard refined it in the light of twenty years' more experience of colonial rule and stressed the need to protect Africans by restricting the scope of alien economic enterprise. A similar doctrine of trusteeship was extended to the colonial world at large when in 1922 the League of Nations set up the International Labour Organisation.

This emphasis on the protective role of the imperial trustee was at odds with the dominant trend among the makers of British colonial policy. The war had given new scope to imperialists. Milner, the architect of reconstruction in South Africa after the Boer War, entered Lloyd George's War Cabinet in 1916. Smuts, who had led the British imperial forces in East Africa in 1916-17, and was also a member of the South African parliament, joined the War Cabinet in 1917; he also took a leading part in the Paris Peace Conference, where he pressed South Africa's own claims to empire. As the economic power of Britain and France declined in relation to that of the USA, their governments became more

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 20-1.

attentive to those who argued the value of imperial links, whether with dependent territories or with autonomous partners such as South Africa and other British Dominions. When Milner became colonial secretary in 1919, he sought to make the colonial empire an engine of economic growth. Like his radical French counterpart, Sarraut, Milner called for investment in colonial infrastructures to boost production. But the times were unpropitious. Economic weakness at home might be a reason for strengthening empire, but it was also an obstacle. Besides, there were more pressing concerns: for Britain, trouble in Ireland, India and the Middle East;¹⁹ for France the reconstruction of her war-ravaged north-east. The trade depression of 1920–1 stiffened the ingrained reluctance of the British Treasury to facilitate colonial ventures. It was ready enough to join Milner in encouraging private enterprise (which had received much favour from colonial governments during the war). But this was opposed by senior officials in the Colonial Office.

Nonetheless, it still seemed worthwhile to pursue imperial ambitions on a political plane. Union in South Africa had very largely fulfilled one British dream of imperial federation; at the same time, it was also the inspiration for other such dreams, expounded in the pages of the *Round Table*. This journal was founded in 1910 (the year of Union) by Philip Kerr, a former member of Milner's 'kindergarten' in South Africa. It sought to promote closer links between populations of British origin and culture around the world, and it lent intellectual weight to belief in the genius of the British for government, especially over other 'races'. The defeat of Germany — where some had cherished visions of a *Mittelafrika* straddling the continent — gave new hope to imperial dreamers in Britain. Before the war, Britain and Germany had made provisional plans to dismember Mozambique, of which Portugal herself controlled only the southern third. Milner now enabled Union Castle, a British shipping line, to acquire confiscated German shares in a subsidiary of the Niassa Company, which mis-ruled the far north. Milner also enabled the British-dominated Mozambique Company to finance a railway from Beira to Nyasaland, at the expense of the latter; this was

¹⁹ In 1920 Milner sought, against the advice of his own officials, to help the War Office use African soldiers in Mesopotamia, but the rising there was quelled by the RAF and Indian troops.

explicitly meant to boost British influence in an area on which American firms were thought to have designs. Most important of all, when the League of Nations assigned the mandate over most of ex-German East Africa to Britain, the way seemed clear for building some sort of British Dominion that might encompass the continent from the Limpopo to the borders of Ethiopia. However, plans towards this end had to wait upon events in Kenya and the Rhodesias.

By the end of the war, the charter of the British South Africa Company was approaching expiry. The company had no wish to renew it, but argued over the terms of transfer. When Winston Churchill succeeded Milner as colonial secretary in 1921, he tried to persuade the settlers in Southern Rhodesia to join South Africa as a fifth province: like Smuts, he saw them as a potential counterweight to nationalist Afrikaners. The settlers voted instead for self-government, which they achieved in 1923, and meanwhile Churchill had taken the fateful decision to let them run their own defence force. In theory, Britain retained control over external relations, but in practice this was rapidly obscured by Southern Rhodesia's participation in imperial conferences. Britain also reserved the right to veto legislation affecting Africans, but this was never used; more important, in practice, was the informal agreement that such legislation should be discussed in draft with officials in London. In this way, Britain sometimes exercised a moderating influence, but in matters of detail rather than principle. As for Northern Rhodesia, this was problematic. Back in 1899, Milner had considered that it lay beyond the proper frontiers of British-dominated southern Africa. Twenty years later, there was reason to see Northern Rhodesia differently. True, it had attracted little white settlement, and the prospects for large-scale mining had scarcely been investigated. But even if its main use to capitalists was still as a labour reserve for mines elsewhere, it could serve imperial ends as a link in a chain of white settlement up the central spine of eastern Africa. It was clearly too soon to think of self-government, and the Colonial Office took it over from the company in 1924. But the first governor, Herbert Stanley, was an old South Africa hand who soon set about plans for encouraging white settlement, while confining Africans in reserves.

Over Kenya, the British government was at odds with itself. White aspirations to self-government were encouraged by Milner

when he allowed British subjects of 'European' descent a large elected minority in the legislative council. The much more numerous Indians were championed by the India Office. Settlers, alarmed by new plans for Indian representation, plotted rebellion in 1922: no less significant, settler non-cooperation had obliged the government to withdraw a new income tax. A constitutional compromise was achieved in 1923 when the 'paramountcy' of African interests was upheld by the colonial secretary, now the Duke of Devonshire. This could perhaps be seen as a reassertion by the Colonial Office of control over Kenya at the expense of the India Office as well as the settlers. But the Colonial Office continued to exercise this control very cautiously: official attitudes to both Kenya and Northern Rhodesia were henceforward dominated by concern to avoid any further confrontation with settlers. White interests in Kenya were effectively, if discreetly, served by the appointment of men with South African experience to key tasks in agriculture, the railways, education and local government. Besides, Kenya was central to any wider plans for entrenching white hegemony in eastern Africa. The first steps were taken by a parliamentary commission which toured Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and East Africa in 1924. It was instructed by the short-lived first Labour government to examine prospects both for coordinating policy in the region and for improving the condition of Africans. But it was dominated by the Conservative chairman, Ormsby-Gore; its conclusions, reported in 1925, were congenial to the new Conservative colonial secretary, Leo Amery; and Ormsby-Gore became Amery's deputy.

Amery remained at the Colonial Office throughout Stanley Baldwin's government from 1924 to 1929; his tenure was the longest of any colonial secretary between Harcourt and Creech Jones (1946–50). True, this degree of stability (and that of Amery's senior civil servants) must be measured against the reign of Warren Fisher as permanent secretary to the Treasury from 1919 to 1939; this undoubtedly cramped the style of other departments. Still, Amery made the most of his time. He set up the Empire Marketing Board in 1926, through which modest sums were directed to agricultural research in the colonies. He toured the Dominions in 1926–7 and made a point of visiting the Rhodesias; he furthered the interests of white tobacco farmers in Southern Rhodesia and sought to boost white settlement there.

In 1926 he arranged a £10m loan for transport works and scientific research in East Africa; this was justified as a way of stimulating British exports, and thus employment. The same rationale was offered for moving towards the idea of outright grants for colonial development: a Conservative policy implemented by the second Labour government in the Colonial Development Act of 1929. But Amery's special concern was to further the emergence of a white Dominion in eastern Africa. In 1925 he appointed as governor of Kenya Edward Grigg, neither a civil servant nor a soldier but a politician sympathetic to *Round Table* ideals. In 1927 Amery sent out the Hilton Young Commission to East Africa to report on the possibilities for closer union — a term generally understood to mean the subordination of regional policies to settler minorities, especially those in Kenya. This time, however, the visitors were much more impressed by the force of Indian (as well as African) opposition: their report in 1929 held out no hope of reconciling the rival claims of settlers and Indians. The cause of closer union was not abandoned, but it was seriously retarded by the fall of the Conservatives in 1929, the greater weight of India in imperial counsels, and the onset of the 1930s depression.

The Milner–Amery vision of empire was shared by few, if any, civil servants. Fiddes, permanent under-secretary at the Colonial Office from 1916 to 1921, had worked for Milner in South Africa but was plainly irritated by settler pretensions in Kenya. Samuel Wilson, head of the Colonial Office from 1925 to 1933, though more soldier than mandarin, was despatched to East Africa by Amery in 1929 to tackle local opinion on closer union yet again, but his few crumbs of comfort were offset by the vehement objections of the governor of Tanganyika, Sir Donald Cameron. Senior officials in London regarded Grigg's 'South African' plans for Kenya as a direct challenge to their own authority. But it is easier to say what the Colonial Office opposed than to say what it approved. The question came more sharply into focus when in 1925 the Dominions Office took over responsibility for relations with the self-governing empire. This might seem to have opened the way for the Colonial Office to achieve a distinctive new identity, as the chief trustee for Britain's subject peoples outside India. But Amery remained head of both departments; the accretions of the Colonial Office in the Middle East complicated the picture; and in any case senior officials had been trained to

guard rather than to guide. The Colonial Office was organised to deal with places rather than problems; despite the appointment in the 1920s of specialist advisers on trade, medicine and agriculture, it was ill-adapted to promote the economic initiatives wished upon it by Amery. Ormsby-Gore in 1926 found it 'out-of-date and creaking badly'.²⁰ The same charge was made by Sir George Schuster, who as a member of the Hilton Young commission dampened Amery's hopes of closer union. Schuster, fresh from reorganising the finances of the Sudan, wrote from Northern Rhodesia in 1928 that 'it is astounding to find each little Government in each of these detached countries working out, on its own, problems which are common to all, without any knowledge of what its neighbours are doing and without any direction on main lines of policy from the Colonial Office'.²¹

These narrow perspectives were perpetuated by the structure and management of the colonial service. From 1919 all recruitment to administrative posts in Africa was handled by Ralph Furse, who firmly believed they required not brainpower so much as force of character, as developed by the team sports and prefectorial discipline of the average English public school. Selection was based on personal impressions: a degree was desirable (and most recruits had been to Oxford or Cambridge) but its quality mattered less than for entry to the Sudan Political Service, let alone the Indian Civil Service. From 1926 most recruits to the administrative service spent several months at Oxford or Cambridge, taking courses that included anthropology and colonial history. But this was much less rigorous than the training provided by the *Écoles Coloniales* in France and Belgium, or the Colonial University set up at Antwerp in 1920, and until 1937 there were no formal arrangements for in-service training. In Nigeria, as late as 1940, out of 110 administrative officers empowered to act as magistrates only thirteen were professionally qualified.

Furse's methods of selection accorded well enough with the priorities of colonial administration, which could still be defined as keeping the peace cheaply. Furse himself later remarked that good district administration consisted of 'a reasonable hut tax, the

²⁰ W. G. Ormsby-Gore, minute, 15 December 1926, CO 967/2B (cited by Mandy Banton in a forthcoming thesis).

²¹ Sir George Schuster, *Private work and public causes* (Cowbridge, 1979), 78.

preservation of tribal customs, young men respectful to their elders, proper care of native agriculture'.²² It was logical to employ men who had been brought up to regard themselves as natural rulers, because holding down Africa was largely a matter of bluff. Members of the colonial administrative service remained thin on the ground in Africa, even if they continued slowly to increase. In Nigeria, they rose by 30 per cent during the 1920s but numbered only 431 in 1930, when the population was around 20 million. By then the Nigerian police included some 4,000 Africans and 80 British officers, but the armed forces numbered only 3,500; as elsewhere in British colonial Africa, military establishments were much smaller, in relation to total population, than those of the French, Belgians or Portuguese.²³ For all branches of government, mobility was a key element of strength; the motor car, and the motorable road, became central to the preservation of colonial authority between the wars. Ironically, this could mean that district officers spent less time than before 1914 on trek, and more time in court or on paperwork; their contact with Africans tended to become increasingly formal. Besides, medical advances (and improved steamship services) encouraged the advent of white women: between 1921 and 1931 their proportion of the white population of Nigeria rose from about one-tenth to one-fifth. As elsewhere in the tropics, the presence of white families tended to contribute to the estrangement of rulers and ruled, and officials with black mistresses or concubines faced still greater hostility in white circles in British territories than they did elsewhere in tropical Africa.

British rule in Africa between the wars was predicated on the assumption that routine tasks of local government should be delegated to 'traditional' African authorities. This accorded with the pressures to economise, and also with the diminishing need for governments to innovate once the foundations of an export economy had been laid and the financial basis of British over-rule secured. But to these negative reasons for relying on local African leadership were added positive arguments. Belief in the British

²² Furse, *Aucuparius*, 298.

²³ Permanent armed forces as percentages of estimated total population, c.1930: Nigeria, 0.18; Gold Coast, 0.43; Kenya, 0.47; French West Africa, 0.86; French Equatorial Africa, 1.5; Belgian Congo, 1.6; Angola, 2.6 (based on data kindly supplied by Dr David Killingray and on Lord Hailey, *An African survey. A study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara* (London, 1938), 108).

genius for ruling alien races was quite compatible with the belief that the customs of alien races also had merit, albeit of a lower order. This view became easier to sustain as the less acceptable aspects of African tradition yielded to superior force, and it gained weight as educated Africans began to challenge white monopolies of power. Mixing cultures made trouble; it was better to keep them apart. The crudities of a legalised colour bar might indeed be abhorrent, but more subtle forms of discrimination were not necessarily to be opposed. Obviously African societies could not be wholly isolated from the forces of change if they were to contribute to the world's wealth. But the basis for social and political change should be African, not British, institutions. It was better to build upon African notions of justice and order, however primitive, than to risk anarchy by replacing them with patterns which few, if any, could understand.

Such thinking, which had a long ancestry in India, underlay Lugard's influential exposition, in *The dual mandate*, of the virtues of indirect rule. This term, already given currency by Lugard's erstwhile subordinate, C. L. Temple, was widely adopted in the course of the 1920s, as African styles of government were more systematically adapted to imperial ends. In part, of course, this trend was encouraged by the accumulation of colonial experience; but it also derived from the belief, widespread among the British ruling classes, that country life was good while towns were bad. British policy in Africa was informed not only by contemporary ethnology but also by the latest version of an ancient rural idyll: the virtue and beauty of the English countryside had been spoiled by modern industry.²⁴ Social policy in late Victorian London had been dominated by fear of a rootless, lawless, disease-ridden *Lumpenproletariat*, and such fear spread to Africa. Racial segregation in South African towns was rationalised on grounds of hygiene, and when Milner became colonial secretary he espoused academic schemes for urban segregation on similar lines, until forced to retreat by governors in Nigeria and Uganda who could see the practical difficulties of enforcing commercial as well as residential segregation. Hygiene, indeed, was a potent imperial metaphor: when Sir John Maffey arrived from India to govern

²⁴ Cf. Martin J. Wiener, *English culture and the decline of the industrial spirit, 1850–1980* (Cambridge, 1981).

the Sudan he sought to develop ‘native states’ which, as in India, might be protection against the ‘septic germs’ of nationalism.

If towns were feared, so too was trade, which helped to make towns and enticed people away from traditional authority. Trade might be a source of revenue, but it was also a dangerous social solvent; besides, it was not an occupation for gentlemen. British officials were often better guardians than their critics allowed: in Kenya and even in Southern Rhodesia some attacked the use of African taxes to subsidise white farmers; but they were usually lukewarm and ill-informed in their attitudes to entrepreneurs, whether African or Asian. To be sure, colonial governments promoted the conservation of natural resources: indeed, this (together with transport) largely accounts for the rapid expansion of British staff in the technical services during the 1920s; but African initiative was regarded more often as a threat to these resources than as their indispensable complement. Such paternalist concern largely accounts for the general reluctance of British colonial governments to enable Africans to register freehold titles to land, and thus become eligible for bank loans.

The ideology of indirect rule obstructed thought about long-term political change. Britain’s rulers agreed that in theory they should, as trustees, prepare their wards in tropical Africa for eventual self-government, on the analogy of the white Dominions and recent trends in India. But this was a far-distant prospect. Lugard believed that ‘the era of complete independence is not as yet visible on the horizon of time’,²⁵ and this view was often repeated. There seemed no reason to think much about the possible role of Africans in the central institutions of government; it was far more obviously important to develop African participation within frameworks with which Africans were already familiar. The question was how best to integrate those frameworks within the structures and requirements of the colonial state. The answer was usually conceived in terms of chiefs and tribes. Indirect rule was by no means a doctrine of *laissez-faire*; it often involved meddling with African societies to make them conform more nearly to British notions of the ideal ‘traditional’ society. People without chiefs were given them, while chiefly hierarchies served to delineate tribal frontiers of which Africans themselves

²⁵ F. D. Lugard, *The dual mandate in British tropical Africa* (London, 1922), 198.

might hitherto have been little aware. Citizenship within the colonial state was to be fostered by degrees, by instilling attachment to local authority and language group. There is, indeed, a sense in which colonial regimes actually invented tribes: contrasts based merely on dialect, or location, or livelihood, were hardened into legal and administrative constructions. In the process, 'customary' law might also be invented: colonial courts were inclined to emphasise bonds of kinship (especially in the male line) at the expense of other, less clearly traditional, principles of association. The ethnic kaleidoscope of Africa was being transformed, not into modern states, but into a jigsaw of discrete tribal blocks.

Much as the British might wish to protect Africans from the modern world, exceptions had to be made. Literate blacks on the West African littoral had long been part of that world and pressed for a greater share in its counsels. Milner, while allowing whites in Kenya to elect legislators, refused to concede the same right to West Africans. He did not prevail; between 1922 and 1925 (and following constitutional advances in the smaller West Indian islands), a limited franchise was introduced for the legislative councils of Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast. But it was contingent on property qualifications and restricted to certain coastal areas. It is instructive to compare these arrangements with those for the only other legislative council (besides that of Kenya) to which elections were made between the wars. The franchise in Northern Rhodesia was extended in 1926 to all British subjects: it was thus ostensibly based on legal status rather than racial category (as in Kenya) or wealth (as in West Africa). Since, however, almost all British subjects in Northern Rhodesia were white, this was a trifling distinction; the key point was that indigenous Africans were classed as protected persons, whose spokesmen, at the level of territorial politics, were to be their self-appointed trustees, the colonial administration. In urban local government, white power was also on the increase: from the start, whites were given elective majorities in the municipalities of Nairobi (1918), Ndola (1927) and Livingstone (1930). In Sierra Leone, by contrast, Freetown council was reconstituted in 1927 with an official instead of an African majority, while in other town councils on the West African coast the minority of African-elected seats excited little interest.

In the 1920s, however, it was not African political rights but African education which created most complications for the theory of indirect rule. After all, colonial governments needed African clerks and interpreters, while businessmen and Christian missions also sought literate auxiliaries. But West Africa — and still more India — showed what trouble could follow from education uncontrolled by imperial guardians. Much thought was therefore given to advancing African education in such a way that it would promote rather than frustrate the ends of indirect rule. Since education was still so largely in the hands of missionaries, their collaboration was crucial, and the Colonial Office looked for guidance to J. H. Oldham, secretary to the International Missionary Council.²⁶ He in turn had learned much from the experience of negro colleges in the USA, and took a leading part in the newly-formed Colonial Office advisory committee which reported in 1925 that:

Education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions of the various peoples...Its aim should be to render the individual more efficient in his or her condition of life..., to promote the advancement of the community as a whole through the improvement of agriculture...the training of the people in the management of their own affairs, and the inculcation of true ideals of citizenship and service.²⁷

This approach informed the development of secondary education in both West and East Africa between the wars. It was not an ungenerous vision, but it was firmly paternalist. As a compromise between tradition and progress, it seemed far-sighted at the time, but whether Africans would consent to it remained to be seen.

If the motives for cherishing African culture were often very mixed, it was certainly studied more systematically than hitherto. In West Africa, three British officials, Rattray, Meek and Talbot, were appointed ‘government anthropologists’. In the Sudan and Southern Rhodesia, journals were founded in which officials and others reported local researches; other such journals followed in the 1930s in other British territories. A comparable development in French West Africa was the formation at Dakar in 1917 of a committee for historical and scientific studies. Far more than in British Africa, however, ethnography was dominated by the few

²⁶ See chapter 3.

²⁷ Advisory Committee on Native Education in British Tropical African Dependencies: *Education in British tropical Africa* (Cmd. 2374, 1925), 4.

officials who specialised in such work: Marty, Tauxier, Delafosse and Labouret. The courses on Africa at the École Coloniale were too often wasted: few French officials stayed in the same territory more than five years; few knew the language of their subjects; and they were not encouraged to pursue research.

Meanwhile, academic interest in Africa had gathered pace. The study of its languages was carried forward from the compilation of dictionaries (in which missionaries continued to do much notable work) to the investigation of grammatical structure and phonetics. The age of the gifted amateur reached a climax with the publication in 1919–22 of Johnston's comparative study of Bantu languages. The new paths were signposted by the work of Meinhof and Westermann in Berlin, Lilius Homburger in Paris, and Alice Werner, who taught at the School of Oriental Studies in London from its foundation in 1917. Linguistic expertise contributed to the improved recording and appreciation of African oral literature. The phonograph was occasionally employed for the recording both of speech and of music, though at this early stage in its history its use in the field was problematic.

There was also a new approach to the study of African institutions, at any rate in much of the English-speaking world. Before 1914, the academic study of 'primitive' peoples had consisted either of ethnology, with its search for genetic links between cultures, or of anthropology, which then usually signified the measurement of physical characteristics. These modes of analysis and differentiation now began to yield to sociological theory, which had already been applied to ethnographic data by Durkheim, Mauss and van Gennep. In such theory, human society was conceived somewhat in terms of a living organism, whose various parts (institutions, customs, beliefs, modes of livelihood and so forth) should be regarded as functionally interdependent. This emphasis on function characterised the new discipline of social anthropology. A chair in the subject was founded at Cape Town in 1920; the first professor was A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, whose own research had been outside Africa but whose influence, direct and indirect, bore much fruit among South African scholars between the wars. However, he left in 1925 and had no more to do with Africa until appointed to an Oxford chair in 1937. More central, in this period, was Bronislaw Malinowski, who taught social anthropology at the London School of Economics from

1922 to 1937. It was his particular distinction to have studied a ‘primitive’ people (on a Pacific island) by living among them as a friendly neighbour rather than as someone in authority; unlike almost all other scholars in this field he had learned through observation and casual conversation rather than through formal interviews. Fieldwork of this kind became characteristic of the new discipline. It was Malinowski’s example, rather than that of his colleague Seligman, which guided their student, E.E. Evans-Pritchard, who between 1926 and 1930 lived among the Zande of the south-western Sudan and sought to relate their beliefs in witchcraft to their social and economic context, a project for which the work of Lévy-Bruhl on ‘primitive mentality’ was also a potent stimulus.

Functional anthropology, especially that of Radcliffe-Brown, has latterly been charged with retaining, albeit in altered guise, the nineteenth century’s predilection for biological analogies and taxonomy, thus entrenching the notion of primitive societies as discrete units or tribes; it has also been criticised for exaggerating the importance of kinship in social relations.²⁸ There is indeed a marked congruence between aspects of social anthropology and the ideology of indirect rule; an interest in integration, stability and continuity consorted more easily with conservation than with change. Nonetheless, the new discipline represented an important break with established attitudes towards colonial subject-peoples. It rejected explanations of human behaviour in terms either of ‘conjectural’ history, based on mere inference from the present, or of innate racial difference — a concept which, as in Seligman’s own work, muddled up cultural and physiological criteria. And it opened the way to a more humane understanding of African value-systems; this was no small matter when the weight of missionary disapproval was still so widely felt.

The art of Africa made an impact on the West which extended well beyond the restricted circles of those who worked in Africa or read about it. A Fang mask acquired by the painter Vlaminck in 1905 caused great excitement among other artists in Paris, including Picasso and Matisse; by 1914, art from Africa, Oceania and pre-Columbian America had been studied by them and by the sculptors Epstein and Gaudier-Brzeska. The extreme stylisation

²⁸ E. R. Leach, ‘Social anthropology: a natural science of society?’ *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1976, 62, 3–26; *idem*, *Social anthropology* (London, 1982), chapter 1.

characteristic of much primitive art was clearly congenial to Western artists moving towards abstraction, though it was scarcely responsible for the trend. African art was displayed not only in museums but in exhibitions at Marseilles in 1906 and 1922 and at Paris in 1925; in the 1930s it was prominently featured in a dozen exhibitions in Europe, while several important sales were held. The subject began to be discussed in aesthetic terms,²⁹ while von Sydow, Kjersmeier and others refined the ethnographic analysis of museum collections. Such work, however, was seldom informed by any first-hand acquaintance with Africa. Growing familiarity with African art in this period may have bred respect for its creators but it also tended to reinforce popular notions of the 'otherness' of Africa, and in particular the misconception of the primitive artist as the anonymous vehicle of a communal, rather than individual, imagination.

There was one kind of African art which could not be removed and displayed overseas: the rock paintings of northern and southern Africa. By 1930 many of them had been copied by a number of scholars, of whom the most remarkable was the German Leo Frobenius. More keenly, perhaps, than any other scholar of his time, Frobenius appreciated the imaginative power of African cultures and their various forms of expression. On numerous expeditions, both before and after the First World War, he collected artefacts, conducted archaeological excavations and recorded oral traditions. Unfortunately his methods were far from scientific, and his materials were pressed into the service of theories typical of the cloudiest German idealism. Frobenius believed his discoveries could throw light on the African past, but like lesser Germanic ethnologists he conceived of cultural history as a mixture of unsystematic comparison and speculation. It was hardly surprising that his grandiose schemes should have tended to discredit the very notion that Africa had a recoverable past of its own. Another approach to cultural history was available, in the chronological techniques characteristic of British archaeologists, but these were seldom applied to Africa. Sites in the Sudan, in Nubia and around Meroe, attracted expeditions both before and after the war; and by 1930 the study of the Stone Age had been initiated by Goodwin and van Riet Lowe in South Africa and by

²⁹ C. Einstein, *Negerplastik* (Leipzig, 1915); Paul Guillaume and Thomas Munro, *Primitive negro sculpture* (New York and London, 1926).

Louis Leakey in Kenya. But until 1929, when Gertrude Caton-Thompson followed up MacIver's work at Great Zimbabwe, no further light was shed by archaeologists on the cultural history of contemporary black Africans.

The study of African history was by no means neglected. Between 1905 and 1930 at least forty books on the African past were produced by British authors. Most, however, including those few written by academics, were about whites rather than blacks. Only nine were chiefly concerned with the history of Africans, and none of these dealt with Africa south of the Equator. The main focus of interest was northern Nigeria, and the work of its foremost scholar-administrator, Richmond Palmer, was vitiated by a preoccupation with the search for alien influences and origins. This was typical of the times: Seligman was by no means alone in ascribing African cultural achievements to light-skinned, long-nosed 'Hamitic' intruders. The white community of South Africa generated its own voluminous historiography, to which Afrikaner authors made a rapidly growing contribution after the First World War. And there the history of at least some African peoples had long been so closely involved with that of whites that it did not entirely escape attention. Bryant, for example, attempted to synthesise Zulu oral traditions. In the course of the 1920s the relations between white governments and black South Africans began to be studied by professional historians, notably W. M. Macmillan. But the only general histories of Africa to be written in our period, those by A. Moulin (1920), Delafosse (1921) and G. Hardy (1923), were produced in France; and perhaps the most impressive editorial achievement came from Italy — Fr Beccari's publication (1902–17) of reports by early western visitors to Africa.

One remarkable feature of the expansion of knowledge about Africa between the wars was the crucial part played by the USA. This was part of a broader movement to promote racial harmony, and the extension of capitalism, through greater understanding between white and black, and the dissemination of technical skills among Africans. In 1911 the Phelps-Stokes Fund was set up to further the education of blacks in Africa as well as the USA; the fund despatched two commissions to tour sub-Saharan Africa in 1920–1 and 1924 and report on the educational scene. In South Africa, educational planning owed much to a continuing con-

nection with Columbia University.³⁰ From 1925 the Carnegie Corporation (established in 1911 to advance 'knowledge and understanding' in Britain and her colonies as well as North America) provided support for a variety of educational projects and also for the South African Institute of Race Relations. Meanwhile, American scholars conducted field research in Morocco, Liberia and Angola. In 1931 the anthropologist Melville Herskovits visited Dahomey while Harry Rudin completed a thesis on German rule in the Cameroons: more than any others, these scholars introduced the study of Africa to universities in the USA. But even their achievements were overshadowed by R. L. Buell's *The native problem in Africa* (1928), a comprehensive and frequently critical survey of colonial regimes south of the Sahara which was sponsored by Harvard University and based on a fifteen-month tour of the continent in 1925–6.

It was the Rockefeller Foundation which made possible the establishment, in 1926, of the International African Institute (IAI). The diplomacy was conducted by J. H. Oldham, secretary of the International Missionary Council; the moving spirits were Edwin Smith, an outstanding missionary–anthropologist; the philologist Diedrich Westermann; and Hanns Vischer, a former director of education in Northern Nigeria and now secretary of the Colonial Office advisory committee on education. Lugard served as an active chairman from 1926 until just before his death in 1945. The object of the Institute was 'To promote an understanding of African languages and social institutions, with a view to their protection and use as instruments of education'. Within a few years, it had gone far towards standardising the spelling of African languages; it stimulated African vernacular writing; pressed for the reform of schoolbooks; and founded the quarterly journal *Africa*.

Britain, France and Germany were strongly represented in the IAI, and it rapidly advanced the international exchange of ideas and information among scholars, educationists and missionaries. Among colonial rulers there was no such co-operation. The one organisation concerned with the comparative study of empire was the International Colonial Institute. This had been created in

³⁰ During our period, at least nine South Africans wrote Ph.D. theses for Columbia University about education in South Africa; they included C. T. Loram (1915) and E. G. Malherbe (1926).

Brussels in 1894. It held meetings almost annually up to 1913 and several times between the wars; these generated a mass of documentation on colonial principles and practice. In the 1920s its members included Lugard, Ormsby-Gore, Oldham, Lyautey, Delafosse and Rolin; but until the 1930s serving colonial officials seldom took part. By and large, British imperial circles showed remarkably little interest in other colonial systems. The French and Germans were less parochial. Before 1914 and in the 1930s at least nine French books of substance were published on non-French colonial Africa, other than works of ethnography. In Germany, at least 18 such books on non-German colonial Africa were published during our period. Britain, by contrast, could point to little beyond official handbooks and polemics against Leopold, the Portuguese and the Germans.

Colonial Africa was still in any case of marginal interest to British intellectuals. Journalists in Britain paid it scant attention; they produced nothing in the 1920s that could stand comparison with the damning reports on the French Congo by Albert Londres or André Gide, or the critique of the Belgian Congo by the socialist Arthur Wauters, who foresaw the trouble his compatriots were storing up for themselves by seeking profits in Africa rather than black partners. In Britain such criticism was most knowledgeably pressed by Norman Leys, who had been a medical officer in Kenya and Nyasaland, and MacGregor Ross, former director of public works in Kenya. Both became key members of the Labour Party's advisory committee on imperial questions. This was formed in 1924 by Leonard Woolf, who during the war had argued strongly for international trusteeship as an alternative to imperialism. But the formulation of a distinctive Labour policy for Africa was fraught with difficulties. In some respects, especially in its opposition to white settlers, the committee was close to opinion in the Colonial Office, whence indeed came one of its first members, J. F. N. Green. On education, Leys and Woolf had much more ambitious ideas. Leys valued education as a defence against oppression; Woolf believed that it should prepare Africans for self-government. This breadth of vision was shared by few in the Labour Party, which was mostly sceptical of African abilities. Besides, such concern as was shown by Labour MPs was understandably focused on Kenya; they cared little for colonial development or news of West Africa. Moreover, British trade

unionists were more attentive to their white brothers in South Africa than to the claims of black or brown workers, despite the eloquent advocacy of Olivier. Racial difference was a more palpable fact than class solidarity.

The sentiment of 'race' continued to exert a powerful hold upon white people, and at all intellectual levels. Press coverage of Africa may have been too slight to have made much impact, but the entertainment industry popularised the image of the black man as at best a simpleton and at worst a monster. This was the message of pulp fiction, hunters' tales and the Broadway theatre,³¹ and it was reinforced by the cinema: Africa was an apt setting for escapist fantasy, but Africans appeared only as a form of wild life. The belief that black people were fundamentally, and perhaps immutably, different from whites informed some of the best-intentioned paternalists. Lugard simultaneously extolled equal opportunity, race purity and race pride. Oldham acknowledged that 'race' was a term without scientific validity for the study of human beings, but he did not discard it: he concluded a sceptical discussion of intelligence tests by observing, 'while races presumably do differ in native capacity, how they differ, and to what extent, we do not know'.³² 'Race' survived even in the highest-minded discourse partly because it was not yet possible to replace the all-too-convenient cultural-physiological concepts of 'the black man', 'the African', 'the Bantu' or 'the Hamite' with classifications based solely on physiological criteria: the study of blood groups, for example, was still in its infancy.

All the same, if men of good will continued to write of 'the African race', they were increasingly inclined to attribute its apparently distinctive characteristics to environment and history rather than to heredity: colonial governors as well as missionaries could be quoted to this effect. One eccentric theory was propounded by the psychiatrist C. G. Jung, who was so impressed in 1925 by the tribal displays in the British Empire exhibition at Wembley that he went off to East Africa and found evidence of the 'collective unconscious'. The Elgoni people, on the Kenya–

³¹ E.g. the plays *The Emperor Jones* (Eugene O'Neill, 1922), and *At home abroad*, or the musical *Golden dawn* (1927). Broadway musicals by American blacks presented black Africans in a more sympathetic (and even romantic) light, but were less successful: cf. *In Dahomey* (1902), *Abyssinia* (1906) or *Africana* (1934). Late in 1914 Oscar Asches had brought a 'Zulu show', *Mameena*, to London, but it flopped: no doubt it was ill-timed.

³² J. H. Oldham, *Christianity and the race problem* (London, 1925), 61, 75.

Uganda border, were ‘still sound in their instincts’, due to minimal contact with whites: evidently the savage who lurked at the back of the white man’s mind was a noble savage. More prosaically, some writers tackled the problem of race prejudice and attributed it to the defence of privilege. This was Olivier’s view; it was also that of the zoologist Julian Huxley, who toured East Africa in 1929 on behalf of the Colonial Office advisory committee on education. Huxley noted that even in the mandated territory of Tanganyika the full implications of trusteeship were obscured by

various current assumptions which are felt rather than thought out, and felt as so self-evident that they are hardly ever questioned. The chief such assumption is that black men are in their nature different from white men and inferior to them. The second is that since white men know how to do a great many things of which black men are ignorant, they therefore know what is best for black men and are entitled to lay down what they ought to do and how they ought to live. The third, continuing the second, is that natives should develop ‘along their own lines’ — their own lines being those on which there is the greatest possible taking on of European useful arts; the least possible taking on of European ways of dress or ways of general thought; the least danger of their claiming or obtaining political, social or intellectual equality with Europeans; the greatest chance of perpetuating the gulf between the races. The fourth is economic: it is that production for export is virtuous, while production merely for your own local consumption is not — and is, indeed, rather reprehensible.³³

Malinowski, in the course of a denial in 1930 that anthropology should be merely a tool of colonial government, saw Africa as a field of conflict between a variety of interests that cut across the lines of ‘race’. A. V. Murray, who taught British missionaries how to teach, toured Africa in 1927 and concluded, ‘It would almost seem as if the race problem is simply one aspect of the class problem’; he likened arguments against educating Africans to those advanced in the nineteenth century against educating the British working classes.³⁴ Charlotte Leubuscher, who taught political economy in Berlin, visited South Africa in 1929 and made the first extended study of Africans as workers and townsmen, though as it was written in German it made little impression on

³³ Julian Huxley, *Africa view* (London, 1930), 376–7.

³⁴ A. V. Murray, *The school in the bush: a critical study of the theory and practice of native education in Africa* (London, 1929), preface and appendix I. Even by the 1930s only 20 per cent of the adolescent population in Britain was receiving secondary education, and of these more than half paid fees.

the English-speaking world.³⁵ And in 1931 Robert Delavignette published *Paysans noirs*, a novel in which he drew on his own experience as an official in French West Africa to portray Africans, not as ethnographic curiosities, but as people whose attitudes were not essentially different from those of the French countryman. It was still a romantic view, which glossed over the extent to which African rural life was already moulded by colonial constraints, but it was Delavignette who most succinctly summarised the problem facing British as well as French officials in Africa at this time: 'the natives are evolving faster than the administrators or the administration'.³⁶

1930-1940

The economic depression of the 1930s was a new stimulus to reappraise imperial attitudes to Africa. The trend towards imperial protection in economic policy accelerated the growth of trade between Africa and the metropolitan powers. This was most marked in France: Africa's share of her external trade rose from about one-tenth in the 1920s to over one-fifth by 1935. Algeria then took 12.5 per cent and had become France's main trading partner; the share of black Africa and Madagascar had risen to 5 per cent. By the end of the decade North Africa accounted for 27 per cent of French foreign investment; tropical Africa, 6 per cent. That fraction of British trade directed to sub-Saharan Africa increased from 5.3 per cent in 1930 to 7 per cent in 1938.³⁷ This was chiefly due to the gold boom in southern Africa and to copper-mining in Northern Rhodesia; by 1938 Britain's trade with the Rhodesias was two-thirds of that with West Africa. As the world moved out of depression, Africa's value as a source of base metals was revealed: by 1937-8 the continent provided 16 per cent of the world's copper output and 12 per cent of its output of tin. The imperial estates were giving abundant proof of their utility to Britain and France as their own economic stature continued to decline, and as Nazis made irredentist claims on Germany's former colonies.

³⁵ C. Leubuscher, *Der südafrikanische Eingeborene als Industriearbeiter und als Stadtbewohner* (Jena, 1931). In 1933 she was dismissed by the Nazis and thereafter worked in England on economic studies of Africa.

³⁶ Quoted by W. B. Cohen, *Rulers of Empire* (Stanford, 1971), 128.

³⁷ These figures exclude African exports of gold and diamonds. See above, table 1, p. 25.

Meanwhile the depression and its local consequences had compelled some reconsideration of priorities. White settlers were more clearly exposed as high-cost producers by comparison with African farmers. Cut-backs in employment, and industrial unrest, drew attention to the problems posed by semi-proletarianised African wage-earners. Financial crises provoked enquiries into the operations of colonial governments. At the centres of empire, trade was likely to seem more important than tradition. There was decreasing faith in indirect rule and the omnipotence of the district officer. At least in some quarters, there was a new awareness that not only the doctrine of trusteeship but imperial self-interest called for social as well as economic investment in Africa: manpower was itself a resource to be husbanded and nurtured. Besides, the British Empire was increasingly on the defensive. The enemy circle extended from Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany to Japan and Italy. All seemed real or potential rivals for the allegiance of colonial peoples. British imperial trustees became more sensitive to the movement of African minds, if only for fear that, if they did not seek to direct this movement, others would. In a still spasmodic and unsystematic way, African opinions were sought out and made known in the higher reaches of imperial government.

The intellectual climate was congenial to this new assertiveness. In Britain, there were conservatives as well as socialists who believed that national economies required deliberate management, while the economist John Maynard Keynes had radically questioned the value of balanced budgets. Moreover, thanks to American funding, there was now a substantial body of academic knowledge about Africa, much of which was specifically focused on contemporary social problems. Reform was in the air, even if its implementation was obstructed by officials invoking indigence to excuse inaction, or deferred by the outbreak of war.

For the visionaries who still saw the future of eastern Africa in terms of a new white Dominion, the decade brought new grounds for hope but also new setbacks. Smuts himself had forcefully pleaded their cause in his Rhodes Memorial Lectures at Oxford in 1929. In a probably accidental echo of Ruskin's inaugural Slade Lecture at Oxford in 1870, Smuts urged the British to populate their empire and thereby diffuse a higher civilisation. For Smuts, 'No flash in the pan of tropical exploitation

will really help the cause of African civilisation. It will be a slow, gradual schooling of peoples who have slumbered and stagnated since the dawn of time, and only an ever-present, settled, permanent European order can achieve that high end.³⁸ However, Smuts's enthusiasm for British colonisation was shared by few of his fellow Afrikaners; besides, plans for closer union in East Africa were in effect shelved after a joint select parliamentary committee in 1931 had heard eloquent objections from African as well as Indian witnesses. The field of controversy was inadvertently shifted to central Africa by Sidney Webb, the veteran Fabian who as Lord Passfield was colonial secretary in the Labour government of 1929–31. In 1930 he affirmed publicly that African interests should prevail in any clash with those of immigrants. This was ironic, since in the same year, while still serving also as Dominions secretary, Passfield had failed to exercise Britain's right to veto Southern Rhodesia's Land Apportionment Act — a measure ignored by the colonial experts in the Labour Party. Thus Passfield had provided two good reasons for settlers in Northern Rhodesia to seek escape from Colonial Office rule by joining up with their southern neighbours, and the region's growing mineral wealth fortified their hopes. Eventually settler pressure prompted the visit of a Royal Commission to Central Africa in 1938, but once again African opinion proved a stumbling-block to regional unification which threatened to entrench white supremacy. Furthermore, Africans in the High Commission Territories who opposed incorporation in the Union now had able advocates in London, and the British government became increasingly sceptical of white South Africa's eagerness to offer them a slow, gradual schooling.

In this respect, then, the momentum of Amery's years at the Colonial Office was not sustained. In another respect, it undoubtedly was. From 1930 the secretary of state no longer had to look after the Dominions Office. Despite the comings and goings of politicians,³⁹ the Colonial Office improved its ability to specialise in problems as well as territories, and to interfere

³⁸ J. C. Smuts, *Africa and some world problems* (Oxford, 1930), 66.

³⁹ Secretaries of state: Lord Passfield (1929–31); J. H. Thomas (1931); Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister (1931–5); M. MacDonald (1935); J. H. Thomas (1935–6); W. Ormsby-Gore (1936–8); M. MacDonald (1938–40). Permanent under-secretaries: Sir Samuel Wilson (1926–33); Sir John Maffey (1933–7); Sir Cosmo Parkinson (1937–9); Sir George Gater (1939–40).

accordingly. In 1927 and 1930 it had summoned colonial governors and senior officials to conferences in London, but this was an unduly cumbersome procedure. More significant was the handling of business according to subject as well as region, a process already initiated by Samuel Wilson. Africa was central to this reorganisation, for in the 1930s it accounted for four-fifths of the area and population of Britain's colonial empire, albeit only one-fifth of its trade. Within the Colonial Office, new departments were created for economics (1934), social services (1938) and defence (1939). Between 1932 and 1938 the administrative and specialist staffs of colonial governments were brought into a series of unified services according to function; this facilitated the transfer of expertise between territories. There were also occasional secondments of staff between the Colonial Office and the colonial administrative service. And the seasoned expert from outside played a growing part in the formulation of policy; indeed, in most fields of action it is only from this period, if then, that one can point to anything so definite.

Thought about the means and ends of colonial rule in Africa was stimulated from several quarters during the 1930s. Commissions of enquiry appointed by the Colonial Office crystallised trends of thought which were to become dominant in the 1940s. In 1933, the legal adviser to the Colonial Office chaired a commission to investigate the administration of criminal justice in East Africa. Of the other members, all of whom came from East Africa, only one was a lawyer, but all agreed that this work should in principle be shifted from officials in the administrative service, acting as lay magistrates, to professional lawyers of the High Courts (whose scope had recently been extended in Nigeria). This advice was opposed by the local governors, but they postponed rather than prevented the separation of judicial and executive powers. The Colonial Office also instigated a series of financial investigations by Sir Alan Pim, late of the Indian Civil Service: he reported on Zanzibar and Swaziland (1932), Bechuanaland (1933), Basutoland (1935), Kenya (1936) and Northern Rhodesia (1938). Pim's far-reaching reports, which proposed a variety of social as well as economic reforms, challenged the *status quo* in these territories more powerfully than any unofficial critiques in Britain at the time; they provided a valuable rationale for colonial development as government resources began once

more to expand. For West Africa, a philosophy of state intervention was argued by the commission set up in 1938 to investigate protests by cocoa farmers against the marketing system; it advocated large collective agencies which would eliminate supposedly wasteful intermediaries.

Meanwhile, a policy on higher education in Africa had begun to germinate in Whitehall. In 1932 there were talks in East Africa about the possible future development of Makerere, a college for higher education in Uganda. As a result, a Colonial Office sub-committee was prompted to consider the whole future of higher education in British tropical Africa. The chairman, Sir James Currie, had been director of Gordon College, Khartoum. He swept past the hesitations of those who thought western civilisation a dubious gift to Africa, for Africans were already helping themselves: 'What the native wants is knowledge of a kind that will enable him to take his place in the world's economic struggle on equal terms with the white man.'⁴⁰ His report was at once imaginative and pragmatic: it concluded that five existing colleges should be developed into universities, for if the thirst of Africans for higher education was not satisfied they would continue to go abroad or create their own institutions at home. In either case, British prestige would suffer, African opinion would be alienated, and the risk of political trouble increased. The Currie Report was then circulated to colonial governors: in West Africa it ran into the sand, but in East Africa it prompted a commission in 1936–7 on the future of Makerere which recommended the early establishment of a university college. This advice was approved in London, though the immediate results were disappointing.

Social tensions within the colonial empire, and international tensions outside it, heightened concern both with maintaining British prestige and with finding new ways to shore up white authority. Even in the usually unpromising circumstances of tropical Africa, buildings were sometimes conceived not simply as shelter but as symbols of power. Moreover, the mystique of royalty was believed to exercise a powerful hold upon African imaginations, and it was sedulously cultivated by colonial governments. Architecture and royalty might even be jointly enlisted in

⁴⁰ Sir James Currie, 'Present day difficulties of a young officer in the tropics', *Journal of the African Society*, 1933, 32, no. 126, 32.

the attempt to mould minds. In 1935, the year of the Silver Jubilee of King George V, Lusaka became the new capital of Northern Rhodesia; it was planned around a large Government House, designed in classical style by a pupil of Sir Herbert Baker (who had himself left a considerable mark on Nairobi and much of South Africa as well as New Delhi). Those who might have criticised the project for needless extravagance at a time of general retrenchment were reminded that ‘Northern Rhodesia is a Protectorate in which the Africans outnumber the Europeans by a hundred and twenty to one. To them, this House and its great occasions will be the outward and visible sign at all times of the dignity of the Crown.’⁴¹

Yet in that same year, 1935, strikes by African mine-workers on the Copperbelt, some two hundred miles away, called in question the adequacy of such techniques of social control. This at least was the conclusion of the colonial judge who chaired a locally appointed commission of enquiry into the disturbances arising from the strikes:

It is all very well putting a District Officer in the open in the middle of 100,000 natives and with half a dozen askari to keep order...But mining areas are a different matter...The whole position rests on bluff — the prestige of the white man — a good and effective bluff which must continue in this country — but not at the mines.⁴²

However, the commission persuaded itself that the root of the trouble lay in the subversive influence of literature distributed by Jehovah’s Witnesses. There was little else for Africans to read, and the provision of more suitable reading material became a matter of official concern. The government started a newspaper for Africans in order to pre-empt the emergence of an independent and less desirable press. Elsewhere, too, there was anxious discussion of what Africans ought to be reading. The IAI had already begun to help Africans to produce the right sort of books themselves. Reginald Coupland, professor of colonial history at Oxford from 1920 to 1948, became chairman of a committee formed in 1937 to advise authors intending to write history books

⁴¹ *Lusaka* (London, 1935), 44.

⁴² Sir Alison Russell to Sir John Maffey, August 1935, quoted by Ian Henderson, ‘The origins of nationalism in East and Central Africa: the Zambian case’, *Journal of African History*, 1970, 11, 4, 598.

for African schools; at least six such books on the history of individual British territories were produced in the course of the decade.

This was worthy work, but most Africans were illiterate. Films and broadcasting could exert far more influence, for good or ill, than the written word, especially where Africans gathered in large numbers for work in proximity to white people. In 1926 King George V had told Amery of his concern that Hollywood was projecting a disreputable image of the white man. In practice, the censorship needed to put this right was largely exercised by South Africa, from which were distributed the American films seen in East and Central Africa. A few commercial films provided useful, if crude, propaganda for white rule in Africa,⁴³ and in 1939 a short film for this purpose, *Men of Africa*, was specially commissioned. Besides, the cinema could also be used to instruct: films were made in Kenya and Nigeria to inculcate principles of hygiene, and in Egypt to combat drug-trafficking. The International Missionary Council, backed by the Carnegie Corporation, obtained the co-operation of the Colonial Office for the Bantu Educational Kinema Experiment; in 1935–7 this made both instructional and entertainment films in East and Central Africa, though the desire of the Colonial Office for some follow-up was not shared by the East African governments. The first attempts to promote broadcasting for Africans followed a similar course. The king's Christmas broadcast to the Empire in 1932 demonstrated the key role that radio could play in cementing imperial ties. In British West Africa, from 1934–5, rediffusion by wire to subscribers extended the reach of the BBC's Empire Service.⁴⁴ In 1936 the colonial secretary set up a committee to consider colonial broadcasting. This stressed the educational as well as political advantages, and governors were asked to develop plans for local broadcasting to African audiences, though little had been done by 1939.⁴⁵

Labour, however, was the issue which most severely tested the

⁴³ E.g. *Palaver* (1926), *Sanders of the river* (1935), *Rhodes of Africa* (1935).

⁴⁴ By 1937 there were 1,600 African subscribers in Accra. Sir Arnold Hodson, then governor of the Gold Coast, had developed a keen interest when governor of the Falkland Islands, 1926–31. Sidney W. Head, 'British colonial broadcasting policies: the case of the Gold Coast', *African Studies Review*, 1979, 22, 2, 39–47.

⁴⁵ The South African Broadcasting Corporation was formed in 1936; it succeeded a commercial service begun in 1924 and by 1937 there were over 160,000 wireless licences in the Union.

capacity of imperial governments to interpret social change in Africa and influence what was done there. It was also an issue on which there was pressure for reform from an international body. In 1930 the International Labour Conference approved a convention on forced labour. This was largely the work of a committee which included four former colonial governors (Lugard among them) and the official adviser on African mine labour in the Transvaal. The convention required little more than the restriction of forced labour to a limited range of public works and a commitment to its progressive abolition. Over the next seven years it was ratified by all colonial powers in Africa with the exception of Portugal, though France and Belgium made some reservations. Three more conventions relevant to Africa were issued in the course of the decade. None, however, could be said to have made any practical difference to labour administration in British Africa: more significant were discussions in and around the Colonial Office.

Metropolitan intervention in local labour policy was steadily opposed by senior civil servants in London, and they were not immune from lobbying by commercial pressure groups.⁴⁶ With the advent of the second Labour government in 1929, other views were encouraged. Passfield's deputy, Drummond Shiels, soon called for a thorough overhaul of colonial labour legislation. Throughout British colonial Africa, breaches of contract between black workers and their employers were subject to penal sanctions; this was a legacy from early English labour law. Since the 1870s, industrial relations in Britain had largely been removed from the sphere of criminal law to that of civil law, and India had followed suit in 1926. Shiels believed Africa should do the same, but he succeeded only in West Africa; elsewhere, it was widely argued that civil damages could not be expected from migrant workers who lacked distrainable property. Thus penal sanctions continued in East and Central Africa to subject African employees to what was in practice very lopsided justice. Shiels was still less successful in persuading governors to introduce local legislation regarding the formation of trade unions, even though he recommended this as a means of countering subversion. By July 1931 he was out

⁴⁶ Since 1923 the Joint East Africa Board, a group of British businessmen, had been in regular contact with the Colonial Office and with governors; it was also represented in the imperial affairs committee of the Conservative Party.

of office, and his reforming momentum was not sustained. Senior officials were indifferent, and colonial labour problems receded into the background as Palestine made increasing demands upon ministers, while India absorbed parliamentary time. Nor was much pressure in these matters exerted by the Labour Party's colonial advisory committee: it had, in Arthur Creech Jones, a pertinacious spokesman in parliament, but it was chiefly pre-occupied with wider political questions.

It was not trouble in Africa but the general strike and ensuing riots in Trinidad in 1937 which forced the Colonial Office to think again about labour. The colonial secretary, Ormsby-Gore, advised governors to review their own labour legislation and set up specialist labour departments. In 1938 the Colonial Office appointed its own labour adviser, G. Orde Browne, who had reported on labour for the IAI and the Northern Rhodesian government. Between 1937 and 1939 — when there were at least a dozen strikes in East and West Africa — trade-union legislation was introduced in Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. It was becoming steadily harder to maintain the pretence that African workers were merely tribesmen on short-term loan to the capitalist; an influential white minority began to argue that labour relations and urban administration were too important to be left to companies, chiefs and district officers. Some officials in London argued that Britain had much to learn from the Belgians in Katanga, who in the 1920s had begun to create semi-permanent urban communities of relatively skilled and well-paid African workers. Meanwhile, the British labour movement was beginning to take a more informed interest: in 1937 the TUC formed a colonial advisory committee which closely resembled that of the Labour Party.

The involvement of rural Africa in the operations of capitalist enterprise was a major theme of social research in the 1930s. In South Africa, pioneering work on rural poverty had been done by W. M. Macmillan; now a variety of local academic expertise was deployed in 1928–32 in a study of the 'poor white' problem. This was funded by Carnegie, as was the team which in 1932 studied social conditions on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt on behalf of the International Missionary Council. Meanwhile Monica Hunter was investigating social change among the Pondo, in the eastern Cape, and in Northern Rhodesia Audrey Richards,

a pupil of Malinowski, was studying the Bemba, a people particularly affected by labour migration to the mines. Between 1932 and 1939 the IAI provided from Rockefeller funds 17 fellowships for extended research in Africa. All but three were for work in British territories, and most were given to social anthropologists trained by Malinowski in the study of ‘culture contact’, of whom six were South African, four were German or Austrian and two were British.⁴⁷ Social research in south-eastern Nigeria, and by Evans-Pritchard in the Sudan, was funded by the Leverhulme Trust.

Governments also promoted research. In Britain, a government research committee helped in the later 1920s to extend to Africa the new science of nutrition. A League of Nations report on the subject in 1935 prompted the Colonial Office to collaborate with the Medical Research Council and the Economic Advisory Council in organising a survey in 1938 of nutrition in British colonies. In probing the causes of malnutrition, the ensuing report stressed ignorance rather than poverty, despite evidence from Richards and others that economic pressures could seriously impair African diets. Nonetheless, there were leading experts who found good sense in African farming practices, and in any case there was increasing official concern to improve subsistence agriculture. The Colonial Development Fund helped to finance, among other research, ecological surveys in Northern Rhodesia. In Tanganyika and southern Nigeria administrative officers conducted full-time enquiries into land-tenure. Two academic social anthropologists were employed by governments: Schapera in Bechuanaland and Nadel in the Sudan. In 1925 the former German agricultural research station at Amani in Tanganyika had been revived. Scientists in government employment gathered at imperial conferences and at others held in East and West Africa. Museums were enlarged or created in the Rhodesias and provided bases for archaeological research (for which the South African government had created a department in 1935). In Northern

⁴⁷ Two IAI fellowships were given to French ethnographers for work in Algeria. Social research by French academics in tropical Africa in the 1930s consisted only of a team study of the Dogon people, in Soudan, led by Marcel Griaule of the Institut d’Ethnologie (from which the Musée de l’Homme was formed in 1938). In 1929 the administrator-anthropologist Henri Labouret wanted to study labour migration from Upper Volta to the Gold Coast, but the federal government at Dakar took no interest. Matters improved after the foundation at Dakar in 1938 of the Institut Français de l’Afrique Noire.

Rhodesia, the initiative of a colonial governor led to the foundation in 1937 of the Rhodes–Livingstone Institute for Social Research; its first director, the social anthropologist Godfrey Wilson, embarrassed the government by tackling the contentious question of Africans in towns. This episode illustrated the distance which in practice separated colonial governments and professional anthropologists, despite assertions from both sides of belief in the value of ‘applied anthropology’.

There was a modest growth of concern with Africa in British universities, and in subjects other than social anthropology. Rockefeller, which had financed the expansion of the London School of Tropical Medicine in the 1920s, now advanced the study of African languages at the School of Oriental Studies. At the London School of Economics the anthropologist Lucy Mair lectured on colonial administration. At Oxford, Coupland’s historical research treated Africa chiefly as a field for British philanthropy and diplomacy, but his younger colleague Margery Perham travelled widely on the continent and wrote a major study of indirect rule in Nigeria. Another Oxford lecturer, John Maud, was commissioned by Johannesburg to study its administration; a third, Christopher Cox, became director of education in the Sudan. In 1937 Coupland and Perham started an annual summer school on colonial administration for officials on home leave. From Cambridge, the economist E. A. G. Robinson contributed to the IMC report on the Copperbelt, and scientific expeditions visited the East African lakes. As in France and the USA, numerous doctoral theses were written on African topics.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ British and US doctoral theses on Africa (excluding ancient Egypt):

	Accepted after 1930		Humanities and Social Sciences				Natural Sciences				Oxford or Cambridge	
	Total		Total	N.A.	Trop. A.	S.A.	Total	N.A.	Trop. A.	S.A.	London	
UK: 1920–40	96	70	64	20	23	19	32	1	23	8	51	22
USA: 1903–40	104	66	90	22	33	27	14	—	4	8		

Many of the theses on South Africa were by South Africans, and most of those on Egypt for British universities were by Egyptians.

Much of the research achieved during the 1930s was drawn upon for the African Research Survey. This project may be said to have originated in Smuts's proposal at Oxford in 1929 for a centre of African studies that would serve the interests of European governments, but especially that of South Africa. Funds for this were not forthcoming, but the idea was transplanted and transformed at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). This had been founded after the war at the instigation of Lionel Curtis, a member of the *Round Table* group, and it was he who in 1931 persuaded the Carnegie Corporation to finance an African research survey. The aim was to examine the impact on sub-Saharan Africa of European civilisation, including its 'economic revolution', in the hope that through better-informed government this impact would help and not harm Africans. The survey was directed by Sir Malcolm Hailey, until recently a provincial governor in India. Ironically, in view of the survey's origins, the appointment thus epitomised the growing tendency of British rule in Africa to depend on expertise from India rather than South Africa.⁴⁹ The survey resulted in the publication in 1938 of three volumes: S. H. Frankel's *Capital investment in Africa* and two collective compendia, E. B. Worthington's *Science in Africa* and Hailey's own *An African survey*, which collated information on an international basis from academics and officials. Meanwhile Chatham House had also sponsored the first of R. R. Kuczynski's studies of African population statistics and W. K. Hancock's *Survey of Commonwealth*

Doctoral theses in law, letters and science for French universities, 1905-40:

Area studied	Total	1931-40	Law or letters	Science
Maghrib	353 ¹	109	323	30
Africa S. of Sahara	131 ²	50	110	21
Madagascar	46 ³	19	31	15

¹ 5 by Arab authors; 85 for University of Algiers

² 3 by African authors (incl. 2 from Anglo-Egyptian Sudan)

³ 1 by Malagasy author

In addition, there were 132 such theses on Egypt (excluding ancient Egypt); at least 90 authors were Arab.

⁴⁹ Next to Hailey and Pim, the most influential colonial adviser with Indian experience was Arthur Mayhew, secretary of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 1929-39.

affairs; this last included searching analyses of economic change in South and West Africa.

Hailey's *An African survey* presented an enlightened and cautiously reformist view of the continent. It was the first British work to give serious attention to the African empires of other European powers, which Hailey himself visited during a tour of Africa in 1935–6. The *Survey* gave no currency to prejudices such as still survived in officialdom about African indolence or brain capacity.⁵⁰ It confronted many of the implications of economic change and implicitly at least offered a critique of indirect rule. The prevailing tone was humane and by no means complacent. Yet the *Survey* exhibited the faults as well as the virtues of the mandarin, and it reflected a dominant trend in contemporary social thought insofar as it implied that Africa was a vast laboratory for experiments in scientifically controlled social adaptation. 'The African' appeared frequently in its pages; individual Africans, scarcely at all. The existence of African organisations was barely acknowledged, let alone the diversity of contemporary African culture. 'Nation-building' was seen as work for administrators, not agitators. It was inevitable that the *Survey* should have taken little account of the African past, for this had been neglected both by historians and by anthropologists, who mostly ignored unmatched opportunities to record oral historical testimony. But it was significant that neither Hailey nor Worthington could find room for any account of such work as had been done on the Iron Age archaeology of Africa — which now included excavations at Mapungubwe in the Transvaal and Schofield's studies of pottery in southern Africa. All in all, what passed for a survey of Africa was primarily a survey of Europe in Africa.

Hailey's team, for all their distinction, might well have echoed the recent remark of a former official in Northern Rhodesia: 'We ...complacently rejoice in our high-mindedness, forgetting that we are still as arrogantly dictating, still every whit as compelling...' ⁵¹ Indeed, one senior administrator had recently accused himself and

⁵⁰ Two doctors in Nyasaland argued that one cause of African insanity was excessive education, and as late as 1939 the naked and indolent negro still basked in the condescending sunshine of a history book published by the Colonial Empire Marketing Board, *The story of the British colonial empire*.

⁵¹ Frank Melland, in F. H. Melland and Cullen Young, *African dilemma* (London, 1937), 35.

his colleagues of being 'too much obsessed with our thoughts, our teaching, our plans. It is high time we heard a little from the other side.'⁵² One remarkable purge for spiritual pride was supplied by a German museum curator who, before fleeing from Hitler, had sought out representations of white people by African artists.⁵³ Besides, Nazi behaviour had itself done much to discredit beliefs in racial superiority. Colonial rule in Africa was criticised in books by Leonard Barnes and W. M. Macmillan, both in the Labour Party's circle of advisers, and in Geoffrey Gorer's account of travels in French West Africa. The voices of Africans were mediated through Perham's collection *Ten Africans* (1936) and less directly through the novels of Joyce Cary.⁵⁴ But closer contact was exceptional. Creech Jones (who from 1936 served on the advisory committee on colonial education) corresponded with political leaders in West Africa. Jomo Kenyatta and Z. K. Matthews participated in Malinowski's seminar; Malinowski himself warned that by ignoring African agitators 'we may drive them into the open arms of world-wide Bolshevism', and noted the catalytic effect upon African opinion of Italy's invasion of Ethiopia.⁵⁵ But between colonial governments and their African wards dialogue scarcely existed: dissent was commonly treated as sedition. Even in West Africa, constitutions had stagnated since the early 1920s, while little came of Governor Guggisberg's bold plans for Africanising posts in the Gold Coast civil service. To be sure, African voices had not been wholly impotent: in eastern and central Africa they had influenced decisions regarding closer union, while strikes and boycotts compelled some official re-thinking in Northern Rhodesia and West Africa. But to rely on the dialectic of neglect, explosion and commission of enquiry was poor trusteeship by any standard. Against those who claimed that good government was better than self-government, there were grounds for arguing that government could not be good unless it was self-government, or at any rate moving in that direction.

⁵² C. C. Dundas (chief secretary, Northern Rhodesia) to the International Colonial Institute, 1936 (quoted by Rosaleen Smyth, 'The development of government propaganda in Northern Rhodesia up to 1953' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983), 43).

⁵³ Julius Lips, *The savage hits back* (London and New Haven, 1937).

⁵⁴ Aissa saved (1932), *An American visitor* (1933), *The African witch* (1936), *Mr Johnson* (1939). Cary had been in the Nigerian political service from 1913 to 1920.

⁵⁵ Introduction to Jomo Kenyatta, *Facing Mount Kenya* (London, 1938), x.

All the same, *An African survey* did induce some forward thinking. It acknowledged that 'the political future which British policy has assigned to the African colonies must be understood to be that of self-government based on representative institutions'.⁵⁶ It prudently refrained from attaching any sort of time-scale to this future, but it drew attention to the difficulty of reconciling elected legislatures with the structures of indirect rule. In October 1939 this problem was discussed at a meeting convened by the colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald. This exposed sharp disagreement. The officials, supported by Coupland, pressed the claims of the African intelligentsia to a share of power at the centre; Perham and Lugard wished to confine their scope to local government. Hailey was despatched on another tour of Africa, to make a report on which to base a policy. Meanwhile, the *Survey* had given weighty backing to those who believed that British investment in colonial development under the act of 1929 should be increased and extended in range: a new bill was drafted in 1939.

In September the Second World War broke out. Colonial questions, so far from receding into the background, seemed more urgent than ever. Reform was needed, both to forestall subversion and to advertise to the world Britain's fitness to be a great power. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed in July 1940. War, and the threat of war, also changed Britain's attitude to the French empire in Africa. An early sign of awakening interest had been an academic enquiry in 1935 into education in French West Africa. But the War Office continued to regard France as the major threat to British power in Africa. By 1937 this was patently absurd, for a real menace to Britain's position in Egypt, the Sudan and Kenya was now posed by the Italians in Libya and Ethiopia. In 1938-9 air services connected French and British colonial capitals between Dakar and Khartoum. In October 1939 MacDonald made history by visiting the French colonial minister. But the time for such exchanges was fast running out. Paris would soon cease to matter; what Britain now needed in Africa was the goodwill of the USA.

⁵⁶ Hailey, *An African survey*, 1,639.

CHAPTER 2

ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY

FOUNDATIONS OF THE COLONIAL EXPORT ECONOMY

The economic changes that took place in Africa in the period under review have been summarised in terms of varied implication, as the economic revolution, the second stage of Africa's involvement in the world economy, the intensification of dependent peripheral capitalism, the completion of the open economy, or simply as the cuffing of Africans into the modern world.¹ The concrete fact, however, from which these descriptions take off in different directions is not itself in much dispute. Between 1905–9 and 1935–9, exports from African countries between the Sahara and the Limpopo² increased by about five times in value and by nearly as much in volume; import values rose by some three-and-a-half times, import volumes between two-and-a-half and three times. Total trade thus grew in real terms at an annual average rate of a little over 3 per cent.³ At first sight this is hardly a momentous expansion. For even though it was nearly double the rate of growth of world trade taken as a whole, it started from such low levels that the global impact was hardly perceptible, and was not of primary significance for the economies of the colonial powers themselves; before the Second World War, trade with

¹ This selection alludes to the work of Allan McPhee, *The economic revolution in British West Africa* (London, 1926) and S. H. Frankel, 'The economic revolution in South Africa', chapter 3 of his *Capital investment in Africa* (London, 1938); A. G. Hopkins, *An economic history of West Africa* (London, 1973), 168 and ch. 6; I. Wallerstein, 'The three stages of Africa's involvement in the world economy', in P. C. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds.), *The political economy of contemporary Africa* (London, 1976), 30–57 (cf. Frankel, *Capital investment*, ch. 5, 'Africa joins the world economy'); Samir Amin, 'Underdevelopment and dependence in black Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1972, 10, 4, 503–24; R. E. Robinson and J. Gallagher, 'The partition of Africa', in F. H. Hinsley (ed.), *New Cambridge modern history*, XI (Cambridge 1962), 640.

² This chapter pays no heed to Mediterranean Africa, nor, regrettably, to the Horn. South Africa, where the decisive changes began earlier, is excluded from this sentence but not from the chapter.

³ These figures, especially the volume ones, must be taken as very approximate.

sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa still excluded) never accounted for a twentieth part of the United Kingdom's exchanges.⁴ So inconspicuous, indeed, were the short-term and even the medium-term commercial gains accruing from the European conquest of tropical Africa that many metropolitan observers, unaware that the investment was a long-term pre-emption, have concluded either that it was a mistake or that it must have been undertaken for reasons that were not commercial. For Africa, however, none of the innovations of the early and middle colonial periods, apart from the spread of literacy, compared in importance with the advance of overseas trade, to which most other economic changes were directly related either as condition or as consequence.

The most crucial of the conditions was the conquest itself, that is to say the incorporation of African societies into larger and solidier systems of political order than had existed before. (The reference is to the colonial empires, not to the individual units of colonial administration, which were not always decisively larger than earlier African states.) The linkage is unmistakable but its nature may need to be clarified. It was not primarily that trade was no longer interrupted by warfare or banditry, for in fact long-distance commerce had often been conducted across disturbed African frontiers. It was rather that most Africans were now released from the posture of defence and enabled to concentrate on productive enterprise. That is not to say that they had formerly spent all or most or even any large part of their time fighting one another, but readiness to fight had been the first obligation of males in the most vigorous period of their lives and work had had to take a subordinate place. In economic terms, the conquest meant (and this change appeared to be permanent) that the function of protection was specialised, taken away from the general body of adult males and assigned to very small numbers of soldiers and policemen, whose organisation and weapons gave them an unchallengeable monopoly of force. For the others, there

⁴ See chapter 1, table 1. For relations with other metropolitan powers see chapters 6 and 7 (France), 9 (Belgium) and 10 (Portugal). The gold-mining boom in the 1930s greatly increased South Africa's share of the British export market; in 1935-8 it averaged 8.7 per cent, as against only 4.7 per cent for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. In 1925-8 the respective figures had been 4.8 and 4.1. (Calculated from B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, *Abstract of British historical statistics* (Cambridge, 1962), 284, 320; Mitchell, *International historical statistics: Africa and Asia*, 414.)

was a loss of autonomy, even of the sense of manhood, as well as unprecedented possibilities of oppression, but the economy of human energy was very great.

Above all, the new order made long-term investment possible. It is no accident that tree-crops such as coffee and cocoa were not planted on any scale on the mainland of Africa until there was no longer a risk that they would be cut down by raiders just as they were coming into bearing. But most important was the investment in transport which, as most colonial rulers knew, was what colonial rule was mainly for. As Adam Smith had remarked,⁵ nature had so constructed the African continent that most places were a long way from sea or navigable river, and so from what in his and all earlier times had been by far the cheapest mode of transport. In addition, diseases of stock were so prevalent that between the camels of the desert and the horses and trek-oxen of the far south there were no load-moving animals except a few donkeys. Tropical Africa thus moved straight from head portage to the railway and the motor lorry. To an extent which can hardly be overstated, it is today the creation of these devices, and especially the former. Railways are uniquely large, expensive and vulnerable pieces of fixed capital, which demand political security over very wide areas. They are necessarily at least partial monopolies; but even so, since they yield mainly external economies, the profits from their construction are more likely to accrue to other enterprises than to the builders. For all these reasons, even in societies otherwise committed to pluralistic capitalism, they have always been closely regulated, usually at least partly financed and very often built and managed by the state. More than anything else, it was the exigencies of railway-building that had brought the European states into Africa, persuading their ruling classes that they must move from informal to formal empire in a continent that could not provide the political cover needed for the revolution in transport without which the exploitation of its resources could not proceed much further.

The converse is also true. Once colonial governments had been established they had to build railways in order to justify their existence, and sometimes in order to be able to govern. There was in consequence some construction which, as will appear, was

⁵ *The wealth of nations* (1903 edition), 16.

premature or wrongly located and yielded too little trade to justify the heavy burden of debt charges imposed on the peoples it was supposed to serve. Most lines, however, easily vindicated themselves, in the sense that they gave access to resources which would otherwise have been unusable and brought the territories far more revenue than they took out.


Railway-building was in full swing well before 1905, and by 1914 the crucial thrusts into the interior had mostly been completed. As in all forms of development, South Africa was far ahead of the rest of the continent; and even at the end of the period it contained nearly half the total mileage south of the Sudan (13,600 miles out of 30,700). Construction had of course been undertaken mainly to connect Kimberley and the Rand with the outer world, and had been stimulated by competition between the business and political interests identified with the ports of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban and Lourenço Marques. Already by 1914, however, there was a true network, with lateral and interlocking lines as well as those leading to the coast, promoting activities other than mineral export alone.

Elsewhere there were at that time only tentative and isolated ventures, undertaken at the lowest possible cost and with no overall planning, each administration probing from its coastal base towards real or imagined sources of future wealth in the interior. Typically the railway struggled to the nearest stretch of navigable water, where it thankfully handed over to steam-boats. Thus the famous 'Uganda' Railway, having opened up the Kenya Highlands on its way, reached the easternmost gulf of Lake Victoria in 1901, bringing much of the fertile lake basin within reach of world markets. The Germans, though they pushed a line past the Usambara mountains to the base of Kilimanjaro by 1911, were slower to traverse the unpromising central and western parts of their East African sector and did not reach Lake Tanganyika till the eve of war in 1914; and by the next year the lake was also linked to the Atlantic by four separate bits of railway and three smooth stretches of the Congo river. Meanwhile the Nyasa country had been reached by a line which started from the just-navigable lower Shire, and the South African system had sent out a long tentacle through the Rhodesias, reaching Bulawayo in 1897, Salisbury (Harare) in 1902 and the Broken Hill mine in 1906; Salisbury had also been provided with a much shorter link to the

coast at Beira as early as 1899. In West Africa, after a quarter-century of war and doubt, the French opened their line from Dakar to the Niger in 1906. Rival French administrations were also trying to attract the supposed riches of the Western Sudan to their ports; but whereas the line from Conakry to Kankan was completed in 1914 the northward thrust from Abidjan was long delayed by African resistance and heavy mortality in a conscripted labour force. In British territory, much of the Sierra Leone hinterland was joined to Freetown by 1908, and a line from the Gold Coast port of Sekondi to Kumasi, completed in 1903, helped to develop both the goldfield and the cocoa country. The major effort, however, was the railway which, having set out from Lagos in 1896, finally arrived at Kano in 1912, making it probable that Nigeria would become a single state. There was already an alternative route using the Niger for most of the way, and later there would be an eastern route to the north which would help to give the future state its unstable triangular structure.

That line belongs to the second main epoch of railway-building, which began in the optimistic years just after the First World War and ended to all intents and purposes in 1931, in time for the world slump. This was mainly a programme of consolidation, when feeder lines were built in some favoured areas, and some of the more awkward transshipments were eliminated. The most extravagant projects of the immediate post-war euphoria, such as the trans-Saharan line long dreamt of by the French, gave way to economic realism in the 1920s, but there was some undoubted over-investment in this sphere; the most flagrant example was the line from Brazzaville to Pointe Noire which, roughly duplicating the existing Belgian outlet, was constructed through difficult country at a cost of 900 million francs and at least 15,000 lives. Less certainly misconceived but still controversial was the Benguela railway, which was completed in 1931 as the culmination (in our period) of the efforts made to link the Central African Copperbelt to the sea. The emergence of this potential major source of wealth in the heart of the sub-continent provoked a new Scramble, in which railway contracts took the place of flag-plantings and treaties. British, South African, Belgian and North American capital, partly in collaboration and partly in rivalry, manoeuvred for profitable position; the Portuguese state again exploited its historic rights to crucial stretches of the coastline;

ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY



3 Africa: principal mining areas, railways and waterways, 1937

and a pertinacious Scots engineer, Sir Robert Williams, played the role of the partly independent empire-builder.⁶ The upshot was that the copper deposits which straddled the border of Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo were eventually supplied with rail or rail-and-river outlets in five different countries: South Africa, Mozambique, Tanganyika, Angola and the Congo.

Nearly all railways ran from the interior to the coastal ports, and the whole system was designed to facilitate the removal of bulk commodities from Africa and the introduction of mainly manufactured products from outside the continent, and for no other purpose, except sometimes a military one. Local traffic was welcome but incidental to the planners' intentions. It would be pointless to complain about this. Neither colonialists nor anyone else could have been expected at that time to construct lateral or purely internal communications which, joining territories with broadly similar resources, could not possibly have generated enough trade to justify the capital outlay. It is the high initial cost and the consequent rigidity of a railway system that is its outstanding disadvantage — and it is interesting, though futile, to speculate on the different course that the history of Africa might have taken if the internal combustion engine had been developed a generation earlier. As it was, colonial Africa came in at the tail-end of the great age of railway-building; and the lines lay across the land like a great steel clamp, determining which resources would be used or left unused, where people would live and work, even what shape the new nations would have and on whom they would be dependent. The railway, even more than the distribution of natural resources which only partly determined its location, was responsible for the uneven development that is so striking a feature of modern Africa. Anchorages which became railway termini grew into cities, while all others stagnated or fell into decay; and in the interior there was always a contrast, more or less pronounced, between the thronging 'line of rail' and the neglected hinterland.

However, as the railway system was being constructed, road transport was entering a new era, and road-building was the second great thrust of the colonial transport revolution. Some roads were in fact carved through the bush even before there were

⁶ The story is told by S. E. Katzenellenbogen, *Railways and the copper mines of Katanga* (Oxford, 1973).

any railways, because of the illusory hope of using ox-drawn wagons or simply to make easier the passage of porters, donkeys and bicycles, which in Africa carried commodities as well as people. But the main stimulus was of course the advent of the motor-lorry. A few motor-vehicles made their appearance in the decade before 1914, but the main influx was in the 1920s, and it was then that the motor road began to penetrate deep into the countryside, widening the domain of the exchange economy well beyond the narrow confines of the unaided railway system. Except in the far south, there were hardly any tarred roads outside the towns until after the Second World War. In our period the term 'motor road', as well as the more cautious 'motorable road', connoted a track which a Dodge truck or tough Ford car could negotiate in the dry season without falling to pieces; but such highways were enough to produce economic stimulus second only to the first advent of the railway train. Road transport, moreover, involved Africans more deeply than the railways. It was not only that almost all African males had to turn out to make the roads, whereas the railway *corvées* were more localised. In West Africa, the vehicles themselves soon passed into African ownership, road haulage being for many the second step, after produce-buying, up the capitalist ladder, and everywhere it was mostly Africans who drove and maintained them. The internal combustion engine initiated many into modern technology, and the lorry-driver became the new type of African hero, the adventurer who, like the traders and porters of earlier times, travelled dangerously beyond the tribal horizons and even beyond the colonial ones.⁷

Africa, even sub-Saharan Africa, is far from being a single country, and the impact of the commercial revolution of the early colonial period varied widely according to the nature of the local resources, the policies of the different colonial powers and the previous history of the several regions. For example, between Lake Chad and the Nile valley, in the northern parts of French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo, the southern Sudan and north-west Uganda, there was a wide expanse of sahel, savanna and forest margin in which the revolution can hardly be said to have occurred. Between Nguru in north-east Nigeria and El Obeid in the middle of the Sudan there was a gap of some 1,300

⁷ This is one of the leading themes in Wole Soyinka's otherwise bleak vision of the colonial legacy, *The road* (London, 1965).

miles in which no railway ran during the colonial period, and some 800 miles separated El Obeid from the furthest station of the East African system in central Uganda. This region, which had suffered severely from slaving and local imperialisms in the nineteenth century, now enjoyed an interlude of peace, but its economic development remained negligible. South Africa, on the other hand, already possessed by 1905 a concentration of finance capital, an established professional class, a farming population of European descent which included prosperous entrepreneurs as well as simple pastoralists differing little, except for the amount of land at their disposal, from the subjugated tribes, and the nucleus of a skilled working class. Among the black population, moreover, a process was well advanced which in other parts of Africa was at most incipient: much of it had exchanged the tribal way of life for that of either wage-workers or peasants producing for an urban market. No change of similar scope took place in our period, which can in many ways be seen as an interlude allowing time for the consequences of the 'mineral revolution' to unfold. South Africa remained far ahead of the other African countries in the development of its international exchange sector; in the last years of our period it still supplied very nearly half the total value of exports from sub-Saharan Africa. But the rate of expansion was much less than the average, exports growing over the period by a factor of 2.3, compared with the factor of 5 for the remainder.

For West Africa too the factor of export expansion, 3.6, was below average. In this region, especially its seaward parts, the transition from the pre-colonial to the colonial scheme of things was less abrupt than elsewhere. Half a century or more of active 'legitimate' commerce, preceded by three centuries of the Atlantic slave trade and several more centuries of trans-Saharan commerce, had pre-adapted the peoples of West Africa in varying degrees to the twentieth-century type of exchange economy. Towns, markets, money (in the sense of conventional means of payment and standards of value), credit and writing were already familiar. Thanks to the ocean and several usable waterways, the new means of transport were valuable aids to import and export, not absolute prerequisites; and in fact not only the exploitation of the palm forests but also the cultivation of cocoa (in the Gold Coast and western Nigeria) and of groundnuts (in Senegambia) were well established by 1905. Here the changes of the next three decades,

far-reaching though they were, could be seen as the amplification of two processes that had been going on for a long time: the growth of exchange, and the shift in the balance of economic activity from the desert-facing to the ocean-facing sector of the region.

In west-central Africa (Gabon, French Congo, the western Belgian Congo and Angola) there was a similarly long experience of European commerce, but here its effects had been more purely destructive, owing to the more direct intervention of European power. Indigenous organisation had been shattered, population (for whatever precise combination of reasons) was much sparser than in the Guinea region, and the very weakness of African society at the beginning of the twentieth century invited a colonialism of the most crudely exploitative kind.

It was in the eastern interior of Africa that the advent of government and railways was most truly revolutionary. Here 'production' for export had hitherto consisted almost entirely of the collection of elephants' teeth and the rounding up of human captives, and in many areas even these activities were recent developments. The possibility of agricultural and mineral exports introduced a new economic era, and it was in these countries that exports grew at the highest rates: nearly seven times in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, eleven times in the Sudan, over fourteen times in the three East African territories.

The European peace and the new means of transport can be claimed as necessary conditions of the commercial expansion of the early twentieth century, but were they also sufficient conditions? To what extent was the expansion enforced, and not simply permitted, by the alien intervention? It is this question which has made the economic history of modern Africa an ideological battlefield. Some have seen the developments of the time as the welcome liberation of Africa from ancient impediments to economic growth, others as the imposition of the capitalist mode of production on societies that were not ready for it, in conditions that robbed it of its historically progressive role, so that it brought no material benefit to Africans, or none that could begin to compensate them for the loss of autonomy, security and cultural integrity. In this form, the alternative interpretations do not lend themselves to clear-cut decision — and the choice between them usually depends partly on the predilection of the observer and

PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT

partly on which region of Africa he happens to know best. Some clarification of the issues may however be attempted. The optimistic liberal interpretation relies heavily on three propositions. First, Africa's natural endowment is distinctive enough to ensure that it would yield a large rent as soon as economic progress in other parts of the world had created an effective demand for its products, and as soon as the price that could be offered for them was no longer swallowed up by transport costs. Secondly, even though much of this surplus might be appropriated by foreign landowners and officials through the exercise of political power, by foreign traders through the exploitation of monopoly advantages and by foreign consumers through the mechanisms of unequal exchange, some part of it could hardly fail to accrue to the indigenous people in the form of additions to peasant income, wages that exceeded the product of subsistence farming, and services rendered by governments using the revenues they extracted from trade. Thirdly, the income derived from the commercial use of Africa's assets was in the main a true surplus, since the inputs needed to produce it were mostly not diverted from other employment, as the theory of comparative costs assumes, but were drawn from reserves of both land and labour which, for want of a market, had not hitherto been employed at all.⁸

PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT

The first of these assumptions is the least controversial, even though estimates of Africa's natural potential have fluctuated widely. Of the attractiveness of its subsoils, at least, there has never been much doubt. Most of its rocks are very old, and contain an abundance of metallic ores, especially of the rarer metals of complex atomic structure that were formed when the earth was young, as well as the highly metamorphosed form of carbon that we know as diamonds. Younger sediments, in which there were seams and lakes of fossil fuel, were not scarce. In fact there were few parts of the continent, apart from the volcanic

⁸ The reference is to the 'vent-for-surplus' model originally formulated by Adam Smith and re-stated in modern terms by Hla Myint, 'The "classical" theory of international trade and the underdeveloped countries', *Economic Journal*, 1958, 68, 317-37, *The economics of the developing countries* (London, 1964) and 'Adam Smith's theory of international trade in the perspective of economic development', *Economica*, 1977, 44, 231-48.

highlands in the east, that did not contain exploitable minerals of one kind or another. However, the exploitation of many of them had to await the progress of technology and industrial demand or the depletion of reserves in more accessible continents; and in the early and middle colonial periods the only minerals that really counted south of the Sahara were diamonds, gold, copper and, to a lesser degree, tin.

The two first of these had been the dynamic behind the nineteenth-century transformation of South Africa, and demand for both continued to be buoyant. It is perhaps appropriate that the most distinctively African products in world trade should have owed their fortune in the first place to a symbolic mode of thought often deemed to be distinctively African. Engaged couples in Europe and America used the special qualities of the diamond to pledge the durability as well as the brilliance of their love; and as Europe grew richer more and more of them could conform to this convention. The role of this commodity in rituals of display gives it a peculiar place in economic theory, in that demand is actually a function of supply; the gemstones would have only a fraction of their market value if they were not believed to be scarce. Price can therefore be sustained only by strict regulation of supply, which, since diamonds are in fact strewn about the subsoils of Africa in great profusion, necessitates that rare form of economic organisation, absolute monopoly. The De Beers Company, created by Cecil Rhodes to control the entire South African output, came to regulate the sale of diamonds from all sources except the Soviet Union (which has been careful not to destroy the market). Independent producers in other parts of Africa quickly agreed to collaborate in a system without which they could have made only a very short-lived profit. The same system helped to sustain the value of what was really a separate commodity but a joint product with the gemstones: industrial diamonds, too small for display but finding more and more practical uses because of their unique cutting power. The result was that in 1937 the average value of diamonds (mainly gem) from South and South West Africa was not much less than twice as high as in 1913 and only fractionally less than in 1929, the year before the general collapse of commodity prices. This, however, was achieved at the cost of a steep decline, both relative and absolute, in the volume of South African output and sales, the latter falling

from nearly six million carats in 1913 to three million in 1929 and under a million in 1937. Africa as a whole nevertheless continued to produce over 80 per cent of the world's output, for there was an overall rise in the production of industrial diamonds in the Belgian Congo, supplemented by the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Angola.

Diamonds had initiated the economic revolution in southern Africa but gold carried it much further. Early predictions of the rapid exhaustion of the great reef were repeated by cautious observers and interested parties with less and less conviction as time went on, and there was no question here of price being depressed by increased output. Gold production in South Africa represented over half of the world output in the 1920s, though it declined to about a third in the next decade. Its contribution to South Africa's exports fluctuated in our period between just under a half and as much as three-quarters, and South African gold was never less than a quarter and sometimes exceeded two-fifths of all exports from the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.⁹ The peculiar social evolution of South Africa is of course the result of the chance or mischance that had placed the world's largest deposit of precious metal in a country where seaborne migrants, arriving for other reasons from the far side of the planet, had established military and economic supremacy but not numerical preponderance. The industry had special features with far-reaching consequences. In spite of the outcrops that had drawn attention to it, the main gold reef lay deep in the earth and could not be exploited without massive capital expenditure. After its earliest days, therefore, the industry belonged to large organisations having access to major sources of international finance. In fact most of it came to be controlled by six finance houses or 'groups', between which there were complex financial and personal connections, forming by far the greatest concentration of economic power in Africa and one of the greatest in the world. One of the groups, though not yet pre-eminent as it would later become, was the Anglo American Corporation. The name is misleading: though the firm was launched in 1917 with the help of copper-mining finance in the USA, it was created and controlled by Ernest Oppenheimer, a South African diamond broker who would later

⁹ See Frankel, *Capital investment*, tables 12, 16 and 49.

secure control of De Beers; and this was one of a number of links between the two great extractive industries.

The South African gold ores are of immense extent but generally low grade, and this, combined with their depth, meant that other things being equal the costs of production would be high and there was a constant danger that the break-even point would exclude a large part of the potential output. Though the companies made the most of this argument in putting their case for low taxation and privileged access to labour, their problem was a real one. It was both alleviated and aggravated by peculiarities of the labour supply. The mines needed masses of hewers and carriers, and there were in southern Africa masses of men able to perform those tasks and having no other comparably lucrative occupation. But the mines also needed skills which at the beginning of the century were not to be found in any section of the South African population and so had to be imported at a heavy premium, largely from the decayed metal-mining districts of Britain. The huge differential for skill, originally determined by supply and demand, was perpetuated both by the exploitation of trade-union power and by the assertion of racial privilege. Finding it politically difficult to substitute cheaper black labour for expensive white labour, the companies exerted themselves to make maximum use of their greatest asset: the presence of numerous African workers for whom mine employment even at a low wage was the best economic option open. This initial advantage was in its turn perpetuated by widening the range of recruitment, restricting the freedom of the workers, and delaying the development of a stabilised labour force with all the external costs that that would entail. Permanently dear white labour, in other words, was offset by permanently cheap black labour, each having its allotted sphere. Even so, the inevitable decline in the crucial ratio of pennyweight of gold per ton of ore was becoming alarming to the industry in the 1920s. It was rescued by the disintegration of the world monetary system and the consequently much greater use of actual rather than notional gold. Britain left the gold standard in September 1931. South Africa did not follow until fifteen months later, and when it did the currency price of gold was at once almost doubled, remaining near the new level through the 1930s. Although the extraction rate continued to fall, this was offset by technical improvements and by the lower price

PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT

Table 2. *Gold output (metric tons).*

	1913	1916	1921	1930	1933	1938
South Africa	273.7	289.2	252.8	333.3	342.6	378.3
Southern Rhodesia	21.5	28.9	18.2	17.0	20.0	25.3
Gold Coast	11.9	11.8	6.3	7.5	9.5	21.0
Belgian Congo ¹	1.3	3.0	5.0 ⁴	5.9	9.5	13.5
Madagascar	2.0	—	0.5	—	—	—
French W. Africa ²	—	—	0.5	0.3	1.6	4.0 ⁵
Tanganyika	0.4	—	—	0.4	1.0	2.5
Kenya	—	—	—	—	0.4	2.1
French Eq. Africa ³	—	—	—	—	0.8	1.7
Sierra Leone	—	—	—	—	0.4	1.0
Nigeria	—	—	—	—	0.5	0.8
Uganda	—	—	—	—	—	0.7

¹ exports

² mostly from Guinée

³ including Cameroun

⁴ 1920

⁵ exports in 1937.

of imported equipment, the money wages of African workers remaining constant. So profits soared, and the South African economy received its biggest stimulus since the initial discovery of gold.

It gradually became clear that the riches of the Transvaal are not repeated elsewhere in Africa — except in the Orange Free State. The Rhodesian goldfields, though they were easily the country's most valuable resource throughout the period, were a considerable disappointment to those who thought they had become the owners of King Solomon's mines. The small deposits in Tanganyika and Kenya could be worked at a profit only in the special conditions of the 1930s. In fact, the only significant supplements to the output from southern Africa were made in the Gold Coast and the Belgian Congo. In the former, modern technology had been applied to an ancient industry by 1905, and its output then was not equalled in the Belgian colony until 1930. By 1936 gold exports from the latter were worth £3.6m and those from the Gold Coast £3m, but this last was only 60 per cent of exports from Southern Rhodesia and a mere 4 per cent of those from South Africa.

Apart from gold, the most important mineral produced in West Africa before the Second World War was the tin of the Jos plateau in northern Nigeria. These alluvial deposits had been

worked for centuries before the colonial era, contributing to the ornamental metalwork for which the region was celebrated; but, with the coming of settled government and the railway, output was greatly expanded to serve the needs of Western industry. Some African entrepreneurs survived as 'tributors' of the European firms who now organised the industry, but the excavation of the deeper deposits required the more direct application of foreign capital. The industry was not, however, highly capital-intensive and was composed of numerous small companies and individual enterprises, though in this sector as in others the hard times of the 1930s led to a marked increase in concentration. Among the production companies one had a special position: as part of the terms for the surrender of its charter in 1900 the Niger Company received half the royalties accruing from mineral output in Northern Nigeria. It should also be noted that the entire output of the field was consigned to a smelter in the United Kingdom. By 1929 Nigeria had become the world's fourth largest tin-producer. It lost ground slightly in the next decade, largely as a result of the international restriction scheme to which the British government subscribed on its behalf in 1931. It has been said of later commodity agreements that they 'tend to be an international conspiracy against Africa',¹⁰ which is generally the 'new' producer and the one with the lowest costs. In this case, however, the deal probably saved the Nigerian industry from a more severe contraction, since its production costs, though lower than Bolivia's, were higher than those of its main competitors in South-East Asia. Besides, Nigeria now had an African competitor, for tin mines in the Belgian Congo had been developed in time to gain a share in the restriction scheme, and by the later 1930s their output approached that of Nigeria. Almost a quarter of the ore was smelted in the Congo; the rest was shipped to Belgium.

On the continental scale tin was less significant than copper, which by the late 1930s had achieved second place to gold — though a very poor second — among Africa's mineral exports. This output came overwhelmingly from the great metalliferous region around the Congo–Zambezi watershed, straddling the border between British and Belgian territory. The anciently worked deposits lay on the Belgian side of the line, and it was

¹⁰ W. Arthur Lewis, *Aspects of tropical trade, 1883–1965* (Uppsala, 1969), 26.

PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT




Fig. 2. Copper production, Belgian Congo, Northern Rhodesia and USA (in thousand tons)

here that capitalist production started, the first exports beginning in 1911 as soon as there was a rail connection to the sea. The venture, however, owed much to the initiative of Sir Robert Williams, through whose organisation, Tanganyika Concessions, British capital secured a substantial stake in the monopoly concessionaire, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga.¹¹ Nor was the British sector as inferior as it seemed at first. New treatment processes made possible the exploitation of its sulphide ores, and when development was taken seriously in hand in 1923 it was found that Northern Rhodesia was endowed with a great deal of high-grade and low-cost copper to make up for its lack of other obvious resources. Financial control was here divided about evenly between Oppenheimer's Anglo American Corporation and the Rhodesian Selection Trust. RST was formed in 1928 as an offshoot of Chester Beatty's Selection Trust, whose chief African interests had hitherto been in Gold Coast diamonds; but from 1930 the majority shareholder in RST was the American Metal Company. Thus Northern Rhodesia became in effect the joint annexe of the South African gold and diamond mines and the

¹¹ See Robert Hutchinson and George Martelli, *Robert's people* (London, 1971), chs. 8, 9 and 11.

North American base metals industry. Growth was very rapid, being inspired by the development of the electrical industries of the West, which imparted a stimulus to demand so vigorous that it was only briefly checked by the general economic collapse of the early 1930s. By 1937–8, Northern Rhodesia supplied a quarter of Britain's copper imports, and one-fifth of Germany's.

Though not to any extent an export, coal was very important to the economy of South Africa and the Rhodesias, and also to that of Nigeria, where the state-owned colliery at Enugu provided cheap fuel for the railways almost from the time of their construction. Other minerals which were produced on a smaller scale for export included chrome, asbestos, wolfram, columbite, platinum, mica and uranium. This last metal was mined in the Belgian Congo from 1921 onwards, mainly as a joint product with radium though it had also a minor use as a colorant. In the 1920s the Shinkolobwe mine was almost the only source of either substance, and although Canadian deposits began to be worked in the next decade the Congo suddenly acquired a new global significance in 1939, when the possibilities of nuclear fission dawned on scientists. Alerted by French interest, the chairman of Union Minière, Edgard Sengier, farsightedly shipped 30 tons of uranium ore to New York in the summer of 1940, well in time to be used in the Manhattan Project.¹²

Africa's other great future mineral asset, petroleum, was held in reserve during this period. Northern Angola was explored intensively but vainly in the 1920s. Petroleum was found west of the Niger delta in 1908, but in 1913 Lugard refused to provide the government finance needed for deep-level drilling, and Britain continued to rely on Persian supplies that lay nearer the surface. In 1938 Shell and Anglo-Iranian (later British Petroleum) jointly acquired, for £50 a year, an exclusive licence to explore for petroleum in Nigeria,¹³ thus ensuring that mainly British capital would have a first claim on the oilfield likely to be found among the sediments of the lower Niger basin, though it would be nearly two decades before the time was ripe for its discovery.

The full exploitation of Africa's mineral wealth lay in the future, yet even in our period important fractions of international capitalism had been attracted to mineral production, far more

¹² Margaret Gowing, *Independence and deterrence* (London, 1974), 350.

¹³ L. H. Schätzl, *Petroleum in Nigeria* (Ibadan, 1969), 1, 78.

strongly than to any other sector of the African economy. One reason was the very easy terms on which access was generally granted to this natural wealth. Only in South Africa were there political forces strong enough to extract mineral rents from the exploiting companies on a substantial scale. In Northern Rhodesia government revenue from the mining industry amounted to £645,000 in 1938, a mere 12.5 per cent of the sums remitted abroad by the companies.¹⁴ In the ten years from 1928 to 1937 the Nigerian government received about 4.5 per cent of the income generated by mining, or about 8 per cent of the share that accrued to capital.¹⁵ So it is not surprising that, as S. H. Frankel remarked in 1938, 'mining has been the touchstone of economic development in most parts of Africa, and the areas most advanced economically are those whose main activities rest on mineral exploitation'.¹⁶ He went on to show that 66 per cent of all the capital invested in Africa from outside, and 71 per cent of the private capital, had gone to what he called the 'special mineral territories' — the Union, South West Africa, the Rhodesias and the Belgian Congo. The predominance of minerals among Africa's exports, strongly established by the beginning of our period, weakened only slowly as other forms of extraction were developed; 64 per cent of all exports were minerals in 1907, 57 per cent in 1935.

In other respects nature has been less generous to Africa. With rare exceptions its soils are of low to moderate fertility, heavily leached, vulnerable to erosive forces whenever they are exposed for cultivation. Over the greater part of the continent — even when actual deserts are excluded — the rains, though they may be adequate in most years, are not reliable enough to give the farmer peace of mind; and in the forest zone, where rainfall is sure, the soils are especially deficient. Pests and diseases prey on both plants and animals with ceaseless tropical malignity. The adaptation of these environments to the needs of international commerce was not an easy process, and in the first years of

¹⁴ See Phyllis Deane, *The measurement of colonial national incomes* (Cambridge, 1948), 53–4. The total tax paid was 25 per cent, which was quite high by contemporary standards, but this was paid to the government of the United Kingdom, where the companies were domiciled, and only half of it was remitted to the country of origin.

¹⁵ See P. A. Bower, 'The mining industry', in Margery Perham (ed.), *The economics of a tropical dependency, I. Mining, commerce and finance in Nigeria* (London, 1948), 12.

¹⁶ Frankel, *Capital investment*, 210.

colonial rule the main supplement to minerals in the export market was not provided by agricultural products proper but by animal and vegetable substances that lay more immediately to hand. Ivory, which had been the staple of 'legitimate commerce' in the nineteenth century in East and Central Africa, quickly dwindled into insignificance, as elephants had been all but exterminated except in the remotest regions and the new governments enforced a change from general slaughter to a strictly regulated culling. Another natural product, however, continued for a few years to enjoy the prominence it had suddenly acquired in the 1880s, when the surging industrial demand for rubber caused the forests of tropical Africa to be ransacked for the various species of latex-yielding trees and vines that were scattered through them. This was, however, a strictly temporary expedient, for it was far more profitable in the long run to procure rubber from deliberately planted trees of a single Brazilian species, which was better suited to other parts of the wet tropics than to Africa. After the second decade of the century, therefore, rubber ceased to be important to any African country except Liberia. While it lasted, the wild rubber boom gave rise to the most notorious episode of colonial exploitation, the brutal harassment which caused the hapless subjects of the Congo Independent State to deliver large quotas for little or no reward. This business was passing its peak when our period begins, partly because of humanitarian pressure but even more (so it has recently been argued)¹⁷ because of diminishing returns. That there was no intrinsic connection between rubber-collecting and atrocity is shown by the experience of the Gold Coast and southern Nigeria, where many Africans welcomed this temporary addition to the range of gainful activities open to them.¹⁸


The forest of course also yielded valuable hardwood timbers, which became an increasingly valuable resource and were the principal export from otherwise undeveloped regions such as French Equatorial Africa and parts of the Ivory Coast. Other gifts of nature such as kapok, gum copal and gum arabic were of no

¹⁷ Robert Harms, 'The end of red rubber; a reassessment', *Journal of African History*, 1975, 16, 1, 73–88.

¹⁸ Raymond E. Dumett, 'The rubber trade of the Gold Coast and Asante in the nineteenth century: African innovation and market responsiveness', *Journal of African History*, 1971, 12, 79–102; E. D. Morel, *Affairs of West Africa* (London, 1902; new edn. 1968), 119ff.

general significance. But almost in the same category were hides and skins, the natural by-product of subsistence pastoralism, which were the leading exports from Kenya until after the First World War and were a useful bonus to the commerce of a number of other countries of the savanna belts. A similarly ambiguous position, midway between foraging and agriculture, was occupied by the exploitation of the oil-palm. Like the yam, this plant had been used for thousands of years and had greatly extended its habitat with the help of man. Unlike the yam, it did not come to be cultivated but was merely preserved when other trees were cut down or burned. The resultant palm forests of southern West Africa, and to a less extent those of the Congo basin, had been exploited for the purposes of overseas trade, as well as for consumption and for regional trade within Africa, since the early nineteenth century; and contrary to some expectations they went on being exploited through the colonial period and beyond it. Palm oil, which had replaced slaves as the main export from West Africa, supplying material for soap, lubricants and lighting fuel to distant markets, had suffered growing competition from both vegetable and mineral substitutes in the latter part of the nineteenth century; but against that, the chemists had found ways of making it edible in the form of margarine, and this demand gave economic value to the kernel as well as to the pericarp. So although palm products lost ground relatively to other export commodities — representing nearly 20 per cent of all exports from sub-Saharan Africa except the Union in 1913 but only 15 per cent in 1929 and 8.5 per cent in 1935 — they still remained the chief support of many regional economies.

The oil-palm is potentially a fully cultivated plant, and it became one in the Belgian Congo and to a small extent elsewhere. It is evidence that Africa did have some comparative advantages in the international market for agricultural commodities. Simply by virtue of being in the tropics, African plants have special properties: they envelop their seeds with oily substances; in the drier areas they develop strong fibres; for purposes of their own they use the sunlight to build up complex chemicals which are valued by man for their pungent flavour, their insecticidal potency or their effect on the nervous system. So Africa was in a good position to exploit the needs of industrial societies in the temperate zone for edible and inedible oils, for textile and rope materials and



4 Africa: major vegetation zones

for those frequent small doses of nicotine, caffeine and theobromine without which the stresses of industrial life would have been harder to endure.

Apart from the West African oil-palm, oil-yielding plants included the coconut palm, which continued to be exploited commercially on the East African coast, and sesame (simsim, benniseed), an indigenous food plant which now entered into the

PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT




Fig. 3. Exports of palm-oil, palm kernels, groundnuts and groundnut oil (thousand metric tons) from selected countries
 Source: M. J. Herskovits and M. Harwitz, eds., *Economic transition in Africa* (London, 1964), 158-9

export trade in a small way in both East and West Africa; but much the most important was the groundnut (or peanut), principal export from the Sudanic zone of West Africa. The groundnut had many attractions for peasant farmers in this region: it positively enjoyed dry conditions; being a legume, it put nitrogen into sandy soils instead of removing it; above all, if other crops failed, it could be eaten locally rather than being sold. (It also responds enthusiastically to phosphate fertilisers, but this fact did not become relevant until the 1950s.) Production for export was established in Senegambia during the nineteenth century, and it took off spectacularly in the densely populated Hausa country of Northern Nigeria in 1912, within weeks of the railway's arrival at Kano. This episode has been celebrated as a demonstration of African economic responsiveness;¹⁹ and rightly so, although the complex society of Hausaland was to some extent a special case, having, unlike most other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, a true peasantry long accustomed to the provisioning of an urban market and a numerous class of professional or semi-professional merchants quick to recognise an opening for profit.

The leading commercial fibre in terms of export value throughout this period was actually not a tropical product at all, but wool, which came almost entirely from the backs of South African sheep. It is an index of South Africa's continuing economic dominance of sub-Saharan Africa that it supplied the chief non-mineral as well as the chief mineral export commodity. By the 1920s, however, wool was being run close by cotton. This had long been the mainstay of Egypt's foreign trade, and in the middle colonial period it achieved similar dominance in the Sudan and Uganda, was important to Nyasaland and Tanganyika and had some significance for Mozambique, the Belgian Congo and several West African countries. Cotton had traditionally a very special place among the raw materials imported by Great Britain, and at the beginning of the colonial era the Lancashire cotton interest had a sharp eye on tropical Africa not only as a promising market for cloth but also as a possible major source of lint. Likewise the alleged need to break the British-American monopoly of cotton supplies had figured largely in the propaganda of the colonial lobby in Germany. It is therefore natural to suspect

¹⁹ Jan S. Hogendorn, *Nigerian groundnut exports: origins and early development* (Zaria and Ibadan, 1978).

that the rapid rise in production owed more to metropolitan pressures than to African self-interest. (This is separate from the more general question, which will be discussed later, of coercion to take part in the exchange economy as such.) It is certainly true that compulsory cotton-growing was the proximate cause of the great insurrection of 1905 in German East Africa and that in the British East African territories the element of compulsion, though rather more tactfully applied, was no less present in the early stages of cotton development. It is also true that the crop was enthusiastically promoted by the young Winston Churchill, then under-secretary for the colonies and MP for Oldham; that the British Cotton-Growing Association, a body formed by Lancashire interests and enjoying a small government subvention, helped to initiate production in both East and West Africa; and that it was succeeded in 1919 by a fully state-financed organisation, the Empire Cotton-Growing Corporation, which imparted a bias towards cotton in agronomic research and extension work all over the British tropical colonies. The corporation's medallion, which showed Britannia sitting on her throne while straining black and brown figures laid bales of cotton at her feet, was a gift to critics of British colonial egotism. Yet neither the Colonial Office nor the colonial administrations were in any simple way instruments of metropolitan business interests; and the administrations had interests of their own which sometimes pointed in a contrary direction. For their own part, they would want their subjects to produce whatever paid them best, because that would make them more contented and so more easily governed, and also because the maximising of taxable incomes was conducive to the well-being of the government itself. Thus, though London wanted the peasants of Northern Nigeria to grow cotton, when most of them decided to grow groundnuts instead the Nigerian authorities did nothing to impede their choice. And the East African governments remained keen on cotton-production even when metropolitan pressures had died away; it is ironic that by the 1920s, when African cotton-growing really got going, the Lancashire industry had entered its terminal decline, and most of the new output went to feed the mills of India and Japan.

The other significant fibre crop was sisal hemp, among whose functions was to supply the vast amounts of twine that were needed at that time for the harvesting of temperate-zone cereals.

ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY




Fig. 4. Exports of cocoa, coffee and cotton (thousand metric tons) from selected countries

Source: (cocoa, cotton) M. J. Herskovits and M. Harwitz, eds., *Economic transition in Africa* (London, 1964), 157, 159; (coffee, and cocoa from S. Tomé) Mitchell, *International historical statistics: Africa and Asia*, 199–200

PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT

Introduced by German entrepreneurs to East Africa, it became the principal export of Tanganyika and a very important product of Kenya as well. It had the great advantage that, being adapted to semi-arid conditions, it could be grown in large areas of East Africa that were good for little else.

In the production of the crops so far mentioned Africa had no very special advantage over other regions of the tropics and sub-tropics; and insofar as African countries had an edge over competitors in Asia and South America, or even over southern Europe and the southern United States, it was because their labour was cheaper. The same holds for tobacco, the most valuable export crop of the Rhodesias. It was with certain tree products that parts of Africa had a more truly distinctive role, and it was these that provided the most obvious agricultural success stories. Cloves had been introduced to the hot, wet islands of Zanzibar and Pemba in the early nineteenth century. Despite the fears of many, the industry survived the abolition of slavery and continued to provide about 90 per cent of the world's supply until the expansion of clove-production in Madagascar in the late 1930s. By a reversal which might well have become proverbial, large quantities were shipped to Indonesia, the original homeland of the spice. Tea was found to grow very well in the wetter western parts of the Kenya Highlands as well as in the hills around Lake Nyasa (Malawi), and production was rising rapidly towards the end of the period. But the main commodities of this kind were coffee and cocoa. Forest species of coffee, native to equatorial Africa, were produced in large quantities, especially on the shores of Lake Victoria in Uganda and Tanganyika, in Angola and in the Ivory Coast. Mountain coffee, producing fine-flavoured beans for the European and American markets, was much more exacting in its requirements. The subtle combination of soil and climate needed for the production of the most lucrative kinds was found on the slopes of Mt Elgon in Uganda, the Aberdare mountains in Kenya and Kilimanjaro and Meru in Tanganyika, and these became districts of quite exceptional prosperity, though in highland Ethiopia the value of the crop was reduced by lack of quality control. Both kinds of coffee could be grown in the eastern part of the Belgian Congo, and in 1937–8 this territory produced more than any other in mainland Africa. Still better rents accrued to those Africans who had access to land that was favoured by the

cocoa tree, a plant of the American tropical lowlands that does well in parts of the West African forest zone and in few other places in the world. By 1905 cocoa-growing had been developing in the Gold Coast for about three decades and it went on expanding rapidly for another two, by which time this one country was producing not far short of half the world's supply. Cocoa in fact did even more than gold to make the Gold Coast easily the richest of the 'black' African dependencies; and it also made south-west Nigeria a much more than averagely prosperous region, though here the crop was slower to establish itself and output barely reached a quarter of the Gold Coast total.

In the organisation of colonial agricultural extraction there was in principle a clear choice of method: primary production could be left to African smallholders working on their own lands in their own time, or the producers could be assembled in large enterprises under capitalist direction. The choice was not easy and the outcome of competition between the two systems was usually hard to predict. There was little difference at this time between alien planter and African cultivator in the equipment or the techniques of cultivation; insofar as higher output was obtained on the plantations it was because the work was better organised and disciplined, not because it received any large application of capital, and it was often doubtful whether the gain would be enough to offset the heavy costs of the foreign management by which it was secured. On the other hand, from the African point of view it was by no means always clear that a higher income could be gained from independent production than from wage-earning, and even the non-monetary advantages were not all on the side of the homestead, when account is taken of the boredom suffered by young men in rural communities where war had been abolished and politics had been reduced to triviality.

It was in the processing of the product that advantages of scale sometimes became significant. Certain specialised crops, namely tea, sugar, sisal and flue-cured tobacco, were strong candidates for the plantation mode, because harvesting and processing needed to be closely linked. (Tea must be treated within hours of plucking sugarcane and sisal leaves are too bulky to be carried to distant factories.) Sugar was chiefly grown in Natal, though it was also produced in Uganda, mostly for local consumption; tea, tobacco and sisal were mostly grown in East and Central Africa. Cotton

on the other hand lent itself with special ease to cultivation on African smallholdings. It fitted well into many systems of subsistence farming, and the necessary labour, most of which was needed briefly for the picking of the ripe bolls, was most economically supplied by the farmer's family. Moreover there was no compulsory connection between cultivation and processing, as the raw cotton could be carried to small independent ginneries spaced around the countryside. The Gezira scheme in the Sudan, where cotton was grown on newly irrigated land, was a special and interesting variant; here the crop was produced by small-holding tenants of a private company, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, which provided processing, marketing and technical services, and the proceeds were divided between the cultivators, the company and the government, which had carried out the major irrigation work. Elsewhere irrigation was neither necessary nor usually feasible. In its absence, and without either slave labour on the one hand or effective boll-picking machines on the other, there was no case for the large plantation. So the economics of cotton, the crop most coveted by the metropolis, helped to ensure that Uganda especially developed as a nation of sedentary peasants rather than of migrant wage-earners.

Similar considerations applied to groundnuts, which were never even thought of as a crop for large-scale cultivation before the ill-considered East African venture of 1947, and to cocoa, which fitted easily into the traditional forest-gardening systems of West Africa and needed only simple processing before export. The story of cocoa, however, serves to correct any notion of an absolute distinction between the 'plantation' and the 'peasant' (or 'petty-commodity') modes of commercially oriented production, or of the synonymy of 'capitalist' and 'non-African'; many of the Gold Coast growers, especially, hired labour and operated with a business style and objective that put them in much the same category as the smaller European planters in some other African countries,²⁰ as did some African coffee-growers, notably in Buganda.

With coffee the question of scale and organisation was more ambiguous. The indigenous *robusta* coffee already took a minor part in many African economies, and the sun-dried beans could

²⁰ Polly Hill, *Migrant cocoa farmers of southern Ghana: a study in rural capitalism* (Cambridge, 1963).

be taken without much difficulty to central curing works, so there was no need to bear the costs of foreign management or investment. The more valuable mountain coffee, on the other hand, needed processing of a kind which gave some advantage to units larger than a normal African holding. But the advantage was not decisive, and the striking success of African coffee-growers on the slopes of Mt Elgon (Masaba) and Kilimanjaro between the wars showed that there was no real impediment to 'native production' of this crop. The practically exclusive control of it by European planters in Kenya and Angola was a function of their political power much more than of superior economic efficiency.

The oil-palm presented problems of a rather different kind. Here organised plantations had distinct advantages over the traditional West African method of production. Harvesting of the fruit was easier because the palms grew less tall when they did not have to compete with forest trees; yields were higher, more efficient processing expressed more oil from a given quantity of fruit, and it was oil of a higher quality, with a lower percentage of free fatty acid. William Lever, anxious for larger and more secure supplies of his raw material, sought to overcome the last difficulty by setting up oil-mills at strategic centres in Nigeria in 1911. But to make these pay he would have needed monopoly purchasing rights in the catchment areas, and this the authorities refused to grant him. After the war he returned to the attack, now seeking land for plantations, and was again rebuffed. The episode shows that official favour did not always go to the most capitalistic of the available forms of production. On the first occasion the refusal reflected the Colonial Office's rooted dislike of monopoly concessions, reinforced by opposition from Lever's mercantile competitors; but the post-war controversy elicited ideological pronouncements about the superiority of 'native production'²¹ and these would become settled doctrine in British dependencies during the inter-war period, except where European interests in land were already entrenched.

Meanwhile Lever had secured large grants of land from the more complaisant Belgian authorities, and his Huileries du Congo Belge became the second pillar, after the Union Minière, of the Congolese economy. Since palm plantations were being estab-

²¹ See especially Sir Hugh Clifford, address to the Nigerian legislative council, 1921.

lished in Malaya and Indonesia as well, it was feared that West African export production must succumb to the competition of more progressive industries. And indeed it steadily lost ground in the world market. Yet in absolute terms the Nigerian export at least continued to grow for a long time, even though the producers were slow to move to more systematic cultivation. For in fact the old methods fitted in well with their other activities, and they had the great advantage over capitalist planters of being able to consume their produce or to trade it locally when the external market was adverse.

On the whole, then, the classical tropical plantation had only a modest role to play in colonial Africa. But there were divergent forms of European enterprise that call for special consideration. One was the concessionary system, whereby private companies were in effect granted control over whole populations as well as the land they lived on. This was of course an expedient by which metropolitan governments tried to avoid the capital expenses of colonial development, thereby renouncing its profits and tolerating the inevitable abuses of private monopoly. The British 'chartered companies' of the late nineteenth century were obvious examples, and in the Rhodesias a somewhat modified form of company government persisted until 1923-4. The Congo Independent State was a private empire of much the same kind, and spawned a number of sub-empires. King Leopold's role was much the same as that of Rhodes and Goldie in their respective spheres: to bring a tract of Africa to the point of development at which metropolitan finance capital would find it profitable to take over. In the high colonial period, however, concessionary regimes survived only under weak colonial governments and in unpromising regions where population was sparse and few exploitable resources were apparent. The chief examples were in French Equatorial Africa and in Mozambique.²² Most of the latter territory was misruled during the first three decades of this century by private firms, of which the two largest and most nearly sovereign, the Mozambique and Niassa Companies, came to be controlled by British and South African financiers. Between 1928 and 1930 the Niassa Company and the lesser concessions were replaced by the new Salazarist bureaucracy, but the Mozambique Company retained its prerogatives until 1941.

²² See chapters 7 and 10.

Then there was that special kind of entrepreneur, the white colonist. Whereas the most characteristic type of plantation is owned by a company domiciled in the metropolitan capital and operated by a salaried manager who will eventually return home, the 'true' colonist or settler is a working farmer who endeavours to replicate in a more spacious land the agricultural patterns of his European homeland, thinks of himself as belonging to a permanent community of emigrants and does not envisage return either for himself or for his descendants. In practice the distinction was not clear-cut, for many Europeans in Africa were planters by virtue of the kind of agriculture they practised (coffee-growing for example) but settlers by virtue of the scale of their operations and the source of their finance, and also by their political aspirations and their social role. It is however conceptually important, in that the economic decisions of settlers were less strictly determined by prospects of financial profit.

To describe the white settler as a 'special' type was perhaps misleading. It is true that liberal commentators have commonly looked on settler Africa, most of all of course South Africa, as a deviation from the norm of colonial development that was represented by West Africa and Uganda and had its archetype in the great Indian empire. But at the beginning of our period many Englishmen would have reversed the emphasis, seeing colonisation as the ideal and the West African mode as a last resort where malaria and dense native populations kept the door closed to settlers. The idea of creating an Indian type of empire in tropical Africa had appealed only to limited sections of the business and professional classes, but there was much wider enthusiasm for the dream of new Australias, where British workers could find a better life, become efficient suppliers of Britain's needs and high-income consumers of British goods, and send their strong-grown sons to help Britain in her wars. Likewise the need for colonies where land-hungry peasants could find living-space without being lost to the Fatherland had played a large part in the rhetoric and some part in the actual calculations of German imperialism. It is now widely believed that the prime object of colonialism was to extract surplus value from African labour, but at the turn of the century it seemed that for many colonialists the ideal Africa would have been one without Africans, or one where the aborigines played no greater part than they did in Australasia or North America,

or Siberia or Chile. This was the condition which to all appearance the Germans were trying to create in South West Africa at the beginning of our period. Only later would they regret that so few Herero had survived to work the lands from which they had been driven; and only later would Britons begin to assure one another, in a cliché very popular between the wars, that the greatest asset of Africa was the African.

So it was more or less taken for granted in the first two decades of the century that the frontier of white settlement would advance far beyond its long-established strongholds in the far south and that European farmers would be encouraged to move into all areas where they could live and raise children in reasonable health. In practice this meant the irregular but nearly continuous tract of malaria-free upland that stretched through the eastern interior from the Drakensberg to Mt Kenya, inviting the intrusion of some thousands of hopeful settlers, some of whom moved up from the old Afrikaner and British colonies in the south while others were newly arrived from Britain, Germany and other parts of Europe. Here they attempted to rear crossbred sheep and cattle, to grow wheat or, failing that, maize, or to plant more specialised crops such as coffee and tobacco. But the vision of colonisation was not firmly based in economic reality. The white farmers were not occupying an untamed wilderness, as some of them supposed. They were inserting themselves into lands which were already being exploited, if not always very intensively, by a numerous and resilient native population. It was not simply that, short of genocide, there was no way of making room for a mass influx of colonists, but also that African labour-power, by its mere presence, drove down the market price of white labour, leaving no economic space for unskilled and semi-skilled emigrants, or for the independent homesteaders who were the nucleus of European colonies elsewhere. In East Africa, moreover, European artisans and small traders were confronted by unbeatable Asian competitors. Thus the people of European origin did not come to constitute whole communities as some had hoped, but formed an upper stratum of landowners, urban and rural capitalists and professional people, separated from the indigenous masses by increasingly rigid caste barriers. The new societies north of the Limpopo were formed on a caste basis from the outset; and the history of South Africa in this period is essentially the consolida-

tion of a caste society, as nearly all white men were enabled to move out of the ranks of unskilled labour in town and country and to become either capitalists or a specially privileged stratum of the working class.

Further, in the production of meat, cereals and dairy produce the white farmers of Africa were at a serious disadvantage in comparison with the better-established, lower-cost suppliers in other continents. This did not seem to matter in our first decade, when world demand was rising fast, but the glut that developed between the wars created a serious crisis. Thus they depended on local urban markets, which were not yet sufficiently developed except in the far south. But here again there was the same problem: Africans were able to provision these markets at much lower cost. Technically there was no decisive gap at this time, certainly not a wide enough gap to justify the far higher returns that the farmer of European origin needed if he was to stay in business. (Ironically, it is in the last twenty years that effective mechanisation, together with fertilisers, insecticides and herbicides, has everywhere generated crucial advantages of scale in cereal farming, so that the professional, highly capitalised farmer has been acquiring an indispensable economic role at the time when his political privileges were disappearing.) Hence one of the main bones of racial contention in 'settler' Africa was the local market for foodstuffs. During the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth many South African tribesmen had gone a long way towards transforming themselves into peasants, producing systematically for the market and sometimes adopting radically new techniques such as the ox-drawn plough. At the time this trend was encouraged by the authorities, but after 1910 it was deliberately reversed by political action; from then on, the roles assigned to the African majority were to be those of subsistence cultivator and wage-earner, and no other.²³ Further north, where the entry of Africans into commercial production was slower, similar policies were adopted, though their application was less rigorous.

It is clear that there was a close link, almost a symbiosis, between white farming and the mining enterprise which alone could generate a sufficient demand for its product. In Kenya,

²³ See especially Colin Bundy, *The rise and fall of the South African peasantry* (London, 1979).

where minerals were lacking, the true working smallholder never managed to establish himself, and the smaller capitalist farmers, those who could not go in for coffee-growing or large-scale ranching, survived only because of their political influence, which won them a great variety of favours in the form of technical assistance, branch railways, differential freight rates, tariff protection and, from 1931, cheap finance from the state land bank. Even in southern Africa, urban capitalists complained bitterly that the farming sector was more parasitic than symbiotic, that the economy was massively distorted in support of an uneconomic agriculture whose real strength was that it was conducted by members of the dominant ethnic group.²⁴ In the last resort, however, they would tolerate its exactions for the sake of the political underpinning which it provided for their own position.

With hindsight the idea of the mass colonisation of Africa seems so improbable that it must be suspected of having been little more than the cover for what actually happened: the appropriation of large quantities of African land by the British, and for a time also the German, ruling class. Significant here was the 'Soldier Settlement Scheme' of 1919 in Kenya, which turned out to be a scheme for the allocation of virtually free estates to officers and gentlemen, with generals and ex-governors (or their wives) rather more prominent than the survivors of the trenches.²⁵ Here and in the Rhodesias much of the early alienation of land was the 'staking of claims' on the increment of value which transport and commercial developments would give it in the future. Would-be landed proprietors did not, however, have things all their own way, since colonial administrators held more or less strongly to the conviction that this increment belonged, not to 'speculators', but either to the indigenous communities whom they governed or to the state which they embodied. Yet officials were also constrained by the fear of discouraging the inflow of capital into their territories. The outcome of this often acrimonious dispute varied. The Southern Rhodesian referendum of 1923 was a

²⁴ A characteristic statement from the 1930s was that of C. S. Richards, 'Subsidies, quotas, tariffs and the excess cost of agriculture in South Africa', *South African Journal of Economics*, 1935, 3, 365-403. Cf. the Rhodesian complaints cited by V. Machingaidze, 'The development of capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia...1908-1939' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1980), 308.

²⁵ The *East African Standard*, 22 August 1919, reporting the results of the ballot held in London.

victory for white proprietors over both kinds of government, that of the chartered company and that which was directed from Whitehall. In Kenya the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 did indeed declare the land of Kenya (then nominally a protectorate) to be the property of the British Crown, but it also provided that those parts of it not actually being used by Africans could and would be handed over to Europeans on 999-year leases, which amounted to outright property. In Tanganyika, on the other hand, the British administration declared all land to be 'public' unless already alienated, signifying that it was the property of the African communities, and in Uganda too official policy hardened in the 1920s against permitting alien rights in land. In British West Africa, as we have seen, alienation was practically excluded.

The white farm in Africa, as distinct from the highly capitalised plantation, was always a somewhat artificial construction. While some critics have seen it as the highest as well as the most offensive form of colonialism, others have dismissed it as a mere epiphenomenon, a colourful but not really important feature of the drama of capitalist exploitation, which took other and more serious forms. Certainly the support given to it by finance capital was lukewarm at best, as settlers complained between the wars and as would be implied by political events north of the Limpopo after 1950. Yet in our period it was too prominent in the scenery of East and southern Africa to be easily ignored; nor was it by any means entirely an obstacle to African freedom and progress, given the general context of colonial domination. Wherever a substantial European population established itself, the development of a modern infrastructure proceeded much faster than elsewhere, as the government felt obliged to provide it with roads and hospitals and technical services and urban amenity; and although these developments were in the short term irrelevant to the needs of the mass of the people, and took place partly at their expense, they would eventually be a valuable endowment for the emergent nations. By the same token, as we shall see, governments of these countries had to adopt less deflationary fiscal and monetary policies than in the pure African dependencies. Perhaps more important still, independent European proprietors were a countervailing force competing with governments and mine-owners and merchants for African labour and so enhancing its value. The Kikuyu who went to 'squat' on European estates were

not only gaining access to land which had hitherto belonged to the Masai if anyone; they were also escaping from the oppressions of government-appointed headmen and the obligations of road *corvées* and the like. Conversely, the system of 'native production' adopted in British West Africa, in Uganda and for the most part in Tanganyika ensured that the increasing rental value of African land was not directly appropriated by foreigners, but did not necessarily prevent a large part of it from being diverted away from Africans through monopoly profits of merchants or through government taxation.

The peasant producer of export crops was a long way from the final markets for his product and from the manufacturing sources of the consumer goods that were a large part of his reward, and for the liberal model of the economy to have worked perfectly there would have had to be perfect competition at each of the intervening levels of exchange. Needless to say, this did not occur. At the lowest level there was usually a fair amount of competition to buy his produce and to relieve him of the resultant cash. In West Africa there was no lack of enterprising African produce-buyers and retailers,²⁶ and in East Africa, where indigenous commercial institutions were more weakly developed, the gap was largely filled by immigrants from the mercantile districts of western India. If competition weakened at this level in the 1930s, especially in East Africa, it was mainly because of the intervention of the state in favour of a few established and politically influential firms and organisations. There were, admittedly, exceptions: in French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo firms enjoyed monopolies over the trade of very large areas. But in most of tropical Africa, competition, however imperfect, was the norm.

At the highest level, too, competition on the whole prevailed. The 'world market' was not the mystic expression of economic law, but neither was it a conspiracy to fix prices to the disadvantage of colonial producers. It consisted of complex institutions in London, New York and other centres which were sensitively adjusted to the shifting balance of supply and demand in the world

²⁶ P. T. Bauer, *West African trade: a study of competition, oligopoly and monopoly in a changing economy* (Cambridge, 1954), 22ff.

as a whole. (The long-term determinants of supply and demand for primary produce are another matter.)²⁷ Moreover, the rules of the Partition, implicit even when not written into formal agreements, provided that there was to be free communication between these markets and the African producers and consumers; import duties were to be for revenue only and neither import nor export taxes were to discriminate between different sources and destinations. For a while the rules were fairly well observed. In 1919 Britain reduced customs duties on various Empire products, which specifically benefited Rhodesian tobacco, but an attempt at about the same time to divert palm kernels to crushing mills in the United Kingdom by means of differential export duties was quickly abandoned as improper and on balance inimical to British interests.²⁸ But the crisis of the early 1930s put an end to the era of free-trade empire, and the economies of the African colonies became thereafter steadily less 'open'. In 1934, for example, the British West African dependencies all introduced customs duties that discriminated against Japanese textiles, which had just begun to invade markets hitherto dominated by British manufactures. (The East African territories could not follow suit because they were formally committed to free trade by the 'Congo Basin' treaties of the Partition era, to which Japan had acceded in 1919.) Understandable to anyone who saw the grey faces of unemployed weavers in the grey streets of Lancashire, this intervention was nevertheless an injustice to Britain's still poorer subjects, who were compelled to pay more than they need have done for what had become necessary imports. In some ways it was a more significant turning-point than the introduction, in the same year, of the imperial preference system, from which the African colonies benefited little. Britain was not of course alone in moving towards the closed imperial economy. Subjects of France and Portugal in particular were becoming more and more the captive customers of high-cost metropolitan industries.

Even without the help of fiscal or other overt discrimination, colonial rule had skewed the pattern of African trade in the direction of the metropolis. All the goods imported for the use of British colonial administrations were procured through the

²⁷ See below, pp. 129–31.

²⁸ W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth affairs*, II, part I (London, 1941), 113–21.

Crown Agents, who placed almost all their orders with United Kingdom suppliers. Though French and German firms did business in British territories and British firms in French ones, merchants with a base in the homeland had linguistic and institutional advantages which tended to give them an increasing market share in their 'own' colonies; and even when there was no vertical integration they would have a bias towards metropolitan consumers and producers. In spite of this the United Kingdom's share of Africa's trade decreased slowly but continuously, apart from the lift given by the temporary elimination of German competition during the First World War. Of Nigeria's imports, for example, the British percentage was 77 in 1905, 71 in 1913, 82 in 1920, 68 in 1930 and 55 in 1938. The fall, however, was much less steep than the deterioration of Britain's position in the world economy as a whole; and so it could be argued that the colonial empire mitigated the effects of her slowing economic growth (and of the continuing stagnation of Portugal and France). It could also be held, however, that the possession of privileged colonial markets, by cushioning the metropolitan economies against the impact of inevitable change, was itself a major cause of their debility.

By its nature, a colonial economy cannot be an ideally open one, for however sincerely the government may think itself an impartial umpire of commercial exchanges it is in the last resort too closely linked to one set of players to perform that function properly. Nevertheless, until the 1930s at least, the trade-creating effects of peace and transport easily outweighed the trade-distorting consequences of imperial power; and even then none of the empires in Africa formed a fully closed system of state-imposed monopoly. Quite apart, however, from the direct action of colonial governments, there were forces at work which, especially in West Africa, tended to reduce the number of separate businesses competing in the import and export markets and so to strengthen the power of the survivors. The high overhead costs of long-distance trade in Africa, the advantages of scale in the procurement of standardised goods for the mass African market, the intensity of price fluctuations in the inter-war years favoured the largest concerns. Well before the end of the period the smaller independent European traders, as well as Africans, had been practically excluded from overseas operations and from the highest levels of

internal commerce; and even in the middle levels African traders were increasingly becoming agents for particular European firms, or even their employees.

By the 1930s the general trade of British West Africa was dominated by the seven firms which belonged to the collusive organisation called the Association of West African Merchants, who were joined in the purchase of cocoa by agents of the British chocolate manufacturers.²⁹ These firms, moreover, were of very unequal size. One of them, the United Africa Company, is reckoned to have handled over 40 per cent of the entire overseas trade of Nigeria and a not much smaller proportion of the trade of the whole region.³⁰ This firm, itself merely one part of the great manufacturing and distributive organisation, Unilever, had a complicated genealogy. One of its ancestors was Sir George Goldie's Royal Niger Company which, after losing its title, its political functions and its presiding genius in 1900, maintained a rather unenterprising existence in Nigeria until 1920, when it was acquired by William Lever as one way of getting direct access to the raw materials of his soap. The purchase, made at the top of the market, nearly broke Lever Bros but left it firmly locked into the West African economy. The other parent was the African and Eastern Trade Corporation, the result of a series of mergers and take-overs which had united nearly all the old coastal trading concerns of the British sector. This group finally came to terms with the Niger Company in 1929 to form the United Africa Company. In the same year European competition for oils and fats was mostly eliminated by the merger between Lever Bros and the Dutch margarine combine of Van den Bergh and Jurgens. This concentration of commercial power had certain advantages for West Africa. Unilever's interest in keeping raw material prices at the lowest possible level was partly balanced by the opposite interest of its merchandising wing, which needed African peasants to be able to afford its goods.³¹ To a certain extent UAC and the other big trading firms wielded countervailing power against another monopoly, the West African Shipping Conference, which

²⁹ For the organisation of external trade in French West Africa and the dominant role of SCOA and CFAO, see chapter 7.

³⁰ J. Mars, 'Extra-territorial enterprises', in Perham, *Economics of a tropical dependency*, II, 58–9. Bauer, *West African trade*, 71, 220, gives the market shares (for 'Firm A') in 1949 in tables 8 and 14.

³¹ Charles Wilson, *The history of Unilever*, II (London, 1954), 318–23.

for most of the time consisted of Elder, Dempster & Co., with the Hamburg firm of Woermann as its junior partner.³² And, although competition in West African commerce was very imperfect, it was not entirely suppressed. Approaches to actual monopoly or monopsony were checked by interlopers, often Greeks or Levantines or North Africans, such as the well-known Saul Raccah who broke UAC's control of the Kano groundnut market in the late 1930s, or by the concerted action of African producers and middlemen, as in the successful hold-up of cocoa in the Gold Coast in 1938.

All the same, it is unlikely that West Africans gained quite as much from the growth of external trade as they might have done if its structure had conformed more closely to the model of perfect competitiveness. In this respect they were worse off than the countries of eastern and southern Africa, where foreign merchants had to deal with more sophisticated consumers and more powerful producers, some of whom could sell directly on the world market through London brokers while others formed effective selling co-operatives such as the Kenya Farmers' Association. East Africa's external commerce was handled partly by Indian merchants and partly by London-based firms for which it was an annexe to a varied Indian and Australasian business.³³ None of these was in a position to dominate the market or had direct links with British domestic interests.

On the worst reckoning, excess profits of monopolistic merchants were not the most important of the deductions that were made from the income theoretically accruing to Africans from commercial expansion. That there were such deductions is evident from inspection of the trade balances. Countries in Africa's early stage of incorporation into the modern world economy would be expected to be substantial net importers of capital and therefore to show large deficits on visible trade; and the 'settler' countries did consistently run such deficits; but in the countries of 'native production' the picture was very different. In West Africa the trading accounts were approximately in balance before the First World War, and thereafter showed a very regular surplus, as they did also in Uganda. In the decade after 1945 such surpluses, which

³² Charlotte Leubuscher, *The West African shipping trade, 1909–1939* (Leiden, 1963).

³³ Kathleen M. Stahl, *The metropolitan organisation of British colonial trade* (London, 1951), part 4.

were then associated with the operation of the State Marketing Boards, attracted a good deal of attention and criticism; but proportionately they had actually been slightly larger in the decade of the 1930s, when they amounted to 32 per cent of the value of the Gold Coast's exports, 27 per cent of Nigeria's and no less than 48 per cent of Uganda's.³⁴

Among the mechanisms which generated such a large volume of unrequited exports there must be included the operations of colonial public finance. The peace and transport which made the new trade possible were not free gifts. The British Treasury reluctantly paid the military and administrative expenses of 'new' dependencies, but it insisted on self-reliance at the earliest possible moment, and the balancing of its budget had to be the first concern of every colonial government. Not just the balancing either: they were expected to achieve prudential surpluses, and generally did so except in the worst years of the 1930s. Except for the special case of the Uganda Railway, constructed at the expense of the British taxpayer, railways were financed by interest-bearing loans. In addition, since the work of colonial officials was deemed to be performed entirely for the benefit of Africa, it was Africa that had to pay them, not only while they were in service but also after they had retired to Britain. These fixed charges were made more onerous by the inter-war fall in the price level, and led to an outward flow of resources comparable to the 'drain' which had aroused passionate complaint in India in the late nineteenth century.

Taxation, it should be noted, took highly regressive forms. Africans usually paid a flat-rate hut- or poll-tax. The bulk of colonial revenue, however, came from import duties, which were calculated *ad valorem* and bore heavily on cloth and other items of common consumption. In British Africa north of the Zambezi, income tax was unusual before the 1940s, being introduced only in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (from 1921 onwards), Kenya (briefly in 1920–2 and again from 1937) and Nigeria (from 1927 but not for companies until 1940). The larger trading and mining firms, however, were domiciled in the United Kingdom and paid tax there, though a half share of this was remitted to the colony in which the income was generated.

³⁴ A. Hazlewood, 'Trade balances and statutory marketing in primary export economies', *Economic Journal*, 1957, 67, 74–82.

The impact of fiscal institutions and policies was strongly reinforced by colonial monetary arrangements, especially in the latter part of the period. At the beginning of the century trade was conducted in tropical Africa, not by barter, but partly by sterling coins issued at a substantial profit to the Royal Mint (or, in East Africa, by Indian rupees), partly by a variety of other European coins, and partly by 'traditional' currencies (cowries, brass manillas and the like) which had all the characteristics of money except that they were not subject to monopoly control of the supply. Under the new regime it was naturally thought essential to establish a more orderly system, and one which reflected the dominant role of exchanges with the capitalist world. So official currency boards were set up for British West Africa in 1912 and for British East Africa in 1920 (when the rupee was replaced by sterling) to regulate the money supply in their respective regions.³⁵ In order to assure traders and bankers of monetary stability, the boards (and therefore the colonial governments) were deliberately deprived of any powers of initiative, and the system is indeed one of the best illustrations of what 'dependency' actually means. They were instructed simply to issue local currency in exchange for sterling on a basis of parity. The money supply in the colonies was thus tied strictly to their export earnings. Fluctuations in world market prices were transmitted automatically to the domestic economies. Inflation-led growth was ruled out, and there was no opportunity for counter-cyclical action on the part of the local administrations. In addition, the boards were instructed to maintain a very high ratio of reserves to currency liabilities. The reserve funds, like the balances of the territorial governments, were of course invested in London, and most authorities believe that the interest earned did not compensate the dependencies for the deflationary effect of their absence. In this matter there was a very significant difference between the performance of the boards. The West African board achieved the target of 100 per cent reserve ratio in 1926 and exceeded that figure through the rest of the period.

³⁵ W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, *Money and banking in British colonial Africa* (Oxford, 1954), 25–71; A. G. Hopkins, 'The creation of a colonial monetary system: the origins of the West African Currency Board', *African Historical Studies*, 1970, 3, 1, 101–32; J. Mars, 'The monetary and banking system and loan market of Nigeria', in Perham, *Economics of a tropical dependency*, II, 178ff.

In East Africa, where local interests carried more weight and the influence of the Treasury and the City of London relatively less, the ratio never reached 50 per cent before 1940 and in 1932 fell even below 10 per cent.³⁶

The passivity of the monetary institutions would have had a less depressing effect if the banks had not shared similar traditions and objectives. Those operating in British colonial territories were few in number and homogeneous in character. In West Africa there was the Bank of British West Africa; in East and Central Africa (neatly reflecting the nature of this region as the zone of interaction of two sub-imperialisms) there were the Standard Bank of South Africa and the National Bank of India; and from 1926 Barclays (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas), an amalgamation of banks hitherto operating in South Africa, the Middle East and the West Indies, functioned in all territories. All these were based in London and had close links with one or more of the British joint-stock banks. Thus they were 'part of the British banking tradition and the London money market' and 'fundamentally their colonial operations resulted from the extension of British commercial banking into a colonial context'.³⁷ The main features of the tradition in question are well known. The historic function of banks in Britain has been to finance trade by providing a safe and modestly remunerative outlet for the liquid assets of the propertied classes. With the security of their depositors as the overriding consideration, risk has had to be eschewed. Productive enterprises might be supplied with working capital but not usually with long-term loans, still less with equity participation. Banks of this sort were very efficient and reliable lubricators of Africa's international exchanges but were not equipped to act as agents of its internal development. Moreover in the colonial context their behaviour was in certain ways more restrictive than in their home environment. The special talent of British bankers was the personal evaluation of the creditworthiness of borrowers. It might not be necessary to play golf with the branch manager in order to get a bank loan, but one had to be the kind of person with whom he might play golf. Needless to say, very few Africans were in this category; more seriously, very few Africans held land

³⁶ Newlyn and Rowan, *Money and banking*, 50, 59.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 74.

on terms which rendered it a mortgageable asset to would-be borrowers.³⁸ Thus the banks found it hard to discern suitable opportunities for investment within Africa, and consequently the greater part of the funds entrusted to them by colonial governments and expatriate businesses was transferred to London.

So the repatriation of profits from territories dominated by mining enterprise was matched by the combined remittances of colonial treasuries, currency authorities and banks in the countries where production was in African hands. It was only where there were resident populations of European origin that the great bulk of the income generated by international trade was kept within the country. And this was the main reason why it was those parts of Africa that achieved the most rapid and diversified development. Elsewhere the funds retained were not sufficient to break the chain of underdevelopment: low productivity, low income, low demand and low investment.

LAND AND LABOUR

All this says little more than that Africa had to pay heavily for the capital and the capitalist organisation that were supplied to her in the colonial period. The other factors, land and labour, were, as was noted earlier (p. 87), assumed by the liberal model to be virtually free goods, which could be applied to export production at hardly any real cost; and that assumption now needs to be qualified. It is true that production for export was in this period almost entirely a net addition to total output, just as the compensating imports were in the main a net addition to consumption. Cash-crops were generally grown as well as subsistence food-crops, not in substitution for them; and where this was not so, as in parts of the West African cocoa belt, food was bought from neighbouring areas, thus widening the orbit of the exchange economy. Overall, Africa remained self-sufficient in basic foods. By the end of the period, as will be seen, there were more people in Africa than at the beginning and most of them

³⁸ There was a trend towards the establishment of individual land titles in parts of East Africa (see pp. 684, 696 below), and in West Africa the possibility of registering freehold titles was discussed in the late 1920s and 1930s, but the legal complications were considerable and the registration of freehold was introduced only in Lagos, in 1935. The French in West Africa were less restrictive: see chapter 7, p. 382 and n.67.

were probably eating a little better, yet food imports were still small and consisted almost entirely of luxury and semi-luxury items consumed by the immigrant communities and a few of the most prosperous Africans. Nor would it be correct to say that Africa had been de-industrialised in order to make way for the export–import economy. The smelting of iron ores, formerly a widespread activity, had indeed practically ceased, and blacksmiths had been reduced to the reforging of scrap metal. On the other hand, where cotton textile-production was well-established (that is, mainly in West Africa) it had maintained its position, since the factory-made imports, though cheaper than the traditional product, were on the whole less desirable. And losses in some of the old crafts were at least offset by the rise of new ones, such as vehicle maintenance, bicycle repair and tailoring (with the now ubiquitous treadle sewing-machine), as well as the various ‘modern’ building trades.

At the same time, the application of land and labour to export production was far from being a cost-free process. It is true that land continued to seem abundant except in a few special areas, notably in south-east Nigeria, parts of Kenya, Basutoland and the native reserve areas of South Africa. But in a good many other areas the extension of cultivation, brought about by the combination of the export demand and the growth of population, began to disturb the often precarious ecological balance. Bush fallows were shortened and the depleted soils became more vulnerable to erosion. The removal of forest and woodland cover also promoted both erosion and leaching of the soil, and may have altered local climates for the worse. The alarms raised by ecologists in the inter-war period, which led to the appearance of books with titles like ‘Africa, the dying land’, seem with hindsight to have been excessive or at any rate premature;³⁹ but it cannot be doubted that agricultural activity was already causing some loss of natural capital. By comparison the effects of mining were less serious, for although minerals are more obviously a non-renewable resource than surface soils the operations in our period had hardly even begun to exhaust the reserves of any of the principal ores.

The salient feature of the colonial era for Africans was

³⁹ J.-P. Harroy, *L’Afrique, terre qui meurt* (Paris, 1944). A soil scientist, quoted by W. Allan, *The African husbandman* (Edinburgh, 1965), 385, warned in 1941 that erosion could put an end to organised life in the United States by the end of the century and in Africa almost certainly before that.

undoubtedly a great increase in the total amount of work done by men, and probably also (though this matter needs more investigation) by the already heavily burdened women. In conventional analysis the cost of this addition would be identified as the sacrifice of leisure. But 'leisure' was a concept alien to Africa, and it would be more pertinent to note that many of the new forms of labour required arduous journeying and long separation from home and family and that nearly all of them, whether in mines, on plantations or on peasant smallholdings, were repetitive and exhausting activities, such as no sensible person would undertake except by necessity or for large reward. And here was the crux of African development, quickly perceived by governments and other employers. Necessity did not drive, since the workers possessed the means of subsistence, and high rewards could not be offered, because in most cases they would eliminate profit and exhaust the revenues of states. African societies in the early twentieth century were not disintegrating, overcrowded peasant communities for whose members any sort of wage employment was an improvement. They were still functioning, essentially self-sufficient tribal societies, and 'subsistence' in this context did not mean bare physical survival but the material basis for a satisfying human life, however straitened it might appear to outsiders. When the rains failed, of course, this basis collapsed, and in the first years of the colonial system famine was sometimes an effective recruiter of wage labour; but such an occasional, and steadily less frequent, stimulus hardly provided an adequate foundation for a new economic system. Wage goods were usually not essentials, but were either sources of ephemeral pleasure (cigarettes, beer, purchased sex) or commodities such as cloth and ornaments that were acquired at least as much for status as for utility.

Thus the model of development with unlimited supplies of labour,⁴⁰ applicable to some other parts of the Third World, had little validity in early colonial Africa. The logical alternative would have been development with high wages, as in Australia or North America. Consumers of labour, however, argued that, given the limited need of the workers for money, high wages would actually reduce the amount of labour offered. The concept

⁴⁰ W. A. Lewis, 'Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour', *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*, 1954, 22, 139-91.

of a 'backward-sloping supply curve for labour' has latterly come under heavy fire, because it was used as an excuse for paying abysmally low wages and because it is thought to imply that Africans were idle or irrational. In some circumstances, however, it implies entirely rational behaviour, and there is good reason to suppose that those circumstances obtained in early colonial Africa. It is true that the argument holds good only over a limited range of possible wages. A really large increase in the income obtainable from work, such as to make a decisive change in the African economic environment and to open up the prospect of continuous improvement, would certainly have produced a response of the kind considered 'normal' in capitalist economies. But the relatively primitive varieties of capitalist enterprise operating in Africa at this time could hardly have borne such high labour costs. So most employers, public and private, chose instead to try to alter the supply conditions, so as to make labour abundant even at a low price. And to some extent at least they had the power to bring about this change.

In the first place, imperfections in the market for export crops in regions of peasant production were matched in regions of mines and European farms by imperfection in the market for labour. In South Africa the market had long been rigged against the sellers by the notorious pass laws, which were now copied in the newer lands of European occupation. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA; 'Wenela'), set up by the South African Chamber of Mines, went a long way towards putting the gold industry into a position of monopoly control. Elsewhere there was enough informal solidarity between employers to establish a 'standard wage' that was difficult to raise. Counter-action was made extremely difficult by official discouragement of trade unions and by the fragmented and amorphous character of the labour force.

The most obvious solution to the problem, however, was to deprive Africans of the means of subsistence, and in South Africa this was done. From 1913 (except in urban areas and in the Cape) none of the 'Bantu' were allowed to acquire land rights outside reserved areas which were even then inadequate to support the population. The solution, however, was only partially applied, even in South Africa. For it was realised that if the workers became full proletarians the mines, municipalities or governments

would have to bear the cost of feeding their families and of providing them with permanent housing and the other facilities that make regular urban life supportable. It was thought more expedient therefore to let the subsistence sector continue to carry part of the cost of development. The areas set aside for Africans were small enough to force most of the males to seek at least temporary wage employment but not so small that they would all have to bring their wives and families with them and find other means of providing for their retirement.

Outside South Africa structural change was less drastic. Initially at any rate, even in settler-dominated territories, Africans were left with enough land for their subsistence. Certain other features of the South African scene, however, were widely copied, especially the use of direct, flat-rate taxation as a means of compelling men to enter the money economy. But tax, which was usually calculated as the equivalent of a month's wages, was not by itself a complete solution, and most colonial authorities resorted to simpler forms of coercion, especially in the early stages of their rule. Conscription for public purposes, such as road-building and the carrying of officers' loads, was taken for granted before and during the First World War, and was often justified as an extension of traditionally sanctioned communal service, the colonial states being deemed to have inherited the right of the tribal authorities. It was condemned in principle by the international conventions of the post-war period, but loopholes were left for cases of special need and were often used. The early practice of 'supplying' forced labour to private employers was forbidden by the British government in 1908. Administrators, however, were still allowed and expected to 'encourage' Africans to seek wage employment, and the distinction was lost on most of the chiefs and headmen who actually did the encouraging. 'Forced labour', moreover, was a term that meant what it said. Pain and humiliation are of course matters for economic history even though there is no way of quantifying them; and it has to be recorded that the flogging of recalcitrant labourers, by private employers as well as by public officials, was a common feature of life wherever settlers and planters were present, at any rate in the first two decades of the century, and did not entirely cease until after the end of our period.

Nor was coercion confined to the recruitment of wage labour.

As we have seen, the forced cultivation of cotton by peasant farmers in German East Africa was the trigger for the great Maji Maji revolt at the beginning of the period; and though British methods were less heavy-handed, the production of export crops in Uganda and other territories of East and Central Africa was not initiated without an element of compulsion. In French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo, peasant farmers were required throughout the inter-war years to produce certain quantities of cash-crops for sale at fixed prices to monopoly trading companies under pain of prosecution which could lead to flogging or imprisonment. However, as Lord Hailey later drily observed, 'It must not...be assumed that compulsion for the growth of marketable or "economic" crops had in fact been confined to the Belgian or French territories. The difference between their practice and that of the British Administrations lay in the fact that the latter did not have legal powers to stimulate the production of marketable crops.'⁴¹

To the extent that the exchange of African labour for the goods and services of the West was made under duress, the liberal model of colonial economic development is of course invalid; and in East, central and southern Africa the role played by coercion was undoubtedly a large one. But perhaps in retrospect the real cause for surprise is that so much labour was voluntarily supplied, both to the capitalist and to the 'petty-commodity' sectors of production. The most effective stimulus, as the more far-sighted capitalists had always recognised, was the development of new wants: the incorporation of imported consumer goods, obtainable only for money, into the catalogue of conventional necessities or of common aspiration. This development proceeded steadily through the colonial era and allowed the progressive withdrawal of the harsher kinds of constraint. As time went on the possible rewards for additional work came to include minor pieces of capital equipment such as bicycles, sewing-machines and permanent roofing materials, whereby genuine improvements in the standard of living could be secured, and the ideal of indefinite accumulation made its appearance. This process was perhaps assisted by an emphasis which, it can be suggested, was especially characteristic of African cultures: the supreme valuation of

⁴¹ Lord Hailey, *An African survey* (Revised 1956) (London, 1957), 1370-1.

political goods — authority, recognition, power — and the use of material possessions primarily as counters by which those goods could be acquired.⁴² It is in the nature of status symbols that they are subject to incessant depreciation, so that when new goods are introduced into a society addicted to such symbols it finds itself committed to ever-increasing expenditure of acquisitive effort. This may have been one reason why wages and peasant income could be held low enough to allow an elementary kind of capitalist development to proceed. Be that as it may, the distribution of political goods was radically altered by the new economy. One of the chief consequences of colonial trade was to speed up the rate at which power and status, and women, were transferred from one male generation to the next.

Another consequence was the massive geographical mobility of labour. It is true that the combination of European capital and African labour now took place on African soil, and not in the New World as it had done in earlier centuries. But the application of capital, as we have seen, was spatially very selective, so that very large numbers of Africans could enter the exchange economy only by leaving home for varying periods of time. The most spectacular migration was caused by the insatiable appetite of the mines of southern and central Africa for human muscle-power, so that the whole of the region has been quite aptly designated as 'the Africa of the labour reserves'.⁴³ But elsewhere too there was a steady drift of clerks, domestic servants and general labourers, and in West Africa also of petty traders and mechanics, into the growing seaports and centres of government. In addition, the expansion of commercial agricultural production, whether under European or African control, was made possible only by large-scale emigration from the regions less favoured by nature or transport investment or both. Every year thousands of people trekked from Upper Volta and the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast to the cocoa groves of the south, from outlying areas of Uganda and from the densely populated territories of Ruanda and Urundi to

⁴² In a little-noticed essay, Lloyd A. Fallers suggested that in Africa production and exchange have typically been undertaken 'as an adjunct — a means — to the organisation of power, the field in which, it appears, the African genius has really concentrated its efforts...[There is] a tendency for economic structures and processes to be overshadowed by — perhaps better, *contained within* — political structures and processes.' ('Social stratification and economic processes', in M. J. Herskovits and M. Harwitz (eds.), *Economic transition in Africa* (London, 1964), 115, 119).

⁴³ Amin, 'Underdevelopment and dependency in black Africa'.

the rich cotton and coffee farms of Buganda, as well as from western and southern Tanganyika to the sisal estates of the north and east. By far the greater part of this movement was at least formally voluntary; and indeed the function of the cruder kinds of coercion was not, on the whole, to force Africans into the labour market but to prevent them from making optimal use of it: not to drive them to the City of Gold but to stop them getting there, so that they might work for lower wages in weaker enterprises of Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique or the rural parts of white South Africa.

The migrations were also for the most part circular, not final. The African worker left his homestead for a season, for a year, for a few years, occasionally for a working lifetime. Hardly ever did he set off for the city, the mine or the foreign farm without the intention of returning, and rarely did he fail to return in fact. There were exceptions. An increasing number of originally migrant labourers managed to secure permanent farming tenancies in Buganda. The government of the Belgian Congo set out to establish a small but significant proportion of the African population in the *centres extra-coutumiers*, the enclaves of European economy and culture; and its principal private firm, Union Minière, had decided by the 1930s that its long-term interests required the creation of a labour force that was fully committed to wage employment and urban life. Other capitalists, however, balked, as we have noted before, at the short-term and medium-term costs of 'stabilisation'; and British administrations regarded what they called detribalisation as a threat to everything that they valued. At this time, nearly all Africans undoubtedly concurred. Nothing in the 'modern' sector of the colonial society could offer any substitute for the material and psychological security provided by membership of the rural community and the land rights that went with this membership. At the same time, outside the most favoured regions of cash-crop production, the natal village could supply men with no inducement to permanent residence. The results were in many ways unhappy. Men lived a good part of their lives in encampments of urban scale that lacked the rudiments of urban civility, while women struggled to raise their children without the material and moral support of their husbands. However, it would probably be sentimental illusion to suppose that, other things being equal, African men would choose

THE COURSE OF CHANGE

to spend all their time at home being husbands and fathers; and the material loss from their absence was serious only in those agricultural systems, a minority of the whole, in which the main input had previously been male labour. Moreover the coming and going of workers contributed to that widening of intellectual horizons that was the main intangible benefit of the new order.

THE COURSE OF CHANGE

The changes outlined in this chapter followed an erratic course, with several marked alterations of pace and character even within the limited time-span that is here held in view. The principal regulator was the fluctuating price of Africa's exports, together with the closely related terms of its trade with the outer world. For individual colonial governments and foreign entrepreneurs as well as for African communities, these were facts of life over which they had little or no control, and so they have to be taken as given by Africa's historians too. It need only be said that the demand for primary products, African and other, rose and fell in approximate harmony with the irregular rate of industrial expansion in the capitalist countries, while the supply side of the price equation was mainly determined at any given time by the size of recent capital investment, not in Africa alone but throughout the tropical, sub-tropical and mineral-bearing regions of the world. World prices were indeed controlled by diamond-producers in South Africa, and briefly influenced by producers of copper, chrome and asbestos in Central Africa (through international restriction agreements in the early 1930s). But apart from chrome (in 1929), cloves and cocoa were the only commodities of which tropical Africa contributed more than half the world's supply at any point in our period, and controlling buyers' prices for these was impracticable. At the same time, almost every country in tropical Africa was highly vulnerable to price movements for one or two commodities. Such dependency varied considerably: indeed, in contrast to most other parts of the British colonial empire, most British territories in Africa widened their export base between the two world wars. It was widest, in the later 1930s, in Nigeria, followed by Kenya and Southern Rhodesia; Nyasaland, the Gold Coast and Somaliland (like Malaya) owed

around half their export earnings to a single commodity; while in Northern Rhodesia and the Gambia the proportions were 87 and 98 per cent.

The figures for external trade were among the less inaccurate of colonial statistics, but there are serious difficulties in the construction of price indices where exports are composed of a very few commodities, the relative prices and volumes of which are subject to large and frequent changes. Moreover, if Africa is aggregated the picture is dominated by the price of gold, which was constant for most of the period and then moved in the opposite direction to all other prices. For those African countries that were not primarily gold-producers the fluctuations are clear in outline, though their amplitude is often open to doubt.

At the beginning of the period export prices were on a rising trend which continued until 1920, becoming very steep towards the end, thanks to the monetary inflation and the world-wide commodity famine induced by four years of war. The prices of imported manufactures were rising too, but until 1913 their increase was slower, and so Africa on the whole enjoyed a decade or so of markedly improving terms of trade,⁴⁴ following a long period of stasis or decline. This therefore was a time of spiralling activity and change. Though Africa, apart from the far south, was still too raw to attract more than a small proportion of the capital that was pouring out of Europe to the primary-producing regions of the world at this time, there was a mood of optimism and enterprise, a sense of widening opportunity — for foreigners certainly but also for many African individuals and groups. ‘Favourable’ terms of trade, however, were not an unmixed blessing to Africans. They stood to benefit as peasant producers,

⁴⁴ The reference is to the ‘net barter’ or ‘commodity’ terms of trade, which measure changes over time in the quantity of imports that can be paid for by a given quantity of exports. In principle, a better indication of changes in the *relative* positions of Africa and its industrialised trading partners would be the ‘double factorial’ terms, which take account of differences in the rate of growth of productivity as well as of fluctuations in the price ratios. These are even harder to calculate but would certainly show a marked deterioration for Africa over the whole period. (Since it is much easier to improve productivity in secondary industries than in primary ones, there is a sense in which the commodity terms ought, in compensation, to move continuously in favour of primary producers, and this of course they have not done.) On the other hand, the ‘income’ terms, which include changes in export volume as well as in export and import prices, and are therefore the best measure of the *absolute* gain from external trade, were on a rising trend throughout, except in the early 1930s.

as wage labourers and as consumers of state services, but they also came under especially heavy pressure to *be* peasants or wage earners, to reshape their lives to the often oppressive demands of the market economy. From 1914 to 1920 a rising price level was unusually combined with deteriorating terms of trade, so that the pressures intensified while the benefits were less. The commodity boom broke in the summer of 1920 and was followed by a brief but very sharp recession. By the middle 1920s there had been a partial recovery, but the terms of trade were not restored to the 1913 level in our period, perhaps not at any time since.⁴⁵ By now vast new supplies of food and raw materials were pouring into the industrial countries from the farming and mineral regions opened up by the heavy capital outlays of the pre-war decade. Lord Lugard's 'dual mandate', one side of which proclaimed the duty of the colonial powers to make Africa's resources available to 'the world', was partly obsolete when it was publicly formulated in 1922, by which time the world's appetite for Africa's wealth had markedly abated.

This temporary decline in Africa's commercial fortunes has to be related to the characteristic colonial ideology of the 1920s: the complex of ideas summed up in the term 'indirect rule', the insistence that Africans should 'develop along their own lines', even if this meant that in most accepted senses of the word they would hardly develop at all. The relationship was of course permissive, not determinant. Officials who at heart preferred social stability to economic growth were more likely to have their way when external conditions made rapid growth in any case unattainable. For example, the contrast which has often been seen between the aggressive developmentalism of the German rulers of Tanganyika and the paternalist inertia of their British successors is a contrast of economic epochs at least as much as of colonial cultures; few capitalists would have rushed to invest in the wastes of Tanganyika in the inter-war years even if its government had been more eager to receive them; and, conversely, it was British

⁴⁵ This is the result of G. K. Helleiner's calculations for Nigeria, presented in his *Peasant agriculture, government and economic growth in Nigeria* (Homewood, Ill., 1966), appendix A, table IVA.6. There is no systematic index of the terms of trade for any other African country before the Second World War, but preliminary calculations for East Africa suggest that, while the general pattern was similar, the 1913 peak was not quite so dominant.

Tanganyikans whose initiative, in the very different conditions created by the Second World War, led to that *reductio ad absurdum* of developmentalism, the Groundnut Scheme of 1947.

So long as the 1920s lasted, commodity prices were good enough to attract a modest flow of capital to the more favoured regions of Africa and to make more Africans willing partners in the international exchange economy. But between 1929 and 1933 nearly all prices, except that of gold, fell to unprecedented depths, some export commodities losing more than half their average value in that period. Partial recovery in the mid-1930s was followed by a renewed collapse in 1938, and the outbreak of war, with restrictions on shipping and loss of European markets initially made matters worse still. Moreover, primary producers suffered even more heavily than industrial workers from the economic sickness of the time, and Africa's terms of trade worsened still further, reaching their lowest point ever about the middle of the Second World War. And so our period ended in deepening gloom.

The gloom was not caused only by the periodic ebb tide of the world capitalist economy. There were more fundamental reasons why the first two or three decades of colonial rule should have been an 'age of improvement' but the next two decades a time of doubt and discontent. The colonial stimulus worked, we have suggested, by creating the conditions for the fuller employment of both land and labour. Once the slack of the pre-colonial economy had been taken up, progress slowed towards a halt.⁴⁶ Production for export did increase during the 1930s, because governments brought greater pressure to bear on the people in order to sustain their revenues, because the people themselves sought to sustain what had become a customary level of consumption, and because in the case of tree-crops and mines the greater part of the production costs had already been incurred. But expansion was achieved with a growing sense of strain and the limits of the process were in sight. The limits were both structural and technological. Wage labour and production for distant markets had been superimposed upon, but had not

⁴⁶ The most ambitious econometric study, Robert Szereszewski's *Structural changes in the economy of Ghana, 1891-1911* (London, 1965) suggests that the decisive period was the quarter-century before 1914 and that thereafter (p.92) the pace of structural change was 'rather slow' until the mid-1950s.

superseded, older systems of local and domestic economy. Extension of the market had greatly enhanced the value of the marginal product of Africa's land and labour, but physical productivity had hardly altered. The ox-drawn plough had been widely adopted by African farmers in South Africa, but elsewhere they had rarely found it feasible or profitable. Mechanisation was not very far advanced even on white-settler farms and was unknown on African holdings. Secondary industry made some headway in South Africa, where the foundations even of heavy industry were being laid in the prosperous 1930s. But elsewhere manufacturing did not go beyond the elementary processing of agricultural products, with here and there a plant for the production of lager beer, soft drinks or cigarettes, though the necessary repair workshops run by the railways, the posts and telegraphs and the public works departments should be mentioned as important nurseries of the basic engineering skills. The fundamental reason for the failure to move out of the extractive phase of development was not technical or political but economic: outside South Africa purchasing power was too small to warrant the local establishment of forms of production whose virtue lies in the economies of scale. Advanced technology could have been hired or bought, skills could have been imparted if it had been worth while to impart them, and political considerations were relevant only in that the economic impediments could not have been overcome except by tariff protection or other forms of state assistance, to offer which would have been inconsistent with the basic objectives and philosophies of the colonial regimes.

The admission that African societies, even towards the end of our period, were still too poor to provide an adequate base for local industrial development concedes that the gains accruing to the mass of the people from the systems of exchange described in this chapter were not remarkable. The gains, however, did not consist solely of an increased supply of consumer goods but also of the extension of public services, especially in the fields of education and health. These services were provided mainly through the agency of the missionary societies, the resources being provided partly by the contributions of the people themselves, partly by the Christian congregations of Europe and America (easily the most important donors of 'aid' in this

period)⁴⁷ and partly by subventions from the colonial state, which of course was in the main merely returning part of the money levied in direct and indirect taxation. (The Colonial Development Act of 1929 may be a landmark in the history of British colonial policy, but its impact was barely perceptible, and in any case the scope of the term 'development' was still narrowly economic; it was only in 1940 that the words 'and welfare' were added to legislation of this kind.⁴⁸)

Education was regarded instrumentally by most of those concerned: by governments as a way of meeting their own and the commercial organisations' need for employees who were literate, numerate, disciplined and not prohibitively expensive; by teachers for similar reasons and often also to help in propagating the message of salvation; by pupils and their parents as a means of personal and group advancement. Yet the extension of knowledge must surely be seen as one of the most valuable fruits of economic progress, and not just as one of its most crucial preconditions. Better health was even more obviously an intrinsic good, and hospitals and rural dispensaries, inadequate though they were, received the most unambiguous welcome of all the twentieth-century innovations.

Hardly any African would doubt that, other things being equal, an increase in the quantity of life is to be desired above all other ends. Demography is therefore the most important measure of the success of any economic system. Unfortunately, however, there is the usual lack of hard figures. Though most of the administrations conducted periodic 'censuses' they did not have the means to make genuine and comprehensive counts of a suspicious population, and registration of births and deaths, if attempted at all, was hopelessly incomplete. Each census usually showed a large increase on the previous one, but improved recording certainly accounted for part of the increase and it is difficult to know how large a part. After 1945, in some though by no means all territories, census-taking became thorough and sophisticated

⁴⁷ This assertion is made confidently, although the financial aspect of the missionary effort has received little scholarly attention, and there appears to be no systematic estimate of the cash investment.

⁴⁸ Between 1929 and 1938 British colonial Africa received from the Colonial Development Fund some £2.4m as grants and £1.6m as loans (of which most were remitted under the 1940 Act). These moneys were chiefly devoted to the improvement of water supplies, the prevention of soil erosion and the expansion of transport facilities.

enough for the general trend of African population to become clear; by the time of independence it was growing fast, often at more than 2 per cent per annum, in a few areas at as much as 3 per cent; in other words Africa was by then experiencing the population explosion that was convulsing the rest of the Third World. But exactly when the upsurge began is still uncertain. Some trust can probably be reposed in the figures from South Africa, which show that African population almost doubled in the first thirty years of this century; but the South African experience was certainly atypical, and for the rest we have to rely mainly on circumstantial reasoning.

The general pattern of pre-colonial African demography was that which would be expected in rural societies with simple technologies and no knowledge of scientific medicine. Mortality and fertility rates were both very high, and some 'normal' excess of births was offset by periodic disasters. There was probably a long-term upward trend but it was very slow. And whatever growth there may have been was checked in many areas, especially in East and Central Africa, by the unheard-of disasters that immediately preceded the colonial conquest. The conquest itself, though for the conquerors it consisted only of minor campaigns and punitive expeditions, was for many African communities the most violent event in their historical experience, and the revolts that followed, notably those against the Germans in East and South West Africa at the beginning of our period, led to very heavy loss of life. Then, when things seemed at last to be settling down, there began the great conflict which from Africa's point of view was the last act of the Scramble. In Cameroun, in South West Africa and most of all in East Africa the conquerors fought with one another on African soil, with African auxiliaries and with calamitous results. In East Africa the British alone recruited nearly a million troops and 'carriers', of whom, according to conservative official figures, not less than a hundred thousand died, nearly all from disease and malnutrition.

This war service was in fact only the heaviest of many lethal burdens laid on the African peoples in the first decades of colonial rule. Those who died in battle, whether fighting against the colonialists or against one another at their behest, were few in comparison to those who succumbed or were permanently enfeebled while engaged in arduous labour in unaccustomed

climates, sustained by inadequate quantities of unfamiliar food, and exposed to a new range of diseases. Most notorious, because of the accompanying brutalities, was the fate of those who had to ransack the forests for wild rubber in King Leopold's Congo. That scandal was passing its peak as our period opened, but the tribulations of the concession-ridden French section of the Congo basin, as of Angola, would get worse for some time to come. On a smaller scale, there were many deaths among the highland Kikuyu recruited for unsuccessful plantations on the Kenya coast, and many more among the railway-building gangs of Gabon and the Ivory Coast. And worse than any of the direct consequences of the conquest were the results of the sudden increase in human and animal movements that preceded and accompanied it; for these opened the way for the agencies of disease to spread among populations not inured to them. Smallpox and bubonic plague were not new to Africa, but there is every reason to believe that their incidence greatly increased in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, as did measles, tuberculosis and in some savanna countries sandfly fever and cerebrospinal meningitis. Venereal diseases likewise multiplied, becoming almost pandemic in the regions of most extreme social disruption; they are held responsible for the belt of unusually low fertility that extended, during and even beyond the colonial period, over the northern part of the Congo basin. The worst single demographic disaster occurred when the tsetse flies native to the northern shores of Lake Victoria became infected with a virulent strain of human trypanosomiasis, and before the outbreak died away, mainly through the forced evacuation of the affected islands and coastlands, very large numbers of people — 300,000 is the usually accepted figure for Uganda — had died the miserable death of sleeping-sickness victims during the first decade of the century. More widespread and long-lasting were the effects of animal trypanosomiasis, which also took advantage of ecological disarray to establish itself in vast tracts of former grazing land, denying them to cattle and their human partners. By 1905 the herds were just beginning to recover from the great rinderpest epidemic which swept through eastern Africa from Ethiopia to Natal in the 1890s, reducing pastoralists to starvation and rendering mixed husbandmen far more vulnerable to the effects of crop failure; but recovery was made slow by the attacks of other

cattle plagues: foot-and-mouth, redwater, east-coast fever, pleuropneumonia. And then came the culminating human disaster, the influenza pandemic that was the last and worst consequence of the conflict which the greed and stupidity of Europe's rulers had wished upon the world. It may well be that 2 per cent or more of Africa's population perished in 1918–19 from this cause alone.

Africa's peoples have great resilience, however, and there were countervailing forces which gathered strength throughout the colonial period. Even before 1914 the security of life had been improved in some parts of Africa, and by no means all of it was lethally affected (except through the influenza) by the European war. Thereafter there were two decades of almost total peace. In addition, the intruders were able to do something to combat the diseases which their coming had helped to spread, and eventually to produce a net gain in health. The scale and timing of the improvement are hard to assess. Outside the towns — which were actually healthier places than the countryside — skilled medical help was very thinly spread; and in any case, apart from quinine, certain remedies for dysentery and a very successful treatment for yaws, medical science had few specific remedies for Africa's ills until after the Second World War. On the other hand the administration did to some extent manage to curb the most lethal epidemic diseases, vaccination playing some part in this, but quarantines and destruction of plague-infected dwellings a greater one. Though epidemics of various sorts were reported year by year by almost every territory throughout the period, mass mortalities of the kind common in the previous half-century do not seem to have occurred after 1920.

However, medicine and public health measures probably had a less significant positive effect than a general improvement in the standard of living that can be noticed in the more favoured territories from the beginning of the period and in nearly all of them by its half-way mark. Here again it is difficult to be very specific. There was no general or radical change in housing or other features of the economic environment. The rapid and widespread increase in the use of washable cloth doubtless had some effect on health; but the main improvement is likely to have been in diet. After the early scandals and disasters, most labourers in European employment were adequately and regularly, though monotonously, fed. For those who stayed in the villages there

were some additions to the agricultural repertoire, notably the New World plants, maize and cassava, which had been spreading slowly into the interior since the sixteenth century but made rapid headway in the twentieth. This was not an unequivocal improvement, either agronomically or nutritionally — if it had been, it would have been effected much sooner — but on balance it made people's diet more secure. Temperate-zone crops such as wheat and potatoes, together with woollen blankets, helped to make habitable the well-watered and malaria-free mountain countries, where population grew especially fast. More generally, the money incomes derived from the sale of crops or labour enabled people to eat more meat and dried fish and so to correct the protein deficiency that was the main drawback to life in the moister lowlands. In the cattle countries, wherever the tsetse fly permitted, there was marked expansion in the latter part of the period. Veterinary science had rather more to offer than human medicine, and of course livestock breed faster than people, so that in many areas the number of beasts per person was greater by the 1920s than it had ever been before; indeed, overgrazing was becoming the most serious threat to ecological equilibrium.

So people on the whole were eating a little better, and there were no longer years in which they did not eat at all. Thanks to the new means of transport, food could be moved into drought-stricken areas, if necessary from outside Africa, and most people had or could acquire enough money to buy it. Deaths from hunger did not cease with the arrival of colonial government. In East Africa, for instance, the administrations were unable to prevent many thousands from perishing in 1919, when a severe drought was added to the afflictions of that terrible time. But this was the last disaster of its kind. In the early 1930s there were three successive years of low rainfall and massive locust invasions as well, but the result was hardship and malnutrition, not the large-scale mortality that must have ensued at any earlier time.

For East and Central Africa, then, the outline story is that between 1880 and 1920 there was almost certainly an overall loss of population, but that this was rather more than made good by unprecedented growth, probably averaging already between 1 and 1.5 per cent per annum, in the next two decades. In West Africa, which had been exposed to the outer world for centuries, the most difficult phase of biological adjustment was already over; the

colonial experience seems to have been a fairly steady acceleration of an upward tendency which can be detected from the early nineteenth century onwards and may have brought the annual increase to 2 per cent by the end of our period. In the healthy south too there was continuous expansion. So population was nearly everywhere denser in 1940 than it had been in 1905, or in 1880.⁴⁹ But, apart from areas where alienations to white land-owners had created artificial scarcity, it was only in a few special districts — in south-east Nigeria, in some of the hill countries of East Africa — that there was yet any real pressure on the land, or any serious threat to the ancient assumption that everyone had a right to enough land for his subsistence. That crucial change, probably the most drastic of all the long-term consequences of the colonial intervention, still lay in the future.

What is true in the demographic domain is true in other spheres as well; the consequences of the major innovations made at and just before the beginning of our period were only just beginning to work themselves out by its end. Moreover, many of the underlying long-term trends were masked by the effects of international recession and of war. Histories have to stop somewhere, but an economic history which stops in the middle of the colonial epoch is perhaps especially incomplete.

⁴⁹ The total population of Africa in the 1930s is likely to have been between 130 and 160 million. Over 33 million lived in the countries of Mediterranean Africa, and almost half of these were in Egypt. South of the Sahara, there were about 10 million in South Africa, perhaps rather more in the Belgian Congo, and twice as many in Nigeria, as also in French black Africa.

CHAPTER 3

CHRISTIANITY

Apart from the Coptic Church in Ethiopia and Egypt and the established settlements of Christian whites in North and South Africa and of Christian Creoles in Freetown, Monrovia and Cape Palmas, Christian influence in Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century was still largely restricted to a thin scatter of missionary outposts. Already, however, there were some dramatic exceptions to the overall lack of positive response, and already these cases had illustrated an ironic and prophetic fact. Some of the most notable Christian advances had been made in the absence of foreign missionaries, and the future development and maturity of the indigenous churches would largely depend on the elimination of missionary control and paternalism. It was while the missionaries had been excluded from Madagascar in the reign of Ranavalona I (1828–61) that Malagasy Christians had laid the foundations for a conversion of the Merina kingdom so intensive that by 1913 visitors could report that ‘probably in no country in the world are the Christian Churches better attended’.¹ Similarly in Buganda, when the White Fathers temporarily withdrew in 1882, the young Catholic converts immediately displayed that zeal and conviction which in less than a decade was to carry them and their Anglican counterparts through persecution to a position of power and dominance. In coastal West Africa, where disease and mortality reduced the number of European missionaries, the expansion of Christianity among the Fante, Yoruba and Niger Delta peoples had been largely directed and accomplished by African clerics and laity. Other Africans were also beginning to find in Christianity fresh answers, often forgotten or belittled by Western missionaries, to traditional spiritual

¹ Anon., *Madagascar for Christ*, Being a joint report of simultaneous deputations from the London Missionary Society, the Friends’ Foreign Mission Association and the Paris Missionary Society, to Madagascar, July to October, 1913 (London, 1913), 22.

PROTESTANT PIONEERS

concerns and opportunities. The momentum of African response² effectively restricted missionary surveillance and control. Independent churches, originating almost exclusively from the Protestant tradition, provided some of the clearest illustrations of the ways in which Christianity was becoming at home in Africa. Even in the Catholic Church distinctively African forms of ministry and spirituality were gradually emerging. Already Christianity in Africa was by no means identical with the missionaries' understanding of the Faith; already it had a vitality independent of its contacts with the West.

For most missionaries, however, developments at the turn of the century appeared as divine interventions enabling them to intensify their rapid occupation of Africa. Steamers, railways and bicycles were removing problems of access; advances in tropical medicine enhanced the chances of survival; the constraints imposed by tribal warfare or by recalcitrant African rulers were being removed, and although the colonial regimes sometimes expelled missionaries of foreign nationality, this merely constituted a temporary setback which realignments with other missionary societies soon overcame. It seemed an era of unparalleled opportunity and the divided sections of Western Christendom were prepared to respond.

PROTESTANT PIONEERS

The pioneer pace-setters throughout the nineteenth century had been the great Protestant missionary societies, many of them originating from the evangelical revival at the end of the eighteenth century. Most influential in tropical Africa was the

² Even the best of statistics are an uncertain guide to religious movements. In Africa, the figures themselves are highly questionable. The following set conveys a broad idea, however, of the dimensions of the African response to Christianity, the difference between church and government statistics representing 'a nominal fringe around the churches but unrecognised by them':

	1900	1910	1930	1950	1970
Church statistics	4m	7m	16m	34m	97m
Government statistics	5m	9m	21m	44m	126m

(D. B. Barrett, 'A.D. 2000: 350 million Christians in Africa', *International review of missions*, 1970, 59, table 3).

Church Missionary Society, which from Freetown had followed the Saros (returned ex-slaves) back into southern Nigeria, while in East Africa its early labours on the coast had been crowned with triumph in Buganda. The strange conjunction of David Livingstone's appeal at Cambridge in December 1857 and the impulse from the Anglo-Catholic Oxford Movement had brought into eastern Africa another Anglican mission, the Universities' Mission to Central Africa, while the much older Society for the Propagation of the Gospel had assisted in the establishment of the Anglican hierarchy at the Cape and in Natal and in missions in their hinterland. In southern Africa and Madagascar the prominent pioneer had been the London Missionary Society, which had also assisted the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to start their work among the Sotho and Zulu. Meanwhile the Dutch Reformed Church at the Cape gradually assumed a missionary role which took it north of the Limpopo and the Zambezi and even as far as the Tiv in Nigeria. Methodists and Scottish Presbyterians started influential missions throughout English-speaking sub-Saharan Africa, and from Basel a stream of south Germans and Swiss established a mission of fundamental importance at Accra, at Akropong and among the eastern Akan. German and Scandinavian Lutherans began work in South Africa and Madagascar and subsequently moved into areas which became German colonies. Finally, Baptists and other British missionaries forestalled Leopold by starting work in the Congo basin, and in the 1880s North American Methodists and Congregationalists opened missions in the interior of Angola.

Representatives from these Protestant pioneers met at Edinburgh in June 1910 to plan, for the first time, a strategy embracing the world. Compared with Asia, and particularly with China which was recognised as 'the chief storm centre of urgent opportunity',³ African missions received a relatively low priority. Not until much later was Africa to emerge as the central focus of the modern missionary movement. For the first half of the twentieth century, as during the nineteenth, the greatest challenge was seen to be in Asia. One aspect of the African situation was, however, felt at Edinburgh to be of crucial significance. Reports from across the continent, from Nigeria to German East Africa,

³ W. H. T. Gairdner, *Edinburgh 1910* (Edinburgh, 1910), 77.

emphasised the rapid and impending advance of another world religion: Islam. Delegates were urged 'to throw a strong missionary force right across the centre of Africa to bar the advance of the Moslem and to carry the Gospel northwards'.⁴ Gustav Warneck, the veteran founder of Protestant missiology, explicitly repudiated the slogan championed by John R. Mott, the American chairman of the meeting at Edinburgh, which aimed at 'the Evangelisation of the World in this Generation'. If workers were scattered and pushed into countries not yet ripe for missions, wrote Warneck, 'we may lose hundreds of thousands to Mohammedanism, whilst perhaps winning some few Christians in a country like Tibet'.⁵

This clash over strategy was only one aspect of the differences which, at least at the level of missionary theory, divided continental Protestants, especially Germans, from the English-speaking missionaries. Led by Warneck, German Lutherans saw themselves accommodating 'foreign peculiarities' and fostering national churches tolerant of indigenous customs. In contrast, most British and North American missionaries, from their early alliance with the humanitarian anti-slavery movement, saw Christianity intimately linked with legitimate commerce and the introduction of African societies to Western ways of life. The convert, asserted one American missionary, must 'live in a permanent upright house, with a chimney in it'; he must no longer be befuddled by his hut's smoky atmosphere or degraded by creeping into it; he must be 'decently' clothed, an individual 'independent of everybody else'.⁶ At such extremes, this difference in theory was of fundamental and enduring significance: much later on, after political independence, the churches founded by the missions would become increasingly aware of the dangers of being identified with westernised educated individuals cut off from great numbers of the underprivileged. But in practice, during these early decades of colonial rule, African realities forced most missionaries to adopt remarkably similar policies. Confronted

⁴ G. Robson in *World Missionary Conference, 1910: report of commission I* (Edinburgh, n.d.), 406.

⁵ Letter from G. Warneck in appendix to *World Missionary Conference, 1910, Report of Commission I*, 435.

⁶ G. A. Wilder, quoted in J. K. Rennie, 'Christianity, colonialism and the origins of nationalism among the Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935' (Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University), 1973, 305-7.

with acculturation and African demands for modernisation, even the German missionaries in East Africa soon found that their theories required to be modified in practice. Ensnared among the Chaga in Kilimanjaro, Bruno Gutmann and the Leipzig mission held out for a tribal church, a communal morality with a Christianised kinship and ritual system, but already at the 1911 Evangelical Missionary Conference at Dar es Salaam other missionaries saw clearly that the detribalised were the key to the future. Karl Axenfeld, the influential inspector of the Berlin Mission, gave priority to educating a Christian, Swahili-speaking national élite, and Bishop Hennig, director of the Moravians, while still thinking in terms of a tribal church, wholeheartedly endorsed the educational strategy pioneered by the Scots at Livingstonia in northern Nyasaland. Most missions fostered some rudimentary form of school. Whether this developed early into a full-scale educational strategy in part depended on the theories of different missionary societies; but mission schools were also quickly and profoundly shaped by African responses. The social mobility of the Lakeside Tonga in Nyasaland and their demand for education were fundamental elements in Livingstonia's success.⁷ Yet even where the response was far less spectacular, the pioneer bush-school proved generally to be the revolutionary spearhead of the Christian movement. Often imparting to many of its participants little more than a smattering of literacy, it was nevertheless summoning the youth, and sometimes the adults, of Africa towards a positive encounter with modernisation.

Another point of divergence among Protestant missionaries was their attitude towards non-Christian religions. One note of protest was recorded at Edinburgh against those who dismissed the values in African traditional moral and religious systems. It came from the Swiss missionary Henri Junod who asserted that 'among Bantu tribes there is a rich folklore...which illustrates the voice of conscience in a wonderful way'.⁸ At the subsequent meetings of Protestant and Anglican missionaries at Jerusalem (1928) and Tambaram (1938), this basic theological issue had become dominant. The conservatives and continentals, led by H. Kraemer, denounced the dangers of syncretism and emphasised the radical discontinuity between Christianity and other faiths.

⁷ See chapter 12.

⁸ *World Missionary Conference, 1910: Report of Commission IV*, 13.

This debate was primarily focused throughout this period, however, on Christian relations with the religions of Asia. Among missionaries in Africa, the comparable divide was between those who, like Junod and E. W. Smith, had obtained a specific understanding of African cosmologies and social systems and those who continued to operate with second-hand stereotypes. For Africa the major debates among missionaries concerned questions of discipline, and at Tambaram it was the Gold Coast churches and a young African theologian, Christian Baëta, who raised the question which from the first had haunted the Christian mission in sub-Saharan Africa: 'whether monogamy is essential to Christianity'.⁹

At Tambaram this question still elicited a rigid monolithic response from the missions. Indeed it is significant that the issue itself was raised in the context of the progress of missionary co-operation and of unity in the life of the church. For much the most important result of Edinburgh 1910 had been the creation of a Continuation Committee which duly became in 1921 the International Missionary Council. The Council's secretary was the Scottish layman, J. H. Oldham, who more than any other person had been the moving spirit behind the Edinburgh conference. The impetus thus given by the missions to the development of the ecumenical movement as a whole was of universal consequence. Able to mobilise support throughout Christendom, the Council also substantially strengthened missions in their negotiations with the colonial regimes and, as will be seen, Oldham himself became a formative influence on British colonial policy in Africa during the inter-war period. The Council thus complemented and embodied that relative independence of action enjoyed by the modern missionary movement. This independence from the national state had its roots in the far-flung character and organisation of its home bases, which gave both Protestant and Catholic missions a financial and organisational freedom unknown before the nineteenth century. Missionary co-operation could, however, dangerously circumscribe the scope for African response and initiative. Comity arrangements, the agreement to respect each other's spheres of action, which were the practical fruit of many missionary consultations, could prevent a wasteful use of scarce

⁹ International Missionary Council, *The life of the Church*, Tambaram Madras Series, IV (London, 1939), 405.

resources. They could also bestow on missionaries a monopoly of power leading to a dictatorship in matters of discipline. And when the mission school provided the main means of economic and social advance, such powers threatened not merely African converts but the local community as a whole. This threat to the customs and the cultural heritage of African societies might have been far more serious had not Catholics and some other Christian bodies continued to operate outside such comity agreements. For these differences among Europeans gave Africans, both Christian and non-Christian, the opportunity to contain and transform the missionary impact.

Africa also provided a spectacular demonstration of the difficulties on the road to church unity. Only three years after Edinburgh, the Protestant missionaries in Kenya met at Kikuyu, the principal station of the Church of Scotland mission, to consider a scheme of federation as a step towards a local African Church. The proposals for collaboration were tentative, but the fact that in this remote corner of Africa the delegates had participated in a service of Holy Communion celebrated by the bishop of Mombasa seriously threatened the cohesion of the whole Anglican Church. Frank Weston, the Anglo-Catholic bishop of Zanzibar, arraigned his evangelical neighbour before the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the controversy was still at its height on the outbreak of the First World War. That disaster made the furore soon appear incredibly parochial and irrelevant, yet in that eventful summer Anglicanism was still the religion of those who ruled much of the world, its fortunes were the concern of statesmen, and the young Ronald Knox's witty review of the Kikuyu crisis was read aloud to the prime minister, 'as he basked on the river bank at Sutton Courtenay'.¹⁰

In future decades the established Protestant missionary societies were to concentrate in Africa on modes of practical co-operation. Henceforth they formed missionary councils in the various territories, and the initiative in church union passed to south India. The presence at Kikuyu of delegates from the Seventh Day Adventists and the Africa Inland Mission (AIM) indicated, however, the extent to which the colonial era had opened Africa to new missionary initiatives. Interdenominational in recruitment but rigidly fundamentalist in theology, the AIM was typical of

¹⁰ E. A. St J. Waugh, *Ronald Knox* (London, 1959), 117.

the 'Faith' missions first popularised by Hudson Taylor of the China Inland Mission and concerned to assert their absolute dependence on God. At a practical level this involved no soliciting of funds, no regular budget, no promise of permanent support. Consequently they were free to respond to new openings with extreme rapidity, uninhibited by any ongoing commitments; from one missionary in 1889 the AIM had increased to 158 by 1919 and their field had expanded from Kenya into the eastern Congo. This organisational flexibility coincided with a distinctive theory of missions, in which the preaching of the Gospel was seen as hastening Christ's second coming. Other established missions had already benefited from similar convictions — the wealthy eccentric Robert Arthington, guided by this motive, had decisively assisted the missionary occupation of Equatorial Africa. For the AIM in East Africa and other 'Faith' missions, such as the Sudan Interior Mission, however, the early emphasis was wholly on a mobile, rapid evangelism. They had no need of the planning and paraphernalia involved in bringing a Christian civilisation to Africa: they would achieve their mission through preaching, or the Lord's will would be indicated by a lack of response, and in either case they would move on to untouched fields. Like other missionaries untrammelled by a hierarchy or by institutional control, they exulted in their autonomy. 'Each of us is practically independent. We can work as in fact the Lord leads. We do not have a wrangling church board at home jealously watching us and asking us to do things of which they have a poor understanding.'¹¹ Yet by the 1920s most AIM missionaries had settled down to become supervisors of African Christian communities, involved in education and questions of discipline and church order, and in these situations their independence merely tended to accentuate their paternalist autocracy. They continued however to mobilise fresh recruits and resources on a scale which offset the economic depression of the 1930s and other factors later affecting Protestant recruitment in general, and, together with other missions such as the Salvation Army, these conservative fundamentalists continued to represent a vigorous individual strand of Christianity in Africa.

¹¹ J. Stauffacher to his fiancée, 23 October 1903, quoted in Kevin Ward, 'The development of Protestant Christianity in Kenya, 1910–40 (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1976), 22.

'ETHIOPIANS', ENTHUSIASTS AND PROPHETS

Some new Protestant arrivals, however, brought a much more distinctive and disruptive influence; they soon found a common cause in the social and political protests, and in the religious adaptations, of African Christians. Already in 1883 the first independent church in southern Africa had been founded by Nehemiah Tile among the Thembu, partly in protest against white political and ecclesiastical control, and in the 1890s several 'Ethiopian' churches were started in South Africa. By their use of this term, they asserted an independent, black appropriation of an ancient Biblical and Christian inheritance. They echoed the words of the Psalmist (Ps. 68.31) and recalled the apostle Philip's baptism of the Ethiopian eunuch. Some of them also looked northwards to Abyssinia, with hopes stirred by Menelik's victory at Adowa in 1896. One of the leaders, James Dwane, tried to collect funds for Menelik from Negroes in America, and later, during the Italo-Ethiopian war in 1936, thousands of new followers joined these churches in South Africa as a result of the nightly prayer-meetings held on behalf of Ethiopia's cause.

None of these independents, however, established links with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, which remained almost as isolated from the rest of Africa during the whole of this period as it had been throughout the centuries, apart from its historic link with the Coptic Church of Egypt, whence it continued to import its *abuna* (metropolitan). With its Ark of the Covenant, its holy Zion at Aksum, its fasting, and its rich, distinctive liturgy, Ethiopia displayed a Christianity which was markedly indigenous. Its resistance to Italian aggression strengthened its symbolic potency for Africa, but the absence of actual contacts with Christians elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa was one of the great impediments to the development of Christianity in Africa during this period.

With their Pan-African vision, the South African Ethiopians quickly established contact with black churches in the United States, one of which, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, immediately sent assistance. Bishop H. M. Turner arrived in 1898 to ordain some sixty ministers, and the AMEC entered on a missionary enterprise which in the following decades was to lead it along the routes of migrant labour as far north as the

Copperbelt. In West Africa the issue of white control, epitomised in the bitter controversy over Samuel Crowther, the Yoruba freed-slave who was an Anglican bishop from 1864 until his death in 1891, led to several independent African churches among Baptists, Anglicans and Methodists. Here also, with the mission of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church and other black churches, Christian Negroes from the New World were no longer mere auxiliaries to the Western mission societies but were now helping to proclaim among Africans a new and independent road to self-improvement and freedom.

It was not only black Christians who brought revolutionary influences to Africa. Radically independent, constantly ready to seize on new doctrines and Scriptural texts, Joseph Booth, who arrived in Nyasaland in 1892 to found on his own an industrial mission, had experienced in his own career something of the turbulent, self-instructed, enquiring background of the young African converts whom he introduced to a world of new opportunities and ideas. Booth also made contacts in North America, and he helped a few of the hundred or more Africans from South Africa who, joining others from West and Central Africa, set off in these years for study in America. Among them in July 1898 was Kwegyir Aggrey, 22 years old and already headmaster of the leading Wesleyan school in the Gold Coast, whose craving for higher education was later to inspire Africans throughout the continent and whose personality was to challenge men of all races. Aggrey was to become an apostle of racial cooperation, but a year before he left for the States, John Chilembwe, baptised by Booth in 1893, arrived in America with his radical mentor to lecture their audiences on ‘Africa for the Africans’. In the States Chilembwe broke away from Booth and returned to Central Africa in 1900 with powerful Negro Baptist support and finance to found his Providence Industrial Mission at Chiradzulu, soon to be joined at this ‘hornets’ nest’¹² by other American Negro helpers. In his successful creation and leadership of a respected, educated Christian community, Chilembwe demonstrated an independent achievement of status and progress; almost inevitably he also became a spokesman for those who

¹² *Central African Times*, 20 April 1901, quoted in G. Shepperson and T. Price, *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the origins, setting and significance of the Nyasaland native rising of 1915* (Edinburgh, 1958), 136.

suffered from colonial rule and the settler economy and society of the Shire Highlands. Resentments deepened until, finally exasperated by the recruitment of Africans to fight a European war, he led a violent apocalyptic rising from 23 January until his death on 3 February 1915.

Chilembwe's life and death vividly illustrated the intellectual speculation and liberation which Christianity and the Bible brought to a wide range of Africans. It was not merely that some Africans had found within the independent churches a means of expressing revolutionary social and political aspirations and of creating new modes of association which could form a model for the future. More fundamentally, these men and women had glimpsed, along with many others who stayed within the mission churches, a new teleological, eschatological view of history. Like Chilembwe, they were to claim for themselves, and for Africa, prophetic texts which embodied a Biblical concept of history as progress. 'Have you forgotten,' wrote Booth to Chilembwe in 1911, 'the marvellous and unthinkable greatness of the promise of God to you in Isaiah 60 v.22 which you rushed to show me, in your canoe, as I came up river ... long ago?'¹³ And among some of those who followed Chilembwe into revolt, millenarian expectations were running high.

Christian teaching concerning life after death presented a major, unexpected challenge to the cosmologies of most African peoples, particularly those who were relatively unaffected by Islam. It was proclaimed in sermon, catechism and confessional, and was supported by the calm, persuasive witness from the death-beds of many pioneer missionaries and African converts. No longer was the hereafter merely a faint reflection of this world, slipping imperceptibly into the forgotten past. Suddenly the future assumed a novel, almost overwhelming significance, and it was a future primarily determined by the individual's response to prophetic demands. Sometimes Christian eschatological symbolism was proclaimed and interpreted so literally that it powerfully strengthened traditional beliefs in the possibilities of restoring a utopian natural order, free of evil and suffering. But even where these expectations were not aroused, Christian eschatology

¹³ J. Booth to J. Chilembwe, 10 December 1911, quoted in G. Shepperson, 'The place of John Chilembwe in Malawi historiography', in B. Pachai (ed.), *The early history of Malawi* (London, 1972), 420.

brought with it novel, disturbing and even revolutionary implications. The millenarian convictions which proliferated before the First World War were thus but one aspect of a much wider conceptual development that was taking place in these decades as a direct result of the impact of Christianity. The particular form of these millenarian beliefs owed much to another chance contact with North America, mediated again by Booth; but the widespread interest they aroused illustrated the extent to which the world-view of an increasing number of African individuals and societies was being challenged and changed.

The most dramatic African response to a Christian millenarian message occurred among the Tonga in northern Nyasaland. In 1908 a young Tonga migrant worker, Elliott Kamwana, returned to his people after an absence of some seven years, during which he had first been baptised at Booth's mission in southern Nyasaland, gone on to work at a mine near Johannesburg and then had spent six months at Cape Town with Booth. By this time, Booth had been converted to the millennial teaching of Charles Taze Russell, the Pennsylvanian founder of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, later to be known as Jehovah's Witnesses. It was therefore as a Watch Tower emissary that Kamwana returned to the Tonga. Within a few months, before he was deported, he had baptised more than 9,000 adherents. Here was a faith which embraced not primarily an emerging élite but the masses; its literature denounced in general terms the existing structures of church and state and proclaimed exciting alternatives. Such millennial hopes inspired some of Chilembwe's followers in 1915, but Kamwana dissociated himself from political revolt and his main impact appears to have been religious rather than political. Already among the Tonga and neighbouring peoples a general response to the Gospel proclaimed by the Scottish missionaries was developing, with enthusiastic audiences of several thousands attending evangelistic services and impatiently demanding baptism. Fearful that such enthusiasm might be superficial, the missionaries insisted on an increasingly strict probation and greater educational qualifications, and Kamwana himself, when he had been a student at Livingstonia, had not been granted baptism. In this situation Watch Tower offered an immediate alternative to the mission and one which was open to all, for Kamwana criticised the 'bad effect' of college education

and emphasised the importance of using 'knowledge properly for general interest'.¹⁴

As Watch Tower reached out to the multitudes, it became at times increasingly involved in traditional spiritual concerns, bringing new rites and concepts to the solution of long-standing problems. Mass baptisms could be experienced as a cleansing analogous to witchcraft eradication, and one of the converts to Watch Tower, Tomo Nyirenda, was to become not merely a finder but also a killer of witches among the Lala in Northern Rhodesia in 1925. But besides its wide and sometimes transient appeal in remote rural areas, Watch Tower spread among migrant workers on settlers' farms and in the urban areas of Central Africa, and it also developed some relatively prosperous agricultural settlements. Its links with the international society remained tenuous, but its adherents became so firmly established during the colonial period that later they were even seen by some politicians as threats to national mobilisation.

The fiercely independent Watch Tower groups had thus appropriated a specific eschatological emphasis in Christianity and around this message had formed significant and enduring movements in a crucible of rapid and disruptive social change. It would be wrong, however, to overemphasise the peculiar character of this experience or to see African Christian initiatives as uniquely exemplified by these independents. The *balokole* revival, which developed among evangelical Anglicans, both black and white, in Ruanda and East Africa in the 1930s, produced similar close-knit fellowships. It provided, like Watch Tower, a new 'lineage', in which dreams were taken seriously as in indigenous traditions, public confession was used to eliminate jealousy and mistrust, women found new roles and respect, and ecstatic phenomena were accepted as normal. In northern Nyasaland, only a year after Kamwana's preaching among the Tonga, a missionary evangelist drew even larger crowds to his revival services, and the thousands at Loudon who burst into public confession of sin may well have experienced a catharsis similar to that found in Watch Tower services. The initiatives could also look towards the future. As early as 1904 a well-known example of Tonga evangelistic initiative, David Kaunda's ministry

¹⁴ Quoted in J. McCracken, *Politics and Christianity in Malawi 1871-1940* (Cambridge, 1977), 211.

among the Bemba, had been launched from his Livingstonia base. Labour migrants educated by him and by the Scots were to play a major part, especially in the inter-war period, in creating unaided the church in the Copperbelt and in founding the associations in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which were to be forerunners of national political parties. 'We were reading our Bible,' recalled Donald Siwale, 'and knew that every human being was the same. Our idea of equality came from the Bible.'¹⁵ Far more significant than the specific messages relayed by Booth or the particular emphases brought by the Scots was the fact that, in certain nuclear areas in Africa, Christian insights had been widely accepted as being deeply relevant to an increasing range of African experiences.

Ethiopianism and eschatology were but two of the novel aspects of Christianity which at the turn of the century were gaining acceptance among Africans. Of even greater significance, since it quickly fused with one of the most powerful elements in African religious traditions, was the Pentecostal emphasis on spiritual healing. Like Russell's millenarianism, this emphasis had its origins in the revival and 'Holiness' movements which had so deeply influenced Western Protestantism in the later nineteenth century, and it reached Africa in many diverse ways. In 1897 Petrus Louis Le Roux, a young Afrikaner Dutch Reformed Church missionary at Wakkerstroom in the eastern Transvaal, began reading *Leaves of Healing*, a periodical published by John Alexander Dowie, who had recently announced in Chicago his plans for Zion City. Refusing to hide the 'glad tidings' of divine healing from his Zulu congregation, Le Roux resigned from the DRC, and in May 1904 an emissary sent by Dowie held the first Zionist baptism in South Africa, immersing Le Roux and his Zulu followers in the river outside Wakkerstroom. Two years later 'the fire came down', marked by the charismatic speaking with tongues, at a Negro Holiness Church belonging to Azusa Street Mission in Los Angeles. 'Faith gives quaint sect new languages to convert Africa,' announced the press,¹⁶ and in May 1908 a former member of Dowie's Zion went to South Africa, there to

¹⁵ Quoted in D. J. Cook, 'The influence of Livingstonia Mission upon the formation of welfare associations in Zambia, 1912-31', in T. O. Ranger and J. Weller (eds.), *Themes in the Christian history of Central Africa* (London, 1975), 108.

¹⁶ *New York American*, 3 December 1906, quoted in W. J. Hollenweger, *The Pentecostals* (London, 1972), 23.

be joined by Le Roux, to establish the Apostolic Faith Mission, the first of several Pentecostal missions in South Africa. Even before this new development, some of the Zulu Zionists at Wakkerstroom had split off from Le Roux to create their own symbols and practices. Soon the Zionist churches multiplied in South Africa and spread north across the Limpopo. They brought a fresh urgency in their challenge to divination and ancestor veneration: accepting the reality of the evils which the traditional religions confronted, they proclaimed that possession by the Holy Spirit was made manifest in faith-healing and rain-making. They encountered the message of God in dreams and visions, and almost all of them practised the purification ritual of baptism by immersion. In some cases they developed a far from orthodox theology. In 1911 Isaiah Shembe, the greatest of the Zulu prophets, founded the Church of the Nazaretha at Ekuphakameni near Durban, Natal. He seemed to his disciples to have the characteristics not of a pastor but of the Lord, 'the mask of the Black Christ'.¹⁷ He called his people to worship 'the God of Adam' in indigenous songs and dances of great dignity and beauty. They responded in their thousands and continued to do so, led by his son after Isaiah's death in 1935. Shembe and many Zion leaders in southern Africa owed little or nothing directly to Pentecostal and North American leaders, but the career of Le Roux and other white enthusiasts indicates that the origins and affinities of these churches in southern and Central Africa lie not so much with 'tribal psychology' or a recrudescence of 'paganism' but rather with a world-wide, charismatic wave.

In southern Nigeria, the other principal area which witnessed the early emergence of African churches with a healing ministry, the initial contacts with overseas Pentecostalism were even slighter. The first African churches in Lagos differed but little in belief and emphasis from the mission churches out of which they had developed. Their dispute primarily concerned questions of organisation, leadership and discipline: the acceptance of polygamy by some of these African churches and its partial toleration by others was perhaps the aspect which most clearly distinguished their practice from that of the missions. The first major shift in emphasis appeared with Garrick Braide and the thousands who

¹⁷ The phrase used by B. Sundkler, *Zulu Zion and some Swazi Zionists* (Uppsala, 1976), 193.

followed his teaching and example, first in the Niger Delta and then throughout southern Nigeria. In one respect Braide’s break in 1915 with the Niger Delta pastorate, that branch of the Anglican Church led by Crowther’s son and staffed entirely by Yoruba and other clergy of African descent, seemed yet another dispute over leadership, with Braide recruiting support from people at Bonny and elsewhere who resented being ruled by an alien clergy. But from the first, Braide’s charismatic challenge had also a radical spiritual dimension, which led to an enthusiastic destruction of charms, mass baptisms and an acceptance of Braide as a prophet whose prayers — and, it was alleged, his bath-water — possessed the power of healing. Braide himself, imprisoned by the colonial administration, died in November 1918 and after his death his Christ Army Church divided into various sections, but the 1921 census reported 43,000 adherents and the emphasis on healing soon developed momentum.

During the influenza pandemic of 1918, a prayer-group of Yoruba Anglicans was formed in Ijebu-Ode. Renouncing all forms of medicine, they relied solely on prayer and divine healing. Their beliefs spread to the Ijebu in Lagos, one of whom, David Odubanjo, found a similar emphasis on prayer and healing in tracts published by the Faith Tabernacle of Philadelphia. Adopting the name of this American body, prayer-groups were established in other Yoruba cities: one was started at Ibadan in 1925 by Isaac B. Akinyele, who thirty years later became the *olubadan* or ruler of the city while his brother was its Anglican bishop. Other separate groups were also formed, the most notable of which, led by Captain Abiodun, daughter of a cleric, developed into the Cherubim and Seraphim. At first these *Aladura*, or prayer-groups, sought to remain within the mission-connected churches, holding that their beliefs and activities merely satisfied a need previously neglected by the missions. Many of their leaders were drawn from the relatively well-educated ranks of established Christian families and their theology was exclusively Biblical. Their desire for a Pentecostal awakening was intense and in July 1930, at a conference at Ilesha, the prayers of a young charismatic convert, Joseph Babalola, were followed by several dramatic healings. The wave of enthusiasm spread to Ibadan and other Yoruba towns and several prophetic figures emerged, including Josiah Olunowo Oshitelu of Ogere in Ijebu, who as a young Anglican teacher had

already received visions. Great crowds attended open-air meetings in the markets. Many patients were cured, while others were cleansed from witchcraft. Baptism services continued all night. Soon the *Aladura* were no longer merely a small band of Christian deviants who had been separated from the main churches; suddenly with Babalola and the prophets they had become a dynamic evangelising force, which presented for the first time a Christian challenge to many illiterate farming communities.

The rapid expansion brought persecution: at different periods both Babalola and Oshitelu were briefly imprisoned on charges of making accusations of witchcraft. It also brought divisions and fierce theological debate. At Akinyele's house in Ibadan throughout the night of 23 January 1931 the leaders questioned Oshitelu and condemned on scriptural grounds some of his practices, particularly his use of 'Holy Names'. At the close, Oshitelu, firm in his own convictions but also in the ecumenical belief that, as he expressed it, 'there is but one tree and there are many branches',¹⁸ withdrew to found the Church of the Lord (*Aladura*). For a period the Faith Tabernacle leaders developed contacts with the Apostolic Church, a British Pentecostal church, which as a result sent missions to southern Nigeria and the Gold Coast. The principal consequence, however, of the *Aladura* revival of 1930 was that Christianity was established in many previously unevangelised areas of Yorubaland where Muslim influences were penetrating quickly: in the crusade against the expansion of Islam, which had so concerned the 1910 Edinburgh conference, Western missionaries had received, albeit if they failed to recognise it as such, a powerful, independent reinforcement from a most unexpected quarter.

It seems an extraordinary coincidence that the Pentecostal emphasis on faith healing should have developed in Western Christendom precisely at the moment when large numbers of Africans were seeking in Christianity a solution to the problem of suffering and evil broadly consonant with their previous concepts of healing. The links, albeit tenuous, in Zululand and southern Nigeria with Western Pentecostals helped to emphasise the universal significance of this local African response. Yet the careers and impact of two other prophetic figures — William Wade Harris and Simon Kimbangu — illustrate the fact

¹⁸ Quoted by H. W. Turner, *History of an African independent church* (Oxford, 1967), 25.

that as Christianity reached a wider circle of Africans, as the immediate entourage of the mission station ceased to be the focal point of evangelism, the call to purification and healing almost inevitably emerged as a dominant emphasis of the Gospel to Africa irrespective of the presence or absence of Pentecostalist teaching.

A Grebo from Cape Palmas in Liberia, brought up under the influence of Episcopalian missionaries, Harris received his prophetic calling while in prison for having challenged the Liberian authorities. In a trance Harris heard the Archangel Gabriel proclaim that God was coming to anoint him and he felt the Spirit descend upon him. When released from prison, probably early in 1912, Harris discarded all European clothing and set out, with Bible, cross, calabash and a bowl of water, on a preaching mission along the coastal areas of the Ivory Coast to the western Gold Coast. ‘Possessed by a holy horror of fetishism’,¹⁹ he proclaimed repentance and summoned his hearers to renounce the old gods, while acknowledging the reality of traditional spiritual anxieties. He offered them immediate baptism and healed them, casting out evil spirits by beating his patients on the head with his Bible. It has been estimated that about 200,000 people responded by burning their charms. Fearing political disturbances, the French expelled Harris from the Ivory Coast at the end of 1914, but he left behind him thousands of convinced converts. Some followed a variety of prophets and formed independent churches; others joined one of the mission-connected churches. Ten years later the first Methodist missionary to visit Harris’s followers in the Ivory Coast found about 150 congregations with a total of some 30,000 members, many of whom, on the condition that they accepted monogamy, became the nucleus there of the Église Protestante Méthodiste.

In July 1915, Simon Kimbangu, aged about 25, was baptised at Ngombe Lutete, a station of the Baptist Missionary Society in the Lower Congo. Three years later, during the influenza pandemic, Kimbangu received his first summons to a prophetic mission, but, restrained by a sense of inadequate training, it was only in March 1921 that he responded by effecting a spectacular cure. News of the miracle spread rapidly, the mission hospitals

¹⁹ The phrase is that of a Roman Catholic eye-witness, the Rev. P. Harrington SMA, quoted by G. M. Haliburton, *The Prophet Harris* (London, 1971), 38.

CHRISTIANITY

were suddenly deserted and for the next three months the prophet was at the centre of a tumultuous movement, which attracted thousands of adherents and produced an unprecedented demand for Bibles and hymn-books. Like Harris, he commanded his followers to destroy images and charms and, like Harris and the *Aladura*, Kimbangu appears to have seen his message not primarily as a challenge to the missions but as an extension of their activities, a translation of the Gospel to African spiritual realities. In June the Belgian administration, alarmed at the impact of his teaching, attempted unsuccessfully to arrest him, but in September he was arrested, condemned to death and then imprisoned for life, dying in prison in 1951. Many of his closest disciples were also arrested and exiled to other parts of the Congo, but the movement continued clandestinely. A large number of his adherents, led by his sons, remained faithful to his message, re-emerging as a well-organised, extensive church which in 1969 became a member of the World Council of Churches. Both Harris and Kimbangu were prophets proclaiming the New Testament. Both were shunned and persecuted by missionaries and administrators, and they had merely a fleeting contact with their followers during their brief public ministries, but both left a legacy at once profoundly indigenous, Christian and ecumenical.

CATHOLIC STRATEGY AND PRACTICE

Besides the established and the newly arrived Protestant missions, and the wide-ranging spectrum of independent Christian radicals and enthusiasts, Africans at the beginning of the twentieth century were also becoming increasingly exposed to a massive momentum of the Catholic missionary movement. The rapid Catholic expansion into tropical Africa which marked the closing decades of the nineteenth century was a direct consequence of the major reorganisation achieved earlier in the century. New missionary societies, closely linked to the Congregation of Propaganda Fide in Rome and based, like their Protestant counterparts, on a widespread mobilisation of recruits and finance, had replaced the earlier initiatives which had been heavily dependent on Catholic monarchs. The Congregation of the Holy Ghost, or Spiritans, reorganised in 1848 and with headquarters in Paris, had started work on the coast of Senegal and Gabon and

later expanded into Angola and the East African coast. They had been joined in West Africa by the Society of African Missions (SMA) from Lyons, while in the Turco-Egyptian Sudan Bishop Comboni and priests from Verona attempted to make a reality of the vicariate of Central Africa established in 1848. In South Africa, where the hierarchy had been established largely to meet the needs of Catholic settlers, significant missionary initiatives were gradually developed by the Reformed Cistercians (Trappists) at Mariannhill, near Durban, by the Oblates of Mary Immaculate in Basutoland, and by the Jesuits north of the Limpopo.

None of these missions had, however, made an appreciable impact in the interior of tropical Africa before 1878, when Charles Lavigerie, Archbishop of Algiers, persuaded Propaganda Fide to entrust four enormous vicariates in Equatorial Africa to the Society of Missionaries of Africa, founded by him ten years earlier and known as the White Fathers from their adoption of the Algerian tunic. This extraordinary coup gave his society responsibility for the immense area from the Lower Congo to the great lakes, and the first caravans set off immediately for the kingdom of Buganda and Lake Tanganyika. Soon Cardinal Lavigerie's vicariates were drastically reduced, particularly in the Congo Independent State where Leopold insisted on preference for Belgian missionaries, especially the Belgian Jesuits and Scheutist Fathers, but in the east the White Fathers were still left with a vast, densely populated, undivided area which embraced all the interlacustrine kingdoms. Elsewhere the newly established colonial powers often preferred missionaries of their own nationality: German Benedictines and Pallotin Fathers were sent to German East Africa and Kamerun respectively; Mill Hill Fathers from Britain were introduced into Uganda, and Irish Spiritans moved into eastern Nigeria, speaking the same language as the colonial administrators but hardly sharing all their imperial attitudes. In French Equatorial Africa the French Spiritans, under the local leadership of Prosper Augouard, set their active assistance in the extension of French colonial rule as a counter against the demands of French anti-clericals, and in Madagascar French Jesuits were able to exploit their nationality first against British and Malagasy Protestants and then against anti-clerical attacks. In subsequent years many other Catholic orders and societies were allocated missionary responsibilities in Africa, but throughout the

colonial period the scene was largely to be dominated by a few societies — the Spiritans, White Fathers, SMA, Verona Fathers, Scheutists and Belgian Jesuits — who, unlike most of their Protestant counterparts, were free to concentrate virtually all their energy and resources upon Africa.

This rapid occupation of sub-Saharan Africa by virtually independent, and sometimes rival, Catholic missionary societies created problems of co-ordination and control for the Vatican, even though the missionaries were among its most trusted supporters. Threatened and beleaguered after the Italian capture of Rome in 1870, the papacy found faithful and useful allies in the new missionary societies who owed their powers, and often their existence, to the encouragement and support of Propaganda Fide. Leo XIII had been able to use Lavigerie to launch a policy of reconciliation with the Third Republic, and missionaries were enthusiastic supporters of Pius X both in his condemnation of Modernism and in his confrontation with French anti-clericalism in the events leading to, and following from, the *Loi de la Séparation*, the law by which the government of Émile Combes separated church and state in 1905. As with the earlier case of Lavigerie and Gambetta, missionaries were able to exploit their positions of relative strength in the colonies. Their weapons were various. Sometimes a delicate, diplomatic tact was employed, as with the emissary, Princess Anne Bibesco, prioress of a Carmelite convent in Algiers, who helped persuade Combes to include the White Fathers among the orders which were to be reprieved. More often the defence was far more direct, as with Augouard's blunt assertion to Savorgnan de Brazza in May 1905 that it would cost the state 500,000 francs per annum to laicise the schools in the French Congo and that if there was to be 'a religious war' he would not hesitate to appeal to the powers who had signed the Berlin Act. In this conflict with European anti-clericalism, in which it sometimes seemed their very survival was at stake, both papacy and missions were firmly united.

Yet the Vatican could not allow the missionary societies to establish themselves as the undisputed, virtually autonomous rulers of enormous ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Rome's authority over the mission fields was enshrined in Propaganda's right to appoint the prefects and vicars apostolic, but since these dignitaries were in practice selected from the missionary society operating

in the relevant area, the Vatican needed additional means of control and influence. Finance provided an important weapon and in 1922 Propaganda succeeded in centralising its control over the major fund-raising organisations; the negotiations provided Angelo Roncalli (later John XXIII) with his first assignment in Vatican diplomacy. In so far as the missions were dependent on grants from these organisations, this control provided an important set of sanctions, but for many of the established missions the grants supplied only a part of their total receipts. The societies could rely on private benefactors, relatives and friends of the missionaries and on a range of local resources — plantations, the profits derived from providing a variety of skilled services, and government grants for education. Thus besides these possibilities of remote control, Propaganda needed to exert some measure of continuous supervision over the activities of the societies in the mission field itself. In 1922 Pius XI created the post of apostolic delegate to southern Africa, considered by Catholics at that time to be the hardest and perhaps the most sterile mission field in the world, and this was followed in 1930 with the appointment of Mgr A. Hinsley and Mgr G. Dellepiane as apostolic delegates to British tropical Africa and to the Belgian Congo respectively. Hinsley's most urgent task was to coordinate the Catholic response to British educational policy, while Dellepiane operated within the favoured context provided by the Congo colonial regime. But in addition to the political dimension, the appointments carried a far wider ecclesiastical significance. The delegates were responsible not to the Secretariate of State but to Propaganda Fide, and were charged with exercising a direct surveillance of religious activity in their areas. As such they could furnish Propaganda with information of the highest value and in their turn act as channels of direct communication.

The ultimate check on the powers of the missionary societies depended, however, on the emergence of an African priesthood from which eventually could be recruited African hierarchies in direct relation with Rome. From its creation in the seventeenth century, Propaganda had insisted on the paramount need for an indigenous clergy which, following the Council of Trent, had to conform to universal standards of training and discipline. This charge was solemnly given absolute priority in Benedict XV's *Maximum Illud* (30 November 1919). It was reiterated in a circular

letter dated 20 May 1923 sent from the prefect of Propaganda, Cardinal van Rossum, to every Catholic missionary institute, and in Pius XI's *Rerum Ecclesiae gestarum* (28 February 1926). At the same time Catholic missiology, as professed by Pierre Charles at Louvain, was turning from J. Schmidlin's earlier emphasis at Munster on the saving of souls or the evangelisation of individuals. As the overriding purpose of missionary activity, Charles stressed the *plantatio ecclesiae*, the establishment of the visible, hierarchical church in areas where it did not previously exist. The theological and cultural implications of this shift were far-reaching, for while the earlier emphasis had naturally favoured a policy of assimilation, the second opened the door to adaptation and eventually to a far more generous assessment of the potential contribution of Africa to a universal Christianity. Yet in the minds of most supporters of foreign missions and of most missionaries trained in the earlier tradition, the practical emphasis continued to be focused on an evangelism which sought to wrest individuals from the clutch of heathens or heretics.

In large part this was doubtless the result of inertia, ethnocentric ignorance and even racial arrogance. But in part it was also due to the often apparently insuperable difficulties which beset the task of creating an African priesthood. If the sacrifices demanded of the seminarians in those days were severe, so also were the consequences of concentrating scarce missionary resources on the seminaries. Cut off for almost ten years from their families, forbidden to speak their vernacular languages, provided with Cicero as recreational reading, regularly required to pass the standard examinations, few among the seminarians survived to take up their career of life-long celibacy. Similarly the cost for the missions was considerable: able and active missionaries absorbed for years on end in an experiment notable at first for its massive failures and with its rare triumphs still to be obtained. The 'failures' by no means implied a total waste of effort. It was while he was at the Libermann seminary at Dakar in the early 1920s that Léopold Senghor acquired the love of Thomistic synthesis which, when in 1931 he returned to the Faith, attracted him to the French philosopher Maritain and later to Teilhard de Chardin. But it was difficult for missionaries to appreciate these possibilities at that time, and it is little wonder that many missions, faced with the advance of Protestant or Muslim rivals into areas still unoccupied,

decided to renounce or postpone the experiment. As late as 1920, Augouard could excuse the lack of progress by asserting to Propaganda that 'Africans place much more trust in the European priest than in those of their own race'.²⁰

A few missions persisted, however, notably the White Fathers in their Nyanza dioceses. Here the resolution of their leaders, Bishops Hirth and Streicher, was steered by Propaganda's admonition that 'a mission that can produce martyrs can produce priests'.²¹ In 1913 the first Ganda priests were ordained. By the 1920s the experiment was obviously succeeding, and Cardinal van Rossum at Propaganda could insist that other societies followed this example. By the 1930s the apostolic delegates could begin to regulate the relations between indigenous and missionary clergy, and in 1934 an official at Propaganda, commenting on the fact that parts of Uganda and Ruanda-Urundi were witnessing the greatest mass conversion movements in the world, confidently predicted that 'in no great time African bishops would be chosen to rule these churches',²² a promise first realised with the consecration of Mgr Kiwanuka as Bishop of Masaka in 1939. At the same time in Rome itself, Propaganda incurred considerable debts, underwritten in 1927 by the Archbishop of Chicago, in providing lavish new buildings for the Collegio Urbano, which from the seventeenth century had served to train priests from the mission territories. In the late nineteenth century these had come mainly from northern Europe and North America, but in the twentieth century it was first China and India and then Africa which were to benefit most. At the opening of the new buildings in 1931 a cardinal who was present is reported to have remarked to Cardinal Pacelli, then secretary of state, that it was too large and luxurious for these '*sous-développés*', eliciting from the future pope the reply 'Eminence, these *sous-développés* will save the Church'.²³

Gradually, then, it was becoming apparent that the Vatican was attempting to indigenise a universal institution, but to an extraordinary extent Catholic missions had been left to evolve

²⁰ Quinquennial report to Propaganda Fide, 1 January 1920, in Jehan de Witte, *Monseigneur Augouard: sa vie* (Paris, 1924), 348.

²¹ Quoted by A. Hastings, *Mission and ministry* (London, 1971), 161.

²² G. G. Considine in G. Monticone *et al.* (eds.), *Guida delle Missioni Cattoliche, redatta sotto gli auspici della sacra congregazione di Propaganda Fide* (Rome, 1934), 81.

²³ J. Metzler (ed.), *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide memoria rerum 1622-1972*, III, no. 1. 1815-1972 (Rome, 1975), 102.

their tactics independently one from another. The degree of this isolation was felt, for instance, in 1905 by Mgr F. X. Geyer, whose priests in the missions recently re-established by the Verona Fathers in the southern Sudan had adopted radically different approaches to their task: among the Shilluk, the missionaries restricted themselves to learning the language, establishing a presence but avoiding any active proselytism, whereas in the Bahr al-Ghazal Antonio Vignato was intent on a vigorous evangelism. Geyer appealed to Propaganda for guidance, but it was not until 1914 that Vignato, by then Superior of the mission in northern Uganda, found in the White Fathers' methods both a revelation and in some respects a confirmation of his earlier practice. Both Benedict XV and Pius XI sought to counter this unpreparedness and lack of coordination by insisting on the need for 'missiology' and the better training of missionaries, yet there was a more fundamental cause of missionary confusion.

In the nineteenth century most Catholic missions in Africa had sought to create Christian villages, where ransomed slaves and a few other converts could be gathered under the rule of a missionary. This approach had come to be accepted as orthodox missionary practice, and the finance for missions was often specifically tied to the ransoming of slaves. African response and African initiative combined, however, to undermine this strategy and to pioneer fresh methods of evangelism. As Africans began to respond *en masse* to new religious challenges and to demand on an ever-increasing scale educational and other modernising facilities, the system of separate Christian villages became totally inadequate and even irrelevant.

Among the Ibo, where the response in the first decade of the twentieth century seemed to the Irish Spiritans to emulate that of the era of St Patrick, Bishop Shanahan was soon forced to realise that the village or bush school had become the crucial institution of Christian expansion. Adept at exploiting denominational rivalries, the Ibo made it clear that their allegiance would be given to the mission that provided the best educational facilities. Shanahan readily appreciated the opportunity this offered for evangelism, yet as late as 1912, in his annual report to Propaganda, he had to defend his emphasis on education by describing the school as 'the only breakwater' against 'the traffic in human flesh'. He had to plead desperately that the substantial

subsidy for ransoming slaves should not be withdrawn if it was diverted to this broader purpose.²⁴

Among the Ganda, the mass response had come more than a decade earlier and there it had completely transformed missionary tactics. Lavigerie, with his vision of Christian kingdoms, had indeed been more concerned with changing African society than with constructing isolated Christian villages. By reviving the catechumenate system of the early church, with adult proselytes being admitted as postulants for one year and then placed as catechumens under regular instruction for three years, he had opened the possibility of deeply influencing a large number of Africans. But the early stations of the White Fathers in East Africa around Lake Tanganyika had in fact been forced to become isolated, fortified havens. In Buganda the missionaries were at first confined to the capital, and it was only after the move to Buddu following the civil wars which started in 1888 that the White Fathers recognised the crucial role that could be played by African catechists. As he heard how in these troubled times many Africans, themselves under instruction, had taught others, how an old, blind flute-player, for instance, had 'prayed for five years' and had brought with him, to support his request for baptism, a group of 32 men whom he had instructed, Streicher decided to start employing full-time catechists, noting in the station diary that 'the first efficient plan of evangelisation of Africans by fellow Africans came to us from the Africans themselves'.²⁵

It was not only male Ganda who forced the mission to recognise African initiative and leadership. There had been women among the early martyrs and converts, but at first the White Fathers had regarded them merely as future Christian mothers. Before long, however, the mission came to regard them as potential members of a religious order. This was mainly due to the determination of Maria Matilda Munaku, sister of one of the martyrs, who at her baptism in 1886 had told Father Lourdel that she had promised 'never to marry anyone but Christ'. Maria gathered together an association of unmarried women dedicated to support without payment the seminarists, 'our children', and

²⁴ Quoted in John Jordan, *Bishop Shanahan of Southern Nigeria* (Dublin, 1949), 89–93.

²⁵ Villa Maria diary, May 1891, quoted by J. M. Waliggo, 'The Catholic Church in the Buddu Province of Buganda, 1879–1925' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1976), 97.

when the first White Sisters arrived in 1899 they found a large nucleus of aspirants already in existence. In 1910 some of these became the first Ganda to 'eat religious life' as members of the *bannabikira*, a congregation which finally received full recognition and self-rule in 1925. Indeed it has been convincingly argued that the success of the Buddu seminary, itself a key, as we have seen, to the Vatican's strategy in Africa, owed at least as much to the enthusiasm and support of these women and of the whole community of Buddu Catholics as it did to the determination of Propaganda and of Hirth and Streicher.²⁶

The response in Buganda was startling and exceptional, yet the ministry of the catechist gradually developed and became widely accepted among other Catholic missions. Sometimes this ministry assumed unusual forms. In the Lower Congo, Belgian Jesuits started a system of chapel-farms to increase supplies of meat and to create small Christian nuclei. Three catechists, recruited from freed slaves, lived on each of these farms, visited the surrounding villages each morning, worked on the farm in the afternoons, and returned to the mission station each Saturday to report their progress and to attend Mass on Sunday, before returning to the farms in the evening. By 1902 there were 250 chapel-farms with more than 5,000 children located on them, many of these 'orphans' supplied by agents of the state. In part their success derived from the very wide initiative left in the hands of the catechists, but the system, particularly the recruitment of 'orphans', was open to abuse and the Jesuits were accused in 1911 in the Belgian parliament of creating 'a new Paraguay'. Some of the missionaries also felt that the system isolated the children too much from their environment, so in 1912 the decision was taken not to create any more farms. Henceforth catechists were placed in Christian villages, the agricultural aspect of their work becoming eclipsed by the scholastic.

Among the White Fathers, the Buganda example was from the first closely followed. By 1909 the two Nyanza vicariates were employing about 3,000 catechists, and through much of this area the pioneers of this method of evangelism were those Ganda who had gone out from Buddu. In some places they appeared to the local populace, at least at first, as military auxiliaries. At the first

²⁶ Waliggo, 'Catholic Church in Buddu', 169–82; see also pp. 205–22 for Munaku and the *bannabikira*.

station to be established in Rwanda in 1900, the Ganda catechists mounted guard each night, firing into the air to frighten off intruders. During the day they rounded up Hutu children for training, and as late as 1903 Bishop Hirth stigmatised their activities at one station as those of an '*armée roulante*'.²⁷ Even in this tense situation, however, there were gentle and friendly Ganda catechists, and most catechists came to be respected not for their force but as trusted intermediaries.

The majority of catechists were given little or no training and lived in their villages, passing on some rudiments of literacy and imparting to both children and adults a knowledge of the catechism often painstakingly acquired by rote. In contrast to these were the relatively few catechists who received formal education. They became the itinerant, professional supervisors of bush schools or lived at the central station assisting the missionaries full-time. Some of the latter became widely known, like Andréas Mbangue, who, after three years' training in Germany, returned to Kamerun to help the Pallotins in their translations; he may become one day 'the patron saint of Camerounian catechists'.²⁸ In their different spheres, both groups of catechists enjoyed in these early decades considerable prestige. In part this was derived from their successful acquisition — however slight — of some of the missionaries' skills, but it also reflected their position in a spiritual universe which combined both new and traditional elements. In the local communities the catechist, although ultimately depending on new and alien sanctions and gaining much of his conscious motivation from the eager response of a first-generation convert, nevertheless also assumed many of the functions of the traditional diviner and ritual expert. It was the catechist who, often with the help of a group of Christian elders, had to solve problems and reconcile disputes, lead prayers for those in sickness or troubled by the power of evil, prepare the perplexed for confession, and finally comfort and baptise the dying. And in homesteads and communities which lacked a formally recognised catechist, some of the more important of these functions were performed by unpaid prayer-leaders and baptisers, often even unknown to the mission. In the inter-war period much of the secular prestige of the catechists was to pass

²⁷ Quoted in Ian Linden, *Church and revolution in Rwanda* (Manchester, 1977), 41.

²⁸ E. Mveng, *Histoire du Cameroun* (Paris, 1963), 460–1.

eventually to the trained schoolteachers, but the development of this distinctive spiritual ministry was to remain one of the most notable aspects of the Africanisation of the Catholic Church.

The extent to which the day-to-day interpretation of the Faith was left to the understanding and initiative of these relatively untutored elders and leaders also assisted the process by which Catholic spirituality acquired an African flavour. Some features of missionary practice, such as Shanahan's lavish use of holy water as a precaution against injury at the hands of Satan, were easily accepted. Holy water was readily drunk to cure disease and was used to protect crops from evil charms. Other features had to be transposed. Catholic missionaries, in reaction to the rationalism and secularisation of their homelands, took with them to Africa a Marian devotion which had been intensified by the dogma of the Immaculate Conception and the development of Lourdes and, later, Fatima. In some areas of Africa the traditional respect for a queen-mother was used as an analogy to explain the powers of Mary. Traditional African titles were applied to the Blessed Virgin, and rosaries and Marian medals became accepted as protective religious charms. In rivalry with Protestants, this Marian devotion provided a useful, distinctive symbol; but it also moulded and bound together Catholic communities in a more positive and fundamental fashion. Whereas the shortage of priests and the rigidities of church discipline, especially on marriage, often prevented all but a few from regularly receiving Holy Communion, all adherents could participate equally in the devotion to Mary, recitals of the rosary, communal prayers and visits to her chapels. These rituals were therefore extremely popular and may well have helped to mitigate the traumatic division between the new religious discipline and the old.

Thus in some areas of Africa Catholicism gradually became accepted as a popular or folk religion, and great processions involving thousands of worshippers on the major feast-days became a recognised feature of the African scene. One other aspect of Catholic spirituality also gained significance. At the turn of the twentieth century missionaries, particularly those from France, took out to Africa the cult of St Thérèse of Lisieux, who in those decades became the focus of a world-wide veneration. The journals which reported her miracles carried a special section for the mission countries. Seminaries for African priests were placed

under her protection. She was appointed 'regent' of at least one African country, and in 1927 she joined Francis Xavier as the patroness of all missions and missionaries. Her influence was not of course restricted to the miracles. Shanahan saw the example by which she became a great missionary without ever setting foot in foreign lands as a challenge to the whole Irish nation to adopt her weapons of prayer and sacrifice. This vision in part inspired his Maynooth appeal in 1920 and thus, eventually, the foundation of the Kiltegan Fathers. But the stress on the miraculous may well have been seen by many Africans as a most significant aspect of Catholicism, and St Thérèse was but one of the foci for this emphasis. Sometimes the impetus carried its adherents outside the Catholic fold. In the 1920s a devotion to the Holy Face developed in Calabar province, possibly brought there from Cashel in Ireland. Against mission orders, a prayer-house dedicated to the Holy Face was established and soon became a popular centre for healing. One of its main protagonists, a night-watchman from Benin, enthusiastically declared, 'this thing can cure; it will take the place of sacrifice at the juju house',²⁹ and eventually the mission felt compelled to excommunicate all who attended the prayer-house. Generally, however, as the veneration of St Thérèse illustrates, belief in miraculous cures could easily be accommodated within mission orthodoxy and it provided a Catholic counterpart to the spiritual healing of the Pentecostals and other enthusiasts. Inevitably in the period of missionary predominance and at a time when the beleaguered ultramontanist of the First Vatican Council still set rigid boundaries, the differences between Protestants, Independents and Catholics in Africa were emphasised and exaggerated by missionaries; but as the leadership and structures of the churches became increasingly African, and as theological perspectives gradually changed, the similarities of the common spiritual needs and experiences of many African Christians, already apparent in this early period, were to become ever more obvious.

²⁹ Quoted in C. M. Cooke, 'The Roman Catholic Mission in Calabar, 1903-1960' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1977), 198.

CHRISTIANITY

MISSIONS AND SECULAR RULERS: INDIGENOUS AND COLONIAL

Yet even if the new beliefs and practices were gradually becoming an integral part of African religious life, Christians in Africa, both missionaries and Africans, were primarily concerned with creating new, distinctive communities. This pursuit unavoidably involved the groups of Christians in a variety of relationships with the secular powers both indigenous and colonial. Few African rulers had entered into a wholehearted alliance with the pioneer missionaries. Even Khama of the Ngwato (1838–1923), often presented as the perfect model of a Christian chief, set firm limits to his co-operation with the mission, and elsewhere African Christian rulers were the rare products of far-reaching social and political changes. The young Christians, who divided between themselves the principal political offices in Buganda in 1890 and who supported the British against Mwanga's revolt in 1896, established a process of conversion promoted from above. This had been common enough in early Anglo-Saxon England but was almost unique in tropical Africa, where the Christian kingdom or theocratic state was to be a very rare response to missionary activity. At the other extreme, some African peoples consistently excluded Christian agents: missions were seldom welcome in Muslim areas, and some rulers, or fiercely independent groups of warriors, had prevented all access. Many powerful rulers, including those of the Asante, the Ndebele and the Zulu, successfully imposed rigid limits on missionary activities and a virtual veto on all conversions. Even where, for a variety of diplomatic, political and economic motives, missionaries were accepted or welcomed, most African societies sought to confine their influence within customary structures. The missions and their few adherents could thus be assimilated into the society, and they would constitute merely a new group of immigrant 'strangers' together with their dependants.

The frustrations inherent in these relationships were largely responsible for the fact that most missions, with a few notable exceptions, welcomed the extension of colonial rule. The establishment of the colonial regimes did not, however, immediately transform the relations between Christians and African rulers. At the local level, the missions and their adherents often remained

dependent on the goodwill of chiefs and elders, if only to exclude a rival Christian denomination. On the other hand, in the years when the colonial governments were still seeking to establish their authority, generally with minimal resources, the missions often disposed of far greater immediate strength and could seek to improve and entrench their positions in the three-cornered negotiations with traditional rulers and the advancing administrators. Throughout this period of adjustment, the relationships of missions and African authorities continued, therefore, to range from close cooperation to open hostility. Among Buganda's neighbours, the process of conversion from above spread rapidly. The rulers of Toro and Ankole became supporters of the Protestant ascendancy, and in Busoga the Church Missionary Society (CMS) was known as the *ekirya obwami*, the denomination out of which the chiefs were appointed. In Ruanda the White Fathers at first gained adherents among the Hutu and were regarded by the Tutsi court somewhat as rebellious nobles who were extending a potentially disruptive protection over the royal vassals. By the end of the First World War, the mission, strengthened by the Belgian take-over from the Germans, was a focus of influence rivalling that of the royal court. Already, however, the basis of an understanding with the Tutsi was also being laid. In 1931 a Christian *mwami*, Mutare IV, was eventually installed, thousands were swept into the church and by the mid-1930s 90 per cent of the chiefs and sub-chiefs were Catholic. As in Buganda, Christianity had in part assumed the role of a legitimating ideology, but despite this close alliance with the dominant élite the alternative, radical implications of the Gospel remained open to the Hutu majority.

Generally the tensions between missions and African rulers endured. As the missions insisted that their adherents should be freed from obligations which upheld traditional religious allegiances, the occasions for rivalry proliferated. A chapel, remarked the Bemba paramount in Northern Rhodesia, as late as 1915, could 'kill the chief',³⁰ and even among peoples predominantly Christian, such as the northern Ngoni in Nyasaland or the eastern Akan in the Gold Coast, accession to royal office was regarded as automatically debarring the holder from access to Christian

³⁰ Quoted in B. Garvey, 'Bemba chiefs and Catholic missions, 1898-1935', *Journal of African History*, 1977, 18, 3, 424.

sacraments. One energetic ruler, Njoya at Foumban in Kamerun, faced with the competing claims of Hausa Muslims and the Basel missionaries, founded his own schools from 1910, invented his own script and sought to propagate a religion which combined Christian and Muslim elements with Bamum rituals and beliefs. Such deliberate and conscious syncretism was however extremely rare; more often the conflicts were left to run through a course first of resistance and sometimes persecution of Christian converts, and then to the stage where, as among the Bemba by the 1930s, the rulers' powers had been reduced to the confines of their villages. The chief's compound became a refuge for lapsed Christians, just as the pioneer mission stations had earlier given protection to the marginal fugitives from tribal society.

Increasingly the local relations of missions and African rulers merged into the wider relationships of missions and colonial regimes. The position of chiefs became merely one of several relatively minor issues — such as the importation of alcoholic spirits, the continuance of domestic slavery, or the legal recognition of Christian marriages — which were the subject of debate between missions and colonial administrators. Few missionaries welcomed the implementation of indirect rule, fearing that it would resuscitate forms of 'paganism' which were being forgotten; instead they generally supported the emergence of voluntary political associations, such as the Kikuyu Association founded in 1920, which strengthened mission-sponsored chiefs while seeking to neutralise the influence of hostile chiefs and of customary laws repugnant to missionaries. Kenya indeed became the arena for one of the most notorious conflicts between missionaries and African custom, with the Church of Scotland and other Protestant missions leading a determined attack in the late 1920s on the Kikuyu practice of female circumcision. The conflict helped to focus Kikuyu resentment against the whole range of European encroachments and, for the missions, it left a bitter legacy of separatism or schism in church and school.

These differences between missionaries and colonial administrators were, however, relatively unimportant compared with the furore and consequences of missionary participation in the campaign against King Leopold's Congo. No other single issue illustrated so vividly the far-ranging significance, but also the limits, of the political independence of the modern missionary

movement. On no other occasion did missionaries influence so decisively the development of colonial Africa. In the fight against the abuses, and then against the concessionaire system itself, in the Congo Independent State, the missionaries were by no means the sole combatants. The strategy was devised by others and much of the impetus was to be derived from sources in no way identical with the missionary, or even the humanitarian, lobby; but it was the missions who provided the first startling denunciations, the initial mobilisation of international opinion, and the crucial, continuing supply of first-hand information and eye-witness evidence throughout the campaign. Yet it was those missionaries who were most independent of Leopold's system who took the major part. The first missionary criticism in the press was voiced in *L'Univers* in October 1894 by Augouard, who at Brazzaville was safely beyond the reach of Leopold and, as a Frenchman, was never reluctant to make a patriotic point. Whatever protests Belgian Catholic missionaries may have made in private, the brunt of the rest of the campaign until 1906 was borne by Protestant missions. In particular, it was American and Scandinavian missionaries who led the protests, not at first those British missionaries who had so notably joined forces with Leopold in 1884–5. In this situation, the strength of the American Baptists and Presbyterians was derived in part from the fact that their work in the Congo was relatively unimportant for them compared with their commitments elsewhere in the world; the international variety of the modern missionary movement gave the missions great local flexibility, while its breadth and the number of its supporters ensured that their protests reverberated throughout the home bases.

The Congo Independent State provided the test case for the humanitarian tradition in the early colonial period in Africa. The threatened condemnation by the signatories of the Berlin Act of this total disregard for so many human rights established, perhaps at a critical juncture in African history, a notable precedent for international concern and involvement in colonial policy. Elsewhere, however, the missions during this early colonial period were far less effective in challenging abuses. In Southern Rhodesia, in German South West Africa and in Natal only a few voices were raised to protest against the conditions which led large numbers of Africans into desperate rebellions. Although Harriet

CHRISTIANITY

Colenso, James White and Arthur Shirley Cripps kept alive a prophetic critique, most churches were too deeply involved with white congregations, segregation and land alienation to expose the system to an intensive scrutiny. Like the Belgian Catholics, these missions had lost a vital element of their independence, while the process of dispossession in southern Africa was, as a whole, both more gradual, and supported by far greater resources, than in Leopold's Congo. White supremacy, at least for the foreseeable future, seemed to many missionaries working there almost to be part of God's established order.

AFRICAN INITIATIVES DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND IN THE TOWNS

It was the First World War, more than flagrant colonial abuses, which first shook to its foundations the complacency of Christian Europe. The spectacle, witnessed at first-hand in many areas of tropical Africa, of the whites murdering each other, struck at the whole ethical authority of the missions as at least one missionary, Albert Schweitzer, immediately realised. 'I make no attempt to explain or extenuate, but say that we are in 'front' of something terrible and incomprehensible.'³¹ During the Second World War, increasing numbers of Africans were, like the young Ndabaningi Sithole, to see 'through European pretensions that only Africans were savages',³² but in 1914–18 only a few, like John Chilembwe, directly challenged white demands and refused to enlist in a war which was none of their making. In Africa the conflict did not destroy white ascendancy; but in Europe the churches and the concept of a Christian civilisation were widely discredited. The few radical, rationalist critics of Christian missions were now joined by a far greater number whose previous certainties had been irrevocably shaken. Yet the immediate impact on the missions in Africa was much less damaging than has sometimes been supposed. In the doubts and questionings of the post-war period, the missions were able to challenge settler assumptions and to help consolidate the policies of trusteeship. Despite the disillusionment with Christian teaching in Europe and North

³¹ A. Schweitzer, *On the edge of the primeval forest* (London, 1922), 138.

³² N. Sithole, *African nationalism* (Cape Town, 1959), 19.

America, the numbers of recruits for the missions in Africa steadily increased, so that by 1938 there were twice as many Western missionaries in Africa as there had been in 1910. The more sensitive missionaries became far less certain of the superiority of Western values, but on the whole the war if anything strengthened the missions' voice in colonial policy-making in Africa.

Indeed the most serious setback for Christianity in Africa during this period was the fact that the experience of the war years did not result in a diminution of the missionary presence, and did not lead to a major reappraisal of mission policy, particularly on the central issue of Africanisation. For here the war had presented a great challenge and opportunity. The military operations, particularly in East Africa, and the fear, often exaggerated, that German missionaries represented a security danger, seriously disrupted missionary activity. Many German missionaries were interned and then repatriated; many Frenchmen were recalled for military service; and for the rest there was an almost total break for five years in recruitment and replacements. Most missionaries assumed this disruption would threaten the life of the African churches, especially in areas recently evangelised. Desperately they sought to extend their responsibilities and fill the gaps, but in many cases there were insufficient missionaries. Yet far from disintegrating, African congregations seized the initiative and revealed what to the missionaries were quite unexpected signs of mature vigour. In Buddu, in southern Uganda, the number of seminarians rose to 95 and some of the teaching was taken over by senior seminarians. Around Masasi, African priests of the Universities' Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) led their communities through famine and military oppression. In the Lutheran Bethel mission in Tanga province, where no Africans had been ordained, African teachers assumed leadership, maintained the coffee estates and banana plantations, and looked after lapsed Christians. Their congregations seem to have played a central role in the community at large, exercising the communal rituals and spiritual healing initiatives expected of them. 'During that time,' some of them nostalgically remembered long afterwards, 'there was a true manifestation of love. At funerals many came from far and sang hymns and played trumpets... They helped the sick even

though some of them were pagans.’³³ Similar developments occurred in Kamerun, where in the Bamenda grasslands German Catholic missionaries had settled at Shisong only two years before the outbreak of war. A small band of catechumens spread the faith, and about 900 of the converts crossed to Fernando Po to be baptised by the expelled Pallotins before returning home to sustain the nascent Christian communities in the face of vigorous opposition from the traditionalists.

The challenge and disruption of the war had thus illustrated yet again the central, ironical paradox of African church history that, if the churches were to grow to maturity, the missionaries had either to transfer their responsibilities or be removed. To the original sacrifice involved in leaving family, home and country, the missionaries were now required to lay down their power and privileges in the lands of their adoption. With their vision clouded by the current paternalistic assumptions, the missions, however, failed to perceive and apply the lesson of this experience. Entrenched in their alliance with the colonial regimes, they settled down to what many of them assumed would be generations, if not centuries, of white control. African spontaneity was stifled and members of the Bethel Church in Tanga, for instance, looked back more than forty years afterwards to the brief period of African leadership as a golden age. ‘When the missionaries came back, there were signs that the Holy Spirit had left, for the desire to co-operate to work for the Lord was no more seen. Trouble started when they started grading workers. Hatred started.’³⁴

Only in the Gold Coast were African pastors able to insist successfully that the leadership, which had passed to them on the expulsion of the Basel missionaries, should remain in their hands. Here, as a result of Basel mission policy and of the wealth derived by the Akwapim congregations from the cocoa boom, substantial progress had already been made towards a financially-independent African church. In 1912 the Twi district was self-supporting and the local church sessions and district meetings were in the hands of African ministers and presbyters or elders. When in 1917 the Basel missionaries were somewhat ruthlessly expelled by the British colonial authorities, Scottish Presbyterians from Calabar were asked to take over their work. They could spare, however,

³³ Quoted in M. L. Pirouet, ‘East African Christians and World War I’, *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 127–8.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 128.

only a handful of missionaries, and in August 1918 effective control of the church passed to the synod, where the missionaries were heavily outnumbered by 28 African ministers and 24 African presbyters. The executive committee of the synod consisted of eight Africans and three missionaries, and Africans were appointed to the key posts of moderator and synod clerk. In 1926 when the Basel missionaries returned, they found that they had to accept this situation and work under the authority of the synod and its committee with their African majorities. Power had been transferred irrevocably, though it would be several years before the Basel missionaries fully recognised the hand of Providence in this.

With this significant exception, the missions elsewhere re-established after the war their control and discipline over the churches. African catechists, prayer-leaders, baptisers and church elders still exercised a crucial influence at local, grass-roots level, softening the rigidities of demands inspired by an alien culture. Here much of the effective indigenisation of Christianity was in practice still located, but the activities of these African Christians remained, in the rural areas, under the ultimate supervision of the missionaries. In the inter-war period it was the towns which provided Africans with their greatest challenges and widest opportunities. In much of Africa the missions were anchored institutionally to the rural areas: even Blantyre mission, for example, was mainly a centre for rural out-stations; but the towns were the new frontier. Full of privation, danger, insecurity and poverty, they also opened new material, social and intellectual horizons. This was particularly the case in the vast industrial complexes of South Africa and Katanga, and then the Rhodesian Copperbelt, or in major commercial cities and capitals such as Leopoldville, Dakar, Lagos and Accra; but it was also true of the multitude of much smaller market and administrative centres which on a minor scale still presented the same opportunities for Africans. Fort Rosebery (Mansa) in the Luapula area of Northern Rhodesia was a typical example. Here a Bemba catechist, Romano Lupambo, was sent in 1915 to assist in the transport of provisions. He decided to remain in the town and for the next seventeen years, virtually unassisted by any missionaries, he built up there a flourishing Catholic community, helped by other voluntary catechists chosen from among them. And outside the mission

churches, members of the Watch Tower were to find in such centres a major developing field for their somewhat similar, if less orthodox, initiatives.

Such local leadership was often left unrecorded, but the best-known case of urban Christian initiatives came from the early years on the Rhodesian Copperbelt. In 1925, only two years after the initial discoveries of the deep copper ores, African Christians working at Ndola decided to elect their own board of elders in order to organise, discipline and recruit an urban church. They opened their own school, built their own church, conducted services in the compounds and evangelised the surrounding Lamba villages. They created a community which transcended ethnic and denominational diversities. It was ten years before the Protestant missions set up an organisation to work specifically in the Copperbelt, and when in 1936 the 'United Missions in the Copper Belt' was formed it followed this ecumenical African example. The first steps had been taken by educated Nyasalanders — clerks, store-assistants and others — but the appeal of Christianity in the urban area was by no means restricted to a select élite. One of the first missionaries to work on the Copperbelt reported how 'passing through a compound after dark on almost any night you could find little groups of people gathered around the light of an underground worker's acetylene lamp, singing Christian hymns'.³⁵ These groups served significant material and social purposes, they provided nuclei of security and friendship in what could otherwise prove a terrifyingly anonymous new environment, and the faith of their members had also been enlarged and deepened in the challenges of urban life. Yet these congregations were mere islands in a shifting, anxious sea of people, and for many young men and women the towns were also places of neutrality or freedom where they could escape from the constraints and conflict imposed by both primal and Christian religions. It was all the more regrettable that the missions, burdened with their institutional rural cares and their increasing responsibilities in the sphere of formal, professional education, turned so little of their attention to this formative frontier in the inter-war period.

³⁵ R. J. B. Moore, *Man's act and God's in Africa* (London, 1940), quoted in P. Bolink, *Towards church union in Zambia* (Franecker, 1967), 178.

CATHOLIC HIERARCHIES AND COLONIAL POWERS

In the towns, in the independent, separatist churches and throughout the whole enterprise at the expanding periphery and at the local, homestead level, Africans were creating and shaping an indigenous Christianity. But at the top, at the level of policy-making, it was generally the missions who spoke for Christianity in Africa during the inter-war period. The missions' varied influence on colonial policy in Africa directly reflected, however, not so much African realities but the very different situations governing church-state relations in Europe. Although the French missionary orders had escaped the brunt of the 1905 *Loi de la Séparation*, the state, in the colonies as in the metropole, remained for French missionaries primarily a hostile antagonist. In Senegal and French West Africa as a whole, missionary education was discouraged and at times forbidden, and until the Second World War mission schools played an almost negligible role compared with the state system. In Madagascar a convinced anti-clerical, Victor Augagneur, was governor-general from 1905 to 1910. Immediately on arrival he took steps which resulted in the closure of about four-fifths of the mission schools. Open-air religious meetings were prohibited, and in 1913 the separation of church and state in Madagascar was formally decreed. Only in French Equatorial Africa did the missions succeed in retaining a substantial role in education. In France itself, the war and Pius XI's condemnation in 1926 of Action Française helped to modify anti-clerical sentiment, but French missions remained on the defensive, and in the Third Republic the tension between church and state seems to have inhibited any intimate missionary influence on official colonial policy or even their participation in an effective humanitarian lobby.

In the Belgian Congo the impact of the metropolitan situation was equally direct, though its result was the exact opposite. In Belgium, the Catholic party (the Parti Social Chrétien) participated in every government throughout the inter-war period and Catholics were particularly influential in the colonial ministry. In the Congo, therefore, the colonial state welcomed Belgian missionaries, virtually all of whom were Catholic, as allies against the forces of European anti-clericalism. When confronted by Maurice Lippens, a Liberal, anti-clerical governor-general, Catho-

lics in the Congo and in Belgium played a large part in causing his resignation in 1923; all official and subsidised education in the Congo was entrusted to Belgian missions and they received other substantial financial assistance from the state and from the major corporations. The Catholic missions' wholehearted participation in the policies of Belgian colonial paternalism rested not merely on these financial advantages secured for their evangelistic activities at the expense of their foreign, Protestant rivals, but also, perhaps even more fundamentally, on the ideological alignments which directly reflected the political conflicts in their homeland.³⁶

In Portuguese territories, the relations of missionaries with the metropolitan state had a far longer history. By 1900 the *padroado*, or patronal rights granted by the papacy to the Portuguese crown, which in the sixteenth century covered most of Africa and Asia, survived only in those areas ruled from Lisbon. There Catholic missionaries were still regarded by the state as agents of Portuguese 'civilization and national influence', a position thus defined and strongly reaffirmed by Salazar in his 1930 Colonial Act. Other missions, some of which, like the UMCA in northern Mozambique, had been pioneers before Portuguese rule was extended over the interior, had to operate within a framework of increasingly severe restrictions. Among the Catholics, few non-Portuguese were permitted to enter the African territories, but the number of Portuguese missionaries also remained very limited. Ecclesiastically, as well as economically, Portuguese Africa fell far behind the rest of the continent. Faced with this situation, the Vatican signed a Concordat and Missionary Agreement with Portugal on 7 May 1940, which, in return for an increased right of entry of foreign missionaries, recognised extensive powers of control by the state over church activity. The government retained a right of veto over the appointment of church leaders, mission schools had to use the Portuguese language and detailed reports on church work were required annually by the authorities. The agreement opened the door for an influx of Catholic missions, but the church was placed in colonial bondage. Not for another generation would some of these new arrivals move from their position of subservience to an open criticism of the colonial regime.

For the Vatican, it was Italian colonial ambitions that posed in

³⁶ See chapter 9.

the inter-war period the greatest political challenge in Africa. As Italy threatened and then invaded Ethiopia, Protestant missionaries, especially those who, like the Swedish Lutherans, had for long worked in the area and who had already been severely harassed in Eritrea by Mussolini, raised their voices in vigorous and concerted protests. The Catholic response was, however, much more ambiguous. A group of distinguished French Catholic intellectuals led by Maritain did not hesitate to denounce the unprovoked aggression and its racist justification, but the position of the hierarchies, and particularly that of the Vatican, was far more complex. 'Indignation has no bounds,' proclaimed Hinsley, now Archbishop of Westminster, in a sermon preached at the Church of St Edward the Confessor, Golders Green, on 13 October 1935, 'when we see that Africa, that ill-used Continent of practically unarmed people, is made the focus and playground of scientific slaughter.' Hinsley then tried to explain why the pope was unable to intervene and he referred to Pius XI, in a phrase that won instant international notoriety, as 'a helpless old man with a small police force... to protect his diminutive State'.³⁷ It was an unfortunate attempt to condense for an English audience a relationship of peculiar difficulty.

At the beginning of his pontificate, Pius XI and Cardinal Gasparri, his promoter and secretary of state, had skilfully and resolutely begun the negotiations which in 1929, with the Lateran Treaty and a concordat with the Italian state, finally created the Vatican state and, in a small measure, compensated the papacy for the losses incurred in 1870. Two years later, in a trial of strength with the Fascist regime, Pius succeeded in maintaining some of the independence of his favoured arm, Catholic Action, but, during this crisis, the publication of his crucial encyclical *Non abbiamo bisogno* was only ensured by sending several hundred copies to Paris in an aeroplane piloted by the young American, Mgr F. Spellman. If the concordat was to be preserved, the limits of resistance in Fascist Italy were narrow, and in the Ethiopian war the Vatican had no *locus standi*. The Vatican had been denied membership of the League of Nations, and the Lateran Treaty stipulated that it should not intervene in temporal disputes involving Italy unless asked to arbitrate by the contending parties. Within these limitations, the Curia attempted to urge restraint and

³⁷ Quoted in J. C. Heenan, *Cardinal Hinsley* (London, 1944), 56.

CHRISTIANITY

on 28 July 1935 Mussolini was warned of his opponent's right to self-defence. There was, however, no public condemnation of extravagantly patriotic statements by Italian clergy, from Cardinal Schuster, Archbishop of Milan, downwards. Immediately after the war, Pius himself seems to have been caught up in similar emotions when on 12 May 1936 he referred to 'the triumphant joy of an entire great and good people', while Italian missionaries hastened to seize their apparent advantages in Ethiopia. With the publication of *Mit brennende Sorge*, Pius was soon to return to a much clearer denunciation of racialism, and in two addresses to the students of the Collegio Urbano in August 1938 he publicly ridiculed the Fascist imitation of German racist policies and denounced the 'curse of exaggerated nationalism',³⁸ but in the Ethiopian crisis, Italian patriotism, concern with concordat diplomacy and what seems to have been a measure of European ethnocentricity had seriously transmuted the voice of the Vatican.

TRUSTEESHIP AND EDUCATION

The most significant contribution of the churches to colonial policy in this inter-war period did not come from those who, beset by the conflict with anti-clericalism in Europe, somewhat inevitably saw the African mission field as an extension of this arena. British and American missionaries were free of this incubus. Coming from what, by the twentieth century, was a far more pragmatic tradition of church-state relations, they could approach colonial policy in Africa unhindered by these pre-occupations. In the International Missionary Council they had an instrument well fashioned to mobilise the principal Protestant missions on issues of common political concern, and J. H. Oldham, its secretary, was a man well equipped to translate the humanitarian tradition into the colonial politics of the 1920s. In the two areas of policy most crucial to this tradition — the development of the concept of trusteeship and the missions' role in African education — American experience and ideology made notable contributions; but in both cases it was Oldham's industry, tact and expertise which converted principles into practice.

The principle of trusteeship, of colonial rule as a trust to be

³⁸ Quoted in D. A. Binchy, *Church and state in Fascist Italy* (London, 1941), 621.

exercised in the interests of the subject peoples, was developed and applied in East Africa in the 1920s as a counter-balance to the older, and locally stronger, imperial tradition of colonial settlement. South of the Zambezi, the settlers were firmly entrenched and missionaries exerted little direct influence on the main lines of policy. Smuts and other imperial strategists saw a similar pattern of European settlement as the steel framework for development north of the Zambezi. Kenya with its 'white highlands' provided the strongest core of settlers, and here the missions and Oldham played a major part in challenging their demands and ambitions. First the Anglican bishops of Uganda and Mombasa together with Dr Arthur, leader of the Church of Scotland mission, denounced official instructions in 1919 designed to compel Africans to work for white settlers. Oldham took up their protests, and in successive memoranda presented to Milner and Churchill at the Colonial Office by the Archbishop of Canterbury in December 1920 and July 1921, he set out the range of issues which a policy of trusteeship, as enunciated by the Covenant of the League of Nations, would involve. As an alternative to settler economic enterprise, Oldham pointed to the potentials of African production. Politically he helped to check settler pretensions, first in the negotiations which resulted in the Devonshire Declaration of 1923 on the paramountcy of African interests in Kenya, and secondly as a member of the Hilton Young Commission which in 1928 frustrated the plans to give European settlers a predominant place in the development of East and Central Africa.

In the main these were negative, defensive achievements. Of far greater significance for the missions was the co-operation between missions and the Colonial Office in the field of African education, decisively fostered by Oldham. In British territories in both West and South Africa, the colonial governments had already assumed limited direct responsibility for education by the establishment and maintenance of a few government schools. They also provided some modest financial assistance for some of the larger mission schools, and they had begun to link this aid with an incipient system of official inspection and controls. By 1920 the most famous institutions for African education were situated in the eastern Cape, culminating in the Scottish

Presbyterian educational complex at Lovedale with its neighbouring Fort Hare College. This was soon to be affiliated with the University of South Africa, and had been opened in 1916 as a result of African, government and missionary initiative. But government intervention in African education in South Africa had developed furthest in Natal. There a separate, specialised inspectorate for African education had been established, and close co-operation with the missions was achieved through their participation on an advisory board and on government school committees. This system was seen as a possible model for the rest of Africa, but here, as in the Transvaal and Orange Free State, government provision for African education was severely restricted by white opposition, while earlier the attitude of Milner's young administrators in the Transvaal had been firmly secular, depriving denominational schools of any subsidy.

In West Africa, despite the early pre-eminence of Freetown, with its Fourah Bay College, owned by the CMS and affiliated with the University of Durham since 1876, and with its concentration of secondary schools, the lead was being taken by the Gold Coast, enriched by its cocoa exports which in 1919 provided more than half the world's supply. A system of inspecting those mission-schools which qualified for financial assistance was well established there, and the governor, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, placed education in the forefront of colonial policy. Yet even in the Gold Coast less than 10 per cent of children were enrolled in government-assisted schools, and in the whole of the northern territories, which contained about a third of the total population, four small government schools were the only recognised provision for education. In the far larger territory of Nigeria, government expenditure on education was less than half that of the Gold Coast, and a fifth of the total number of government and assisted schools were concentrated in the city of Lagos. The governor of Nigeria, Sir Hugh Clifford, asserted in 1920 that the northern provinces had not yet produced a single person 'sufficiently educated to enable him to fill the most minor clerical post in the office of any government department', while education in the southern provinces was, he thought, 'in even worse case' with 'an abundance of schools but very little genuine education'. Faced in the south with a rapidly growing demand and 'the extraordinary irruption of "hedge-schools"', Clifford anxiously wished to

extend government control in this field but was seriously hampered by lack of resources.³⁹

This issue of government participation in education was also acutely posed in East Africa. In Kenya, settlers demanded that Africans should merely be educated to serve white economic interests, and the government's director of education, like Milner's officials in the Transvaal in the early 1900s, was opposed to mission dominance, claiming in 1923 that 'no African should be compelled to receive doses of Catholicism or Calvinism in his endeavour to learn'.⁴⁰ The missions feared that the British colonial governments might decide to direct all government resources towards establishing a rival school system, and it was to meet this threat that Oldham, exploiting his earlier contacts, arranged a meeting with the Colonial Office in June 1923. It was decided to establish an Advisory Committee on Native Education in Tropical Africa to facilitate and implement a permanent system of co-operation with the missions. Basically this alliance merely recognised the realities of the situation in Africa, and it underlined yet again the immense significance of the early, independent base of the modern missionary movement. In many cases mission schools, however rudimentary, had long preceded the onset of colonial rule; virtually everywhere it was the missions and the first African converts who had begun to overcome African reluctance to expose their youth to this new form of initiation; and having aroused an irreversible demand for education, it was the missions, drawing upon their independent sources of finance and recruitment, who were able to commit men and money in the schools on a scale far beyond that of any colonial government in the crucial early decades. So when in the 1920s Clifford and others sought to curb and control this 'extraordinary irruption', they found themselves confronted with a momentum they could not confine, and they recognised that they could merely seek to influence education by closer inspection and syllabus planning, purchased with larger financial grants. At the same time, the missions, faced with the rising demands on their often declining financial resources, welcomed the opportunity of continuing to

³⁹ Quoted in *Education in Africa: a study of West, South and Equatorial Africa* (Report of the Phelps-Stokes Commission prepared by T. Jesse Jones, chairman. New York and London, 1922), 175.

⁴⁰ J. R. Orr quoted by K. J. King, *Pan-Africanism and education* (Oxford, 1971), 111.

play a leading role in this field, even if they sacrificed to some degree their earlier independence.

Acceptance of this compromise was facilitated by influential promptings from North America. During the preparations for the Edinburgh conference of 1910, Oldham had been brought into contact with Dr T. Jesse Jones, who advocated that the approach to Negro education, pioneered in the Southern States by Booker T. Washington and other individuals at Hampton and Tuskegee, should be applied elsewhere. Following a visit to these institutions in 1912, Oldham became convinced that their emphasis on moderation, racial co-operation and rural community development could prove crucially relevant in Africa. It would not merely correct an alien and literary bias in education. More strategically, it might counteract the growth of an embittered African nationalism similar to that of the Congress Party in India. After the First World War, with interest in African education aroused by the mandates system of the League of Nations, some American missions approached Jesse Jones, by then educational director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, which had been established in New York in 1911 to assist 'the education of Negroes both in Africa and the United States'. As a result, the Fund appointed commissions under his chairmanship to visit Africa in 1920-1 and 1924. The commissions worked closely with Oldham. Their reports emphasised the importance of adapting education in Africa to the needs of local, rural development and stressed the potential contributions of both missions and governments. These ideas provided an acceptable theoretical consensus for the co-operation of missions with the Colonial Office, but the actual implementation and maintenance of this alliance depended to a very large degree on Oldham's personal links in London with politicians, government officials and church leaders.

The consequences of this co-operation for the missions in Africa were considerable. The attempt to provide staff and facilities for schools which would meet the standards set by government inspectorates involved many missions in a major diversion of their resources. The Scots and some of the other older Protestant missions experienced the least difficulties, as they had already developed a commitment to education far beyond the narrow confines demanded by evangelisation, literacy and the need to train African agents. The CMS indeed found that

government grants covering the salaries of missionary educationalists in tropical Africa made an important contribution to the society's funds, especially in the 1930s when other sources were diminished by the depression. As its official historian has commented: 'these grants not only made it possible to maintain a total missionary force comparable in numbers with the pre-war period; they were a chief factor in a massive redistribution of missionary forces between Asia and Africa'.⁴¹ Yet if some missions, well placed to recruit teachers with recognised qualifications, benefited financially, others made considerable sacrifices and missions generally made a major contribution to African education in purely material terms. In 1936 it was officially estimated that about 60 per cent of the cost of schools in Nyasaland was provided by the missions from their overseas resources, and in the far wealthier Southern Rhodesia the financial contribution of nine of the largest missions almost matched that of the government.

Most Catholic missions were ill-prepared to meet this challenge and opportunity. After his initial experience with the foundation of Christian orphanages in Algeria, Lavigerie had become determined that the White Fathers should avoid introducing an alien educational system into tropical Africa. Apart from the rigid professional training of the seminaries in the Nyanza diocese, the educative role of the White Fathers was often virtually restricted to catechetical teaching. Sometimes this did not even involve the acquisition of literacy, for among the Bemba the catechism was learnt by rote. Even in Buganda, 41 Catholic chiefs had been driven by the inadequate educational provisions for Catholic children to complain directly in 1901 to Livinhac, who had succeeded Lavigerie as superior-general. Rubaga High School was founded only in 1906 and right into the late 1920s Bishop Streicher's priority remained a purely religious education.

It was the Vatican, in the person of Hinsley, when Apostolic Visitor, that persuaded most Catholic missions in British Africa to accept the conditions of educational cooperation with the colonial authorities. By January 1929 Streicher had obediently reversed his priorities, accepting the school as henceforth 'the heart' of the missionary organisation in each vicariate, and it was Hinsley's visit to southern Africa in February 1928 that gave

⁴¹ G. Hewitt, *The problems of success. A history of the Church Missionary Society 1910-1942*, I (London, 1971), 432.

Catholic missions there the impetus to acquire government grants for their schools. In eastern Nigeria, as a result of Shanahan's early response to the Ibo demand for education, the Spiritans already in 1926 had more than 1,000 primary schools with 60,000 children enrolled. But they had nothing else: no secondary schools, and their teacher-training college had been closed after the war. Here Hinsley had to persuade the mission to accept the Nigerian Education Ordinance of 1926 with its emphasis on quality rather than quantity. This coincided with the Ibo's fierce desire for higher qualifications and Hinsley had no difficulty in carrying the Irish missionaries with him, but the French Spiritans remained deeply antagonistic to any state interference in their work, fearing that it would distort their mission and restrict their religious activities.

It was not only French Catholic missionaries, with their experience of anti-clericalism in Europe, who opposed the alliance with colonial education. A similar response came from a quite different ecclesiastical tradition. Evangelical Fundamentalists shared with conservative Catholics the conviction that educational responsibilities should not be allowed to divert resources from direct evangelism and expansion. After a brief initial acceptance of government grants in 1924, the Africa Inland Mission in Kenya reverted for the rest of the inter-war period to the position that its status as a Faith mission prevented it from entering into ongoing commitments with the state. In Ruanda, the most evangelical of the CMS missions in Africa regarded education purely as a means of evangelisation. Only after the Second World War did they accept Belgian financial assistance and then only because 'to refuse would have meant handing over the whole youth of the country to the Roman Catholics'. Ironically, in 1912 it had been the entry of German Lutherans into Ruanda that had caused the White Fathers to intensify their educational efforts there in the conviction that 'error will soon establish its schools everywhere'.⁴² The logic of missionary rivalry eventually overcame the reluctance to cooperate with the state, and, as in other spheres, it also forced them to meet African needs and demands.

Yet while most missions were compelled to strengthen their commitment to education and in many cases to redeploy their

⁴² Mgr L. Classe quoted in Linden, *Church and revolution*, 111; P. St John, *Breath of life* (London, 1971), 169.

resources, the increasing government intervention affected the content of African education far less than had been anticipated. The emphasis of the Phelps-Stokes reports on the importance of adapting the syllabus ignored the revolutionary impact already exerted by the denigrated and inefficient bush schools and it ran directly counter to emergent African demands. Theorists and government inspectors sought to rationalise the educational structure and syllabus, but villagers insisted on the multiplication of schools, district councils diverted funds into educational expansion and in 1929 Johnstone Kenyatta, on behalf of the Kikuyu Central Association, demanded facilities for secondary and further education and for the teaching of *ngirigaca* (agriculture), the acquisition of science and skills needed to produce cash crops, rather than mere digging. Dr Aggrey as a central figure in the Phelps-Stokes commission might advocate rural adaptation and racial moderation, but, quoting Latin tags at Fourah Bay, fêted by Guggisberg, welcomed as an equal by missionaries and liberals throughout the continent, he symbolised for his countrymen in the Gold Coast and for the thousands of Africans who saw and heard him elsewhere, the successful seizure from the whites of the advantages of their classical education. Only much later would more Africans begin to demand syllabus revision and an emphasis on communal development. Government intervention from the 1920s led to a much greater emphasis on the training of teachers and to a rationalisation of standards; but it failed to eliminate much wasteful proliferation and the schools remained a narrow and precarious ladder up which a few persistent and fortunate individuals managed to climb towards a position from which they could challenge the whites' claim to superiority.

The missions preserved a major role in a field where they had already rendered a great service to Africa, and any church, in Africa or elsewhere, has inevitably a keen interest in the development and nature of education. But this increasingly secular commitment proved a major liability to the missions. In the villages, the earlier prestige of the evangelist and catechist was supplanted by that of the schoolteacher; in the churches, the missionary tended to become a bureaucrat, remote, linked with the colonial state, concerned with the pressures of administering a system. As a consequence, the missionary was often unaware of the spiritual problems facing African Christians and of the

CHRISTIANITY

challenges confronting the churches in the urban areas, where most of those whom he had come to convert were receiving their sharpest initiation into the modern world. For many Africans, the mission churches as institutions became synonymous with education, identified with white leadership and with an African educated élite, who were preoccupied with an essentially alien mode of living, organisation, standards, discipline and thought. Yet the missionaries and the educated élite did not constitute the major component of Christianity in Africa; already their preoccupations presented a stark contrast to the desperately eager and anxious search on the part of their fellow men and women for new forms of community and for an integrated cosmology, confronting traditional concerns with fresh spiritual insights, which might together provide a measure of social and intellectual security in a rapidly changing environment.

CHAPTER 4

ISLAM

Islam was still a new faith when it was carried across North Africa and down the East African coast. Within six hundred years of the Prophet's death it had penetrated the Sahara to the Sudanic belt stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. By the late nineteenth century the range of Islamic institutions in Africa's Muslim communities resembled the complexity of those in the heartlands of Islam; indeed, the northern third of Africa was firmly integrated into the Islamic world, both through the faith itself and through its overlapping economic networks. The region that was to provide a testing ground for Islam during our period was the middle third of the continent. There the combined forces of Christian missions and colonial governments generally sought to mitigate or at least control the advance of Islam, and Muslim communities were thereby spurred on to answer this challenge, occasionally under the aegis of the Europeans but also in contradiction to the Western values associated with the colonial order.

The particular adaptations of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa were typical of the variety of Muslim communities on other frontiers of the Islamic world. There were a few Shi'ite communities in North Africa and along the East African coast, but nearly all African Muslims were 'orthodox' Sunnī. Islamic law (*sharī'a*) and the scholars ('*ulamā*') and jurists (*qādīs*) who interpreted it served as the foundation for each community, whether a cluster of nomads' tents or a polity of several million souls. Among the four schools of Islamic law, two were widely represented in Africa: the Mālikī rite predominated in North Africa and West Africa, and the Shāfi'ī school in East Africa. Treatises from the other schools were found in libraries and were noted in legal decisions of the day, and adherence to differing schools of law rarely led to political confrontation as did controversies over legal interpretation, or compromise between the *sharī'a* and pre-Islamic practices.

More important still in providing group identity were the mystic Sufi orders or brotherhoods (*ṭuruq*, sing. *ṭariqa*). These were generally known by the founder's name, taken on by adherents who observed a litany and teachings of the saint and his disciples or holy men (shaykhs) who served brotherhood members as intercessors between this world and the next. Important orders in Africa included some of the oldest, such as the Qādiriyya (named after the twelfth-century Baghdad mystic 'Abd al-Qādir) and the Shādhiliyya (after the thirteenth-century Maghribi saint al-Shādhilī); and one of the most recent, the Tijāniyya (founded by the Algerian mystic Aḥmad al-Tijānī who died in 1815). The Muslim brotherhoods have traditionally been in the vanguard of Islam, and this was no less true in Africa where shaykhs on the frontiers of the Muslim world imaginatively adapted the teachings of the Prophet and of their own orders to incorporate local religious sensibilities. The inherent tension between a highly personalised Sufism and an often rigid *sharī'a*, and between the advocates for each, was also found in Africa's Islamic communities. The most important and sensitive arena of cultural influences across Muslim Africa was the educational system. Religious education began (and for most ended) in Koranic schools where youths memorised the holy book of Islam; students seeking advanced training in the Islamic sciences sought out '*ulamā*' and libraries at a centre of scholarship (*madrasa*). Such training developed informal regional and transcontinental networks amongst the '*ulamā*', as did the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*) to the holy city of Mecca, though relatively few believers from distant lands found this obligation practicable before the mid-twentieth century.

The significance of the thirteenth century after the Prophet's *hijra* or flight from Mecca in AD 622 (from which time the Islamic calendar begins) deserves special mention, for Islamic literature had widely announced the arrival then of an 'awaited deliverer' (*mahdī*) who would prepare the world for the end of time. The end of the thirteenth century AH marked the appearance of a mahdi in the Sudan, Muḥammad Aḥmad b. 'Abdallāh, in AH 1299/AD 1881, but during the nineteenth century numerous other mahdist predictions, expectations, self-declarations and denials had affected Muslim communities throughout the Sudanic belt. Muḥammad Aḥmad died in 1885, but there was speculation

that the Mahdi might in fact appear soon after the thirteenth century AH, and amid the political uncertainties following the partition of Africa mahdism retained a populist appeal which lasted into the late 1920s.

The European conquest of Algeria (1830), of Tunisia (1881) and of Egypt (1882) led to change in many Islamic institutions. In Algeria, even the Arabic language was replaced by French for official use. In Tunisia and Egypt, the westernisation of state institutions was under way well before the French and British, respectively, began their rule, and leading Muslim intellectuals debated the issue of modernisation. Neighbouring Libya, at the same time, remained under vestigial Ottoman control, although for the last quarter of the nineteenth century the province of Cyrenaica was largely administered by the *Sanūsiyya*, a Muslim brotherhood founded by a mid-century Algerian holy man. Morocco was governed by a centuries-old Muslim dynasty where the office of sultan was one of the few institutions holding together disparate economic and ethnic groups.

Across the southern Sahara and Sudanic belt European intruders in the late nineteenth century encountered a number of Islamic states that had mostly been founded earlier in the century. Some overlaid centuries of Islamic culture. Some, such as Futa Toro in the Senegal river basin and the Sokoto caliphate in what became Northern Nigeria, traced their origins to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Islamic reform movements that predated European colonial interests in the region. Others, such as al-Ḥājj 'Umar's state at Segou and the Mahdist state in the eastern Sudan, were stimulated by the challenge of infidel incursions as well as by their leaders' call for a purified Islam.

Islam had also spread along trade routes into the West African rain forest, as in Asante, and in south-western Nigeria it was well established by 1905 in several Yoruba towns. On the eastern fringes of Ethiopia, Islam had long been dominant, and there was another string of Islamic communities along the East African coast, from the Horn to the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. In the later nineteenth century Muslim influence reached inland from the east coast to Lake Nyasa (Malawi) and the Congo basin. Further south, in Natal, some Indian immigrants followed Islam, while the small Muslim community in the western Cape originally derived from Malay slaves and political prisoners. Between and

beyond all these centres of Muslim settlement moved Muslim traders; they were often accompanied by teachers associated with the Sufi brotherhoods who implanted Islamic institutions where previously there had been only cursory knowledge of the Prophet's message.

By the end of our period, Muslims may have constituted nearly half the population of Africa and were bound together by their common colonial experience. They had witnessed movements of resistance to infidel rule; they had evolved mechanisms to reject that rule where it intruded upon fundamental aspects of Islam; and they were experiencing a regeneration and expansion of Islam within their regions. The form and content of this resurgence varied according to the interplay of several factors: the nature of contacts between Muslim communities and European colonisers early in the century, the policies of colonial administrations, and the communications between particular communities and other parts of the Muslim world. By the early 1940s there were broadly parallel developments within Islamic communities on a regional basis throughout the continent and a linking of those communities and regions across Islamic Africa. Our survey of these changes will consider first the hostility of Muslim communities towards European invaders during the first quarter of the century; it will then examine the attitudes of colonial administrators towards Islamic communities; and it will conclude by reviewing the signs of expansion and regeneration of Islam in Africa between the wars. The focus will mainly be upon sub-Saharan Africa. Islamic institutions and trends in North Africa are surveyed in chapter 6, and other regional chapters provide further information regarding topics treated here.

RESISTANCE

Appeal to jihad (holy war) against backsliders and infidels was frequently synonymous with reform and expansion in Islamic polities during the nineteenth century in Africa. During the first quarter of the twentieth century in the Maghrib and across the Sudanic belt, jihad continued to provide powerful motivation for diverse Muslim communities, although its focus was not so much internal reform as a defence of Muslim lands against the encroachments of European infidels. Most of these militant

Islamic movements sought to maintain or re-establish an Islamic state that was either under attack or had been recently occupied by the European powers. They tended to be led by officers or descendants of notables in the former regimes, although some drew inspiration from religious visionaries who stepped into the void of Muslim leadership in conquered territories. Their resilience was due as much to their inaccessibility and the lack of resolve by colonial powers during the early years of the century as to their ideological cohesion and belief in a divine ordination. They shared a belief that the occupation of Muslim lands by Europe might be stemmed by a frontal attack and that military action constituted the only correct response for the Muslim whose country was being invaded by infidels. In view of the modest number of European troops seen in many parts of the continent during the opening years of the century, the success of jihads in the recent past, and the number of such movements affecting the continent, it is understandable that holy war held a widespread appeal for Muslim communities confronted with European occupation.

The four regions in which militant Muslim resistance to colonial rule proved to be the most determined — the Sudan, Somaliland, Libya and Morocco — were also among those territories in which Islamic states flourished at the time of European conquest. In Libya and the Sudan those states were recent, late nineteenth-century creations, and colonial forces faced opponents who were among the vigorous first- and second-generation leaders in those polities. In Morocco, it was the compromises forced upon the venerated office of sultan, first by the French and then by the Spanish administration in the north of the kingdom, that precipitated two calls to jihad.

The Sudanese resistance took its inspiration from the Mahdist state founded by Muḥammad Aḥmad in 1882, which fell with the British victory at Karari (Omdurman) in 1898. For the next eighteen years the western sultanate of Darfur remained an autonomous regime under ‘Alī Dīnār who maintained his independent slave army, and an administration modelled on that of the Mahdist state. ‘Alī Dīnār successfully retained control over Darfur until 1916, despite French advances in Wadai and along the western marches of Darfur. From his capital at El Fasher he entered into correspondence with young Turkish leaders and

remonstrated over the British deposition of Khedive Abbas II. The final British action against El Fasher, complete with air support, came after the British concluded that 'Alī Dīnār was about to launch an invasion of the Sudan. Of lesser significance were the 'Kaffiyya Rising' in 1908 led by the Mahdist 'Abd al-Qādīr in the Gezira and the jihad announced in southern Darfur in 1921 in response to British taxation schemes.

During the first two decades of the century the British were also preoccupied with a movement in the Horn of Africa which owed its inspiration in part to the Sudanese Mahdiyya. This was the jihad launched by Muhammad 'Abdallāh Ḥasan, called by the British the 'Mad Mullah', who preached holy war against all infidels, including Somalis who did not recognise his claims or who had not joined his branch of the Ṣālihiyya brotherhood. His strict discipline, and his efforts to create a Pan-Somali allegiance transcending clan loyalties, gave particular force to his anti-European sentiments. The British sent four expeditions against him between 1900 and 1904, and in 1909 he was denounced by the leader of the Ṣālihiyya, but his reign over northern Somaliland continued until 1920.

In Libya and the central Sahara it was the Sanūsīyya brotherhood that served as a focal point for Muslim resistance to alien intrusion. Between 1879 and the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911, the Cyrenaica province of that territory had been administered jointly by Ottoman officials and Sanūsī shaykhs. Their common combat against the infidel forces of France, Italy and later Britain was an extension of this collaboration, despite the uneasy tolerance each party maintained toward the other. Sanūsī forces held out against Italian advances into the interior from the departure of Ottoman troops in 1912 until 1916. Sayyid al-Mahdī (d. 1902), the successor to the brotherhood's founder, had expanded the Sanūsīyya into the central Sahara where another theatre of Sanūsī warfare developed in the first two decades of the century. Sayyid al-Mahdī's successor, Sayyid Aḥmad al-Sharīf, tried unsuccessfully to defend the order's settlements against French incursions in 1906 at al-Kawar and Bilma and in 1909 in Wadai. During the First World War the Sanūsīs were able to recapture French and Italian posts in the region, only to lose them again during the French reconquest between 1917 and 1920. The second Italian-Sanūsī war (1923–32) was a popular uprising fought in the name of Islam for an independent Cyrenaica.

Militant confrontations with European infidels in Morocco came first from the Sahara where by the turn of the century Shaykh Mā' al-'Aynayn had collected some ten thousand followers at Samara in territory to the south of Morocco that was soon to be claimed by Spain. His status as the most revered figure in the northern Sahara, a region famous for its holy men, persuaded the Moroccan sultan, 'Abd al-'Azīz, to despatch to him a deputy and arms for the defence of the Sahara in 1905 as the French began their advance northwards from the Senegal valley. Two years later the shaykh helped to precipitate the sultan's deposition in favour of 'Abd al-Hafīz who would, he believed, offer sterner resistance to French inroads in the kingdom and seek closer ties with the Ottomans. In 1908 Mā' al-'Aynayn declared a jihad against the French; when French advisers obliged the sultan to sever relations with the shaykh in 1910, Mā' al-'Aynayn declared himself sultan and advanced through Marrakesh towards Fez. Here he was decisively defeated by the French and in September of that year he retired to his retreat at Tiznit where he died the following month. His son and successor, al-Hayba, continued the struggle against the Christian infidels and for a unified Morocco and Sahara. In 1912 he declared himself both mahdi and sultan and temporarily regained Marrakesh, but he was forced to retreat to the desert. His guerrilla warfare continued during the First World War with the help of arms obtained through traders in the Rio de Oro. At his death in 1917 one of his brothers took up leadership of the struggle until 1926, and in 1929 another of his relatives, Muḥammad al-Mamūn, revived the shaykh's cause by preaching jihad and taking the offensive against French outposts. Not until 1934 could the French claim that their 'pacification' campaigns had successfully crushed the last of this Islamic resistance in their Saharan territories. In the north of Morocco yet another genre of militant resistance to European occupation emerged in 1922 with the creation of the Rif Republic under the leadership of 'Abd al-Karīm (1882–1963). He had been educated both in Islamic and in Spanish Catholic schools, after which he worked until 1919 in the Spanish colonial administration. Thus 'Abd al-Karīm was able to bring some knowledge of Western methods of government and warfare to the task of creating an Islamic republic which might defend its own against the infidel. He leased mineral concessions to European firms in return for arms and military technicians, and launched devastating military offensives against the Spanish forces

before being defeated by French and Spanish troops in 1926. This warfare, reinforced by news of Islamic militancy from elsewhere in the Maghrib and the Sudanic belt, served to identify Islam with an anti-colonial stance amongst those Africans who sought such an ideology.

This last point can be illustrated from several other parts of Africa in the first quarter of the century. Conversions followed in the train of French campaigns against Samory Toure's state in the West African Sudan during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, strengthening Islam among the Mandinka despite the casual adherence of Samory himself. In German East Africa, the savage repression of the Maji Maji revolt in 1905–7 induced the Ngindo and other peoples in the south-east to espouse Islam as a modern belief-system which owed nothing to Europeans. In 1908 an Arab trader in Zanzibar, Rumaliza, whose business had been ruined by the Germans, caused the distribution on the mainland of a letter, supposedly written in Mecca, which promised an early anti-colonial millennium. During the First World War the Central Powers further promoted the image of a militant, anti-colonial Islam, allied through the Ottomans to Germany and against the British and French occupation of Muslim lands. This accounts in part for the alliance in 1915 between Muḥammad 'Abdallāh Ḥasan and the Ethiopian emperor Iyasu, whose own flirtation with Islam contributed to his deposition in 1916.

The feature that distinguishes the militant Islamic movements of the early twentieth century from preceding jihads, and the feature that most alarmed the colonial powers, was the Pan-Islamic links between them. For example, regular communication between the Sudanese Mahdi's camps and potential religious reformers in Bornu at the end of the nineteenth century promoted a number of declarations of mahdis which the British in Northern Nigeria regarded as among the chief threats to their early administration. In 1906, British officers reported mahdis in Bauchi and Gombe as well as Kontagora; German intelligence uncovered a likely mahdi in Adamawa. Another mahdi was said in the northern Gold Coast and Ivory Coast to have come from Bornu in 1904–5. But the major challenge to British rule in Nigeria was the offensive taken in Satiru, a village near Sokoto, in 1906, when a mahdist force successfully attacked a British column and acquired con-

siderable weaponry as well as open pledges of assistance from the emir of Gwandu. Within a month punitive expeditions had dispersed the Satiru threat and razed the village. But subsequent investigations by French officers pointed to possible links between the Satiru affair and a wider conspiracy against French forces in nearby Zinder, and possible collaboration in such an offensive by the emir of Kano. During the First World War, the youngest son of the Sudanese Mahdi was recognised by the British as a religious leader, since they saw him as a natural ally against the Ottoman Empire.¹ The ensuing revival of Mahdist organisation in the Sudan gave a new impetus to mahdist activity in northern Nigeria, and Fulani from Bornu and Gombe rallied in 1923 around Malam Sa'īd, son of Muḥammad Bello's descendant, Ḥayātu, who had acted as the Mahdi's agent in Sokoto at the close of the nineteenth century. Malam Sa'īd was deported, but as late as 1927 British officers detected mahdist activities in Katsina.

The Pan-Islamic network within Africa also linked the Sudanese Mahdi's legacy with Sanūsī leaders and, during the second decade of the century, both briefly with Northern Nigeria. One of the most effective Sanūsī chiefs in the central and southern Sahara was Kawsen ag Muḥammad, a Tuareg who in 1904–5 left his exile in Kanem to fight against French incursions in the southern desert. He affiliated with the Sanūsī in 1909 and two years later travelled to Darfur where he contemplated joining 'Alī Dīnār's forces before returning to the Fezzan with his troops to join a Turkish garrison. By 1916 his forces were laying siege to Agades and could claim control over the main commercial entrepôt of the central Sahara, having rallied Tuareg compatriots against the French throughout the Fezzan, Ahaggar and Aïr. In a rare display of co-operation, British administrators in Kano were prompted by the Kawsen threat to provide military supplies to French troops as they took the offensive against him in 1916; three years later Kawsen was caught and put to death at Murzuk.

During the first two decades of the century the most pervasive Pan-Islamic influence associated with militant Islam in Africa was that of the Ottoman Turks. Sultan Abdülhamid II, who reigned from 1876 to 1908, attracted an allegiance from many African Muslims who acknowledged Turkey as the only remaining Islamic power of consequence in a world of aggressive Christian

¹ See chapter 15, pp. 760–1.

states. Thus the sultan had been addressed by and replied to the Muslim community of Lagos in 1894 on the importance of Western education; from the 1870s there were links between Istanbul and Cape Town Muslims. The sultan of Zanzibar, Sayyid 'Alī b. Hamūd (1905–11) was entertained by Abdülhamid; and as late as 1910 Friday prayers in Dar es Salaam were still being said in the name of the Ottoman sultan. During the period of the Young Turks (1908–18) there emerged a Turkish intelligence service with African ties that provided substance to previous vague notions of fealty. At the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottomans issued a call to jihad against the Allied powers which was widely distributed in North Africa. It surfaced also in East and Central Africa, where in 1915 the British arrest in Nyasaland of a Muslim from Mozambique uncovered Swahili tracts bearing Istanbul's call for holy war against the English. During the war Ottoman and German arms and technicians were provided for the Sanūsī movement after Turkey formally withdrew from Libya, and an attempt was made by Germany to smuggle arms to Mā' al-'Aynayn's successor; 'Alī Dīnār had representatives in Istanbul, and Ottoman recognition was extended in 1916 to Muḥammad 'Abdallāh Ḥasan, who also received a Turkish adviser at his headquarters in northern Somaliland.

If the extent of these Pan-Islamic ties and sentiments set these militant movements apart from the jihads of earlier times, their avowed aim of maintaining Muslim authority in the face of threats to a rightly guided practice of Islam united them with a centuries-old tradition which was at once their main strength and their chief liability. Popular support for calls to jihad against the Christian infidels is evident from the tens of thousands of believers who joined these movements. But in the end their success in opposing European armament depended upon their own access to such armament. By the mid-1920s, apart from the continuing Sanūsī war and minor skirmishes in the Sahara, jihad had been rejected as an anachronism in Muslim Africa. Islamic leaders and communities who sought to distance themselves from their Christian rulers joined others who, from the advent of colonial rule, had simply withdrawn from the political realities of infidel occupation.

The most dramatic form of withdrawal was emigration from European-occupied lands. The little information that is available suggests that this option was taken up by individuals and

communities throughout the continent. Families and clans from Shinqit, in northern Mauritania, migrated to Syria and the Hijaz during the first decade of the century. Several hundred descendants and associates of the nineteenth-century Segu reformer, al-Ḥājj ‘Umar, passed through the central Sudan fleeing French columns as they approached the Niger in 1890; the refugees settled in the Sokoto emirate of Missau, but continued eastwards in 1905 when the British conquered Sokoto’s domains. The most famous of this group, Alfa Hashim, finally settled in the Hijaz where he and his son, as shaykhs of the Tijāniyya brotherhood, were to wield considerable influence over West African pilgrims to the holy lands of Islam. Indeed, the belt of villages and clans of West African origin that stretches from Lake Chad to the Red Sea owes its origin both to permanently settled pilgrims *en route* to or from the holy lands and to migrants seeking escape from infidel rule. Among the thousands who did so were the Hausa saint, ‘Umar Janbo (who lived in Darfur under ‘Alī Dīnār before fleeing to Mecca where he died in 1918) and Sultan Mai Wurnu (son of a former Sokoto notable who settled in the Sudan in 1906). There was also emigration from North Africa; in 1911, heeding a call from the *mufti* of Tlemcen, some 800 Algerians departed for Syria.

More frequent than physical withdrawal from European rule was the response of numerous holy men who, in keeping with an Islamic tradition advocating non-involvement in temporal affairs, sought to ignore the European presence. Examples of the recluse could be found in nearly every major Muslim community across the continent: three from West Africa must suffice here. Shaykh Bay al-Kunti (1865–1929) inherited the leadership of the famous Kunta holy family of the Timbuktu region on the Niger bend in 1896. Shaykh Bay was something of a recluse prior to French occupation of his land in 1904; thereafter he refused to present himself to French authorities who took him to be hostile to their presence in the early years, although it may have been his counsel that discouraged some from joining Muḥammad Kawsen’s attack on Agades. Shaykh Bay was chiefly responsible for the Tuareg Islamic revival in the years after the First World War, and his library functioned as a legal centre for the central-southern Sahara during the first quarter of the century. He maintained a refuge and redistributed the wealth disbursed to him. His hermitage and his erudition effectively linked Tuareg and Moorish

traditions of Islamic scholarship in the central Sahara. A comparable figure in Guinea was Fanta Mady (d. 1955) who resided in Kankan, an Islamic centre dating from the sixteenth century which had long disseminated teachings fostered by the Kunta family from the Niger bend. Fanta Mady's father had been a spiritual adviser to Samory Toure, and the shaykh himself studied with a son of Samory. He thus enjoyed a link with one of West Africa's major resistance movements while observing strict neutrality in political matters and, by the early 1940s, the 'Grand Cherif Fanta Mady' was recognised as one of the most erudite and influential figures residing in the West African savanna. In the Gold Coast another such savant was al-Hājj 'Umar Kratche, a Hausa scholar who settled at Salaga during the 1870s. Between his return from pilgrimage around 1913 and his death in 1934 he was widely regarded as the spiritual head of the Gold Coast Muslim community. Other holy men distinguished themselves as shaykhs in the Sufi brotherhoods, and still others developed working relationships with the colonial authorities in order to promote Muslim education or applications of the *sharī'a*. Indeed, the most characteristic holy men were those, discussed below, who responded positively to the new opportunities offered by colonial rule to them and their communities. They were the main agents of the expansion of Islam in Africa during our period, and their moderating influence, both within and beyond areas of open confrontation, confirmed the wisdom of colonial policies aimed at the incorporation and appeasement of Muslim authority.

COLONIAL POLICIES

Colonial attitudes towards Islam were influenced both by early Muslim responses to colonial intrusion and by past experience in dealing with Muslim populations. British administrators in the Sudan and in Northern Nigeria drew upon experience in India, especially in matters of Islamic law. French containment of Muslim resistance in mid-nineteenth century Algeria contributed to the preoccupation of French officials with the potential dangers elsewhere of the Sufi brotherhoods; North African experience also demonstrated the efficacy of French policies of appeasement toward Muslim authority. No less important were the personalities of certain administrators whose policies not only affected their

own Muslim subjects but served as examples for other parts of Islamic Africa.

One of the most imaginative of early colonial administrators was Louis-Hubert Lyautey. As resident-general in Morocco from 1912 to 1925, Lyautey developed a system of indirect rule through the office of sultan and a restructured Muslim state. Although the sultan's administration was greatly circumscribed by the resident-general, the Moroccan protectorate dramatically contrasted with French government in Algeria. Lyautey's philosophy of respectful paternalism in Morocco had parallels in sub-Saharan Africa. Maurice Delafosse acquired an extensive experience of, and respect for, West African societies which led him to introduce African language teaching to the École Coloniale in 1909. Paul Marty published numerous studies of Islamic societies in French West Africa while chief of its department of Muslim affairs during the second decade of the century; they formed the basis for future French Islamic policy. An analogous influence upon Islamic societies and the preservation of Islamic authority in Northern Nigeria was the high commissioner there from the British conquest to 1906, Frederick Lugard. 'Lugardisme' was to have considerable popularity amongst French administrators also; its effect upon Islam in Nigeria lay in the creation of emirates where no Muslim authority had effectively ruled before, and in the extension and expansion of Islamic law.

The practical effect of such systems of indirect rule upon Muslim communities lay mainly in the colonial sanction of Islamic offices. The power of a sultan, emir, pasha, *qā'id*, *khalīfa*, or *qāḍī* might now be severely circumscribed, but it might also be enlarged and in any case was backed by the authority of the colonial administration. Between the two world wars such offices and their incumbents were sometimes attacked as props to colonial authority by conservative Islamic leaders and also by modernisers. But for those regions on the frontiers of Islam, the colonial powers' approval of Islamic titles, like their sanction of Arabic and their acknowledgement of the *sharī'a*, served to confirm and reinforce the importance of Islamic institutions. The favoured position of Muslims as agents in the colonial administration in German East Africa, and the recruitment of Muslims into most colonial military and police forces, similarly gave prestige to their communities. So too did the spectre of Pan-Islam

which so alarmed colonial authorities, even though as a cultural and even political reality it rarely measured up to European fears. This had come to be understood by colonial administrations in the aftermath of the First World War, as was the potential danger of policies that acknowledged Muslim authority over any large territories. In Senegal an officer charged with Muslim administration reasoned that 'reduced to the role of ethnic-group religion, Islam loses all character of a religion of opposition [to our interests]'.² By the 1920s most colonial administrations had established networks of Muslim holy men, many recruited from the ranks of the Sufi shaykhs, who could be counted on to dispense mediation and moderate counsel to their communities.

At the beginning of the colonial era, Muslim Africa was served by tens of thousands of Koranic schools whose students subsidised as many teachers and holy men. The added prestige accorded to Islam by colonial powers and the association of Islam with a rival, non-European ideology further enhanced the importance of Koranic education. Colonial attitudes toward Islamic education were initially supportive, although the Koranic schools were generally regarded as irrelevant and their pedagogical technique arcane. Some administrations envisaged the development of a civil servant cadre in Muslim territories through fostering advanced training in Arabic and Islamic law, along with such subjects as geometry, mathematics and surveying. By the end of the first decade of the century Gordon Memorial College, opened in Khartoum in 1902, had become a model for British education officers; staffed by Egyptians, it comprised a training college for teachers and *qāḍīs*, an industrial workshop, and primary and upper schools. Hanns Vischer, the first education officer for Northern Nigeria, drew on Sudanese experience for the school he opened in Kano in 1911 and the following year schools at Sokoto and Katsina were incorporated under government supervision. Such integration of Western and Islamic advanced education in Northern Nigeria led to the establishment in 1923 of Katsina Teachers' Training College and, by the mid-1920s, some 69 government schools in the region. A government law school was opened in Kano in 1934 staffed by Sudanese jurists. But the

² Robert Arnaud, 'L'Islam et la politique musulmane française en Afrique', *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française, Renseignements coloniaux*, April 1912, 152.

numbers served by these schools were modest when compared to student attendance in Koranic schools.

In Sierra Leone and the hinterland of Lagos, early Muslim education owed much to Dr E. W. Blyden who, while not himself a Muslim, served as an Agent of Native Affairs from 1895 in Lagos and as Director of Mohammedan Education in Sierra Leone in 1902 until his retirement in 1906. Blyden brought a Sierra Leonean Arabic tutor from Fourah Bay College to Lagos in the 1890s, and by the turn of the century three government Muslim schools were functioning at Lagos, Badagry, and Epe; these continued with government subsidy until 1926, drawing heavily upon Muslim teachers from Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, Blyden supervised five such government schools and in 1906 Arabic and Islamic legal studies were incorporated into the curriculum for the School for the Sons of Chiefs at Bo. In French West Africa the School for the Sons of Chiefs at St Louis was converted in 1906 into a *madrasa* modelled on the Algerian government *madrasas*; another was opened in 1907 at Jenne, in the Soudan, a centuries-old centre for Islamic studies. Other government *madrasas* were opened at Timbuktu and at Boutilimit, in southern Mauritania, with staff from Algeria. These schools resembled government-sponsored Muslim schools in southern Nigeria and Sierra Leone inasmuch as Western pedagogy tended to displace the Islamic sciences. In East Africa the government-sponsored school in Mombasa, belatedly opened in 1912, offered a curriculum comparable to the government Muslim schools in Zanzibar and Tanga in which neither Arabic nor Koranic studies had a place. Low enrolment at Mombasa and at a similar school at Malindi nearly doubled once the Kenya government agreed to the inclusion of Koranic studies in 1924, but the great majority of Muslim youths remained outside this westernised education system.

Colonial administrations exercised their most subtle effect upon Muslim Africa through the codification and administration of Islamic law. A new degree of uniformity and consistency was introduced in applications of the *shariʿa* throughout individual colonies or protectorates, as was the concept of a division between state authority and religious sanction. While this undermined the adaptability of the *shariʿa* to local customary law which characterised its applications in pre-colonial days, it also extended the

sharī'a into legal matters and to some communities where Islamic law had previously had little impact. Indeed, Governor-general William Ponty in French West Africa felt obliged in 1910 to prohibit indigenous tribunals from applying what he called 'Koranic law' in cases where it contradicted local custom (and in 1911 he ordered that tribunal judgements and administrative correspondence be issued in French rather than Arabic). But where Islamic law did not interfere with 'native law and custom' (as the British formula read), its application was tolerated, even encouraged in Muslim areas, mainly in matters of family and personal law. In fact, legal administration in Muslim communities in the British possessions made little distinction between Islamic law and 'native law'; in northern Nigeria, where only 'native law' was recognised, the extent and enforcement of Islamic law was surpassed in the Muslim world only by legal practice in Saudi Arabia. In the Gambia the *sharī'a* was applied in civil cases involving Muslims (most of the population) through a system of *qādis*' courts created by statute in 1905. Elsewhere in British colonial Africa, the *sharī'a* was applicable to Muslim contestants, just as 'native law' was applicable to non-Muslim Africans. In French black Africa, customary law was until 1946 applied to all non-citizens, which in Muslim areas meant in effect the application of the *sharī'a* (first formally recognised as a legal code for Senegalese Muslims in 1857). In the Sudan, legislation in 1902 and 1916 established a court structure and system of legal administration closely paralleling that of Egypt.

Islamic legal administration under colonial rule has not been well studied, but several tendencies deserve mention. In most areas there developed, formally or informally, parallel legal and court systems, the one being informed by Islamic law, the other by European law or by administrators' perceptions of customary law. All colonial-sanctioned court systems specified an appeals process which ultimately terminated in the local or regional administrative officer, who was generally ill-equipped to handle the intricacies of Islamic law. In northern Nigeria the standard reference on Māliki law was F. H. Ruxton's summary translation (1916) of a French translation of the *Mukhtaṣar* of Khalīl. It followed from the dual court system and the appeals process that government-recognised *qādis* held highly political positions in

colonial administrative systems. Predictably the administration of the *sharī'a* by 'ulamā' in Muslim communities thus continued, outside colonial systems of justice, and may well have increased in importance since pre-colonial days, even while the European sanction of the *sharī'a* and the incorporation of *qādis* into the administration contributed to the status of these Muslim authorities.

In North Africa it was the modernisation of the *sharī'a*, encouraged by colonial authorities, that preoccupied Muslim jurists. An example had been provided by the Young Turks who developed Ottoman law on family rights in 1917, the first major modernist influence to affect the *sharī'a*. From the 1920s Egypt took the lead in writing new legislation in matters of family law and in the establishment of tribunals. Similar moves followed in the Sudan and Libya which paralleled earlier developments in the Algerian *Code Morand* (1916) and a *Code Santillana* in Tunisia enacted in 1906. Only in Morocco did the pre-colonial structure of the *sharī'a* remain essentially untouched by these modernising influences. French attempts in 1930 to remove the Berber population from the jurisdiction of the *sharī'a* resulted in an alliance between the Berber tribes and Moroccan nationalist leaders.

From the late nineteenth century, Christian missionary societies regularly criticised colonial government policies and attitudes towards Islam. Mission strategists correctly believed that many colonial administrators were indifferent if not hostile toward their own evangelical objectives, even if they approved their educational enterprise. British officials invoked the Indian precedent of non-intervention in religious matters; in Nyasaland, government directives in 1894 specified that missions should gain the approval for their work in Muslim districts from the Muslim chiefs. Hostilities between missionaries and Muslim authorities in Northern Nigeria in 1900 caused the government to restrict Christian mission activity to non-Muslim areas. Such policies, the utilisation of Muslim authorities in systems of indirect rule, the colonial sanction of Islamic education and law, and the concomitant expansion of Islam throughout sub-Saharan Africa were viewed with great anxiety by Christian missions. In 1910 the World Missionary Conference declared its 'protest also against anything which serves to identify British State policy with the

predominance of Islam, considering it to be a danger not only to the cause of Christian Missions, but ultimately to the very government which practises it'.³

Confrontations occurred between Muslim communities and Christian evangelists and their followers, despite the efforts of colonial administrators to avert them, and frequently the two groups of believers were thrown into political or economic competition. Under such circumstances each ideology took on something of an ethnic, linguistic, or occupational mark by which competitors and their clients might identify themselves. Thus the Ngindo and the chiefdoms of Ifakara and Kiberege in southern Tanganyika, like the speakers of Manding or of Hausa in West Africa, are associated with Islam, as too are butchers in much of West Africa, and tailors and long-distance transport drivers in certain areas. The explanations for these associations of Islam with specific groups cannot be generalised, although 'stranger' communities whose home areas were dominantly Muslim or Christian tended to carry their belief-systems with them and, indeed, to emphasise them with special zeal. In areas where large Muslim and Christian communities lived alongside each other, such as western Nigeria, southern Tanganyika, or Sierra Leone, competition between Muslim and Christian educational establishments was common. But the level of financing, the number of schools, and opportunities for Western-trained students of the mission schools increasingly put Muslim schools at a disadvantage. At the beginning of the century both types of education may have been accepted as options for modernising societies, but by the end of the 1920s it was clear that students from Muslim schools could rarely compete in the colonial economy with school-leavers from the mission station.

EXPANSION

By 1940 perhaps almost half the population of Africa adhered to Islam, and the impressions of colonial administrators and missionaries suggest that there had been a rapid expansion of Islam since the opening years of the century. Two-thirds of Africa's Muslims were in Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco and the Sudan; by 1950 nearly 40 per cent were in Egypt and Nigeria alone. By 1940 over half the population was Muslim in French

³ *World Missionary Conference 1910: report of Commission V/II* (Edinburgh, n.d.), 60.

North Africa, Libya, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Soudan, Niger, Chad, the Gambia, Nigeria, the Sudan, Somaliland and Zanzibar. Moreover, both in these countries and elsewhere there were districts in which the Muslim population increased two- or three-fold. In central Cameroun nearly one-third of the 80,000 Bamum were converted following their ruler's acceptance of Islam in 1918.

The most pervasive single group of agents in this process of Islamisation were the Sufi brotherhoods. Superficially, the brotherhoods represented simply a set litany and disciplined prayer-response which, if fulfilled with other prescriptions of the order, generally assured the believer a place in the world to come. In practice, the brotherhoods frequently linked ethnic groups and intellectual traditions, and provided tangible evidence of Pan-Islamic ties for members. In the face of rapid social change during the colonial era, they became increasingly important in urban centres, and they also provided a migrant or traveller with credentials that might link him to fellows in a stranger community.

The oldest of the Sufi orders in West Africa was the Qādiriyya, which gained widespread adherence during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries from propagation by the Kunta holy men in the Timbuktu region. In the course of the nineteenth century it became associated with the '*ulamā*' class in many centres of learning such as Boutilimit in Mauritania and Kankan and Touba in Guinea, while it was associated with the ruling class in the Islamic states of Futa Toro, Masina and Sokoto. Among the best-documented of the Sufi orders in West Africa is a populist offshoot, the Murīdiyya, named after the followers (*murīds*) of the Senegalese Shaykh Ahmadu Bamba (c. 1850–1927), whose early career and large following brought him under suspicion among the French administration in St Louis. He was exiled to Gabon in 1895, and within a few months of his return to Senegal in 1902 his rapidly growing number of Murīds led the French to exile him again, to the custody of the Mauritanian shaykh, Sidiyya Baba, where he remained until 1907. Ten years after his return from exile he was estimated to have had 68,000 disciples; by 1940 over a quarter-million members of the Murīdiyya were to be found in Senegal. Their economic colonisation of the Senegalese hinterland was inspired by Ahmadu Bamba's injunction, 'Work as if you

would never die and pray as if you would die tomorrow.' It was the Murids' commitment to labour that placed vast stretches of the Senegalese Ferlo under groundnut cultivation, and it was groundnuts that provided the economic base both of the order and of the colony of Senegal. The success of the Murīdiyya can partially be attributed to the anti-French posture with which the brotherhood was associated in the popular mind at the turn of the century. Much of its early recruitment came from the lower classes of Wolof society, although nobles in the old social order soon saw the advantage of joining forces with the Murid shaykhs. The order came to represent an alternative to French notions of assimilation, a development reinforced by the increasing co-operation between Ahmadu Bamba and French authorities during the years following his exile.

One of the Murids' chief competitors in Senegal, the Tijāniyya, illustrates a more common phenomenon: a brotherhood appealing to a clientele across ethnic or linguistic lines, albeit lacking in highly centralised control. There developed in Senegal two major Tijāni branches, one located at Tivaouane and another at Kaolack under the direction, respectively, of al-Ḥājj Mālik Si (d. 1922) and al-Ḥājj 'Abdullahi Niass (d. 1922). Both traced their inspiration to the mid-nineteenth-century reformer, al-Ḥājj 'Umar. Both presided over a religious centre (*ṣāwīya*) and mosques that attracted adherents from throughout Senegal and beyond (totaling nearly half the Senegalese population by the 1950s); both maintained links with fellow Tijānis in North Africa and across West Africa. There were other branches of the Tijāniyya inspired by al-Ḥājj 'Umar in the former empire of Sokoto where the reformer lived during the 1830s on his return from Mecca. Disciples were initiated in Bornu and throughout the Sokoto emirates, and a Tijāni *ṣāwīya* was founded in Zaria, but individual Tijāni groups had little influence during the nineteenth century, when the emirate authorities emulated Shehu 'Uthmān dan Fodio's patronage of the Qādiriyya brotherhood. When the emirs of Kano and Katsina accepted the Tijāni litany from a Mauritanian holy man during the second decade of the twentieth century, it symbolised a break from Sokoto's hegemony just as it gave a prestige to the brotherhood in Northern Nigeria that steadily increased during our period. This process was accelerated in 1937 by a meeting in Mecca between Ibrahim Niass, successor to the

founder of the Kaolack Tijāni *ẓāwiya*, and the emir of Kano. On his way out, Ibrahim Niass had visited Fez to renew his father's links with Tijāni authorities; on his way home, he visited Kano, and thereafter he was widely regarded as spiritual head of the Tijāniyya in West Africa, in succession to Alfa Hashim in the Hijaz, who had died in 1931. Tijāni shaykhs can be found across the Sahel of Africa and throughout North Africa, but it is in West Africa that the brotherhood has had its widest following. The reasons for its popularity varied from place to place. It was an exclusivist order, prohibiting members from joining other brotherhoods; at the same time, in line with al-Ḥājj 'Umar's own preaching, it appealed to the unlettered folk, thus setting the order apart from the older Qādiriyya, commonly associated with the jurists and learned men in the nineteenth century.

The loose association of Tijāni leaders, the rapid expansion of the brotherhood and its popular appeal made it susceptible to a splintering effect typical of the growth and multiplication of Sufi orders throughout Islamic history. Besides the two main branches of the brotherhood in Senegal, there was another Tijāni tradition in the Senegal valley led by a grandson of al-Ḥājj 'Umar whom the French appointed as the 'Grand Marabout' of the colony. Yet another source of Tijāni teaching from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was that of the holy men of the Mauritanian Idaw 'Alī tribe. All these branches were on good terms with the French authorities, in contrast to the Hamalliyya. Shaykh Hamallah (c. 1886–1943) was initiated into the Tijāniyya by a Tlemcen shaykh and settled in Nioro, east of Kayes, at the turn of the century. His followers expressed hostility to non-Muslims and Muslim collaborators with the French, a doctrine no more acceptable to orthodox Tijāni than to the French administration. Shaykh Hamallah was arrested in 1925 and exiled for ten years in Mauritania and the Ivory Coast, which exacerbated the anti-colonial sentiments of his followers. In 1940 a Hamallist band near Nioro killed many of its rivals; the shaykh was exiled to Algeria and then France, where he died in 1943. Shaykh Hamallah's militancy appealed to Muslims who associated the privileged position of certain shaykhs with the largesse provided them by the French administration. The Hamalliyya itself gave rise to a further offshoot, founded by a Hamallah disciple Ya'qūb Sylla, who began preaching to his Sarakolle countrymen in Kaedi in

1929. His was a message with millenarian overtones, advocating absolute equality between followers, irrespective of sex, age or former social status; although the Ya'qūbiyya broke with its Hamallah origins, it joined that movement in its antipathy towards the orthodox Tijāniyya.

It would be impractical to trace in further detail this process of fission and expansion among the Sufi orders in West Africa; every major Muslim community in West Africa had its shaykhs or brotherhoods that were offshoots from the Tijāni or Qādiri orders. In the Sahara alone, a list of the major brotherhoods would include the Qādiriyya, Mukhtāriyya, 'Aynayniyya, Fāḍiliyya, Sanūsiyya and Tijāniyya, each with an estimated following of tens of thousands. In the Maghrib the brotherhoods were also widespread. Their importance there lay less in proselytisation than in the social and political networks which they represented, but there too their organisational structures ranged from the highly centralised to loose associations, they appealed both to learned men and to the unlettered, and their influence was as much a function of the status of their leading shaykh as it was of their numbers. Conservative estimates from Morocco in 1939 set brotherhood membership at a quarter-million; in Fez some 13 per cent of the total population was affiliated to the orders. Membership tended to be highest in rural areas and on the Algerian frontier, and nearly three-quarters of the Sufis were to be found in seven brotherhoods, the largest being the Tijāniyya. In Algeria the Raḥmāniyya, Qādiriyya and Tijāniyya accounted for one-fifth of the adult male population in 1956; comparable figures from Senegal would be close to two-thirds. This contrast can be explained by the absence of alternative Islamic associations in sub-Saharan Africa; besides, the brotherhoods came under attack in the Maghrib in the twentieth century from advocates of reform and modernisation who viewed them as an anachronism and denounced them as agents of the colonial administration, with which their leaders usually enjoyed mutually beneficial relations.

The brotherhoods had come under attack in the Sudan at the time of the Mahdiyya when the orders were outlawed and their leaders sought exile in Egypt and the Hijaz. They were re-established after the British occupation of the Sudan, which was actively supported by some of the seven principal orders, such as the Mirghaniyya and its offshoot, the Ismā'īliyya. Although the Mahdiyya was not a *ṭarīqa*, its political significance in the Sudan

as a rallying point for descendants of the Mahdi's followers, and its popular appeal during the twentieth century, bears comparison with the social and religious function of the *turuq*, with which it successfully competed.

On the East African coast the major brotherhoods at the close of the nineteenth century were the Qādiriyya and the Shādhiliyya. Three branches of the Qādiriyya expanded rapidly in the early twentieth century not only in Zanzibar, Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo, but also far into the interior, where Muslim communities were already established at commercial centres. Shaykh Uways b. Muḥammad (d. 1909), from Brava in southern Somalia, was the main inspiration to the spread of Qādiri practice in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam as well as southern Somalia; his disciples settled in Tabora, Bagamoyo and, during the 1930s, in Ujiji. A second strand of Qādiri propagation had great success in the Rufiji area, whence disciples of Shaykh 'Alīb. 'Umar al-Shirazi (d. 1925/6) spread it to Lindi, Nyasaland and Mozambique. The third and perhaps the largest Qādiri branch had its origins in Bagamoyo in 1905; disciples of Shaykh Ramiya (d. 1931) carried it to Tanga, Ujiji, the Manyema region and Ruanda. The Shādhiliyya came to the coast from their base in the Comoro Islands at the end of the nineteenth century, but it was mainly through a school at Kilwa, directed by the Shādhili shaykh Ḥusain b. Maḥmūd, that the brotherhood spread to students from Mozambique; other shaykhs in the order were to be found in Tabora and Dar es Salaam, Ujiji and Kampala. Other, smaller brotherhoods developed in the 1930s — the 'Askariyya in Dar es Salaam and the Ahmadiyya–Dandarawiyya in Bagamoyo — but the region was dominated by the Qādiriyya and Shādhiliyya during the first half of the century. The spread of these brotherhoods took place at the same time as many communities in the interior were adopting Islam, and their role in this may be likened to the contemporary activity of West African brotherhoods. In central and north-western Tanganyika Islam was spread by Muslim traders, and just as it had spread in the aftermath of the Maji Maji rebellion, so too it spread during and after the First World War, which had caused widespread upheavals and forced Christian missions to retreat. For the recently converted, the brotherhood represented a progressive movement offering links to the wider Muslim world.

Criticism of the brotherhoods came from the '*ulamā*' and from

advocates of modern reform, and centred on their supposed compromise of Islamic ideals. While some Sufi shaykhs studied and preached a highly esoteric mysticism founded on the classics of the eleventh-century savant al-Ghazālī, others also sought lucrative return in this world through their thaumaturgical services. The close association of medicine (*ṭibb*) and mysticism in traditional Islamic scholarship found expression in the Sufi shaykhs who ministered to diverse needs of their communities by writing amulets, interceding between God and their followers, or administering holy water. Such practices, like the veneration of holy men's tombs and the search for holy essence (*baraka*) and miracles (*karāmāt*) from revered authorities, were by no means new, yet the efficacy of amulets, as of *baraka* and *karāmāt*, was in no way impaired by the changed economic and political circumstances of colonial rule. Indeed, modern improvements in transport contributed to the popularity of visiting particular holy men, and such shrines as the tombs of Abdullah Abdu-Salam at Cape Town; Muḥammad al-Fāḍil (father of Sa'ad Bū and Mā' al-'Aynayn and founder of the Fāḍiliyya) in the southern Sahara near Walata; or Aḥmad al-Tijāni at Fez.

The colonial peace and the advent of mechanical transport also contributed to the growing importance of pilgrimage (*ḥājj*) to Mecca and Medina which every Muslim is enjoined to perform once in his lifetime. During the nineteenth century, caravans linked West and North African communities with the Hijaz, providing opportunities for the wealthy and pious to make the sometimes hazardous journey which could take two to ten years to complete, and these continued into the twentieth century. One representative account from Chad in 1905 reported a caravan of 700 pilgrims that had been collecting travellers since its departure from Timbuktu the previous year; in 1909 five caravans passed through Fort Archambault. Records from the Ottoman health authorities in 1905–6 show 2,300 pilgrims from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and indicate that of the total number of 70,000 pilgrims over one-third entered Arabia from Africa. In 1925 an administrator in the Sudan estimated that there might be some 25,000 West African pilgrims in transit. Colonial authorities tried to limit the number of pilgrims, warning them of the dangers of the journey and of the presence of Africans in servitude in the Hijaz. Nevertheless, when the *ḥājj* was prohibited in 1940 as a

result of the war, it was commonplace to find *ḥājjis* in most of the large Islamic communities of the continent. By the 1930s the British had begun to subsidise the *ḥājj* for select local dignitaries, a practice that dated from the nineteenth century in francophone Africa.

The importance of *ḥājj* extended far beyond the status which it offered to select, usually already wealthy men and women upon their return home, and the Pan-Islamic contacts it fostered, not only in the Hijaz but in Khartoum and Tunis, Cairo, Fez and Zanzibar. As the number of pilgrims increased from West Africa, so too did the number of West Africans settled along the pilgrimage route, particularly from Maiduguri, west of Lake Chad, to Port Sudan. These settlements, in turn, facilitated and benefited from the overland pilgrimage, as did the community of several thousand permanently settled Africans in the Hijaz. As the *ḥājj* thus became increasingly accessible to African Muslims, so too the Hijaz took the place of Istanbul as a spiritual focal point, and from the establishment of the Saudis as rulers of the Hijaz in 1925 the exponents of Wahhābī reform demonstrated the viability of an orthodox Islamic state in the modern world.

Asian Muslims settled in Africa afforded another, albeit limited, contact between the continent's Islamic communities and the Muslim world beyond. In the West African commercial centres the small numbers of Lebanese merchants (including Sunnī and Shi'ite as well as Christian families) kept apart from African Muslims. In East Africa, on the coast and at major commercial centres, Indian immigrants, who first arrived in significant numbers during Sayyid Sa'īd's reign at Zanzibar (1840–56), included Muslim communities who mostly kept apart from their African and Arab neighbours. The fragmented nature of the Indian Muslim communities restricted their influence upon Arab and African Muslims. The major Shi'a groups included both Ithnā'-*'ashariyya* ('Twelvers') and Ismā'īliyya communities, and a still smaller number of Sunnīs; further divisions in the Ismā'īlī community separated the Musta'lī (Bohora) from the Nizārī (Khoja). This last group, also known as the Eastern Nizārī, was the most highly structured of the Indian communities; their *imām* was the Aga Khan. The third Aga Khan (b. 1877) lived throughout our period and was firmly committed to the British Empire. In South Africa, a minority of Indian immigrants in Natal

were Muslims and are unlikely to have proselytised. But at the Cape, Muslims of Malay descent had made converts among other non-whites in the nineteenth century and this process evidently continued. By 1915 it was reckoned that one-third of the Cape Province's Muslim population was Coloured (as distinct from 'Asiatic'), and there were more mosques than churches in Cape Town. By 1936 there were 35,000 Coloured and 42,000 'Asiatic' Muslims in the Union. Missionaries viewed with alarm the steady communication between Cape Town and Zanzibar, Mecca and Istanbul, and in 1925 they reported the appearance of Islamic literature in Afrikaans and in Arabic script.

Indian Muslim missionaries from the Aḥmadiyya, founded by the Punjab saint Ghulām Aḥmad (d. 1908), were active from the 1920s. Fante Muslims in the Gold Coast sought help from the Aḥmadiyya, who in 1921 sent out from London an Indian missionary, 'Abd-ur-Rahīm Nayyar, who visited Accra, Lagos, Zaria and Kano. In 1933 a permanent Aḥmadi missionary settled in West Africa. The Aḥmadis in Lagos were estimated at 500 in the early 1940s; the largest community was that of the Fante Aḥmadis at Saltpond where the West African headquarters of the Aḥmadiyya was established. In the northern Gold Coast, an Aḥmadi mosque was built at Wa in 1936 and was soon followed by others. In Sierra Leone a permanent Aḥmadi missionary settled in 1939 at Baomahun, near Bo. In East Africa, Aḥmadi mission enterprise appeared only in 1934, at the request of local Indians; the first Aḥmadi mosque was erected in Tabora in 1942. The significance of the Aḥmadiyya lay in part in the violent reaction commonly aroused by the espousal of Ghulām Aḥmad's claims to be a peaceful mahdi, the Messiah and a prophet after Muḥammad. In addition to their theological heresies, Aḥmadi missionaries advocated teaching the Koran through use of an English translation, which threatened the status and livelihood of '*ulamā*' trained in Arabic. Their main impact lay in their educational facilities, which competed favourably with Christian mission schools.

The Aḥmadi missions, like the expansion of Sufi brotherhoods and the increased ease of pilgrimage, contributed to a regeneration of Islam during the period between the wars which also found expression in the growing political consciousness of many Muslim communities. This was largely independent of colonial govern-

ment encouragement and it evolved with little direct influence from the wider Islamic world. This development generally took the form of new urban, regional, or colony-wide associations or societies of Muslims; some were overtly political forums representing special interests within Islamic communities. On the East African coast, Muslim associations reflected the ethnic and economic divisions of Arabs, Indians and Africans. In Zanzibar four separate groups were formed: the Arab Association (established at the turn of the century), the Indian National Association (formed before 1914), the African Association (1934) and the Shirazi Association (1939), each professing Islamic ideals of unity while promoting their own economic interests. Analogous cleavages appeared in Kenya. The legislative council there included from 1920 one seat for a nominated Arab member, and in 1921 the Coast Arab Association was formed to seek elective representation. This was obtained in 1923, but elections polarised rivalries which in 1927–8 produced the Afro-Asian Association and the Arab Association. In Tanganyika tensions within the East African Muslim Association led, in 1934, to the formation of a Muslim Association of Tanganyika in reaction to Indian exclusiveness. In Senegal, Sufi brotherhoods rather than ethnicity were determining political allegiance by the mid-1930s. The return of Ahmadu Bamba from exile was gained through the intervention of the Senegalese deputy to the French National Assembly, François Carpot (1902–14), who had received support from the Murīdiyya. Both Tijāni and Murid leaders developed relations with Senegal's rival politicians; in the 1934 elections Tijāni support helped Galandou Diouf to defeat the Murid candidate, the socialist Lamine Guèye. In the Gambia, the Muslim community of Bathurst was represented on the local branch of the National Congress of British West Africa and thus formed a counter-weight to Christian Creole domination. In British West Africa the possibility of Muslim trade unions was discussed by colonial officials in 1941. Each of these examples points to an involvement by Muslim communities in colonial affairs that was a dramatic departure from earlier resistance and collaboration, even when their participation tended to be circumscribed by ethnic, economic or sectarian interests.

Another new type of association was devoted to cultural affairs. The *Brigade de la Fraternité du Bon Musulman* was founded in

Senegal in 1934 and sponsored by Tijāni groups who sought to promote religious and historical studies for Muslims. Of the same genre was the short-lived Mohammedan Reform League which pressed the Mombasa Municipal Council in 1934 to ban spirit-possession cults and other organisations that the League feared would corrupt the young. More typical, however, were associations to promote Islamic education, generally reflecting a new generation of Muslim leaders who sought to modernise their education along the lines of Western schools. Western Nigeria's four major Muslim communities in Lagos, Ibadan, Abeokuta and Ijebu-Ode illustrate this well. Two of the five factions in the Lagos community in the early 1920s were led by modernisers; the Lemomu group at the Central Mosque which founded the Young Ansar Ud-Deen Society in 1923, and the Aḥmadi group from which the Zumratal Islāmiyya originated in 1924. Both associations declared their non-sectarian educational aims and their desire to obviate the necessity for Muslim youth to attend Christian schools. Founders of the Ansar Ud-Deen declared their objective of 'education on Western lines; by this means alone can Islam be better studied and understood; as lack of proper knowledge of the essence of Islam and failure to grasp its spirit and correct teaching have been the greatest cause of the backwardness of the Muslim'.⁴

During the 1930s in Abeokuta a comparable society, the Young Nawair Ud-Deen, was formed to carry on the work of the Abeokuta Muslim community which opened its first school in 1920; the Ijebu Muslim Friendly Society, formed in 1927, opened its first school at Ijebu-Ode in 1930. Divisions in the Lagos Aḥmadi community in 1940 led to the break-away of a group calling itself the Aḥmadiyya Movement-In-Islam which was not officially accepted by the Aḥmadis but which focused almost exclusively on education. Some of these local societies were formed in response to the British decision to withdraw education subsidies for Muslim schools in Yorubaland in 1925; in their turn, the societies provoked conservative reform groups to organise against them. In East Africa, the movement for modern Islamic education centred on Shaykh al-Amin, son of one of Mombasa's

⁴ *A review of the Society's work, 1923-1943* (Lagos, 1943), 4; cited in G. O. Gbadamosi, 'The establishment of Western education among Muslims in Nigeria, 1896-1926', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1967, 4, 1, 114.

most illustrious scholars, who began a career in journalism on the Kenya coast in 1930. It was Shaykh al-Amin's influence which led to the first co-educational *madrasa* in Mombasa, and the first government school for Muslim girls in 1938. But divisions in Mombasa's Muslim communities precluded large-scale educational associations.

Shaykh al-Amin's inspiration, and that of the Lagos Ansar Ud-Deen, was *salafiyya* doctrine, which owes its origins to the Egyptian writer Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), who was himself a student of the Pan-Islamist al-Afghānī (d. 1898). Al-Afghānī sought a reformed, revitalised Islam that would not be beholden to Western, modern trends any more than it would be weighed down by age-old traditional accretions. 'Abduh, his master's most famous disciple, taught, held influential positions in the Egyptian press, went into exile in Paris, and returned to serve in the judiciary; he concluded his career as the chief legal officer of Egypt. He argued that a reformed Islam could co-exist with Western ideas, accept their challenges and replace the slavish imitation either of Europe or of antiquated tradition with a dynamic and innovative culture such as distinguished Islam at the time of the first generation or *salaf*. Thus the *salafiyya* doctrine came to be associated with attacks on mysticism, saint-veneration, and specifically the Sufi orders, just as it was embedded in programmes for modern education that emphasised reason and rational sciences.

The impact of *salafi* doctrine was keenly felt across the Maghrib. By the early 1920s it inspired a social and religious reform group in Fez that was opening 'free schools' for Muslims and in the mid-1920s taking the offensive in Rabat and Fez against collaboration by Sufi brotherhoods with the French administration. Similar developments in Algeria led to the foundation of the Association of the 'Ulamā' in 1931 under the guidance of Ibn Badis, which campaigned against Sufi brotherhoods and for the adoption of Arabic as the official language; it devoted itself mainly to educational efforts. In Tunisia, *salafi* doctrine was disseminated in the early 1920s through the Destour party of Shaykh 'Abd al-'Azīz Taalbi. In each of these countries the *salafi* advocates had an ambiguous relationship to the emerging nationalist movements. Anti-colonial conservatives approved their counsel to return to the fundamentals of Islam but their attacks on Sufi orders and

traditional education offended many; to anti-colonial radicals their advocacy of cultural revival provided common ground, yet their moderation in political affairs was a handicap to movements that were increasingly militant. In Morocco, by the late 1930s, *salafi* doctrine and leaders had largely been incorporated into the nationalist cause; in Tunisia Taalbi had been eclipsed by the formation of the Neo Destour party in 1934. The Islamic Congress of Algiers that was called in 1934 marked both the height and collapse of alliance between the '*ulamā*' and Western-educated advocates of Islamic reform; thereafter leadership in the nationalist cause passed to more radical spokesmen.

Reformers in West Africa who voiced *salafi* ideas appeared in Kano and Bamako at the close of our period, but their numbers were small and their influence slight. In Kano it was Sa'ad Zungur (1915–58) who advocated Egyptian notions of Islamic reform as well as the Aḥmadiyya in the late 1930s. In the French Soudan, students who had studied at al-Azhar in Cairo, where they had come under the influence of such organisations as the Society of Young Muslims, returned to Bamako in 1943 and began to adapt *salafi* doctrine.

Other symptoms of the Islamic cultural revival between the two world wars ranged from the dissemination of printed Arabic and Swahili texts to the adoption of Muslim dress. Printed Arabic reading matter had regularly reached sub-Saharan Muslim communities from Egypt and North Africa from the mid-nineteenth century. In the early twentieth century, government presses published occasional administrative circulars in Arabic with moderate counsel by favoured Muslim holy men. It was in this spirit that the French administration saw to the publication in Tunisia, in 1914–15, of 22 tracts by the Senegalese Tijāni shaykh, al-Ḥājj Mālik Si, who was among the first Muslim West African authors to appear in print. One work by Mā' al-'Aynayn had been published in Fez at the end of the nineteenth century, and during the 1920s some of his other religious tracts appeared in Cairo, as well as the major work of the nineteenth-century reformer al-Ḥājj 'Umar. In the 1930s the Senegalese Tijāni Ibrahim Niass and Abubakr Atiku from Kano had works printed in Cairo, while presses in Khartoum and Abeokuta, Kano, Zanzibar and Damascus published works by and about Africa's Muslim notables. From 1930 to 1932 Shaykh al-Amin produced a Swahili newspaper in Mombasa.

Among the vast majority of newly-converted Muslims, not touched by the printed word, the Islamic cultural revival was identified with the adoption of the long flowing *jallabiyya* or dress commonly associated with traditional Middle Eastern wear. In areas as far removed as Nyasaland and Sierra Leone, visitors commented on the growing popularity of Muslim dress, equated with conversion to Islam; this trend stimulated cloth imports, tailoring and embroidery (which was popularised by Middle Eastern imports). There were local variations in the style or colours of customary dress, the use and styles of hats or turbans or the types of rosaries, but it is the dramatic expansion of the general style of dress during our period that attests to a popular confirmation of the Islamic cultural revival.

During the first forty years of the twentieth century, Africa's Islamic communities exhibited the full range of contemporaneous forces and contradictions at work in the Muslim world: resistance, adaptation to infidel overrule, receptivity to proselytising by Sufi orders, and a new political consciousness encouraged by both fundamentalist and modernising Pan-Islamic influences. For the two centuries prior to 1900 and independent of European contact, the Muslim world had generated numerous reform movements which sought a social and moral reconstitution of Islamic society, attacked economic and social injustices and called for political action. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jihads in West Africa, the *Sanūsiyya* in Libya and Mahdism in the Sudan were thus part of a phenomenon that included Wahhabism in eighteenth-century Arabia, the *Padri* movement in nineteenth-century Indonesia and diverse reform movements in India. It was this momentum, however highly fragmented and dispersed, that was channelled into confrontation with the West during the nineteenth century. This confrontation elicited two broad patterns of response which were illustrated with a certain irony in the fortunes of the two spiritual centres of Islam during our period: Istanbul and the sultanate under the modernising pressures of the Young Turks, and Mecca, representing the traditional values of Wahhabism. The contradictions are profound, for Sa'udi control over the holy lands and their rise in influence as champions of *Wahhābī* norms for tens of thousands of annual pilgrims was contemporaneous with the flowering of the modern press, nationalism, and educational ideas that were forcing secular,

Western liberal notions, first embraced on a national scale by the Turks, upon the world of Islam. During our period the common anti-colonial struggle largely overrode these divergent forces in the Muslim world.

The most remarkable feature of Islam in twentieth-century Africa has been the rapidity with which diverse communities embraced the Faith. Muslim Africa not only mirrored and shared the contradictions and vitality of Islam in the Middle East and Asia; it proved to be one of the most rapidly expanding regions in the Islamic world. The agents of this Islamisation, mainly the Sufi brotherhoods, and the catalysts that promoted it, such as better communications and rapid urbanisation, may explain how and where Islam expanded. To understand why this process moved with such vigour in such widely varying social and political settings requires, in part, an assessment of the impact of the European presence in colonial Africa. Islam was widely perceived as a modernising influence which, at least until the late 1930s, could compete with Western and missionary education systems; it was an ideology that offered believers a wider world that was not exclusively tied to the colonial order. This served to link sub-Saharan Africa to Pan-Arab issues just as it created a bridge that brought North Africa and Egypt into Pan-African causes, especially from the late 1940s onward. But Islam was also highly compatible with notions of corporate responsibility stressed in many African societies and religions, and the faith was well served by able and imaginative interpreters whose energies brought about religious change in diverse communities.

CHAPTER 5

AFRICAN CROSS-CURRENTS

This chapter is concerned with the circulation of ideas among Africans south of the Sahara, and in particular those ideas which travelled across the frontiers by which the succeeding regional chapters are circumscribed. Growing awareness of belonging to a particular colonial territory was one very important feature of our period, but the units of colonial government were by no means the only new frames for social action. They overlapped with spheres of economic pressure and religious affiliation which also created new routes for travel and new occasions for the exchange of ideas. These routes led Africans from one part of the continent to another, and for a tiny but most important group they also led overseas, to Europe and the USA. As their social horizons expanded, Africans refined their comprehension of the colonial condition and reflected on their multiplying social identities: as blacks, as Africans, as colonial subjects; as workers, soldiers, students or professional men; as Christians or Muslims; as members of tribes and as potential citizens of future nation-states.

This process had of course begun well before 1900. The great expansion of trade in much of sub-Saharan Africa during the nineteenth century had caused free Africans to move further from home than ever before. Caravan routes were extended or created. The old networks across the Sahara linked up with routes across the length and breadth of West Africa. South of the equator, traders pushed into the interior from both east and west coasts; the great lakes, and the rivers of the middle Zaïre basin, became important highways. This greatly accelerated the interchange of information, customs and beliefs between African peoples. Languages were learned, and some, such as Hausa, Swahili or Lingala, became *lingua francas*. Religious cults acquired new followings; wars of conquest extended fields of political allegiance; and as people became more aware of cultural difference they acquired a sharper sense of their own ethnic identity: many of the

tribal names current in Africa today were invented by Africans in the last century. Meanwhile, religions of alien origin were developing their own networks in Africa: those of the Muslim brotherhoods and the already bewildering variety of Christian missions. These enabled a very few Africans not only to leave Africa (which all too many had had to do) but to come back again and share with their fellows their experience of the outside world.

Thus, even outside the 'westernised' enclaves in the Cape and along the West African coast, the social experience of many Africans was more rich and varied than European intruders commonly appreciated. All the same, the changes of the earlier twentieth century enormously extended the range of social contacts. As the colonial presence was extended and intensified, so more and more Africans were drawn into a variety of large-scale structures and developed appropriate forms of solidarity. It seems helpful here to consider four types of structure which could transcend territorial or regional frontiers: those of capitalism, those of the imperial powers, those of Christian missions, and those of higher education.

THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE

Networks of empire

By the early twentieth century, the pressures of capitalist enterprise had begun to draw Africans along new routes to congregate in new centres of production. Southern and Central Africa, from the Cape to Lake Victoria, comprised in effect one vast market for black labour. This was dominated by the gold mines on the Rand, though countervailing force was exerted by mines, plantations and farms throughout the region. The search for higher wages and better working conditions moved men to cover great distances, on foot as well as by train or truck, with small regard for political frontiers, despite the efforts of governments to regulate the flow. Workplaces, towns and wayside labour camps became forums for the exchange of news and ideas. A colonial labour official remarked in 1933: 'The degree to which the African is not only travelling, but also observing, is probably not generally recognised; it is, however, easy to hear a camp-fire conversation in the Congo during which conditions in the Union,

Rhodesia, Tanganyika and Angola are all discussed and commented upon...¹ Within this great region, the incidence of labour migration was on average far higher than anywhere else in Africa. Nonetheless, other patterns of movement were also important. Cotton and coffee farmers in Buganda employed migrant workers from north-western Uganda, Ruanda and Burundi. In the Sudan, cotton-growers in the Gezira made use of workers from the impoverished hinterlands of West Africa, whence others migrated to cocoa farms in the Gold Coast or the Ivory Coast, or groundnut farms in Senegal and the Gambia. And throughout Africa the growth of exports caused harbour towns to become magnets for workers on the move. Seamen saw strange countries, and some settled abroad: between the two world wars, there was probably an annual average of well over a thousand West Africans and Somalis living in British ports. For literate Africans there were special opportunities for travel in the service of trading firms: in the late nineteenth century a few from British West Africa had worked as agents in French territory, and by 1914 one Nigerian had twice visited London on behalf of his employers in Lagos.

For most purposes, colonial government was organised in territorial or at most regional compartments. In British Africa, there was little movement between territories among white civil servants, except at the highest level. To be sure, movement from one civil service post to another within the same territory could be an important experience for Africans, and like other forms of employment requiring literacy the civil service provided opportunities for Africans to work outside their native territories. Nyasaland was especially productive of such migrants. But the colonial powers had various ways of making Africans feel that they belonged to empires wider even than the shores of Africa. The British Crown was one such instrument: the main occasions for its use were the coronations in 1911 and 1937 and the Prince of Wales's African tour in 1925.² Africans were occasionally rewarded by Britain with imperial and royal honours. Empire Day (24 May) was marked in schools by sports competitions, parades and concerts. Loyalty to a distant sovereign, and pride in belonging to so great an empire, were characteristic of those blacks in West or South Africa who aspired to British culture.

¹ G. Orde Browne, *The African labourer* (London, 1933), 120.

² The Belgian king and queen toured the Congo in 1928; the crown prince in 1933.

However, mounting racial discrimination in the early twentieth century strained it severely, and the more precise attribute of imperial citizenship was restricted to a narrow circle. Indeed, it was only France which conferred, however sparingly, formal citizenship in the sense of civil rights equal to those of natives in the metropolitan country; to be 'British subjects', as were Indians and a handful of Africans in colonial Africa, brought no comparable advantage. Blacks in British Africa perhaps came closest to imperial citizenship when in 1931 ten were summoned from East Africa to testify before a parliamentary committee.

War, however, compelled many thousands of Africans to travel in the service of empire. Before and after the First World War, Senegalese soldiers served in Morocco. In the Allied struggle against the Germans, men from British West Africa fought in East Africa; men from French North and West Africa fought on the Western Front, and black men from South Africa served in non-combatant roles. For some, at least, these experiences profoundly altered their perspectives of white rule. And for a small but crucial minority soldiering became a way of life. For them, social life was principally defined by membership of a regiment, an organisation no less totalitarian than the average mine compound but probably a good deal more satisfying. Indeed, army or police service was likely to offer the best hope of social advancement to members of the 'martial tribes' favoured by colonial recruiting officers, for in the last analysis their supposed martial qualities consisted in the lack of sophistication consequent upon lack of access to economic and educational opportunities. Recruitment ignored imperial frontiers: many Hausa and Mossi from French West Africa served in British units. One minor offshoot of war deserves passing mention here. Baden-Powell's Boy Scout movement, influenced by his experience of African campaigns, was explicitly dedicated to imperial ideals. In the 1920s it was established among Africans in West and South Africa, though in the latter country blacks could only become 'pathfinders' or 'wayfarers' and the founder himself was unable in 1937 to blaze a trail for them into the company of white Scout troops.³

³ In 1938, when there were nearly 15,000 Pathfinders in South Africa, the Chief Pathfinder there was Senator J. D. Rheinallt Jones, a leading member of the Institute of Race Relations. In the Gold Coast, where the governor was Chief Scout, there were 3,500 Scouts in 1934.

Christian missionaries formed yet another new series of networks criss-crossing Africa. Some had established spheres of influence in the nineteenth century which were overlaid, but not abolished, by later economic and political developments. By 1910 the Universities' Mission to Central Africa had a base in Zanzibar, two centres in German East Africa and outposts in Nyasaland, Mozambique and Northern Rhodesia. The Free Church of Scotland had one base in the eastern Cape and another on the shores of Lake Nyasa (Malawi); the Paris Missionary Society had one in Basutoland and another on the upper Zambezi. The Catholic White Fathers were pre-eminent over a huge region centred on Lake Tanganyika. In West Africa, the Church Missionary Society maintained links between Sierra Leone and south-western Nigeria. As in colonial government, it was European management which was most conscious of wide-ranging institutional affiliation, but as Africans too became teachers and even priests they also tended to move from one post to another within the sphere of their mission. Moreover, certain missions had been much involved in the liberation of African slaves: the networks of employment organised by the CMS in West Africa or by the UMCA served to redistribute African freedmen who had been gathered by slavers from still larger catchment areas.

Links were also made in Africa with the descendants of Africans once shipped to the New World. American blacks worked as Protestant missionaries in the Belgian Congo and Angola. Elsewhere, two black American churches were especially influential: the African Methodist Episcopal Church in southern Africa and the AME Zion Church in West Africa. Between 1902 and 1910 graduates of Tuskegee, the black college in Alabama, assisted cotton-growing schemes in Togo, Nigeria, the Sudan and the Belgian Congo.

Education

For the widening of African perspectives, institutions for secondary and higher education were of fundamental importance. In our period, these were still very thin on the ground. Few schools for Africans provided classes beyond the eighth or ninth annual grade. In 1938 there were some 5,500 Africans receiving secondary

education in this sense in South Africa; there were probably no more than this in tropical Africa.⁴ Only in the Union, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone did they even approach one-tenth of one per cent of the total population, and in these countries, as elsewhere, access to all kinds of education was heavily biased towards certain areas. Any school which offered post-primary instruction was likely to attract Africans from far and wide, perhaps more indeed than those who lived nearby:

Every boarding school is a cosmopolitan place, and there is no guarantee in setting up a school 'for a territory' that it will really serve that territory. Thus, too, when the little cathedral schools of the twelfth century branched out into higher studies, men in England travelled to Paris and students from Bohemia found themselves in Oxford. There is something almost sacramental in all this coming and going. It is as if a new world of thought required for its due appreciation a change of circumstances.⁵

In southern Africa, the most significant schools of this sort had been founded by the Free Church of Scotland, at Lovedale in the eastern Cape and at Livingstonia in northern Nyasaland. In 1936 there were about fifty Africans from Southern Rhodesia studying in South Africa for want of secondary education at home. In French West Africa, the most able, determined and fortunate found their way to the government's William Ponty School in Dakar: between 1918 and 1939 only 1,500 completed courses there. By 1930 British colonial governments had added Achimota, near Accra, in the Gold Coast, Yaba in Lagos, southern Nigeria, and Makerere in Kampala, Uganda. Makerere had to cater for students from all over East Africa, but Lovedale's catchment area was even larger. From Northern Rhodesia, for example, came sons of the Lozi king in 1908; some years later, a young man from near the Tanganyika border paid his way through Lovedale with what he had saved from working as a foreman in the Belgian Congo.

To begin with, the emphasis at such schools was on vocational training, but by the 1930s Lovedale, Makerere and Achimota were teaching up to university entrance standard. Lovedale, indeed, enlarged its pupils' sense of community in terms of time as well as space: a visitor in 1927, struck by its far from utilitarian library,

⁴ Figures for children in secondary schools in tropical Africa would be a good deal higher, since such schools often included classes at primary levels.

⁵ A. V. Murray, *The school in the bush* (London, 1929; 2nd edn. 1938), 98.

remarked that 'what Lovedale really does, whether it teaches carpentry or Latin, is to put its students into a historical succession and to give them a sense of belonging to a distinguished company'.⁶ There was a 'university feeling about the place', and this was scarcely surprising, for out of Lovedale had grown the nearby Fort Hare, a university college where between 1923 and 1936 some fifty BA degrees were obtained from the University of South Africa; the first woman graduated in 1928. In 1938 the Fort Hare graduates included one from Kenya; in 1939, the first from Southern Rhodesia. Outside the Union, university education was available south of the Sahara only at Achimota, where in 1938 there were 37 students working for London degrees, and at Fourah Bay College, in Sierra Leone. This had been founded in the nineteenth century and attracted students from all parts of British West Africa; two or three each year obtained degrees awarded by the University of Durham.

The development of higher education for Africans both in South Africa and in British colonial Africa was intended to reduce the flow of African students overseas. This subject is still too little known. In 1913 about forty Africans attended a conference for African students in London. West Africans had for some time gone to London to read law. By the late 1920s there were some sixty African lawyers in the Gold Coast and about as many in Nigeria; in both countries there were several lawyers from Sierra Leone. Smaller numbers of West Africans studied medicine in Britain, usually at Edinburgh; in 1913 there were seven African doctors in Nigeria.⁷ In 1920 there were hardly any West Africans who had obtained British degrees in arts or sciences, but between 1930 and 1937 there was an annual average of 53 West Africans, other than law students, at British universities; and in 1938–40 the average had risen to 71,⁸ reflecting Nigeria's provision from 1937 of scholarships for study in Britain. By 1939 there were also a dozen students from East Africa in Britain, though few were black.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁷ The composer Samuel Coleridge-Taylor (1875–1912) was the son of a Sierra Leonean doctor; the band-leader Reginald Foresythe (1907–58) was the son of a West African barrister. Both musicians were born and educated in England, and made their careers there; both also worked in the USA.

⁸ A. T. Carey, *Colonial students* (London, 1956), 28. There were about twice as many West Indian university students in Britain in the 1930s.

Black South Africans seldom went to Britain as students; the first black barrister in South Africa qualified in London in 1909. But by 1906 at least 150 were said to have gone to study in the USA; most would have been following up contacts established through American missionary networks. One was Charlotte Maxeke, the first black woman graduate from South Africa; she went to the USA in a touring choir and in 1905 graduated from the AME church's Wilberforce Institute, Ohio. The First World War interrupted the diaspora, but in 1919 fifty African students attended a conference in Chicago at which the African Student Union of America was formed. The first Kenyan (a Masai) went to the USA in 1908; in the 1920s the Phelps-Stokes Fund helped some Africans, including three from Uganda, to study in the USA; a few obtained postgraduate teaching diplomas at Columbia University. In 1931 the white South African educationist C. T. Loram moved to Yale University, and this led to three black South Africans, including Z. K. Matthews, pursuing graduate studies there. Between 1920 and 1937 twenty students went to the USA from Nigeria; most had been sent by missionary societies to pursue religious studies. Twelve more came in 1938; most had private African sponsorship and all but one went to Lincoln, Pennsylvania, a black university whose graduates included Nnamdi Azikiwe (1931) and Kwame Nkrumah (1939). Several Africans remained in the USA after qualifying as teachers, doctors or lawyers: perhaps sixty by 1940. One who did not stay was Hastings Banda, from Nyasaland, who in 1925 had come to Wilberforce with the help of AME contacts made in Johannesburg; he studied at Indiana and Chicago, and finally obtained a medical degree in Nashville; in 1938 he moved on to Edinburgh in order to obtain British qualifications.

Most African students in France during our period came from North Africa. In the early 1920s the government of French West Africa sent 23 Ponty graduates to France for further teacher-training. It later sent nine Africans to French universities, mostly for veterinary studies; Léopold Sédar Senghor, from Senegal, was the only one to take a degree in arts or letters. Perhaps no more than a dozen black students from French West Africa obtained university degrees in our period, while in the late 1920s there were only two African lawyers in the region. It offered even less scope for African professional men than did British West Africa, and

THE MEANS OF EXPRESSION

several of those who did get to France for study stayed on after obtaining qualifications. M. K. Tovalou-Houénou, from Dahomey, practised at the Paris bar after 1911, while Senghor taught at *lycées* in Tours and Paris in 1936–40. Of the many Africans who served in France during the First World War, a few either contrived to stay there, as did the self-taught writer Bakary Diallo, or else went back soon after their return to Africa, as did Lamine Senghor. In his case, as with Tovalou-Houénou and others, political activity in Europe made him unwelcome to the rulers of his own country. The same was probably true of Panda Farnana, who, like a very few other Congolese, had been taken in youth as a servant to Belgium and was there given a secular education. Farnana spent the war as a prisoner in Germany and then settled in Brussels; he eventually obtained a Belgian passport.

THE MEANS OF EXPRESSION

Language and literacy

Colonial conditions generated new routes for the circulation of people and ideas; they also fostered new channels of expression. Inside and outside school, African languages already established as *lingua francas* became still more important. Those languages learned by officials or missionaries acquired a special utility. Government policy in much of East Africa (including part of the Belgian Congo) favoured Swahili; missionaries in Sierra Leone favoured Mende. In Southern Rhodesia, the Ndebele were taught in Zulu, which is related to but distinct from their own language. Labour migrants might have to learn some crude language of command used by white supervisors; they would certainly have to understand one or other of the main languages represented in their compound or location. In Northern Rhodesia, Bemba and Nyanja became dominant in different areas along the railway line, hundreds of miles from their country of origin. For a rapidly growing minority, the languages of the colonial powers afforded the means to transcend African language barriers.

As the scope of the spoken word expanded, so also did that of the written word. Far more Africans read and wrote than ever before. Postal services enabled migrants to keep in touch with those they had left at home. Statistics of mail use reflect much

besides African literacy, but they help to indicate its extent and growth. In 1934 the mails were most used in South Africa, followed well behind by Southern Rhodesia, Tunisia and Egypt. Between the Zambezi and the Sahara, the mails were most used in Senegal and Northern Rhodesia; they were least used in the Belgian Congo and Ethiopia.⁹ Between 1920 and 1938 the volume of mail roughly tripled in the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanganyika and Uganda; it doubled in the Sudan, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa (which in 1938 accounted for 42 per cent of all mail on the continent); and increased by a half or less in Egypt, the Gold Coast, Nyasaland and Sierra Leone. A more precise, if very localised, measure of the use of literacy is provided by the bookshops of the Church Missionary Society; in 1935 two in eastern Nigeria sold 11,800 copies of Bibles, prayer- and hymn-books in Ibo or English, and 21,000 copies of other books in Ibo.¹⁰ But missionaries not only distributed books; they also published them. In South Africa, the Lovedale mission press produced most of the 238 titles in Xhosa which had appeared by 1939, a higher number than in any other African language except Swahili.

The press

Newspapers played a large part in the growth of African understanding of the contemporary world. They were likely to learn most from those published by whites for whites, but those published in vernacular languages circulated much more widely among Africans. Some newspapers were designed by missionaries,

⁹ Posted letters and postcards per inhabitant, 1934 (statistics compiled by Universal Postal Union, Berne):

Europe		Africa			
France	41.5	S. Africa	24.3	Senegal	1.7
Belgium	38.8	S. Rhodesia	9.0	N. Rhodesia	1.7
Italy	20.1	Tunisia	8.9	Madagascar	1.0
Portugal	11.1	Egypt	5.2	Gold Coast	0.9
				Sierra Leone	0.7
				Kenya, Uganda & Tanganyika	0.7
				Togo	0.6
				Mozambique	0.6
				Nyasaland	0.5

For Angola, Nigeria and all territories of French black Africa not listed above, the figure was 0.3 or less; for the Belgian Congo it was 0.14.

¹⁰ Mary Nicholls, 'History of CMS Nigeria bookshops, 1869-1969', Ms. in archives of Church Missionary Society, University of Birmingham.

big business or colonial governments to influence African thought, but Africans too founded and edited newspapers. Moreover, most papers, of whatever kind, were platforms on which African correspondents could address whites or Africans. And the printed word, whether in newspaper, pamphlet or book, sometimes reached far beyond those who could actually read it: in Tanganyika in the 1930s, vernacular reading circles were attended by a hundred or more listeners.

Although the first English-language newspaper in Africa appeared in Cape Town in 1800, the modern newspaper era in South Africa dates from the appearance of *The Cape Argus* (1857) and *The Cape Times* (1876). The former became the flagship of the Argus Printing and Publishing Company (1889), whose shares were held by the leading South African commercial and mining interests. During the next forty years the Argus group became the most powerful publishing enterprise in South Africa and acquired every English-language newspaper in Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In 1903 it acquired a substantial interest in the Central News Agency, which was eventually to establish a virtual monopoly over newspaper distribution in southern Africa.

The black press in South Africa, as in most regions, had its origins in Christian missionary efforts. Although certain African-language publications had begun to appear as early as the 1830s, it was the establishment of the Lovedale Mission Press (1861) and the Morija Printing Works in Basutoland (1874) that created a solid base for the promotion of African-language publications and for the training of African journalists and printers. The Lovedale-sponsored *Isigidimi Sama Xosa* (1876) was the first South African newspaper edited by Africans. The missions continued to expand the range and the interests of their publications, but African journalists began to strike out on their own. In 1884 John Tengo Jabavu (formerly editor of *Isigidimi*) established *Imvo Zabantsundu*, the first newspaper in South Africa owned and controlled by Africans; this was published in English and Xhosa and became the most influential vehicle of African opinion in the Cape Colony. Other African newspapers followed from 1894. In 1905 the Native Affairs Commission advised that the African press did a useful job and required no special controls; this was not wholly surprising, since three papers at least depended on white financial support. By 1912 there were six weeklies in the Union owned by Africans,

and two in Basutoland; all were published in English and one or more African languages. There were also two fortnightly papers in Coloured hands.

Between the two world wars, white influence over the black press greatly increased. Since the foundation of the African National Congress in 1912, its main organ had been the weekly *Abantu Batho*, published in Johannesburg, and from 1918 this reflected the most radical opinion in Congress. When African mineworkers struck early in 1920, the Chamber of Mines tried to kill off *Abantu Batho* by founding its own weekly, *Umteteli wa Bantu*. This was edited by Africans and at once became an important organ of middle-class African opinion, but it remained firmly under white control. *Abantu Batho* survived, but its finances became ever more precarious and it was eventually forced to close in 1931. Yet, despite the onset of economic depression, white businessmen began to take an interest in African readers as a potential market: in 1921 it had been reckoned that one in ten black South Africans was literate. In 1932 a white liberal, B. G. Paver, founded the Bantu Press, a company which with financial backing from Africans launched the *Bantu World*. The editor, R. V. S. Thema, was himself a Congress member and made the paper a major forum for African writers; it was printed in several languages and in 1934 had a circulation of 6,000, which in the African market was a very large figure. However, the Bantu Press had by then been taken over by the Argus group, and the last African (Thema) on the board of directors was ousted in 1936. The Bantu Press itself took over *Ilanga lase Natal* (founded in 1903) in 1934 and in 1936 it took over a paper in Southern Rhodesia; the successor, *Bantu Mirror*, catered for readers throughout British Central Africa. Soon afterwards, *Imvo* also fell to the Bantu Press. By 1941 there were eight newspapers in the Union (excluding missionary publications) which were edited by Africans, but only three were not exclusively white-owned; two of these were published by the multiracial Communist Party of South Africa and the third was *Inkundlaya Bantu*, an English–Zulu monthly founded in 1938 (and then called the *Territorial Magazine*). The Coloured press, which had virtually disappeared between 1923 and 1932, consisted of two weeklies, the *Sun* and the *Cape Standard*. The two main Indian newspapers during our period, both weekly, were *Indian Opinion*, which Gandhi helped to found in 1903, and *Indian Views*, which was primarily addressed to Indian Muslims.

In East Africa, the English-language press was dominated by the Standard group. The Mombasa *African Standard* was founded in 1902 by A. M. Jeevanjee, one of the richest Indian merchants in East Africa. In 1905 it was sold to European owners and came to represent the interests of European settlers and commercial interests in Kenya. As the *East African Standard*, the newspaper was moved to Nairobi in 1910. With the *Mombasa Times* (1910), the *Tanganyika Standard* (1930) and the *Uganda Argus* (1953), the Standard group eventually excluded all other European newspaper interests in East Africa. But as the genesis of the Standard group indicates, there was also a strong Asian journalistic tradition in East Africa, most vociferously represented by the *East African Chronicle* (1919) in Nairobi.

An independent African press in East Africa made its début in the 1920s and 1930s. Its most striking characteristic was the use of vernacular languages, particularly Luganda, Kikuyu and Swahili. (This contrasts with the bilingual format of southern African newspapers and the English or French mostly used by the West African press.) The first newspaper in East Africa owned and edited by Africans was *Sekanyolya* (1920), a Luganda monthly catering for Ganda at home and in Kenya. Other Luganda papers followed soon after, many of them critical of Ganda chiefs and — eventually — the colonial administration in Uganda. The first African-controlled newspapers in Kenya and Tanganyika were *Muigwithania* (1928) and *Kwetu* (1937) respectively. Such African newspapers usually appeared on an irregular monthly basis and seldom had a printed circulation of more than 2,000 copies. The different languages used did restrict wider regional circulation, but editors were aware of what was happening in neighbouring territories. *Sekanyolya* was actually published in Nairobi rather than Buganda, and the editor of the Swahili-language *Kwetu*, Erica Fiah, was himself a Muganda in touch with East African events and Pan-African issues. Even the Kikuyu-language *Muigwithania* claimed it was read in the Kilimanjaro area across the border in Tanganyika. By the early 1930s black newspapers from South Africa were being read in East Africa.¹¹

The English-language press in West Africa is as old as that of South Africa, with the crucial difference that it has mostly been in African hands, beginning with the black American immigrants

¹¹ For the press in Portuguese Africa, see chapter 10; for that in Ethiopia, see chapter 14.

in Liberia and the freed slave populations of Sierra Leone. They and their descendants established newspapers all along the West African coast during the nineteenth century — in Monrovia, Freetown, Cape Coast, Accra and Lagos. These newspapers were aimed at a very small educated élite and for long were printed only in English. Several lasted only a few years, but three Lagos weeklies founded in the nineteenth century survived to 1920 or later, while the *Gold Coast Independent* continued from 1918 throughout our period. Newspaper circulation in Lagos increased rapidly between 1918 and 1923, when that of a dozen weeklies may have totalled around 8,000. Daily papers first appeared in Lagos in 1925, Accra in 1927 and Freetown in 1933. The *Nigerian Daily Times*, founded in 1926, was published by a company in which expatriate trading firms predominated; it not only made use of Reuters news agency and British broadcasts but had enough capital to modernise its format and organise distribution throughout Nigeria; it also attracted the bulk of expatriate advertisers. Two other Lagos dailies were fully under African control, but for ten years there was no serious challenge to the *Daily Times*. Then in 1937 the *West African Pilot* was founded by Nnamdi Azikiwe, who as a student and teacher in the USA had learned from radical black journalism there and in 1934 had launched a successful daily in the Gold Coast. By the end of 1937 the *Pilot's* populist style and nationalist policies had gained it a circulation of 9,000, thereby doubling the total sales of Lagos dailies. Meanwhile there had been a remarkable expansion elsewhere in southern Nigeria;¹² by 1937 six provincial weeklies had a combined circulation of about 15,000, of which 3,000 belonged to a Yoruba-language paper (others had been published in Lagos since 1923).

By comparison with British West Africa, the press in French black Africa was a tender growth. This was due partly to the very low levels of African literacy and partly to customs regulations which favoured the import of French newspapers rather than the production of local papers. The white-owned press consisted chiefly of a paper founded in Cameroun in 1919 and papers founded in Dakar (1933) and the Ivory Coast (1938) by a firm which already had papers in Tangier and Morocco. The first African-owned paper of any consequence was the *Voix du*

¹² This is inferred from the government statistics given in Fred I. A. Omu, *Press and politics in Nigeria, 1880-1937* (London, 1978), 263-4.

Dahomey (1927).¹³ In the course of the 1930s a number of papers came and went in Senegal and the Ivory Coast; most were critical of government.

Literature

Apart from the press, much of the literature available to Africans consisted of translations. Christian scriptures occupied much of the energies of missionary and African translators, and the most frequently translated secular book was Bunyan's *Pilgrim's progress*: there were at least ten African versions by 1905 and another seven by 1940. Much translation was made for the classroom and probably derived from European schooltexts. *Robinson Crusoe* was translated into Kongo (1928) and Yoruba (1933); extracts from Aesop, *Arabian nights*, Swift, R. L. Stevenson, Rider Haggard and Kipling appeared in Swahili. In the late 1930s an African literature committee in Northern Rhodesia promoted moral uplift by arranging translations of suitable African life-stories, such as those of Booker T. Washington or J. E. K. Aggrey. The first plays by Shakespeare to be published in African translations, both into Tswana and both by Sol Plaatje, were *The comedy of errors* (1930) and *Julius Caesar* (1937).

Translation commonly prepared the way for Africans to write for publication in their own languages. But these themselves were problematical. It was in the interests of missions, governments and indeed African authors to promote the standardisation of both spelling and usage. 'Standard' Yoruba was based on the Bible translation (1900) initiated by Bishop Crowther. In Nyasaland, a syncretic form of Nyanja was used in translating the Bible, and this became an accepted literary medium. Lack of agreement on Tswana orthography was a major obstacle to Plaatje's efforts to publish in that language. In 1932 a prolific Ganda writer, J. T. Ggomotoka, called a conference to standardise Luganda orthography, on which Catholic and Protestant missions had conflicting views. In northern Nigeria, in the 1930s, the government sought to propagate the writing of Hausa in Roman rather than Arabic script. In Southern Rhodesia, in 1929, C. M. Doke investigated the possibilities for unifying Shona dialects, and in 1930 a committee was formed in East Africa to advance the use of the

¹³ See chapter 7, pp. 389–90.

Zanzibar dialect of Swahili, though neither venture bore any early literary fruit.

African writing in the earlier twentieth century included work in the established literary languages of Africa, literary adaptations of oral performances, and ventures into genres derived from Europe. In parts of West Africa, and in Somalia, poetry continued to be written in Arabic and sometimes achieved, through printing, a wider circulation than hitherto. Verse chronicles, in an Islamic didactic tradition but about recent events rather than legends or holy men, were written in Swahili early in the century and in Hausa in the 1920s. Little Swahili verse was written outside Lamu between the world wars, though singer-poets flourished in popular musical clubs along the coast. Imaginative writing in languages other than those with a Muslim literary tradition was comparatively slow to develop. The first generations of literate African Christians in both West and South Africa tended to regard English as the proper medium for writing, while their mission education had seldom introduced them to much fiction or poetry in English. It was thus very significant that the Paris Missionary Society in Basutoland should from the end of the nineteenth century have published literary versions by African teachers of Sotho stories, praise poems and proverbs. A Sotho translation of *Pilgrim's progress* had appeared in 1872, and this provided a model for more ambitious ventures, notably the first novel, written in 1906, by Thomas Mofolo. Mofolo went on to write a historical novel, about Shaka, and this was emulated by other black South African writers.¹⁴ Imaginative writing in Xhosa, which was mostly published by the Lovedale Press, flourished especially in the 1920s; in Zulu and Tswana, such writing first began to appear in the 1930s. Elsewhere in non-Muslim Africa, imaginative writing in the vernacular was essentially a development of the 1930s, apart from some stories in Amharic and Twi, and poems in Yoruba. A major stimulus was provided by the International African Institute, which from 1930 held competitions to encourage vernacular writing. In East and Central Africa, this had little result in terms of publications: one novel in Swahili and another in Nyanja, but nothing at all in Shona. The West African coast

¹⁴ Thomas Mofolo, *Moeti oa bochabela* (1912; written 1906); tr. as *The traveller of [sic] the east* (London, 1934); *Chaka: an historical romance* (1925; written 1906); tr. F. H. Dutton (London, 1931); tr. Paris, 1939.

yielded one novel in Ibo and another in Efik; some verse in Efik and Twi; two novels and a collection of stories in Yoruba; most was achieved in Fante. Meanwhile, in Muslim northern Nigeria, an official literature bureau encouraged and published several Hausa writers of prose fiction and in 1939 founded the first Hausa newspaper.

Writing in prose, for instruction rather than recreation, had a long ancestry in Muslim Africa; in our period it flourished chiefly in Senegal, especially among members of the Tijānī brotherhood. The historical work of one convert, Sultan Njoya of Bamum, in Cameroun, is of particular interest in that it was first composed in an ideographic script invented by his councillors and then translated into a secret language fabricated from the vernacular, German and French. By the late nineteenth century, Christian Africans were pioneering the recording of oral historical traditions. Yoruba historians published in both Yoruba and English; great influence was exerted by Samuel Johnson's *The history of the Yorubas* (1921). History was often mingled with autobiography and pressed into the service of local politics: in Buganda, much controversy was provoked by the work of Sir Apolo Kagwa. Few Africans, however, concerned themselves with the history of ethnic groups quite different from their own; special interest therefore attaches to the work of E. F. Tamakloe, a government clerk from the coast of Togoland who carefully recorded traditions of the Dagomba state.

Most work of this kind, like the parallel efforts of missionaries, owed more to its oral sources, and to Christian scripture, than to any acquaintance with European secular literature. This after all was confined to a very small readership. (Even this had little opportunity in Africa to extend such acquaintance: in the Transvaal a Carnegie Non-European Library was established in 1931, but elsewhere public libraries open to Africans were first developed some years later.) Extended works of non-fiction other than history were usually written in European languages and, with few exceptions, were produced in our period only on the west coast and in South Africa. More will be said of these later, but it may be noted here that in French black Africa at least a dozen Africans published dictionaries, grammars and ethnographic studies during our period, while in the Gold Coast grammars were compiled by Tamakloe and Akrofi. By 1940 three students from

tropical Africa had obtained doctorates from British universities.¹⁵ One Senegalese, Lamine Guèye, obtained a doctorate in law. Two eminent Africans were prevented by public service from completing doctoral theses. J. E. K. Aggrey (1875–1927) qualified in 1923 to submit a thesis on education to Columbia University but then resumed his work for the Phelps-Stokes Commission before joining the teaching staff at Achimota. Z. K. Matthews received a grant from the IAI in 1935 for research in social anthropology in Bechuanaland, but while teaching at Fort Hare he was appointed to the De la Warr commission on higher education in East Africa.

In English-speaking Africa, English was little used for imaginative writing. Casely Hayford's *Ethiopia unbound* (1911) is less a novel than a series of ruminations tied by a loose narrative thread. Black South Africans published some English poetry in magazines. The only real works of fiction in English by Africans during our period came also from South Africa: Sol Plaatje's historical novel *Mbudi* (written around 1920, though not published until 1930), a story by Rolfes Dhlomo (1928) and a play by Herbert Dhlomo (1936).¹⁶ Outside English-speaking Africa, writing by Africans was almost wholly in European languages. By and large, French and Portuguese authorities did not favour the literary use of the vernacular, and they exercised much control over education. In the French territories, Africans wrote either in languages such as Wolof, with a Muslim literary tradition, or else in French. Apart from a Bambara dictionary, and versions of folk tales, the first book in French by an African writer since the 1850s was Bakary Diallo's autobiographical novel (1926); this was probably ghosted. A teacher in Dahomey, Félix Couchoro, published a novel in 1929; Ousmane Diop, a Senegalese university graduate, published a novel of town life in 1935 and a collection of folk tales in 1938, when Paul Hazoumé produced a historical novel based on his academic researches into pre-colonial Dahomey. In the mid-1930s, students at William Ponty were encouraged to make dramatic versions in French of folklore and dances from their home areas; some of these were produced and published in Paris. By 1939

¹⁵ J. B. Danquah (London, 1927); A. K. Nyabongo (Oxford, 1939); N. A. Fadipe (London, 1940).

¹⁶ Robert Grendon (c. 1867–1949), a Coloured teacher, is known to have written much in English that may yet be discovered.

African writers in the Ivory Coast had formed a touring company to perform their own plays. In Equatorial Africa, a black official from Martinique, René Maran, expressed his disgust with economic exploitation in a novel, *Batouala*, which in 1921 won the Prix Goncourt. Nothing of consequence by Africans in the Belgian Congo was published in our period, but in 1934 a *mestiço* in Angola, Assis Junior, published a novel and meanwhile, among the *mestiços* in the Cape Verde Islands, there was a literary revival, expressed chiefly in poetry; the merits of the local Creole language were reasserted.

Music and dance

Whereas the written word, even in the vernacular, could seldom reach far beyond an educated minority, the performing arts had a much wider appeal. Poetry for oral declamation continued not only to be composed but to exert influence on belief and action: Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh Ḥasan, in Somalia, and Isaiah Shembe, in Zululand, were poets as well as prophets.¹⁷ The prestige of Hausa emirs continued to be reinforced by court musicians. Elsewhere, African priests and rulers often found it hard to maintain traditions of sacred and ceremonial music in face of economic and missionary pressures. But Africans also made music for recreation which, free from ties to specific institutions, could more easily adapt and survive in colonial conditions. The history of popular African music clearly shows how the cross-fertilisation of indigenous traditions with alien influences could attract new audiences. This process was not new: styles in music and dance had long been exchanged and diffused along trade routes. But it was only in this century that exotic music, from Europe and the Americas, made a widespread impact on black Africa. Foreigners imported music; Africans travelled ever further afield; and as towns expanded so did the opportunities for the travelling entertainer.

By the end of the nineteenth century the church choir and the military band were familiar features of many coastal towns. Missionaries and bandmasters introduced diatonic harmony, musical notation and new instruments; black American missionaries introduced the spiritual. Africans not only performed but

¹⁷ Shembe wrote down his hymns, and a collection was published in 1940. For the poetry of Muhammad ‘Abdallāh Ḥasan, see chapter 14, p. 719.

began to compose in exotic idioms. The hymn which became an anthem for blacks in South Africa was written at Lovedale in 1897. Hymns were also composed by a Fante church organist at Cape Coast who offered postal tuition in music and in 1916 boldly but vainly established a training college 'of music and commerce'.¹⁸ A more lasting impact was made in the Gold Coast by another music teacher, Ephraim Amu, who in the 1920s began to study indigenous music and in 1932 published songs of his own composition, prefaced by exercises in the reading of African rhythms. White missionaries were slow to acknowledge the incompatibility of European church music with African tonal languages, but imported hymnody was freely adapted in the singing of independent churches, and in many of them dancing continued to be an important form of African religious expression. Further scope for turning local tradition to account was provided by the morality plays or 'cantatas' mounted by missions and independent churches in West Africa; by using a stage, these introduced a novel distinction between performer and audience. Meanwhile, overseas influences were altering secular music. Europeanised black élites developed a taste for European and American dance music. In Freetown, one enterprising African businessman, bent on what might be called 'horizontal integration', advertised himself as an importer of music, musical instruments and fireworks, and a manufacturer of aerated water. Along the coast, from Freetown to Durban, black American sailors, and Kru sailors and stevedores from Liberia, taught Africans their songs and introduced them to the guitar, concertina and mouth-organ; these instruments were cheap, portable and adaptable to African idioms. From early in the century gramophone records began to make available samples of ragtime, jazz, 'cowboy ballads' and vaudeville songs; when the cinema acquired sound, it further extended the range.

Ghanaian 'highlife' is one well-known example of the fusion of African and exotic music. Highlife derived from syncretic popular music current on the Gold Coast early in the century. This was gradually adopted by musicians playing for the concerts and dances of the élite; they elaborated the orchestration for their popular tunes and called the results 'highlife' by way of ironic compliment to their patrons. One early highlife has been analysed

¹⁸ M. J. Sampson, *Gold Coast men of affairs past and present* (London, 1937; repr. 1969), 149.

as a synthesis of West African gong rhythms, a local two-fingered style of guitar playing, and hymn music. By the 1920s, highlife was being played in the Gold Coast by dance orchestras, brass bands and guitar bands. The growth of highlife intersected with innovations in theatrical entertainment. It was usual for schools to celebrate Empire Day with a 'concert party', and much more than imperial sentiment was propagated on these occasions. One celebrated comedian in Ghana, Bob Johnson, has recalled that in the early 1920s 'Our teachers used to say, "Empire Day is coming. Let's learn songs"'; one was 'Mini the moocher'.¹⁹ Highlifes were often played at concert parties, and another popular feature was the story-teller, familiar to the Akan peoples, who impersonates different characters. Johnson studied one such performer, a schoolteacher whose sketches were supported by ragtime and ballroom music from a trap drum and harmonium; Johnson also learned from a visiting black American vaudeville team, from silent films (including Chaplin's) and from the first 'talkie', *The jazz singer*; ironically, the white Al Jolson's disguise as a 'black minstrel' became a favourite mask for Johnson. In 1930 he formed a group which performed in a mixture of Fante and English; in 1935 he toured Nigeria with a number of Gold Coast musicians. They made some records and on their return some of them toured their own northern territories. By 1940 there were several travelling groups of musicians in the Gold Coast and Nigeria.

There were comparable developments in South Africa. In Johannesburg, associations of the black middle class enlivened social functions with performances by choirs, dance orchestras or variety artistes. At shebeens (illegal drinking houses), workers held *amatimitin*, musical parties modelled on those of missionary 'tea meetings'; the women who brewed liquor for the shebeens spent their earnings on pianos and gramophones as well as silk dresses. Workers also formed clubs for music parties, and it was in these that the syncretic style called *marabi* flourished between the wars. By 1914 players with mission or military training had begun to form their own bands. In 1917 the choir of Ohlange, an all-African training college in Natal, toured several towns; its director, R. T. Caluza, 'made ragtime respectable and élite choral music popular'.²⁰ As gramophones became cheaper in the 1920s,

¹⁹ Efua Sutherland, *The story of Bob Johnson, Ghana's ace comedian* (Accra, 1970), 6.

²⁰ D. Coplan, 'The African musician and the development of the Johannesburg entertainment industry, 1900–1960', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1979, 5, 2, 139.

record sales increased, and gained large followings for Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington and the black vaudeville duo Layton and Johnstone. Numerous professional singing groups and dance bands in Johannesburg performed in a variety of styles and brought together Africans of different social classes and age groups. Music, especially that of black America, reinforced the solidarity of urban Africans, in spite of ethnic and social distinctions. Whites were slow to notice the new urban music, but in 1938 one music-theatre group, the Lucky Stars, was taken to perform in London while the South African recording industry engaged an African talent scout.

In eastern Africa, the most important musical innovation of the early twentieth century was the *beni* style of dancing. *Beni* is a Swahili word derived from 'band'. Brass bands were formed in the late nineteenth century by freed slaves on the east coast. But *beni* itself originated in the competitive dance societies of Swahili towns. By about 1900 one society in Mombasa had a brass band inspired by that of the Sultan of Zanzibar and instructed by Mgandi, a deserter from a German African band. Competition bred imitation along the coast. In Mombasa, *beni* societies were élitist; members had to be sufficiently prosperous to afford the uniforms which became obligatory. But in the coastal towns of German East Africa *beni* became the focus of competition between élite and popular societies. Clerks and labour migrants both spread *beni* to towns up-country along the lines of Swahili penetration in the previous century. Local societies paid travelling musicians to teach them the latest tunes, some composed by Mgandi. In this way, *beni* generated a network of communication which not only ignored tribal distinctions but spanned one very large colonial territory. Moreover, since *beni* societies drew together Africans in towns it was natural that they should concern themselves not only with entertainment but also with welfare: dance teams gave rise to friendly societies. Mass conscription in the First World War disrupted the organisation of *beni*, but also diffused it into rural Tanganyika, to Nairobi, the eastern Congo, Nyasaland and the Rhodesias. As *beni* spread, it moved far from its origins in brass bands: the characteristic features were rhythms and dance routines which evoked (by way of both parody and emulation) the white man's language of gesture. Multiple cross-rhythms contrived to suggest 'European-sounding rhythm... Each drum and the song

are in strict relation to each other, and yet, as it were, mutually independent, going on their own ways and preserving an individual freedom.'²¹ By the 1930s *beni* was yielding in parts of Central Africa to other, though similar, dance modes, such as *kalela* or *mganda*. In Tanganyika, the coastal élite discarded it in favour of *dansi*, a style modelled on ballroom dancing which made use of accordion and guitar and which had been derived in the 1920s from Christian freedmen in Mombasa. By the end of our period, a jazz band had been formed in Dar es Salaam, and the first records of black music made in South Africa were on sale there.

Art

Our knowledge of the history of plastic art in black Africa before the 1950s is still more patchy than that of musical history. Art, as well as music, had long been associated with kingship, and in parts of West Africa at least royal patronage persisted. The doors and pillars of Yoruba palaces were elaborately carved by several artists, some of whom belonged to an *atelier* of master and apprentices. The Benin brassworkers' guild survived and in 1926 admitted the first member not to belong to one of the traditional guild families. Much carved furniture was made between the wars for royalty in Abomey. In Bamum, the philosopher-king Njoya appointed an artist to his school in 1908, and in 1918 commissioned him to build a new palace. Nor were royals the only African patrons. Wealthy Yoruba commoners built stately houses, adorned with cement sculpture, in a style introduced by former slaves repatriated from Brazil. In eastern Nigeria, Christian Ibibio began in the 1920s to build elaborate funerary monuments in cement.

But in several ways colonial rule had done much damage. Most pervasive were the economic pressures. Imports of tools, domestic utensils and fabrics undermined local crafts, even if these were in places more resilient than is sometimes supposed. The need to work for the convenience of white people deprived men and women of the time and opportunity to learn and practise arts and crafts. Besides, some areas had lost much of their artistic heritage to museum collectors: Frobenius was criticised for this in 1914

²¹ A. M. Jones, 'African music: the *mganda* dance', *African Studies*, 1945, 4, 4, quoted by T. O. Ranger, *Dance and society in Eastern Africa, 1890–1970: the Beni 'ngoma'* (London, 1975), 73. See also below, chapter 13, p. 670.

by van Gennep. (In Belgium, in 1925, the Congolese Panda Farnana attacked the white theft of African art and called for local museums in Africa.) Cults and societies which had patronised artists were liable to fall foul of suspicious governments and missionaries. Controls on the ivory trade struck at the use of an important medium for carving. In the Belgian Congo, want of ivory ended a major artistic tradition among the Lega and caused two artists elsewhere to take up watercolours; in this new medium they gained a *succès d'estime* among Europeans but by 1936 one of them, Lubaki, was too poor to buy his imported materials.

Here and there, white tourists and local residents began to provide a new sort of market, not indeed for art but for stereotyped souvenirs. Woodcarving among the Kamba of Kenya seems to have begun during the First World War with Mutisya Munge, who learned his craft while a conscript in Dar es Salaam. Back at home, he began selling his work on the streets of Nairobi and founded a family business. In Gabon, in the 1920s, an official encouraged his African neighbours to make souvenirs from the local steatite. In Northern Rhodesia the peoples of the upper Zambezi were selling 'curios' near the Victoria Falls in the 1930s.

By this time, there were forces making for a revival of traditional artistic skills. The apostolic delegate to the Belgian Congo, Mgr Dellepiane, promoted the use of African art in churches. In West Africa, in 1935, a French official at Mopti directed local Africans in the building of a new mosque which strongly resembled a Dogon mask. (The contemporary railway station at Bobo Dioulasso is but one of many buildings which attest to French admiration for the architecture of the western Sudan.) Most important, some colonial authorities tried to repair artistic traditions by engaging Africans to teach arts and crafts in schools: one was Makerere and another was Achimota. Finally, Europeans began to give publicity not only to African art but to living African artists: watercolours from the Belgian Congo were exhibited in Europe from 1929 and in 1938 the work of the young Nigerian painter and sculptor Ben Enwonwu was seen in England for the first time. Colonial models and networks were beginning to affect African art, as they had for some time affected African music and literature, though the results by 1940 were still too slight and scattered to admit of useful generalisation.

THE CRITIQUE OF COLONIALISM

THE CRITIQUE OF COLONIALISM

The scale on which Africans exchanged ideas and the means by which they did so clearly changed greatly during our period. It remains to be seen what sort of messages were conveyed. Africans underwent a wide variety of new experiences, for which they sought explanations; they encountered new problems for which they sought solutions. At every point, social change presented challenges to African ideas of justice and propriety. Colonial rule and capitalism created opportunities for some, but for many they disrupted accustomed ways of earning a livelihood; they spread disease and aggravated jealousy and greed. Christianity claimed to offer salvation to all, but in practice could easily seem indifferent to African worries, contemptuous of African custom, and pre-occupied with perpetuating white domination. The white man's schools and hospitals displayed new kinds of knowledge which clearly commanded respect, but whether Africans could take what they wanted was not at all obvious. Few disputed that in colonial conditions the new kind of education was essential to political maturity, but the painstaking efforts of Africans to 'improve' themselves seemed more often to lower than to raise them in the white man's esteem.

It was nothing new for African artists to be social critics, but colonial rule gave their comments a new edge. African kings and chiefs were especially vulnerable; they were the most easily identified agents of alien regimes whose protection they too often exploited for personal advantage. In Nigeria, in the 1920s, the king of Oyo banned a travelling theatre troupe because its performances at religious festivals satirised the royal household. In 1934 the Yoruba poet Ajisafe criticised the late king of Abeokuta in a verse biography. In southern Africa the 'praise poem' was a medium for much more than mere encomium. When the Prince of Wales visited South Africa in 1925, the Xhosa poet Mqhayi sarcastically apostrophised 'Great Britain of the endless sunshine... You sent us the light, we sit in the dark...' ²² Among the Chopi of southern Mozambique most large villages had their own xylophone bands, and these performed with singers who voiced topical concerns. Comments on local intrigue and scandal

²² Quoted in A. C. Jordan, 'Towards an African literature: II. Traditional poetry', *Africa South*, 1957, 2, 1, 104-5.

were overshadowed by the all-pervasive theme of Chopi life: labour migration to the Rand. Songs recorded in the early 1940s told of women lamenting their absent menfolk, of men fearing the labour recruiter, of venal mine policemen and mineworkers crippled for life. Chopi continued to play and sing on the mines (one in ten there was a performer), though the mingling of different village traditions created tuning problems. In central Mozambique, music expressed the suffering of plantation workers on the lower Zambezi. One song which originated in the 1890s spread widely in different versions, and came to involve dancing and drumming. The song denounced and satirised the brutal regime of a monopolist sugar company; more than that, it preserved for singers, who in most respects were creatures of the company, 'one small region of the mind which refuses to capitulate completely'.²³

Ideas about health and healing were central to African thinking about white rule. Some insight into popular attitudes may be gained from a play by the Zulu writer Herbert Dhlomo which he wrote in the 1930s and called simply 'Malaria'. He blamed white penetration for the spread of diseases into the African countryside and significantly made the central character at once a dispenser of western medicine and a traditional healer who has the qualities of a saint.²⁴ This epitomised the eclectic approach of Africans to western medicine. It was commonly seen as a useful adjunct to customary techniques but inadequate insofar as it predicated a separation between body and mind. Christian missionaries might pay lip-service to the integration of spiritual and physical healing, but to achieve this in practice Africans were often obliged to form churches of their own.²⁵ A concept of wholeness which encompassed not only human nature but the entire natural world lay at the root of beliefs in witchcraft, and much discontent with colonial conditions was expressed in the idiom of witchcraft fears. In Central Africa, these came to a head in the 1930s and in part reflected the impact of the depression. In earlier years, villages had been drained of young men; now they were thrown

²³ Leroy Vail and Landeg White, 'Plantation protest: the history of a Mozambican song', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1978, 5, 1, 25.

²⁴ Shula Marks, 'Approaches to the history of health and health care in Africa', unpublished seminar paper, SOAS, 23 February 1983. For the actual spread of malaria in Zululand at this time, see above, p. 17.

²⁵ Cf. chapter 3.

out of work and began to come home, but their values were no longer those of the village. Witch-finders roamed far and wide, offering to rid the land of witchcraft once and for all. Nor was this the only millennial prospect to seize the imaginations of migrant workers and their families. Well before 1914, the doctrines of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society had begun to spread northwards from the Cape along the migrant labour routes. Its literature, imported from New York, was eagerly studied by clerks and other literate Africans on the mines in the Rhodesias; applying it to their own situation, they looked forward to an imminent last judgement in which blacks, not whites, would be saved. Between the wars, these beliefs, sometimes mingled with action against witches, gave rise to several movements of popular protest in Central Africa.²⁶

Much African social thought crystallised around town and tribe. The moral threat posed by town life, especially in the conditions of acute deprivation that were usual for Africans, was an obvious theme for early African writers of fiction. Tales of the triumph of rustic simplicity and virtue won the approval of missionary patrons, while they provided an excuse to describe dangers endured and delights forsworn. One such story by a Xhosa writer was thought so edifying that it was translated into Swahili and English.²⁷ The Senegalese writer O. S. Diop produced a sophisticated variant of this theme; in his novel *Karim* (1935) the values of the new capital, Dakar, are contrasted with those of the old town of St Louis, by then something of a backwater. Most adult Africans, however, had been raised in the countryside. It was rural tradition which they contrasted with their urban experience and indeed with all the white man's innovations. Inevitably, those who were most articulate were also the least representative of 'traditional' Africa: it was mission-educated writers who in South Africa in the 1930s used the play or the novel to debate ethical conflicts between the community and the individual, or the competing imperatives of polygamy and Christian marriage. But such debate did not necessarily involve any simple equation between 'traditional' communities and backwardness. The all-too-evident failings of the colonial town as a form of

²⁶ *Ibid.*; and cf. chapter 12, pp. 618, 622–3, 645–7.

²⁷ E. S. Guma, *U-Nomalizo* (Lovedale, 1918); tr. S. J. Wallis, *Nomalizo, or The things of this life are sheer vanity* (London, 1928).

community were themselves one reason for a growing sense of attachment to tribe: for migrant workers, fellow-tribesmen were a source of help while away from home and of social security back at home when no longer employed. Missionaries and colonial officials might have reservations about some 'tribal' customs but, in English-speaking Africa at least, there was a widespread consensus among whites that African progress should be rooted in the countryside. To a large extent, literate Africans were willing to accept this. It is an educated chief who is the protagonist of *Ingqumbo yeminyanya* ('The wrath of the ancestors') (1940), a novel in Xhosa by A. C. Jordan. The tribe, indeed, could be seen as at once the repository of ancient wisdom and a vehicle for social improvement and uplift in the best modern way.

This belief informed much African writing between the wars. It inspired the first Kikuyu newspaper, *Mwigwithania*, whose first editor, Johnstone Kenyatta, visited London in 1929–30 in an attempt to defend Kikuyu interests in discussions about East Africa's future. He made a second such visit in 1931 (sailing on a ship named *Mazzini*) and remained in Europe for the rest of the decade. In 1936–7 he took part in Malinowski's seminar for social anthropologists and wrote a study of Kikuyu customs, *Facing Mount Kenya* (1938), under a new first name, Jomo. This book offered a deeply romantic and partisan vision of pre-colonial society which concluded by accusing Europeans of robbing Africans of the material foundations of their culture. Much the same point was made by a very different writer, Martin Kayamba, the most senior African civil servant in Tanganyika and a loyal Anglican. No less than the footloose Kenyatta, Kayamba thought that Africans should be allowed to decide for themselves what to take from Europe. In his book *African problems*, written in 1937, Kayamba perceived three kinds of threat to the good society in Africa: ill-considered meddling by missionaries, migrant labour, and landlessness caused both by white settlers and by the growth of African commercial farming. He called for 'the development of tribal industries and agriculture in their own home areas so that Africans can possess an economic status of their very own'.²⁸ The cure might seem naively utopian but the diagnosis was clear-sighted and forthright. It is not surprising that Kayamba should idealise village life, for he had no first-hand acquaintance with it:

²⁸ Martin Kayamba, *African problems* (London, 1948), 93.

his father had been a mission teacher (and had even been to school in England). But the idealisation of pre-colonial Africa was characteristic of many African writers who like Kayamba or Kenyatta resented the cultural arrogance of the white man. History could restore a people's dignity, whether it was presented in the guise of fiction (as by Sol Plaatje or Rolfes Dhlomo in South Africa), through records of proverbs or traditional narratives, or through studies of law and custom (as by J. Mensah Sarbah and J. B. Danquah in the Gold Coast, or J. H. Soga among the Xhosa).

In cultivating the sentiment of tribe, Africans were liable to be no more disinterested than were colonial officials. The promotion of tribal unity could usefully obscure or deflect emergent feelings of class conflict. The educated defenders of Kikuyu culture were in fact less truly radical than Martin Kayamba, insofar as they were allied to chiefs and others bent on accumulating land for commercial gain. Similar alliances between old and new wealth and leadership could be cited from the Gold Coast or Zululand between the wars. But in the larger towns Africans with wealth or education above the average were keenly aware of belonging to a distinctive social class with few precedents in pre-colonial Africa. This was most obvious on the West African seaboard and in South Africa. It found expression in the biographical entries to Macmillan's *Red book of West Africa* (1920), M. J. Sampson's *Gold Coast men of affairs* (1937), Mweli Skota's *African yearly register* (c. 1931) and Mancoe's *Bloemfontein Bantu and Coloured people's directory* (1934). These books, indeed, provide black Africa's most revealing 'self-image' of a middle class between the wars: Egypt was as yet the only part of the continent where the novel performed this function.²⁹ But the aspirations to 'respectability' which are so eloquently and indeed poignantly concentrated in these works of reference were voiced in many places. In 1920 literate Africans on the Rand argued in defence of wage claims that they needed 'all the things practically required by the European'.³⁰ In 1925 African civil servants in Tanganyika told their new governor, 'Civilisation means one to have enough money to meet his ends...just to keep him up to date in the class

²⁹ Cf. M. H. Haykal, *Zaynab* (Cairo, 1913), and Roger Allen, *The Arabic novel* (Manchester, 1982).

³⁰ Quoted by P. Bonner, 'The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917-1920', in S. Marks and R. Rathbone (eds.), *Industrialisation and social change in South Africa* (Harlow, 1982), 277.

and company he belongs to...'³¹ In many parts of Africa teachers, clerks and traders formed local 'welfare associations', 'progress unions' or youth clubs. Urban black élites developed distinctive tastes, not only in dance and music but in drink, in dress and in styles of house-building. Their members often intermarried, and they set great store by education: some of the richest West Africans sent their children to school in England. By 1920 more than two hundred Africans in the Gold Coast owned motor-cars. Pride in social achievement was recorded in photographs for newspapers and family albums; in West Africa, several Africans became professional photographers.

Within the ranks of a very broadly defined 'middle class', a commitment to particular occupations was beginning to emerge. Civil servants were among the first Africans to form professional associations, since relatively large numbers shared a common employer. Teachers were mostly divided by affiliations to different missions, but associations of African teachers were formed in all four provinces of South Africa, and by 1934 three produced their own magazines. Inevitably, the growth of professional solidarities was handicapped by the reluctance of governments — in tropical as in southern Africa — to allow blacks to threaten white jobs: even in West Africa, few Africans became doctors or engineers. It was these obstacles, as much as hope of private gain, which caused ambitious West Africans to enter the legal profession: its practice did not depend upon government employment (which in any case was seldom offered to black lawyers). Even so, the scope of lawyers in colonial courts was severely restricted, and in Nigeria this became the object of a campaign for legal reform which gave rise in the 1920s not only to professional associations but to a law journal. Meanwhile, West African businessmen also combined to advance their interests. Cocoa farmers tried to raise cocoa prices by forming associations, while efforts were made to unite farmers and African traders in challenging the hegemony of European trading firms, though these foundered on the inherent conflict of interest between producer and trader.³²

There were also signs of conflict between the African middle class and African workers. Little is known of African employers, since most were in the countryside and escaped the attention of

³¹ Quoted by John Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), 268.

³² See below, chapter 7, p. 389; chapter 8, pp. 433, 441, 443–4.

officials concerned with labour. In Nyasaland, in 1912, nearly fifty Africans signed a petition asking to be allowed to compete for labour on equal terms with white employers. In South Africa, by 1918, there was sharp disagreement within the African National Congress as to the propriety of industrial action: many members of Congress believed that workers should allow their grievances to be handled by middle-class blacks in concert with middle-class whites. In 1920 and 1934 strikes in Lagos were condemned by African newspaper editors.

However, there was little real working-class consciousness among black Africans during our period. This was due above all to the prevalence of migrant labour: long-term commitment to wage labour, and to particular industries, was still exceptional. A generalised sense of class distinction was common enough in towns. Music and dancing could express this, as we have seen; so too could sport. In Tanganyika, football clubs polarised around contrasts between the educated and uneducated as well as between different tribes. At work and along the labour routes, Africans compared their experiences and developed informal critiques of employers. Sometimes such talk led to strikes, but there was little continuity of effort. Railway unions were formed in Nigeria and Sierra Leone in 1919, but before the Second World War industrial organisation was ephemeral. In 1922, 1930 and 1931–2 unsuccessful attempts were made in Lagos to create worker solidarity across a broad front. More success attended a venture of this kind in South Africa. In 1919 Clements Kadalie, a migrant from Nyasaland who had been educated at Livingstonia, founded the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU). This soon established itself among African workers in harbour towns, but in 1926–7 overreached itself in seeking mass support in the countryside. It gained some support in Southern Rhodesia, but there too problems of organisation proved insuperable and meanwhile, in 1928, the ICU in South Africa had split up. It is only from this period that one can trace the history of trade unions proper in black South Africa, which begins, as one might expect, with the growth of small-scale associations among groups of relatively skilled and settled urban workers, and they owed much to advice and assistance from white Communists.

Within and across the emergent borders of social class, African women created bonds of solidarity. In Lagos, early in the

twentieth century, women of the élite made concerted efforts to escape the economic dependence associated with Christian, monogamous marriage. In 1907 they opened a girls' school which offered 'a sound moral, literary and industrial education'.³³ The building was donated by Mrs Sisi Obasa, who in 1913 established the city's first motor transport company. She was also a moving spirit in the Lagos Women's League, which between the wars pressed the government on a variety of issues, including women's education, public health and prostitution. In eastern Nigeria, in 1929, Ibo women protested against the failure of the colonial government to acknowledge the extent to which they had long shared power with men. In Mombasa there were dance societies for Muslim women, similar to those formed by men. In southern Africa, new bases were created for female cooperation. Well before 1914 women were active in political protest; they had to contend with male chauvinism in Congress but formed a Bantu Women's League. Women in Johannesburg, many of whom were self-supporting, were a particular concern of white social workers. Women's prayer-unions on the Rand, in Natal and in Southern Rhodesia engaged in the struggle against polygamy. But all too few African women could write; while some composed songs and hymns, perhaps the only books by black women to be published in our period were stories and short novels by Lilith Kakaza (Xhosa, 1913–14), Victoria Swaartbooi (Xhosa, 1935) and Violet Dube (Zulu, 1935). Realistically, black schoolgirls in the Transvaal aspired to be teachers or nurses, according to an enquiry in 1935;³⁴ in the same year the first black woman barrister in West Africa was called to the bar in Nigeria, while in 1934 another Nigerian woman had graduated from Oxford.

IDEOLOGIES OF LIBERATION

As literate Africans developed deeper and wider-ranging solidarities, they pushed further their criticisms of the social order and began to question the whole basis of white domination. In doing so, they adopted a variety of ideological approaches. Four will be

³³ Kristin Mann, 'The dangers of dependence: Christian marriage among elite women in Lagos Colony, 1880–1915', *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 1, 54.

³⁴ Deborah Gaitskell, 'Women, religion and medicine in Johannesburg between the wars', unpublished seminar paper, SOAS, 18 May 1983.

considered here: the appeal to what may be called the 'imperial conscience'; Pan-Africanism; socialism; and nationalism. In parts of Africa, Islam was also of great importance, and its political significance is discussed elsewhere in this volume.

In challenging white domination, Africans often invoked the values of their white teachers. Christian doctrine could not easily be reconciled with racial discrimination. Democracy, which some colonial powers professed at home in Europe, was scarcely compatible with the exclusion from power of educated men who happened to be black. And insofar as whites believed in free trade and the virtues of the market, they contradicted themselves by thwarting the aspirations of Africans to own land and accumulate capital. Black lawyers, teachers, clergymen, businessmen, civil servants and journalists justifiably regarded themselves as civilised according to the standards introduced by whites and thus felt entitled to participate in representative institutions. In British West Africa, spokesmen for the black middle class pressed for the right to elect representatives to the legislative councils in each territory. This was a principal aim of delegations which visited London in 1912 and 1920, in vain appeals to the seat of imperial power over the heads of colonial governors. The second delegation was sent by the newly-formed National Congress of British West Africa and persuaded Labour MPs to ask questions on its behalf in the House of Commons. It was characteristic that when the Congress met in Freetown in 1923 a local Methodist pastor spoke on the text, 'I am a citizen of no mean city' and exhorted his listeners to appeal for their citizens' rights to the king-emperor. In fact, limited franchises were conceded to West Africans in 1923-5; ironically, they undermined the reform movement by increasing the occasions for conflict between chiefs and educated commoners in the struggle for government favours. Elsewhere in colonial Africa, Africans continued to be represented, if at all, by white legislators. In Tanganyika, in 1929, coffee-growers on Kilimanjaro were asking for a seat in the legislative council. Kayamba wanted at least an African council, a demand that was revived in the late 1930s. In Angola, in 1938, an association of literate non-whites requested representation in the governor's advisory council. In Northern Rhodesia, a government clerk began a long letter to the *Bantu Mirror* in 1939 by blaming white

settlers for African difficulties in obtaining education; he concluded by wondering

whether we shall come to the time when the African will be able to represent his own interests in the high courts of parliaments and enjoy the franchise; open up farms and businesses, and be employer instead of employee; be able to tackle his own problems...He is sick of being ever a hewer of wood and drawer of water! He desires something real and decent out of life...³⁵

In South Africa, black prospects of power-sharing were steadily reduced: the Act of Union prevented the extension to Africans in other provinces of the common-roll vote which some still enjoyed in the Cape, and in 1936 even this was abolished. From 1910 to 1914 a black clergyman, Walter Rubusana, sat in the Cape Provincial Council, but he had no black successor. Thus the South African Native National Congress had still more reason than its counterpart in West Africa to appeal to imperial headquarters in Britain, even though the Union was virtually autonomous. In 1914 the Congress sent a deputation to London to ask the British government to veto the Natives Land Act of 1913. When war broke out, one member of the delegation, Solomon Plaatje, stayed on in London to keep up the pressure. For the next two-and-a-half years Plaatje spoke on average twice a week about Africa to meetings arranged by church groups and other sympathisers. Meanwhile, he wrote and published a book, *Native life in South Africa* (1916), which was much the most substantial study of contemporary African conditions to be written by an African in our period. It was primarily an attack on the Land Act and embodied Plaatje's own detailed observations during journeys around South Africa in 1913–14. In various ways Plaatje set out deliberately to woo the British reader. He invoked shared Christian beliefs and shared ideas of natural justice. He emphasised that he spoke, not for the 'naked hordes of cannibals' which peopled white fantasies of Africa, but for five million British subjects who (unlike some Afrikaners) had been unswervingly loyal to king and empire in the First World War. And in describing the destruction under the Land Act of a black South African peasantry, Plaatje evoked English literary classics: Defoe's *Journal of the plague year*, Goldsmith's *Deserted village* and Cobbett's *Rural rides*.

³⁵ Ackson Mwale, *Bantu Mirror*, 11 and 18 February 1939; quoted by Rosaleen Smyth, 'The development of government propaganda in Northern Rhodesia up to 1953' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983), 58–9.

Black South African appeals to British consciences proved vain, even though a further Congress deputation in 1919 made a strong impression on the prime minister, Lloyd George. But meanwhile Africans had found another source of moral support: the black people of the USA. They too had suffered from the rising tide of racism in the later nineteenth century. Emancipation from slavery, and the extension of civil rights, had soon been followed by disfranchisement and segregation. Blacks became ever more conscious of blackness as a handicap; in self-defence, they sought to make it also a source of pride and strength. But over the means to this end there was sharp disagreement. One approach was pioneered by Booker T. Washington, the principal of Tuskegee College in Alabama, who argued that black people should move gradually forward together, making the most of what whites could offer by improving their own capacity to contribute to modern industry and agriculture. This approach naturally commended itself to white educationists in the USA and Africa, but it also had African admirers. Ohlange College, in Natal, was founded by John Dube in emulation of Tuskegee. And in James Kwegyir Aggrey the gradualist approach found an African advocate whose influence spanned the continent. Aggrey left the Gold Coast to study at Livingstone College in North Carolina, which was run by the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church. He graduated in 1902 and married a black American: in his courtship, as in Plaatje's, reading Shakespeare played an important part. Aggrey settled down to teaching and further studies in the US, and in due course was sought out by white American philanthropists concerned to foster the education they thought appropriate for blacks in the US and Africa. In 1920 Aggrey joined the Phelps-Stokes Commission on African education and in this capacity spent much of the next four years touring Africa. His firm belief in the value of co-operation between black and white made a particular impression in South Africa, where he helped white liberals and members of the black élite to discover a common interest in piecemeal reform. Yet for many more Africans, Aggrey's counsels of moderation and patient self-improvement counted for less than his own personal stature as a black man to whom whites listened as to an equal. When he died in New York in 1927 there were memorial services for him in the Gold Coast, Lagos and London.

Early in the century, the gradualist strategy for black progress had been challenged by W. E. B. DuBois, a sociology professor who had studied in Germany as well as at Harvard. In company with other black scholars in the US, DuBois asserted the right of the most able and educated blacks to full citizenship, while also stressing the importance of solidarity between black people throughout the world in face of white domination. In 1900 DuBois attended in London a Pan-African Conference (which consisted largely of blacks from the US and the West Indies), but his most important work for black unity was done after the First World War. DuBois was sent to Europe by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to try to represent African interests at the Peace Conference in 1919. The attempt failed; instead, DuBois hurriedly improvised a 'Pan-African Congress' in Paris. Most of the members were blacks from the New World: there were none from South Africa or British West Africa. White observers approved the Congress's moderate demands for progressive African participation in government. The creation of the League of Nations held out hopes that blacks might fruitfully appeal to an international conscience. DuBois took a leading part in organising further Pan-African congresses in 1921 (London, Brussels and Paris), 1923 (London and possibly Lisbon) and 1927 (New York). These were hardly more successful than the first in involving Africans. In 1921 DuBois read a paper on South Africa by Plaatje (who was then in the USA) and in 1923 some British socialists attended, but meanwhile DuBois lost the support of French-speaking blacks. The congresses were intended not only to register the discontent of black people but to advance their political education; little, however, was done to spread knowledge about Africa and DuBois was criticised on this score by West Africans.

All the same, Africans abroad were greatly stimulated by encounters with blacks of the diaspora. The latter promoted the concept of black nationhood, even if the connection between this and any particular people or territory remained uncertain. They encouraged Africans to recover their own history and cultivated the myth that the civilisation of ancient Egypt was the work of Negroes — a myth to which even the normally matter-of-fact Aggrey succumbed.³⁶ They demonstrated to Africans what could

³⁶ It is, of course, no more accurate to claim that ancient Egyptian civilisation was the work of 'whites'.

be achieved, despite white opposition, in education and business. John Chilembwe, from Nyasaland, attended a Baptist seminary in Virginia in 1898–1900 and returned with two black missionaries to found the industrial mission from which he launched his tragic rebellion in 1915. Chilembwe's death seems to have been little remarked by blacks outside Nyasaland; its history was written by his fellow-countryman G. S. Mwase around 1930, but this was not published until much later. However, widespread African interest was aroused by Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican, who in 1914 founded the Universal Negro Improvement and Conservation Association. Garvey's unusual eloquence soon won him a large black following in New York, where he declared himself Provisional President of Africa. Garvey had a more practical side: taking up an idea floated by West Africans, he founded the Black Star shipping line, wholly owned by blacks on both sides of the Atlantic. To DuBois and the NAACP, Garvey was an impudent demagogue. Aggrey denounced him; and in 1924 a young Sotho student in the USA referred to him sarcastically as 'the self-styled saviour of the African people'.³⁷ In the early 1920s Garvey tried to settle US blacks in Liberia; this project collapsed, and so did his shipping line. But Garvey was by no means eccentric in his concern to strengthen economic links between blacks in the US and Africa. This had long been a preoccupation of his associate Duse Mohamed Ali, a 'Sudanese Egyptian' who between 1912 and 1919 had run a magazine in London which voiced the grievances of colonial peoples and promoted their commercial interests. Up to the late 1920s, West African traders made several attempts, though none very successful, to escape the hegemony of British import–export firms by selling direct to the USA with the help of black American businessmen. And while Garvey excited both traders and workers in West Africa, the writings of black Americans made a great impact on the more educated Africans. The 'Harlem Renaissance' of the late 1920s was a reassertion of the cultural autonomy of black people: its leading authors, Langston Hughes, Claude McKay, Countée Cullen and Alain Locke made a particular appeal to black intellectuals in South Africa, where the disjunction was sharpest between white repression and black aspirations to share in the best that has been thought and said in the world.

³⁷ I. Geiss (tr. Ann Keep), *The Pan-African movement* (London, 1974), 489.

Black solidarity in the French-speaking world developed on rather different lines. Its African base was very narrow. In Senegal, Africans in the four oldest colonial towns could elect a deputy to the French parliament; from 1914 to 1934 this was a black Senegalese, Blaise Diagne. The black lawyer Lamine Guèye was mayor of St Louis in 1925–7. In theory, after 1912, it was possible for Africans throughout French West Africa to qualify for French citizenship. In practice, such ‘assimilation’ was achieved by very few, and without it there was no scope for Africans to participate in colonial politics. In any case, Paris became their main field of action. Here, after 1918, a number of West Africans met Algerians and other French colonial subjects. Tovalou-Houénou, a lawyer from Dahomey who had fought in Europe, wrote a book in 1921 which claimed that Africa, no less than other parts of the world, could contribute to civilisation; besides, he had already discovered that ‘civilisation is a colossal farce which ends in mud and blood, as in 1914’.³⁸ Houénou, like other black expatriates in Paris, despised Diagne as a colonial stooge; he invoked France’s own revolutionary and republican traditions to demand for Africans either full integration with France or else autonomy. In 1924 he visited the USA and shared a platform with Garvey; he seems to have tried in 1925 to liberate Dahomey, but was arrested in Togo. Other Africans in Paris founded a journal, *La Race nègre*, which criticised Western civilisation and industrialisation. This vein of argument echoed the ideas of black Americans with whom Houénou had already made contact. During the 1930s Paulette Nardal, a black from Martinique, ran a *salon* in Paris for black intellectuals; she also edited a journal which brought together work by Langston Hughes, McKay and Locke, the Haitian writer Jean Price-Mars, and several white students of black culture, including Delafosse, Frobenius, Herskovits and Westermann.

By the late 1930s the leading African intellectual in France was the schoolteacher Léopold Senghor. More completely than any other African, he experienced a conflict of loyalties between Europe and Africa. Such conflict surfaced among French-speaking Africans later than in English-speaking Africa: it was felt well before 1914 by Blyden, Casely Hayford and Plaatje. But for French-speaking Africans the struggle was peculiarly intense, due

³⁸ K. Tovalou-Houénou, *L’Involution des métamorphoses et des métempsychoses de l’univers*, I (Paris, n.d. [1921]), 59.

to the opportunities and pressures on the literate minority to become 'black Frenchmen'. As a student in Paris, Senghor did so well that he could write a master's thesis on exoticism in Baudelaire. And it was as a Frenchman rather than an African that he discovered his own roots. In 1929 he was introduced by his fellow-student Georges Pompidou to a novel about cultural renaissance in the French provinces, Maurice Barrès's *Déracinés* (1897). This made a profound impression on Senghor. Within a year or so he underwent a reaction against the cultural demands of Paris which amounted to a conversion. Just as DuBois had gained inspiration from hearing Franz Boas lecture on the kingdoms of the Western Sudan, so Senghor now began to read the work of white Africanists; he attended lectures by the anthropologist Marcel Griaule and studied Lévy-Bruhl's work on 'primitive mentality'. Senghor even took a passing interest in European racist theory, though this subsided when Hitler came to power in 1933. Like other black intellectuals in Paris from Africa or the West Indies, Senghor came to regard official French notions of 'assimilation' as a personal affront. France might make room for black Frenchmen; it would not admit that they could still be African. Senghor and his friends refused to make the cultural surrender which seemed required of them; instead, they asserted the distinctive value of black culture, for which they coined the term *négritude*. It is hard to say what impact these Parisian Africans had in Africa at this period, but the concept of assimilation was increasingly criticised in the African press in Dahomey, and perhaps too in unpublished plays performed in Madagascar.

Socialist theory was an important element in the mixture of ideas to which blacks in Paris were exposed between the wars. In Senegal, something may have been learned from the newspaper which the French Socialist Party introduced in 1907; it is more certain that during and after the First World War soldiers returning from France to West Africa brought back ideas which helped to inspire strikes at this time. Then in 1917 the Bolshevik revolution established the Soviet Union as a great power explicitly opposed to colonialism and imperialism. This was to give Communist parties considerable potential prestige in the colonial world. The French party, formed in 1920-1, soon took an interest in expatriate blacks, and by 1924 it had recruited two students,

the war-veteran Lamine Senghor from Senegal and T. Garan Kouyaté from Soudan; both took part later in organising black workers in French ports. Senghor founded the Committee for the Defence of the Negro Race, which elected Lenin posthumously as honorary president. In 1927 Senghor attended the inaugural conference in Brussels of the Berlin-based League against Imperialism. This gathering included delegates from North Africa and other parts of the colonial world (Nehru came from India), South Africa and Latin America. When Senghor died later that year an obituary in the monthly paper he had founded likened him to the hero of a classic French tragedy: 'to the work of the emancipation of his race he brought the mystical stubbornness of Polyeucte'.³⁹ Under Kouyaté's leadership the Committee (renamed League) used black seamen to distribute its paper in West Africa, sought financial help from DuBois in the USA, and developed close links with French Communists and trade unionists. However, there was soon fierce argument over the extent of Communist interference; government harassment was intensified; and the movement lost momentum in the 1930s.

In South Africa, socialist thought had influenced sections of the white working class since early in the century. The First World War provoked a split in the Labour Party: in 1916 pacifist dissidents formed the International Socialist League, which called for class solidarity across the colour line and sought African support. One Congress member, L. T. Mvabasa, attended meetings of the ISL in 1917; a year later he told the Transvaal Congress, 'The capitalists and workers are at war everywhere in every country.' 'The white people teach you about heaven...they don't teach you about this earth on which we live...The God of our Chiefs...gave us this part of the world we possess.'⁴⁰ By 1921 the ISL and other socialist groups had merged to form the Communist Party of South Africa, which both disavowed racialism and eschewed participation in electoral politics. At first the CPSA included no Africans, who were mostly suspicious of its white leadership; Clements Kadalie decided to keep his distance. However, other members of the ICU took an interest; from 1925 the party held night-school classes for Africans in Johannesburg; and

³⁹ Quoted in J. A. Langley, *Pan-Africanism and nationalism in West Africa, 1900-1945* (Oxford, 1973), 305.

⁴⁰ Quoted by P. Bonner in Marks and Rathbone, *Industrialisation and social change*, 293-4.

it won some support within Congress. By 1928 the CPSA consisted largely of Africans, and James La Guma represented it in Moscow in 1927 after attending the anti-imperialism conference in Brussels. Unfortunately for the CPSA, the Comintern had belatedly begun to concern itself with South Africa, which it found hard to analyse in terms of revolutionary strategy. Policy changes in Moscow disrupted the local party. In an attempt to strengthen South African allegiance, Africans were brought to Moscow: J. B. Marks, E. Mofutsanyana and Moses Kotane attended the Lenin School in 1932–3. Meanwhile Albert Nzula was working at the Eastern Workers' Communist University, and not only as a pupil: in collaborating on a book about labour in black Africa he had much to teach the founders of African studies in Russia. Nzula, however, died in Moscow in 1934, and by then the party line had swung round towards co-operation with imperialist powers against Fascism — i.e. Hitler's Germany. For many black people, international Communism stood revealed as merely a tool of Russian foreign policy, though the CPSA remained important as South Africa's only non-racial political party.

British West African contacts with Soviet Communism originated in America. Bankole Awoonor-Renner, son of an eminent Gold Coast barrister, went to Tuskegee, became secretary of the African students' union in the USA, attended the first meeting, in 1925, of the Comintern-inspired American Negro Labor Congress and was despatched with four American blacks to study in Moscow, where he attended the Eastern Workers' University until 1928. He then returned to the Gold Coast and on Casely Hayford's death in 1930 became editor of the *Gold Coast Leader*. By then, Russian interest in the black world had expanded from the USA to Africa. In 1930 a Negro Workers' Conference was held in Hamburg and attended by Africans from each territory in British West Africa. Among them was I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson, who had as wide a knowledge of Africa as any African at the time: he had served during the war as an army clerk in Cameroun, East Africa and the Middle East, and probably made his first contacts with communists while working in the late 1920s as a seaman along the coast from West Africa to South Africa. Wallace-Johnson went on from Hamburg to study in Moscow, where he got to know the Trinidadian George Padmore, secretary

of the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers and editor of its paper, the *Negro Worker*. Wallace-Johnson returned to West Africa in 1933 and threw himself into a variety of protest activities.⁴¹ His efforts to realise Padmore's aim of making the *Negro Worker* a 'mass organ' in Africa were frustrated by colonial governments, and in any case Padmore himself broke with Moscow in 1934, following its rapprochement with Britain and France. All the same, a good deal had been done to acquaint Africans with Marxist–Leninist arguments and sharpen West African criticism of colonial economies in the depths of the depression.

African nationalism developed in response to the whole range of ideas generated by higher education and foreign travel: constitutional reform, Pan-Africanism, international working-class solidarity. 'Nation' was itself one such idea. In our period, it mattered most in West Africa. In the Gold Coast, national feeling was invoked early in the century by writers who chiefly had in mind the Fante people around Cape Coast, but these writers also belonged to another sort of nation: the Christian élite whose enclaves along the coast of British West Africa were linked by familial and professional ties. When members of this élite combined for political purposes in 1920, they called themselves a 'National Congress', since their own field of action was the whole littoral of this region rather than any one colonial territory. By 1930 the commitment of this Congress to a united British West Africa was under strain, and the impact of the depression intensified the shift towards a territorial focus. Economic grievance combined with the spread of education (and the growing numbers of those who had studied abroad) to create a more popular and widely diffused basis for anti-colonial protest. Coastal élites developed links with their hinterlands: by 1932 the West African Students' Union (WASU), based in London, had branches in Kumasi and towns in Northern Nigeria. There was indeed a conflict of generations: the younger men with political ambitions, such as Nnamdi Azikiwe, were more sensitive than their elders to popular discontent, less respectful of British culture and civilisation, and more inclined to see indirect rule through chiefs as an obstacle to the extension of African freedom.

African thought about nationalism and imperialism was not

⁴¹ See chapter 8, pp. 450–3.

simply provoked by African experience; it also responded to major currents in world politics. Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 showed blacks in Africa and the Americas that economic and technological mastery need not be a white monopoly. It made a great impression on Casely Hayford, and also on the young Ethiopian Gebre Heywet Baykedagn, who returned to Africa in 1905 after being educated in Germany and Austria. He extolled the merits of bureaucratic government, but he was also a pioneer African economic nationalist. He pointed out that his country's political independence was undermined by its economic subservience to foreigners: until it could trade, as did Japan, on equal terms with Europe, it was no more truly free than other African countries. African awareness of economic imperialism was later extended, as we have seen, through contacts both with black American capitalists and with international socialism.

A further challenge was posed by the rise of fascist dictatorships in Europe. In 1933 WASU's journal attacked the degeneration of German nationalism into racism; in the Gold Coast, J. B. Danquah reprinted anti-Nazi articles by German writers. For a time it was easier to admire Mussolini, but in 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia. The shock was felt in many parts of Africa. Ethiopia had for some time represented to Africans a potent symbol of black independence, and not simply because its deficiencies were less well publicised than those of Liberia or Haiti: it was after all a Christian state with as long a history as any in Europe. D. D. T. Jabavu, a lecturer at Fort Hare who had been the first black South African graduate of a British university, observed that the invasion had revealed the white savage beneath the European veneer. For many West Africans, the invasion called in question the superiority of Western civilisation, while Britain's failure to take a firm stand against it discredited her claims to rule in Africa as a trustee for its people's welfare. In London, a group of blacks, mostly from the West Indies, organised a welcome party for Haile Sellassie when he arrived as an exile in 1936. In 1937 this group became the International African Service Bureau, a Marxist but non-communist body which was led by Padmore and C. L. R. James (also from Trinidad), Wallace-Johnson, and Jomo Kenyatta (who had visited Moscow in 1931-2). Growing African awareness of links between colonial problems and the world crisis was ventilated in July 1939 at a conference in London that was mainly

organised by the relatively conservative League of Coloured Peoples; its resolutions included demands for national self-determination. Moves towards the amalgamation of black pressure groups in London were cut short by the outbreak of war, but close ties had been formed with a variety of British sympathisers, especially in the Labour Party; these were to bear fruit when peace returned.

At the end of our period, anti-colonial nationalism was widespread among literate people in British West Africa and beginning to influence illiterate workers and farmers. Both in West Africa and in London collective action was addressed not simply to participation in the structures of colonial government but to its replacement. There was a growing tendency to regard individual colonial territories as capable of being turned into nation-states, even if the means to do this had scarcely been developed. In South Africa, the African National Congress maintained a territorial network but had been reduced to a marginal role in the country's constitutional politics, and its social base was still very narrow. In Southern Rhodesia, a Bantu Congress had been formed in 1936 but it barely contained tensions between Shona and Ndebele. Elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the only territory-wide African organisation was in Tanganyika, and this was still primarily a clerical élite. Four of the men who were eventually to lead their countries to independence were still working overseas: Léopold Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah and Hastings Banda. They did not return until 1945 or later, and meanwhile the Second World War had transformed the conditions for political development in Africa. Only after the war did opposition to colonial rule reach a point at which Africans were forced to be explicit about the character of the nation which they sought to liberate: was this to be a group with a shared indigenous culture (whether or not it called itself a 'tribe'), or was it to be the whole population of a colonial territory, owing such unity as it might possess to alien intervention?

CHAPTER 6

THE MAGHRIB

In 1905 the Maghrib was sharply divided. Although Algeria had been French since its conquest in the 1830s and 1840s, Morocco was still an independent state, and Libya still a province of the Ottoman empire. They had not yet been overtaken by the European partition of Africa at the end of the nineteenth century, which began with the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881. Both Morocco and Libya, however, were under threat: Libya from the Italians, who had secured international recognition of their claim to the territory as compensation for their acquiescence in the French protectorate in Tunisia; and Morocco from the French, who had obtained British acknowledgement of their special interest in the country with the conclusion of the *Entente Cordiale* in 1904. By 1914 Morocco had become a second French protectorate, at the price of territorial concessions to Spain in the north and south. Libya had been invaded by Italy, whose troops occupied the coast.

The subjugation of Morocco and Libya was not complete until the 1930s. The length of the conquest, combined with the interruption of European colonialism by the First World War, delayed the large-scale settlement and economic development of these countries by the European states concerned. Almost throughout the period, therefore, there continued to be big differences between Morocco and Libya and the well-established colony of Algeria, officially part of metropolitan France. These differences appeared in a less pronounced form between Algeria and Tunisia. They were offset by a policy of colonisation which the French extended from Algeria into Tunisia and Morocco, and which was copied by the Italians in Libya and by the Spanish to a lesser extent in their Moroccan zones. The effect was to create in each country a dominant resident European community which, with the help of capital investment, was intended to ensure a close political, social and economic connection with the metropolitan power.

THE MAGHRIB

This policy of colonisation, pursued with few qualms and considerable enthusiasm, took less than proper account of the native Muslim population of the area. Except in Morocco, few precautions were taken to protect the subject peoples from the adverse effects of Europeanisation, or to assure them of a share in its benefits. They were, on the other hand, by no means primitive. Despite great changes in their society and economy, which brought about widespread dislocation and impoverishment, some groups were able to profit from new opportunities. At the same time they possessed in their religion, their language and their history the elements of a strong national consciousness. The combination of these factors during the period is the least known but certainly one of the most important subjects for historical investigation.

1905-1914

Algeria


By 1905, the constitution of French Algeria was essentially complete in the form which survived down to the Second World War. With the recent reorganisation in 1896-8 of the Conseil Supérieur de l'Algérie to include elected members, and the creation of an elected assembly, the Délégations Financières, to control an Algerian budget, direct administration from Paris had come to an end, and a measure of self-government obtained in what was officially an integral part of France. Under a governor-general, responsible to the French Ministry of the Interior, these two bodies were at the summit of a system of *départements*, subdivided into *communes*, which had replaced the original military administration of the country throughout the more inhabitable regions of the north, leaving only the deserts of the south under the control of the army. The similarity of this system to that of local government in France was only superficial. The *communes* were of two kinds, *de plein exercice* and *mixte*, with a third category, *indigène*, for the most remote. Those *de plein exercice* were governed as in France by mayors who represented a European community whose size varied, but was almost always small in relation to a Muslim majority. The *communes de plein exercice* were far larger than any comparable units in metropolitan France, but much smaller

than the immense *communes mixtes*, where the European population was minimal, and government was in the hands of administrative officials, district officers with their own uniform, recruitment and career structure. It was the incompatibility of this system with that of the mother country which had been responsible for the grant of separate status.

Socially and economically, Algeria was in fact a colony. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were roughly 400,000 French, 200,000 Spanish and Italians, and four million Muslims, the highest ratio of Europeans to 'natives' in the history of the territory; over the next forty years the ratio dropped from 1:6 or 7 to 1:8 or 9. The two populations were segregated on the basis of religion. Although the Muslims had French nationality, they did not have and could not acquire French citizenship unless they renounced their *statut personnel*, their rights and duties under the *shari'a*. These rights and duties, for example those concerned with marriage and inheritance, were regarded as incompatible with the French civil code, and therefore with the obligations of French citizenship. This was somewhat inconsistent. In the first place, the native Jewish community of Algeria had been naturalised in 1870 as citizens *en bloc*, Talmudic law notwithstanding. Moreover, the act of 1889 which declared that the children of foreigners, born in Algeria, were to become French citizens unless they wished it otherwise, was regularly held to apply to Muslim expatriates as well as to the Europeans for whom it was designed.¹ Few Algerian Muslims ever thought it worthwhile in the circumstances to take advantage of the procedures whereby, under the *Senatus Consulte* of 14 July 1865, they might apply for citizenship. The meagre total of 8,000 citizens of Muslim Algerian origin in 1936 was largely accounted for by professional men of no great family who had made their way with the French in a recognised career. Muslims regularly preferred wealth and status in their own community, despite the many drawbacks of their position as subjects.

These drawbacks were severe. As non-citizens, Muslim Algerians had been left by years of *assimilation* (the Frenchification of government) without either self-government or government on the same terms as Europeans. The introduction in 1901 of a policy of *association*, envisaging their separate development, meant

¹ C.-R. Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France, 1891–1919* (Paris, 1968), 349 and n.1.



◀ **Algeria and Tunisia, 1938**

very little. As Muslims they had separate representation on local councils as well as in the Conseil Supérieur and the Délégations Financières (one Muslim *délégation* to two French), but always in the minority. They were ruled by French mayors and administrators, with the functions of the *caïd* (*qā'id*, the Muslim district chief, reduced to a minimum. French judges and juries handled even matters of Muslim law, severely restricting the competence of the *cadi* (*qāḍī*) the Muslim judge. In 1902 the burden of the *code de l'indigénat*, penal regulations directed solely at the Muslim population, was aggravated by the creation of *tribunaux répressifs* to deal with the many offences regarded as signs of insubordination and rebellion. Fiscally, Muslims were liable to the *impôts arabes*, the traditional Islamic taxes on crops, livestock and so on, greatly increased by irregular assessment and additional levies. These *impôts* were doubled by taxes payable to the commune, such as labour services or money in lieu, and by indirect taxes on goods entering each commune as well as the country. The burden fell heavily on the poor, who were the great majority. It was exacerbated by the fact that while Muslims accounted for 46 per cent of the total revenue but only 36 per cent of the national income, the taxes they paid were spent by the Europeans almost wholly for the benefit of Europeans, as in the construction of all the well-laid-out French towns and villages. This transference of resources from one community to another was only one aspect of the systematic creation of a modern European economy at the expense of the traditional sector.

By the First World War, land laws for public and private property had enabled the French to appropriate about half of the total area of Algeria north of the Sahara. The bulk of this land belonged to the state or the communes, and consisted of forest and waste. The rest, about a tenth of the area north of the Sahara, was arable land belonging to European settlers. As arable land, however, it accounted for no less than two-fifths of the arable area of this mountainous country bordering on desert. Its loss, together with that of the forests and wastes belonging to the state, meant the end of the traditional system of extensive cultivation and grazing for the majority of the Muslim population. Deprived of good agricultural land and of much former pasture, people turned to grazing ground for their crops, while the number of

animals in their possession fell. This exploitation of marginal land to obtain essential grain brought about its rapid deterioration. A concentration of the population on smaller and smaller areas was followed by a dispersal as the means of livelihood failed. Some became destitute scavengers, others went out for work. European properties, increasingly capitalised, offered less and less permanent employment to labourers or tenants, requiring mainly seasonal labour for the harvest. Wages were low, and by the first decade of the century migration to France for industrial work had begun. Meanwhile there was a drift into regions around the big Algerian cities, and into the cities themselves, where the immigrants settled to form a new population. They found little work, for traditional crafts and occupations survived with difficulty, and the European sector had little to offer apart from housework for women. Regular crime and frequent famine indicated a situation all the more desperate as the population continued, despite everything, to increase.

There were few survivals from the past. The great families of Turkish Algeria, still prominent in 1870, had lost wealth, power and status under the Third Republic. Their dwindling remnants, however, still formed a group of Muslim landlords. These were reinforced by a new generation of Muslims who had learned to take advantage of the opportunities for acquiring property provided by the French. Land in Muslim ownership which was *francisé* or registered under French law was not far short of the amount of land owned by Europeans. While many of the older estates, still running to hundreds of hectares, were farmed by poor sharecroppers in the traditional manner, others were more modern. Their owners frequently held official positions, charged by the French to keep order, collect taxes, or serve as Muslim representatives on local councils. Known as the *Beni Oui Oui* as a result of their compliance with French demands, their positions made them influential in their communities, and sometimes rich. At Tolga, on the northern edge of the Sahara, an English traveller reported that an artesian well had been sunk. A man with a divining rod had found the water, and offered to sell the secret for 60,000 francs. The *cadi* had the money and a certain amount of scientific knowledge; he had paid, and caused the well to be dug. Then he had given half the water to the village in return for a large tract of land, which he was developing and planting. The

water was turned alternately upon his land and that of the village.² Equally enterprising were marabouts or holy men, moneylenders whose operations were both essential and disastrous for the peasantry, professional people who had managed to acquire a French education, and a class of shopkeepers and businessmen who ensured the distribution of the manufactures on which the population had come to rely.

The modern economy to which such people belonged despite their inferior status was less than modern in the high proportion of the employment accounted for by government and agriculture and in the correspondingly feeble share of industry. The peasant way of life of the first French settlers had nevertheless been transformed by the investment in cash-crops in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. By 1905 the vine was well established, and wheat-growing by the dry-farming methods of North America was beginning. Cultivation of this kind needed capital, and the process was already far advanced by which smallholders were obliged to sell out; properties grew in size, and were progressively acquired by companies ultimately owned by the great French banks. As a result, the rural European population remained static at little more than 200,000, while the urban population continued to grow. Resentment at the progress of capitalism had shown itself at the time of the Dreyfus affair in hostility to the Algerian Jews naturalised as French citizens, who were blamed for their modest success in government employment and commerce. The riots of 1897 had marked the conversion of the settlers from left-wing republicans to right-wing radicals suspicious of the liberalism of the metropolis. Their hold upon the government of Algeria, and the permanent repression of the Muslim population, seemed their only guarantee of survival in an economy dependent upon credit for the production and export of primary products. The Délégations Financières, which gave the European population effective control over an Algerian budget, were vital to its calculations.

The settlers were aided by the fact that they were represented, as the Muslims were not, by three senators and six deputies in the French parliament. These formed a powerful group led by Eugène Étienne of Oran, vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies and a prominent supporter of world-wide French imperialism. Down to 1914 they were able to resist the attempts of men like Abel

² C. F. and L. Grant, *'Tixt sand and sea* (London, n.d. [1912]), 404-5.

Ferry, Albin Rozet and Paul Bourde to introduce legislation of a kind to abolish the distinction between the two communities in Algeria on the grounds of religion, and to assimilate the Muslim population to the French, administratively, fiscally and electorally. Such proposals were logical for a country which formed part of metropolitan France, but were totally rejected by the settlers on the grounds of national security and their own dignity. In 1911 a celebrated incident, the mass emigration of eight hundred Muslims from Tlemcen to Syria, led to a public enquiry which highlighted the disagreement. The committee of enquiry which investigated the reason for this apparent rejection of French rule produced a list of Muslim grievances condemning every aspect of French rule in Algeria. The settler deputies, on the other hand, ascribed the affair to Turkish intrigue. It confirmed them in their belief that the insurrection of a fanatical race was still a danger to be guarded against with the utmost severity. Putting the blame for Muslim discontent upon that severity, the reformers for their part used the incident to show why all Muslim Algerians might be expected to resent their treatment, rather than to explain why these particular people had taken this particular action.

As the settlers were quick to point out, however, a basic weakness of the case for liberal reform was the lack of Muslim support. It was favoured by the so-called Young Algerians, those younger Muslims who had managed, despite the inadequate provision of the regime for the education of the Muslim population, to obtain a French schooling and professional qualifications. Their political demands were dismissed by the settlers as the agitation of people who really wanted jobs they could not get. Certainly, although they refused to separate themselves from their community by discarding Islamic law for French citizenship, as *évolués* they were at a distance from the bulk of the Muslim population. The mass of the people was inarticulate except in songs and stories which preserved the memory of resistance to the French while commenting on a hard present, sometimes looking for the coming of the Mahdi, 'the Rightly-Guided One', sent by God to give the victory to the faithful. The better-off, especially those who depended on the French for jobs and grudging toleration, found their advantage in the existing separation of the two communities, which they looked to the French to maintain. More principled opposition to a campaign which

linked equal rights to common citizenship in a European democracy came from the Vieux Turbans, the members of learned and respectable urban families from which came the *oulémas* ('*ulamā*'), the traditional scholars. Those who held office in the mosques and the judiciary showed little independence of the French who appointed them. But insofar as there was a single explanation of the exodus from Tlemcen, it was the proposal to introduce conscription for the Muslim population, favoured by the reformers as a step towards equality. Beyond the narrow issue of service in an army which might go to war with the Ottoman empire was the appeal of the doctrines of Islamic reform and regeneration current in the Middle East.

Tunisia

The Tunisian Protectorate had been conceived in a generous spirit as an alternative to the oppressive regime of Algeria. It was governed in accordance with the recently published statutes of France Outremer as a separate country with its own nationality and native administration under French supervision. The bey, his ministers and his caids (district governors) acted on the advice of the resident minister and his staff of district officers, the *contrôleurs civils*, members of a special service with its own recruitment, training and career structure. The resident minister, in turn, was responsible not to the colonial ministry but to that for foreign affairs. In practice, however, the Tunisians submitted to French dictation. To incorporate the country firmly into the French empire, the policy was to encourage French investment, but above all, as in Algeria, French settlement on the land. French land laws had therefore defined landownership in a European sense. Their progressive application to about 13,000 sq.km of cultivable land by 1928 was largely at the expense of the rights of native occupants, whether individuals or groups, who either remained precariously or were driven off. French purchases of land thus made available had at first been speculative; before 1900, more than 5,000 sq.km were acquired by individuals and companies, but much less was actually developed. To promote settlement, the state had turned to official colonisation, allocating to European colonists land from the state domain and from the so-called public *habous*, properties dedicated under Muslim law to the maintenance

of charitable foundations, and administered for this purpose by the state. By 1914 such colonisation had spread over some 2,500 sq.km, mainly in the cereal-growing districts of the north. By that time the total land under European control was approaching the maximum of about 9,000 sq.km, more than a fifth of the cultivable area. It was predominantly in French hands, with roughly 15 per cent belonging to Italian proprietors, mostly small fruit-farmers in the north-east.

As in Algeria, French farmers were soon in difficulty, and most of those provided with land by the state moved away to the towns. However, European agriculture was assisted by the railway system centred on Tunis, running eastwards into Algeria and southwards from Bizerta to Sfax and eventually Gabès. Branch lines brought the minerals of the north to Bizerta and Tunis, and the phosphates of the south to Sfax and Sousse. These, especially Tunis and Sfax, were the principal ports, with new docks. The development of mining was rapid in the first two decades of the century; Tunisia caught up with the Algerian production of about a million tons of iron ore a year, and greatly exceeded her neighbour in the production of phosphates. With lead and zinc in addition, Tunisia made a significant contribution to the world supply of these minerals. Cereals, wine and olive oil were the main agricultural exports. From a negligible quantity in international trade at the beginning of the French occupation in 1881, the country had become a fairly important trading partner of France, with whom she enjoyed a favourable customs arrangement.

The benefits were felt for the most part by the Europeans, a small community at the beginning of the century of about 75,000 Italians, 25,000 French and 10,000 Maltese. The number of Italians in Tunisia had worried the French since before the protectorate, and continued to do so as the various construction programmes of the regime attracted a workforce from Sicily and southern Italy in addition to the existing numbers of small proprietors. By 1911 there were almost 90,000 Italians, but immigration from Algeria, Corsica and the south of France had brought the number of French to about 45,000. Their nationality as citizens of the ruling power gave them a privileged position as the chosen agents of French policy. Although expatriate, they were politically represented in the *Conférence Consultative*, a body created out of the French chamber of commerce to advise the resident minister on behalf of the French community.

Nationality, rather than religion, distinguished them equally from the native population of more than a million Muslims and some 50,000 Jews. A separate Tunisian section added to the Conférence Consultative commented separately on the few subjects it was invited to discuss. Tunisian nationals suffered in the same way as the Muslims of Algeria from the loss of land, and more generally from the growth of a modern economy. This devalued traditional occupations, while offering insufficient opportunities for employment in European agriculture and industry. Nevertheless, in the oases dates became a commercial crop in native hands. More important were olives, especially in the Sahel and around Sfax. Europeans who acquired the land developed the plantations by *mughāraṣa* or *bail à complant*, a form of sharecropping by which the Tunisian cultivator who planted and tended the trees until maturity eventually received half the plantation, and often continued to look after and divide the product of the remainder with the landowner. The practice was taken up by Tunisian landlords, some of whom grew rich. In general, the possession of land registered (*immatriculé*) under French law helped the old aristocracy to survive. The former ruling families were joined in government service and the professions by the traditional bourgeoisie of scholars, merchants and craftsmen. By 1914 a new generation of those with a European education had begun to take over. Although largely drawn from established families, it included some from very humble backgrounds. European education and training was becoming a way for the son of a poor man to do well.

In the decade before the First World War, the French presence led to conflict as much between Tunisians as between Tunisians and French. In Algeria, virtually the entire process of modernisation had been the work of the French, but in Tunisia, as in Egypt, modernisation was already well advanced when the French took control. A constitution or *dustūr* had been in force from 1861 to 1864; in the 1870s, Prime Minister Khayr al-Dīn (Kheireddine) had endeavoured to establish an efficient administration in accordance with the principles of Islam. Khayr al-Dīn had enlisted the services, not of the conservative Malikite ‘*ulamā*’ of Tunis, but of the great Hanafite ‘*ulamā*’ of Turkish origin more closely identified with the government of the beys, and the humbler Malikite ‘*ulamā*’ of provincial origin who needed the employment offered by an expanding administration. To produce the ‘*ulamā*’

he required, he had modernised the teaching of the Islamic sciences at the Zitouna (Zaytūna) Mosque school, and founded the Sadiki (Ṣādiqī) College to provide a European-type education within the framework of Islam.³ For twenty years after their occupation of the country in 1881, the French had endeavoured, with some success, to ally with the more progressive '*ulamā*' and the graduates of the Sadiki College. In 1896 they encouraged the foundation of the Khaldounia, an educational society named after the great historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldūn, which under the presidency of the Sadiki graduate Bechir Sfar offered to students of the Zitouna the opportunity to broaden their studies beyond the limits of the traditional Islamic curriculum. But the '*ulamā*' were eventually deterred by this French enthusiasm for westernisation, which seemed to them to threaten the Zitouna itself. In a quarrel over education, they found themselves opposed not only to Bechir Sfar and his colleagues; their hostility extended to the Salafiyya, the movement for Islamic reform. The Salafiyya, inspired by the Egyptian Muḥammad 'Abduh, who visited Tunisia in 1903, aimed at the revival of Islam and Islamic society by the purging away of the traditional interpretations of the Faith which obscured the religion of the Prophet and prevented the triumph of the community in the modern world. This aim was profoundly Islamic, but the Tunisian '*ulamā*' were repelled by pronouncements on the Koran by the principal Tunisian spokesman of the Salafiyya, Shaykh Taalbi (al-Tha'ālībī), which they considered blasphemous. What began as a quarrel with an individual rather than a doctrine, however, left them with no alternative to Europeanism but conservative traditionalism. From 1905 their attitude was welcomed by the French, who turned away from their earlier encouragement of modernism as Tunisian *évolués* became increasingly critical of the protectorate. By 1914 the '*ulamā*' had come paradoxically to accept a tacit alliance with the authorities against their own more radical countrymen.

The break between the French and the *évolués* occurred in the years after 1900 over the political representation of the settlers in the country, and the introduction of the programme of official colonisation. The organisation of the *évolués*' opposition began in 1905 with the foundation of the Société des Anciens Élèves de Sadiki, grouping the graduates of the school in an association led

³ G. S. van Krieken, *Khayr al-Dīn et la Tunisie (1850–1881)* (Leiden, 1976), 186–98.

by the lawyer Ali Bach Hamba, independent of the administration. In 1906 Bechir Sfar publicly criticised French policy, to the indignation of the French press. In 1907 he and Ali Bach Hamba created a political group, the Young Tunisians, with a French-language weekly, *Le Tunisien*, to speak for the interests of their countrymen. Unlike the Young Algerians, who may have taken the name from them as they had probably taken it from the Young Turks, the Young Tunisians thought not in terms of assimilation to the French, but in terms of equality with them as people in their own right. The basis of their programme was the moderate demand for rights in accordance with the terms of the protectorate, but their approach was more radical. In 1909 they were joined by Shaykh Taalbi, and the movement acquired a religious as well as a constitutional character, with an Arabic as well as a French edition of *Le Tunisien*. In the absence of a Khayr al-Dīn to found a modern state on the basis of Islamic law, the Salafiyya as represented by Taalbi called first and foremost for an inner change of heart in preparation for the future. Politically, however, it could hardly avoid being anti-colonial, opposed to the principle of European rule. The association of Taalbi with the Young Tunisians was an important step in the formation of a Tunisian nationalist movement.

The popular appeal of the new party was demonstrated in 1911, when it protested against the Italian invasion of Libya. In November 1911 the excitement was focused at Tunis by a French proposal to bring the Djellaz cemetery under the French law of property. A riot, quelled by troops, led to the proclamation of a state of siege. When in February 1912 an Italian tram-driver knocked down and killed a child, the trams were boycotted, and Tunisian employees of the company claimed equal pay with the Italian personnel. The government declared there had been a political plot and exiled, among others, Ali Bach Hamba and Taalbi. This combination, in the capital, of political agitation, popular protest and workers' demands was the first clear manifestation of a Tunisian national consciousness. As the final stage of the colonial conquest of North Africa commenced, the disturbances coincided, significantly, with the beginnings of revolt against British rule in Egypt.


Morocco

Morocco had long been regarded by the French in the same light as Tunisia, as a natural extension of their empire in North Africa. For many years, however, international rivalry had prevented any agreement over the future of the country. Down to 1904 the French had concentrated upon a favourable delimitation of the border with Algeria. The Moroccan oasis of Figuig was almost encircled. Tuat, whose inhabitants traditionally owed a nominal allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco, was annexed in 1900. Thereafter, under the command of Lyautey, the French army moved westwards across the desert towards the Anti-Atlas, successfully persuading tribesmen of the northern Sahara who thought of themselves as subjects of the sultan to submit to incorporation into Algeria. The conclusion of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 enabled the French foreign minister, Delcassé, to prepare for something much more important, the eventual creation of a Moroccan protectorate with the acquiescence of Britain.

By common consent in Europe, Morocco was barbarously backward, a state whose weakness would threaten international peace until the powers could agree upon a form of control. A great deal of this weakness was attributable to European infiltration, which had undermined the sultan's authority and disrupted the traditional economy. Moroccans who became European protégés in and around the main ports were immune from the sultan's jurisdiction. The import of European commodities, in excess of what could be paid for by the export of grain, wool and dates, drained the country of its silver, and led to severe inflation. While the sultan attempted, with insufficient resources, to modernise the army, modern rifles found their way to the tribes. Poverty, insecurity and rebellion were the result. From 1900 the situation became acute. The attempt of young Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz to introduce a single new tax, the *tertib* (*tartīb*), in place of traditional dues without any kind of preparation deprived the government of its basic revenue for at least two years. The extravagance and corruption of the court made foreign loans all the more necessary.

In 1904 a French loan was made under an agreement which created a *Contrôle de la Dette*, in charge of the French official Henri Regnault, to supervise the customs and ensure that 60 per cent of their revenue was allocated to repayment. Delcassé had

1905-1914



6 Morocco, 1938

purchased the approval of Spain for his plan to use the Moroccan debt as the means to ultimate French domination with the promise of territory in the far south and along the Mediterranean. In 1905 France was briefly defied by the sultan with the encouragement of Germany. The landing of the Kaiser at Tangier in March, however, was followed by the Conference of Algeciras in January 1906. This authorised the French, as leaders of an international commission to supervise the government of Morocco, to take their plans further with the separate administration of the eight ports, notably Tangier and Casablanca, where Europeans were resident, and the setting-up of a Banque d'État in charge of all finance except the unpopular *tertib*. The Act of Algeciras was signed by 'Abd al-'Aziz in June.

Moroccans were opposed to the Act. Its signing was considered not simply as a defeat but as a betrayal of his people by the sultan.

It came in the middle of three years of famine, when the effects of currency depreciation and rising prices were intensified. Resentment was expressed in 1907 in scattered attacks on Europeans. These culminated in July in an attack upon the railway outside Casablanca. In March, Lyautey had occupied the town of Oujda just across the border with Algeria to the west of Tlemcen, as a reprisal for the killing of the missionary doctor Mauchamps at Marrakesh. In August a French force landed at Casablanca to defend the city against a widespread rising in the Chaouia, the surrounding region.

The rising in the Chaouia was a popular action joined by people from the rest of Morocco. Localised in its opposition to the French in Casablanca, however, it was subordinated to a country-wide movement to depose the ineffective 'Abd al-'Azīz. the campaign was a thoroughly traditional solution to the problems of the country, a call for a new sultan from the royal 'Alawite family who would defend the land of Islam against the infidels, and restore the golden age of justice. The leadership was equally traditional, centred on the brother of 'Abd al-'Azīz, the pasha of Marrakesh 'Abd al-Ḥafīz (Abd al-Hafid). Initially it was composed of the governors and chiefs of the south. Most prominent among these were the great *cuids* of the High Atlas, notably the brothers Madani and T'hami el-Glaoui (al-Glawī), who had risen to power as supporters of the government over the past twenty or thirty years. Funds were collected from confiscations and gifts, and an army assembled for the advance northwards. The campaign lasted a year, from the proclamation of 'Abd al-Ḥafīz at Marrakesh in August 1907 to the abdication of 'Abd al-'Azīz at Casablanca in August 1908. Its success was due less to military victory than to the support of Fez, which entailed widespread recognition of the rebel. Defections in the south and the failure to triumph over the French in Casablanca, on the other hand, meant that the final defeat of 'Abd al-'Azīz as he advanced from Rabat on Marrakesh was perhaps only just in time to prevent the movement's collapse.

As sultan, 'Abd al-Ḥafīz completed his victory with the submission of the Rif. In the west, towards Tangier, the virtually independent al-Raysūnī came to terms. In the eastern Rif the pretender Bū Ḥimāra was defeated and executed in August 1909. That was the limit of the sultan's success. While northerners whose loyalty he doubted were drastically dealt with, 'Abd al-Ḥafīz

was unable to break out of the constraints imposed by the Act of Algeciras. Attempts to obtain diplomatic support and aid from Germany and Turkey were abandoned in 1910 for yet another French loan on terms still more severe. To find money, the tribes around Fez and Meknes were harshly taxed. Discredited by such brutality and such weakness, ‘Abd al-Ḥafīẓ was faced by yet another revolt in favour of a member of the royal family, his brother Mawlāy Zayn al-‘Ābidīn, at Meknes in 1911. This was not a conspiracy of the great. The rising of the tribes in the region may have been more of an appeal to the sultan to remain true to the hopes he had once embodied. Besieged in Fez, however, ‘Abd al-Ḥafīẓ turned in alarm to the French. Fez was relieved by a French expedition mounted by those in favour of a quick military solution instead of diplomatic and financial pressure. The expedition provoked the landing of Spanish troops at Larache and the arrival of a German cruiser at Agadir, but as in 1905 the crisis was resolved in favour of the French. While Germany recognised the French claim to Morocco in return for concessions of territory in the Congo, a protectorate treaty on the Tunisian model was prepared for presentation to the sultan in March 1912.

The signing of the Treaty of Fez by ‘Abd al-Ḥafīẓ took place without the effective occupation of the country by the French. Mutiny and rioting in Fez were followed in May 1912 by a second siege of the city by well-armed tribesmen who showed considerable organisation and determination in their attack. This time the enemy was clearly the French, and although the attack was repulsed, the soldier Lyautey, appointed first French resident minister, spent an anxious summer. In August ‘Abd al-Ḥafīẓ was removed, with a huge pension and large estates as the price of his abdication, to make way for yet another relative as sultan. Marrakesh and the south were dominated as before by the lords of the High Atlas, who had done so much to bring ‘Abd al-Ḥafīẓ to power. The principal figure continued to be Madani el-Glaoui, who had made himself unpopular at Fez by the rough methods he had used as minister of war and grand vizier to force the tribes to submit, and who after his dismissal in 1911 had retired to the south to await events. He and his fellows were all inclined, despite their mutual jealousies, to ally with the new regime. Their calculations were only briefly upset when in that same month of August 1912 they were obliged to fall in with the leader of a holy

war. Al-Hayba (el-Hiba), son of Shaykh Mā' al-'Aynayn, led a mass invasion from the northern Sahara to sweep away the infidel and proclaim himself sultan.⁴ The movement was irresistible until the horde was massacred on 6 September in its assault upon an advancing French force. Al-Hayba fled, leaving the great caids to recover their authority as allies of the French, and Lyautey to begin the long task of reducing the country to order.

Al-Hayba continued to resist in the Sous and the northern Sahara, where for many years his father Mā' al-'Aynayn had ruled the tribes in their resistance to the French advances from the south into Mauritania. Mā' al-'Aynayn had blessed the Hafidiyya, the campaign to instal 'Abd al-Ḥafīz, and the jihad of his son was a logical consequence of its failure, an attempt to go still further with an onslaught to evict the French and establish a dynasty in place of the 'Alawites entirely. The episode demonstrates the traditional ability of the marabout or holy man of North African Islam to accumulate both wealth and power within the tribal society, and in the right circumstances to step across the gap between the man of saintly wisdom and the warlike ruler.⁵ Those circumstances were traditionally the collapse of the state and its authority. In similar circumstances in Libya, the tradition proved still more effective.

Libya

Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan had formed the Ottoman province of Libya since the fall of the Qaramanli dynasty in 1835. Since the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, however, the country had been regarded by Italy as her just due in North Africa. The arguments were those which had been employed immediately before the creation of the French protectorate to justify Italy's claim to Tunisia, namely the proximity of the country and the number of Italian residents, higher than that of other Europeans. As in Tunisia, Italian investment and settlement had been encouraged; Italians had begun to buy land and establish businesses with the aid of the Banco di Roma. Like the French in Morocco,

⁴ See chapter 4, p. 197.

⁵ Cf. M. Brett, 'Problems in the interpretation of the history of the Maghrib in the light of some recent publications', *Journal of African History*, 1972, 13, 3, 489–506.

however, occupation depended upon international consent. By 1902 this had been obtained, after years of diplomatic bargaining, from Britain and France on the one hand, and Germany and Austria on the other. As the ally of the Ottoman empire, Germany nevertheless remained reluctant to countenance the complete loss of Libya by the Turks. The situation changed only with the advent of the Young Turks in 1908. Suspicion then mounted that Germany and the Ottoman empire intended to halt the progress of Italian colonisation in favour of German settlement. In September 1911, in the midst of the Agadir crisis in Morocco, Italy declared war on the Ottoman empire, and in October invaded Libya.

The pretext was an alleged threat to Italian lives from Turkish policies. Resistance, however, was sharp. Turkish administration, enforced by the Turkish army, was accepted in the coastal cities as a lawful government, and particularly as a defence against the growing threat of European rule. In the vast interior, Turkish rule had steadily reduced the independence of tribal chiefs, though it had promoted their establishment among peoples who had hitherto largely dispensed with such authorities. Thus by the end of the nineteenth century, especially in Tripolitania, a native political élite had been constituted in the tribal population, organised on local family lines, but educated, sometimes in Europe or Egypt, and involved in the politics as well as in the administration of the Ottoman empire. In 1903, adherents of the Young Turks amongst its members had become deputies in the Ottoman parliament. The rivals whom they had defeated in this way in the competition for preferment welcomed the Italians as allies, but were outweighed by these government supporters, who with the assistance of the Ottoman army mobilised their peoples for war. In Cyrenaica, less well developed and more remote from Tripoli, the Ottomans received support from the powerful *Sanūsī* brotherhood of marabouts, who in this crisis feared the Italians more than they disliked the Europeanising policies of the Young Turks. After the initial occupation of Tripoli, Homs, Benghazi, Derna and Tobruk, therefore, the Italians were confined to these five ports until the Turks, under heavy pressure from the European powers to capitulate, consented to withdraw under the Treaty of Lausanne in October 1912. By this, they agreed first to grant Libya independence, then to acknowledge Italian

THE MAGHRIB



7 Libya, 1940

sovereignty, saving the authority of the sultan as the allegedly spiritual head of the Muslim population.

This ambiguous formula enabled the Libyan leaders to claim a formal legitimacy in their efforts to continue the war with the assistance of Turkish officers who stayed behind to help organise their resistance. While other Turkish agents vainly tried to assist al-Hayba in Morocco, these found an effective ally in Aḥmad al-Sharīf, the Sanūsī leader. Like Mā' al-'Aynayn and his son in southern Morocco, Aḥmad was in the first place a holy man. The Sanūsīyya was a Sufi brotherhood based on the *ṭarīqa* or way of its founder, a Moroccan whose studies had been in the Middle East, and who had settled in Cyrenaica in the 1840s. His sons and disciples were missionaries, engaged like the Wāhhābīs of Arabia

upon the propagation of the true faith in opposition to the spread of European influence in the lands of Islam. In Cyrenaica they were at the same time marabouts in the North African tradition of holy men within the tribal society of kin groups, large and small, which governed themselves by their alliances and enmities. The Sanūsiyya, like other marabouts, received land and other gifts from the beduin in return for their blessing and their arbitration in tribal disputes. By the 1890s the *ṣawāyā* (sing. *ṣāwiya*) or settlements of the order reached southwards from its headquarters in the oasis of Jaghub, with its large library and school, as far as Wadai and Darfur in the Sudan. These settlements marked the stages of a trade route across the Sahara which the Sanūsiyya had developed, and from which the brotherhood drew still further wealth. The route had been the means to a great extension of the brotherhood in the Central Sudan. From there, however, it had been driven by the French as they advanced rapidly eastwards in the years preceding the Italian invasion. As the French stamped out the order in the lands they had conquered, Aḥmad al-Sharīf returned northwards to the oases of Kufra and Jaghub to fight the new enemy.

The organisation, wealth and prestige of the Sanūsiyya gave it predominance over the pastoral and agricultural tribes of the Jabal Akhdar and the desert. Its doctrinal hostility to European influence brought it into armed conflict with European imperialism. When Aḥmad al-Sharīf laid claim to the whole of Ottoman Libya as the rightful emir in succession to the Turks, he was on the brink of the final transformation of the man of God into the man of power, a ruler. He was nevertheless distrusted in the coastal cities and in Tripolitania, the metropolitan province, as an outsider. The four main tribal leaders of Tripolitania, notably al-Barūnī in the Jabal Nafusa, resisted his intrusion. They were themselves unable to agree to cooperate, and following the Treaty of Lausanne began to make their peace with the Italians as the new power in the land. The Italians broke out of the five ports in 1913 to occupy the whole of the coast apart from the barren stretch around the Gulf of Syrtis.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

Morocco

By 1914 the pacification of Morocco was far from complete. The country was nevertheless divided in ways which put an end to the possibility of a national resistance. The sultan, upon whose recognition as the rightful ruler over a very wide area the sense of nationhood traditionally depended, was effectively controlled by a new monarch, the French resident, Marshal Lyautey. The public respect which he paid to the new Sultan Yūsuf (Youssef) and to the religion of Islam reassured the Moroccans, and turned traditional sentiment to the advantage of the French. Royal visits were arranged for the sultan to the principal cities of the kingdom and to France. Islam was honoured as a national religion, with the additional intention of discrediting the ideas of Islamic reform emanating from the Middle East as both foreign and objectionable. The leading families of the old regime were similarly favoured. Gestures of this kind satisfied the Fassi (al-Fāsiyūn), the merchants and scholars of Fez whose name was applied by extension to all those throughout Morocco who shared their manners and way of life. They found no great cause for offence and much for relief in the establishment and gradual extension of orderly government after years of confusion. Their business, whether it was concerned with the traditional exchange of goods between town and country, or with the import and export of commodities abroad, began once again to grow. Thus when Lyautey captured Taza in May 1914, to secure the route from Fez to the Algerian frontier, he found himself in relatively peaceful possession of what he called *le Maroc utile*, the main cities and the plains.

The remaining parts of the country were separated from each other. The northern region of the Rif and the Djebala in the hinterland of Tangier and the old Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla had been assigned to Spain under an agreement of November 1912 by which France honoured her undertaking to provide Spain with a share in the protectorate. This Spanish zone, which excluded Tangier, was much smaller than the Spanish had expected, and caused much bitterness. It was governed from Tetuan by a Spanish high commissioner acting in conjunction with a *khalīfa* or deputy of the sultan, and a cabinet of three

Moroccan ministers. The administration was in the hands of Moroccan caids supervised by Spanish district officers. But this regime remained embryonic, and the region stayed quiet from neglect. The only exception was the rebellion of al-Raysūnī, for many years the lord of the Djebala, who had hoped to be made *khalīfa*. Denied the appointment, he remained independent until forced by a more determined campaign to withdraw to a refuge at Tazerout in 1920.

In the far south, Spain was forced to be content with the enclave of Ifni, and the long coastal stretch of the Sahara known as the Rio de Oro. The desert itself was still dominated by al-Hayba and his brothers. Lyautey, without the resources to deal with al-Hayba himself, entrusted the defence of his southern frontier to his allies, the great caids of the High Atlas, el-Glaoui, el-Mtouggi and el-Goundafi. In May 1913 they drove al-Hayba from his base at Taroudant in the Sous, and established a precarious lordship over the valley. They were likewise employed in the south-east to contain the tribe of the Ait Atta in the Tafilelt after the defeat of a French expedition in 1918. Beyond the Tafilelt, which remained independent but isolated down to 1934, the region of the northern Sahara which Lyautey himself had conquered prior to 1905 was largely assigned to Algeria. The remainder was entrusted to yet another protégé, Mohammed Oufkir, who had risen to power since 1900 as an agent of the French.

The great caids of the High Atlas effectively relieved Lyautey of direct concern for the security and administration of the whole region centred upon Marrakesh. This delegation of authority began as an expedient. With the passage of time, however, it became a permanent feature of the regime, changing as it did so into the personal power of one man. Madani el-Glaoui remained head of the Glaoua until his death in 1918, when he was succeeded by his brother T'hami. T'hami, already pasha of Marrakesh and the warrior of the family, took over not only from his brother but from the rivals of the Glaoua, the Mtougga and Goundafa, as these lost favour with the French or were deserted by their clients. In 1922 he was defeated in an attempt to subdue the tribesmen of the eastern High Atlas, but by then his outstanding position was virtually secure. Throughout the rest of the period he ruled the region from Marrakesh despite the protests of French officials at the means by which he obtained obedience and wealth.

So far as Lyautey was concerned, he was able for ten years after 1913 to devote his slender resources to the pacification of the remaining area, that of the Middle Atlas, with an extension eastwards towards Algeria and northwards into the Rif. The most severe fighting was with the two great chiefs Moha ou Hammou of the Beni Zaïan and Moha ou Said of the Ait Ouirra, whose personal honour was at stake. However, the character of the resistance is illustrated by the fact that after their defeat in 1921–2 their sons succeeded them as notably loyal allies of the French. One by one the tribes surrendered to persuasion. The use of force was kept to a minimum. Detailed records of alliances and enmities between the various groups enabled the French to avoid provoking a united resistance. Instead, they isolated and dealt with each people in turn. Denial of some vital resource such as fields in the bottom of a valley or access to a market proved more effective than the fighting which might be required to satisfy the honour of the group concerned. Equally important were the inducements offered. The establishment of a military post in a newly-pacified district meant not only sacks of grain in exchange for the tribesmen's rifles, but the building of a new and attractive market. The benefits were not simply commercial. Particular groups and individuals could hope for political and social advantages from collaboration. As the French introduced caids into districts where they had never been known before, or simply recognised the representative of each group, the process apparent elsewhere in Morocco was extended into the mountains. Power, wealth and influence came to be dependent upon a special relationship with the new regime.

The mountainous regions, once pacified, were nevertheless kept separate. Morocco was a protectorate on the Tunisian model, in which the sultan in theory ruled with the advice of the resident, who in turn was responsible to the ministry of foreign affairs in Paris. Each of the sultan's caids acted with the help of a French official. The *caïdat*, however, was not everywhere employed in the creation of an effective administration for the entire country. Lyautey laid stress upon a fluid distinction between the *bled el-makhzen* and the *bled es-siba*, which in the pre-protectorate period loosely described the territory governed and taxed by the *makhzen* or state, and the land 'running free' which escaped such control. The distinction took no account of the many ways in which the

peoples who eluded the sultan's administration nevertheless looked to his authority, but it conformed well enough to the situation faced by the French in the early years of the protectorate. For them it expressed a fundamental difference between the Arabs of the cities and the plains, subject to the despotism of the traditional Islamic state, and the Berbers of the mountains, who governed themselves. Instead of the use of caids in the administration of such people, therefore, it was felt more appropriate to convert the *djemaa*, the assembly of village or tribal elders who laid down customary rules of behaviour, into a council responsible for the government of the locality. To this end, a *dahir* or decree presented by the resident to the sultan for signature was promulgated in 1914, and another in 1915.

The unifying factor was provided by the French themselves in the form of district officers appointed to supervise each administrative unit with its Moroccan personnel. These officers were taken initially from the army, but were quickly constituted into two separate services of *contrôleurs civils* in the more settled areas, and *officiers des affaires indigènes* in the remoter regions. Unlike the *contrôleurs civils* in either Tunisia or Morocco, the *officiers des affaires indigènes* were in command of the military forces in their districts. They enjoyed better pay than their civilian colleagues, although the same dedication and skills were required of both, a fact which was bad for morale in the system as a whole. While the administration was being created, however, the arrangement worked admirably. Throughout the First World War, deprived of all but the minimum of troops, Lyautey was able to continue the conquest. With the progressive organisation of government, he was in fact able to supply France with soldiers, workmen and grain, making a useful contribution to the war effort. A German attempt to start a rebellion in the Sous was defeated with the help of the caid el-Goundafi. The situation was somewhat more serious in the north, where the feeble Spanish presence in the Rif enabled the Algerian Abd el-Malek, none other than the son of France's great adversary 'Abd al-Qādir, to enjoy a brief career with the assistance of German agents. On the whole, however, the European war elicited active loyalty from Moroccans rather than attempts to prolong their resistance.

The progress of the protectorate was such that the French were able to make preparations for the extensive colonisation which in

their eyes continued to be essential to the development of North Africa. A *dahir* in 1913 provided, as in Tunisia, for the *immatriculation* or registration of land-ownership in the French fashion. The *dahir* of 1914 assimilated to the state domain the lands occupied by the so-called Guich (*jaysh*: army) tribes in return for military service to the old *makhzen*; the *dahir* of 1919 regulated the manner in which tribal land might be partitioned between its native occupants and the government for allocation to French settlers. In that same year, following the creation in 1916 of a Comité de colonisation, the Crédit agricole mutuel du Maroc was instituted as a service of the Banque d'État in the manner of Algeria and Tunisia. In 1920 appeared the first co-operatives. Although colonisation was still in its infancy, the facilities were available for post-war growth.

Algeria and Tunisia

In Algeria and Tunisia the First World War was an interruption. There were resemblances to Europe in that people who might have been expected to oppose the war did not. In Algeria, only the remote region of the Aures mountains revolted, in 1916, against the recruitment which produced about 173,000 Muslim soldiers and over 75,000 workmen for service in metropolitan France.⁶ In Tunisia the figure was 63,000; the country remained dissociated from the revolts in the Tunisian Sahara in 1915–16, which were connected with events in Libya. Again as in Europe, the end of the war brought disillusionment, as the men returned to the depressing reality of societies in which nothing seemed to have changed, except for the worse. The years immediately following the war were years of hardship for the majority, in which the idea of peacetime emigration to France in search of work took hold in Algeria.

The Europeans, conscripted as French citizens into the forces, were equally affected. Those same years after the war witnessed a crisis of confidence in French North Africa, the most striking feature of which was the sale of land in European possession, as settlers came back from the army to the prospect of making up

⁶ Cf. C.-R. Ageron, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, II (Paris, 1979), 261. 25,000 Muslims died; 72,000 were wounded; 22,000 Europeans died, out of 150,000 who enlisted. 10,500 Tunisians were killed or listed as missing.

for lost time on farms which were inherently difficult to make profitable. Between 1918 and 1921, Muslim buyers took 111,000 out of the 2,100,000 hectares of cultivable land owned by Europeans in Algeria in 1917. In the same period in Tunisia, Muslims and Italians purchased 80,000 hectares, or one-seventh of the land owned or occupied by French settlers.

This crisis of French confidence was partly occasioned by the prospect of Muslim political advancement. The military service of Muslim Algerians in the war was critical, for conscription had been an essential feature of proposals for greater equality before 1914. It was to have been the price paid for advancement. To Clemenceau the war record of the Muslim population seemed to justify the conclusion of the bargain. Muslims were to be taxed on the same footing as Europeans. In 1919 the Muslim electorate was enlarged to 100,000 for the Algerian assemblies and 400,000 for the local councils, while Muslim representation on these bodies was raised to a quarter in the case of the Conseil Supérieur and a third in the case of the municipalities. Muslim councillors were to participate in the election of mayors. These limited reforms, however, were passed in the teeth of settler opposition and did nothing to alter the basic relationship of the two communities. Citizenship had still to be applied for, while no provision was made for Muslims to share in elections to Paris. The loss of a great opportunity to put the relationship right has been regretted.⁷ Enfranchisement leading to complete assimilation would have been in accordance with French democracy. It continued to be advocated not only as right in itself, but as the only way to keep Algeria French. Imposed upon a largely unenthusiastic Muslim population as well as upon a hostile European community, it would certainly have altered the structure of politics, but without any guarantee of the outcome. As it was, it remained an unattained and probably unattainable ideal.

Tunisians looked, not to the European vogue for enfranchisement, but to the example of Egypt, where the end of the war brought the demand for independence. Their loyalty during the war, the speeches of Woodrow Wilson and the creation of the League of Nations all held out the prospect of a revision of the protectorate. In 1919 Shaykh Taalbi petitioned the American president in Rome before going to Paris to try to attract the

⁷ Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans*, 1226, 1237–9.

attention of the Peace Conference. There in November he published *La Tunisie martyre*, translated into French by the Paris representative of the Young Tunisians, Ahmed Sakka. The book looked back to the Tunisian constitution of 1861, and called for its restoration in more modern form in place of the offensive innovations of the protectorate. Early in 1920, on the basis of this demand, the party of the Young Tunisians was refounded as *Ḥizb al-Ḥurr al-Dustūrī* ('the party of constitutional freedom'), which became known simply as the Destour (constitution). In 1921 two eminent French jurists, Barthélemy and Weiss, gave their opinion that legally the government of the bey had remained constitutional in character since 1861, the imposition of the protectorate notwithstanding. The creation of the Destour upon this basis was a decisive step in the formation of a nationalist movement for national independence. Within the country, the new party immediately made its mark with its opposition to a proposal by the administration to make available for colonisation private *habous* — land established in Islamic law as the inalienable estate of a family which, in the course of time, might have died out, leaving the property to tenants at little or no rent. On this issue, the Destour recovered the support of the '*ulamā*'.

Yet the Destour was not the Wafd, nor Tunisia Egypt. The initial programme of virtual independence from France was reduced to a petition presented to the new resident Lucien Saint for a constitution within the scheme of the protectorate. Saint declared that such reforms were beyond his power under the treaties of 1881 and 1883, and merely agreed to lift the state of siege, which had been in force since 1911, and create a ministry of justice. The bey, in a brief incident, was obliged to draw back from the argument. The positive outcome, in 1922, was the creation of a Grand Conseil to replace the *Conférence Consultative* as a body representative of French and Tunisian opinion. But whereas more than half the 56 members in the French section were elected by their community, the 41 Tunisians in theirs were all to be nominated. There was little chance of opposition from such a body.

Libya

Libya came closest to gaining by the war. In 1914, Turkish officers and agents had returned to the country as allies of Germany to reopen hostilities. Since they regarded Britain as a more important enemy than Italy, however, in Cyrenaica they persuaded Aḥmad al-Sharīf, the head of the Sanūsiyya, to invade Egypt in November 1915. Defeated, he left the order and his position in Cyrenaica to his young cousin Muḥammad Idrīs, and retired to Istanbul. The Cyrenaicans nevertheless gained the support of Britain, anxious to reconcile them with the Italians for the sake of the war in Europe. Idrīs, who preferred his religious duties to his military and political authority, was willing to cooperate. The agreement of 'Akrama in 1917 allowed the Sanūsiyya to remain in the Egyptian oasis of Jaghub and to trade through the Egyptian port of Sallum, while recognising their authority in Cyrenaica outside the Italian towns along the coast. For their part, the Italians agreed to respect the *sharī'a* law for their Muslim subjects, and to exempt the Sanūsiyya from taxation. Although the Sanūsiyya undertook in return to disarm, the Italians in fact supplied them with more weapons to enable them to keep the peace by building up their power.

In Tripolitania the Turks supplied weapons to the tribal leadership through the port of Misurata, thus re-activating the resistance to the Italians, who withdrew to their coastal bases. Warlords in their respective territories, however, the Tripolitanian leaders quarrelled among themselves and with the Sanūsiyya, whose invasion of Tripolitania in 1916 they repulsed. By 1918, after years of exhausting conflict, it was too late for the independent republic proclaimed by the four main chiefs, al-Barūnī, al-Suwayḥilī, al-Murayyid and Ibn al-Khayr (Bilkhayr), with the assistance of the Egyptian nationalist 'Azzām Bey, to do more than negotiate with a similarly exhausted Italy. The outcome was the Fundamental Law for Tripolitania enacted in June 1919, and followed by the Fundamental Law for Cyrenaica in October. These, the first fruit of post-war liberalism, provided for Italian governors each assisted by a council and an elected assembly. The Tripolitanian republic accordingly reconstituted itself as a National Reform Party under 'Azzām and his associates to take advantage of the new situation. But since there was still no

agreement, either with the Italians on the ultimate status of the province, or among the Tripolitanian leaders themselves, it was impossible to force Italy to introduce the new constitution. 'Azzām therefore returned to the pre-war idea of a greater Libya under Sanūsī leadership, which would, he hoped, enjoy the support that Britain had already given to the Cyrenaicans.

In Cyrenaica, as the undisputed leader of the resistance, Idrīs was well placed to negotiate with Italy; there, moreover, the Italians were willing to act in good faith. The liberalism of the governor, Di Martino, aided by his Cyrenaican adviser 'Umar al-Kikhyā, was matched by Idrīs's desire for compromise. Idrīs accepted the Fundamental Law for Cyrenaica, and in the agreement of al-Rajma, in October 1920, consented to a formal definition of his position as emir of the oases of Jaghbub, Kufra, Jalu and Awjila only. The honours due to his rank, and the Italian subsidies for himself, his family, his shaykhs and his officials, were to be offset by the disbanding of the partisans and their organisation in the rest of the province. Power in the province as a whole was to be exercised through the Cyrenaican parliament, which first met in April 1921. In it, Sanūsī influence was assured by its president, Idrīs's cousin, Ṣāfī al-Dīn.

This promising arrangement, however, broke down over the refusal of the partisans to disband. Di Martino concluded the Bu Maryam agreement of November 1921, under which the groups of partisans were to be under joint Italian and Sanūsī control prior to their eventual dissolution. The agreement failed when shortly afterwards Di Martino died, and his successor turned against what he regarded as the appeasement of the Sanūsīyya. Meanwhile the Tripolitarians had at last been brought together by a distinguished exile now returned, Bashīr al-Sa'dawī, in the congress of Gharyan. Unable to obtain an answer from Rome to their request for implementation of the Fundamental Law for Tripolitania, the delegates to the congress invited Idrīs to accept the emirate of the province. Relations between the Sanūsīyya and the Italians deteriorated towards a renewal of the war. At the end of 1922, with the Fascists about to come to power with an aggressive colonial policy, Idrīs first accepted the Tripolitanian invitation, then withdrew into exile in Cairo. Ṣāfī al-Dīn became his deputy in Tripolitania, while in Cyrenaica his brother Muḥammad al-Riḍā exercised his religious authority, and Shaykh 'Umar al-Mukhtār

1922–1930

was sent back from Cairo to take command of the resistance. After more than ten years of mobilisation for a ruinous warfare, the scanty and impoverished population of Libya faced still further conflict and still further transformation.

1922–1930

*Colonisation and production*⁸

The Italian offensive in 1923, which drove the Libyan partisans away from the coast, revealed a fresh determination to achieve the original object of the conquest: to create an economic as well as an international asset in North Africa. Such a policy of agricultural settlement had been developed by the French as a fundamental feature of their regimes in Algeria and Tunisia. It was introduced into Tripolitania in 1922 following a French pattern, with a decree pronouncing uncultivated lands to be state property. By 1925, some 58,000 hectares were thereby added to the tiny state domain of some 9,000 hectares taken over from the Turks. Of these, some 32,000 hectares were allocated to Italian settlers on very favourable terms, by comparison with the 3,600 hectares previously disposed of. The land was mainly in the Jaffara plain between the Jabal Nafusa and the sea, dry pasture which could be made suitable for agriculture by investment in wells and pumps. From 1925 onwards the programme was incorporated into a general Fascist scheme for the population of the country by Italians. This began in earnest in 1928, when Libya, 'the Fourth Shore', was united under the government of Marshal Badoglio. Heavily subsidised, and on land procured for Italian use, settlement extended to the east as well as to the west of Tripoli. In Cyrenaica, its expansion was delayed by the continuation of the guerrilla war.

This renewed Italian determination not only to conquer but to colonise became identified with Fascist imperialism. In the 1920s, however, Italy was not alone in active colonisation. From 1922 the French in Tunisia also recovered their balance after the uncertainties of the post-war period. As a matter of urgency, the government returned to the policy of official colonisation, abandoned in 1914 just as more stringent regulations were being introduced to attract and keep small-scale settlers. The programme

⁸ The sources for the statistics cited here are discussed in the bibliographical essay for this chapter. A hectare = 2.47 acres (0.01 sq. km).

was revived with the aid of a fund from Paris of 33.5 m francs. Since the government was forced by the outcry led by the Destour and its allies to abandon its attempt to gain access to private *habous* land, little fresh land could be found for the purpose. Almost half of the 200,000 hectares made available were bought by the state from the larger European landlords, usually companies owning more land than they worked. The victims were the native occupants, who were evicted now that the land was required for use. The intention of the regime, to instal a numerous French population on the land, was not realised; the number of French farmers in 1914, 5,000, was barely maintained. The revolution was in the intensity of cultivation. Land officially colonised, and land privately owned by Europeans, some 850,000 hectares in all, was for the first time exploited in its entirety by European agriculture.

The result was particularly apparent in the production of wheat, especially soft wheat for the European market. With the yield per hectare rising by more than 40 per cent over the decade as the area under European cultivation expanded, the harvest in the late 1920s was, at about 3 million quintals a year, almost double the pre-war average, and wheat overtook the native barley as the principal cereal crop. The increase stemmed from the technique of dry-farming, which came into its own in the 1920s with the tractors to plough, harrow, sow and reap over a two-year period the extensive acreages required to make the effort worthwhile. The investment was considerable, calling not only for general banking services and government assistance, but for the specialised *Crédit foncier de Tunisie*, founded in 1906, the *Caisse mutuel de Crédit agricole*, founded in 1905, and the various co-operatives established from 1912 onwards. This was equally true of the vineyards, confined to the plains around Tunis, whose area nevertheless doubled in the period after the First World War to almost 40,000 hectares by 1930. Investment in olives, on the other hand, remained connected with the *bail à complant*, and developed so far as Europeans were concerned much more gradually on the basis of arrangements largely completed before the war. Oil production tended to increase as trees planted at the turn of the century matured; in 1929 the number of fruit-bearing trees was about two-thirds of the total of 15,600,000 cultivated.

The output of metallic ores levelled off, and in the case of lead and zinc somewhat declined. Phosphates, however, increased to

3,300,000 tons in 1930, a quarter of world production. To the railway system, substantially complete by 1914, was added the beginnings of a new road system in northern Tunisia, as the motor-car made its appearance in areas of European settlement.

Economically, Algeria followed a similar course. By 1930 the loss of European-owned land to Muslim buyers between 1918 and 1921 had been more than made good by fresh purchases, aided by legislation in 1928 designed to help turn collectively-owned tribal land into individual, marketable holdings. Cultivable land then in European possession amounted to 2,350,000 hectares. Given the growth of agriculture before the war, however, there were not the same opportunities to bring under-used land into full production. After the low yields of the early 1920s, the recovery of European agriculture, twice as productive per hectare as Muslim farming, did no more than restore the output of cereals to its pre-war level of two million tons a year by the end of the decade. The production of wine remained static at about nine million hectolitres a year. Moreover, as in Tunisia, the figures disguise the failure even to maintain the number of European proprietors. Those whose holdings were too small to allow economies of scale continued to sell to Muslim buyers or to European companies. The state, repurchasing land from these companies for redistribution to individual settlers, was quite unable to halt the process. In 1930, a mere 5,000 of the 26,000 European proprietors accounted for about four-fifths of the land which these owned. Only mining, a much less important sector, clearly progressed. Phosphates reached a peak of 900,000 tons in 1925, while the production of iron ore more than doubled, from one million tons in 1920 to 2.2 million in 1930.

It was left to Morocco, the country with the greatest natural riches and the last to be colonised, to show the greatest gains from what in 1920 was still almost the pre-colonial level. Benefiting from the experience of Algeria and Tunisia, the programme of official colonisation divided the lots of land for distribution into three categories: small — a few hectares for vegetables and fruit in the neighbourhood of towns; medium — from 150 to 500 hectares, primarily for cereals; and large — up to 3,000 hectares, for more distant and difficult country. By 1930, about 250,000 hectares had been distributed. Twice that amount had been acquired, mainly in the last ten years, for so-called private

colonisation attracted by the prospect of good land across the Algerian border and in the northern plains between Casablanca and Fez. Farming was predominantly for cereals, cultivated from the outset by mechanisation, and with the aid of strains newly developed for North Africa. Mainly thanks to this, by 1930 Moroccan cereal production was on the point of overtaking that of Algeria itself.

Mining developed equally rapidly with the exploitation of the deposits of phosphates inland from Casablanca and Safi by a public corporation, the Office Chérifien des Phosphates founded in 1920. Beginning at Khouribga in 1921, production approached two million tons within a decade and rivalled the qualitatively inferior Tunisian product on the world market. Lead, zinc and manganese began to be extracted in the eastern part of the country, near the Algerian frontier. Iron ore was mined chiefly in the Spanish zone, from which it was exported through Melilla. Production in 1925 was about 800,000 tons. As with the phosphate mines of Tunisia and some of the iron mines of Algeria, the advantage of Moroccan phosphates and Moroccan iron lay in good deposits easily accessible by opencast working and quarrying. Deep mining was comparatively less profitable.

So was mining in remote areas without good transport. As in Tunisia, the development of mining led to extensions of the railway system linking the major cities, which was built for the most part during this period. The cities themselves grew in size and number. Casablanca, the centre of economic activity, outstripped them all. Between 1920 and 1930 its population trebled to over 150,000, of whom a third were Europeans. Many of the latter came into the country from Algeria to take advantage of the new opportunities, part of an immigration which more than doubled the European population of French Morocco from about 80,000 in 1921 to over 170,000 in 1931.

Military and political repression

European settlement in both Libya and Morocco took place when the conquest of these countries was still far from complete. In Tripolitania the persistent disagreements of the leaders of the resistance prevented any effective opposition to the Italian advance in 1923. The partisans were dispersed by bombing; Bashīr

al-Sa'dawī left the country in 1924, while Ṣāfi al-Dīn retired to Jaghbub. In Cyrenaica the Sanūsī camps were attacked by surprise in March 1923, and many prisoners taken. Ajdabia, Idris's official capital, was seized, and all agreements with the Sanūsiyya denounced. But the return of the sixty-year-old 'Umar al-Mukhtār from Cairo was the beginning of a long guerrilla war in the Jabal Akhdar and the desert, in which for ten years the Italians ruled by day and the partisans by night. The war was only won from 1930 onwards, when Graziani collected the tribal population in concentration camps by the sea, and built a 300 km barbed-wire fence down the Egyptian frontier. Deprived of the people on whose sympathy they relied, and of supplies from Egypt, the guerrillas suffered a final blow when in September 1931 'Umar al-Mukhtār himself was captured and hanged.

In Morocco, the uninterrupted progress of pacification was rudely disturbed when the Spanish at last moved to occupy the mountains of the Rif, where they threatened with their favours to upset the tribal balance. Resistance first gathered around the *cadi* of Melilla, a scholar and shaykh of the Rifian tribe of the Beni Ouriaghel. Typically, however, it was the son who assumed the leadership of the jihad in place of the venerable father. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, better known as Abdelkrīm el Khatabi or al-Jatavi, had with his brother been educated in Spain and, like al-Barūnī for example in Tripolitania, was more than the traditional leader of a traditional confederation banded together against attack. With no real rival to contend with, his achievement against the Spaniards was certainly more spectacular than that of the Tripolitanian leaders against the Italians. In 1921 the rout of the Spanish army at Anoual gave him the mastery of the Rif. To conduct the war of religious and national liberation, a Republic of the Rif, with Abdelkrim as president, was proclaimed in 1922. Directed by a central government of various ministries, the *caids*, who were appointed one to each people, helped the continual mobilisation of the tribes in support of the small regular army of about 2,500 infantry and artillery. Possession of the ports of Nador and Zelouan near Melilla facilitated the private supply of arms and military instructors from Europe, and by 1924 the Spanish were confined to the coastal towns of Melilla, Ceuta, Arzila and Larache.

No official aid or recognition, however, was forthcoming from

any of the powers, who as in Tripolitania refused to take the claim to republican independence seriously. Eventually, therefore, Abdelkrim was left alone to face a massive attack by the Spanish and the French. The latter intervened when it seemed that Abdelkrim, already a popular hero, might become the leader of a countrywide movement for Moroccan liberation. In 1925 the Rifians advanced close to Fez. With his whole strategy thus called in question, Lyautey was relieved of his position as commander-in-chief, and in the New Year resigned as resident. On the advice of the expert scholar Robert Montagne, the offensive directed by Marshal Pétain was aimed at Abdelkrim's headquarters. As predicted, the surrender of the leader in May 1926 entailed the collapse of the confederation. Abdelkrim was deported to Réunion, in the Indian Ocean, and the Rif settled down to a collaboration with the European authorities which produced an army of Moroccans for the Spanish Civil War.

The result seemed to confirm that Abdelkrim had been no more than a tribal leader. Certainly it made clear that there would be no short cut to national independence. Nationalism as known in Tunisia, which had been a minor element in the Moroccan resistance prior to 1912, was left on the margin of a society which after its initial defeat had been persuaded to come to terms with the conquerors. The close alliance between the French and the traditional order which Lyautey had fostered encouraged a conservative resistance to the revolutionary ideas current in Europe and the Middle East, whose newspapers were not allowed into the country. In the 1920s the erosion of this complaisance by European settlement had only just begun. The failure of Abdelkrim restricted the nationalist opposition to a few young men from well-to-do families who were at variance with their elders in the matter. Some, educated in Paris, were Western in outlook, and were mostly found in the new capital, Rabat. Others at Fez had received an Islamic education under the influence of the *Salafiyya*, the movement for Islamic reform. These, represented notably by Allal al-Fassi, touched the protectorate more closely in that their call for religious revival was a direct attack upon the beliefs and practices of the influential Sufi brotherhoods in the country, whose leaders and chief members, like the *sharīf* of Ouezzane and T'hami el-Glaoui himself, were among the main supporters of the regime. The group at Fez was loosely associated

with those at Rabat, men like Ahmed Balafrej, Mohammed el-Ouezzani and Mohammed Lyazidi, in a so-called Reform Party, and more distantly with a group at Tetuan led by Abdelkhaleq Torres. The French thought of them, as they thought of the Young Algerians and Tunisians, as malcontents wanting jobs. Moroccans suspected them because they were young.

‘Muslim nationalism’ was a term employed by the French in Algeria to condemn all claims for political rights put forward or supported by *les indigènes*. In the controversy over Muslim representation in 1919–22, it was used especially of the demands made by the ‘emir’ Khaled, grandson of the great ‘Abd al-Qādir and a former officer in the army. His call for the naturalisation of all Algerian Muslims as French citizens, Islam notwithstanding, resembled the programme of the Young Tunisians rather than that of the Young Algerians, in that it was intended to enable Muslims not to be assimilated, but to keep their cultural identity as recognised equals of the French. In the elections of 1919–20 for the Algerian assemblies, it proved more popular with the Muslim voters than the proposals of the Young Algerians. Khaled’s candidates were elected to the municipal council of Algiers as well as to the territorial assemblies. But faced by growing opposition to their ‘nationalist’ demands, they were defeated in fresh elections in 1922–3. Khaled himself withdrew his candidature and in 1923 he left for Egypt. In 1924 he moved to France after the left-wing Cartel des Gauches had come into power there. However, the fact that Khaled was then taken up by the Communists lost him all sympathy among Socialists and liberals concerned with Muslim rights. He returned to Egypt where he died in 1936.

The Khaled affair helped to keep the concessions made to the Muslim population in 1919 to a minimum; the *code de l’indigénat* in particular was renewed at the insistence of a frightened European population. At the same time it marked the beginning of movements more hostile to France than the Young Algerians, who in close alliance with the French Socialists continued the campaign for assimilation. From 1925 the Salafiyya found an outlet in the journal *El-Mountaqid* produced by the scholar Ben Badis (Ibn Bādīs), followed by *El-Chihab*. Ben Badis and his associates stood for Islam and the Arabic language as the signs of an Algerian nation culturally if not politically independent of

France. The idea of political independence arose in connection with the new French Communist Party. On the one hand the Communist International included Algeria among colonial territories to be liberated. On the other, the Algerian branch of the party took the view that the separation of a Muslim Algeria from France would destroy the unity of the working class, one of the premises on which the French Socialists founded their Algerian policy of total assimilation. The Communist Party in France, strongly opposed to the Socialists, approached the question through the recruitment and organisation of some 100,000 North African workers in France. Their rights were defended by the Communist-dominated *Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire* (CGTU), whose activities extended to Algeria in competition with the more socialist *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT). Meanwhile an Algerian member of the Central Committee of the party, Hadj Ali Abdelkader, was involved in the creation in France in 1926 of an organisation and newspaper called the *Étoile Nord-Africaine*. By 1927–8, the *Étoile* had fallen under the control of Messali Hadj, for whom national independence, especially for his own country of Algeria, the home of most of the North African workers in France, took the place of the ambiguous attitude of French Communism.⁹ For this illegal aim, and for the incitement of workers to revolt, the *Étoile* was prohibited and dissolved in 1929. Messali Hadj and his followers went ‘underground’.

The conflict in France between Socialists and Communists had its repercussions also in Tunisia, where it helped to delay throughout the decade the development of a nationalist party with an extensive organisation in the country. In 1923 Taalbi left Tunisia for the Middle East, but the coming to power of the *Cartel des Gauches* in 1924 encouraged the remaining leaders of the *Destour*, Ahmed es-Safi and Salah Ferhat, to petition Paris for an assembly which should be both more representative and more powerful than the *Grand Conseil*, in accordance with the nine points of the programme presented at the beginning of 1921. Their campaign, however, was overtaken by the major strike of Tunisian workers at the end of the year. Labour unrest, with occasional violence, had resumed at Tunis immediately after the

⁹ The origins of the *Étoile* are a matter of dispute: cf. Ageron, *Histoire*, II, 349; M. Kaddache, *Histoire du nationalisme algérien, 1919–1951* (Algiers, 1980), I, 183–9.

war. The extension of French union activity into North Africa had led to the formation of a Tunisian section of the socialist CGT, which recruited both European and Tunisian workers. In October 1924, however, the *Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (CGTT) was formed with Communist approval by Mohammed Ali, a Tunisian returned from Germany. In December, dockers, cement workers and agricultural labourers in and around Tunis struck for recognition of the new union, forcibly opposing the continuation of work by European employees.

The resident, Lucien Saint, accused the Destour of conspiring with the Communists in the matter, in a bid for national independence. Obligated in this way to declare itself, the party showed that it was still an association of essentially moderate intellectuals from the upper classes of the capital, who hesitated to commit themselves to the radical populism which their political demands implied. Rejecting the resident's accusation, the Destour hastened to join with the Socialists in condemning the strike and calling for the dissolution of the CGTT. Its hope of obtaining a sympathetic hearing for its proposals for constitutional reform within the framework of the protectorate was nevertheless deceived. While the CGTT was dissolved in February 1925, and Muhammed Ali and certain Communists were tried and imprisoned, the French commission sent to Tunisia to study the possibility of reform recommended only minor changes. At the beginning of 1926, as Salah Ferhat drew the conclusion that only independence would serve, decrees prohibited any criticism of or activity against the protectorate on pain of fines, imprisonment and exile. Until the departure of Lucien Saint in 1929, the Destour remained incapable of overt action. More important, it had lost a great deal of its popularity.

Changes in the Muslim community

Good harvests in Algeria and Tunisia no doubt accounted for some of the peacefulness of French North Africa during the last years of the 1920s. Impoverishment was briefly disguised. The factors, however, remained constant. In Algeria the burden of taxation on the Muslim poor apparently remained the same despite the abolition of the *impôts arabes*.¹⁰ The Muslim population

¹⁰ C.-R. Ageron, *Politiques coloniales au Maghreb* (Paris, 1972), 231–48.

continued to increase, despite the mortality of the war and the years of influenza, famine and typhus, 1918–21: it numbered around four million at the beginning of the century, almost five million in 1921 and 5.6 million in 1931. Of these, about 550,000, rather more than half the number of adult males, owned land, but 70 per cent owned an average of four hectares each in a country where 12–20 hectares was considered the minimum needed to make a living; 23 per cent had just about enough.¹¹ The inadequacy of these tiny holdings appears from the total cereal production of the country which, despite the efforts of European agriculture and the recovery towards the end of the 1920s, was down by an average of 20 per cent from pre-war yields in the course of the decade. Agricultural wage labourers were no more than 160,000; the old-fashioned tenant sharecropper was vanishing. Many in the countryside had little or no employment. Vagrants were common; in bad years their numbers increased, and they became dangerous.

Dispossession coupled with a corresponding growth in population produced similar results in Tunisia and Morocco, if not to the same extent. In 1931 the Muslim population of Tunisia stood at 2,159,000, an increase of 270,000 during the previous ten years; of this increase, 200,000 was in the rural population. The area of land under native cultivation correspondingly increased to well over a million hectares sown for cereals, but with almost a third of the cultivable area in the north (the best land for the purpose) taken up by colonists, much of this increase was on land largely unsuitable for crops. For Morocco the collection of statistics was not yet satisfactory.¹² A growth in the area under cultivation may have been partly due to the end of feuding, which made it possible to venture farther from home. But certainly in the northern and western lowlands, tribesmen were induced to part with, or simply forced off, their usual territory. It was the pastoral tribes who were most affected as enclosures made their migrations increasingly difficult. Throughout North Africa the number of animals tended to fall, although nowhere so drastically as in Algeria, where the

¹¹ Ageron, *Histoire*, II, 294–5, 469–79, 507–15.

¹² Censuses in 1936 gave a figure of almost seven million for the native population of the French and Spanish zones, which may be too high but may well reflect a substantial increase since the beginning of the century. Cf. Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division), *Morocco*, II (1942), 32–9; J. Despois, *L'Afrique du Nord* (second edn., Paris, 1958), 185.

number of sheep, for example, had fallen from nine million before the war to five million by 1930. It was an aspect of that sedentarisation and settlement on marginal land which in Algeria was at its most extreme.

Little was done to help the peasant adapt. Credit made available by the state was tiny by comparison with that provided for European agriculture, despite some improvement. In Algeria, little was achieved by agricultural co-operative societies, first introduced in 1893. In Tunisia on the other hand, the co-operative societies created in 1907 were reinforced by a special office set up in 1925 to make government loans to native farmers. In 1928 these loans exceeded 8m francs (£70,000 at the current inflated rate of exchange). Land itself was distributed for settlement on a considerable scale, although in small lots of five to ten hectares, compared to those of hundreds of hectares for Europeans. Almost 200,000 hectares had been allocated in this way by 1930. Distributions of this kind in Morocco had scarcely begun; nevertheless provident societies multiplied from 1917. Farmers paid their contribution by law along with their basic tax, the *tertib*, and received in return a minimum of insurance against natural disaster, and access to small loans which reduced their dependence on usury.¹³ Once again, the Moroccan protectorate proceeded less inequitably than the regimes elsewhere.

Nevertheless, peasants were largely left to help themselves. From 1920 this increasingly meant migration. In Algeria, the denser areas of European settlement, like the Mitidja plain near Algiers, received an influx from the barren outskirts of the cultivable area. More and more people, however, found their way to the towns. In 1920 the urban population of Algeria and Tunisia was about 20 per cent of the whole, much less in Morocco. Up to half this percentage was accounted for by Europeans. By 1930 the percentages had increased, markedly so in Morocco. In ten years of population growth, even small increases of 2–3 per cent as in Tunisia meant a substantial rise in actual numbers, especially in the case of the Muslims. In Tunisia the number of Muslims in the towns went up by 70,000 from the post-war figure of 310,000. In Algeria the increase was over 100,000, to about 600,000. Still more important in Algeria was the number of young adult males who went outside the country altogether, up to 100,000 working

¹³ Cf. chapter 7, p. 377.

in France at any one time. About half came from the relatively well-populated region of Kabylia, which became heavily dependent upon their remittances to keep their extensive families still in place in the poverty-stricken countryside.

European resistance to this emigration had been undermined by the abolition of the need for Muslim travel permits in 1913, followed immediately by the recruitment of North Africans to work in France during the war; the 1924 requirement that emigrants should have guarantees of employment in France was rescinded as unlawful in 1926, following the protests of the Young Algerians in the Algerian assemblies and the Muslim press. The fear of Europeans was for the supply of cheap labour. Despite the growth of population, this was not a simple question of numbers, either in agriculture or in industry, but of the different requirements of employers and workers. J. Despois, who taught geography at the Sadiki College, argued that agricultural wages in Tunisia were driven up partly because nomads, traditionally available for seasonal chores, were now sedentarised and occupied with their own plots, and partly because of the money to be had in the towns. This was doubly bad because high wages made Tunisians disinclined to work more than part-time; they had not learnt to appreciate the long-term benefits of earning as much as possible by sustained effort. Mining suffered in the same way, especially in years of good harvests; labour had to be imported from Algeria and Libya. Still greater increases in population were needed to undermine this attitude, and provide a workforce of the right size and quality in industry as well as agriculture.¹⁴

Even in Algeria, that goal was still in the future. The attitude of which Despois complained was rooted in a basic need to remain at home, economically and socially, on the land, within the community. The workman left his land and his family in response to both need and opportunity, but as far as possible temporarily. Seasonal employment at harvest time was a familiar feature of the traditional economy, as was sharecropping to eke out an insufficient patrimony. The European economy imposed new constraints, which reduced the value of such traditional occupations. At the same time it created fresh activities which could fulfil the same purpose of contributing to an existing way of life. In Morocco, and even in Tunisia, the opportunities to supplement

¹⁴ J. Despois, *La Tunisie* (Paris, 1930), 144–6.

the family income might well outweigh the need to do so; in Algeria, the need was likely to outweigh the opportunity, obliging the workman to go as far as France for a job he might not find. The basic attitude to wage labour nevertheless endured, and while it might seem unsatisfactory to the European employer, in many cases it did provide him with workers of the quality desired.

The departure of young men to the towns in search of employment dated back to pre-colonial days, and was accelerated with the growth of the European city. The growing facility of transport by rail, by coastal shipping, and especially by road with the advent of the motor-vehicle from 1919 onwards, together with the expansion of the cash economy, made it both much easier to travel over long distances and to retain close links with home. For Europeans, therefore, the local labour market was swollen by immigrants with the same motivation as the people in the vicinity, but who were prepared, because they were far from home, to work steadily for two or three years at a time for as much as they could get from the one job. This willingness went with a tendency, likewise dating back to the pre-colonial period, for immigrants from a particular area to concentrate in one particular occupation which they would monopolise to their advantage. Europeans thus found themselves employing, through native foremen, groups of workers from an often remote region who were not only fairly satisfactory in themselves but who would, after completing their spell of work, arrange for an equally satisfactory replacement from their own people. This was especially apparent in Morocco, both in Casablanca and in the mines. In French North Africa as a whole, migrants originally constituted the bulk of the indigenous mine labour force, whose numbers rose to over 40,000 between the world wars. By the end of our period, however, migrants were in a minority, for permanent settlements with resident mine-workers grew up around the mines, for example at Khouribga and Louis-Gentil in Morocco, or Metlaoui and Redeyef in Tunisia.

The growth of the new mining towns shows how the migrant gradually turned into the permanent immigrant, without necessarily losing all connection with his homeland, and certainly without renouncing his membership of the community of immigrants from that homeland. This membership was essential, not merely for success, but often for survival in an urban situation. The traditional urban population clung to what remained of its

livelihood after the decline of the crafts and trades of the old *medinas*. Families of newcomers settled around the European as well as the native quarters. In small market towns, the problems of such growth were manageable, but in the big cities the rapid expansion of the slums quickly defeated the authorities. Not all could gain a living by working for Europeans, for industry was confined to building, public works and utilities, and the manufacture of cement and foodstuffs.

Instead, many of the new townsmen turned to trade. The hillmen of southern Tunisia made a modest living selling newspapers and cooked food on the streets of Tunis. But for many years the Ibadites of the Mزاب in the northern Sahara had been active in the retail trade of Algeria, especially in groceries and textiles, where they predominated. In Morocco, even before the pacification of the Sous, the Swasa or people of the Sous had come north, first of all into western Algeria, where at Oran they specialised in the grocery trade for the European market. Recruited as workers during the First World War, they became shopkeepers in the suburbs of Paris. In the northern cities of Morocco in the 1920s, they were on the way to dominance in the retail trade in foodstuffs, moving into tobacco, hardware, cafés, restaurants and small hotels, preparing to enter the wholesale business. In all these cases, the occupations were developed by men who came north in relays under the care of the older and more successful members of their communities.

For some there was real prosperity, as when the Mزابis and the Swasa accumulated capital in excess of what they needed to send back or invest at home. Others from the traditional bourgeoisie of the old cities had already made their fortune out of imported commodities, for example as wholesalers to the retail trade in town and country. In Morocco the Fassis, the merchants of Fez, had taken the opportunity to move into Casablanca, where their wealth and experience enabled them to patronise retailers like the Swasa until these in turn made good. The commodities they dealt in were basic, cereals for export, tea, sugar, coffee and fine fabrics for import. From the ports where their business was concentrated, dealers extended their operations inland. Alongside the Muslims were the Jews, who numbered in 1930 about 130,000 in Morocco, 110,000 in Algeria and 60,000 in Tunisia, some 2 per cent of the population of each country. Traditionally artisans and

small shopkeepers, most were now employees or self-employed workmen and craftsmen. The minority who had been merchants and moneylenders, however, whether or not they enjoyed French citizenship, had become strongly Europeanised, and were in competition with their Muslim counterparts in the same kind of enterprises.

For the Muslim population, nevertheless, affluence was still closely related to the land and its inhabitants. Moneylenders, landowners and officers of the regime, often the same people, enjoyed the tolerance and indeed patronage of the French. In turn they patronised the peasantry, to whom they offered a form of protection. This depended partly on the nature of the regime. In Algeria the presidents of the *djemaas* (native councils within the communes), the *aghas* (headmen) and the caids, whether elected or appointed, had limited authority and opportunity. In the two protectorates, however, the caids were theoretically in charge of their districts under French supervision. Responsibility for justice and taxation, without the possibility of revolt to restrain them, gave these officials wide powers, especially in Morocco. The two sons of the Middle Atlas chief Moha ou Hammou at Khenifra acquired a form of lordship over their charges, while el-Glaoui, the pasha of Marrakesh, was the virtual ruler of an empire in southern Morocco with revenues running into millions of francs (although his debts to French banks amounted to many more). With the caids went the marabouts or holy men, now generally favoured by the French after years of distrust as the representatives of a native Islam opposed to the revolutionary doctrines of the Middle East. Traditionally living off the gifts of their congregations, they owned property and dispensed patronage on a considerable scale, with Morocco once again providing the outstanding example in the *sharīf* of Ouezzane.

The upper classes formed by such people were basically drawn from old-established families which had adapted to French rule, increasingly supplemented by newcomers who seized the opportunity to take the place of those who failed to keep their position. Their success was measured in landownership. The Muslim community as a whole continued to lose land to the Europeans, often by expropriation or forced sale. Great landlords had disposed of their traditional estates, sometimes at a profit, more often at a loss, leaving their tenants to be evicted. Muslims

themselves, however, were in the market, buying from each other and from Europeans, among whom the turnover was quite fast. To the surviving domains of the old nobility, therefore, were added new estates in the countryside and in the towns, where at Salé for example impoverishment forced many families to part with their houses. In Morocco, the sultan was on his way to becoming the richest landowner in the French empire. In Tunisia, large profits were made from olive groves. Most striking were the figures from Algeria, where in 1931 about 43,000 proprietors, or 7 per cent of the Muslim total, occupied 42 per cent of the land in Muslim possession. Of these the great majority owned an average of 43 hectares each. But 7,000 had average holdings of 198 hectares, accounting for half the land belonging to the group. In eastern Algeria, older families were more prominent; in the west, '*enrichis*'. Some of these landlords were traditional, leaving the land to be cultivated by tenants in the old way. But many, with the advantage of property registered in French fashion, were turning to European modes of cultivation. If equipment and yields were far below the European standard, they were higher than the Muslim average, and much more so in terms of the produce marketed.

Meanwhile a class of professionals and some skilled workers was slowly forming, severely hampered by the European near-monopoly of professional, skilled, and even semi-skilled occupations. The necessary French education and training was best acquired privately or in France. State education was limited. Whereas the French in Algeria had the same system of education as in France, progressing through the *lycées* to the University of Algiers with its 2,000 students, in 1929 only 60,000 of the 900,000 Muslim children of school age attended the so-called auxiliary schools which in 1908 replaced the more ambitious 'native schools'. A few hundred only went on with scholarships to the French secondary schools, and a mere handful to the university. A Christian missionary education in secular subjects was available to the Berbers of Kabylia. In Morocco the dozen or so primary schools in Berber tribal areas emphasised French and Frenchness, while the thirty or more rural schools in Arab districts kept the teaching of French to a minimum. Results were all very poor, but the regime persisted at secondary school level with the two branches of the Collège Musulmane at Fez and Rabat, where

1922–1930

Arabic studies predominated, and the Berber College at Azrou, opened in 1929, where teaching was in French. Tunisia had the advantage of the Sadiki College. Despite the difficulty, the number of *francisants*, those at home with the language and culture of the ruling power, was nevertheless increasing at the expense of those who came up from the Koranic schools to the mosque universities of the Karaouiyyine (Qarawiyyīn) at Fez and the Zitouna at Tunis, and went on to the profession of Islamic law. In Morocco these received some official encouragement, but in Algeria in 1924 Ben Badis felt it necessary to found the first of his Arabic-language schools to provide Algerians with a proper education in their classical culture.

1930

The centenary of the capture of Algiers, 1930, was a year of French celebration. The expensive festivities in Algeria were accompanied by literature of varying value describing the French achievement in the Maghrib. One mild protest was the first edition of Ch.-A. Julien's *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord*, an attempt to reveal that Muslims also had a history of which to be proud. The *tribunaux répressifs*, set up early in the century to deal with Muslim offences as a threat to public security, were finally abolished. Europeans were alarmed by a bill presented in July 1931 to the French Senate by Maurice Viollette, who had been governor-general of Algeria in 1925–7. The bill proposed that selected Muslims, of good French culture, should be able to vote with the Europeans for the same candidates, instead of with the mass of the Muslim electorate for separate representatives. It was indeed a similar proposal that had caused Viollette to be dismissed. He now supported his bill with a book, *L'Algérie vivra-t-elle?*, which warned that without such a reform Algeria would be lost in twenty years. Its publication coincided with a collection of articles by Muslim *évolués* of the kind envisaged by Viollette, in which they argued the same case. The editor, Ferhat Abbas, and his colleague Bendjelloul had in 1927 created the Fédération des Élus Indigènes, elected representatives of the Muslim community who now concentrated on support for the Viollette project. The critical stage of the argument over assimilation had been reached.

One alternative became clearer when in that same year, 1931, Tewfik el-Madani published the first history of Algeria in Arabic.

He and twelve others grouped themselves under the leadership of Ben Badis into the Association des Oulémas réformateurs to promote the movement for Islamic reform, and to combat both the spread of French culture and the corruption of the Faith by the maraboutic allies of the regime.

In Tunisia the Destour was unable either to agitate or to seize the opportunity presented by renewed disturbances. In 1930, students of the Zitouna and the Sadiki College rioted in protest at the ostentatiously Christian character of the celebrations attending the holding of the Eucharistic Congress at Carthage, but this was an isolated incident. The affair of the *dahir* of May 1930 in Morocco was more serious. This so-called *dahir berbère*, obtained from the young Sultan Mohammed by the new resident, Lucien Saint, just arrived from Tunisia, was the last of a series dictated by the idea that the Berbers could and should be separated from the Arabs and *shari'a* law, to live in accordance with their own customs in a special relationship with the French. It therefore recognised the judicial competence of the *djemaas* or village assemblies, going on to create 'customary tribunals' to judge by local custom in all but criminal cases. Since local custom was different from the *shari'a* in these matters, although tolerated in practice by the Muslim scholars and judges who continued to handle civil cases under the protectorate, the effect was to make hard and fast a distinction which had previously been obscured. The *dahir* went on to remove criminal cases from the competence of the sultan, represented in these matters by the Haut tribunal chérifien created in 1918 to hear appeals from the judgements of pashas and caids, and to judge in all cases carrying a penalty of more than two years in prison. In Berber areas such cases were to be given directly to the French.

This attempt to regularise the colonial division of Morocco was well understood by the young nationalists of Rabat and Fez. Their agitation began at Salé, where the elderly *imāms*, the prayer leaders in the mosques, were persuaded to recite the *latīf*, the prayer for God's mercy in time of trouble, as a general protest against the Christian protectorate. Only as the recitations spread from city to city was specific mention made in the prayer of the separation of the Berbers from the *shari'a* law. By then a more important objective had been achieved: the winning of mass support, irrespective of generations and classes, for a nationalist cause. In

1930–1940

their appeal to Islamic tradition, the organisers were not unaware of the success of Gandhi in his association of a general strike with prayer and fasting. The campaign was taken up and given an international dimension by the Arab nationalist Chekib Arslan in Geneva. Within the country, at Fez, the crowds overflowed from the mosques onto the streets. A number of agitators, including el-Ouezzani, were arrested and flogged. The excitement over, it was left to a *dahir* of 1934 to restore criminal jurisdiction in Berber areas to the Haut tribunal. Meanwhile the groups of Rabat and Fez, ‘the Reform Party’, had constituted themselves into the Jamā’a al-Waṭaniya, the National Association, whose inner circle became known as the Zāwiya. This use of the word meaning a Sufi lodge was perhaps intended to deceive the police, but represented a popular image not too far from the reality of a partnership of initiates presiding over their followers. Like the Destour before them, however, they settled down to work for constitutional reform within the framework of the protectorate.

1930–1940

The depression and its economic consequences

The response of Moroccans to the agitation over the *dahir berbère* had economic roots. The comfort drawn from the establishment of law and order by the French was giving way as the disadvantages of European occupation began to be felt. Even those whose businesses had benefited were outclassed by European enterprise. This enterprise, moreover, had rendered the economy vulnerable. Trade had doubled during the 1920s. The increase was the result of European investment, public and private. At this early stage in the exploitation of the country’s hitherto untapped resources, such investment was still unrewarded. Instead, it financed a notable trade deficit. Imports were more than twice as high as exports. Prices had risen in consequence, standing six times higher in 1929 than in 1914. Moroccans who lacked credit were hit hard, and certainly could not afford any kind of failure. Three years of drought, culminating in 1930, corresponded to years of good harvests in Europe. The reduction in the production and export of cereals was a blow.

Unlike the rest of French North Africa, whose trade was protected by agreements with France, Morocco remained bound by the Act of Algeciras to admit all foreign goods at no more than 10 per cent *ad valorem*. While exports fell in 1930 to only half their value in the previous year, therefore, imports remained high, swollen by commodities 'dumped' by Japan in particular. Thereafter exports remained almost steady, with a minimum value of 600m francs in 1933. Imports on the other hand fell sharply, so that by 1935 the total value of foreign trade had been cut by half in six years. By 1940 it had grown again by little more than 10 per cent, its worth disguised by the devaluation of the franc. Except for the bumper year of 1934, cereal production remained below the level of 2 million tons attained in the 1920s, mainly because of North American supplies on the world market. Vegetables, citrus fruit and wine began to be exported, but still on a small scale. Phosphates likewise fell short of the 1929 peak of 1,880,000 tons, partly because of the fall in world demand, partly also because of agreements with Algeria and Tunisia to restrict output. As with cereals, the major crop, this failure of the major mineral could not be made good by modest success elsewhere. The production of manganese, lead, zinc and cobalt ores reached commercial proportions in the mid-1930s. Coal began to be produced from deposits near the Algerian frontier at the rate of 100,000 tons a year by 1939, enough to export to Algeria and France, and to supply the Moroccan railways. Spanish production of iron ore in the Rif reached well over a million tons a year, mainly for export to Germany.

Algeria, more closely connected to metropolitan France, was not seriously affected by the world depression until 1931 or 1932. Between then and 1935, however, the value of its foreign trade fell by 40 per cent, with a very modest recovery by 1940. Cereals faced the same problem of competition in France from North American grains, as well as from domestic French production in years of good harvests. Exports of fruit and vegetables, on the other hand, were at least as valuable as those of cereals, while exports of iron ore, after a disastrous fall from over 2 million tons to less than 500,000 in 1932, climbed to almost 3 million tons in 1938 as a result of British and German demand. What saved the country, however, was the continued export of wine to metro-

politan France, where it was valued for its high alcoholic content. At about 14 million hectolitres a year, wine accounted for as much as half the total value of Algerian exports and, despite a drastic reduction in the price, served to keep the country's foreign trade at three times the level of Morocco's.¹⁵

In Tunisia the export of phosphates dropped from almost 3 million tons in the late 1920s to less than 2 million in the 1930s. On the other hand the main agricultural exports, olive oil, grain and wine, maintained themselves despite wide seasonal fluctuations, partly because of the very high alcoholic content of the wine, which gave it a market in France in excess of the limited quota of 550,000 hectolitres a year admitted duty free. Indeed, first wheat and then oil reached new heights in the early 1930s, although the increase in quantity was offset by catastrophic falls in value of as much as 85 per cent. From 1936 onwards, with the exception of wine, the quantities exported fell back to the average of the early 1920s, but their value was somewhat restored by rising prices. The result by the end of the 1930s was that total Tunisian foreign trade, which was roughly the same size as that of Morocco, had fallen in value by about 40 per cent, a reduction comparable to that in Algeria.¹⁶

Throughout French North Africa the trade gap narrowed as imports suffered most from the depression; indeed, from 1935 Algeria had a favourable balance of trade. The new level of imports corresponded more nearly to the true earning power of the economy. At the same time it revealed the extent of the fall in purchasing power. This unprofitability on the part of economies

¹⁵ J.-P. Charnay, *La Vie musulmane en Algérie d'après la jurisprudence de la première moitié du XXe siècle* (Paris, 1965), 116-19; Ageron, *Histoire*, II, 480-2; 510. See above, p. 299; below, pp. 318-9.

¹⁶ External trade of North Africa, 1938 (in millions):

	francs			pesetas
	Algeria	Tunisia	French Morocco	Spanish Morocco
Imports	4,666	1,600	2,100	123
Exports	5,650	1,350	1,500	71

Sources: Great Britain, Admiralty handbooks: *Algeria*, II, 279; *Tunisia*, 548-9; *Morocco*, II, 224, 232. Comparisons with the values of previous years are complicated by fluctuations in the value of the franc and the peseta: in 1938 the French franc stood at less than half its value in 1930, after rising in 1935 to 165 per cent of the 1930 value.

created and sustained by credit called for still greater assistance. Regulations increased, to control and market the colonial product in sufficient quantities at an adequate price. Tunisian wine for example had been excluded from the customs union with France which was finally completed in 1928; nevertheless the quota allowed into France duty free was raised by 35 per cent. More comprehensive were the various *offices* for grain and oil created in Morocco, France and Algeria, and Tunisia, while general control was exercised in the two protectorates by the Office Chérifien de Contrôle et d'Exportation and the Office Tunisien de Standardisation. Work continued on capital projects planned or begun before the crisis. Road-building continued, and the rail link between Casablanca and Tunis was completed in 1931. Dam-building for electricity and irrigation went on in Morocco and Algeria; as a result, Algeria in particular showed a spectacular increase in the generation of electricity from 20m kwh in 1922 to 200m in 1937.

Credit itself was made available to a still greater extent, in the first place by the state, through the various institutions previously created to finance European agriculture. The funds came ultimately from the autonomous budget of each country. Meanwhile the French banking system as it operated in North Africa helped to raise loans for each government on the French money market, and provided advances to suitable clients. The banks themselves owned many of the most important concerns. In Tunisia, for example, mining was controlled by subsidiaries of the Banque de l'Union Parisienne and the Banque de Paris et du Pays-Bas. In Morocco, the Union Parisienne owned the large holding company Compagnie Générale du Maroc. Private capital meant that mining in particular remained subject to the fluctuations of the market, while state-funded agriculture was gradually stabilised. From 1935, however, the general effect of all these measures was a slow but steady improvement.

The price that was paid was the final failure of the policy that had governed the colonisation of all three French North African territories: the peopling of the countryside by numerous European settlers. Official colonisation, whereby the state made available to such settlers individual lots on favourable terms, was finally abandoned. Its ending meant that the perpetual loss of European

farmers to the towns, discouraged by the constant battle to maintain a European standard of living out of irregular yields and uncertain prices, was no longer even partly made good. Only those individuals and companies who could take advantage of the credit offered, and go on to enlarge their holdings to the size necessary to ensure an adequate return, were able to survive and prosper. In Algeria between 1930 and 1940 the number of European farms fell by only 800 to about 25,000. More revealing is the enormous drop in the number of Europeans employed on the land, whether as proprietors, tenants or wage-earners, from 35,000 in 1930 to perhaps no more than 20,000 in 1940. European villages were blighted; in 1935 at Malakoff, only eight colonists remained out of an original 36; at Fromentin, 12 out of 40; at Charon, 6 out of 68. Meanwhile the number of European farms with more than 100 hectares each increased by almost a thousand to 6,345, growing from less than three-quarters to over four-fifths of the area involved. Some were enormous, anything up to 10,000 hectares. They more than made good the loss of European land to Muslim buyers, enlarging still further the area in European possession. The Europeans themselves, however, were ever more closely concentrated in the cities, where their numbers rose from 673,000 in 1931 to 735,000 in 1936. Over half lived in the two great cities of Algiers and Oran, five-sixths in Algiers, Oran, Constantine, Bone, Philippeville and Sidi Bel Abbes. As yet there was no great industrial growth to support this constant increase; in this period it was mostly absorbed by the tertiary sector.

In Tunisia and French Morocco, where the colonised area was much smaller, some 850,000 hectares in each country, the results were similar. By 1934 in Tunisia, European properties were being sold at a tenth of their previous value to pay off accumulated debts. Loans from the new Caisse foncière, repayable at an interest rate of 7 per cent over fifteen years, enabled others to continue. Nevertheless the number of French proprietors fell to a mere 3,000. Italian owners numbered no more than a thousand as a result of the naturalisation law of 1921, coupled with the Fascist ban on Italian emigration. The total of 4,000 European proprietors for Tunisia was roughly the same as in Morocco, where the more thorough provisions for colonists lessened the gravity of the crisis. No further increase, however, took place in the European

rural population, only in that of the big cities.¹⁷ On the eve of the Second World War, it was clear that throughout French North Africa the large-scale enterprise had finally triumphed over the small in a European economy concentrated on the production of a few primary commodities for export. While this may have been essential to the survival of the colonial system, it could not and did not generate wealth spread evenly or adequately through the society as a whole.

The growth of nationalism

The French conquest of Morocco was completed in 1934 when the Ait Atta of the Anti-Atlas were defeated in the Djebel Saghro, and the Tafilelt was finally occupied in a campaign undertaken from Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania to put an end to the last elements of resistance in the north-western Sahara. It was an event of little significance to compare with the rapid rise of political opposition to the French in North Africa from 1930 onwards. Deprived of credit on the scale available to Europeans, Muslims were hard hit by the depression. Violence increased, with attacks on officials and tax-collectors in Algeria. No effective organisation existed to turn this misery to account. Those who suffered most were incapable of combining. No radical initiative was forthcoming from the leaders of Muslim society in the country, however they may have been affected; the wealthier continued to increase their possessions.¹⁸ The French Left was out of power; Muslim politicians and reformers lacked the representative character and the constitutional channels to pursue their case. They remained dependent upon the occasional issue and the favourable moment to make themselves heard. Agitation never-

¹⁷ European population of North Africa, 1936 (thousands):

	Algeria	Tunisia	French Morocco	Spanish Morocco	Tangier
Urban	735	153	160		
Total	946	213	206.5	44*	17

* There were also 120,000 in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

Sources: Great Britain: Admiralty handbooks, *Algeria*, II, 37; *Tunisia*, 187-203; *Morocco*, II, 32-119. The classification of the urban population of Algeria in 1936 was eccentric.

¹⁸ Cf. Ageron, *Histoire*, II, 509-10; above, pp. 311-12.

theless resumed during the 1930s, and came to present a more serious challenge to the authorities.

In 1932 the Jamā'a in Morocco renamed itself the Kutlat al-'Amal al-waṭanī (L'Action Nationale, or Marocaine). In Tunisia a new group within the Destour, consisting of the young Habib Bourguiba, Mahmoud Materi, Tahir Sfar and Bahri Guiga, began the publication of a new newspaper, *L'Action Tunisienne*. The group continued the association of nationalist with Islamic sentiment when it denied the right of Tunisians naturalised as French to be buried in a Muslim cemetery. Rioting compelled the government to create separate cemeteries for such people; meanwhile in 1933 *L'Action* was banned together with the Destour, and a new resident, Peyrouton, appointed to restore order. In Paris, Messali Hadj was imprisoned for an attempt to reconstitute the forbidden Étoile; in Algiers Ben Badis and his colleagues were denied the right to preach in the mosques. In Morocco, on the other hand, L'Action Marocaine organised the celebration of the anniversary of the sultan's accession, and in May 1934 welcomed the sultan to Fez with an anti-French demonstration. At the end of the year the party published and presented a *Plan de réformes marocaines* drawn up by the French-educated members of the group. The *plan* called upon France to act in accordance with the Treaty of Fez as a true protector, supervising the progress of Moroccans towards the responsible management of their own affairs.

The year 1934, when the government in Paris and throughout French North Africa was assailed by the demand of the European population for remedial action, was a critical one. The measures to rescue the European sector of the economy contrasted with the continued repression of manifestations of discontent on the part of the *indigènes*. At Constantine the increasingly frequent attacks on government officers in the region were followed in August by riots against the Jews, of whom 24 were killed. It was the signal for disturbances throughout the province. Bendjelloul and his fellow members of the Fédération des Élus Indigènes in the province endeavoured to minimise the affair, to moderate a European reaction which threatened the success of Viollette's proposals for constitutional reform. These ran into fierce opposition in the French Senate in March 1935 on the occasion of a fact-finding visit to Algeria by the minister of the interior,

Régnier, who came to the conclusion that there was no need for further substantial change. Instead, a law of 5 April 1935 was directed at all those who might incite the native population against the sovereignty, laws and officials of France.

The riots around Constantine had meanwhile led to violence in Tunisia, where the harvest was bad, and it was necessary to drive the hungry back from the towns into the countryside. Earlier in the year, the attempt of the moderate Chedly Kheirallah to create a party breaking away from the Destour to negotiate with the French authorities had been overtaken by the decisive action of Bourguiba and his associates, who at the party congress at Ksar Hellal in March 1934 seceded to found the Neo-Destour. With the support of French-educated intellectuals and a popular following in the towns and villages of the Sahel, the new movement left the old Destour to those of higher social standing whose uncompromising nationalism was Islamic and Arabic in inspiration. The Neo-Destour, by contrast, captured the programme of constitutional independence briefly put forward in 1920, together with the old popularity of the nationalist cause. It did so by flamboyant organisation, with processions and uniforms in the style of the populist movements of contemporary Europe. Peyrouton responded by arresting the leaders and redoubling the repression to end the strikes and riots which greeted these arrests.

Confrontation throughout the Maghrib with an intransigent French authority, however, was delayed by events in France. The advent in May 1936 of the left-wing Popular Front, under the premiership of Léon Blum, offered the prospect of sudden change.¹⁹ At last reorganised to recruit mainly from the Muslim population, the Algerian Communist Party joined with the Élus Indigènes, the Oulémas and the followers of Messali Hadj in the Premier Congrès Musulman at Algiers in June 1936 to agree upon a joint submission to Paris. Messali alone dissented from the *charte revendicative*, or list of demands, which emerged, demanding the assimilation of Algerian Muslims into the body of French citizens without prejudice to their religion, on the grounds that it denied the possibility of eventual independence. The *charte* was rejected by Blum. Instead, he gave his support to Viollette who, as minister of state without portfolio, put forward a bill to enfranchise some 21,000 *évolués* as citizens without prejudice to their *statut*

¹⁹ Cf. chapter 7, p. 386.

personnel. For most members of the Congrès Musulman, this bill took the place of the *charte* as their great hope.

For Tunisia and Morocco, Blum appointed Pierre Viénot, a former administrator under Lyautey, as secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the left-wing teacher Ch.-A. Julien became secretary of a committee for the coordination of Muslim affairs in all three territories. The appointments were welcomed in Tunisia, where the restrictions imposed by Peyrouton were lifted by a new governor. Bourguiba went to Paris to present to Viénot an invitation to France to prepare Tunisia for eventual independence. From Morocco went el-Ouezzani, expressing similar hopes. An immediate change was the removal of Peyrouton after only six months as resident in Morocco and the appointment of General Noguès, no sympathiser with nationalism, but nevertheless a man of the school of Lyautey.

Internationally, the moment coincided with French and British difficulties in Syria and Palestine. Correspondence with Chekib Arslan in Geneva had developed the sense of Arab nationalism even among the most *francisant* of the reformers. Nearer home were events in the Spanish zone of Morocco. Since the defeat of Abdelkrim the territory had been subjected to regular administration through military district officers (*interventores*). Without making promises, Spain had nevertheless favoured the notion of Moroccan independence as a counter to French predominance in the country as a whole. In July 1936, at the outset of his rebellion, Franco went further, promising complete autonomy for the territory. Nationalists were given freedom of speech and of the press, with the liberty to establish their own schools. Their leader, Abdelkhaleq Torres, became minister of *habous*. Moroccans in the French zone were urged over the radio to demand the same rights. The campaign quickly became a vehicle for German and Italian propaganda, introduced into the Spanish zone by Italian newspapers and German agents seeking to penetrate French North Africa.

Disciples of Chekib Arslan were involved in the Nazi and Fascist attempt to win support in the Arab world against Britain and France. Bourguiba had taken his ideas of party political organisation from the extreme Right. In Algeria the French Nazi movement, the Croix de Feu, resurrected as the Parti Socialiste Français and the Parti Populaire Français, attracted some support

from *évolués* for programmes of land reform and citizenship. Nothing, however, came of the excitement. When the Popular Front fell in June 1937, discussion of Viollette's bill in the Chamber of Deputies had been blocked by Algerian deputies, and it was finally defeated in the Senate in December 1938. Separate Muslim representation continued with little change. In Tunisia Viénot merely had time to criticise over the radio the defects of the protectorate. He refused to see the Moroccan delegation because of the peremptory tone of its demands.

Viollette's bill was the most direct attempt hitherto to alter the constitutional principle on which French Algeria was built. As in 1919, it is doubtful if such a measure could have committed even the Muslim élite at which it was aimed to the permanent integration of Algeria and France. Its failure nevertheless deprived the reformers, whatever their aims, of a focus. Messali Hadj, demanding universal suffrage and Algerian independence, was rejected by the majority at the second Congrès Musulman in July 1937. His Étoile Nord-Africaine, banned once again earlier in the year, had been transformed into the Parti du Peuple Algérien, a specifically Algerian nationalist party which offered its candidates to the Muslim electorate and at the same time took to the streets. For this activity in opposition to the legal status of the country, Messali and his lieutenants were imprisoned until 1939, and reinterned upon the outbreak of war.

Other groups quarrelled among themselves. The Socialists remained firmly for total assimilation. The Communists, anxious lest nationalism affect the struggle against fascism, spoke of the equality of all in an Algerian nation choosing to remain French. The Oulémas, accepting French nationality with reluctance, concentrated on the cultural identity of the Muslim population, although their teaching of Islam in the mosques and Arabic in the schools was severely hampered by French prohibitions. The Fédération des Élus split. In 1938 Bendjelloul created the Rassemblement Franco-Musulman Algérien to continue co-operation with the French Left. Ferhat Abbas on the other hand organised a Union Populaire Algérienne to appeal to the people with a programme which harked back to the 'emir' Khaled, for equality as Muslims, not simply as French. It was a programme which distinguished him from Messali Hadj and his call for a single assembly elected by universal suffrage, when in 1944 he came to

demand that emancipation should be on the existing basis of separate Muslim representation. The war, however, was necessary to bring such proposals back into politics.

Similar splits in the nationalist movements of Morocco and Tunisia led to violence and repression. In Morocco, el-Ouezzani formed his *Haraka al-qawmiyya* or *Mouvement Populaire*, leaving the majority of *L'Action Marocaine* to Allal al-Fassi and the more Islamic nationalists; both were distrusted by the Socialists and Communists as bourgeois, and in the case of Allal al-Fassi as clericalist. Allal al-Fassi, however, reconstituted *L'Action Marocaine* as *al-Hizb al-waṭanī*, *Le Parti National*, under his leadership, and exploited the excitement which began at Meknes in August 1937 with the rumour that the city's water supply was to be diverted to irrigate French land. Rioting in the main cities broke out in October, with many casualties, many arrests, and the subsequent deportation of al-Fassi to Gabon.

In Tunisia the appeal of Islamic nationalism centred on Shaykh Taalbi, who returned to the country in 1937 after 14 years abroad to resume contact with his old colleagues, now the leaders of the *Vieux-Destour*. In this case, however, the influence of his doctrine was on the side of moderation. Challenged by his threat to their hold over the nationalist movement, it was the radicals of the *Neo-Destour* who brought about the major conflict with the authorities. This was a year of strikes at mines and factories, and a number of deaths when the army opened fire. In the general indignation of Socialists, Communists and nationalists, Bourguiba separated himself from the Left when he encouraged the revival of the national CGTT, independent of the French trade-union movement, and aspiring to be the sole representative of native labour. He further separated himself from the moderates of his own party when he turned away from collaboration to confront the regime with militancy. A general strike in November was followed by a second in April 1938, culminating in a riot at Tunis for which the official figures were 22 demonstrators dead and more than 150 wounded. Bourguiba and 18 others were arrested, the *Neo-Destour* was dissolved, and severe restrictions placed upon meetings, assemblies and the press. Taalbi and the *Vieux-Destour* denounced their rivals, and looked forward to recovering their lost leadership of Tunisian nationalism.

North Africa on the eve of the Second World War

By 1939 the long transition from settler farming to capital-intensive agriculture in French North Africa was substantially complete. The development of fruit and vegetable growing for the French market was a promising ancillary, while phosphates, the main mineral, could expect to share in the recovery of world agriculture and world trade. It appeared that the European economy could look forward to a period of profitability in which the investments of previous years would begin to show a return. More than ever, the European community was concentrated in the big cities, with the prospect of industrial growth to compensate for the shrinkage of employment in the countryside. The problems created by the century-old attempt to install a large European population on the land had apparently been overcome.

In Libya the attempt was energetically renewed. Despite the enthusiasm of the 1920s, agricultural settlement had proceeded slowly by private enterprise or through the agency of companies like the *Azienda Tabacchi Italiani*. By 1933, although 75 per cent of the necessary capital had been lent by the state and the banks, there were still no more than 7,000 settlers in Tripolitania. With the end of the guerrilla war in Cyrenaica, the best agricultural land in the country became available by confiscation and appropriation; the first 150 families were installed in 1934. The coast road from the Tunisian to the Egyptian frontier was completed in 1937. Spectacular results, however, were only achieved with the assumption of direct control of settlement by the state, and the application of far greater funds. Under the direction of Italo Balbo, workers were brought from Italy to help prepare the land, sink wells and build houses in readiness for the arrival of 20,000 settlers in 1938 and a further 10,000 in 1939. By then the Italian population had risen from 50,000 to 90,000 in five years in a country now officially integrated into Italy. Although there may have been little prospect that the programme would solve what was thought to be the overpopulation of the Italian peninsula, the effect upon Libya was considerable. By 1940 the area of European farmland had reached about 370,000 hectares, extensively irrigated by wells and pumps. Eight million new trees and 17 million vines transformed the appearance of the coastal region. The problem of the economic size of the European farm, which had affected

the European settlement of Libya in the same way as in French North Africa, was for the moment suppressed.

The Muslim population of about a million was largely disregarded. Opposition to the Italians was centred on Cairo, where the *émigrés* gathered. In French North Africa the situation was more complicated. The French had always been able to rely upon a measure of complaisance and of active support for their regimes. For many, these regimes were a source of place, power, prestige and wealth; for others, they created the conditions under which wealth and standing might be obtained and enjoyed. This body of vested interest reached right down into the various communities through the patronage of relatives and clients; to it must be added the enthusiasm generated by the idea of France, permanently among many of the *évolués* or regular soldiers, sporadically among the population at large in emergencies like the outbreak of war. Yet such support was liable to erosion.

It was not, in the first place, efficiently mobilised. Tradition was respected, notably by Lyautey in Morocco, and democracy was severely restricted, to maintain a paternal authority and to keep any part played by the Muslim community in the affairs of government to a minimum. The organisation of opinion therefore fell to those, beginning with the most enthusiastic of the *évolués*, who were opposed either to the character or to the principle of French rule. By 1939 their different opinions had developed into policies and movements which already had long histories and close connections with the Middle East as well as metropolitan France. The continued refusal of the French to make concessions to their demands, and the repression of all agitation, had reduced them once again to inactivity. Neither they nor their doctrines, however, could be abolished in this way; the growing body of ideas and followings posed an increasing challenge to the colonial order.

The extent of popular support for this opposition was still uncertain. The leaders came from many different backgrounds, without necessarily representing particular groups or classes. Poverty, about which so much has been written in explanation of the growth of North African nationalism, was not in itself the cause of that nationalism, nor yet of its initial popularity. In Algeria, the misery of the depression led directly to violence; Messali Hadj, who enjoyed the largest following of any Muslim

Algerian leader, exploited the theme of want. Yet the wide following of the Parti du Peuple Algérien came in the first place from the *petite bourgeoisie* of tradesmen and craftsmen, not from the very poor. It was the economic discontent of people like these, in Tunisia and Morocco as well as in Algeria, which joined with the demands of organised labour for better pay and conditions. In the inter-war period, such discontent had lent its weight to nationalism rather than to Communism or Socialism, despite the great influence of the French movements. The main reason was Islam, which distinguished the populations by law, culture and tradition. The political appeal of religion, however, was not automatic. It required an effort of education to equate the profession of faith with support for a political programme. The most that can be said about the progress of this equation is that the emphasis upon Islam as a national creed developed as nationalism emerged and spread across the whole range of opposition to the French regimes, becoming as it did so increasingly populist in its appeal.

By 1939 it is probable that even in Morocco, where the Muslim authorities of the *makhzen* were both influential and aligned with the French, nationalist leaders working through nationalist parties could, if they had been allowed to operate constitutionally, have captured mass support. Their appeal to the people, however, was designed to bring sufficient pressure on the French for what was still a constitutional aim, the recognition by France of certain basic rights. The formula varied from party to party and country to country, but was in all cases a matter of democratic reform. Loyalty to France was still strong. In January, Tunisians welcomed the French president Daladier with a demonstration of support against the Italian threat to Tunisia, Djibouti and Corsica conjured up by the unilateral Italian denunciation in December 1938 of the Franco-Italian agreement of 1935.²⁰ At the outbreak of the Second World War, it seemed that France could still rely upon her North African subjects in a struggle with Germany.

²⁰ See above, p. 7, and below, p. 383, n.70.

CHAPTER 7

FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

The partition of Africa had left France in nominal possession of most of the region between the Sahara and the Congo river. It is likely, however, that well under half the population of this region had come under French rule, for the greater part of French territory consisted of desert or arid savanna. From 1904, the government-general of French West Africa, based on Dakar, provided a colonial form of federation for seven territories: Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Senegal and Niger, Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Guinea and a territory east of the river Niger which was still under military rule. This whole area was about nine times the size of France; the population was probably between 11 and 15 million. To the south-east, France ruled four territories: Gabon, Moyen-Congo, Ubangi-Shari and Chad; from 1908–10 these were brought under a federal government at Brazzaville and they were collectively known as French Equatorial Africa, with a population one-third to one-quarter that of its vast neighbour. A large part of French black Africa — wherever ‘pacification’ was in progress — remained under military authority; this applied to Mauritania until 1905 and to Chad until 1920. In the interior of each colony there were areas where penetration was either precarious or non-existent; this was the case in much of French Equatorial Africa, the arid Sahel, with its nomadic population, and the densely forested parts of the Ivory Coast. Such areas were slow to come under civil administration, if only because of shortage of personnel. The official gauge of administrative maturity was the regular payment of taxes. In theory, this had been introduced everywhere in West Africa between 1897 and 1899 and in Equatorial Africa in 1903; in fact it was for a long time limited to the coastal and urban regions.

1905–1914

Conquest and resistance

By 1908 the French had largely completed the conquest of their African domain. Even in Equatorial Africa, where the settlement of boundaries took longer, the 'march on Chad' signalled, after 1900, the end of the colonial share-out. 'Pacification', on the other hand, had by no means been achieved. For different reasons two large areas appear to have been particularly difficult to bring under control. One was the Sahel, comprising Mauritania, Upper Volta and Chad, where political and religious alignments, which were both autonomous and hierarchic, organised resistance based on the cohesive ideology of Islam. The other such zone was that of the forest, more or less mountainous and difficult to penetrate, where local minorities obstructed the unifying requirements of colonial rule. In both regions there was a series of resistance movements, suppressed over a period by operations which were both brutal and effective. The decisive years were from 1908 to 1912, with a widespread attempt at subjugation during 1911.

After the traumatic experience of Algeria, the colonial administrators regarded Islam as both attractive and formidable; it was useful for its rational organisation of hierarchic power but was a disturbingly potent focus for opposition. In 1914–16, affected partly by the war psychosis, the usual policy throughout the Sahel was to repress the upper class, which was thought to be dangerously anti-French, yet this was soon succeeded by a policy of alliance with the leaders. Ordinary people mounted their own, spontaneous resistance, in the form of local mahdisms and 'popular' jihads which, though little known, were a crucial feature of the period. Islamic authorities did not condemn conquest as such, but only conquest effected by non-Muslims. There were three possible rejoinders to the colonial challenge. There was the *hijra* or withdrawal to a safe place, generally in the mountains, in order to consolidate forces against the infidel. This could be a preliminary to the jihad, the conventional war of conversion proclaimed by a Muslim ruler and was the line taken in Mauritania. Finally there was *taqiyya* or prudence, which authorised the persecuted sects to negotiate a kind of 'internal exile'. This last policy was adopted by Hamalla at Nioro in the

Sahel, from 1908, and by Ahmadu Bamba on his return in 1912 to Djourbel, in Senegal, from exile in Mauritania: it marked the beginning of a period of co-operation with the government which in 1918 earned him the Legion of Honour in recognition of the success of his recruiting operations.

In Mauritania, the opposition of marabouts (holy men), beginning in 1905–6, gave cohesion to a resistance movement which swept the whole country as far as the Upper Niger. It was led by Shaykh Mā' al-'Aynayn, who rallied most of the Moorish tribes and, after proclaiming himself sultan, declared a holy war in 1909. The tribes' supplies of arms, which were apparently considerable, had been obtained by trade with German merchants. Moroccan support until 1911 and the rise of Mauritanian national feeling made retaliation difficult. From 1910 onwards the French were obliged to reverse their policy of alliances; instead of founding it on the great shaykhs of the Trarza, they made use of the internal dissension between warriors and marabouts. Henceforward the French entrusted police duties in the Sahara to the submissive warrior tribes, and distributed a wide range of presents, favours and authority to their own auxiliaries, a move which, incidentally, contributed to the distortion of traditional social values. Despite heavy losses due to harassment by opposing guerrilla forces, the strategy succeeded. The death of the shaykh in October 1910 left the movement without a leader. In 1912 resistance was reduced to isolated acts of 'social banditry' which were finally subdued by the drought of 1913.

In Niger the rising of the Tuareg of Aïr in 1916–17 was a late example of 'primary resistance' by peoples who had hitherto remained independent, and it involved a typical combination of ethnic, religious and socio-economic factors. The arrival of the French constituted an attack on both cultural and technical fronts. They had destroyed the trans-Saharan traffic, commandeered the camels and interfered with the unwritten laws which gave the Sultan of Agades his livelihood. Instead, they imposed a series of interpreter-intermediaries on whom the local people concentrated their hatred. In the drought of 1913–14, which was one of the worst ever known in the Sahel, claiming thousands of victims in middle Niger and killing livestock, French requisitions of millet were bitterly resented. The war in Europe weakened the French position and their isolated desert outposts were evacuated. In 1915



8 French West Africa, 1930

the tribes revolted, at the instigation of the marabouts. In spite of a setback, when black reserve forces made common cause with French troops, the end of 1916 brought together the Tuareg who were loyal to the Qādiriyya brotherhood and the Sanūsī force of the Targui of Damergou, who united in the three-month siege of the fort at Agades. The repression which followed was merciless and all the marabouts of Agades were beheaded. Nevertheless, raids and counter-raids continued until 1931 among the ruined oases of the north-eastern desert.

Elsewhere, however, there was in the end small reason for French apprehension. The great religious leaders knew that their liberty depended on their docility, which could also bring considerable material benefits. Among the Mande peoples, the marabouts, so recently warriors, now appeared anxious to exert a peaceful influence over the animist peoples. They proved effective and Islam made enormous progress. In middle Casamance, for example, the Diola of Foñni underwent a mass conversion, instigated by some powerful marabouts, many of whom, like Chelif Yunus of Wadai, were of foreign origin. Further up-river, in the Fulaadu country, the rise of the Sarakole marabout Suleyman Bayaga, who in 1908 undertook to build a mosque, aroused considerable opposition from the administration; he fled to the Gambia and was eventually pursued and killed. But this was an exception.

In 1908 the Mossi of the upper Volta region mounted their last major resistance. It was led by the marabout Alassane Moumani of Ramongo, who called on people both to be converted and to refuse to pay taxes. In the name of Islam, he succeeded in acting as a catalyst for malcontents of all classes, especially those leaders who, at the heart of this kingdom with its remarkable hierarchic structure, resented the erosion of their authority by the French. Two thousand armed men approached Wagadugu, but they were rapidly subdued; the marabout was killed and the subsidy of the Mossi ruler, the *mogho naba*, was reduced by a quarter. In 1914, a few months after war had broken out in Europe, the French believed they had uncovered a vast Muslim conspiracy. Most Muslim leaders in the upper Volta region were arrested and in 1915 heavy penalties were proclaimed for 'any anti-French propaganda or call to a Holy War'. Since nothing further was proved, there was a fairly rapid return to the policy of collaboration.

In Ubangi-Shari and Chad, the French regarded Islam primarily as a political instrument of power over subjugated animist peoples, and a policy of collaboration proved still more effective. In the upper Ubangi area the administration economised by relying on local sultans, who had previously wielded considerable military power and were now commercial agents of the concessionary companies. Further north, the Sanūsiyya gave the French rather more trouble. In a region which had been ravaged by slave-running brigands, the brotherhood controlling the great pilgrim highway had brought peace of a sort by promoting religious conversion and centralising political control. Direct confrontation came about in 1910 with the deportation of the sultan of Dar el-Kuti. Similarly in 1908 the French set out to conquer Wadai, which since the middle of the nineteenth century had been the most firmly unified state in this part of Africa. In 1909 they seized its capital, Abeshr (Abéché), and replaced the sultan by a prince turned bureaucrat who in turn was deposed in 1912. Thereafter the marabouts formed a centre of ideological resistance linked to the royal family, in a situation rendered unstable by the great famine of 1913–14 and by the First World War. In 1917 — the year of all-out recruitment for the war — the military authority reacted fiercely to the distribution of an Arabic propaganda leaflet. The four principal marabouts were arrested in November, but the ‘Senegalese’ troops, left to their own devices, massacred almost the entire upper class. The city of Abeshr was emptied of many of its people, including its intellectuals, who took refuge in the Sudan. However, the struggle against the Sanūsiyya was not over until 1931, when the Italians destroyed all their communities in Libya.

In non-Muslim areas the colonising power was obstructed by a variety of political units bent on preserving their own identity. This was most clearly demonstrated in the Ivory Coast. During the phase known — somewhat misleadingly — as ‘peaceful conquest’ (1903–7), colonial authority was extended very gradually by negotiation. But Governor Angoulvant (1908–18) initiated a deliberate programme of conquest, characterised by military operations on a grand scale. He implemented a decree of 1904 which provided for the deportation of leaders, the payment of collective war indemnity and the surrender of all firearms still retained by the people: between 1909 and 1915 more than 110,000

firearms were seized. When in 1910 Angoulvant's methods aroused violent controversy in France, he defended himself with a reference to Gallieni and the association between moral and military conquest. However this may be, the myth of 'peaceful conquest' must be demolished. Angoulvant was hardly an innovator in colonial warfare, apart from his readiness to extol the advantages of the 'short war'. By the eve of the First World War, the Ivory Coast had been almost wholly subjugated.

Elsewhere military intervention, if less spectacular, was equally persistent. Detailed local studies have shown that at the start of the twentieth century penetration was only just beginning. In the forests of lower Casamance, tax-collection began in the early 1900s, but there were still police operations in 1908 and not till the 1920s was it possible to move about freely in relative safety. However, these Diola resistance movements reflected local social structure and were never the expression of a people united in arms. The trouble-centres, numerous but sporadic, reacted spasmodically to all aggression of a political, economic or cultural kind. In south-eastern Dahomey, from 1905, the Hollidje, a cluster of 16 forest villages not far from Pobé, which was soon to be a railway terminus, repeatedly refused to pay taxes and resisted forced labour. Insurrection broke out in January 1914 and its suppression continued until June. The disarmament of the inhabitants, the doubling of the tax and the arrest of the leaders left the population as refractory as ever until the early 1920s.

'It is easy to forget,' noted an observer in 1905, 'that the Congo has never been conquered, that there has been no effective take-over of the vast territories of our colony.'¹ Thus there were persistent local and regional reactions, so that it is quite erroneous to talk of 'peaceful colonisation'.² Besides, there is a disturbing coincidence between the most unstable regions — Nyanga, upper Ngounia, Ibenga and Lobaye — and those where the concessionary companies or the administration committed acts of serious violence. Systematic campaigns of repression, which began in 1908, continued until 1911 and even until 1918. Subsequently, such 'primary resistance' was not to occur very often, except in

¹ 'Union Congolaise Française' to the Minister of Colonies, 28 March 1905, Archives nationales, Section Outre-Mer, Concessions 25 D (1).

² H. Ziegler, *Afrique équatoriale française* (Paris, 1952), 100; cf. *Cambridge history of Africa*, vi (1985), 312–14.

isolated areas not yet penetrated by the colonial administration, such as eastern Gabon in 1928–9. A local chief, Wongo, had been paying tax since 1923, but revolt was triggered off by the creation of obligatory markets in the region, which were charged with supplying the government outposts and which at the same time afforded a pretext for raising taxes and forced levies. In a zone characterised by a very diffuse power-structure, both the cohesion of the resistance movement and its duration was extraordinary: it required two years and several campaigns to bring it to a close.

With this belated exception, the regular collection of taxes, regarded as the criterion of true subjection, was virtually established in all areas by the start of the First World War.

The French administration

In French West Africa the basis for federal organisation was established in 1904 by the creation of a general budget financed by the revenue from all indirect taxes, particularly customs duties, and intended specifically to pay for public works. The governor-general had his seat at Dakar and was assisted by annual sessions of a consultative government council, composed of the secretary-general, the commander-in-chief of the forces, the attorney-general, the departmental heads of the civil service, the governors of the different colonies and several prominent personalities, both European and African, as nominated members. It was the governor-general who actually held all the power, though the resident Europeans, especially traders, who attended council meetings undoubtedly exerted influence on colonial policy. The governor-general was responsible solely to the minister of colonies, who appointed him and to whom he alone had access; he was beyond the control of the elected deputies and senators in the French parliament. In each colony the lieutenant-governor (later, governor) was likewise appointed by the minister. In Senegal, he was advised by an executive council consisting largely of officials; such councils were later introduced in other colonies. In French Equatorial Africa the commissioner-general (upgraded in 1908 to governor-general) was invested with supreme authority, both political and administrative, for all four territories; his consultative council was composed entirely of nominated mem-

bers. Locally, power was exercised by *commandants* of provinces.³ Nearly all, by now, had come from the École Coloniale which, since 1890, had been a symbol of imperial unity. Originally, in her eagerness to civilise and assimilate, France had intended to create a single government training-school, designed to produce officials who would be interchangeable and of universal suitability, capable of exercising the most varied functions throughout all the territories. Since, however, the school could not supply enough candidates for all the subordinate posts, the ‘employees and assistants for native affairs’ (later to be called ‘civil affairs’) continued for several years to be of miscellaneous and mainly local origin.

The personal characteristics of these colonial administrators are hard to define. Some of the officials who followed the first generation of explorers were distinguished successors to them. Especially eminent were Georges Bruel and Maurice Delafosse; the latter’s work (for long unequalled) on Upper Senegal–Niger and on translations of Arabic texts was reckoned among the most valuable contributions to the growth of African studies. Such researches, however, depended entirely on the personal qualities of the administrator, at a time when ‘the African’ was generally regarded as a big child, lazy and troublesome, whom it was necessary above all to subdue and discipline. Although straightforward adventurers and financially embarrassed younger sons became increasingly rare, most officials continued to be prompted by related psychological factors, such as a taste for authority, responsibility and danger, a need for independence and an appetite for discovery. Their common ideological aim was to raise Africans to the level of ‘civilisation’ by inculcating French social and cultural values, but with a view to efficiency and results. ‘From non-commissioned officer to Governor-General, colonial society is European in its devotion to progress, or to what it calls progress, and in its pride in controlling the means to it, be it the rifle or the railway, the lottery or the Order in Council.’⁴

Within his province, the administrator exercised total authority over several thousand people: he was at the same time head of government, judge, tax-collector and commissioner of police, and

³ This term is used here to refer to the major territorial subdivisions, variously called *cercles* or *circonscriptions*; these were often further divided into districts.

⁴ R. Delavignette, *Les Vrais Chefs de l’empire* (Paris, 1939), 35.

poor communications meant that he was largely independent of his superiors. His principal task, at least until the war, was to levy taxes. For several reasons the administration placed exceptional stress on this thankless task. Taxation regularly collected was the outward and visible sign of the 'pacification' of the territory. Besides, although the colonies were poor, it was necessary for them, according to the opinion of the day, to be self-supporting, and taxation was, along with customs duties, the only source of revenue. In Madagascar Gallieni extolled the 'educational function of taxation';⁵ in black Africa too the French saw it as the only method of compelling people to earn money, to produce for the market and enter the modern economy. Taxation was accordingly introduced in all territories between 1900 and 1910. When administrators were required to find money in areas which had scarcely begun to use it, they found it by forcible means: auxiliary troops sacked and terrorised villages, beat up or murdered recalcitrants and seized hostages; such excesses were especially rife in Equatorial Africa. Thus, even if the assessment of personal head tax did not in itself seem excessive, being between two and five francs a year before 1914 on a wage — if any — of about 20 to 50 francs a month, the imposition was remembered with particular revulsion. People became terrified of the *commandant*; they fled and they rebelled.

In these conditions it was difficult for the administrator to win people over by practising a consistent 'native policy'; ill-equipped and seldom kept in one post for more than two years, he improvised measures which his successor was likely to overturn. He was, however, the only one in a position to do anything at all. One of the few instruments put into his hands was the judicial function, which was gradually institutionalised. 'Native justice', strictly speaking, was based on customary practices, so far as they had been reconstructed and so far as they were compatible with French law. In the civil and commercial sphere, two jurisdictions existed side by side. From 1912, Africans could obtain French citizenship, but the high qualifications required put it beyond the reach of all but a few; besides, it imposed monogamy and military service.⁶ All other native Africans were French 'subjects', bound

⁵ Title of a circular of 30 November 1904, *Journal officiel de Madagascar*, 1904, 12045.

⁶ For details, see Lord Hailey, *An African survey. A study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara* (London, 1938), 199; for the special case of Senegal, see below, pp. 350–1, 360–1.

by African law and custom as administered by recognised courts. In the court of first instance, two African assessors assisted the administrator who served as president. For the court of second instance, at provincial level, the structure was identical, but Africans were included only in a consultative capacity. With each advance to a higher court, the European presence increased its impact. In the capital of the colony was the criminal or assize court, to which two European assessors were also attached, and in the court of appeal the president was assisted by two European administrators and two prominent Africans. Finally, at the federal level, the Supreme Native Court of Appeal included only two Africans.⁷

Beneath this theoretical framework of jurisdiction, the ordinary African was subject in the first place to the penal system for ‘natives’ (*indigénat*). From 1907 in French West Africa and 1909 in French Equatorial Africa, administrators had secured the unfettered right to inflict on ‘natives’ penalties not exceeding a fine of 100 francs and fifteen days’ imprisonment for such offences against colonial authority as ‘disorderly acts’, ‘seditious talk’ or refusal to pay taxes, forced contributions or requisitions. After the war, certain categories, such as ex-soldiers, the more important chiefs and selected *évolués* (Africans literate in French) were exempted from this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, until 1946 it rendered the administrator in office an almost absolute ruler, whose province was a personal fief inhabited by ‘his’ natives, ‘his’ guards, ‘his’ land-agent. Africans were left in no doubt: the true heir to the armed chief of the past was now the *commandant*, the white chief. Despite the personal courage and the undeniable goodwill of a great many administrators, the system inevitably led to the growth of abuses, so long as shortage of personnel prevented the official in authority from being effectively supported by technical experts in agriculture or public health, as was generally the case until 1920.

The early stages of economic growth

Colonial expansion was from the beginning sponsored in France only by a committed minority. Public opinion was generally

⁷ It also included a presiding magistrate, two counsellors and two administrators.

apprehensive of the risks of conquest; businessmen hesitated to risk their capital in a field which offered so little security; and in parliament there were annual attempts to reduce the colonial budget. Nevertheless, from about 1910, in spite of some violent indictments of colonial atrocities in Africa,⁸ no one any longer urged that colonies there should be abandoned. The exaltation of the national idea at the beginning of the century created an atmosphere in which everyone was disposed to see in the 'African epic' the opportunity for France to assert herself as a great power alongside Britain. At the same time, all agreed that the colonies should not cost the mother-country anything. From 1905 to 1914 the colonies accounted for between 5.7 and 7.8 per cent of France's total public expenditure, the maximum being in 1913. These percentages included military expenditure, which in black Africa represented 80 to 89 per cent of the total.⁹ Besides, the main burden was Algeria.

The main lines of economic strategy had been shaped by the 'colonial party', a parliamentary cross-section of diverse elements. It caused French Equatorial Africa to be given over to concession companies, but in French West Africa it promoted freedom of competition for private enterprise. This seeming paradox arose from the expectations of colonial pressure groups in relation to widely differing local interests and contexts.

After the scandals of 1905 in French Equatorial Africa,¹⁰ it was realised that the 'solution by means of concessions', based on commercial monopoly and coercion, was doomed. Yet for lack of legal means of intervention, the system remained intact until the First World War, and the only successful companies were precisely those which plundered most systematically. Over twelve years the Compagnie des Sultanats du Haut-Oubangui, with 14 million hectares, contributed as much to the state as all the others put together. Its output was modest (some 38 tons of rubber and 35 tons of ivory a year), but its profits reached 100 per cent and more. Such results were the fruit of a robber-economy operated by commercial companies which had made no investment and had

⁸ E.g. the pamphlet by Vigné d'Octon, *La Gloire du sabre* (Paris, 1900); Léon Bloy, *Le Sang des pauvres*, on the depravity of colonial customs; and criticisms by the socialist group around Pierre Mille, in *Les Cahiers de la quinzaine* (1905–1908).

⁹ F. Bobrie, 'Finances publiques et conquête coloniale: le coût budgétaire de l'expansion française entre 1850 et 1913', *Annales*, 1976, 31, 6, 1225–44.

¹⁰ See *Cambridge history of Africa*, vi (1985), 314–15.

1905-1914



9 French Equatorial Africa and Cameroun, 1939

consequently declared no amortisation nor ploughed back any of their funds. As a result, virtually all the profits were taken home every year to France and distributed to the shareholders. As soon as supplies of rubber and ivory ceased, the companies were able to halt their activities with minimum losses. In fact, some of these companies survived until the expiry of the monopolies (1925–30) or even later, and were able to negotiate terms for their surrender: in 1929 the Société du Haut-Ogooué, with 11 million hectares, received ‘by way of indemnity’ an area of 35,000 hectares which was not finally allocated until after the Second World War. The Compagnie Forestière Sangha-Oubangui, with 48 million hectares, had, since 1911, reorganised a dozen former concessions on the Congo and Ubangi-Shari boundaries. According to an inspector in 1913, ‘this powerful company has systematically neglected everything except for the collection of rubber’;¹¹ and although in 1925 it was still involved in the cruel abuses denounced by André Gide,¹² its monopoly was extended until 1935. French Equatorial Africa remained, indeed, the Cinderella of the empire; in 1920 the number of agents and of factories was smaller than it had been in 1905 and as yet no serious public works had been undertaken.

In French West Africa, on the other hand, business was booming. Exports were still, on the eve of the First World War, based half on the collection of produce (rubber from the Ivory Coast and Guinea, timber from the Ivory Coast, palm produce from Dahomey) and half on the cultivation of Senegalese groundnuts. The Compagnie Française de l’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO) and the Société Commerciale de l’Ouest-Africain (SCOA) began to dominate the market, together with other business firms, mainly Senegalese, such as Vezia or Peyrissac, which were active on the coast and along the rivers and railways. These firms obtained produce from peasants in exchange for poor-quality consumer goods. Although excesses were not as great as those committed in French Equatorial Africa, profits resulted more from favourable margins than from the volume of the traffic. A respectable ratio between profits and total turnover

¹¹ ‘Rapport général sur les compagnies concessionnaires’, 1913, Archives nationales, Section Outre-Mer, Concessions IV, 9.

¹² A. Gide, *Voyage au Congo: carnets de route* (Paris, 1927), 251; see also M. Homet, *Congo, terre de souffrances* (Paris, 1934), 253.

1905-1914




Fig. 5. Sources of capital investment: seven-year moving averages. Values shown in terms of 1914 francs (millions)

Source: *Travaux de la Recherche co-opérative sur programme*, 326, collated by C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, CNRS, Paris

was established (that of CFAO was about 1:13, supported in 1912-13 by profits of 40 per cent, a rate which was never attained again). Another result was the exceptional yield on shares, which began to attract investors in the metropolis to these colonial enterprises, reputed to give a handsome return precisely because they cost very little.

In West Africa, in contrast to Equatorial Africa, the French made a great effort in this period to organise an improved system for transporting collected produce. Taken as a whole, annual expenditure on public works fluctuated before the war between 30 m and 40 m francs, which was nearly ten times the total for Equatorial Africa and nearly three times that for Madagascar. Half this expenditure was met by the federation and represented a third of the total local colonial budgets.¹³ It was between 1902 and 1910 that the principal railway works were undertaken: the Senegal-Niger line, completed in 1905; the line parallel with the river from

¹³ C. Coquery-Vidrovitch *et al.*, 'Commerce, investissements et profits dans l'Outre-Mer français', unpublished Mss., CNRS, Paris.

Kayes to the junction at Thiès, which was not finished until 1924; the line from Guinea to the Niger (Conakry to Kankan), finished in 1914; the Ivory Coast railway from Abidjan to Bouaké (1904–12); and the line in Dahomey from Cotonou to Savé (1902–12); this last was the only one built by private enterprise (and it was bought out by the government in 1930). The high cost of construction and the advent of motor-lorries help to explain why the railway network was never unified. All the same, these railways caused a realignment of the great economic axes, involving the displacement and regrouping of populations. In the Futa Jalon, for example, Timbo, the *almami*'s capital, which was perched high on the plateau, lost almost all its inhabitants to the new valley station, Mamou, which was created in 1908 and by 1912 comprised 75 Europeans, 150 Syrians and 2,000 Africans.¹⁴ Meanwhile, in order to secure maritime outlets, major harbour works were undertaken. The port of Dakar was completed in 1910, and the wharf at Grand Bassam, taken over by the Ivory Coast government in 1907, was restored to working order in 1907–13, at the same time as were most of the secondary ports of call in the colony.

In Senegal, particularly in Sine-Saloum, this was the period when the groundnut economy, already well established, was launched on modern lines. Between 1904 and 1906 production rose to equal that of millet, and between 1906 and 1914 it increased from 100,000 tons to nearly 300,000 tons a year, though it still occupied only one-third of the cultivated area. The railway thus made possible an entirely new commercial substructure which subverted ancient trading practices and gradually imposed the monetary system, though the mechanised shelling and crushing of groundnuts was introduced only during the war. In the Ivory Coast, by contrast, African agriculture had hardly begun to contribute to exports by 1905. The territory provides an excellent example of the gradual diffusion of a hierarchical trading economy, in which from the beginning there was much alienation of land. Land was reserved for settlers by the decree of 1904, which declared all non-private land to be 'vacant and under no ownership' and that of 1906, which required that private ownership should be registered. From 1906 to 1924 only 61 African

¹⁴ J. Mangolte, 'Le Chemin de fer de Konakry au Niger (1890–1914)', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1968, 55, no. 198, 98–9.

properties were thus registered, representing a total of 150 hectares. Most villages felt themselves excluded from this 'new world'. Outside Grand Bassam there were few European traders, but every outpost attracted a business quarter, especially near the ports and railway stations, at the junctions of paths in active use, as at Tiassale and Zaranu, or in the ancient trading centres of the north, such as Bonduku and Buna. Around 1908 Governor Angoulvant recommended the creation of official markets: regularly stocked — and taxed — they favoured the organisation of regional networks which were already dominated by the major import–export firms. SCOA established itself in the Ivory Coast in 1908. In exchange for cloth, hardware and foodstuffs, such as salt, rice and tinned goods from Europe, the basic exports were still kola, timber, and rubber; the last represented more than half the total value of exports up to 1911. Produce from plantations remained marginal: 3,600 tons of cocoa and barely 100 tons of coffee as late as 1920. In 1912, collective rights of access to oil palms were restricted in favour of proprietary rights; this reinforced the privileged position of the *Société des huileries et plantations de Côte d'Ivoire*. Maison Verdier, on the other hand, which had become the *Compagnie française de Kong*, diversified its enterprises and the *Société française de Côte d'Ivoire* launched forestry projects in Sassandra. However, pre-colonial trading patterns persisted: Dyula and Yarse caravans came south to Bouaké and to Kumasi in the Gold Coast, with livestock and strips of cotton cloth, in exchange for kola, Hausa cloths and gold, which were subsequently resold in Mossi country.

Based on their networks of branch establishments, the European business firms also depended on African collaborators: the Dyula, Appolonian or Nzima pedlars who specialised in gathering supplies of latex rubber and timber, or Senegalese who had often arrived at the same time as the railway and stayed to work on their own account. Some African traders even set up local branches on the European pattern, but their resources were very meagre. Most entered the service of the overseas business houses, or simply held to their pre-colonial system, which was founded on bargaining rather than on credit and which suited the prevailing weakness of the monetary system. Nevertheless, from 1907 onwards, the columns of African troops acquired the habit of making their purchases in French coinage, while the porters were paid in cash.

After 1910 the administration began to refuse local money, such as cowries or lengths of copper, and from 1917 onwards taxes had to be paid in French currency. Even though exports, which were always of greater tonnage, continued to be notably inferior in value to imports, the cash economy steadily entrenched itself.

By and large, the economic exploitation of French Africa was still in its infancy. In 1914, imperial trade represented scarcely more than 10 per cent of France's trade, and of this black Africa and Madagascar accounted for less than 14 per cent. French investments in the empire were indeed a substantial proportion of all investments abroad (not far short of the 25 per cent invested in Russia), but of this sum black Africa accounted for less than 20 per cent. The African empire south of the Sahara cost very little, but it brought in practically nothing. After the collapse of the wild rubber market in 1911, the catastrophic drought of the year 1913 marked the beginning of a distressing cycle of poverty and famine, which was followed by the war.

'Native policy'

Despite the stereotyped antithesis between the 'indirect rule' of the British and the assimilating centralism of the French, the latter were much concerned at this period to obtain the collaboration of local chiefs. The underlying aim of French policy was to break down the cohesion of local communities by fostering individualism through the judicious distribution of rewards: many chiefs, Muslim and animist alike, allied themselves with the administration to the detriment of their subjects. Due to shortage of personnel, there was little direct administration. In Senegal, a decree of 1904 had supposedly ended the distinction between territories under direct government and protectorates, but the latter were maintained until the 1920s. Direct government was confined to the towns and the coastal areas from Dakar to St Louis, up to two kilometres inland, and scarcely extended more than one kilometre from the ports and railway stations. Elsewhere, Africans were subject to the *indigénat*, as enforced by the chiefs in charge of each of the cantons into which provinces were divided.

Colonial policy was pragmatic, in the sense that it was adapted to local conditions. Certainly there was a great temptation to

suppress the existing chiefs; on the other hand, the ruling families, already enjoying the authority due to their rank, were more ready to be of service than any other class. In any case, French attitudes varied. Sometimes both the title and office of a local ruler had faded out before their time, as in Bur Salum, Senegal, where the country was soon broken up into districts which were purely administrative. Not far away, however, in Sine, the chiefs were retained until 1963. In Futa Jalon (Guinea), the office of *almami* was suppressed in 1912, but the prestige of the great ruling families was maintained in the interest of the government. They retained, moreover, such officially discarded prerogatives as the right to own personal slaves; this was the source of their agricultural prosperity and their accustomed prestige, and it also helped them to meet demands for forced labour and conscription.

Where chieftainship had been destroyed, or had simply never existed, it was created by the French, much as the British created 'warrant chiefs' in southern Nigeria. In the Gurunsi country of the upper Volta, for example, the administrators managed, by the judicious choice of chiefs, to divide the territory into units corresponding more or less with the former state of affairs. It was the same in the Congo, where Governor-General Merlin admitted in 1909: 'It is impossible in the colonies to proceed by direct administration, that is to say, of the kind which needs no native intermediary. This means that it is necessary everywhere to implement a policy of co-operation with the native chiefs.'¹⁵ He accordingly recommended that influential families should be sought out, whom it 'would be sufficient to invest with a modicum of authority'. From 1916 onwards there was an attempt to institute a complete hierarchy of local leaders; this was tried first in the district of the Kongo, and from 1922 onwards extended throughout the colony. This hierarchy reached upwards from the village chief (who was liable to delegate some of his powers to the *capitas* or headman of hamlets) to the subdivisational chief, by way of the territorial chief and the tribal chief. This last chief, the only one to receive a salary, was responsible for transmitting orders and enforcing their execution. The territorial chief, who received a percentage of the collection of taxes on condition that

¹⁵ Circular dealing with the occupation of the colony, *Journal officiel AEF*, 1 August 1909; cf. R. Bafouétéla, 'La Politique indigène de la France au Moyen-Congo' (thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1974).

he kept the village chiefs satisfied in his own way, was in charge of compulsory labour, the compilation of taxation lists and the supervision of markets and agriculture. As for the village chief, he had to carry out on the spot a whole range of prescribed tasks. The same system was adopted in Cameroun, following on the German legacy. Here, however, there was little connection with the pre-colonial social structure, if only because of the different pattern of leadership: in Yaoundé province a thousand or so chiefs were subordinate to seven higher chiefs and some thirty chiefs of cantons, instituted in 1925; each canton comprised between 5,000 and 20,000 people.

Thus the hierarchy of chiefs gradually became an administrative mechanism. Indeed, even if the canton chief did not always correspond to a traditional office holder, the basis of his power, at any rate before 1914, tended to remain historical, though he no longer received either personal dues or revenues from his judicial duties. These were replaced by a salary and by rebates on taxation, providing an income which was seldom enough both to satisfy the chief's traditional dependants, such as retainers and medicine men, and to meet his new responsibilities: lodging administrators on tour, liaising with provincial headquarters, supporting a literate secretary and a petty militia. Aided by a strong-arm band which knew the country well and did not hesitate to hold villagers to ransom for their own gain, the canton chief thus continued to exact gifts, more or less under pressure. In this he had some colonial protection, though a hint of denunciation by a clerk or a needy business agent could cost him his office or even expose him to prison or deportation; it was well-known that the misappropriation of taxes or crops was very common. All the same, the chief was not simply a traitor, a collaborator in the misdeeds of colonisation. The village chief, in particular, was doomed to unpopularity: at the bottom of the scale, he had to satisfy all demands and had little freedom of manoeuvre. Revolts by chiefs, in the form of refusal to pay tax or to recruit conscripts, were not uncommon, especially in French Equatorial Africa, and some chiefs paid with their lives for their audacity or weakness. However, the administrator was usually inclined to cultivate the goodwill of his chiefs, who were both his executives and his principal sources of information. He tended to support them against their followers by making the *indigénat*

operate in their favour, even sending them detachments of police for purposes of repression.

A fundamental and lasting double standard was thus built into the position of chief. On the one hand he was exalted, as a sign of the respect shown to African 'customs' and institutions, which were reduced, or very nearly so, to the office of chief; on the other hand he was reminded that he owed his existence to the goodwill of the colonising power and could not hope to be anything but its tool. This was indeed the message of the famous circular issued in 1917 by Governor-General Van Vollenhoven, who insisted on a revaluation of the status of the chiefs: 'They have no personal power of any kind, for there are not two authorities in the province, the French and the native, but only one. Only the provincial *commandant* commands and he alone has responsibility. The native chief is only an instrument, an auxiliary.'¹⁶ Under a 'traditional' exterior, therefore, colonial rule both reinforced and distorted the part played by the chiefs, by suppressing the customary restraints on their powers and by creating new functions for them, such as tax-collection and the presidency of native courts. Some had been trained at the St Louis school for the sons of chiefs;¹⁷ such educated chiefs were no burden on France, which was skilled in making the people of a country bear the cost of subjecting their blood-brothers. In this process, chieftainship was deprived of the religious authority whereby, through links with the ancestors, it had preserved the customs and property of the village or the tribe. Thus administration through chiefs contributed more to the dismantling of the pre-colonial structure than to its renewal.

The skeletal French administration also depended very heavily on the co-operation of a mass of minor African employees — postmen, labourers, porters and foremen — whose numbers and impact have still to be assessed. They, perhaps even more than the 'traditional' chiefs, were the direct and effective collaborators with the colonising power. Many had received the necessary rudiments of education in the mission schools. However, the separation of church and state in France in 1905 dealt a severe

¹⁶ Circular of 15 August 1917, *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française*, December 1917, 1–2, 270.

¹⁷ This was seldom an institution in its own right; in 1903 it was absorbed by the teacher-training college at St Louis; from 1908 to 1922 it was part of the *medersa* there; and in 1927 it was annexed to a primary school.

blow to missionary teaching, especially that of Roman Catholics; the relative diversity of Protestant churches and their limited numbers gave greater scope for local initiative.¹⁸ Not only were subsidies to mission schools halted; various measures restricted their influence. In French West Africa, from 1910, preference for posts in the public service was given to former pupils of the state schools, and in 1914 a circular prohibited private schools from 'any new development' and enjoined on them respect for the official education programme and use of the French language.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the state system of education, which was organised in French West Africa from 1903, did not develop without opposition. By 1910, it accounted for only 11,500 schoolchildren. The aim of state schools was openly utilitarian; as instruments of propaganda for the French cause and language, it was the schools' duty to train the auxiliaries of colonial rule: 'To teach the native to speak our language, to read it, to write it, to inculcate in him some rudiments of arithmetic with some ideas of morality, that is enough for the present.'²⁰ The 1914 programme is eloquent in this respect: 'Intermediate course: origins of French power, geographical advantages, racial characteristics, great generals, statesmen, intellectuals, artists. The colonising and civilising genius of the French, the great epochs of their history.'²¹

As for the middle ranks of African employees, they mostly came from the teacher-training college which was founded at St Louis in 1903, moved to Gorée island in 1913 and was renamed the William Ponty School in 1915.²² Indeed, only Senegal could boast a true élite, originally derived from the Creole society of St Louis and Gorée and extended at the end of the nineteenth century to Rufisque and Dakar. All *originaires* (Africans born in one of these four *communes*) could vote in the election of a local deputy to the French National Assembly, and also in elections to the General Council of Senegal (which exercised limited powers of taxation

¹⁸ See chapter 3, p. 160.

¹⁹ But the circular of 1914 laid down no sanction and teachers already appointed could be retained (decree of 1 August 1922).

²⁰ Governor-General William Ponty, speech of 1908, cited by D. Bouche, 'Autrefois, notre pays s'appelait la Gaule', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1968, 8, 110–22.

²¹ *Journal officiel*, Dahomey, July 1914.

²² In 1934 the school was moved to Sebikhotane, outside Dakar. From 1903 to 1907 the École Faidherbe, at St Louis, provided commercial training; in 1916 it was revived on Gorée, for administrative training as well, and in 1921 it was absorbed by the William Ponty School.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

and legislation over the four communes). Although this electorate was usually manipulated by the European settlers in alliance with Creole political circles, the first mulatto deputy, François Carpot, was elected in 1902 and in 1914 the first black deputy, Blaise Diagne, a former customs officer. This growth of African political self-assertion symbolised the willingness of the 'emancipated' to collaborate with the colonial power, but it was also the sign of a break in the traditional alliance between the *originaires* and the white colonial circles who were losing the privilege of representing them. This rupture was due less to the black élite, which long pursued its dream of assimilation through citizenship, than to the diminutive white minority, imprisoned by its belief in its own racial, religious and economic superiority.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Operations

On 3 August 1914 Germany declared war on France; the next day, Britain declared war on Germany. The German colonies in West Africa, now surrounded by hostile territory, were ill-prepared for external attack.²³ In Togo, the conflict was soon over. The Germans quickly withdrew their small defence force from the coast and made for their strategic radio station at Kamina. On 8 August British forces entered Lomé unopposed, while a French detachment from Dahomey had already occupied Anecho, Porto Seguro and Togoville. The Allies joined forces and set off northwards; they met fierce resistance at the Khra river but on 25 August the Germans surrendered at Kamina. Within a week, the French and British commanders had agreed on a division of Togo for purposes of military administration. In Kamerun, operations were much more protracted. Here, France nourished a grievance. In 1911 she had secured German recognition of French claims in Morocco only at the cost of ceding much territory to Kamerun, including salients to the Congo and Ubangi rivers which divided French Equatorial Africa into three separate blocks. In August 1914 French forces promptly began to reoccupy 'New Kamerun' from the Sangha and Ubangi, and in September a Franco-British force seized Duala. The German

²³ See also below, p. 422.

force, heavily outnumbered, withdrew to Yaoundé on the central plateau, but the Allies were now checked by rivers, dense forest and rains; their supply lines were sorely stretched and they suffered severely from disease. In mid-1915 French columns resumed their advance from the east, while the British pressed on from the north and west. With the German retreat to Spanish Guinea in February 1916 the campaign was concluded. On the French side, 474 black troops and 41 white officers were killed in action, while disease and malnutrition caused heavy losses among the thousands of porters conscripted for war service. In March 1916 France and Britain divided the former Kamerun, though the French had earlier suggested a condominium and still hoped for a comprehensive re-partition of West Africa. The British gave up Duala, which they had occupied since 1914, but retained Bornu, in the far north, along with plantations in the north and west. France took the rest, now called Cameroun, and in 1917 placed it under the governor-general of French Equatorial Africa.

It was not in Cameroun but in Europe that the war made its main impact on French black Africa; the whole region became a reservoir of men for the Western Front. The potential value of black troops had recently been argued by General Mangin, in face of sceptical colleagues, and in 1912, after Mangin's African tour, four-year conscription was authorised in French West Africa in order to strengthen France's own reserves as the threat of war increased. The scheme was far from popular, and when war broke out there were less than 15,000 African troops in French West Africa. By November 1917, however, it had sent 90,000 men to France, of whom 50,000 went in October 1916. This drain of manpower was bitterly resented by Governor-General Van Vollenhoven, who declared in September 1917: 'The colony has reached the limit of what can possibly be done; perhaps this limit has even been surpassed.'²⁴ New measures in November 1917 raised 72,000 men, including, for the first time, 10,000 from French Equatorial Africa. Altogether black Africa supplied 167,000 soldiers, 140,000 of whom arrived in Europe, compared with 236,000 from the Maghrib.²⁵ More than 30,000 black

²⁴ Governor-General Van Vollenhoven to the Minister of Colonies, Archives nationales, Section Outre-Mer, 25 September 1917. *Affaires politiques*, 533 (2).

²⁵ The exact recruitment figures for each colony are given by Marc Michel, 'Le Recrutement des tirailleurs en AOF pendant la première guerre mondiale; essai de bilan statistique', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1973, 60, no. 221, 644-60.

Africans died on European battlefields; this was about 22 per cent of the total effective black African forces or similar to the mortality rate of white troops, but it was 30 per cent of those black troops who had been in action.²⁶

Participation in the war effort was used by the African élite to extract political concessions. The extension of conscription to the four communes of Senegal in 1915 was followed in 1916 by the recognition of the right to French citizenship of *originaires*, and the call-up in 1918 was conducted by Blaise Diagne, who was made a commissioner of the republic and promised a 'package of reforms':²⁷ ex-soldiers were to obtain exemption from forced labour and from the *indigénat*. In general, however, recruitment was a most alarming prospect despite a bonus scheme introduced at the end of 1915. From the first, Africans offered widespread resistance: they fled into the bush or out of the country, and many conscripts deserted. District chiefs had to use force and village chiefs were ingenious in producing sick men and slaves. Some villages made collective purchases of slaves to enable their young men to escape conscription. Thirty-five thousand Senegalese took refuge in the Gambia and in Portuguese Guinea; in Futa Jalon, where desertions ranged between 5 and 23 per cent, there was considerable emigration to Sierra Leone and Liberia. Whole districts were emptied and others were reduced to half their numbers. French forces retaliated by making villages collectively responsible and by hunting down fugitives. In French West Africa there were three stubborn revolts: in February 1915, north of Bamako, among the Bambara of the BéléDougou; in November 1915 in the western Volta region; and in April 1916 in northern Dahomey. These popular revolts were predominantly animist and prompted by the desire to preserve the independence of segmentary societies from all state and external tutelage. In 1918 recruitment was more successful, due to a psychological strategy which relied heavily on traditional leaders; even so, many people fled into the bush.

²⁶ On the whole of this subject the author is deeply indebted to Marc Michel, *L'Appel à l'Afrique. Contributions et réactions à l'effort de guerre en AOF 1914-1919* (Paris, 1982).

²⁷ G. Wesley Johnson, *The emergence of black politics in Senegal: the struggle for power in the four communes, 1900-1920* (Stanford, 1971), ch. 10.

The war effort: economic problems

In 1914 a spokesman for the colonial trade lobby deplored the production of France's colonies as 'wretched indeed for so vast a colonial empire and so rich a mother-country'.²⁸ The government did not at first even consider that the empire might make an economic contribution to the war effort. It was only in November 1915 that the 'Service d'utilisation des produits coloniaux pour la défense nationale' was created, and in December 1916 that governors were ordered to encourage the production of foodstuffs for supplying colonial troops in France. Finally, in June 1917, following on a wheat crisis and a fall in sugar production, the idea of 'full development' was asserted at a colonial conference. This was attended by representatives of the colonial administration and by private colonial interests; it was jointly directed by a businessman, du Vivier de Streel, and the minister of colonies, Maginot, who declared: 'To obtain from our splendid colonial empire the yield that we should normally extract from it, we have to do ten times, twenty times more than we have done until now.'²⁹ In May 1918 a congress of colonial agriculture, with similar membership, sought not only to remedy the current crisis, but to secure for post-war France 'a powerful economic revival'. But there was an obvious contradiction between the vast effort required and the diminishing means to achieve it, as men continued to be slaughtered at the Front, while France reduced subsidies to colonial budgets. In West Africa, the contradiction provoked the resignation in January 1918 of Van Vollenhoven, who demanded to know how West Africa could send 400,000 tons of groundnuts to France while its villages were depopulated.³⁰

The administration had the co-operation of the import-export firms in securing purchases of so-called strategic produce — rubber, oil-products and foodstuffs — and maximum results were

²⁸ J. Chailly-Bert, secretary-general of the Colonial Union, cited by C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, 'French business and the French colonialists', *Historical Journal*, 1976, 19, 985.

²⁹ C. Régismanset and E. du Vivier de Streel (eds.), *Conférence coloniale instituée par M. Maginot* (Paris, 1917), 1-7, cited by C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, 'France, Africa and the First World War', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 19.

³⁰ R. Delavignette, in R. Delavignette and C.-A. Julien (eds.), *Les Constructeurs de la France d'outre-mer* (Paris, 1946), 425.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR

attained in 1916–17.³¹ In Senegal, however, the local people, weakened by both recruitment and desertion, were soon dragging their feet in spite of official pressures: between 1916 and 1917 millet-production fell by a half and that of groundnuts by a quarter. In the Ivory Coast, by contrast, maize-production in 1916–17 increased eightfold and that of castor-oil seed fivefold, while cotton-production had increased by a factor of fifteen between 1914 and 1916. In French Equatorial Africa a programme for intensifying production was launched by a circular in February 1915. Every village was required to organise the clearing and sowing of considerable additional areas. Only a quarter of the produce was left for local consumption; the rest was requisitioned for troops in Cameroun. Since there had been no technical improvements, progress was in fact very modest and foodstuffs were contributed at the expense of the local communities. In French West Africa, granaries were emptied of reserves which had already been depleted by two successive years of semi-drought (1911–12) and one year of total aridity (1913). The lean periods turned into lethal famine, relieved only by the 4,000 tons of cereals which the hinterland had lacked the time and means to send to France. Indeed, the failure to solve the transport problem meant that much of the effort to increase production was wasted. In April 1917 hundreds of tons of cereals bought in Grand Bassam went rotten for lack of shipping. In France itself co-operation was neither decisive nor very substantial: of the 500,000 tons of produce bought from Africa, nine-tenths was oil produce that was insufficient for French industry. Grandiose projects for ‘exploitation’, based on oil produce, stock-raising and especially cotton,

³¹ Exports from French West Africa subject to requisitioning (thousands of tons):

	1916	1917	1918	1919	Total
Maize	1.5	4.6			6.1
Miller	9.6	3.6	1.3	1.7	16.2
Paddy and rice	0.1	2.7	0.8	1.8	5.4
Total foodstuffs	11.3	11.1	3.0	3.5	28.9
Groundnuts and oil, and palm products			138.7	297.6	

Source: Annuaire du Gouvernement-Général de l'AOF, 1917–1921 (Paris, 1921), 55; cf. Michel, L'Appel, 432.

came to nothing for want of any real commitment by the mother-country and its capitalists. In Africa, the misdeeds associated with war-production were out of all proportion to the results obtained: coercion made people hate these ill-rewarded types of cultivation. When in 1918 the pressure was relaxed, while a new spell of drought afflicted the continent, exports fell to the pre-war level. Besides, the war caused a recession in local trade and in the customary credit system, while prices of imported foodstuffs, such as rice, had soared.

The consequences

The war effort did not bring French West Africa out of its marginal role in the foreign trade of the metropolis. It was nevertheless decisive for three reasons: for the end of the great armed resistance movements, which marks the true beginning of the 'colonial era'; the return of tens of thousands of ex-soldiers who were inclined to question the traditional as much as the colonial order of things; and finally, the arrival on the local scene of a modern élite whose ideal was still assimilation. Furthermore, the war effort intensified a demographic crisis.

The defence of France not only involved the deaths of thousands of Africans on active service; it also worsened the physical condition of those who stayed at home. Not that this was anything new: from the first, colonial intrusion had caused the spread of endemic disease. The Native Medical Service introduced in 1905 affected few Africans: some schoolchildren, district guards and urban workers. Sleeping-sickness encountered little resistance. Between 1898 and 1912 it attacked half the population along the porters' route between Brazzaville and the sea; it infested the banks of the Congo and Ubangi, and the Ogowé lagoons in Gabon. In French West Africa, sleeping-sickness was especially prevalent in the Ivory Coast. It was first reported on the railway, in 1904, and by 1914 was spreading northwards along caravan routes. In 1909 plans were announced for clearing bush and isolating infected villages, but nothing effective was done before 1914. Leprosy was also widespread, and also followed trade: along the caravan routes of the Western Sudan and south towards the kola-producers in the forest. New diseases struck especially hard

against wage-earners, most of whom were overworked, separated from their families and obliged to eat unfamiliar food. Before 1914, *beri beri* was a particular scourge among prisoners and railway-workers, who were fed with imported rice. Venereal and pulmonary diseases also took their toll.

The war soon exposed the deplorable health of the population: in 1915, only 6 per cent of recruits at Lahou, in the Ivory Coast, were found fit for military service, and in general the rejection rate was over 50 per cent. Yet conditions continued to deteriorate. Mass movements of men fostered the spread of disease. In Bouaké, in the Ivory Coast, there was smallpox among African troops in 1914 and 1915, and the death-rate rose to 34 per cent.³² In Equatorial Africa, staff shortage caused the closure in 1914 of one of the only two health centres with doctors outside Brazzaville. Most important of all, the demands of war undermined people's capacity to feed themselves. In many areas, the normal rhythm of social and economic life was disrupted by labour recruitment or desertion to avoid it, and by attempts — as in Moyen-Congo — to evade the authoritarian regrouping of small scattered settlements. Population densities fell below the level needed to maintain the ever-precarious balance of self-sufficiency. The advent of familiar hazards, such as drought or locusts, brought neither emergency relief measures nor any alleviation of colonial exactions of foodstuffs and labour. The war exacerbated the major drought of 1913; in Niger, the famine of 1913–15 was the worst and most protracted ever recorded. Between 1917 and 1921 there were terrible famines in many parts of French Africa. In thinly-populated Gabon, famine gradually enveloped the Fang people and did not begin to recede until 1925, after killing half the population.³³ As if this were not enough, in 1918 the influenza pandemic invaded Africa: in French West Africa (excluding the Ivory Coast and Mauritania) it killed at least 120,000 and in Equatorial Africa at least 70,000. Young adults were specially vulnerable, and mortality is likely to have been over 3 per cent in many areas.³⁴ As to the overall demographic effects of famine

³² D. Domergue-Cloarec, 'Les Vingt Premières Années de l'action sanitaire en Côte d'Ivoire 1904–1925', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1978, 65, no. 238, 40–63.

³³ G. Sautter, *De l'Atlantique au fleuve Congo. Une géographie du sous-peuplement. République du Congo, République gabonaise* (Paris and The Hague, 1966), ix, 11.

³⁴ P. Gouzien, 'La Pandémie grippale de 1918–1919 dans les colonies françaises', *Bulletin Mensuel de l'Office International d'Hygiène Publique*, 1920, 12, 707.

and disease in French black Africa, it is reasonably clear that total population declined between 1900 and 1910. The available statistics indicate that the decline continued between 1913 and 1921; that it affected most of French West Africa; and that in Dahomey, one of the more densely populated colonies, there was a decline of 9 per cent. The population of the Congo and Ubangi-Shari fell by a third, and between 1914 and 1926 that of Cameroun fell by 15 per cent, though it is impossible to distinguish between the effects of death and emigration.

Despite the generally wretched condition of the people, this was not a period of major revolts: the renewal of marabout activity was exceptional.³⁵ Colonial government, propped up by chiefs, was pervasive enough to undermine people's confidence in their ability to challenge it directly: opposition took the form of apathy rather than open hostility. The characteristic collective action of these years was the messianic movement, expressing various forms of ideological assimilation to the invaders' propaganda. There was a widespread myth that the patent inequality between black and white originated in a test set by God, which only the white men had been clever enough to pass. This belief legitimised the present impotence of Africans and alleviated their frustration: their submission was to God rather than to Europeans.³⁶ Such a 'flight into the world of the imagination' occurred in many parts of Africa, and among both Christians and Muslims; it was encouraged by the effects of the First World War and by the economic crisis of 1921-2. The syncretic religious movements of these years were not in origin movements of opposition to colonial rule: some did indeed take on this character but only as a result of blunders on the part of colonial governments, which tended to discover subversion in any original line of thought or form of behaviour. One such movement was founded by William Wade Harris, a Methodist-educated prophet from Liberia who in 1913 began to travel eastwards through the Ivory Coast, baptising with water and the Bible, healing, destroying fetishes and preaching that salvation was to be achieved by leading a simple, moral life. Harris's doctrine was essentially religious, and so far from being anti-colonial it advocated self-improvement on the

³⁵ See above, p. 334.

³⁶ J. Merlo, 'Sources populaires de l'idéologie de l'indépendance en Afrique noire' (thèse de 3e cycle, EPHE, Paris, 1967).

European pattern. The French authorities distrusted Harris as a Protestant and anglophone influence, and in 1915 they deported him from the Ivory Coast, but his following there continued to grow and by 1918 it numbered some 150,000. In Moyen-Congo, there was an enthusiastic response in 1921 to followers of Simon Kimbangu, who earlier that year had begun his healing mission across the river in the Belgian Congo. Within a year, the French authorities deported three of his disciples to Chad, but the movement persisted in the French as well as the Belgian Congo.³⁷ Other symptoms of these troubled times were the growth of secret societies, such as the Human Leopards in Cameroun, and the intensive use of the poison ordeal for detecting witches in Casamance, Senegal: after decimating the Balanta in 1909–11, this flourished among the Diola during the war and among the Bayot in 1920.³⁸

The end of the First World War also witnessed the first 'modern' expressions of discontent. In these, the return of African soldiers from France was decisive. Not only had they obtained pensions and certain privileges from the colonial power; they had found in France new ways of life and thought, and had seen white people working in menial positions. The ex-soldiers soon became active promoters of social change. Some were used by the administration as agents or guards, and even as chiefs of villages or districts, in order to reduce the prestige or rivalries of the great traditional families, as in Futa. The very fact that conscripts had been chosen by hereditary chiefs from among their slaves contributed to the corrosion of traditional hierarchies: having left as servants, the soldiers returned as masters. At the same time, their relationship with the French authorities was also tense. Delays in demobilisation engendered unrest in military camps; besides, many were infected with smallpox, which in 1919 provoked mutinies in Guinea. In 1917 ex-soldiers began to form local sections of the League for the Rights of Man, especially in Guinea, where there were several assassination attempts, and in Gabon, where the local section expressed opposition by petitioning the governor and distributing the *Écho Gabonais*. Socialist ideas influenced several strikes for higher wages. In 1916 and 1918

³⁷ Cf. chapter 3, pp. 157–8.

³⁸ Archives nationales du Sénégal, 13 G., 381; Christian Roche, *Conquête et résistance des peuples de Casamance, 1850–1920* (Dakar, 1976).

FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

Abdoulaye Mara, an ex-soldier of Senegalese origin, inspired strikes in the docks at Conakry, Guinea, and in 1920 there was a strike in the port of Dakar. In 1919 and 1920 there were strikes on the Dakar–St Louis railway, where for the first time black workers began to voice their claims separately from white workers. In May 1919 the government of French West Africa was sufficiently concerned to legislate for an eight-hour day, though the law was not implemented and the Work Code of 1927 continued to refer to a ten-hour day.

THE BOOM OF THE 1920S

Administrative consolidation and the creation of mandates

The grant of citizenship in 1916 to the *originaires* of the four communes of Senegal put an end to the claims of the assimilationist lobby.³⁹ Henceforward there was talk only of ‘association’, a vague term which could cover a wide variety of local practice. Reform was very largely confined to administrative structures. In 1920 the departments of the Ministry of Colonies were reorganised on the basis of subject rather than area: this made possible concerted strategies for the whole empire. In the same year the Supreme Colonial Council was revived. This body (which had existed only in 1883–6) was meant to give the French government the benefit of advice from retired colonial officials and representatives of French citizens in the colonies, but it counted for little, just because it excluded serving senior officials. Meanwhile, the École Coloniale undertook the training of junior as well as senior administrators. As soldiers gave way to civilians in the last outposts of military rule, new territories were formed: Upper Volta (1919) and Soudan (1920) replaced Upper Senegal and Niger; they were followed by Chad (1920), Mauritania (1921) and Niger (1922).⁴⁰

In Senegal, the General Council, which had been elected since 1879, was reconstituted in 1920 as the Colonial Council, with responsibility for the whole of Senegal and not just the four

³⁹ In 1922 the conferment of citizenship on Muslims in the communes was made conditional on their giving up their Muslim legal status, as in Algeria.

⁴⁰ In 1929 the Tibesti mountains, from which French forces had withdrawn in 1916, were transferred from Niger to Chad.

communes. The ministry emphasised the liberal character of the reform, in that it ended the dichotomy between 'territories under direct administration' and 'protectorates'. The élite of the *originaires*, however, objected to the moderating role to be exercised by twenty chiefs chosen by their peers and deemed to represent their followers, as distinct from the twenty members to be elected henceforward by all citizens of the colony (and not just inhabitants of the communes). These councillor-chiefs could scarcely act as a check on the governor and provincial *commandants* on whom their careers depended. The council became essentially a ratifying body which confined itself at its annual session to airing views on matters placed before it by the lieutenant-governor and to suggesting supplementary expenditures for budgets already approved by the Council of Government (whose members were either appointed *ex officio* or nominated by the governor-general).⁴¹ The process was taken further by the erosion of municipal prerogatives: in 1924 the territory of Dakar and dependencies (to which Gorée was reattached in 1929) was invested with budgetary autonomy but placed under a representative of the governor-general; in 1937 this official replaced the mayor when Rufisque was reattached.

As for the territories seized from Germany, the French government, like the British, favoured outright annexation. They were opposed by President Wilson, who was supported in France by the Socialists and by advocates of a League of Nations, including the 'League of Intellectual Solidarity for the Triumph of the International Cause' which was launched in 1918 by André Gide, Anatole France, Jules Romains and others. In February 1919 the former German colonies were designated 'mandates of the League of Nations'; these were to be entrusted to those Allied powers 'which by reason of their resources, experience and geographical position are best qualified to assume this responsibility [over] peoples not yet capable of governing themselves [but whose] welfare and development are a sacred mission for civilisation'.⁴²

Each mandatory power was required to submit an annual report on its stewardship to the League. Meanwhile, France had consulted

⁴¹ *Journal officiel de la République française*, December 1920, 20245 *et seq.*, and *L'Ouest africain français*, 15 February 1929, 3.

⁴² First Covenant of the League of Nations, 13 February 1919.

chiefs and notables in Togo and Cameroun; all but one were said to wish her to remain, though some also took the opportunity to make demands of their own, whether for a university or for the protection of the privileges of Duala chiefs.⁴³ In May 1919 France received mandates over much of Togo (where Britain handed over Lomé and the railways) and Cameroun; that part of Cameroun which had been ceded to the Germans in 1911 was now restored to France and re-annexed to French Equatorial Africa.

The rapid replacement of German personnel, both in the public service (partly by citizens of the four communes) and in the private sector (especially missionary groups) gave rise to confusion. In northern Cameroun a sort of indirect rule continued to prevail, based on the traditional authority and militia of the great sultans of Ngaoundere, Rey Bouba and Maroua. In Douala and the rest of the coastal zone, the upheavals among minor officials exposed people to extortion by anyone who had got hold of something like a uniform. And it was only in 1919 that the French allowed the return of the 20,000 Africans who had followed the Germans in their retreat to Spanish Guinea and Fernando Po. These people had mostly been to mission schools and had been the mainstay of the German regime; they were mainly Beti from the Yaoundé region. Among them was Charles Atangana, who had been educated in Hamburg and appointed 'supreme chief' of the Beti in 1914; after some months in prison he regained his post in 1920 and held it until his death in 1943. The French occupation of Cameroun did not go unopposed. In the north, they had to deal with mountain peoples who had scarcely been brought under colonial rule and had always been hostile to the Fulani sultans. And in 1919–20 the Bape of the Bafia region, rich in oil-palms, were brutally repressed: villages were razed, the inhabitants dispersed and a military post set up to watch over the country. By and large, however, Cameroun remained calm. The small-scale communities in the south did not yet realise that they had a common master. True, the people of Douala resented the reorganisation of local justice, since the Germans had left this to local notables, but in fact the French used much the same people. Once civilian rule had been re-established, Cameroun was provided, in 1920, with a consultative Council of Administra-

⁴³ Memorandum of the Duala chiefs, 1 December 1918. Archives nationales, Paris: Section Outre-Mer, AP II, C.28D1.

THE BOOM OF THE 1920S

tion on the pattern of other colonies and was gradually integrated, more or less, into French Equatorial Africa; French Togoland likewise became part of French West Africa. Up to 1934, these mandates were subject to a ban on the establishment of military bases and the recruiting of African troops, but there was frequent interchange of colonial officials between mandates and colonies.

The practice of indirect rule persisted in French Africa wherever local powers were both able and willing to implement colonial demands. Such was the case in Futa Jalon and western Senegal, the home of the Murids. While Ahmadu Bamba lived on as a religious sage until 1927, his kindred busied themselves in giving his teaching an economic content; in Wolof country, the spread of Islam was linked to control over land and markets. Sanctified by their religious association, the local patriarchs placed at the service of the groundnut economy the unremitting labour of 100,000 followers, who were thereby assured both of survival in a hard world and of salvation in the life hereafter. This economic collaboration between Murid chiefs and French officials was but one example of a growing French preference for allying with those Muslim groups which controlled so much internal trade and production. This was in line both with France's new desire to increase the value of French Africa and with her renewed ambition to become a great Muslim power: in 1923 the government launched a subscription fund for building a mosque in Paris.

Even 'direct rule', as the French conceived it, was still far from eliminating chiefs, if only because of the perennial shortage of French personnel.⁴⁴ The administrative officer had to serve as president of a judicial tribunal, superintendent of prisons, director of customs, meteorological observer and special agent. He was still very isolated: telegraph lines between Wagadugu and the various provincial headquarters in Upper Volta were not com-

⁴⁴ Average territory of an administrator in French West Africa in 1921:

	Area (sq.km)	Population
Upper Volta	8,000	66,000
Soudan	5,700	32,000
Ivory Coast	5,000	25,000
Dahomey	2,500	19,000

Source: Haute-Volta, Rapport politique, 1933, cited by A. M. Duperray, *Les Gourounsi de Haute-Volta. Conquête et colonisation, 1896-1933*, Stuttgart, 1984.

pleted until 1928. The only way to gather information was still to go on tour, and this was often impossible during the rains. The support of chiefs thus remained central to colonial policy. True, their prerogatives were formally delegated from France, following the Van Vollenhoven circular of 1917, but the chiefs remained the only line of communication between the administrator and his people. At the same time, the canton tended to become merely an administrative division, while the canton chief himself was gradually integrated into the public service. He was generally chosen from among families qualified to rule by custom, but in 1927 the school for the sons of chiefs was reorganised: henceforward, it was recruited by competitive examination from among primary school-leavers related to prominent people. In 1930 a circular emphasised 'the need, in certain situations, to make a clean sweep of the traditional apparatus...in order to replace it by suitably qualified personnel'.⁴⁵ The canton chief was always nominated by the governor, but after 1937 this was done on the advice of the council of notables for each province: in this way, a caste of chiefs came into being that was far removed from pre-colonial traditions. The remuneration which had been advocated in 1917 and approved in 1922 did not become general until 1934. In 1935 a quasi-retirement pension, with an honorarium, was introduced; the prerogatives of chiefs were regulated and their judicial functions curbed to conform to modern notions of justice. The ambiguous position of the chief, as both agent of the colonial government and spokesman for his people, was exemplified in an experiment with 'district commissions'. These were intended to be equivalent to the councils which had once advised African rulers, but while their composition might be fixed by custom or regulated by the *commandant*, their role was confined to ratifying official decisions. The logical outcome, by the 1950s, was for chiefs as a class to be replaced by petty officials who were less likely to use archaic privileges to exploit the public.

One of the chief's main tasks was to supply the growing demand for labour. Taxation, by now, was generally, if reluctantly, accepted as a fact of life: but the extraction of cheap labour was still more vital to the colonial system. In 1920 an agronomist bluntly remarked: 'For 10,000 francs you can have a house built

⁴⁵ Cited by F. Zucarelli, 'De la chefferie traditionnelle au canton: évolution du canton colonial au Sénégal 1855-1960', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1973, 13, no. 50, 213-38.

which is worth 100,000; you can have dozens of kilometres of roads made for a few hundred francs, and hundreds and thousands of hectares put under cultivation without paying a sou. The man who pays the bill says nothing: he is the native.⁴⁶ Forced labour, in the sense of compulsory labour, was forbidden by French law, but in Africa labour which was to all intents and purposes 'forced' was exacted both for public works and for private enterprise. The most obvious example was the *prestation*, the obligation to contribute unpaid labour for public services, especially roadworks. In 1912 the practice was legalised in French West Africa in the form of a 'work-tax' which varied from eight to twelve days a year; in Senegal, it was made redeemable in cash in 1921 and reduced to four days in 1922. In French Equatorial Africa, *prestations* were introduced in 1918, at first for seven days a year and then, from 1925, for a maximum of 15 days. Food supplies were provided only for those working more than a day's march (30 km) from their villages: in French West Africa this distance was reduced in 1925 to 5 km. Despite their limited duration, *prestations* were most unpopular.

Much labour was needed in areas far removed from the main clusters of population, especially in French Equatorial Africa. The answer was to recruit men on more or less extended contracts. Private agencies, such as the Société du Haut-Ogooué, claimed a monopoly within their own territories and recruited many more workers than they needed themselves. Chiefs had to supply workers to the recruiters, and they were paid according to quantity. In this way, between 1918 and 1925, Governor Lamblin extended the road network in Ubangi-Shari from 340 km to 4,000 km. Between 1921 and 1932, 127,250 men were recruited to work far from home on the Congo-Océan railway. For this, the recruiting campaigns were like police operations and created panic, for such recruitment, at least until 1928, amounted to a death-sentence: it was usually the weakest who were seized and they then suffered from the failures of regional food supplies and inadequate health supervision.⁴⁷ Labour was also recruited for the

⁴⁶ H. Cosnier, *L'Ouest Africain français, ses ressources agricoles, son organisation économique* (Paris, 1921), 142.

⁴⁷ The official figures were at least 10,200 dead between 1921 and 1928, more than 1,300 in 1929 and 2,600 between 1930 and 1932; probably, if victims outside the work-centres are included, at least 20,000 died. G. Sautter, 'Notes sur la construction du chemin de fer Congo-Océan (1921-1934)', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1967, 7, no. 26, 247-8.

railways of French West Africa, especially the Thiès–Kayes line (for which the three central regions of Upper Volta provided more than 22,000 men between 1919 and 1927)⁴⁸ and the line northwards through Dahomey, where chiefs in nearby villages arranged rotas of men to work by the hour or the task. Furthermore, portage was still regularly levied in the mid-1920s wherever there was neither railway nor motor-road. Meanwhile conscription was applied to productive work. The system, called ‘labour service for works in the public interest’ (SMOTIG) was introduced in French West Africa in the early 1920s. In Senegal, in 1928, three units (just over 2,000 men) were called up in this way, two for the Thiès–Niger railway. The government also handed over some of these men to the private sector: to the *Compagnie des cultures tropicales en Afrique* and the *Société des plantations de Haute Casamance*. By 1940, the daily wage of such conscripts was at least higher than that of most workers.⁴⁹

The government tried to restrain the demands of the private sector. In sparsely-populated Gabon, Governor-General Antonetti told forestry developers in 1926 that the existing enterprises already called for more workers than the colony could provide and ‘any new contractor commencing operations will do so at his own risk and peril’.⁵⁰ In French West Africa a circular of 1925 reasserted government prerogatives in distributing the labour force, but in 1930 agricultural and industrial enterprises were authorised to apply to the local administration for help in recruiting labour.⁵¹ The regulation of labour contracts in general began in French Equatorial Africa in 1922 and in French West Africa in 1925. Its impact was limited, however, both by the vast number of casual workers who, in the name of ‘freedom of employment’ were not protected by any control, and because labour contracts (varying from six months to two years) were riddled with irregularities; a specialised labour inspectorate was not established until the 1930s.

A further method of boosting production was compulsory

⁴⁸ The current workforce was about 7,000 labourers at a time, 4,000 of them being ‘volunteers’ from Upper Volta (Duperray, *Les Gourounsi*).

⁴⁹ 0.75 francs plus daily bonus of 0.50 francs, compared with wages of the order of 1 franc a day. Archives nationales du Sénégal, 28/K 105, no. 39. See B. Fall, ‘Le Travail forcé au Sénégal, 1900–1946’ (Mémoire de Maîtrise, University of Dakar, 1977).

⁵⁰ Note in the *Journal officiel de l’AEF*, 1 June 1926, repeated 1 December 1927.

⁵¹ *Journal officiel de l’AOF*, 21 August 1930. Cf. Archives nationales du Sénégal, 19/K 60.

cultivation. During the First World War, Africans who refused to cultivate were liable to be regarded in the same light as tax-defaulters and in 1917 officials in French West Africa were urged to consider all means of expanding cultivation.⁵² After the war there were continued efforts in this direction, based on officially created village-centres, as part of a systematic policy of 'regrouping', especially in French Equatorial Africa. In Ubangi-Shari, the administrator Félix Éboué followed Belgian practice and from 1925 gave four companies sole rights to buy cotton in vast areas of compulsory production, which naturally became extremely unpopular. In French West Africa — in Upper Volta, Soudan and Niger — average annual exports of cotton rose from 189 tons in 1910–14 to 3,500 tons in 1925–9. The compulsion which achieved these modest results was, along with taxation, the main reason why between 80,000 and 100,000 Mossi fled in the course of a decade to the Ivory Coast and the Gold Coast; it also drove Yoruba in Dahomey to flee to Nigeria (which created friction between Britain and France). Chiefs, of course, had much less reason than their subjects to fear compulsory cultivation; indeed, once prestatory workers had discharged their obligations to government, they were liable to be put to work on their chiefs' fields. This was specially common in Cameroun, where the richest chiefs also employed women to expand areas of commercial cultivation. When Zogo Fouda Ngono, chief of the Beti, died in 1939, he left behind him 583 widows, only some of whom had performed other than agricultural functions.

Social investments

In 1923 Albert Sarraut, the minister of colonies, articulated ideas which had been circulating since the war, and voiced the qualms of conscience felt in metropolitan France at the prospect of a general collapse in Africa following the alarming decline in population. 'Our native policy,' he said, 'must be to preserve the African people.'⁵³ Thence arose the need, along with a far-reaching programme of metropolitan investment, for health and education services to improve African welfare and thus productivity, while also generating a local élite of technicians. But though ideas were

⁵² Circular cited in Fall, 'Travail forcé'.

⁵³ A. Sarraut, *La Mise en valeur des colonies françaises* (Paris, 1923), 675.

beginning to advance, their realisation had to wait upon reconstruction in France itself. The 'Sarraut Plan' remained a dead letter for want of money. Loans which were then advanced had actually been authorised before the war, most notably the 171m francs for the Congo–Océan railway (supplemented by credits of 300m francs in 1924). Even so, French Equatorial Africa was unable throughout our period to pay interest on its public debt; between 1914 and 1929 its budget received from France an average annual subsidy of 3m francs (as much in real terms as before the war). In French West Africa, the federation itself assumed responsibility for public works: the resurgence of French trade after the war boosted receipts from customs duties, the main source of revenue. The contribution of metropolitan France to public works in French West Africa was nil between 1914 and 1930, and only 13 per cent between 1905 and 1940 (as against 71 per cent for French Equatorial Africa). Besides, during the 1920s France was the indebted partner, since her net financial contributions to West Africa (loans plus subsidies) were regularly less than what she received in debt repayments and contributions to the metropolitan costs of colonial government.⁵⁴ It is thus not surprising that public works programmes remained very limited before the depression of the 1930s. In 1929 capital goods accounted for 45 per cent of the value of imports to French West Africa, but only 29 per cent for French Equatorial Africa and 33 per cent for Madagascar, compared with just over half for the Belgian Congo. The main undertakings were harbours — notably that of Grand Bassam in the Ivory Coast (1924) — and railways. Motor roads were also built, especially in the Sahel; in 1918 Chad was thus linked to French Equatorial Africa. The introduction of lorries ended the worst abuses of portage.

The war had revealed the reservoir of labour provided by Africans, but also the dangers which threatened it. Following the lead given by Sarraut, who had urged 'the increase of human capital in order to put monetary capital profitably to work', Governor-General Merlin, in West Africa, set out 'the problem of protecting the races and safeguarding their future'. His successor, Carde, in 1931 spoke crudely of the need to 'think black', meaning 'the development of the native races both in

⁵⁴ C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Le Financement de la "mise en valeur" coloniale: méthode et premiers résultats', in *Études africaines offertes à Henri Brunschwig* (Paris, 1983), 237–52.

THE BOOM OF THE 1920S




Fig. 6. Receipts from customs dues (---) and African poll-tax (—) as percentages of total government revenues: seven-year moving averages
 Source: *Travaux de la Recherche co-opérative sur programme*, 326, collated by C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, CNRS, Paris

quality and in quantity⁵⁵ through a programme of preventive medicine which could replace earlier piecemeal efforts. But money was still scarce: health appropriations were not allowed to exceed 12 per cent of the budget and in fact only reached this level in Dahomey, in 1935. The medical school at Dakar, for training medical assistants and midwives, was founded in 1918 and reorganised in 1924, but its medical teaching staff (which was exclusively military) remained notoriously under strength. In 1920 it was reckoned that the Administration de la médecine indigène (AMI) needed at least 130 doctors for French West Africa — twice the actual number; and in 1928 it had only 28 in French Equatorial Africa. The AMI comprised a hospital service and pharmaceutical supplies centre in each colonial capital, and a number of local outposts — usually huts of beaten earth. Dahomey was the best-served territory, since it was the most densely populated, and it supplied most students for the Dakar medical school. Yet even in Dahomey, in 1939, the average distance between AMI posts was 50 km on the coast, 100 to 150 km in the central region and as much as 300 km in the north. Of

⁵⁵ Instructions on the development of the AMI, Agence économique AOF, 1931, 4.

the 51 midwives in the colony, ten had to serve 45 per cent of its population and over 80 per cent of its area.

Against the most serious epidemics there was still very little defence. Typhus was brought by caravans from Mossi country to the middle Niger, where it raged endemically between 1921 and 1929. The major endemic diseases were frequently opposed by such traditional measures as declaring 'prohibited zones' (as in northern Dahomey when invaded by sleeping-sickness), abandoning contaminated villages, isolating the sick and cremating the corpses of lepers. However, by 1930 about a quarter of the population of French West Africa had been vaccinated against smallpox, and in 1936 a regular mobile vaccination service was introduced. In 1934 yellow fever vaccination was introduced but by 1940 it had reached only 1 per cent of the population, almost all in towns. Medical control over wage-earners was improved, especially on railways, and instruction in hygiene was imparted to schoolchildren, though unfortunately few were girls. The first textbooks expressed themselves with frightening candour: 'If you die, who will climb the palm-tree, who will make oil? The government needs tax. If your children don't survive, who will pay it? That is why the government spends money on bringing doctors and hiring the heifers needed to provide vaccine.'⁵⁶

The most impressive efforts were those initiated by Jamot to combat sleeping-sickness. Jamot first encountered the disease as a military doctor during the Cameroun campaign; he then became director of the Pasteur Institute in Brazzaville⁵⁷ and made his first prophylactic experiments in 1917 while examining 100,000 cases in Ubangi. In 1921 he was transferred to Cameroun and in 1926 set up a permanent mission there. His method was based on the systematic investigation and recording of cases by mobile clinics and on treatment by compulsory mass injections of atoxyl. In French Equatorial Africa the struggle was redirected along similar lines between 1928 and 1935, and the disease began to recede in 1938. Such methods were not imported into French West Africa until the 1930s, just when the spread of endemic disease was accelerated, especially in the Ivory Coast, by extensive forest-

⁵⁶ Docteur Spire, *Pour vivre vieux en Afrique* (Porto-Novo, Dahomey, 1921).

⁵⁷ Founded in 1909 following the medical mission of Drs Martin, Leboeuf and Roubaud in 1906-8; cf. *Rapport de la mission d'études de la maladie du sommeil au Congo français, 1906-1908* (Paris, 1909), 721.

clearance and the consequent displacement of people. In 1931 Jamot set up a preventive service in Wagadugu, which in 1932 became part of the AMI, was revived as a mobile service in 1934 and became a specialised service in 1939. By then, 143,000 victims of sleeping-sickness had been tracked down and after 1941 only the central region of the lower Ivory Coast experienced any recrudescence of the disease.

Educational plans in 1924 stressed the need to form an élite loyal to the colonial cause. Public instruction in French West Africa tended increasingly to imitate metropolitan French models. An international congress on education in 1931 concluded that the French policy of assimilation went too far, and in 1935 a British visitor to the William Ponty School, near Dakar, remarked, 'They are French in everything but the colour of their skins.'⁵⁸ This trend ran counter to the educational aims of missionaries, who preferred to make use of vernacular languages, though from 1922 these were officially banned in all schools.⁵⁹ Government provision for secular schools expanded rapidly after the war. By 1924 there were 29,000 children in the government schools of French West Africa: more than twice as many as in 1910. There were also 5,700 in mission schools; these could now receive subsidies if they broadly conformed to patterns of state education, but throughout the 1920s and 1930s they accounted for at most one-sixth of all schoolchildren in French West Africa. Besides, most people remained beyond the reach of any school: even in Dahomey it is unlikely that more than 10 per cent of school-age children went to school in 1939. Throughout French West Africa in 1938 there were less than 70,000 schoolchildren out of some 12 million people; in impoverished French Equatorial Africa there were scarcely 20,000 out of five million.

This narrow base largely comprised village or district schools where, owing to staff shortages, the teacher was often an unqualified African, perhaps an ex-interpreter or a literate soldier, who was left to his own resources and was seldom visited by an inspector.⁶⁰ After four years, the most promising pupils might

⁵⁸ W. B. Mumford, in W. B. Mumford and G. St J. Orde Browne, *Africans learn to be French* (London, n.d. [1936]), 47.

⁵⁹ In the Ivory Coast, the catechism was translated into Nzima in 1911, Ebie in 1923, Dida in 1932 and Atié (Akye) in 1934.

⁶⁰ The school at Kandy, in northern Dahomey, was founded in 1910 but not inspected until 1919.

gain entry to a senior primary school: in 1935 there were eight such schools, with 1,000 places, in French West Africa. From these, pupils might proceed to schools of marine engineering or midwifery in Dakar, or to a teacher-training college: by the late 1930s there was one near Abidjan and one near Bamako as well as the William Ponty School, which also prepared Africans for entry to a medical school in Dakar (founded in 1918) and a veterinary school in Bamako. Secondary education on the French pattern was provided, mainly though not exclusively for whites, by schools at St Louis and Dakar. The first taught up to university entrance standard from 1920; the second, only from 1940. A special effort to provide state-supported education was made in the mandated territories, where the rapid diffusion of the French language was needed to counter the considerable achievements of German mission teaching. In Cameroun, by 1926, ten regional schools with 1,850 pupils led to the high school at Yaoundé, which prepared Africans for posts in government and teaching. Vocational training was supposed to be available in each capital, and it was sponsored by the railway administration, but in practice little was provided, except on the job: the need for staff was so great that it was enough to be literate to be sure of finding work. On the eve of the Second World War, education was still the privilege of a very small minority — small enough to be absorbed without risk by the colonial system while contributing to the cult of the diploma, the guarantee of social advancement.

First results

However restricted all these efforts, their first results were soon apparent. While population statistics for the period are very unreliable, it is clear that from 1925 and especially in the 1930s there was a reversal of earlier demographic decline. Dahomey was thought to number 840,000 people in 1920, 963,000 in 1925, one million in 1930 and 1.3 million in 1935. Cameroun was thought to number 1.9m in 1926, 2.2m in 1931 and 2.5m in 1937. In French Equatorial Africa, an upward trend seems to have begun just after the depression of the 1930s.

Colonial trade was boosted by French prosperity in the 1920s. Already, trading firms had profited during the war from inflated prices and the government's bulk purchases of so-called strategic

supplies (oil-products and rubber). After the brief slump of 1921–2, when the price of palm-oil fell from 4,200 to 1,300 francs per ton, the upward trend was resumed and maintained until 1930, encouraged by the massive inflation of the franc up to 1926 (the Poincaré franc, introduced in 1928, was worth not more than one-fifth of the gold franc of 1913). With new opportunities for profit from speculation, there was a proliferation of colonial firms, especially in commerce. On the eve of the depression, black Africa had 107 companies which were quoted on the Bourse in Paris (compared with 22 founded between 1900 and 1914), including 29 new commercial ventures, 48 plantation companies, 21 in forestry, 11 in mining, 11 in banking and real estate, and 7 transport companies. Between 1924 and 1930 the CFAO made annual profits of 25 to 30 per cent, as in pre-war days. The share capital of SCOA increased almost tenfold from 1920 to 1928 (from 18m to 157m francs); its value quadrupled in real terms. Diversification was undertaken: SCOA and CFAO enlarged on their traditional bases of groundnuts in Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Guinea, and moved into Gold Coast cocoa and Nigerian palm produce and tin. By 1930 CFAO had 191 branches and SCOA 145. Various factors facilitated diversification: machines were applied to the processing of primary products and firms were absorbed or became subsidiaries. In the hinterland, a feeder network of freight transport was developed by Levantines who had first arrived early in the century but mostly came when Syria and Lebanon became French mandates. They readily settled in the interior, learned local languages and lent money on patriarchal lines, at annual rates of interest of up to 50 per cent.

The principal export continued to be groundnuts, which in 1938 still contributed almost half the total value of exports from French West Africa.⁶¹ The completion of the Thiès–Kayes railway in 1923 caused an agricultural revolution in Senegal by opening up Sine–Saloum. Kaolack became the chief outlet for exports, which doubled between 1914 and 1930. In Guinea the banana plantations of Europeans began to mature, yielding 6,000

⁶¹ Groundnuts in French West Africa: percentage of total value of exports:

1920	1925	1928	1930	1932	1935	1938
63	60	53	46	38	33	45

FRENCH BLACK AFRICA




Fig. 7. Ivory Coast: imports and exports, by weight (metric tons)

tons in 1929 and 52,000 tons in 1938 — perhaps a third of total consumption in France. In the Ivory Coast, where exports in 1914 had consisted almost entirely of ivory and wild rubber, commercial agriculture began in the south-east and Ndenye country, contributing 17 per cent of export tonnage in 1930. Coffee-production remained very small (1,000 tons in 1933), but that of cocoa rose between 1919 and 1929 from 860 to 16,500 tons, 41 per cent by value of total exports. In German Kamerun, plantations (both German and native) had flourished and during the war vast concessions were taken over: some were let without much success to French companies while others were alienated in freehold, including the 8,000 hectares taken in 1926 by the *Caoutchoucs et cacaos du Cameroun*. However, the government favoured smaller concessions; 216 of less than 200 hectares were granted between 1922 and 1929. In 1924 it set up a scheme for promoting African enterprise through co-operatives and technical assistance. From 1918 cocoa was cultivated all over the coastal region; it remained mediocre in quality and fetched a very poor price, but from 1933 cocoa and palm produce made up 70 per cent of the value of exports. In Gabon the void left by the collapse of the wild-rubber trade was filled by the production of *okoume* wood. The Germans had bought it for cabinet-making and 130,000 tons were exported in 1914. The war ruined this trade but the wood was well suited for lamination and veneering to meet the needs of the burgeoning aircraft industry. Exports rose to 380,000 tons in 1930, exceeded

only by the record of 407,000 tons in 1937. The former concessionary companies in the coastal zone surrendered their rights to great forestry companies. It was the golden age of the timber trade: prices rose from 30–60 francs a ton in 1913 to 700–800 francs a ton just before the depression. The Consortium des grands réseaux français, which had founded the colony's timber industry and specialised in railway sleepers, then employed some 40 whites and 1,500 Africans and used mechanised saws and workshops, Decauville trucks, steam-haulage and cranes. Independent African participation was obstructed by the suppression of unauthorised tree-felling and by the expense of mechanisation. In any case, most production still depended heavily on manual labour, so that under-population was a real problem.

The economic boom had contradictory results in France and Africa. While colonial firms made swift progress, Africans endured harsh exploitation without benefiting from the dynamic effects of inflation. They met newly created wants by buying imported goods at metropolitan prices, but they were paid for their produce at little more than pre-war rates.⁶² Wages lagged far behind prices. Immediately before the war, wages ranged from 50 centimes to one or two francs a day; a casual worker for the administration got 70 centimes a day; a tree-feller in Gabon got 10–15 francs a month and a trader's agent 40 francs. These figures had at most doubled by 1930, when banana workers in Guinea were hard put to it to obtain a rise from 2 francs to 2.50 a day; in 1929 casual workers in Gabon were awarded 2 francs a day. Rates for contract workers were appreciably higher: in 1911 402 men were engaged on contract for railway work in Dahomey at 14 francs a day for 300 days, whereas 5,000 workers were recruited orally for 2.90 francs a day.⁶³ There were, however, exceptions to this pattern, which explain the rapid growth of non-contracted migrant labour. From Upper Volta and Guinea there was an annual exodus of people — perhaps 50,000 in 1930 — to harvest groundnuts in Senegal. These casual workers, in addition to food rations, could make up to 1,500 francs in a season, or a daily wage of around

⁶² It is this fact which chiefly explains the hostility towards the cultivation of cotton: in 1930 the official price was between 1 franc and 1.25 francs per kilo of picked lint, but only 50 centimes were paid in Ouhamé-Nana, Ubangi-Shari (compared with 60 centimes in 1913).

⁶³ A. Cocou, 'Les Travailleurs du chemin de fer' (thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1977).

12 francs.⁶⁴ Tax-levels, by contrast, showed no such variations: everywhere they kept pace with inflation. From 1914 to 1929, the taxes paid by Africans rose from 26.6m francs to 175m in French West Africa, from 22m to 127m in Madagascar and from 4.4m to 30.5m in French Equatorial Africa. Even if allowance is made for more efficient collection, the annual burden of tax rose from 1–5 francs before the war to 15–25 francs in 1929–30 and sometimes even 50–75 francs in the most prosperous zones, such as Gabon, southern Dahomey and Senegal.

It is usually held that it was the need to pay tax in cash which obliged Africans to work on the land. The reality is more complex. Initially compulsion undoubtedly played a part, especially in French Equatorial Africa, where wages on concessions were so low as to offer no incentive to take part willingly in the cash economy. On the other hand, statistics for the most commercialised activity of the period, groundnut production, show that between 1921 and 1929 only 10 per cent of a cultivator's working time was needed for paying fiscal dues.⁶⁵ The extension of groundnut cultivation was, by and large, achieved without resort to force. One possible stimulus might seem to have been a change in consumer habits, to judge from the net ratio between the volume of exports and that of imports of consumer goods, but this chiefly related to town-dwellers. In the bush, rice from Indo-China remained a luxury, and the farmer in the Sahel could, if pressed, meet his own clothing needs with strips of locally-made cotton cloth. Over much of French West Africa the most widespread stimulus to cash-crop cultivation was indebtedness, aggravated by inflation. Recurrent food shortages in Senegal impelled groundnut cultivators either to consume supplies of seed and replace them just when prices were highest or else to obtain food by mortgaging part of the next harvest. In 1905–6 there was a great famine in Sine-Saloum and the government lent farmers seed and foodstuffs, repayable in kind at 5 per cent interest. The success of this scheme prompted the institution in French West Africa of provident societies to build up food reserves, sink wells, and popularise investment in commercial agriculture. Several

⁶⁴ L. Aujas, 'La Région du Siné-Saloum', *Bulletin du Comité historique et scientifique de l'AOF*, 1929, 1/2, 94–132, cited by M. Mbodj, 'Un exemple d'économie coloniale, Le Siné-Saloum' (thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1978).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

were formed in parts of Senegal and Guinea, but in general they attracted limited support, and in 1915 membership was made compulsory within any province where a society existed. So far from being a tool for local self-help, the provident society tended to become another arm of government: from 1923 each *commandant* had full powers over the local society's budget. Furthermore, the societies lent at high interest rates: 30 per cent soon became normal. And if crop failure, or the fear of it, sucked the farmer into a cycle of debt, inflation could make it a vicious spiral: as the purchasing power of his franc declined, he needed more and more money to meet not only his own material wants but social obligations once discharged by gifts in kind — whether slaves, animals, gold-dust or cloth. All too often the farmer could only settle his debts by allowing an agent, often Lebanese, to dispose of his harvest.

New centres of resistance

In 1923 there were major disturbances at Porto-Novo, Dahomey. Popular discontents briefly combined with those of the young educated élite. Among the latter, the foremost critic of government was Louis Hunkarin. The son of ex-King Toffa's blacksmith, he had left high school in Dakar in 1906 and after a spell of teaching became a journalist, working at first alongside Blaise Diagne. As an anti-colonial radical, Hunkarin spent as much time in Paris as in Dakar or Porto-Novo and was in and out of gaol. In 1917 the first African newspaper appeared in Dahomey, clandestine and hand-written: the *Récadère de Béhanzin*. Then came the slump of 1921–2; the government tried to make up for loss of customs revenue by increasing the poll-tax and trading-licence fee and imposing a tax on European-style houses. In February 1923 protest was instigated by *évolués* in the Franco-Muslim Committee, supported by the local section of the League for the Rights of Man and by King Toffa's dynastic opponents. People in Porto-Novo refused to pay the increased taxes, demonstrated in the streets and shouted down a delegation of canton chiefs. Workers in the private sector and at the port of Cotonou went on strike. The government responded fiercely: it declared a state of siege, imposed a collective fine of 360,000 francs and exiled the activists (Hunkarin spent the next ten years in Mauritania).

In 1925 there were strikes on the Dakar–St Louis railway and among Bambara building the Thiès–Kayes line; the latter at least forced the government to listen to their demands, for fellow Bambara soldiers refused to march against them. But for most of the decade, blacks from French West Africa voiced their protest chiefly in France. In 1924 a Dahomeyan lawyer, Kodjo Tovalou-Houénou, founded in Paris the ‘Universal League for the Defence of the Black Race’: its journal, *Continents*, was attacked by Blaise Diagne, who since 1914 had been a deputy for Senegal. From the early 1920s the French Communist Party sought to reach African ex-soldiers and workers in France through the Intercolonial Union; one of its most active members was Lamine Senghor, an ex-soldier who had returned to France in 1922. It so happened that the best students from the William Ponty School were now sent to Aix-en-Provence to prepare for their diploma examinations. Thus in 1926 Senghor was able to enlist the help of young African communist students in founding the Committee (from 1928 the League) for the Defence of the Negro Race. The problems of these students were sympathetically described in the Senegalese press by Lamine Guèye, a lawyer who served as mayor of St Louis in 1925–7. Otherwise, their movement had little impact in Senegal, but it was in touch with nearly all the militant Africans who passed through Paris.

In 1929 a section of the League was formed in Cameroun by Victor Ganty, originally from Guyana. Ganty had tried to found a spiritualist church in Cameroun, but he now contrived to associate modernist protests with the traditional anti-colonial sentiments of the Douala notables. He succeeded Richard Manga Bell as head of the France–Cameroun Association and in 1931 presented to the League of Nations a petition for the ‘defence of black citizens of Cameroun’. African dissidents in Paris may also have exerted some influence on Andre Matswa, a veteran of the Rif war in 1925, though the ‘Friends of the Original Inhabitants of French Equatorial Africa’, which he founded in Paris in 1926, aspired only to the ‘mirage of citizenship’ as in Senegal. Matswa returned to Brazzaville, where his movement had remarkable success among the Kongo; it then spread to Libreville and Bangui. By 1929 it had 13,000 members in Bangui and the scale of demonstrations by workers there alarmed the government, which swiftly suppressed it. In 1930 Matswa was convicted on a

THE DEPRESSION OF THE 1930S

pretext of currency offences and deported to Chad; he escaped, but died in detention in 1942. His followers moved away from political action to messianism: Matswa himself became, like Simon Kimbangu, a mythical and semi-divine hero. All the same, he had briefly revealed a growing consciousness of the colonial condition.

The one great rural revolt of the period also took place in French Equatorial Africa. On the borders of Moyen-Congo, Ubangi-Shari and Cameroun, the Baya people had been driven beyond endurance by nearly thirty years of terror: by recruitment for the railway and for the *Compagnie Forestière's* rubber-tapping. In about 1924 a local prophet, Karnou, began preaching non-violent resistance. Administrators were so thin on the ground that they did not hear of this until 1927, and by then Karnou's many adherents, convinced by magic batons of their invulnerability, had taken up arms. More than 350,000 people, including 60,000 warriors, took part in an astonishing display of solidarity in an area previously notorious for its fragmented political structure. Karnou was killed in December 1928, but the insurrection spread and persisted until 1931, when the last phase of repression, the 'war of the caves', was particularly savage. In its scale, comparable to that of the Rif war of 1925–6 or the Tonkin revolt in 1930, in its duration and its impact in France, the revolt was a dramatic revelation of the failure of colonial policy. The government took the measure of Karnou's movement: though it had had to depend on ancestral values for support in small-scale societies, the refusal to collaborate with the occupying power and the appeal for inter-tribal unity gave it a pivotal significance. The country, impoverished and half-deserted, was numbed by the severity of repression: recovery seemed impossible.

THE DEPRESSION OF THE 1930S

The depression in world trade which began in 1930 had seemingly contradictory effects in French black Africa. In strictly economic terms, its impact was comparatively slight, for by then protection in trade meant that the French economy acted to some extent as a shock-absorber. But the depression transformed French imperial policy: it stimulated a new emphasis on production for export and on governmental responsibility for economic infrastructures. This

in turn provoked a social crisis, for it was Africans who bore the brunt of these changes.

Structural Changes

In terms of external trade, 1930 did not in fact mark any sudden turning-point: export values from Madagascar had peaked in 1924, from French West Africa in 1925–6 and from French Equatorial Africa in 1927. When the world depression struck, its most immediate effect was on the small white minority, and it sharply exposed the inadequacy of credit facilities.⁶⁶ There were only two private banks in French West Africa (the Banque française de l'Afrique, established in 1904, and the Banque Commerciale africaine (1924)), and the speed of withdrawals forced them to suspend payments. The Banque d'Afrique occidentale (opened in 1901), which issued currency, was not yet firmly established and the long slump in private investment delayed its recovery until 1938–9. On the other hand, colonial trading firms suffered no loss of business. Export tonnages were maintained without difficulty, since agriculture was relatively diversified, at least at the federal level, and France could still absorb what Africa could produce: it was not, after all, in Africa that 'over-production' had become a problem. Indeed, the depth of the depression saw a surge of exports from plantations laid out in the boom years of 1924–8: cotton from Ubangi-Shari, cocoa from Gabon and Cameroun, palm products from Congo, coffee from the Ivory Coast and bananas from Guinea. In an effort to promote more balanced growth, customs receipts were pooled by each federation. France sought to guarantee minimum prices for producers by paying export bonuses to trading firms in West Africa and by further loans to the governments of Equatorial Africa. Moreover, since 1928 the Colonial Customs Union had extended from Madagascar to black Africa a reciprocal agreement whereby tariffs in France and the colonies protected the products of both against foreign competition; this was elaborated in 1931–4. France gained a haven for investment capital that was otherwise boxed in by world recession; the colonies gained a sure

⁶⁶ Cf. the severe report of the former inspector of finance, Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, to the Minister of Colonies, on his mission to French West Africa, 1931–2: Archives nationales, Section Outre-Mer, Affaires politiques, 539.

outlet for their agricultural produce. Between 1929 and 1935 France's share of exports from French Equatorial Africa rose from 34 to 73 per cent, and her share of exports from French West Africa rose from 62 to 80 per cent. Meanwhile, there had been a marked improvement in the barter terms of trade for French black Africa; since 1925 these had been depressed by low prices for exported foodstuffs, but from 1930 they were more than offset by falling prices for imported manufactures. All in all, then, the colonial trading firms did reasonably well; the hardest hit were those, such as SCOA, which were most closely linked to European banks.

Public finance, however, was transformed by the depression. Already, France had decided that preserving colonial financial autonomy mattered less than boosting colonial exports. The onset of the depression strengthened the case for metropolitan intervention: colonial budgets depended heavily on customs revenues and were thus much affected by stagnation or decline in the value (as distinct from the volume) of trade. In 1931 France was authorised to make substantial loans for developing railways, roads, harbours and other installations. The loans were made at 4 or 5 per cent interest and were to be repaid within 50 years, though these terms had to be waived in the case of French Equatorial Africa. In fact, the loans were used to offset local deficits as well as to support new ventures; besides, only half the allocation for French West Africa (1,750m francs = £14m) had actually been advanced by 1940. Still, there was an important new stress on the value of technical expertise, following the tour of French West Africa in 1931–2 by the former inspector of finance, Edmond Giscard d'Estaing. Comments or proposals from the field which had once languished in the files could now be directed to technical specialists within the government. Such experts now advocated a 'dualist' strategy for colonial development: capital investment was to be concentrated in the most accessible zones and other regions would have to be content with windfalls. In 1932, a special organisation was set up to develop a huge irrigation scheme on the middle Niger for growing rice and cotton. There was fresh talk about railways eastwards across the Soudan and even across the Sahara. Industrialisation was left to the private sector, which refrained from competing with metropolitan business and still confined itself to the processing of raw materials:

between 1935 and 1939 exports of shelled groundnuts from Senegal rose from a tenth to half the total, while groundnut oil, hitherto produced only for the local market, was also exported.

It was not only France, however, which came to the aid of colonial budgets: Africans also made a major contribution. Colonial governors sought to compensate for falling export prices by increased output. To this end, the number of provident societies in French West Africa increased fivefold between 1929 and 1933. Meanwhile, some had incurred huge debts. At the depth of the depression, farmers sold groundnuts very cheaply to commercial firms which in due course sold part, whether for food or seed, for three times as much to societies who paid with loans on which they were still paying interest fifteen years later. Such practices were checked in 1933 when the societies were authorised to arrange the sale of their members' produce, despite the traders' protests, but this only served to tighten the grip of government on local production. A further incentive to African production was specifically intended to foster the growth of private ownership. In 1931, the Caisse de Crédit agricole was established for lending either to recognised collectives such as the provident societies or else to 'assimilated' Africans with registered private property.⁶⁷ This encouraged the small-scale African planter to develop land for the benefit of himself and his descendants rather than his extended family (which was sometimes matrilineal). Such credit also gave rise to speculation: in land among certain canton chiefs and in millet among town-dwellers in time of food shortage. There was a remarkable increase in the number, if not the total value, of African savings accounts, though this may be said to have reflected the rise of an African minority with a vested interest in pauperisation.

For most people, the most powerful incentive to increase production was simply the level of taxation. Poll-tax had doubled everywhere between 1925 and 1930; by 1935 it had been still further increased in French Equatorial Africa and elsewhere it was only slightly reduced. Despite protests from local officials, it remained French policy to exercise great caution before making tax reductions: taxation constituted 'the very foundation of our

⁶⁷ In French West Africa, freehold could be obtained through the process of *immatriculation*, and by 1937 Africans had obtained 18,500 such titles, covering 1,900 sq. km; half were in Senegal and most were in towns.

native system and to meddle with it would threaten both the political life of the country and the possibility of a balanced budget'.⁶⁸ Thus the burden of poll-tax was heaviest just when export prices were lowest; furthermore, poll-tax was levied collectively, and that of defaulters had to be paid by their neighbours. In Guinea and the Ivory Coast, people are known to have paid out more in cash than they earned: they had to part with their only securities — silver coins or gold trinkets. In Niger, the depression compounded a local crisis: increasing demands for forced labour (for a railway extension and a government plantation at Niamey) took no account of the seasonal needs of domestic agriculture which were highly sensitive to slight variations in rainfall; besides, food-production had suffered from the exodus of young people to the Gold Coast in protest against tax increases. In 1930 there was a plague of locusts; in 1931 there was a famine, and in some areas the death-rate exceeded 50 per cent.⁶⁹ Even outside such disaster areas, many people abandoned hope of surviving on the land. By 1936 the population of Dakar was 92,000 and that of Abidjan was 17,500: together, they had grown by 71 per cent since 1931. The population of Conakry (13,500) had doubled and that of Wagadugu (14,200) had risen by 30 per cent. Relatively few people, however, were employed: in 1936 there were only 167,000 wage-earners throughout French West Africa — barely 1 per cent of the population. Official control over patterns of migration was facilitated by changes in administrative organisation designed to save money: once Upper Volta had been divided, in 1931, between the Ivory Coast, Soudan and Niger it was easier to divert the Mossi from the Gold Coast towards Abidjan, which in 1934 became the capital of the Ivory Coast.⁷⁰

In the wake of the depression, the French economy was clearly revealed as exploiting colonial peoples.⁷¹ This can be measured

⁶⁸ Reply of the Commissioner to the Territory of the Cameroun to provincial chiefs, Circular 68, 19 September 1932, and 78, 29 April 1938. Yaoundé, Archives du Cameroun, APA - 10895/A.

⁶⁹ M. Sellier, 'Notes sur le peuplement et l'histoire du cercle de Niamey', manuscript, 1951, 84; cited by F. Fuglestad, 'La Grande Famine de 1931 dans l'ouest nigérien', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1974, 61, no. 222, 25.

⁷⁰ In 1935, in a rapprochement between France and Fascist Italy, in face of the growing Nazi threat from Germany, the border between Libya and Chad was moved 100 km further south, but this agreement was denounced by Italy in 1938.

⁷¹ Cf. A. Emmanuel, *L'Échange inégal* (Paris, 1969) and S. Amin, *L'Échange inégal et la loi de la valeur* (Paris, 1973).

‘The map which appears here in the printed edition has been removed for ease of use and now appears as an additional resource on the chapter overview page’.

in two ways. Up to 1930 there was a broad congruence between movements in African cash earnings and the basic wage of French manual workers.⁷² Thereafter, the gap steadily widened, despite barter terms of trade which were relatively favourable to the colonies. Meanwhile, capital gains were increasingly transferred to France. In 1930 the value of capital transfers from French West Africa was two-thirds that of private investments in fixed capital there and only one-fifth that of total exports. By 1938 the value of such transfers was four times that of such investments and one-third that of exports.⁷³

In June 1936 there was a brief but important change of direction in French politics: Léon Blum formed a Popular Front government of Socialists and Radicals with Communist support. This was firmly committed to state direction of the economy, but it also proclaimed the need 'to extract from the colonial system the maximum of social justice and of human potential'⁷⁴ — it was the people's welfare which ensured economic growth rather than the reverse. The Popular Front recommended a reduction of poll-tax in Africa, and laid stress on food-production and storage: silos, wells and roads were to be preferred to large-scale projects such as the Niger irrigation scheme which was already failing for want of proper research and treated its African 'settlers' as if they were convicts. In medicine, the Front stressed preventive care, promoted by mobile teams in the bush, rather than advanced methods of cure that were only available in towns. Furthermore, the Front believed that France should not simply lend to her colonies; she should also give to them. Already, in 1934, an Economic Conference of Metropolitan and Overseas France had sought to emulate Britain's Colonial Development Act of 1929 by proposing a 'National Fund for Public Works in France Overseas', up to 70 per cent of which would be financed by France herself. In 1936 the Popular Front government called a conference of colonial governors-general which approved a similar scheme. However, the money was not forthcoming and a bill to create such

⁷² A. Vanhaeverbeke, *Rémunération du travail et commerce extérieur...au Sénégal* (Louvain, 1970), 253.

⁷³ Calculations based on postal transfers; cf. C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'Mutation de l'imperialisme colonial français dans les années 30', *African Economic History*, 1977, 4, 103–52.

⁷⁴ Minister of Colonies Marius Moutet, undated note, Archives nationales, Section Outre-Mer, Affaires politiques, PA 28 (1).

a fund was thrown out by the Senate in 1939.⁷⁵ The Front itself fell from power in July 1937,⁷⁶ and its one major economic reform was the partial replacement of unpaid forced labour by an additional tax in cash: the number of days worked by such labour fell from 28 million in 1933 to 12 million in 1938.

New thinking about the colonies in Paris evoked few echoes within Africa. The state might be more assertive; the technocrat might enjoy a new-found authority; but official concern with efficient exploitation did not necessarily harmonise with the prejudices and vested interests of white colonial society. In the course of the century, this had become increasingly heterogeneous. In the Ivory Coast before 1914, civil servants had predominated among whites in employment, but by 1934 they were no more than a third; there were as many traders, while a quarter were planters.⁷⁷ Three-quarters of the white population were French people who mostly sought to return to France: whatever might have taken him to Africa, no Frenchman was a true settler, for he did not intend to live out his life in a colony. Keenly aware of being a handful of aliens (less than 5,000 in the Ivory Coast in 1939), whites closed ranks against the surrounding mass of Africans, whom they feared and despised. True, the old stereotype of the savage had been modified: 'the African' was now a tool, but by the same token he was accused of incompetence as well as inferiority. The half-caste child was abandoned to its black mother, yet whites deluded themselves with talk of the 'heroic organisation of the colonial world' and its 'vocation for sacrifice'.⁷⁸ Social contacts across the colour line were mostly confined to the unavoidable requirements of public life. Geographical segregation in towns had been legalised since the epidemics at the turn of the century: a 'white plateau' for government offices and residences was isolated from the business quarter and the African locations. The white sense of common identity was reinforced in the local club. Membership was

⁷⁵ The idea was realised in 1946, with the creation of FIDES, the Fund for Economic and Social Investment and Development, and its financial agency, the Central Bank of Overseas France.

⁷⁶ It had in fact lasted nearly twice as long as the average duration of French governments between 1920 and 1940. Such instability masked underlying continuities (cf. Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848-1945: politics and anger* (Oxford, 1979), 223-6), but few colonial ministers held office for more than a year.

⁷⁷ A. Tirefort, 'Le "bon temps"' (thèse de 3e cycle, EHESS, Paris, 1979).

⁷⁸ R. Delavignette, *Service africain* (Paris, 1946), ch. 2.

restricted to whites and a sprinkling of black French citizens (in the Ivory Coast there was one in 1914 and 114 in 1939): all alike belonged to the White Power. True, by the 1930s white society had its own divisions: an upper layer of officers, senior civil servants, professional men, business executives, managers, the occasional cleric; and a lower layer of clerks, technicians, traders and the smaller proprietors. There were also the outcasts: those who had vanished from white society by setting up house with a black woman or simply by losing their money; the poor white was very much a phenomenon of the 1930s. The advent of the Popular Front, by airing questions about social justice, inflamed the tensions within white communities. Nonetheless there remained a basic conflict between the official commitment, at least in theory, to a gradual policy of 'civilisation' and 'integration' and the concern of colonists in general to defend the 'colonial situation', i.e. the racial *status quo*.

African Responses

While the depression lasted, most Africans were too preoccupied with the struggle for survival to consider revolt, though much migration was protest. The collision between economic facts and inherited values produced both social and mental confusion, in which people discarded ancestral beliefs and lost all thought of return to the world before capitalism. There was no sign even of messianic movements such as had flourished during the First World War. It was orthodox Islam which gained most from the new time of troubles. The government saw it as an effective rival to Communist propaganda: officials received and escorted the great Tijānī marabout Seydou Nourou, grandson of al-Ḥājj 'Umar, when he toured French West Africa in the 1930s and strengthened links between Muslim communities in both town and country. Ironically, it was just as the economic crisis was straining traditional allegiances to breaking-point that the government affirmed its support for 'customary' values: at first in Governor-General Brévié's reorganisation of African judicial procedure in 1931 and then in the codification of 'native customs' from 1935.

It was Africans in towns, especially those with a Western education, who clashed most frequently with government during

the 1930s. The African élite was very mixed in character, as can be shown from Dahomey, the 'Latin Quarter' of French Africa at this period. By 1936 there were 776 literate Africans in government service, half the total number of *évolués*. There were the clerks and cashiers of business houses. There were the Afro-Brazilians, mostly small traders who had compensated for their commercial decline in earlier years by adopting white culture and acting as intermediaries in the process of colonisation. They lived like whites and sent their children to Catholic schools: 'For us blacks, education is a matter of life or death.'⁷⁹ There were also planters, some Afro-Brazilian, some descended from royalty and some from government chiefs who had got rich in the conquest: one such grandee was old Quenum, who sent two sons to study in France while a third subsidised the *Voix du Dahomey*, founded in 1927; it was soon followed by other African newspapers. In 1933 the committee of management of the *Voix* included thirteen traders and merchants, seven business employees, four farmers, an artisan and a civil servant. The paper reflected the growing self-awareness, as a class, of African small traders hindered by government from competing with the big trading houses: the first radical article attacked the taxation of businesses according to turnover. The *Voix* declared its commitment to evolution, not revolution, but in defending 'the general interests of the country' it raised all the key issues: the role of the élite, educational policy, the condition of the masses, miscarriages of justice, taxation, the economy. To rally support for the paper, local committees were set up all over the country: by 1931 there was one in each province. The circulation of the *Voix* was only 2,000, but it disclosed a degree of social awareness which alarmed the government. In 1933 the press in Dahomey took up the cause of Africans in Togo, where 14 had been sentenced to death after tax riots in Lomé. The governor of Dahomey, de Coppet, had a reputation for favouring social reform and African rights but he now complained, 'The newspapers show sympathy for certain extreme forms of Communism... Their influence is detestable. I am determined to fight them.'⁸⁰ The *Voix* fought back: 'We are not rebels, nor revolutionaries, nor Communists, but servants of France.' Nonetheless, de Coppet blamed it for passive resistance

⁷⁹ *La Voix du Dahomey*, no. 70–71, November–December 1932.

⁸⁰ Confidential circular 788 A/AP, 18 November 1933. Archives nationales du Bénin.

to taxation in 1934, which was simply due to rural impoverishment. Part of the management of the *Voix* was brought to trial and charged with 'the pernicious effect of the paper on the natives'. However, by the time that judgement was eventually given, the Popular Front was in power and the climate of opinion was very different. Generous allowance was made for extenuating circumstances and the case was seen as a victory for the élite.

Not that the Popular Front tried to re-open the imperial question. Its main concern was to challenge the rising tide of fascism in Europe, and henceforward none of the main parties, including the Communists, called for either independence or self-government in the colonies. The only constitutional measure adopted by the Front was to advocate the extension in black Africa of the former councils of notables. But it did take a step forward in the sphere of labour law. Hitherto, industrial combination in the colonies had been a criminal offence, subject to the penal code: in 1929 a ministerial despatch declared that 'the population of our colonies has not yet acquired an education which enables it to appreciate the advantages of labour legislation'.⁸¹ In March 1937 the Popular Front authorised collective bargaining and legalised trade unions in French West Africa, though it confined membership to those able to speak, read and write French and thus favoured white rather than black workers. Even so, by the end of the year there were almost 8,000 members of 42 unions and 16 professional associations. Meanwhile, over 1,500 workers came out on strike in Senegal, in the docks at Dakar, Rufisque, St Louis and Kaolack, in bakeries, and in soap and oil factories. This hastened the implementation in Senegal of decrees introducing an eight-hour day (nine hours remained the maximum in the rest of French West Africa), regulating the employment of women and children and providing compensation for accidents at work. A start was also made in improving the enforcement of labour law by reorganising the inspection of work-places.

All the same, there was a widening rift between *évolués* who could be won over by limited concessions and the rank-and-file who questioned the whole colonial system and were ready to shed blood. In 1934 Blaise Diagne died; for twenty years he had represented the four communes of Senegal in the French parlia-

⁸¹ Cited by N. Bernard-Duquenet, 'Le Front populaire et le problème des prestations en AOF', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1976, 16, nos. 61-2, 159-72.

ment. He was succeeded by the moderate Galandou Diouf, who in 1936 beat off a challenge by the socialist lawyer Lamine Guèye. There was still a widespread belief among the African élite that long-awaited reforms were at last within reach: they aspired to play out the role assigned them by French socialists — to cooperate with colonial authority as a means of eventually achieving self-government. But the Popular Front fell from power in 1937, though its influence lingered in the shape of officials and teachers whom it had appointed in the colonies. The path of negotiation and compromise had little appeal to the average worker. In September 1938 the army was used to put down a strike of railway workers at Thiès, leaving six dead and ninety injured.

One *évolué* who, in the name of African freedom and unity, refused to 'join the colonial system' was Tiémoko Garan Kouyaté. In 1927 he succeeded Lamine Senghor as leader of the African Young Communists in France and he agitated within the *Confédération générale du travail* (CGT) for the creation of independent black trade unions. He proposed a Black Man's Institute in Paris and in 1931 organised an Anti-Colonial Exhibition in reply to the International Colonial Exhibition sponsored by Blaise Diagne and the colonial ministry. In Marseilles, Kouyaté founded a school of Marxist studies and took part in the congresses of the Third International. In 1931 he began publishing the *Cri des Nègres* and in 1932 formed the Union of Black Workers. Thereafter, Kouyaté disseminated revolutionary propaganda in Africa. Tracts and newspapers were sent clandestinely from Europe to the larger towns; one important tract was called 'The Story of a White Blackbird' because that was the title of the booklet in which it was concealed. This tract was the manifesto of the League for the Struggle for Liberty of the Peoples of Senegal and Soudan, created by Kouyaté in Dakar in 1933 at the instigation of the colonial section of the French Communist Party. It would seem to be the first call in French black Africa to national independence: 'We are struggling for the right of the peoples of Senegal to manage their own affairs by forming a national, independent State. The branches of the League are preparing the workers and peasants for the great decisive battles of the Senegalese peoples.'⁸²

⁸² Archives nationales, Section Outre-Mer, Fonds Slotform, III, 53, cited by Papa I. Sy, 'Kouyaté et l'action anticoloniale de l'entre deux guerres' (Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1978)

At the end of 1933 Kouyaté was expelled from the Communist Party for failing to toe the party line, but he continued to agitate for African liberation and he collaborated with George Padmore in trying vainly to organise a Negro World Unity Congress. The Popular Front helped him to create the French Federation of the Youth of Black Africa and he presented a plan for decolonisation to the governor-general in Dakar in 1937. Soon afterwards he launched the first Association of West African Students, but when war broke out the Vichy regime deported him and he died in 1942. Even before this, the approaching war-clouds in Europe had distracted public attention from anti-colonial politics. Besides, it was the problem of cultural identity which now most concerned young black intellectuals in Paris. They realised that France was only interested in 'assimilating' them as full citizens insofar as they had adopted Western modes of thought and had rejected ancestral values.⁸³ In reaction, they explored the nature of being African: this was a theme of the magazine *L'Étudiant noir*, which was founded in 1934 by Aimé Césaire, a poet from the Antilles, and Léopold Sédar Senghor from Senegal, who taught in a French secondary school (and was the first African qualified to do so). It was they who formulated the concept of *négritude*, a transitional form of militancy which was to exert much influence in French Africa.

CONCLUSION

On the eve of the Second World War, French black Africa found itself at a crucial stage in its development. On the one hand, it seemed to be marking time: economic plans had made little progress, there had been no political reform, social agitation had collapsed and nationalist claims appeared to have subsided. Nonetheless, the preconditions for rapid change were all there. The traumatic experience of the First World War and the profound upheavals caused by the depression had transformed the relations of French Africa with the outside world and had accordingly modified its internal structures. The region was no longer a more or less negligible dependency of the metropolis; it was beginning to play a significant role within the Western capitalist system. The Second World War was to project it into a new universe.


⁸³ In 1936 there were only 2,136 black French citizens in French West Africa, apart from 78,000 in the communes of Senegal who were citizens by birth.

MADAGASCAR

In 1905 the population of Madagascar was perhaps around three million, mostly concentrated on the central plateau and the eastern littoral. Gallieni, who retired as governor-general in that year, had transformed the military regions into some twenty provinces; these in turn comprised about eighty districts, and 700 cantons under Malagasy chiefs. It had been Gallieni's intention to enforce a *politique des races*, whereby the hegemony of the Merina monarchy over neighbouring peoples would be curtailed and local leadership encouraged. In practice this policy met with limited success. The Merina continued to exert great influence outside their own kingdom, for they retained the head-start in literacy given them by Christian missions; the only two schools in the coastal regions were suppressed in 1909. Thus the lower ranks of the colonial administration were largely staffed by the former ruling class of the Merina, some of whom also became petty traders. In any case, the administration rapidly became more authoritarian as it busied itself with the collection of taxes and the mobilisation of labour to create an export economy virtually from scratch.

During the early years of the century there was a considerable influx of immigrants: by 1905 they numbered 16,500. Many were Indian and Chinese traders, and about 8,000 were French, of whom half came from Réunion. Several hoped to make fortunes by washing gold out of rivers on the eastern edge of the plateau. For a few years, gold was the island's chief export: in 1909, production amounted to 130,000 oz (half that of the Gold Coast), but thereafter exports rapidly declined. For the Malagasy, wild rubber was another instant source of income, but by 1910 supplies had been almost exhausted. White settlers turned to vanilla, coffee or cloves, and some obtained extensive grants of land on the eastern side of the island; but before 1914 exports of such tropical crops were insignificant. By 1910, and for the next two decades, the economy depended heavily on exports of rice, the main indigenous staple, and of hides and meat from the large and numerous herds of indigenous cattle. The promotion of rice exports was associated with a large-scale process of internal colonisation: the suppression of warfare among the Sakalava enabled many people from the east and south-east to migrate westwards and introduce irrigated rice cultivation in this sparsely

FRENCH BLACK AFRICA



11 Madagascar, 1939

populated region. The trade in high-bulk commodities gained greatly from the opening in 1913 of a railway from Tananarive, the capital, to the port of Tamatave.

However, the country's trade was already firmly under French control. By 1908 France accounted for nearly 80 per cent of both imports and exports, and this proportion was sustained throughout the period. Madagascar, as an isolated and captive market, paid heavily for its imports, while exports were at the mercy of monopolistic shipping companies. Customs dues yielded less than 4 per cent of government revenue between 1905 and 1920; instead, Malagasy tax-payers were heavily burdened. In 1905 the poll-tax represented 45 days' wages and sometimes absorbed the whole of a cash income. In 1909–11 the government began to regroup the population in hamlets of not less than thirty dwellings, and to suppress shifting slash-and-burn cultivation. Taxation was frequently levied in the form of labour dues, which drove many Malagasy into a kind of feudal service with settlers. Peoples of the south-east, such as the Antesaka, went north in large numbers to work, first on the railway and then on vanilla or coffee plantations. And at this early stage in colonial rule, its benefits, such as they were, were very unevenly spread: outside Imerina, the provinces contributed on average twice as much to the budget as they received from it. Even so, the educated Merina had a particular grievance of their own. They felt especially threatened by the arrival of Augagneur, governor-general from 1905 to 1910. He was a French politician, a strident republican and militant freemason, who set himself to curb the influence of the Christian missions. His offer in 1909 of French citizenship to those who could pass a stringent test of French culture was received as an insult by the Merina intelligentsia: they saw it as a threat to their own new identity as both patriotic and Protestant Merina. Some radicals, led by a minister of the church, Ravelojaona, looked to Meiji Japan as a source of inspiration. Such circles engendered in 1913 a secret society, the VVS (Vy Vato Sakelika), which became the germ of a national movement.

The First World War aggravated the constraints of colonial rule: 41,000 men served in Europe; 4,000 were killed. The island was valued by France as a source of cheap rice, manioc, butter beans (Cape peas), skins and beef extract. The demands of war also stimulated the production of graphite: 35,000 tonnes were

exported in 1917 and much was carried to the sea by porters. Railway construction and other public works were promoted by the technocratic governor-general Garbit (1914–17, 1920–24): by 1923 there were lines between Tananarive and Antsirabe, and between Moramanga and Lake Alaotra. These were built with forced labour, which was also applied during these years to plantations of coffee and vanilla; in addition to their own employees, settlers were provided by government with workers fulfilling the obligation to perform 30 days of paid labour per year. Between 1914 and 1921 prices rose fivefold while cash wages were only doubled; yet in 1919 the poll-tax was increased by two-thirds. There were still other burdens: in 1917–18 the island was afflicted by a severe drought, and in 1919 influenza killed over 100,000 people. In places, social tension became acute. In 1915–18 there was unrest among the pastoral peoples of the south-west, the Antandroy, Bara and Mahafaly; ironically, this was facilitated by the government's campaign to reduce the powers of local dynasties. And at the end of 1915 the government was alarmed by rumours of a conspiracy by the VVS, several of whom were arrested and heavily sentenced, though they were released in 1918. This incident reflected the government's concern to appease the fears of settlers whose economic importance had been enhanced by the war. For some years they had used the virulent local press to call for a share in government. In 1921 a conference of the *Délégations Économiques et Financières* was convened, and in 1924 this became a consultative assembly in which settlers regularly attacked the cost of government. They failed to obtain any legislative power, but they continued to benefit from laws on land and labour.

Under Governor-General Olivier (1924–30), the administration began to move away from its earlier reliance on settlers as the mainstay of the economy; their incipient feudalism was overlaid by the more or less enlightened despotism of a government which assumed the main role in organising production. The mobilisation of labour remained a high priority, but investments were now made in improving its strength and skills. In 1926 forced labour service for public works was introduced; this was partly applied to the building of a railway from Fianarantsoa to the coast, but also to extending the network of motorable roads, which between 1925 and 1933 increased from 2,400 km to 14,500 km. This

simplified administration; it also extended the potential area of small-scale cash-crop production. The health services were expanded and the population, hitherto static or in decline, began to increase, though plague was a serious worry in the 1920s and was not brought under control until 1937. Government commitment to primary education, which had begun with Gallieni, persisted. By 1930 there were more children in state primary schools than in those of the missions, and about a quarter of the relevant age-group was in school: a much higher proportion than anywhere in French-speaking black Africa. Malagasy was now accepted as the medium of primary-school instruction. A school in Tananarive trained students for entry to the medical school and the lower ranks of the civil service. The administration of justice gave greater scope for Malagasy customary law, while from 1927 tax was assessed on property and products rather than persons.

There were however no political concessions. True, local councils of notables chose representatives for the *Délégations Économiques et Financières*, but these Malagasy members met separately from the Europeans and were quite ineffective. In theory, of course, French naturalisation was a possible avenue to political rights; in practice, the door was closed, if only because the requisite education was virtually unavailable. And it was the acquisition of French citizenship which became the chief goal of Madagascar's first real nationalist movement. This was initiated by Ralaimongo (1883–1942), a Betsileo and former Protestant teacher who had served in France during the war and stayed on there, making contact with socialists. Back in Madagascar, he founded in 1923 a French-language newspaper, for political discussion in Malagasy was forbidden. The paper attacked colonial abuses, encouraged passive resistance among plantation workers, and demanded both mass naturalisation and Madagascar's transformation into a French *département*. Ralaimongo's followers were a small but motley group, including former members of the VVS, a Creole settler and two French Communists. In May 1929 they mounted a demonstration in Tananarive; Ralaimongo was placed under house arrest and others were imprisoned.

When the world-wide economic depression struck in 1930, the island's economy was already in difficulties. Prices for graphite and vanilla fell by 50 per cent in 1927–8: in 1929, vanilla exports exceeded world consumption. Between 1926 and 1934 cyclones

devastated plantations on the east coast. Many settlers were brought near ruin and could not repay loans from the government. To rescue settlers, Governor-General Cayla (1930–9) persuaded the French government to add bonuses to depressed export prices, but this also encouraged Malagasy production which was further fostered by government propaganda. In 1934 the government reckoned that the costs of the Malagasy producer were half those of the settler. By 1935 Malagasy producers occupied more than two-thirds of the area under cash-crops such as coffee, cloves and vanilla. It was largely due to Malagasy planters that in the course of the 1930s coffee became the island's chief export: by 1938 it contributed 36 per cent of the total value of exports and the quantity, at 41,000 tonnes, was close to that exported from Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika combined. Clove production also rose sharply: 6,000 tonnes were exported in 1938, compared to 8,000 from Zanzibar. Thus among the peoples along the eastern littoral dependence on migrant wage-labour was diminished, and some were able to register title to land, under a scheme begun in 1929. The basis for a rural middle class was being laid. Yet political ambitions seemed no nearer fulfilment. In 1936 the advent of the Popular Front government in France led to the release of demonstrators gaoled in 1929, while a strike in Tananarive (now a town of 140,000 inhabitants) was rewarded by the tentative recognition of trade-union rights for Malagasy. In 1938 access to French citizenship was slightly eased, but in 1939 it was enjoyed by less than 8,000 Malagasy. National independence, not assimilation, was now the prevailing ambition of literate Malagasy, though the unification of the country by a dynamic bourgeoisie, on a foundation of nationalism and modernism, was still a distant objective.

CHAPTER 8

BRITISH WEST AFRICA AND LIBERIA

This chapter is concerned with those parts of West Africa where by 1918 English was established as the principal language of government. They included the independent black republic of Liberia, the British possessions of the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, and sections of the mandated territories of the former German Kamerun and Togo which were administratively attached to Nigeria and the Gold Coast, respectively, following the First World War. Varying in size from the Gambia, its 4,003 square miles drawn out along the Gambia river for three hundred miles, to Nigeria, which covered over 356,000 square miles, they encompassed a diversity of ecological zones: coastal swamps, tropical rainforests, savanna, sahel, montane and riverain regions. These contrasts had fostered long-established internal commerce and export trade, sustained in turn by some of the most populous areas in tropical Africa. The pre-colonial political institutions in what became anglophone West Africa had ranged from ancient forest kingdoms and Islamic theocracies to a variety of stateless societies. By 1905 they had been incorporated in a number of colonial polities which were themselves far from homogeneous.

The British West African possessions were constitutionally rather untidy 'multiple dependencies', consisting of older coastal 'settled' colonies linked to larger hinterland protectorates. In the former the African population were British subjects and were entitled to various legal rights not enjoyed by 'protected persons' in the latter. This was further complicated in the Gold Coast by a tripartite linking of the 'settled' coastal colony, beyond which lay Ashanti (Asante), a colony by conquest, and the hinterland protectorate of the Northern Territories, each separately administered under the governor, while three British administrators were in charge of the protectorate of Northern Nigeria, the protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and the 'settled' colony and

protectorate of Lagos. The German colonies were moving from an era of rather muddled imperial supervision and scandal to that of so-called 'scientific' colonialism and exploitation. In Liberia, the non-indigenous Americo-Liberian ruling class struggled to maintain sovereignty over a country it barely governed against the threats of encroachment by its erstwhile European allies.

Economically much of the region was already integrated into the Western commercial system. While subsistence production remained an important aspect of the domestic economy, West Africans had demonstrated a willingness to respond to market incentives. As a result, there was a securely established European maritime trade based on African small-scale production of export commodities and natural products. Hence entrenched European trading firms mounted a strong and sustained opposition to the competing demands of expatriate mining and plantation interests. While often locally significant, the plantation and mining sectors never predominated in anglophone West Africa as they did elsewhere in colonial Africa. Colonial economic policies, monetary regulations and infrastructural developments in communications, transport and distributive systems facilitated the extension of the existing commercial systems into new areas. On the other hand, despite elements of continuity, by subordinating the internal domestic economy to the interest of the export sector while subordinating the latter to external influences, the 'open' colonial economy represented a fundamental change in the nature of Afro-European relations.

Differences in colonial legislation, geography, indigenous culture and socio-economic opportunities influenced the nature and tempo of local response to the colonial situation. Yet the African population shared a core of experience derived from the not dissimilar nature of German, British West African and Americo-Liberian colonialism. All three adopted paternalistic policies of indirect native administration; facilitated the expansion of Western law and education and Christian missions; opened the economy to foreign exploitation; and sought to justify their economic and political control on the bases of racial and cultural superiority. The very nature of indigenous political institutions was altered in the process of being incorporated into the fabric of colonial administration. The adoption of cash-crops, and especially long-term investment in tree-crops such as cocoa, was giving rise to

new attitudes towards the ownership and sale of land, the emergence of a rural capitalist class dependent upon the vagaries of the world market, and increasing reliance upon food imports; there were also subsidiary effects such as the decline in nutrient intake resulting from the increased use of cassava. Areas of economic growth such as the cities of Lagos, Freetown and Accra, the Gold Coast cocoa-growing region of Akwapim and the German plantations on Mt Cameroun were the foci of migration, leading to the disruption of indigenous institutions and culture. Greater mobility and wider social intercourse also facilitated the spread of social and epidemic disease, such as syphilis and gonorrhoea, smallpox and sleeping-sickness. Public health services provided little defence, for as yet they devoted the bulk of their resources to the care of Europeans and the urban élite.

The burgeoning African élite, their status based on educational, economic and social achievement, with their self-conscious class identity, English as a common language and wide-ranging contacts which cut across the narrow confines of ethnic and colonial political divisions, were already a conspicuous element in West African society. Confronted with mounting European racism, they were becoming increasingly assertive in their demands for participation in the decision-making process and for recognition as spokesmen of the new order. Though often as remiss as many of the traditional leaders when it came to articulating the grievances and aspirations of the common people, they were nevertheless to foster a new nationalist, and often radical, political consciousness. Meanwhile, indigenous cultural practices and belief systems were strained by new problems and environments. Many of the coastal areas of anglophone West Africa had been exposed to generations of sustained Christian missionary activity. The more concrete mode of thought prominent in pre-scientific African supernatural empiricism¹ was confronted by an abstract and analytical Western mode, though Christian missionary teachings frequently blurred the distinction and linked Christian faith with Western material culture. In such circumstances, the initial response to missionary Christianity was often followed by frustration and rejection as the new religion proved inadequate as a system of explanation, prediction and control.

¹ Cf. Robin Horton, 'African traditional thought and western science', *Africa*, 1967, 37, 1-2; *idem.*, 'African conversion', *Africa*, 1971, 41, 2.

BRITISH WEST AFRICA, 1905–1914

By 1905 the era of colonial conquest was drawing to a close and British West Africa was entering a period of administrative consolidation. In the interests of economy, Lagos and Southern Nigeria were united in May 1906, to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Yet on such basic issues as land policy, Nigeria remained a divided ‘multiple dependency’. In Lagos Colony a system of freehold land tenure based on Crown grants issued to original African claimants operated. In Southern Nigeria African ownership of the land was recognised, subject to certain regulations designed to prevent alienation to non-Africans. In Northern Nigeria, almost all the land was ‘nationalised’ and all rights to land were vested in the government as trustee. This eliminated what many colonial officials regarded as the vexatious problems of land litigation and individual ownership, as distinct from rights of occupancy, though it did not prevent a shift from communal towards individual rights. British rule thus superimposed legal and bureaucratic diversity upon a heterogeneous complex of indigenous cultures and polities.

‘Punitive patrols’ persisted but increasingly they took the form of police operations against isolated communities in connection with criminal cases, as defined by the colonial authorities, or in reprisal for failure to pay taxes or supply labour. They were thus part of the process of defining the relationship between the new colonial government and African societies. At the local level, administrators were preoccupied with identifying and reaching an accord with traditional indigenous authorities through whom the colonial oligarchy might rule the vast African population. With only one British administrator for every 100,000 Africans in Northern Nigeria, and five administrative officers for the entire Sierra Leone Protectorate with a population of over one million,² day-to-day responsibilities for maintaining law and order, mobilising labour and/or collecting taxes devolved upon the local African authorities.

Known as ‘indirect rule’, the system reached its fullest elaboration in Northern Nigeria. Here Sir Frederick Lugard (high commissioner, 1901–6) had found the sophisticated Hausa–Fulani government and Islamic judiciary well suited to his needs; it was

² Figures based on censuses of Northern Nigeria in 1926 and Sierra Leone in 1921.

strengthened by the system of ‘native treasuries’ developed by H. R. Palmer between 1906 and 1911. However, the popularisation of the emirate model as an administrative paradigm by Lugard and his supporters not only influenced British perceptions and colonial policies but also obscured both its limitations and earlier analogous developments elsewhere in Southern Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. The result was a profusion of arrangements whereby multifarious indigenous authorities — Yoruba monarchs, subordinate chiefs of the once mighty Asante confederation or parochial Limba leaders — were recognised as ‘chiefs’ by the relevant British governor and were allowed to exercise often quite wide-ranging powers, particularly judicial authority, subject to varying degrees of administrative supervision.

Among the Ibo, Tiv and numerous other acephalous societies where no such person of authority existed, ‘chiefs’ were created in accordance both with the demands of administrative expediency and with European theories of evolutionary political tutelage, chieftaincy being regarded as a ‘natural’ form of African government. Colonial officers wanted agents to whom they could issue instructions and whom they could hold responsible for carrying them out. In chiefless societies such as the Tiv, this frequently resulted in the elevation of ‘marginal men’, those imperfectly socialised into indigenous culture who thus had least to lose and most to gain from siding with British authorities, or alien Africans (e.g. Hausa) from stratified societies who were prepared to cooperate with the British. Yet such individuals lacked close familiarity with local customs or the dynamics of parochial power and their new responsibilities, by definition, brought them into conflict with indigenous political norms.

In the case of stratified, hierarchical societies such as the Hausa or Yoruba, the impact of colonial rule was initially less dramatic. Though incumbent rulers who resisted the loss of their sovereignty were removed, the British lavished considerable attention on the subtleties of succession and protocol. However, the authority of traditional rulers no longer rested on the consent of the people or of powerful factions within the community but were derived from the governor. It was a power relationship which astute chiefs, such as *alafin* Ladugbola of Oyo, were to manipulate to negate indigenous constitutional constraints on autocracy,

remove potential rivals and even expand their sphere of authority. At their best, African authorities acted as mediators between the colonial oligarchy and the people, channelling and interpreting information, instructions and ideas. On the other hand, the dependence of the British on local rulers inclined them to turn a blind eye to exactions and abuses of power by men such as Emir Aliyu of Zaria. Only serious breaches of the law, such as embezzlement of government funds or murder, or the threat of serious popular unrest, led to the removal of a colonial chief, and then generally to exile rather than imprisonment. Nevertheless, it was to such rulers, rather than the Western-educated African élite, that the colonial government increasingly turned for advice, thereby reinforcing British conservative and autocratic biases.

By the turn of the century there was already an established educated élite of African doctors, lawyers, clergy and businessmen in the coastal areas, who were accustomed to playing an active role in the political and social life of the community. Predominantly, though not exclusively, Christian, they were imbued with the sombre middle-class Victorian tones of their missionary teachers and models, yet permeated with distinct and vibrant local hues. A common educational experience, often physically and emotionally demanding, and a common language, English, gave the élite a sense of unity, reinforced by social, commercial and marital links. They frequently travelled to other parts of West Africa, as well as Britain, on business and family matters; and collateral branches of prominent families were often to be found in the trading emporia along the coast. Through such contacts, through correspondence and the lively African press, the élite were often better informed than were local colonial officials about the course of events or legislation in other colonies deemed detrimental to African and/or élite interests. The chain of authority within the colonial service led through the governor to the colonial secretary in London; hence British officials rarely made contact with their counterparts in other British colonies. As a result, it was the élite, rather than British officials, who kept alive a sense of the unity of British West Africa. However, for the educated élite, the period was one of mounting frustration and humiliation.

The achievements of their predecessors turned to bitter memories as hardening racist attitudes led to the exclusion of Africans

from senior posts in the colonial service and from official society. Even the missionary societies, which had educated them in the faith of oneness before God, now denied them equality within the church. The colour bar sullied the missionary organisations and the influence of African clergy waned, though as martyrs their standing amongst African congregations and their retrospective image as early ‘nationalists’ grew. Rejected by the leadership of white colonial society, some of the African élite reasserted their cultural roots by adopting African dress and names, along with a renewed interest in indigenous customs and religion, albeit often for the purpose of demonstrating the proximity of the latter to Christian beliefs and practices. The Christian ‘Reformed’ Ogboni Society, established among the Yoruba élite in 1914 in response to the growing European dominance of the Lagos Masonic Lodge, sought to reinterpret and ‘purify’ the traditional institution, a faint glimmer of the syncretism later to become such an important element of African innovation. However, the psychological dependence of the westernised élite inhibited their response. Thus those who broke away from the missionaries to form their own churches carried with them a respect for denominational practices and doctrinal orthodoxy. Other African clergy, such as Bishop James Johnson, could never sever the ties with the Church Missionary Society; God was still perceived as dwelling somewhere behind Salisbury Square.

In the older ‘settled’ colonies, African unofficial representatives appointed by the governor still sat on the legislative council, ostensibly to advise him. However, such representation provided no real check on colonial autocracy. The official majority was required to vote with the governor, who in any case was not bound by the advice of the council. Thus, in spite of African unofficial opposition, discriminatory and restrictive legislation was passed, such as the 1903 Nigerian Newspaper Ordinance and the 1909 Nigerian Seditious Offences Ordinance, both aimed at stifling African criticism of the government. In any case, deliberations of the legislative council were normally confined to matters affecting the ‘settled’ colony, thus limiting their scope and effectiveness as an arena for articulating African grievances. Nevertheless, increased elective African representation on the legislative councils, as well as African membership of the more senior policy-formulating executive councils, became major

objectives of the early African nationalists, absorbing much of the political energies of the educated élite. As in the mission churches, they clung to a vision of participation in decision-making, though in 1920 Lugard expressed the prevailing British conceit and disdain for educated Africans when he remarked that ‘the interests of a large native population shall not be subject to the will...of a small minority of educated and Europeanised natives who have nothing in common with them, and whose interests are often opposed to theirs’.³

Power remained firmly in European hands. Yet the British were highly successful at incorporating potential African leaders, giving them a stake in the colonial system, a factor of far greater significance than the oft-extolled effects of the maxim-gun. In Northern Nigeria, the rebellion at Satiru in 1906 by the Hausa peasantry posed as great a threat to the Fulani emirs as to the British and was duly crushed with combined severity. However, such isolated incidents need to be viewed against the general context of the relatively peaceful transition to colonial rule following the initial conquest, coinciding as it did with a period of economic boom in West Africa between 1906 and the First World War.

Both the volume and barter terms of trade improved, resulting in an increase in the income terms of trade.⁴ This was most dramatically illustrated by the growth of cocoa exports from the Gold Coast. Cocoa had been introduced there towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the leading export was rubber. In 1902 rubber was overtaken by gold, which was mined in the western province by foreign-owned companies and yielded over a million pounds’ worth of exports in 1907. Gold exports first exceeded £1m in 1907 and for most of our period were worth between one-third and one half of Southern Rhodesia’s. From 1910, however, cocoa took first place and by 1914 exports amounted to 53,000 tons, worth £2.2m. The Gold Coast was now the world’s largest producer of cocoa, and remained so to the end of our period. Nigeria’s exports throughout our period were dominated by palm produce: between 1905 and 1913 exports of palm kernels doubled in bulk and their value rose to £3.1m, nearly

³ *Report by Sir F. D. Lugard on the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, and administration, 1912–1919* (1920), Cmd. 468, 19.

⁴ See chapter 2, p. 130.

half the total. Meanwhile, tin was being mined on the Jos plateau. Exports began in 1907 and were boosted by the advent of a railway in 1911; by 1913 they were worth £568,000. In Sierra Leone, the export value of palm kernels increased threefold between 1905 and 1913, when it reached £921,000, over two-thirds of total exports. The expansion of cash-crop production, if not of mining, enabled growth in African consumer demand. Nigeria's imports of cotton goods doubled between 1905 and 1913, while its imports of cigars and cigarettes increased 15-fold. Though the large European import-export firms were the principal beneficiaries, the African bourgeoisie, the entrepreneurial and professional classes, as well as the African primary producer, gained from the better prices for exports and the increased availability of goods.

The increased revenue from import duties and the bullish atmosphere of the boom facilitated capital investment and the expansion of technical departments for forestry, veterinary work and mineral survey. As a result of the discovery in 1909 of coal at Udi in eastern Nigeria, the only deposit in West Africa, the government began construction of a railway line to terminate at a new city, Port Harcourt. Improved transport and communications, government propaganda and more coercive pressures such as forced labour, combined with direct taxation in Northern Nigeria, further fuelled the expansion of the export sector, albeit often not as anticipated. In 1911 the main Nigerian railway from Lagos reached Kano; both government officials and British commercial interests, particularly the British Cotton Growing Association, expected it to tap the vast indigenous cotton-producing areas of central Hausaland. The quest for imperial sources of raw cotton, as an alternative to dependence upon American cotton supplies, was a major theme in British colonial policy. As it turned out, Hausa farmers found that they could reap a greater return in terms of land and labour inputs by cultivating groundnuts, a more reliable crop and one that could be eaten in the event of low producer prices or the failure of subsistence crops. As a result, Nigerian groundnut exports jumped from under 2,000 tons before 1911 to nearly 20,000 tons in 1913.

Moreover, railway routes, dictated by strategic considerations and existing or perceived British marketing opportunities, favoured selected areas while relegating others to the economic

BRITISH WEST AFRICA AND LIBERIA



12 Nigeria and Camerouns, 1935
(see also maps 9, 10)

periphery. Marginal areas with few resources capable of sustaining the high capital investment of railway construction, such as the Nigerian Middle Belt, Sokoto and Bornu, the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast and the Koinadogu district of Sierra Leone, came to be regarded as labour reserves to be drawn upon if and when needed. In addition to periodic demands for short-term unpaid 'political labour' to serve as porters for officials and on projects such as the construction of 'roads', government rest-

houses and even railways, new migratory labour patterns were established, occasionally by direct government recruitment for the commercial sector. In the Northern Territories, chiefs were paid a head-tax of 5s for every man sent to labour underground in the gold mines of the colony, where the mine companies were in direct competition with indigenous cocoa cultivators. When such incentives failed to produce ‘recruits’, district commissioners resorted to coercion. There was even discussion of implementing a system based, as in South Africa, on pass-laws, a labour bureau and a revised Master and Servant Ordinance to ensure greater stability and control over mine labour. Such pressures from mining interests were ultimately rejected by the Colonial Office on the pragmatic ground that the burgeoning cocoa industry might be disrupted. ‘The total failure of the mining industry would cause no more, at most, than a temporary set-back to the revenue of the [Gold Coast] Government.’⁵ More often commercial interests and colonial authorities were in direct competition for African labour. Differential economic opportunities and indirect pressures, such as taxation, were the primary factors sustaining the level of labour supply once the pattern was established. In general, the areas most distant from the colonial capitals were also those most neglected by them. They received little of the limited funds which colonial governments provided for health or education, and they held little status in the hierarchy of government postings, though the historical and religious claims of Sokoto and Bornu as centres of Islamic culture and polity led to their rulers exercising a measure of political influence disproportionate to these regions’ economic significance.

The growth of the colonial economy was accompanied by the subordination and decline of many indigenous industries: African salt-producers, for instance, could seldom compete with inexpensive imported salt.⁶ Moreover, government policies tended to discriminate against African enterprise. While colonial rule facilitated Hausa commercial penetration into many hitherto hostile

⁵ Colonial Office Minute of 24 July 1911, quoted in Roger G. Thomas, ‘Forced labour in British West Africa: the case of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1906–1927’, *Journal of African History*, 1973, 14, 1, 88–9. The same debate took place in Nigeria in 1911 and had a similar outcome: cf. Bill Freund, *Capital and labour in the Nigerian tin mines* (London, 1981).

⁶ For the persistence of the salt industry at Ada, in the Gold Coast, see Inez B. Sutton, ‘The Volta River salt trade’, *Journal of African History*, 1981, 22, 43–61.

areas, Lugard imposed a system of canoe and caravan tolls in Northern Nigeria to reduce the number of people engaged in what he regarded as 'unproductive' labour, hoping thereby to force them into cash-crop production. In 1906 he removed caravan duties on British cottons and other imports, though not on the preferred, more durable, indigenous cloth, in order that British goods might compete more effectively. In 1907 Lugard was posted to Hong Kong, and his successor, Girouard, rescinded these measures, but the cloth industry was then hit by the decline in cotton production in the main Kano–Zaria region following the growth of groundnut cultivation. Decreased cotton supplies led to a reduction in output and labour requirements, both in the weaving industry and, to a lesser extent, in the dyeing industry, which survived by utilising imported cloth. On the Jos plateau, the government upheld European mining leases against the claims of the indigenous mining and smelting industry. The role of Africans in mining was reduced to that of mine labour and 'tributor' sub-contracting: they were compelled to purchase mining 'rights' from European companies to work traditional sites and sell tin to the same companies below market prices. The inhabitants of mining areas, such as the Birom, lost most of their land, while timber and water resources were increasingly brought under the control of expatriate mining interests. It should also be noted that there were still socio-economies, such as those of the Fulani pastoralists and Kofyar hill-farmers, which were so marginal to the colonial system as to be largely unaffected by it.

Those Africans who were able to exploit new opportunities jealously guarded their rights. As well as recruiting labour, colonial chiefs often utilised control over the distribution of land and rights to communal labour, recognised under colonial ordinances, for the cultivation of cash-crops for personal gain. In the forest regions, traditional rulers leased timber rights to contractors who 'mined' the forests, indiscriminately felling trees to extract selected hardwoods. The colonial governments, despite conservationist inclinations, had difficulty regulating the timber industry. The 1902 Southern Nigerian Forestry Ordinance had to be drastically amended in the face of opposition not only from influential European timber and shipping interests but also from the traditional leaders and African entrepreneurs, both of whom viewed government control as an infringement of indigenous

rights and as an attack on African economic endeavour. Between 1907 and 1911, similar legislation in the Gold Coast encountered stiff resistance from the Aborigines' Rights Protection Society, which was drawn from both chiefs and the educated élite. The ARPS convened protest meetings, petitioned the legislative council, and sent a delegation to London, including J. E. Casely Hayford and E. J. P. Brown, barristers who had been active in earlier land disputes. As a result, the Colonial Office instituted an enquiry into land rights and alienation in the Gold Coast in 1912.

Meanwhile the Northern Nigerian Land Ordinance of 1910, which was based on Henry George's theories of economic rent, had aroused considerable interest in Britain, leading to the setting up by the Colonial Office of a West African Lands Committee. The committee members, predisposed to a protectionist policy based on the concept of state control in the interest of the community, were encouraged by the findings of the Gold Coast enquiry. They criticised the exploitation of natural resources by a small élite for personal gain, and the high cost and delays caused by land litigation, and recommended that control over land be removed from the judiciary and be vested in the administration. This, however, ignored the political realities of West Africa. News of the committee had been greeted by a storm of protests. Africans were suspicious of British motives and were well aware of the often arbitrary nature of administrative decisions. At a meeting in Lagos, one speaker pointed to a recent Sierra Leone land concession to Lever Brothers as a portent of the future. Samuel Pearce, a prominent Lagos merchant, led a Nigerian protest delegation to London in 1913.⁷ Land 'ownership' was an issue which united chiefs, the educated urban élite and the emergent rural capitalist classes. The Colonial Office cautiously shelved the Lands Committee's recommendations and the Gold Coast legislation was quietly abandoned.

The growing complexity of the colonial economy was reflected in the relations between élites; traditional, educated bourgeoisie

⁷ Not untypical of the multi-faceted British West African élite of the period, Pearce was a leader of the Lagos Aborigines' Protection Society; at various times member of the legislative council, the Lagos town council, licensing commission and assessment board; trustee of Lagos town hall and of the Lagos racecourse board of management; member of the diocesan board and the parochial board of Christ Church, and representative of the Anglican church synod. In 1915 he became a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and of the Royal Colonial Institute, London. A. MacMillan, *The red book of West Africa* (London, 1920), 97–8.

and rural capitalist. During the 1890s, J. K. Coker, J. H. Doherty and a number of other merchants in Lagos ventured into plantation agriculture to compensate for their weakening commercial position. In 1907 they formed the Agege Planters Union to protect their own interests while promoting cocoa cultivation through propaganda and assistance to small farmers. Simultaneously, news of their cocoa wealth, carried back to the Ondo hinterland by plantation labourers, attracted attention. Cocoa, however, was particularly dependent upon the export trade since the beans had no domestic use. When a combination of low world prices and local buying agreements by exporters led to a 50 per cent drop in Gold Coast producer prices in 1908, a group of cocoa farmers near Kumasi staged a brief hold-up. A number of chiefs, who were themselves cocoa farmers, supported the ban but they came under government censure for interfering with trade. Official reaction thus favoured the companies, which were under little pressure to increase producer prices given alternative supplies and the weakness of the market. Poorer farmers could not afford not to sell, many of the chiefs bowed to government intimidation, and the wealthy farmers rushed to sell lest the price fell further.

Yet, save for momentary setbacks such as the 1908 cocoa slump, price incentives for export cultivation remained high. The dramatic increase in export production of the pre-war period was the result of increased use of land and labour, as well as investment in new tools and seeds, by numerous small-scale farmers. In many areas this was facilitated by rural capital accumulation and consumer demands arising from the rubber boom of the 1890s, when uncontrolled exploitation had led to the widespread destruction of wild latex-bearing plants. In turn, long-term investment during this period was to lay the foundation for the post-war recovery of the 1920s; this was especially true of cocoa, a tree-crop which does not mature for at least seven years. Moreover, export growth was generally achieved without widespread dislocation or diminution of the subsistence sector, which remained the mainstay of the domestic economy. The household remained the basic unit of production, though the responses of farmers frequently involved the innovative adaptation of indigenous institutions. Thus traditional family and kinship obligations were used to mobilise labour and capital, as instanced by the formation of 'companies' in the Akwapim cocoa region for the purchase of

land. Furthermore, as land assumed a new value as a means of obtaining wealth, the transition from communal to individual ownership deplored by the Land Committee became replicated as land became a marketable commodity. The landed rural capitalist class, often themselves originally ‘stranger farmers’, began to employ migrant labour anxious to amass capital in an increasingly moneyed economy. By 1910 there may already have been as many farm labourers as farmers in the Gold Coast cocoa-growing areas, part of a process of increasing rural socio-economic differentiation.⁸

It was, however, the colonial government, as the largest employer of labour, which was primarily responsible for the creation of the African proletariat, with all its socio-political ramifications. The colonial system could not have functioned without African employees, who filled a wide range of subordinate administrative and technical posts: soldiers and police, forest rangers and agricultural assistants, legions of messengers and clerks. The public works and railway departments, which required large numbers of artisans and unskilled labour, even ran their own training programmes. Yet, like the better-educated African white-collar workers in government service, both the permanently employed skilled workers and the less secure semi-skilled and unskilled labourers had experienced a deterioration of their real incomes and conditions of service around the turn of the century. Consequently there were strikes by skilled personnel, such as those of the Nigerian railway clerks in 1902 and 1904 (which were supported by unskilled railway workers and the African press). The immediate reaction of British officials was uncompromising. Strikes were viewed as a direct challenge to colonial authority. Scab labour and violence were used to break strikes; workers were fired upon during the 1911 Sierra Leone railway strike. Yet through such pressure at a time of increasing demand for their services, skilled employees were able to obtain wage increases of 35 to 50 per cent between 1906 and 1914. As for the unskilled, whose daily wage remained fairly static until after the Second World War, the rapid upward mobility helped ease labour relations. On the other hand, British officials and businessmen tended to regard labour costs in British West Africa as excessive,

⁸ Polly Hill, *The migrant cocoa-farmers of southern Ghana: a study in rural capitalism* (Cambridge, 1963), 17.

despite the gross imbalance between their own income and that of their employees: 9d to 1s per day for an unskilled labourer, £36 to £48 per annum for a skilled carpenter and joiner, as compared to £300 per annum plus allowances for the lowest-ranking administrative cadet in Nigeria.

The British colonial system was fraught with contradictions. Development and exploitation necessitated the incorporation of increasing numbers into the colonial economy, yet the government sought to rule through a system of local administration based on indigenous socio-political institutions. The cautious, well-intentioned paternalism of British indirect rule, with its concern for controlled change in harmony with local cultures, lent itself to a narrow preservationist 'zoo-keeper' mentality. Nowhere were the paradoxes more glaring than in the areas of education and missionary endeavour. Privately, junior officials were not infrequently concerned that the forces of change introduced by commercial and missionary activities might lead to local unrest, thereby adversely reflecting on their own abilities to control their districts and thus their prospects for promotion or transfer to more prestigious postings. British officials were not unaware of the need for educated youths if the 'native administrations' were to be 'modernised', with properly written records and accounts. Mission schools far outnumbered and often predated government institutions, being at the centre of evangelisation, and the source of future generations of converts. Yet missionary education and Christianity were indiscriminate in their impact. They tended to attract those with the least stake in the system and thus most inclined to challenge it, often encouraged by missionary denunciation of local beliefs and practices. The prevailing official attitude was dominated by the English 'public school' model and elitist principles. These held that such limited education as was necessary was best restricted to the sons of chiefs, as at the government schools of Kano, in Northern Nigeria, and Bo, in Sierra Leone. The fact that chiefs were suspicious and often sent the sons of slaves or commoners to school was a problem to be overcome by persuasion, and coercion if required. Missionary activities were greatly restricted in the Muslim areas of Northern Nigeria, on the grounds that their presence would be antagonistic to local religious sensibilities, and also in the less closely administered hinterland, such as the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast,

GERMAN WEST AFRICA, 1905–1914

in the interest of safety and security. In the long term, this protectionist policy left the peoples of these peripheral regions ill-prepared to respond to the demands of modern political economies.

In 1912 Lugard was recalled to Nigeria, in order to unify its administration. The Colonial Office hoped both to rationalise the railway policies of the two dependencies and also relieve the British tax-payer of the burden of the recurrent Northern Nigerian deficit by charging it against the revenue derived from Southern Nigeria's export duties. As governor of both dependencies, Lugard supervised their amalgamation in January 1914, when he became governor-general. This union was very imperfect. The transfer of administrative staff between south and north, and even between Muslim and 'pagan' areas within the north, was very rare; differences in land policy persisted; while technical services such as agriculture, education, police and prisons remained separate until the 1920s.

GERMAN WEST AFRICA, 1905–1914

The year 1905 witnessed crises and turmoil within Germany's African empire. Rebellions in German East Africa and South West Africa, and scandals concerning the cruelty and immorality of officials in Togo and Kamerun, had focused attention on the need for reform. In 1906 a new *Kolonialdirektor*, Bernhard Dernburg, was appointed and a colonial ministry was established in 1907, further strengthening the already considerable control which Berlin exercised over its colonial governors. Simultaneously the reorganisation brought to office new governors, Count Julius von Zech in Togo and Theodore Seitz in Kamerun, who were more sympathetic to African grievances though no less determined to wrest an economic return from the colonies. Colonial conquest, which had been prolonged and bloody, due as much to the difficulties of vanquishing numerous small fragmentary polities as to alleged German militarism, was giving way to more settled administration and economic exploitation.

In both Togo and Kamerun the governor was assisted by an exclusively German advisory council composed of an official majority with unofficial representatives of German settler, commercial and missionary interests. African representation was

conspicuously absent. It had been discussed by the governors' councils and in the colonial advisory council in Berlin, but rejected for fear of encouraging African opposition and lessening the influence of unofficial interests. Towards the end of the period, debate shifted to the admission of African traditional leaders, along the lines which were adopted in British West African territories during the 1920s, but the possibility of constitutional innovation was cut short by the outbreak of war in 1914.

In the hinterland of Togo and Kamerun, German administration tended to resemble British indirect rule; shortages of German staff and resources meant reliance upon existing African authorities as agents of control. In 1913 the total German personnel in district administration, including clerks, numbered only 26 in Togo and 47 in Kamerun, while the annual budget of Togo was less than that of Berlin University. Districts were administered by adventurous young German military officers, colonial refugees from a peacetime army who were not unlike their British counterparts. They were assisted by a quasi-military police force as well as the backing of regular colonial troops in Kamerun. There were no such troops in Togo, but the police, armed with rifles plus three machine-gun units, were commanded by German military officers and capable of operating as a military unit. 'Chiefs' who were recognised by the governor were allowed to exercise considerable power subject to periodic administrative supervision. As in British West Africa, this not infrequently resulted in local 'big men' being given authority over peoples over whom they had no traditional claim, while once powerful overlords had their position undermined by government recognition of subordinates as independent authorities. The 'chiefs', who were generally assigned one or two policemen to assist them, were responsible for mobilising draft labour, collecting taxes of which they retained a portion, and trying minor civil and criminal cases in accordance with native law and custom, fruitful areas for petty corruption. Only the more determined colonial subjects took appeals to the German administrator; colonial justice, based on the *Bezirksleiterrecht*, an unspecified combination of German law and local custom, was unpredictable and harsh. Flogging was a common punishment, giving rise to a protracted official debate in Togo over the relative merits of the local leather lash and the officially prescribed rhino-hide whip.

German rule was more direct in the settled coastal areas, the Ewe territory of southern Togo and the regions around Duala, Victoria and Mt Cameroun, where there were already numerous mission-educated Africans, an established African entrepreneurial élite, and a developing export economy. In Lomé, the capital of Togo, a five-man advisory city council was established in 1908, chaired by the district officer with two Togolese members. However, such African representation was exceptional. In addition to the usual racial prejudices and reluctance by colonial authorities to allow subject peoples access to power, the westernised black élite in Togo and Kamerun were at the special disadvantage of being mainly English-speaking: a reflection of the pre-colonial dominance of English commerce and of Anglo-American missionary education in these areas. Consequently there was increasing government pressure for the introduction of German language instruction in the schools. On the other hand, German officials were no less concerned than their British counterparts over the ‘detribalisation’ of increasing numbers of Africans through education: 13,746 enrolled in Togo in 1911, and over 34,000 in Kamerun. In Togo, the reformist governor Zech established a rehabilitation camp at Atakpame for the instruction of detribalised offenders in ‘productive labour’.

The role of guardian of African interests was assumed by the German missionaries. They normally spoke the local languages and were acknowledged as authorities on the indigenous cultures of the coastal regions: mission societies were barred from the Muslim areas of the hinterland. Most educated Africans had been to mission schools; in 1911 almost all elementary schools in both Togo and Kamerun were mission institutions. In Togo the North German Mission had been instrumental in exposing the excesses of officials and the dubious land claims of the German Togo Company, while in Kamerun the Basel Mission was particularly active. The latter not only defended African land rights against German planters, it established a trading company to provide good wares at reasonable prices, and a bank at Duala which paid 4 per cent interest to Africans and helped finance ‘Christian’ development, such as a soft-drink bottling factory at Duala to compete with the liquor import trade. Such activities resulted in direct clashes with German commercial interests but, however well-intentioned, the missionaries were imperfect spokesmen for

African opinion. Frequently themselves in conflict with African beliefs and customs, they were less critical of their own goals and behaviour, often co-operating in the exploitation of the land and labour of those they claimed to protect. African grievances were eloquently expressed in a Togolese petition in 1913 which requested black representation on the governor's council, a written code of justice, equality before the law for black plaintiffs in cases of mixed jurisdiction, improved prison conditions, an end to chaining and corporal punishment, a reduction in head-tax from twelve to six marks, and free trade. This petition was ignored.

Ironically, in view of the scorn subsequently heaped upon German colonial rule, both British and French officials regarded German accomplishments with considerable envy and respect; Togo in particular seemed to many a model colony. Such admiration was elicited not by Germany's treatment of the African population but by her economic exploitation: the healthy balance of trade and revenue of the colonies. The scale and nature of development in the two German West African territories were quite distinct. Togo had a population of just over a million, most of whom lived in the southern coastal half of its 34,000 square miles. Kamerun covered nearly 192,000 square miles (expanded to 292,000 square miles under the 1911 convention with France following the second Moroccan crisis) and had a population of just over three million scattered over a wide range of climate and topography. In an attempt to exploit Kamerun, the German government had granted large territorial concessions to German trading firms whose agents did much to open up the interior, while near the coast most of the fertile land on the slopes of Mt Cameroun behind Victoria was alienated to German planters. The colonial economy of Kamerun thus resembled the concessionary system of Belgian and French Equatorial Africa. In contrast, the export economy of Togo was based on the more common West African model of commercial exploitation of African production. Attempts were made to establish Kamerun-style plantations by the German Togo Company, but like similar companies in Kamerun it was an under-capitalised speculative venture which proved unequal to the task. Among the most successful planters in Togo were the Afro-Brazilians, such as Octaviano Olympio who pioneered the copra industry, or the d'Almeida, Ayavon and

Creppi families whose rubber-tree holdings in the Anecho region far exceeded those of the German planters. Nonetheless, they were prevented from competing with the commercial sector by regulations prohibiting Africans from importing and exporting goods and produce except through European agents. Infra-structural developments and technological research was largely financed by state capitalism, through loans and grants from the imperial government. With a transport network comprising 203 miles of railways in 1914, compared to 193 miles in Kamerun, and 755 miles of surfaced roads suitable for motor traffic, German investment in Togo was much more impressive in its impact, bearing favourable comparison with other territories in tropical Africa. Moreover, by careful supervision of government expenditure, relatively high direct taxation in the settled areas and caravan tolls in the interior, income from customs duties and railway receipts and extensive use of 'political labour', Togo won the distinction of being the only German colony in Africa to maintain a balanced budget. By 1914, both Togo and Kamerun had postal, telegraph and telephone services, as well as marine cable connections with Europe.

Between 1905 and 1912 the external trade of Togo increased in value by 86 per cent and that of Kamerun by 154 per cent⁹. Yet a significant proportion of the imports was consumed by the increasing European population of Kamerun (1,871 in 1914), while rubber, which was obtained almost exclusively from native collectors rather than plantations, constituted nearly half the export value. Many of the Kamerun plantations were just beginning to come into commercial production of crops such as tobacco, cocoa and coffee when overtaken by war in 1914. Despite considerable investment in agricultural experimentation and free distribution of cotton seed, the dream of liberation from dependence upon American cotton supplies through the development

	Togo		Kamerun	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
1905	£379,835	£193,685	£656,880	£454,390
1912	£571,391	£497,945	£1,670,000	£1,136,000

Source: W. A. Crabtree, 'Togoland', *Journal of the African Society*, 1914/1915, 14, 175; H. R. Rudin, *Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914* (London, 1938), 283.

of extensive West African cotton exports proved as illusory for the Germans as for the British. The short-staple West African strains, while well suited to local hand looms, attracted a poor price on the world market. Rather than experiment with varieties introduced from abroad, Africans preferred to grow other crops for which there was a ready market. Besides, European agronomists had hardly begun to come to terms with the complexities of tropical agriculture, and their advice was often worse than useless.

Economic development was often achieved at a considerable cost in African land and labour. By 1905 most of the slopes of Mt Cameroun had been alienated to German plantations and all 'unoccupied' land in Kamerun had been declared crown land. In Togo the German Togo Company laid claim to vast areas based on dubious treaties from the 1890s. Like the British, German authorities were encountering the thorny problems of African land rights and notions of sale, ownership, and usufruct of land. In many instances, local African communities were left with insufficient land for subsistence agriculture, much less export production. The mission societies, while defending African interests, were themselves anxious to obtain ownership of land for schools and churches. Agricultural instruction was introduced in the schools in the hope of somehow improving African yields. Farming students at the agricultural school at Nuatja, in Togo, were amongst a limited category, including certain African government employees and advanced mission pupils, exempt from taxation. The German Togo Company's concessions were drastically reduced and a system of land leasing replaced outright sale to aliens. Togolese could also challenge government claims to 'unoccupied' land and a land register was established: policies which encouraged the move toward individual ownership and favoured the more literate élite. Local land commissions with missionary representation were set up in Kamerun, but they failed to provide solutions; they merely supervised the removal of African communities from plantations to reserves. The most serious confrontation occurred in Kamerun when the government decided to expropriate native property in Duala. The native town was said to be a health hazard, though European speculators were willing to pay high prices to the Duala for waterfront property in the hope of profiting by the boom of the port city and railway

terminus. King Manga Bell sent protests to the Reichstag throughout 1912 and 1913, pointing out that the land was guaranteed to the Duala under the treaty of 1884. Colonial officials were intransigent. In desperation, Manga Bell tried to rally local opposition to German rule and sought support from Britain and France. He was arrested and hanged for treason on the eve of the war.

Shortage of cheap labour was another recurrent problem in Togo and Kamerun. While motorable roads and railways reduced transport costs and liberated labour hitherto engaged in portage, their construction required large levies of 'political labour'. In 1907 a system of six-month contract labour was introduced in Togo in order to establish a more stable semi-skilled labour force for railway construction. Workers received 75 pfennigs (approximately 9d) per nine-hour day, but at least one-third of their wages was deposited in compulsory savings accounts in an official effort to institute concepts of 'thrift'. Africans were generally regarded as indolent, one of the justifications for forced labour being its 'educative' value. District officers in northern Togo, a labour reserve, recruited work gangs for both government and plantations, the latter constituting a constant demand. The situation was particularly bad in Kamerun, where the plantations were in the moist malarial coastal areas, while much of the labour was recruited through 'chiefs' in the elevated hinterland grassfields where malaria was less prevalent. Often exhausted from the long trek to the coast, isolated from their families and culture, fed upon a diet of plantain which was also used to provide shade cover for the young cocoa and coffee bushes, workers soon contracted malaria, a new and thus more virulent form of dysentery, or some other disease; many died. The commercial firms were vociferous in their condemnation of the planters' wasteful labour policy since it threatened their own markets and supplies. They feared the creation of a destitute rural proletariat too poor to buy their goods. On the other hand, German traders and missionaries impressed large numbers of African porters in areas away from the road and rail network, which meant throughout most of Kamerun and northern Togo. In Togo, competing demands for labour by officials, planters, merchants and missionaries, combined with relatively high taxation and low wages, led to alarming emigration into the British Gold Coast.

Furthermore, the extensive use of porters and labour recruitment spread venereal disease, smallpox, sleeping-sickness and other infections. The German colonial administration enacted numerous ordinances regarding the regulation of wages and conditions, recruitment and sanitation, but supervision and enforcement were irregular and the system was open to exploitation by the unscrupulous, whether black or white.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND ITS EFFECTS

Britain and France went to war with Germany in August 1914. British defences in Nigeria were in a muddle. Psychologically incapable of delegating responsibility, Governor-General Lugard had taken the master defence scheme with him when he went on leave to Britain and it was some time before it could be located.¹⁰ Doering, the acting governor of Togo, telegraphed the neighbouring British and French governors at the outbreak of the war suggesting that Togo be neutralised, in order to prevent Africans witnessing fighting between Europeans. His request was refused and on 6 August British and French troops simultaneously invaded Togo. Armed with rifles left over from the Franco-Prussian War, the Togo police force could offer little resistance. Doering retired to the wireless station at Kamina, a major communications link with the South Atlantic, which he kept in operation for the first vital weeks of the war. The Togo campaign was over in three weeks, but the Germans destroyed the wireless station before surrendering to the Allies. The British expected another brief campaign in Kamerun. They brought together the locally recruited units of the West African Frontier Force from the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria, as well as thousands of African carriers; against these the Germans could at first field only some 3,500 armed police and soldiers. In September an Anglo-French force seized Duala, and British forces soon captured Victoria and Buea on Mt Cameroun, as well as the numerous German plantations. But though the combined strength of British, French and Belgian forces in Kamerun eventually numbered 19,000, against a maximum German

¹⁰ Lugard to Colonial Office, enclosure, 9 June 1915, CO 583/30/4984, Public Record Office, London.

strength of 6,000, the latter fought an effective rearguard, hit-and-run campaign before escaping, in February 1916, into the neutral Spanish territory of Rio Muni. On 18 February the long-besieged German garrison at Mora, in the far north, was allowed to surrender with honour: the German officers retained their swords.

The conquered colonies were partitioned between Britain and France, a wartime agreement subsequently confirmed by the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which declared them mandated territories under the League of Nations. Togo was about equally divided; the cocoa-rich western section was attached to the Gold Coast. The bulk of Kamerun was occupied by France, but Britain received the area around Mt Cameroun with its plantations and impressive Bavarian-style governor's residence at Buea, together with a hinterland strip along the Nigeria border, including Bamenda, Adamawa and a separate northern sector, Dikwa. Though mandates were theoretically held as distinct entities, from the start the British Cameroons were administratively integrated with Nigeria, provoking persistent if ineffective criticism from the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League. In effect, the northern mandated territories were treated as districts of adjacent Nigerian provinces while the Southern Cameroons was constituted a separate province of southern Nigeria. Local administration within the British sector was by indirect rule and in most instances the chiefs recognised by the Germans were retained. If anything, the mandated territories were to receive less investment and attention than the British West African colonies.

The African intelligentsia, who mostly saw British rule as less oppressive than that of the Germans, welcomed these territorial acquisitions although there was considerable chagrin that the repartition failed to unite all the Ewe within the Gold Coast. In general the British West African élite saw the war as an opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty and win a claim for greater participation in government. The legislative councils, prompted by polite hints from London, voted sizeable donations to various war and relief funds. Colonial chiefs and emirs actively supported recruitment, and sent money and letters of loyalty to the governors. Together they cheered the barefoot African soldiers and carriers who marched off to fight and die, more often of dysentery and other diseases than in combat.

Nearly 25,000 West African soldiers, mainly recruited from the Gold Coast and Nigeria, with an unquantifiable number of carriers, served in the war. Yet for most of the peoples of British West Africa, it was a white man's war. Some fought as mercenaries, but an element of coercion was fairly common in recruitment. The desertion rate for Gold Coast 'recruits' was about 25 per cent; there were comparable figures for Nigeria. Recruits were occasionally sent to one of the other colonies for training. It became common practice not to tell those recruited for the East African campaign where they were going, lest they desert *en masse*. The carrier corps was particularly unpopular, offering low wages and status despite hardship and military discipline far from familiar surroundings. In the Kamerun campaign alone, of the 20,000 British West African carriers who passed through Duala, almost half are known to have been killed, wounded, died of disease or been invalided.¹¹ Casualty figures were probably comparable amongst the 10,000 to 15,000 carriers engaged locally, as well as amongst the large but unenumerated contingents of carriers who were taken directly across the Nigerian frontier into northern Kamerun. The Nigerian and Gold Coast regiments, which saw almost continuous action throughout the war, lost more than their entire pre-war complement killed, wounded or missing. Sierra Leone is estimated to have supplied some 7,000 carriers during the four years of the African campaigns, plus 889 'recruits' for the Water Transport Service in Mesopotamia in 1917: a loss of able-bodied manpower which was a factor in the decline of agricultural production and scarcity of foodstuffs in Freetown throughout the war.

The most immediate economic effect of the war was on shipping. The German Woermann Line disappeared from West African waters, the French West African steamship service was discontinued and British shipping was partially diverted elsewhere, while freight and insurance rates increased. The tonnage of shipping entering British West African ports fell to half the pre-war levels, while the proportion of American carriers increased. Equally dramatic was the loss of established markets. The Gambia was almost totally dependent upon France for the sale of her groundnuts, which constituted over 90 per cent of her exports. Hit first by the withdrawal of the French steamship service upon

¹¹ Sir Charles Lucas, *The empire at war* (London, 1924), IV, 4.

which she had come to rely, the Gambia received a further blow with the collapse of the price of groundnuts in Europe as German forces overran north-eastern France where much of the oil-crushing industry was located. The price paid to Gambian groundnut-producers dropped from a pre-war average of between 1s 9d and 3s per bushel to between 3d and 4d per bushel. The German market, which had accounted for over one-third of the exports from British West Africa, also disappeared. The Niger Company instructed its agents in Nigeria to cease purchasing certain commodities altogether, stop paying cash and return to barter, thus disposing of old stock. The resulting short-term fall was gradually absorbed by Britain's growing wartime demand while in the long term the loss of German competition helped establish British dominance over the export trade of her West African colonies. Imports from the United States became more common, but that country had well-established alternatives to most West African exports, which remained tied to the European market. British oligopoly was further facilitated by the introduction of wartime controls on foreign trade and on shipping space which tended to favour the larger British-based firms to the disadvantage of the smaller local West African merchants.

The impact of the war on individual commodities and colonies varied considerably. After the initial disruption, the market for edible oils recovered and the unit value of palm produce and groundnuts steadied at or above pre-war levels. The main constraint on export growth was restricted shipping, resulting in firms having to stockpile produce in West African ports. On the other hand the market for tree-crops such as coffee and cocoa, which were deemed luxuries and had lower shipping priority, remained weak. While the actual tonnage of Gold Coast cocoa exports increased, these represented as little as half the trees' annual yield. Unit values and producer prices fell by as much as 50 per cent as productive capacity exceeded market demand. On the other hand, mining in the Gold Coast expanded, despite competition for labour from the military. Gold exports continued to be worth well over £1m each year. In 1915 a geological survey discovered manganese (used in hardening steel) in the Western Province; the deposits were assigned to a British-owned subsidiary of Union Carbide, and exports began a year later. In Sierra Leone the volume and value of exports remained below the 1913 level,

though this was partly offset by economic growth in Freetown, which was a fortified coaling station (the only one in West Africa). The amount of currency in circulation increased dramatically during the war, exacerbating the inflation created by import scarcities and rising wartime prices general throughout West Africa.¹²

British governors agonised over their budgets as they received less from import duties, which provided the bulk of official revenue; there were now the additional wartime costs of their much enlarged units in the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), the recruitment of carriers and financial contributions to the war effort. The Gold Coast bore the entire cost of the Togo campaign (£60,000), while the war cost Nigeria an estimated £1.5m (nearly one-third of its total revenue in 1919). Constraints on expenditure and new revenue measures were imposed. By 1915 most large capital projects were halted, such as the extension of the Sierra Leone railway and the construction of the eastern Nigerian railway north of Enugu and the Udi coalfields. Various technical departments were closed, including the Sierra Leone topographical survey and the Nigeria and Gold Coast forestry departments. The loss of British officials, many of whom were either recalled to their regiments or went to serve with the West African Frontier Force, was augmented by a general policy of retrenching African personnel and suspending increments for the duration of the war. Import duties were increased on popular consumer items such as salt, tobacco and alcohol; and export duties were imposed. In the longer term, wartime scarcities of trade spirits, formerly imported from Germany and the Netherlands, led to permanent changes in cultural practices. Lower consumption of spirits and the decline in government revenue from liquor duties facilitated British enactment of the constraints on liquor trafficking in the 1919 Convention of Saint-Germain. In turn, wartime export duties were retained after the war and became an increasingly important element in government revenue.

Among those hit hardest by the economic impact of the war were African civil servants and others on fixed incomes, who frequently shouldered added work and responsibility with the departure of European supervisors and African colleagues. True, jobs which had come to be restricted to Europeans, such as

¹² See p. 427.

driving railway engines, were Africanised of necessity, resulting in an expansion of the skilled labour and artisan sectors. But African retailers were increasingly forced to obtain their supplies from the larger British trading firms which naturally favoured their own retail outlets. For many, it marked the transition from import-export merchant to the subordinate role of retailer or agent for one of the larger expatriate firms. Though European market prices for many West African commodities had recovered by 1915 and continued to climb thereafter, only a fraction of this increase appears to have been reflected in the prices paid to producers. At the same time the price of imports rose; the Nigerian import price index doubled between 1914 and 1918.¹³ Some farmers cut back export production to a level little above that required to pay school fees and other cash expenses. In the absence of market incentives, Gold Coast cocoa farmers simply did not bother to harvest all their crop. Others expanded cultivation of foodstuffs for the domestic market in response to local war-related scarcities and rising prices, as in Sierra Leone. In general, export volumes increased during the war as producers attempted to compensate for inflation and disadvantageous terms of trade. While many British firms enjoyed record profits from their West African trade, for most Africans the war brought a reduction in their real incomes through the freezing or reduction of wages and a drop in export incomes.

Nevertheless, war-related grievances do not appear to have been the prime factors in the local rebellions which erupted in parts of the Gold Coast Northern Territories and across Nigeria. While specific issues varied, at the heart lay deep-seated resentment at the erosion of traditional values and the exactions of alien authorities, often fanned by rumours that the white man was leaving. In Sokoto, Potiskum and Borgu, in Muslim northern Nigeria, the *talakawa* peasantry rebelled against the oppressive and often corrupt native authorities'. Encouraged by the departure of British officials, many acephalous societies of the Middle Belt such as the Tiv, Eggon and Yunguru refused to pay taxes or obey the British-imposed 'chiefs' and attacked Hausa traders, who were frequently seen as responsible for socio-economic changes. The Ibo near the Udi coalfields and along the proposed railway line

¹³ Gerald K. Helleiner, *Peasant agriculture, government and economic growth in Nigeria* (Homewood, Ill., 1966), 494.

attacked the survey party which they feared was about to take their land. Murder and arson were directed against non-native African messengers, clerks and commercial agents in Kwale District of the Niger delta, in Onitsha District and elsewhere in Iboland. Similar anti-foreign sentiments, against the dominance of Yoruba and Sierra Leonean clergy in the Niger Delta pastorate, were a feature of Garrick Braide's revivalist Christ Army Church in 1915. Braide, a faith-healer and former warden of St Andrew's Anglican Church, Bakana, denounced as incomplete the teachings of the CMS clergy and preached renunciation of alcohol (trade spirits), Western medicine and indigenous witchcraft. He thus antagonised powerful interests and considerable doubt surrounds the allegations that he prophesied German liberation from British rule, on which pretext he was sent to prison, where he died in 1918.

In Southern Nigeria the situation was exacerbated by Lugard's antipathy towards the aspirations of the educated Africans and his attempts to impose a more authoritarian system of indirect rule, based on the Northern Nigerian model. In 1913 the Lagos legislative council, an imperfect forum for articulating African grievances, was reduced to little more than a municipal body, to be supplanted by a rarely convened Nigerian Council dominated by officials, chiefs and appointed African unofficial members such as Kitoyi Ajasa. A barrister, Ajasa founded a newspaper in 1914, *The Nigerian Pioneer*, which espoused the more conservative views of Lagos society. In turn, he was denounced by the 'radical' African leaders, such as Thomas Jackson and Herbert Macaulay, for his support of government policies, including Lugard's controversial reform of the provincial courts. To the apprehension and chagrin of many aspiring Africans, for whom the legal profession offered one of the few avenues of upward mobility and equality with Europeans, lawyers were barred from the provincial courts, which were presided over by the local British political officer, and limitations were placed on the right of appeal. Thomas Jackson's lively *Lagos Weekly Record* was quick to point out that the system placed the judiciary under the control of the local administration and primarily protected the untrained British policeman-prosecutor-judge-administrator from the challenge of legally qualified Africans. Lugard's argument that British officials had a greater familiarity with local languages and cultures than 'detrified' Lagos barristers had a hollow ring in the light of

all-too-frequent examples of British alienation and ignorance. In 1914 the Egba rioted when an indigenous leader opposed to the British-backed *alake* (ruler) died in prison, after callous treatment by a British commissioner. WAFF troops sent to quell the unrest opened fire on a crowd, killing seven traditional leaders and 29 others. The treaty conferring semi-autonomous status on Egba-land was abrogated and sole authority conferred upon the *alake*, contrary to Egba political practice. In 1918 Egba resentment and ethnic nationalism erupted once again, when 30,000 Egba, led by their war chiefs, tore up the railway and destroyed the telegraph lines before marching on Abeokuta. They were determined to regain the autonomy lost in 1914 and restore the traditional checks on the autocracy of the *alake*. Some 2,600 WAFF troops, recently returned from East Africa, were used to put down the uprising in which a thousand rebels were estimated to have been killed.¹⁴ Similarly in Oyo, the widespread Iseyin–Okeiho rebellion of 1916 was crushed and eight customary leaders, who had opposed the British-appointed *alafin*'s abuse of power and disregard for tradition, were publicly hanged on Lugard's orders as an example to others. Poorly armed and undisciplined, parochial in their objectives and appeal, these sporadic localised rebellions were easily dealt with by the battle-trained colonial forces.

In the Gold Coast, anti-colonial protest, sharpened by increasing socio-economic differentiation, was less violent but no less present. In Kwahu state the traditional *asafo* organisation, originally a military institution, became a mechanism for mobilising mass disaffection. Commoners threatened to boycott the paramount chief's palace and tribunal, thereby forcing him to sign an agreement in November 1915 regulating political and economic relations within the state. An impressive document detailing a wide range of grievances, it sought in effect to enforce local measures to curb wartime inflation and transfer power from the British-backed *omanhene* to the commoner-controlled *asafo*. As such, it is interesting not merely as a variant on the theme of popular protest, but as an example both of the use of a traditional institution, the *asafo*, within a new political context and also of the incorporation of colonial models of written contractual

¹⁴ Akinjide Osuntokun, 'Disaffection and revolt in Nigeria during the First World War, 1914–1918', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1971, 5, 2, 171–92; J. A. Atanda, *The new Oyo empire: indirect rule and change in western Nigeria, 1894–1934* (London, 1973), 146–8.

agreements and legal constitutionalism within local politics. Popular protest was thus presented in a form which the colonial oligarchy, under Sir Hugh Clifford (governor, 1912–19), could understand and assimilate. It failed because the colonial authorities were ultimately led to support the traditional leaders in the name of preserving indigenous customs and in the interests of colonial hegemony.

BRITISH WEST AFRICA, 1919–1929

The end of the war brought a short-lived boom, fed by high prices for West African commodities and the increased availability of shipping. Many African merchants, having survived the lean war years, invested heavily in new stock, while handsome profits were reaped by produce buyers who, for want of shipping space, had been forced to stockpile produce acquired at low wartime prices. The élite were encouraged by the appointment of a number of Africans to senior posts: Lugard's promotion of Henry Carr in 1918 to be provincial commissioner of Lagos Colony, ostensibly placing him in authority over Europeans, and Clifford's appointment of C. E. Woolhouse Bannerman as a police magistrate and Dr C. E. Reindorf as a temporary medical officer. Demobilised soldiers, regarded by colonial officials as a potential political threat, were given preferential employment in the expanding administrative and technical services curtailed or suspended during the war. Work recommenced on extending the eastern Nigerian railway from the Udi coalfields to the main Nigerian system. In the Gold Coast, post-war prosperity was based on expanding cocoa exports and on government funds carefully husbanded by Clifford; when he left, in 1919, to succeed Lugard in Nigeria, his own successor, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, was able to launch a major development scheme, unparalleled in British West Africa.

Guggisberg's Ten Year Plan, designed to meet the future needs of the dependency, originally called for an expenditure of £25m. This was revised by 1927 to £16m; half was raised in London by loans which the British Treasury guaranteed, while the rest came from revenue and past reserves. The greater part of these funds was devoted to building a deep-water port at Takoradi, along with new railways and roads. Guggisberg argued that these would enable the Gold Coast to expand and diversify its exports, and

so finance better education; this in turn would facilitate the Africanisation of government posts, which Clifford had begun and which Guggisberg wished to accelerate for the sake of economy and social justice. To supply the needs of the civil service and an expanding economy, Guggisberg brought much of the educational system under closer government control. Government grants to assisted schools were raised, subject to their employing registered teachers and accepting closer government inspection. Four junior trade schools were established and teacher-training facilities increased. In 1927, shortly before his departure, Guggisberg opened the Prince of Wales' School and College at Achimota, near Accra. By 1929 these provided courses extending from kindergarten to university level; in 1930 the government transferred responsibility for Achimota to a council in which officials were in a minority.

The central educational philosophy inspiring these ventures was 'adaptive', in harmony with the most enlightened authorities of the period: the Phelps-Stokes Commission on Education in Africa, which had visited the Gold Coast in 1920, and the Advisory Committee on Native Education in British Tropical African Dependencies (1925).¹⁵ It heralded a general reform of education in British West Africa, emphasising improved standards of instruction, vocational training and 'love of tribe'. In effect, the system mirrored colonial society, creating a two-tiered hierarchy with stress on manual and technical instruction for the majority with restricted access to British-style higher education for an élite. It held out opportunities for the children of the chiefs and bourgeoisie without threatening the social order, and it was sweetened by flattering recognition of African culture. Nevertheless the African-owned *Gold Coast Leader* paused briefly in 1926 to question whether it represented a substandard system which would perpetuate African subordination.

In 1918 the Colonial Office had attempted to stave off discontent among African civil servants by granting a 10 per cent war bonus. There were protests at its inadequacy compared to the increased cost of living and in view of the grossly higher salary scales enjoyed by Europeans. Petitions by African employees also frequently complained of the racist attitudes of European staff and restricted opportunities for promotion. The burgeoning prolet-

¹⁵ See chapter 1, p. 33.

ariat resorted to strikes. In 1919 the Lagos dockers, a generally exploited group whose real income had fallen considerably owing to inflation, went on strike for 4s per day. The going rate of one shilling per day had persisted since the previous century. At the same time the skilled workers were organising themselves into trade unions to defend their interests: the Sierra Leone Railway Skilled Workmen Mutual Aid Union emerged during the railway strikes of July and October 1919 and the Nigerian Railway Mechanics Union led the 1919 Nigerian railway strike. In Sierra Leone, the July strike was also accompanied by widespread attacks on 'Syrian' merchants, Levantine immigrants who by hard work, low profit margins and increasing access to credit through family and ethnic solidarity were challenging established Creole retailers and whose racial exclusiveness and condescending attitude towards Africans bred resentment. They were popularly believed to be responsible for and profiteering from the 1919 rice shortages.

In general the post-war protests and strikes, recurrent in industries such as mining and the railways throughout the 1920s, had the support of the African press and the more politically conscious intelligentsia: Herbert Macaulay in Nigeria, Casely Hayford in the Gold Coast and Claudius May in Sierra Leone. The westernised élite of lawyers, doctors, journalists and merchants could empathise with the plight of the low-paid African clerks and workers. They too had seen their economic and political position progressively restricted. When in 1926 the Sierra Leone railway attempted to impose discriminatory examinations for African salary increments, the workers went on strike. Contributions to the strike fund were received from workers and prominent Sierra Leoneans as far away as Lagos and Kumasi. Yet many of these same middle-class Africans, while sympathetic to the problems of the petty bourgeoisie and clerical class, were distressed by the growth of working-class militancy. They looked upon strikers as rabble-rousers since riots by the urban poor and unemployed were often sparked by labour agitation. Jackson's *Lagos Weekly Record* roundly condemned the 1920 strike by staff of the Marine Department. Official response ranged from compromise with the clerical staff, in the form of increased war bonuses and salary awards, to militant opposition to the unskilled workers. A preference for conspiracy theories resulted in a preoccupation

with identifying and persecuting ‘ringleaders’. The Colonial Office, reacting to British labour unrest as much as to issues underlying West African strife, tended to assume an even more strident stance than the local administration. Official attitudes hardened generally as economic conditions worsened.

Late in 1920 the brief period of prosperity ended abruptly as Europe entered the post-war depression and export prices for African commodities collapsed. The Liverpool price for Gold Coast cocoa fell from 172s per cwt in March 1920 to 44s in December, the highest and lowest prices recorded on the world market during our period.¹⁶ Thereafter the net barter terms of trade remained sluggish, failing to achieve pre-war levels until the 1950s. There was an immediate outflow of specie and a tightening of credit, since colonial monetary supplies were closely linked to the balance of trade. African merchants who had ordered large quantities of stock at premium post-war prices found themselves without a market, in debt and unable to obtain further credit. Many went out of business. Bewildered by falling producer prices, Gold Coast cocoa farmers staged yet another hold-up, in 1921. Local farmers’ associations, often synonymous with the local *asafɔ*, were mobilised by the wealthier farmers, the most prominent being John Kwame Ayew. Such rural capitalists, who had hitherto been brokers and exporters as well as large farmers, were being threatened by the penetration of buying stations and brokers employed by expatriate firms. Hence they supplanted the chiefs as the driving force behind rural protests. The chiefs, in the ambiguous position of colonial agents and leaders of their people, failed to support the strike, their reaction being a response both to the challenge of the rich farmers and to the goading of the British administration. As in 1908, many of the small farmers could not hold out for long and the attitudes of the chiefs were often crucial. The African and Eastern Trading Company temporarily increased its producer price and this, followed by a rise in world price, not only ended the boycott but convinced people of the success of the hold-up.

The impact of falling customs revenue and railway receipts, by over 40 per cent in British West Africa generally, was particularly marked in the Gold Coast where the public debt had doubled and

¹⁶ Roger J. Southall, ‘Polarisation and dependence in the Gold Coast cocoa trade, 1890–1938’, *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 1975, 16, 1, 97.

government expenditure tripled between 1918 and 1920. The pace of appointments slowed and the impetus toward Africanisation was lost. Guggisberg was forced to cancel the proposed Northern Territories railway, intended to tap the hinterland and help sustain investment at Takoradi. Furthermore, construction of the port was plagued by delays and rising costs. This was partially due to the incompetence of the various British and Canadian engineering firms, but also because of the 'buy-British' regulations. As a result, the contractors were compelled to purchase costly but inferior British steam shovels rather than more suitable American ones. Thus 'development' loans, repayable by the Gold Coast, helped sustain British business and employment.

In the British Cameroons, after an unsuccessful attempt to operate the captured German plantations as a government department, it was decided to put them up for sale to Europeans. The possibility of subdividing the land into African farms or returning it to its indigenous owners was rejected:

Without capital it would mean that the buildings and machinery would fall into ruin, entailing loss, and without the necessary experience disease would spread and the cocoa would be destroyed. The resources of civilisation must, therefore, be brought to the aid of the native and the plantations sold to companies able to develop them.¹⁷

To the British officials, plantations represented European investments in development which should be preserved. This view led to self-justifying assumptions regarding the inability of the African population to sustain a viable peasant-based export economy. After failing in 1923 to attract non-German purchasers, Britain agreed to allow the former planters to repurchase their property the following year. By 1936, German planters owned 293,678 acres, compared to 19,053 and 263 acres in British and Swiss ownership respectively. In certain cases Africans who had occupied vacant plantation land were allowed to remain, but such tolerance was as much a reflection of the difficulties in attracting European investors as of British paternalistic concern. A few African-owned plantations were established but in general Africans were relegated to the role of plantation labour. Nearly 16,000 were thus employed by 1935, being increasingly drawn from southern Nigeria and Cameroun.

¹⁷ West Africa, *Report on the British sphere of the Cameroons* (1922), Cmd. 1647, 62.

Between 1922 and 1929 the income terms of trade gradually recovered throughout British West Africa, thereby increasing colonial customs revenues. By 1929 Nigeria's exports were worth over £17.5m; half came from palm-oil and kernels, which were followed by groundnuts, cocoa and tin. From the Gold Coast, exports in 1927 were worth £14m, of which 84 per cent came from cocoa. Manganese now contributed almost as much as gold; scarcely less important were diamonds, which had been found in the Eastern Province by a government survey in 1919: production (open-cast) and marketing (mostly for industrial use) was dominated, though never exclusively, by Consolidated African Selection Trust. Sierra Leone's exports reached a peak in 1927 of £1.6m, very largely from palm products. The overall rise in export values was mainly due to the increased volume of agricultural exports. In the absence of technological improvements, this was achieved by applying more land and labour to the cultivation of cash-crops: more farmers were working harder to sustain the level of imports.

This expansion of cultivation was facilitated by a transport revolution: the introduction of lightweight Ford lorries, pioneered by African importers such as W. A. Dawodu of Lagos. Often African-owned and operated, these American Fords were capable of travelling over crude dirt roads through tsetse-infested cocoa- and palm-producing areas to bush markets hitherto dependent upon human portage. They thus opened up new areas and reduced the ton/mileage rates. The government-owned railways came under increasing competition from motor-transport, despite restrictions on licences and unauthorised African road construction. History was not to sustain Guggisberg's contention in 1923 that 'motor lorries can only be regarded as temporary and inadequate measures in meeting the general demands of trade in this country'.¹⁸ Having assumed the burden of low-return, long-term infrastructural investment to facilitate British private enterprise, the colonial governments were overtaken by technological change. On the other hand, African businessmen who assumed the initial risks were increasingly undercut by the ever more powerful European companies which quickly took over the Ford and automobile tyre franchises. Consequently African investors were forced into the less

¹⁸ G. B. Kay and S. Hymer, *The political economy of colonialism in Ghana: a collection of documents and statistics* (Cambridge, 1972), 146.

remunerative or speculative ventures, thereby reinforcing the prejudices of colonial bankers against loaning funds to Africans.

There were at this time numerous business mergers and take-overs in West Africa, reflecting more widespread trends towards vertical integration and capitalist consolidation. By 1927–8, only fourteen firms exported 95 per cent of the Gold Coast's cocoa. The Niger Company lacked the resources to maintain its increasingly complex commercial and mining operations and was bought out by Lever Brothers during the 1920 crisis. Lever's own original quest for a cheap source of palm-oil for soap-making gave way to broader commercial interests as the company's African holdings increased. In 1929 the United Africa Company was formed; it amalgamated Lever's West African interests with the African and Eastern Trading Company. As commercial operations came to be concentrated among fewer firms, it became easier to establish buying and price-fixing agreements.

The post-war economic problems, and European attempts to deal with them, provoked increasing demands from educated African bourgeois nationalists for a greater voice in government. In March 1920, delegates drawn from the four British West African colonies had met at the Accra Native Club to form the National Congress of British West Africa and to debate a wide range of economic and political grievances. Proposals for such a conference had appeared regularly in the African press since the idea was mooted by Casely Hayford and Dr Akiwande Savage in 1912: it perpetuated the concept of a United British West Africa guided by its educated 'sons of the soil' which dated from the nineteenth century. The delegates were mainly successful professional men: lawyers, doctors and clergy with a sprinkling of merchants, journalists and chiefs. Liberal in their political and economic persuasions, they sought constitutional reforms, including elective representation, in order to redress economic and social disadvantages; they did not press for radical change. They denounced, as obstacles to 'free trade', export taxes on African commodities, proposals by the Empire Resources Development Committee for the exploitation of natural resources through concessionaires under state control, and the discriminatory practices of banks and shipping firms. They called for modification of paternalistic legislation which inhibited the free

sale of land, for the opening of the judiciary and medical services to qualified Africans and for the establishment of a West African university. They wanted equal opportunity, mutual accommodation of their interests and effective representation within the colonial system. Simultaneously they wished the Colonial Office to consider whether the increasing number of Syrians were ‘undesirables and a menace to the good Government of the land’.¹⁹ What distinguished the National Congress from earlier organisations, such as the Gold Coast Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society, was that it brought together African intellectuals and professional men from all four colonies in the hope of rectifying common grievances through concerted political action. To these ends the conference resolved to send a delegation to London, the fountain-head of authority, rather than agitate for local reforms within the separate colonies.

The delegation, which arrived in London in September 1920, sought to present its case to British politicians, the Colonial Office and the press. A lengthy petition asking for constitutional and other reforms arising from conference resolutions was submitted to the king. Unfortunately, like most NCBWA literature and pronouncements, it obscured central issues in a welter of trivia and failed to distinguish specific grievances in the varied colonies. At one stage it was thought that the petitioners were seeking self-government. The mandarins at the Colonial Office were quick to point out inconsistencies and obscurities, while the NCBWA alienated the colonial governors by appealing to London over their heads. Governors Clifford of Nigeria and Guggisberg both denounced the Congress as an unrepresentative body and its demands for elective representation as premature. In the Gold Coast legislative council Nana Ofori Atta, the paramount chief of Akim Abuakwa in the Eastern Province, declared that the chiefs, not the Congress, were the rightful spokesmen of the people; a summary of his speech was cabled to the Colonial Office. The secretary of state, Lord Milner, refused to see the delegation and advised the king to reject the petition. Consequently Congress leaders were compelled to take their case back to the divisive arenas of parochial colonial politics.

From the beginning the National Congress had been plagued by division and petty jealousies. In Nigeria quarrels between Drs

¹⁹ *Resolutions of the Conference of Africans of British West Africa* (London, 1920).

Savage and Randle led the latter to form his own conservative Reform Club, while Ajasa's *Nigerian Pioneer* opposed all manifestations of Congress. In the Gold Coast, Congress leaders clashed with those of the more parochial Aborigines' Rights Protection Society, a division personified by the enmity between Casely Hayford and E. J. P. Brown, who allied himself with Nana Ofori Atta. Only in Sierra Leone was there a semblance of unity amongst the bourgeoisie, and they had no claim to speak for the people of the protectorate: here at least the British authorities could plausibly argue that the chiefs more truly reflected the views of the rural masses. Congress leaders had tended to assume that their interests coincided with those of the chiefs and people. Ofori Atta's speech embodied many chiefs' fears and suspicion of the educated bourgeoisie. The failure of the London delegation inflamed the conflict between the Gold Coast Congress and the more conservative elements, who were accused of stabbing the Congress in the back. Casely Hayford's considerable energies were devoted to rallying support amongst the chiefs against Brown and Ofori Atta and in winning control of the executive of the ARPS, which he achieved in 1922. Yet in the process the Gold Coast branch, which had been the mainstay of the Congress, focused increasingly on local issues to the detriment of the broader British West African perspective. Except during the inter-colonial Congress sessions, at Freetown in 1923, Bathurst in 1925–6, and Lagos in 1930, there was little Pan-British West African activity. At the Freetown session a formal constitution for the National Congress was adopted and Casely Hayford was elected president, a position he held until his death in 1930. But, as in subsequent sessions, the subjects and solutions which dominated deliberations were those formulated at the Gold Coast Convention in 1920. Interest waned; the Gambia branch gradually withered, while the Nigerian branch, which was never very active, failed to send representatives to the Bathurst or Freetown sessions and all but disappeared. Herbert Macaulay, Dr Savage and many of the Lagos élite were preoccupied with local politics, especially their defence of the *eleko* or paramount chief of Lagos and the ruling house of Dosumu against high-handed treatment by the British administration, and the criticisms of Henry Carr, Kitoyi Ajasa and others who viewed the *eleko* as an anachronism.

African leadership was further fragmented by constitutional

reforms initiated in 1921 by Governor Clifford, who moved to abolish Lugard's Nigerian Council and restore the legislative council. As a result, Africans gained elective representation to the legislative council of Nigeria in 1923; Sierra Leone followed in 1924 and the Gold Coast in 1925. It was a limited franchise, excluding all but the wealthiest Africans in the urban centres of the colonies: in Freetown, there were 1,866 eligible voters out of a total population of approximately 25,000, while in Lagos there were only 1,601 voters in 1923, among a population of nearly 100,000. Besides, elected members were outnumbered by 'traditional rulers', colonial chiefs nominated by the governor or, as in the case of the Gold Coast, elected from and by newly-established provincial councils of chiefs. Many of the élite saw this as a betrayal, an attempt to pack the legislative councils with Africans who would vote with the government, which retained an official majority. Casely Hayford attempted to mobilise opposition to the new constitution and provincial councils through the ARPS but merely succeeded in alienating increasing numbers of chiefs. Eventually he and the more assimilationist bourgeois nationalists secured election to the legislative council, vowing reform from within. Yet, like their contemporaries in Sierra Leone and Nigeria, they discovered that their influence upon government policy was marginal. Their ineffectiveness bred disillusion and growing indifference amongst the electorate, and British officials argued that the apathy of voters proved the unrepresentative nature of elected unofficials. There was a similar rift in Sierra Leone between the Creole élite of the colony and the leaders from the protectorate. In 1922 the latter founded the Committee of Educated Aborigines in opposition to the Creole-dominated Congress. The latter was used by E. S. Beoku-Betts and Dr Bankole Bright to win successive re-election to the legislative council, but the Creole establishment received a major blow to its power and prestige when the British invoked instances of corruption and mismanagement to end elective mayoral municipal government in Freetown in 1926. In Nigeria, Herbert Macaulay's Nigerian National Democratic Party dominated Lagos politics, winning the quinquennial legislative council and triennial Lagos town council elections. In effect, however, the constitutional 'reforms' of the 1920s polarised the interests of the various élites, traditional and bourgeois. Politically, the educated bourgeois élite

were confined to the coastal colonies, while divisive ethnic nationalism was encouraged by the delegation of increased responsibility to the numerous Native Authorities, in harmony with indirect rule.

During the 1920s, 'native authorities' became increasingly involved in decisions regarding the location of schools, roads and other amenities; they also became responsible for enforcing a profusion of forestry, agricultural, labour, sanitary and police regulations. All too often, little attention was given to the manner in which these new undertakings were to be financed. Especially in the so-called 'unreformed' native administrations, those without native treasuries where local administration was supported out of the income of the chief, new costs were frequently met by extra-legal exactions. Thus colonial chiefs gained new powers at the expense of alienating their subjects, and in the Gold Coast Colony there were numerous attempts through the courts to destool chiefs. The position of chiefs in the Gold Coast was however further entrenched by the Native Authorities Ordinance of 1927; it was defended by J. B. Danquah, a lawyer and younger brother of Nana Ofori Atta, who invoked the past powers of chiefs while stressing that final power and responsibility for laws now rested with the colonial authorities. The bourgeois nationalists were divided. One faction, led by Casely Hayford, eventually came to accept the new order; the more militant section of the ARPS, led by Kobina Sekyi, a Cape Coast barrister, maintained a determined opposition.

The monarchs of Benin and Asante, whom the British had exiled at the time of conquest, became the foci for resurgent ethnic nationalism. In 1914 the former *oba* of Benin, Ovonramwen, had died in exile at Calabar, leaving the way open for Lugard to restore his heir, as Eweka II, and impose indirect rule, on the Northern Nigerian model. There ensued a protracted struggle between traditionalists and those whose power had been enhanced under British authority, a division which became an institutionalised aspect of Benin polity. As for Asante, Guggisberg was impressed by its people's 'loyalty' and by the image portrayed in Captain Rattray's ethnological studies. In 1924 he cautiously agreed to let Prempeh I return as a private citizen and in 1926 Prempeh was allowed to preside over the attenuated state of Kumasi, though it was not until 1935 that his successor, Prempeh II, was installed as *asantehene* of the reconstructed confederation.

On the economic front, there were a number of African initiatives aimed at countering European commercial dominance. The National Congress had put forward various demands. In 1924 John Ayew formed the Gold Coast Farmers' Association to circumvent exporters by marketing directly overseas. Unfortunately an American agent appropriated the proceeds from the sale of 10,000 tons of cocoa, resulting in a £250,000 loss by the association. On a much more ambitious scale were the efforts of the Gold Coast entrepreneur Winifried Tete-Ansa, who tried to unite African producers, traders and businessmen in competition with the European-dominated export firms. In 1924 he acquired the Industrial and Commercial Bank, which began operations in Nigeria and the Gold Coast in 1929 with the aim of mobilising African savings and assisting African businessmen and farmers. It was linked to another Tete-Ansa enterprise, West African Co-operative Producers, which sought to coordinate the activities of various farmers' associations and serve as their marketing agent. Finally, there was the West African American Corporation, incorporated by Tete-Ansa and a group of American black activists in the USA. This was to market cocoa and other produce, as well as supplying wholesale imports. It was an ambitious enterprise which enjoyed the support of prominent African merchants, cocoa farmers and politicians. In line with the programme of the National Congress, the corporation sought to improve the economic position of Africans without altering the basic system or challenging colonial authority. It was handicapped by lack of capital and managerial skills, compounded by personal rivalries and discord, and in 1929–30 the sudden fall in commodity prices led to its collapse. The story illustrates the general failure of primary-producer interests to break into the established systems of vertically integrated European consumer-supplier oligopoly without recourse to radical economic and political changes.

In the midst of this social, economic and political dislocation, West Africa experienced an often dramatic deterioration of public health. The influenza pandemic of 1918–19, originally introduced from overseas, spread by ship along the coast, and inland by road and rail. In southern Nigeria half the population were believed to have been clinically ill, while 250,000 (3 per cent of the population) died. This was followed by serious outbreaks of smallpox in the south and middle belt of Nigeria and cerebro-spinal meningitis in the sudanic belt of northern Nigeria and the

Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. Both diseases were common to West Africa, but they were rapidly disseminated by the new transport system. In the mid-1920s, bubonic plague struck the port cities and spread to the hinterland where cases persisted into the following decade. The removal of African hill-settlements to the more infectious lowlands, for ease of administration, and the breakdown of rural isolation resulted in the spread of such diseases as sleeping-sickness and onchocerciasis, problems for which the government medical services were totally inadequate.

Epidemic diseases whose true origins were obscure, economic instability, uncertainties created by a growing awareness of alternative life-styles and beliefs, the breakdown of indigenous social and political institutions: all created tensions within local societies which gave rise not only to an increase in accusations of witchcraft and movements to eradicate it but also the growth of pentecostal churches. Even in peripheral rural areas, as amongst the Tiv of central Nigeria, stress intensified; traditional leaders appear to have encouraged witchcraft fears as a means of buttressing their declining power, while missionaries denounced indigenous beliefs as evil and the British administration prohibited trial by ordeal and other anti-witchcraft measures as repugnant. In Yorubaland the *Aladura* or prayer churches broke new ground in areas of Christian doctrine and expression, effecting a reinterpretation and fusion of Christian and indigenous beliefs and practices, validated by visions reinforced by Bible study and Anglo-American evangelical literature. Often founded by prophets and healers who were themselves mission-educated and committed churchmen, these so-called syncretic churches attracted a following amongst the legions of clerks and artisans of the growing urban centres. A high proportion of the congregations were literate, and though few in number they were far from peripheral in terms of society and Christianity in West Africa. During the 1920s these pentecostal groups began to take on institutional form, with buildings, office-holders and liturgy, which led in turn to numerous amalgamations and schisms.

Having gradually climbed out of the post-war economic crisis of the early 1920s, West Africa was rocked by the more sustained depression of the 1930s. But for a brief rally in 1935–7, the net barter and income terms of trade were to remain below levels of the 1920s until after the Second World War. Producer prices, which had reached a peak during the 1928–9 buying season, fell steadily throughout 1930 and 1931. Initially many farmers refused to sell their produce, anticipating higher prices. As buying power was directly linked to export income, imports and commerce declined. African shopkeepers and petty entrepreneurs with already low overheads had little room for economies and went under. Their place was frequently taken by Syrian and Lebanese traders, favoured by both government and commercial firms because they were more dependent and thus amenable to pressure. Many of the more substantial African and expatriate businesses were taken over by the oligopolists: in 1932 Unilever, the parent company of UAC, acquired G. B. Ollivant, thereby increasing its share of Gold Coast cocoa exports to almost half the total. Such large European companies, which had established ties with consumers or were part of vertically integrated corporations, were less affected by the collapse of the commodity market: they cut costs by closing less remunerative branches, reducing personnel and raising prices of imports.

They also sought to control prices and eliminate costly competition by establishing buying agreements, a practice intermittently attempted on a more restricted scale since the 1900s. In 1930 the United Africa Company and the other seven largest shippers of Gold Coast cocoa, including the chocolate manufacturers Cadbury and Fry, entered into an agreement not to compete against each other in the purchase of cocoa but each to buy a fixed share of the total crop. The cocoa farmers blamed this ‘pool’ for falling producer prices. Particularly hard hit were the rural capitalists, who had invested in export production at the expense of subsistence agriculture; they were dependent upon cash income to purchase food and services. Hence wealthy farmers like John Ayew used their local power to mobilise the poorer farmers and chiefs in support of another hold-up, during the 1930–1 buying season. Yet rural allegiances were confused by the continuing

rivalry between the chiefs and the wealthy farmers. Besides, the primary interests of the chiefs lay not in cocoa production *per se* but in buying, land sales, rentals and litigation. Nana Ofori Atta and many of the more influential chiefs united with local entrepreneurs, led by A. J. Ocansey, to form the Gold Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation. Ostensibly representing producer interests and allied with the farmers' associations but dominated by 'moderate' chiefs and the urban bourgeoisie, the federation attempted to provide an alternative to the European buying pool. However, lacking the fiscal and commercial resources to oppose the combined power of UAC and Cadbury-Fry, the federation was eventually persuaded to sell part of its cocoa stocks to UAC, thereby effectively breaking the hold-up. The cleavage of African interests along lines of economic function precipitated a major political crisis, manifest in the destoolment of numerous chiefs. Rural resentment against the sub-élite of brokers and clerks was encouraged by British propaganda, which sought to channel rural disaffection away from the expatriate firms and colonial chiefs. Both in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria, governments sought to impose a measure of control by fostering official farmers' cooperatives, which tended to serve the interests of expatriate buying firms as bulking and buying agencies, rather than those of the farmers. Throughout British West Africa the volume of exports surged to new heights as producers struggled to maintain their standard of living, though their annual value seldom exceeded the levels reached in the 1920s.

Since most people's incomes depended on the cultivation of export crops for declining returns, the opportunity cost of labour also declined. This stimulated mining, which relied on labour-intensive methods. Most mines were able to ride out the depression by forcing down wages: in the early 1930s daily rates for the 20,000 unskilled workers in the Nigerian tin mines fell from 1s to 5d per day, yet there was no shortage of recruits and miners' strikes proved ineffective. The inflated world price of gold encouraged alluvial production by 'tributors' in Nigeria: from 1934 to 1936 exports averaged £250,000. In the Gold Coast, mining contributed a third or more to exports from 1933, and employed upwards of 30,000 men. The value of gold exports rose steadily throughout the decade, and in 1939 reached £6m, equalling those of Southern Rhodesia. Diamond exports remained at the levels of the late 1920s, but the territory became the world's

third largest producer of manganese; this was worth over £1m in 1937. Meanwhile, Sierra Leone underwent a mineral revolution. In 1926, in the hope of reducing the country's dependence on palm products, the government had undertaken a geological survey which led to the discovery of iron ore, gold, diamonds and platinum. In 1927 the African and Eastern Trading Company (later part of the United African Company) secured a 99-year lease over the iron deposits and in 1929 joined with the Northern Mercantile and Investment Corporation to obtain a loan of £500,000 from the Colonial Development Fund to exploit them. Like the early loans to the Gold Coast, the fund was linked to a 'buy British' policy: its primary objective was to support industry and reduce unemployment in Britain. UAC and NMIC formed the Sierra Leone Development Corporation (Delco), transferring their original mineral rights at a handsome profit. Exclusive rights to mine and deal in diamonds were granted to Sierra Leone Selection Trust, a subsidiary of Consolidated African Selection Trust. Gold production, which was mostly alluvial, was open to Africans, but they had to be literate, and foreign licence-holders were joined only by a few wealthy Creoles. When the colony's export values began once more to rise in the mid-1930s, this was due chiefly to minerals, which from 1935 accounted for over half the total. By 1937, mining directly contributed 22 per cent of total government revenue. Yet as this amounted to just over £1m — no more than the value of diamond exports — the gain was not impressive, and the bulk of mining profits either went to shareholders or was reinvested abroad: it has been calculated that over 80 per cent of the proceeds from Delco sales went to British business, while less than 18 per cent remained in Sierra Leone as government revenue and wages.²⁰

True to orthodox economic principles, British colonial governments reduced expenditure to meet falling revenue. Between 1929 and 1931, the revenue of the Gold Coast fell by one-third. There was a general increase in customs duties, though to protect British industry the *ad valorem* rate on imperial cotton goods was reduced while a discriminatory duty was imposed on increasingly competitive Japanese cottons. Various expenditures were transferred from the central treasury to the accounts of the local native

²⁰ Ankie M.M. Hoogvelt and Anthony M. Tinker, 'The role of colonial and post-colonial states in imperialism — a case study of the Sierra Leone Development Company', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1978, 16, 1, 67–79.

authorities and municipalities. Extraordinary and development expenditures were eliminated. One obvious economy, the conversion of the relatively high interest loans of the early 1920s to lower prevailing rates, thereby reducing the burden on the public treasury, was rejected; colonial authorities argued that it would be unfair to bondholders, mainly British, who would suffer a loss of income. On the other hand, colonial and native authority reserves which were invested abroad could not be realised without considerable loss. Hence they were left intact rather than used to offset revenue deficits. In fact, after the initial years of the depression, there were modest annual increases in the colonial reserves. Recurrent expenditure, being mainly devoted to salaries and allowances, was trimmed by substantial retrenchments of Africans as well as Europeans. In numerical terms, it was the low-income government daily-paid employees who bore the brunt of retrenchment, declining in the Gold Coast from 20,239 in 1929 to 12,572 in 1930. One long-discussed palliative, the Africanisation of the colonial administrative service, continued to be rejected on racist grounds, though much of the work previously undertaken by British officials was delegated to African subordinates whose salaries and conditions were frozen at the top of the junior staff grade. In the technical departments, job reservation, though not salary differentials, increasingly broke down.

The cumulative effect of the depression and the European response, which tended to shift the burden on to Africans, worsened relations still further. Deterioration of wages and conditions resulted in strikes by both skilled and unskilled workers, notably on gold mines in the Gold Coast in 1934–7. In Lagos the colonial oligarchy was confronted in 1933 by the chilling threat of a police strike. The ‘ringleaders’, many of whom were non-indigenous Kru from Liberia, were tried and malcontents were dismissed. In 1934 in Lagos, drivers went on strike against the Lebanese-owned Zarpas transport company. They were rebuked by Macaulay’s *Lagos Daily News*: ‘At this time of economic depression, workers ought to know that there are many unemployed ready to take their place if they foolishly go out on strike.’²¹ Scab labour and police action against pickets

²¹ 24 July 1934. Cf. A. Hughes and R. Cohen, ‘An emerging Nigerian working class: the Lagos experience, 1897–1939’, in P. Gutkind, R. Cohen and J. Copans (eds), *African labor history* (London, 1979), 48.

broke the drivers' strike. In an attempt to protect the railways from more competitive African-owned motor transport, licensing, road inspection and restrictive legislation were introduced. The Gold Coast Carriage of Goods Road Ordinance of 1936 provided 'not for licensing but for the prohibition of the carriage of specific goods over scheduled roads'.²² The result was a series of fruitless boycotts and petitions by lorry owner-operators. Class and sectional interests divided African response, yet reality was increasingly at variance with British assertions of inherently superior political and economic competence.

The *ogu umuwanyi*, the Ibo Women's War of 1929, or as the British labelled it, the 'Aba riots', exemplified the gulf which separated the British oligarchy from their African subjects. Traditionally women had exercised considerable formal, as well as informal, influence in Ibo public life, to the extent of redressing grievances by collective action or the public chastisement of offenders, 'sitting on a man'. Such political solidarity rested on women's institutions such as the *mikiri* or 'meeting' and market networks which cut across the more parochial ties of lineage and village. This was not appreciated by the colonial authorities who concentrated power, hitherto diffuse, in the non-indigenous office of warrant chiefs. In 1928 the British introduced direct adult-male taxation and native treasuries in eastern Nigeria, in an attempt to establish administrative uniformity by bringing the warrant chief system into line with northern Nigerian practice. At first, taxation provoked only minor opposition, but at Owerri a young district officer's over-zealous efforts to collect information on women and property raised fears that women were about to be taxed. The fall in the producer price of palm kernels, a 'women's crop', had struck at the economic basis of an increasingly assertive stance by Ibo women, while many were already helping their menfolk pay existing taxes: the warrant chiefs had inflated the earlier tax census, having equated their own prestige with population. In addition, women were particularly resentful of the chiefs' abuse of authority, being victims of both economic and sexual exploitation. At Oloko in Owerri Province, a mass protest by women secured the dismissal of the warrant chief and written assurances that they would not be taxed. News of the 'victory' spread throughout Owerri and Calabar Provinces, and women were soon

²² Kay and Hymer, *Political economy*, 194.

besieging native courts and the residences of both chiefs and British officials to protest against injustices and the alleged women's tax. Some government buildings, particularly native courts, were burned; chiefs and their functionaries were driven off and their property looted; and in some areas women appear to have attempted to capture authority from the warrant chiefs.²³ The British panicked; large contingents of troops and police were drafted into the area, and in two clashes between troops and women demonstrators, fifty women were killed and another fifty wounded. Whatever illusions the people may have harboured about the British not firing upon women were shattered. News of the slaughter spread rapidly, yet localised disturbances persisted well into 1930.

Nor was the Women's War an isolated incident. Similar resentment against imposed chiefs, their disregard for traditional values and the deterioration of the economy, resulted in the contemporaneous though less well known *haakaa* anti-witchcraft movement among the Tiv of central Nigeria. Official enquiries into both movements opened the way for a major reappraisal of indirect rule, particularly as applied to chiefless societies. The resulting reforms, initiated under Sir Donald Cameron (governor 1931–5), introduced the concept of collective responsibility in the form of councils of elders and notables, as a basis for native administration. The British however dismissed as ridiculous demands by Ibo women for a place on the native courts and for the appointment of a female district officer. British sexist stereotypes of the non-participation of women in politics and economy were transposed to Africa: the women's behaviour was regarded as irrational and men were suspected of having secretly organised and directed them. Moreover, the 'Cameron reforms' undermined still further the political position of non-elders, Ibo women and Tiv younger men, by failing to provide any legitimate scope for collective action, their principal basis of power. Such 'working misunderstandings' were typical of British rule in Africa, the success of which has too often been measured by the frequency with which political crises punctuated the system.

The dramatic growth of pentecostalism and the numerous

²³ Judith Van Allen, "'Aba riots" or Igbo "Women's War"? Ideology, stratification, and the invisibility of women', in N. J. Hafkin and E. G. Bay (eds), *Women in Africa: studies in social and economic change* (Stanford, 1976), 59–85.

religious ‘awakenings’ of the 1930s were far more pervasive manifestations of the extent to which large-scale economic and cultural forces impinged upon peoples’ lives and called for explanations beyond the realm of parochial spiritual forces. The failure of the *haakaa* anti-witchcraft movement to alleviate tensions within Tiv society was followed by a Christian ‘awakening’ in 1934–6: bush ‘Bible-schools’ founded by former mission pupils sprang up independent of missionary endeavour, while the South African Dutch Reformed missionaries were overwhelmed to find their churches suddenly overflowing after twenty years of hitherto fruitless evangelism. In Yorubaland, people flocked to the *Aladura* churches. While drawn to specific congregations by the charisma of individual prophets and preachers or by rumours of miraculous cures, their quest was fundamentally spiritual; they were attracted by the universalist assertions of *Aladura* theology. In contrast to the earlier generation of educated and often culturally alienated or isolated *Aladura* converts, those of the 1930s were more often illiterate with strong ties to indigenous culture. Hence they continued to adhere to the corpus of indigenous beliefs, which they brought with them into the church, indigenising it in the process.

Simultaneously a new political consciousness was emerging. The older élitist politics of participation and co-operation were giving way to new political parties which actively sought the support of a wider sector of the population through more assertive economic and political demands. Unlike their more parochial precursors, this new generation of politicians brought to the British West African scene a broader world outlook born of long residence and education abroad. Since the previous century, increasing numbers had gone to Britain and the United States in search of education and employment, encountering overt racism, the phenomenon of poor whites and stimulating new ideas. Through foreign student associations, the most famous being the West African Student Union founded in London in 1926, they forged contacts with blacks from other parts of Africa, the West Indies and the United States, acquiring an awareness of their common plight. During the depression many emigrant Africans returned. In 1933 Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, having achieved academic distinction in America, accepted the editorship of A. J. Ocansey’s *African Morning Post* in Accra. Under Azikiwe, the

Morning Post brought to West African journalism a bold new style, championed reform and helped launch him on a political career ultimately leading to the presidency of an independent Nigeria. Yet however much Azikiwe might criticise the 'pussyfooting hat in hands ... Uncle Toms',²⁴ like the majority of the new generation, he was no less wedded to a bourgeois nationalist approach.

Of a different mould was the Marxist trade unionist, I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson. Born into a modest Creole household near Freetown, and educated in a mission school, Wallace-Johnson had a varied career, working successively in the Sierra Leone customs department, as a clerk with the carrier corps throughout the First World War and as a seaman with the Elder Dempster Line during the 1920s, when he appears to have joined the Communist Party. With Frank Macaulay, a son of Herbert Macaulay, he was active in founding the Nigerian Workers' Union. He could boast of contacts with left-wing British parliamentarians and international organisations. In 1930 he attended the First International Trade Union Conference of Negro Workers in Hamburg, Germany, along with prominent Africans such as Johnstone (Jomo) Kenyatta and the Gambian, E. F. Small. Through the *Negro Worker*, a journal inaugurated by the conference to raise the consciousness of black workers, he was able to maintain a sustained attack on the colonial system. In 1933 Wallace-Johnson was deported from Lagos for trade-union activities. He moved to the Gold Coast where he was to establish himself as a major political leader, directing his appeal to the sub-élite of white-collar workers and the urban proletariat. He was to be primarily responsible for injecting Marxist concepts, albeit often couched in simplified terms, into the anglophone West African political vocabulary.

The reaction of the Gold Coast government was inept. In 1934 Governor Thomas introduced a Sedition Bill to stifle press criticism and ban the *Negro Worker*. Simultaneously, proposals were announced for direct municipal taxation in Sekondi, Cape Coast and Accra to finance improved waterworks, an amenity viewed by many as primarily for the benefit of the élite. Popular opposition to taxation and the threat to the press led to public demonstrations and mass meetings. Alarmed by Wallace-Johnson's more strident denunciations, the *Gold Coast Independent*, a prominent establishment newspaper, launched a counter-attack.

²⁴ *West African Pilot*, 15 November 1936, 4.

In turn the diverse factions led by Wallace-Johnson, Azikiwe, W. E. G. Sekyi and others joined to form the West African Youth League; in 1936 they also helped to elect a radical lawyer, Kojo Thompson, to the legislative council as member for Accra. Soon afterwards Wallace-Johnson and Azikiwe were tried for sedition, for an article in the *Morning Post* criticising European civilisation, Christianity and imperialism.²⁵ The government's case was weak and was ultimately overruled, but appeal to the Privy Council proved costly. The Youth League disintegrated in the absence of strong leadership and more moderate reformers captured the opposition initiative. Azikiwe and Wallace-Johnson departed, carrying their message to Nigeria and Sierra Leone respectively.

The action which the Gold Coast government mounted against its critics was facilitated by the support which it received from the established African middle class, but also by the brief economic recovery of the mid-1930s. Both the world and producer-price for cocoa climbed throughout 1935–6 and 1936–7. As a result, though the Youth League had branches in many towns in the cocoa-belt, response came mainly from the sub-élite of clerks, teachers and brokers; it failed to establish links with the farmers' associations or to reflect the concerns of rural capitalists. By the time prices began to fall at the beginning of the 1937–8 season, Wallace-Johnson had already been removed from the scene and the Youth League was in disarray. Sekyi, Ocansey, Danquah and others failed to associate their political and economic demands with those of the rural population.

The farmers blamed the price collapse on the latest cocoa agreement, which in November 1937 had brought together thirteen major exporters, representing 94 per cent of Gold Coast cocoa exports. The agreement was intended to lower costs by reducing the role of African cocoa brokers. Consequently when the farmers staged a hold-up, they enjoyed the support of the large brokers. Moreover the chiefs, many of whom were themselves brokers, were also mindful of the popular hostility which had followed their defection during the previous boycott and they thus lent their support. Ofori Atta emerged as one of the principal spokesmen against the firms. Not only was the boycott effective throughout the Gold Coast; it spread to the Yoruba cocoa region

²⁵ Leo Spitzer and LaRay Denzer, 'I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth League', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1973, 6, 3, 441.

of Nigeria. The colonial authorities, fearful of a political explosion if they moved against the hold-up, denounced the agreement. British firms lobbied the Colonial Office. Rumours spread that Hershey, the American chocolate magnate, was negotiating to buy directly from the Gold Coast, thereby eliminating British middlemen. In response, the secretary of state instituted a commission of enquiry, which was greeted in West Africa as a victory. However, African producers were soon disillusioned to discover that the commission was powerless to increase cocoa prices, owing to world market conditions. On the other hand, in return for their co-operation, the firms insisted on an official export licensing scheme with allocations based on previous exports. In effect, the commission consented to enforce the market-sharing clauses of the agreement to protect British commerce, though the governor was empowered to issue local export licences for up to 3,000 tons (later reduced to 2,000 tons) as an inducement to African leaders. In April 1938 the hold-up ended with the Africans having gained little for their efforts. The commission's principal recommendation, the establishment of statutory marketing boards, was implemented in 1939 under wartime measures which led to the creation of the West African Produce Control Board. The board, however, set import quotas and shipping allocations in accordance with Britain's wartime requirements. The British export firms acted as agents for the board, responsible for purchasing and shipping, protected by wartime licensing regulations.

In Sierra Leone the plight of workers was, if anything, worse than in the Gold Coast. The Sierra Leone Development Company was paying mine workers between 4d and 1s per day; employees of the ubiquitous United Africa Company often received as little as 4d for an eleven- to fourteen-hour day; government elementary teachers were paid 10d per day, with no transport, accommodation or other allowances. Within three weeks of his arrival in Freetown in 1938, Wallace-Johnson had organised the West African Youth League's Sierra Leone branch. Disgruntled civil servants kept him informed of government initiatives. His publication of a purloined dispatch from Governor Jardine to the secretary of state in which the governor had declared that an African worker and his family could live on 15s per month and that labour was plentiful at 9d per day brought into question direct

official complicity in British commercial exploitation and provoked popular anger. Jardine compounded his error by instituting an enquiry which Wallace-Johnson used as a platform to deride both the British and Creole establishment. The Youth League won a resounding victory in the 1938 Freetown city council elections and in the legislative council elections the following year. Dr Bankole Bright refrained from seeking re-election, thus avoiding an ignominious defeat. However, the humiliation of the old guard brought little comfort to the colonial authorities. Inhibited by possible political repercussions from left-wing British sympathisers, they were unable to silence Wallace-Johnson until 1939, when he was detained under emergency wartime regulations.

Meanwhile Azikiwe had returned to his native Nigeria in 1937 and established his own newspaper, the *West African Pilot*. Joining forces with H. O. Davies, he lent his considerable prestige to the rejuvenation of the Nigerian Youth Movement, founded some years earlier by a circle of political activists. Within a year the Youth Movement had ended the 15-year political reign of Macaulay's Nigerian National Democratic Party, winning control of the Lagos town council and the elective Lagos seats on the legislative council. The Youth Movement, like its counterparts in Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast, had tapped a pool of disaffected, often educated, younger men. Moreover the Youth Movement played a more active role in the cocoa hold-up in Yorubaland, staging mass demonstrations of support in Lagos and collecting evidence for presentation to the commission, which also toured Nigeria. Such activities did much to enhance the movement's reputation outside Lagos. Politically, the Youth Movement represented a further step away from the ill-defined United British West African ethos of the National Congress. It appealed to Nigerian nationalism, pointedly referring to the non-native African origins, mainly Sierra Leone Creole, of many Democratic Party leaders. Yet within a few years the Youth Movement was itself to be rent by ethnically defined factional disputes, which equally reflected the differing perspectives of the rising rural capitalist Yoruba and the urban bourgeoisie.

Shaken by the depression and the looming uncertainty of political events in Europe, colonial officials were less able to confront African demands with their former self-assurance.

BRITISH WEST AFRICA AND LIBERIA

Instead, they began the gradual process of defining a new set of leaders with whom they could reach an accord, a transformation which reached fruition in the post-war independence movements. Simultaneously, they were to bequeath a colonial model of unrepresentative autocracy that was to become part of the political heritage of independent British West Africa, an economic and transport infrastructure which bound dependencies more closely to the world market than to their neighbours, and a divisively heightened tribal and social consciousness.

THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA

While the indigenous population of Liberia was to experience similar processes of confrontation, acculturation and response, the distinguishing characteristic of Liberia was its very existence as an independent black republic in a continent of colonies. For black nationalists it was a symbol of freedom. Azikiwe's first book, *Liberia in World Politics* (1934), extolled African achievement. Conversely, Liberia was anathema to apologists for colonial rule, who portrayed it in consistently pejorative terms.

Liberia had been established as a 'free, sovereign and independent republic' in 1847, under the control of Americo-Liberian settlers: descendants of freed slaves from America, liberated captives from outlawed slaving ships and immigrants from the West Indies. In the early twentieth century these black settlers, English-speaking and chiefly Methodist or Episcopalian, probably numbered less than 20,000 in a population of more than one and a half million, but they retained a monopoly over Liberian government and politics. Thus on one level the economic, political and social structure was essentially colonial, with the vast majority of Liberia's population cast in the subservient role of 'natives'. However, neither 'settler' nor 'native' represented a homogeneity of interests. Tribally-based denominational missions and differing educational and economic opportunities accentuated ethnic divisions, while politico-economic rivalries cut across Americo-Liberian society. Poor communications, and powerful parochial factions within the Liberian legislature, frequently frustrated presidents in Monrovia in their attempts to control the eastern coastal counties, let alone the hinterland provinces. Outside Monrovia the interests of local officials, influential

Americo-Liberians or traditional leaders, generally prevailed. The maritime Kru people, politically fragmented but great travellers, were able to play upon anti-Liberian prejudices in projecting their own local grievances on to the international political stage. Besides, the Americo-Liberians were themselves in a position of dependence, for they were very short of the skills required to exploit the country. A measure of higher education was provided by the government-run Liberia College, the Methodist College of West Africa and the Episcopalian Cuttington College (all founded in the nineteenth century). But as late as 1924 there were only 9,000 children in school, of whom 7,000 were taught by American Protestant missionaries, and few schools provided more than three years' primary education.

At the centre of Liberia's difficulties were her debts, totalling some \$800,000 in 1906, largely to British creditors. As a small tropical nation outside any of the imperial trade networks, her economy suffered from competition, colonial preferences and European trade restrictions. Liberia was but one of numerous suppliers of coffee, piassava, palm-oil and kernels. Due to inefficiency and corruption, real-estate tax and hut-tax were only sporadically collected. The chief source of revenue (which in 1911 was \$483,000) was customs dues, but these were either evaded or paid in worthless government drafts bought by foreign merchants at well below par value. The nation's primary export, manpower for British, German, French or Spanish ships and plantations, largely came from the Kru coast. Local Kru chiefs and middlemen sought to maintain their position by opposing the extension of Liberian administrative and commercial controls. In turn, Americo-Liberian merchants endeavoured to protect their dwindling markets through legislation restricting foreign competitors, who responded by ignoring the law and encouraging separatist aspirations among the Kru and others. At the same time the British in neighbouring Sierra Leone and the French in Guinea and the Ivory Coast were insisting that Liberia assume the added burden of 'effective administration' of the hinterland or relinquish her claims.

President Arthur Barclay (1904–12) responded with a series of bold reforms intended to circumvent external pressures and stimulate the economy without disrupting the internal social order. Citizenship but not the franchise was extended to all

Liberia's inhabitants. A policy of native administration somewhat similar to British indirect rule was to be instituted. Native authorities received 10 per cent of all fines and taxes in lieu of salaries, in the hope of increasing the collection of hut-tax. The number of ports of entry and customs posts along the Kru coast was increased, legitimising trade which the government had proved powerless to prohibit. An agreement was negotiated with the British-based Liberian Rubber Corporation for the establishment of a plantation near Monrovia and improvement of wild-rubber collection, in return for an equal share in a duty on rubber of 8d per pound. Finally, in 1906, a British loan was negotiated through Sir Harry Johnston, who was associated with both the Rubber Corporation and the Liberian Development Company, which was to receive the balance of the loan after redemption of outstanding government debts. In return for \$500,000, Barclay agreed to place British officials in charge of the Liberian Customs, which were offered as security. A total of \$150,000 went directly to foreign creditors, while the Development Company made off with nearly \$200,000 which was never adequately accounted for. When Barclay sought to renegotiate the loan in 1908, the British government insisted on additional control over customs and the establishment of a Frontier Force under British officers to police the country. Thereupon France, having recently forced Liberia into acquiescing in the loss of 20,000 square miles to the Ivory Coast, began demanding equal representation on the force. A US commission subsequently claimed that the failure of Barclay's reform 'was due more than anything else to the bungling of British officers':²⁶ the British consul proved not only tactless but hostile toward the black government, while the officer in charge of the Frontier Force overspent his budget, ignored orders and, when forced to resign in 1909, threatened a mutiny. Only the prompt action of the Liberian government in containing the mutiny, coupled with American intervention, checked more direct British interference. At President Barclay's invitation, US officers supplanted the British in the Frontier Force, while a US-inspired international loan of \$1.7m in 1912 modified British control over the Liberian customs department. Barely covering existing liabilities, the new

²⁶ 'Affairs in Liberia', United States Senate Document no. 457, 61st Congress, 2nd Session, 1910, 24.

debt nevertheless had first call on customs receipts and was linked to an international receivership headed by an American 'designate', who also assumed the ill-defined post of financial adviser to the government. Liberians intensely resented this infringement of their sovereignty but the new president, Daniel Howard (1912–20), had little choice but to accept it as the price for American patronage and protection.

Meanwhile, attempts were made to assert some measure of Liberian authority over the indigenous population; this mostly took the form of exactions by the Frontier Force and the inadequately supervised and often corrupt Liberian officials. Between 1916 and 1918 the regime of James B. Howard, district commissioner of nearly two-thirds of the Liberian hinterland, from the Sierra Leone border to the Cess river, drove the Golas into revolt. Maladministration, combined with economies by European traders and shipping companies that in effect reduced the real income of Africans, led to a series of rebellions on the Kru coast in 1909–10, 1912–13 and 1915 and among the Kpelle in 1920. The most serious was undoubtedly that of 1915, when the Kru, armed with rifles sold by British and German merchants in contravention of Liberian law, declared war on 'Germany and Liberia', hoisted the Union Jack and called for British annexation. British officials viewed Liberia's wartime neutrality as pro-German and interested British opinion favoured the Kru. Once again, however, the USA intervened, supplying arms to the Americo-Liberians, who ruthlessly crushed the rebellion and added to the growing legacy of bitterness. At the insistence of the US government, the system of 'native administration' was ostensibly reformed in 1921, but these changes, like so much Liberian legislation, proved little more than window-dressing.

Anglo-Liberian tensions subsided in 1917, when Liberia dutifully followed the United States into war against Germany. But the war proved disastrous for Liberia. Germany had been the main market for Liberian produce and German firms had dominated Liberian commerce and banking. Their loss was hardly compensated for by the proceeds from the sale of German property, claimed as reparations and used to pay an official overdraft with the Bank of British West Africa. Besides, the decline in shipping following the outbreak of war in 1914 had reduced customs revenue by nearly half. As the nation plunged still further into

debt, the USA began pressing Liberia to accept a new loan which would have eliminated European membership of the receivership and virtually placed Liberia under American control. The Liberian government procrastinated and the proposed loan died in the US Congress in 1922. It was with the hope of securing alternative financial and technical assistance that President Charles King (1920–30) initially welcomed Marcus Garvey's 'Back to Africa' scheme. On the other hand, a further large influx of American blacks would pose a threat to the existing power structure, and King later denounced Garveyism for advocating anti-colonial subversion among Liberia's neighbours. In any case, its economic attractions soon faded in the 1920s, as Liberia began to profit from the export of labour and African-produced coffee and palm-products, while a more promising source of aid was offered by the American tyre magnate, Harvey Firestone.

British efforts to control rubber prices by restricting imperial supplies prompted Firestone in 1927 to seek a 99-year lease on a million acres of Liberia for rubber development, simultaneously insisting on Liberian acceptance of a \$5m credit at 7 per cent interest, payable in forty years. The new loan was to be repaid from tax on anticipated rubber exports; nearly half of it was to be used to clear existing debts (though the 1912 loan bore only 5 per cent interest) and to convert the international receivership into an all-American body. Under pressure from the US government, and confronted by a renewed border dispute with France, the King administration accepted the Firestone agreement in 1927. Unfortunately the price of rubber collapsed in the following year and while the expected rubber boom faded, the loan repayments were immutable. In addition a new storm was about to break upon the government: the labour scandal.

In the absence of local employment opportunities and a secure market for their produce, many indigenous Liberians continued to seek work outside their country, on European ships and plantations. Yet labour recruitment, organised by government-appointed 'tribal chiefs' in cooperation with influential Americo-Liberians, was frequently less than voluntary, especially for the primitive Spanish plantations on Fernando Po. In 1929 stories of corruption, brutality and enslavement eventually provoked an international outcry. President King agreed to accept a League of Nations commission, which produced a highly damaging

report, critical of numerous Liberian officials, including Vice-President Allen Vancy. The report was painfully silent regarding the abuses perpetrated by the European employers of Liberian labour. King, who created a furore by accepting the report's strictures, was forced to resign, as was Vancy, whereupon the secretary of state, Edwin James Barclay, became president (1930–44). The United States refused to recognise Barclay's presidency, Firestone lobbied for unilateral American intervention, and Britain launched a diplomatic campaign for an international protectorate under the League. However, Edwin Barclay proved a consummate diplomatist, promising co-operation and reform while never conceding anything of substance. When the Liberian Committee of the League eventually put forward recommendations for administrative and fiscal reforms in 1934, they were so modified by the Liberian legislature as to make them innocuous. Yet by this time both Britain and the League were preoccupied with problems elsewhere, while the United States was happy to accept Liberian intent as a pretext both for restoring normal relations and for ending the moratorium on the Firestone debt, which Barclay had declared in 1932, citing Liberia's falling revenue and weakened economic position as a result of the depression. Thus the Roosevelt administration found itself in the embarrassing position of being attacked by black American leaders and the liberal press for appearing to defend the interests of Firestone, rather than social reform, in Liberia. In fact, Edwin Barclay proved as tenacious a negotiator with Firestone as he had with the League, and the subsequent amendments to the agreements were much more favourable to Liberia. Within Liberia he proved equally firm. Following yet another rebellion in 1931, a large section of the Kru community were compelled to surrender their arms and, as elsewhere in Liberia, the powers of the government-appointed 'paramount chiefs' were enhanced. Corruption, nepotism and maladministration became, if anything, worse. The presidential term of office was increased from four to eight years. In 1934 a Sedition Act effectively stifled any criticism of the president or government native policy and also made it an imprisonable offence to convey information to a foreign nation regarding conditions in Liberia. Thus the Americo-Liberian ruling establishment maintained its control.

CHAPTER 9

BELGIAN AFRICA

In 1908 the Belgian state took over from Leopold II responsibility for the former Congo Independent State. This huge territory (2.5 million sq. km, one quarter the size of Europe) encompassed great ecological contrasts: savanna and woodland in the north and south, equatorial rainforest in the centre, and high mountains and plateaux in the east and south-east. Most people spoke languages of the Bantu family, but languages of several other types were spoken in the north-east. There were great differences in terms of social and pre-colonial political organisation, while by the end of the nineteenth century the expansion of trade had engendered six spheres of political and economic influence: the Luso-African zone bordering Angola; the Swahili zone in the east and south-east; the hills and pastures of the Great Lakes region; the Sudanese savanna in the north; the riverain zone between Stanley Pool (Lake Malebo) and Stanley Falls (Kisangani); the coastal triangle between Loango, the Teke plateau and Ambriz.

Colonial domination introduced new lines of division, and new attempts at integration. The frontiers of the territory posed one major problem. Although it had been formed as a result of explorations from both east and west coasts, the Congo Independent State had been left, after Partition, with only one point of access to the sea, where the Congo (now Zaïre) river enters the Atlantic. The capital was sited here, at Boma, until 1929. Any attempt to strengthen economic or political links within the colony, and with the Belgian port of Antwerp, was bound to pull it westwards, turning it into an enormous funnel, in defiance of much economic and historical logic. Mineral deposits were mostly situated in the remote north-east (gold) and south-east (copper, cobalt, tin), and the latter were most easily exported through other colonial territories. Regional cleavages within the colony were aggravated by the fact that for economic purposes it was mostly

parcelled out into areas within which European firms exercised monopolistic privileges in running mines, plantations or networks of trade and transport. Onto these were grafted, not always harmoniously, zones for evangelisation by Christian denominations which varied greatly in doctrine and national origin. Of the government's major administrative divisions, Katanga (Shaba) and Orientale provinces aspired to autonomy up to at least the 1930s. Furthermore, the Belgian presence in the Congo was very limited before the 1920s: in terms of investment and personnel, the Independent State had truly been international. Hence Belgian colonial attitudes tended from the first to be xenophobic. To fear of the British and Americans was later added fear of Germans and communists, and while Africans were commonly regarded as fundamentally inferior, Portuguese, Greeks or Jews were often thought inferior to other whites. Besides, the Belgians brought with them the conflicts of their own society, notably that between Fleming and French-speaking Walloon. Meanwhile African societies were profoundly disturbed. Few people lived near the mining areas in the south-east or around Leopoldville (Kinshasa), the entrepôt of the middle Congo and the capital from 1929. It thus became necessary to organise large-scale migrations and the centralised management of both human and agricultural resources. Social relationships were transformed both by capitalism and by individualistic ideas introduced by missionaries. All in all, the Belgian Congo epitomised the contradictions inherent in colonial Africa, and one tract of the Third International called it 'the weakest point in the capitalist colonial front'.¹

1908–1920: REFORM AND WAR

When Belgium took over the Congo, it inherited numerous problems. One was the question of sovereignty. This was qualified by Belgium's treaty obligation to obtain French consent before alienating the Congo. Sovereignty was threatened by politicians in Germany, and in Katanga by British capitalists and Rhodesian or South African immigrants. And it was ill-defined insofar as the eastern and southern frontiers had yet to be delimited. At the same time, the colony urgently needed a legal

¹ Cited by P. Orts, *Le Congo en 1928* (Brussels, n.d.), 24.

and administrative framework congenial to capitalist enterprise, and large-scale capital investment in the economic infrastructure.

For the time being, the colony was thrown largely on its own resources to achieve these ends. Its budget had to be approved each year by the Belgian parliament, which took precautions to spare the Belgian state the cost of any future bankruptcy. The constitution of the Belgian Congo, the Colonial Charter of 1908, specified that the colony had a distinct legal personality and was obliged to service its debt. This was a much heavier burden than in most African colonies, since Belgium transferred to its new colony all the financial obligations of the Independent State, and these had been swollen by Leopold's large expenditures on public works in Belgium and military expeditions in Africa. In a sense, the burden of debt was offset by the extensive portfolio of investments, chiefly in mining and transport ventures, which the colony had also inherited from the Independent State, but these were slow to yield much income. Yet further investment was hard to raise in Belgium: even though the average Belgian taxpayer regarded the Congo as a pit dug by the *grande bourgeoisie*, the latter were not yet prepared to invest in its economic growth. The shares of the three great companies formed in 1906 — Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière (Forminière) and the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (BCK) — still seemed like lottery tickets.² Forminière and UMHK were largely financed from non-Belgian sources. In order to attract investment, use was still made of Leopold's methods, despite strong censure. In 1911 Lever Brothers received concessions of 750,000 hectares for palm plantations in order to set up the Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB). The administration levied forced labour on behalf of one railway company, the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo Supérieur aux Grands Lacs Africains (CFL) and called on foreign capital for another, the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Katanga (CFK). Despite such efforts, the total net contribution of company investment from 1911 to 1920 amounted to 8m francs at 1959 values; this represented on average a slightly lower annual level than for the whole period from 1887 to 1959.

Before 1914 the Congo accounted for less than 1 per cent of Belgium's external trade. Belgian commerce found it difficult to

² This is a paraphrase of remarks on Forminière by the financier Jean Jadot.

adapt to the economic liberalisation of the new regime, which encouraged competition from small businesses run by both Europeans and Africans.³ The sharp fall in the world price of rubber in 1913 made the situation worse, and the progress of the mining industry was not encouraging. The Kilo-Moto goldmines had nearly exhausted surface deposits. The position of UMHK was precarious. The gold deposits of Ruwe proved small, and copper metallurgy presented many problems: in 1911 the extraction of copper in Katanga cost twice as much as the selling price. Forminière had not yet found riches; the first diamonds from Kasai came on the market only in 1913. In 1910 three-quarters of the value of exports was still derived from the collection of wild products, mainly rubber and ivory from the central Congo basin and its surroundings. Transport was provided by the river system and the Matadi–Leopoldville railway, completed in 1898. The CFL linked Katanga and the eastern Congo to this ‘national’ network by building sections of railway, in 1906–10, to bypass the rapids on the Lualaba river. Between 1910 and 1914 the CFK linked the mines of Katanga to the Rhodesian railway system and Wankie colliery. Telegraph lines were extended and some wireless stations set up.

From 1908 to 1918 the minister for colonies was Jules Renkin, a lawyer who had been a director of the CFL. Under his guidance, the ministry prepared the Congo’s transition from a robber economy to one of capitalist development. No major change was made in land policy: the state continued to be the self-appointed trustee of almost all land not occupied by Africans or granted in freehold to concession companies. In 1906 the governor-general had been empowered to allot groups of Africans more land than they actually occupied, in partial recognition of the needs of shifting cultivators. But from 1910 Africans were obliged to pay a poll-tax, in cash, with a supplementary tax for polygynists; from 1914 non-payment was punishable by imprisonment and distraint on personal effects. Along with the re-establishment of freedom of trade, these measures served to precipitate Africans into the market for goods and services, and to open up the Congo for

³ Between 1910 and 1913 the contribution of small traders to ivory exports rose from 1.7 to 36.4 per cent, while their share of rubber exports rose from 0.2 to 18.6 per cent. Cf. Alexandre Delcommune, *L’Avenir du Congo belge menacé...le mal. Le Remède* (Brussels, 1919), 279.

‘The map which appears here in the printed edition has been removed for ease of use and now appears as an additional resource on the chapter overview page’.

capitalist enterprise. The cartel formed among the three main river-transport companies was dissolved a year later, and the government ordered a 40 per cent reduction in tariffs. In 1907 it had bought the railway line north of Boma, and this was later extended; meanwhile the government modernised the port of Matadi and gained a controlling interest in the CFL. However, a reorganisation of the fiscal system, together with the fall in rubber prices, resulted in a fall in revenue and the enforced stabilisation of ordinary expenditure.⁴ The colonial budget, burdened with many expenses in Belgium (such as the Musée Royal du Congo Belge at Tervuren), did not expand until 1920. Since metropolitan expenditure for colonial purposes was almost exclusively limited to the support of the Ministry of Colonies, the resources for African administration were slight. Thus progress in the effective occupation of the Congo was very slow.

In Belgian Africa the legislative and executive powers were not responsible to the society they governed: this was as true of Belgian settlers as of Africans. In theory, the executive was ultimately responsible to the Belgian parliament; in practice, it exercised very wide powers of legislation. The Colonial Charter recognised three sources of law: parliamentary statute, royal decree and African custom. The first was rarely used; colonial government was chiefly shaped by decrees drawn up by the colonial minister. These had to be scrutinised in Brussels by the Colonial Council. In one sense, this was an independent body, since it excluded not only members of parliament but also colonial officials and employees of colonial business firms in which the government had an interest. But eight councillors were nominated by the king (Albert I from 1909), as against only six appointed by the two houses of parliament, and its president was the colonial minister. Most councillors had spent some time in the Congo; several were academics but these, like their colleagues, often had business connections. The council's advice was normally accepted, but it concerned itself with matters of detail rather than basic principle. In the Congo, the Colonial Charter had established, in

	1912	1913	1914	
Revenue	63	49	44	} millions of francs
Expenditure	50	54	54	

response to missionary pressure, the Commission for the Protection of Natives. This was formally independent of the governor-general but consisted wholly of royal nominees. It was meant to meet annually, but it published reports less frequently; it was mainly influential in drawing attention to the physical condition of Africans. In 1914 advisory councils were introduced at the capital and in the provinces, but non-official members were heavily outnumbered by officials. The main counterweight to executive power was the judiciary, which, in reaction against the misrule of the Independent State regime, enjoyed considerable freedom. Magistrates challenged local European abuses of power, for missions and traders often behaved like petty kings. There were many conflicts between the judiciary and the executive, since the former believed that its duty was to ensure the strict application of the law without regard for economic necessities.

In 1910 the Belgian government ended by law the reign of the *Comité Spécial du Katanga*, which had enjoyed many privileges, including the management of state lands. Katanga retained a measure of its special status, but its 'army' of 1,500 men was placed under the command of the police. In 1912 the *territoire* became the basic unit of colonial administration; territorial administrators were in turn subordinated to district commissioners. By 1918 the various districts had been grouped into four provinces: Katanga, Orientale, Leopoldville and Equateur; each was ruled by a vice-governor-general who exercised a wide measure of autonomy. Patterns of recruitment also changed, though slowly. For some years the administration of the Belgian Congo, like that of the Independent State, consisted largely of military officers, many of whom were non-Belgian, but in 1911 an *École Coloniale* was established in Belgium to train civilian Belgian administrators. A new cadre of colonial magistrates was also created, though they dealt mainly with Europeans.

African administration was organised by a decree in 1910 which gave official recognition to approved chiefs. Each chiefdom was divided for legal purposes into sub-chiefdoms. In the absence of clear rules as to how these should be constituted, the result was near-anarchy, with 4,000 recognised chiefs in 1918, as against 2,200 in 1911. Many had in fact been colonial auxiliaries, without local roots, and they were agents of direct rather than indirect rule.

The First World War profoundly altered the relationship

BELGIAN AFRICA



14 Belgian Congo: administrative divisions, 1926 and 1933

between Belgium and the Belgian Congo, though this only became clear around 1920. Belgium herself was almost entirely occupied by Germany throughout the war; her colony took on a vital strategic role. The colonial army (the Force Publique), consisting of African soldiers and Belgian officers, expanded to more than 20,000 by 1917 and enabled Belgium to defeat German forces in Kamerun and East Africa. The Congo's copper was diverted from Antwerp to London; it was used to manufacture Allied munitions, and from 1914 to 1917 production steadily increased. Exports in general from the Congo doubled in bulk between 1915 and 1917, and the share contributed by palm-oil rose very considerably. The war also prompted the colonial government to expand the railway system, from 1,483 km in 1914 to 2,048 km in 1918. The CFK line through Katanga from the Rhodesias was extended in 1918 to Bukama, on the Lualaba, which greatly eased the supply of men and materials, while in 1916 Kabalo, further down the Lualaba, was linked by rail to Albertville (Kalémié) on Lake Tanganyika.

The war, however, retarded modernisation. The robber economy was prolonged by the urgent need for short-term gains. Labour was forcibly conscripted on a huge scale, both for mining and for portage in the East African campaign. Some farmers were compelled to revert to the collection of forest products for export: copal in the equatorial basin, palm-fruits in Kwango. In Orientale province Africans were forced in 1917 to grow cotton and rice. Administrative constraint was still the rule, whether legal (help for recruiting agents and traders) or illegal (private contracts between government agents and traders for the supply of goods). The amount of money in circulation increased, but the franc diminished in value, especially after the return in 1919 to parity with the Belgian franc, which the war had interrupted. At the end of the war, wage-earners numbered about 100,000, including state employees and civilian porters, while 100,000 men had been conscripted for military service; this placed a heavy burden on the rural economy, especially in Lomami and Tanganika districts.

African labour was most obviously exploited in the mining industry. While the labour needs of Katanga were partly met from outside the colony, the price of local labour was forced down by the creation in 1910 of a labour bureau with a monopsony on

recruitment within Katanga. This received much assistance from administrators, while helpful chiefs were paid bonuses. Recruiting agents scoured villages for men and often took them away in gangs roped together. Contracts ran from six to nine months and accommodation consisted of temporary camps. Desertions were common, and in 1917 mortality in the copper-mines exceeded 10 per cent. Forminière and the Kilo-Moto mines, which extracted precious minerals, were able to impose a closed economic system: their migrant workers could only buy from the company, and wages and prices were independent of those outside. In the Lower Congo, people were forced into wage labour by rural impoverishment, due to the disturbances of the Independent State regime and the spread of sleeping-sickness. The railway drew many to Leopoldville or Matadi, while in the Madimba area wage-labour was used to produce each month hundreds of tons of prepared cassava for Leopoldville.

All in all, the war and its aftermath were collectively a traumatic experience. To the recruitment of porters and workers, and the requisitioning of crops, were added the influenza pandemic of 1918–20, which killed many thousands, and the post-war price rises. Africans voiced their discontent. In 1919 a prophet in southern Equateur, Marie aux Léopards, promised speedy deliverance by the Germans. Where Africans were drawn more completely into the cash economy, as along the main waterways, they began to think of taking matters into their own hands. In 1920 one sailor on the Kasai remarked to another, ‘The white man eats big food and takes a big sleep in the middle of the day and you ought to do the same thing. The company that owns this boat has much money and you should be getting more wages.’⁵ There was isolated strike action in 1920–1 in the Lower Congo, at Dima (lower Kasai), and probably at Kilo-Moto, and in 1924 at Albertville.

The subjugation of the Congo was by no means complete. In some areas, as in those inhabited by the Tetela, Mongo and Songye, or that east of the Lomami, the colonial government had had to perpetuate the Independent State’s alliances with brigand chiefs, some of whom remained virtually independent. As other areas began to feel the pressure of tax-collectors, labour-recruiters, missionaries and trading monopolists, these independent chiefs

⁵ I. F. Marcossou, *An African adventure* (New York and London, 1921), 249.

became centres of opposition. Colonial forces crushed Tetela rebels east of Lake Kisale in 1909, suppressed armed bands near the Angolan border in 1913 and put down resistance in Kivu in 1916. In Katanga, the Luba chief Kasongo Nyembo beat off several attacks before his capture and deportation in 1917. Some areas, such as northern Kivu, southern Kwango and Dekese in the Kasai, were still beyond the reach of colonial officials in 1920.

The final stage in establishing a modern administration in the Congo was the reform in 1919 of the Force Publique. Its establishment was set in 1920 at 16,000, which in relation to the total population of the territory was probably a very high level by comparison with other parts of colonial Africa.⁶ The force was divided into *troupes campées* for defence, and *troupes en service territorial* for internal security; the latter comprised about 6,000 men. In 1920 district commissioners were authorised to decide upon military or police occupations and operations. In any repressive operation the detachment had to be personally directed by a European (an administrator or authorised territorial agent) to prevent pillage, for the troops were paid even less than labourers.

The economy still relied heavily on personnel who were neither Belgian nor indigenous to the Congo. In line with their main sources of investment, UMHK and HCB drew much of their administrative staff from Britain, while Forminière looked to the USA. UMHK depended heavily on Americans for technical expertise and obtained much of its skilled white labour from South Africa. Much of its black labour came from Northern Rhodesia and Angola; many African clerks and shop assistants in Katanga were also immigrants. In Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), Belgians complained that one had to speak English to make oneself understood at the post office, and up to 1919 there were more pounds in circulation than francs: it was almost a Rhodesian town. In 1911–13 the government had tried to establish a colony of Belgian farmers in Katanga, but without success. In Leopoldville, with 1,000 Europeans and 15,000 Africans in 1920, West Africans were the dominant group in several companies and on the railway, which unlike the CFL entrusted its trains to African drivers. ‘Creole’ African society considered itself equal to European society: such Africans had a comparable standard of living,

⁶ See chapter 1, p. 49.

organised themselves in associations (such as the 'Franco-Belges'), attended private clubs and dance-halls, dressed like Europeans and read European newspapers. In urban areas the more senior literate Africans could earn as much as some whites and were often paid in pounds. As the purchasing power of the franc declined after 1919, this became a source of real anger among white government employees, and in 1920 some in Katanga went on strike. White workers from the sterling area felt especially aggrieved at being paid in francs, and in the same year South Africans in Katanga played a leading role in strikes on the mines and railways. The net result was to speed up the replacement of such unreliable foreigners with Belgians who were much further from any outside source of support.

The continuing weakness of the colonial state during the First World War enhanced the power of the Roman Catholic Church. By 1910 there were around 500 missionaries in the Belgian Congo, of whom some 200 were Protestant; there were between 50,000 and 100,000 African Christians.⁷ The eastern Congo was the preserve of the Catholic White Fathers, but Protestants were well established in the Lower Congo, along the Congo river and in Kasai; in all these areas there were numerous businesses in British or American hands. In the struggle for African souls the Protestants had the advantage, by 1911, of ten doctors, nine hospitals and twenty-five dispensaries. Moreover, the liberalism

7

Total mission staff						African priests		Black pastors		Baptised Africans (thousands)		Primary school pupils (thousands)			
C		P		C		P		C		P		C		P	
1907	343	211 ¹		—		—		41		50 ¹		1916	60	40	
1922	1,013	539 ²		3		—		337 ³		108 ³		1924	95	82	
1936	2,475	1,280		23		561		1,173		260		1938	722	300	

¹1908. ²1924. ³1926.

Sources: A. Coreman, *Annuaire des missions catholiques au Congo belge* (Brussels, 1924; 1935); F. de Meeus and D. R. Steenberg, *Les Missions religieuses au Congo belge* (Antwerp, 1947), 142-3; E. M. Brackman, *Histoire du protestantisme au Congo* (Brussels, 1961).

N.B. The statistics for numbers of Christians are unreliable. Quite apart from their propaganda functions, they are flawed by large variations between denominations in the criteria for admission to baptism. Roman Catholic figures are swollen by child baptism, which Protestants hardly ever practised.

BELGIAN ASSERTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

of the Belgian colonial regime seemed at odds with authoritarian Catholic strategies — the recruitment of converts from among redeemed slaves and the creation of large mission farms; besides, such concentration of Christians contributed to the spread of sleeping-sickness. However, there was political pressure in Belgium to increase the Belgian missionary presence in the Congo. In line with the Concordat of 1906, the Ministry of Colonies maintained the state's special relationship with Catholic missions by way of land grants and subsidies. The network of Catholic primary schools expanded rapidly. Government schools for training African clerks and artisans were entrusted to Catholic teaching orders, as were several of the schools which the larger industrial firms had set up by 1920. At the United Missionary Conference of the Congo, at Luebo in 1918, there were Protestant complaints against the privileged treatment accorded by the state to Catholic missions.

1920-1930: BELGIAN ASSERTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

In the years after the war, the Belgian Congo became far more Belgian than ever before. In 1918 Renkin finally retired as colonial minister; his successor, Louis Franck, set about strengthening the partnership between government and Belgian capital. The exploitation of men and materials during the war had given rise to exaggerated ideas about the colony's resources, and the commercial slump in 1920-1 did little to check the euphoria widespread in commercial circles. The realignment of the Congolese franc with the Belgian franc in 1919 encouraged private Belgian investment in the post-war period. Belgian capital took advantage of the transfer at par of a weak currency into an expanding economy, and realised profits in a strong currency. In 1920 the law of property was revised to facilitate capitalist growth. Franck told an American journalist, 'The Congo is not only the economic hope of Belgium, it is teaching the Belgian capitalist to think in broad terms.'⁸ In 1921 a leading Belgian financier, Maurice Lippens, became governor-general, and 600m gold francs were raised on the Belgian stock market for a public works programme.

⁸ Marcossou, *African adventure*, 175-6.

Of the total capital invested in the colony between 1887 and 1959, one-third was subscribed between 1921 and 1931. Much was channelled through the colossus of Belgian finance, the *Société Générale*, which sought to compensate for heavy losses in Russia following the Bolshevik revolution. It enabled UMHK to increase its share capital fivefold, while the percentage held by Robert Williams's companies (notably Tanganyika Concessions) fell from 45 in 1920 to 16 in 1923. In 1928 the *Société Générale* took control of the *Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie*. Thereafter, despite protests in Belgium, the 'Empire de la Générale' was a fact. It controlled, more or less, most of the larger businesses in the Congo, amounting to almost half the economy of the colony; and it accounted for 65 per cent of capital investment between 1920 and 1932. Beside this giant, other financial groups were of minor importance. Given the extent to which the *Société Générale* penetrated the Belgian technocracy and bourgeoisie, its hold over the colony's economy was only reinforced by the post-war growth of state enterprises, as in goldmining, plantations and river transport. Between 1920 and 1930 the share of government revenue derived from income tax and government investments rose from 13 to 37 per cent; of this, almost a quarter came from UMHK and a third from companies controlled by the *Société Générale*.

Meanwhile, Belgians came to the Congo: over the decade the white population rose from 7,000, of whom only half were Belgian, to 25,000 of whom 70 per cent were Belgian. Nearly all administrators were now Belgian, and the level of professional competence among them was raised by the four-year training provided by the Colonial University in Antwerp, founded in 1920, though in the government medical service half the doctors in the mid-1920s were Italian.

Belgian power in Africa had also been increased through the acquisition of Ruanda-Urundi. This territory, named after the two largest pre-colonial kingdoms within it, was a highland region of rich volcanic soils, and it had been the most densely-populated corner of German East Africa. Belgian forces had occupied it in 1916, but Belgium valued it simply as a pawn which might somehow be used to get Portugal to give up the south bank of the Congo estuary. This hope was disappointed, and in 1919 the League of Nations conferred on Belgium a mandate to administer

Ruanda-Urundi. There was some argument over the frontier with the British mandate of Tanganyika; due to pressure from missionaries of the White Fathers, Gisaka was reattached to Ruanda, but areas claimed by Burundi were not restored and Belgium had to evacuate territory which its forces had occupied between Tabora and Lake Tanganyika. On the other hand, Belgium was granted special privileges in the ports of Dar es Salaam and Kigoma, and on the railway between them; this eased the problem of exporting copper from Katanga. In 1924 the Belgian parliament finally approved the mandate, and next year made the territory part of the Belgian Congo for administrative purposes. It became subject to the law of the Congo and was given the status of a vice-governor-generalship. Despite German protests at the League of Nations after 1925, Ruanda-Urundi became to all intents and purposes a fifth province of the Belgian Congo.

Earlier hopes of the agricultural wealth to be derived from Ruanda-Urundi were misplaced. While the population (perhaps three million) may well have been one-third that of the Belgian Congo, its commodity exports (mostly hides, skins and livestock) amounted to only one or two per cent of the Congo's, and their real value scarcely increased between 1924 and 1930. A beginning was made with coffee and cotton, but the most immediately useful new crop was cassava, which was intended to protect people against famines such as ravaged the country in 1928. The main export was not produce but men, who left for work both in the Belgian Congo and in neighbouring British territories; it was chiefly these migrants who caused imports of cloth to Ruanda-Urundi to quadruple between 1923 and 1930. There was even talk, though it came to nothing, of the mass removal of people from Ruanda to Katanga, Kolwezi and the Kundelungu Plateau.

In the Belgian Congo the colonial government financed great improvements in transport and communications. The road network grew from 2,400 km in 1920 to 30,000 km in 1930, while annual petrol consumption rose from 500 to 24,000 tonnes. Two new rail links were constructed: Bukama–Port Francqui (Ilebo) (1928) and Tenke–Dilolo (1931); the Matadi–Leopoldville line was reconstructed; and from 1924 a narrow-gauge railway was built to serve cotton-growing areas in the Uele region. Sabena, jointly created in 1923 by the Belgian and colonial governments,

provided air services, both mail and passenger: Leopoldville was thus linked to Elisabethville in 1927, and in 1934 to Brussels (to which it had already been linked by telephone). Several new wireless stations were also built.

The mining companies reconsidered their strategies, for the richest deposits had been rapidly depleted during the war. In order to exploit lower-grade ores, UMHK decided in 1923 to develop a leaching plant and associated chemical industry and to build a hydroelectric power station (others were built near the Kilo-Moto goldmines and on the lower Congo). In the course of the 1920s UMHK became the world's largest copper-producing company, while from 1923 to 1931 the Belgian Congo was the world's third largest source of copper. Between 1920 and 1930 the production of copper increased sevenfold and that of diamonds tenfold. Gold remained important. Kilo-Moto (which the state owned in 1920–6 and in which thereafter it had a majority holding) became the second largest industrial employer in the colony, with an annual average of 20,000 workers. Exploration continued: in 1923 the CFL formed a subsidiary to mine gold and tin in its area, while UMHK began to mine cobalt and also uranium: from 1922 the Belgian Congo supplanted the USA as a source for medical radium. The relative contribution of minerals to export values gradually increased: they accounted for 60 per cent in the later 1920s. In 1929 total exports were worth £8.2m; in the course of the decade their value had probably increased between two- and threefold in real terms.⁹

Local processing industries also began to flourish. According to international agreements in 1890 and 1919, preferential duties on imports could not be imposed within a specified zone which included the Congo basin. In order to limit the market for non-Belgian products, the government therefore encouraged the local production of cement, soap, beer, fabrics and sugar. This policy was assisted by the growth of the white population and the increased circulation of money among Africans. The labour force in private employment rose between 1920 and 1926 from 125,000 to 422,000 while output from farm and forest increased considerably, even though the terms of trade were moving against African producers. The volume of imported consumer goods

⁹ According to one calculation, import prices tripled between 1922 and 1930. Wholesale prices in Belgium slightly more than doubled over the same period. See above, p. xviii.

tripled between 1920 and 1926, and remained at this level until 1929, while over the whole decade the gross domestic product nearly doubled in real terms. Belgium's share of its colony's imports, which had fallen from 74 to 43 per cent between 1908 and 1920, rose to 55 per cent in 1925; thereafter it declined, partly because of oil and motor-vehicle imports from the USA.

The growth of agriculture during the 1920s was not primarily directed to export. The limits of the government's economic liberalism were shown in its policy towards cotton, the possibilities of which had been demonstrated during the war by E. Fisher. The government fixed the purchase price each year and assigned local monopolies over growing and marketing to Cotonco, formed in 1920, and a few other companies. These concessionaires were supposed to build roads to minimise portorage, but they seldom complied. Forced labour was used to build roads in Orientale province, and this was the only area in which cotton-cultivation was widespread by 1930. Some research was devoted to cotton, as to oil-palms, but the government was mainly interested in food-production, both to supply industrial centres and to combat local famines (a particular problem in Ruanda-Urundi). African farmers were goaded by an agricultural tax imposed in 1924, but they also received some technical help. The government joined the mining companies in financing large stock-rearing companies from 1927, in order to supply the compulsory meat component in workers' rations. But little official help was given to the 400-odd European farms which by 1930 had been established in Kivu, Ituri and Katanga; in Katanga they continued to face competition from maize and cattle imported from the Rhodesias.

In the years after the war the government abandoned its pre-war support of small business. In this, it responded to pressure from Delcommune, spokesman of the *Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie*. Lippens himself had been president of this firm,¹⁰ and in 1921 he proposed restrictions (enforced in 1925) on the use of African trading agents, on which the smaller businesses depended heavily. The latter were further handicapped by attempts to prevent barter and loans to Africans, and to enforce wage-payment in cash. However, the big companies had their own

¹⁰ After his resignation from the colonial government in 1923, Lippens founded the *Compagnie Sucrière Congolaise*, which received a concession of 30,000 hectares in the lower Congo and throughout the period retained its sugar monopoly.

ways of controlling the African market. HCB used a subsidiary to sell goods to their African suppliers. Forminière and Kilo-Moto made the most of the restrictions on trade in diamond- and gold-mining areas. By the late 1920s, UMHK and CFK had begun to effect a horizontal integration of Katanga's economy.

As government and big business steadily eliminated competition in agricultural marketing, both during and after the war, prices paid to producers fell very steeply. This in turn depressed the price of wage-labour: it has been reckoned that on average real wages for unskilled workers in 1923 were no more than 40 per cent of their value in 1913.¹¹ The cost of labour was further held down by new recruiting monopsonies, in Kasai and Leopoldville, from 1921–2, and by a partial ban on cash-crop production in Lomami and Lulua in 1925. But although in this sense the problem of finding cheap labour had eased, there was a more fundamental sense in which labour supply was more of a problem than ever. The rapid growth of investment in the 1920s far outstripped the colony's own labour resources. In the early 1920s more than half the labour force of UMHK came from Northern Rhodesia, whence also came many other workers in Katanga. And over the Belgian Congo as a whole it was becoming clear that the scale of labour migration was threatening the capacity of rural populations to sustain and reproduce themselves. In 1924 the government set up a Native Labour Commission, representing government and business, which in 1925 recommended that not more than 10 per cent of a village's able-bodied men should be recruited for work at more than two days' distance. This principle was much modified in practice, though the government did ban recruitment in a few hard-hit areas. Franck's successor as colonial minister, Carton de Tournay, instructed officials not to give direct assistance to recruiters, but many continued to do so, and in any case the collaboration of chiefs was still solicited and rewarded. By 1927 it was reckoned that one quarter of the colony's adult male population was working either for government or for private firms; in the industrial area of Katanga, three out of four adult males were in employment.

The long-term future of the labour force was more effectively

¹¹ J.-P. Peemans, 'Capital accumulation in the Congo under colonialism: the role of the state', in P. Duignan and L. H. Gann (eds.), *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*, IV. *The economics of colonialism* (Cambridge, 1975), 187.

secured by attempts to improve its fitness. The larger companies, and private foundations, began to join government and missions in providing medical care, while sleeping-sickness and other endemic diseases were more systematically attacked. In 1921 provincial governors were given new powers to control workers' rations, housing, hygiene and transport to and from their home areas. Real wages, though very depressed, moved slowly upwards over the decade, in response to continuing labour scarcity. This stimulated the larger firms at least to make more discriminating use of their labour. UMHK was under special pressure to do so, since the cost of immigrant workers, whether unskilled from British Africa or skilled from the USA, rose as the Belgian franc lost value in relation to the pound sterling and the dollar, while by comparison the cost of capital goods declined. On the one hand, UMHK organised recruitment within the franc zone; by 1930 it was obtaining enough workers from Ruanda-Urundi and Lomami to be able to dispense with further recruitment in Northern Rhodesia. On the other hand, UMHK greatly increased the ratio between capital and labour, through changes in mining techniques and metallurgy. To make the most of the experience gained by unskilled workers, and also to cut down on recruitment costs, UMHK sought to retain them for longer periods. It began to place all black workers on three-year contracts and encouraged greater efficiency both through differential pay-scales and by making more provision for workers' wives and children. In addition, a growing minority of Africans were trained to operate machines, which could be much more widely used in Katanga's mostly opencast mines than in the underground mines being developed across the border in Northern Rhodesia.

While the involvement of Africans in capitalist relations of production rapidly increased in the 1920s, the decade also witnessed attempts to strengthen indigenous institutions which resembled contemporary British trends towards 'indirect rule'. In 1920 two officials, P. Salkin and G. van der Kerken, published books which stressed the political dangers of rapid industrialisation and proletarianisation; they wished to strengthen 'traditional' societies and the authority of 'legitimate' chiefs. Such views were entirely congenial to the colonial minister, Franck: he himself had recently been a leader of the Flemish speakers' movement in Belgium, and as such he was naturally sympathetic

both to the promotion of vernacular languages and to resisting the indefinite spread of French-language culture. Late in 1920 Franck outlined his African policy: official recognition should be withdrawn from the less important and effective chiefs, and those without local roots, while recognised chiefs should be grouped on the basis of tribal affiliation into area councils. This policy was patchily applied. Some officials made diligent enquiries into local history and tribal organisation, but systematic reforms were impeded by staff transfers and the attitudes of some provincial governors. Nonetheless, the official standing of chiefs was significantly raised by the constitution, in 1926, of African courts as integral parts of the colony's legal hierarchy: they were given extensive powers in civil, and limited powers in criminal, jurisdiction.

The partnership between the colonial state and the Catholic Church continued to be strengthened. Franck himself was an anti-clerical, but he realised that Catholic discipline had helped to make good workers in Belgium and could be expected to do the same in Africa. He therefore initiated a scheme, finally introduced in 1927, whereby subsidies for primary education were confined to 'national' missions under Belgian management, which in effect meant Catholic missions. The latter were thus enabled to increase the numbers in their primary schools much faster than the Protestants.¹² Catholic primary teachers not only sought to inculcate respect for the white man but also stressed the moral value of working for him. 'The national missions...spread the love of the name of Belgium together with the light of the gospel...'¹³ The teaching of French was allowed but not encouraged: three out of four Belgian missionaries in the Congo were Flemish-speakers and in any case French was thought to contribute undesirably to the 'detrribalisation of Africans'. Much use was therefore made of the African languages most familiar to missionaries, and as these were written down they tended to prevail over others. There were attempts to standardise the Kongo, Luba and Swahili languages, and Lingala (the trade language of the middle Congo). In Ruanda-Urundi, the end of German rule strengthened the position of the White Fathers, who were mostly French. They

¹² See table on p. 472, note 7, above.

¹³ O. Louwers, 'Rapport général', in Institut Colonial International, *L'Enseignement aux indigènes: rapports préliminaires* (Brussels, 1931), 23.

strenuously defended the hegemony of the ruling Tutsi caste and through alliance with them were able to attract very large followings; by 1934 these included 283,000 baptised Catholics and as many catechumens.

The government's educational policy reflected its reluctance to encourage more social change among Africans than was absolutely necessary. Apart from the government's training schools (of which there were twelve by 1925), there was very little provision for post-primary education. As Belgians entered the colony after the war, there was growing concern to prevent Africans competing with them for jobs. Opportunities contracted for the tiny minority of Africans who were literate and enjoyed a European lifestyle. There was no class, however small, of blacks with full citizenship of the metropolitan country, as there was in French West Africa. In theory, it had been possible since 1892 for Africans to register themselves as subject to the Belgian civil code rather than customary law, but the qualifications remained unspecified and the privileges meagre: the procedure (called *immatriculation*) fell into desuetude. The growth of an indigenous petty bourgeoisie was stunted by the measures in 1925 against itinerant traders, while Africans who rented land in CFK territory were not allowed to renew their leases. In the larger towns (and by 1928 there were 32,000 people in Leopoldville), African workers were generally regarded as transient visitors, and little positive incentive was given for women to accompany men. UMHK's change of policy in the later 1920s was exceptional.

Yet the continuing growth of towns and industry meant that more and more Africans spent long periods away from 'home', while some had no intention of going back there. Catholic missionaries tried to exert some influence over such 'detrified' people by creating clubs for clerks, medical assistants or former schoolmates. In Katanga, the prefect apostolic was Mgr de Hemptinne, who came from a banking family and was a friend of King Albert. He secured the ascendancy of his own Benedictine order among mission schools in Elisabethville and the UMHK compounds, and this furthered his aim of turning tribesmen into reliable workers. The emergence of a core of settled African town-dwellers was also acknowledged by a senior administrator in Katanga, Gaston Heenen. When in charge of Lomami district in 1918–22 he had helped colonies of ex-soldiers to become

improving farmers, outside the control of chiefs; as deputy to the vice-governor-general, he managed in 1926 to have the African township in Elisabethville declared a *centre indigène extra-coutumier*, in which limited judicial powers would be exercised by townsmen rather than by representatives of chiefs.

Overt African opposition to the colonial regime seems to have subsided after 1920. Pockets of resistance remained, especially in the forest, but local detachments of the Force Publique sufficed to prevent revolts. Yet African societies were fraught with tension. There was friction between lineages, 'recognised' chieftainship and colonial authorities; the cash economy and colonial rule provided new avenues to wealth and power, at least for a few, and this bred suspicion and jealousy. Fears of witchcraft gave rise, as no doubt in earlier times, to local cults and secret societies. In 1921 Simon Kimbangu, a Baptist convert, attracted a huge following for his healing mission in the Lower Congo. He preached salvation, but nervous officials, supported by Catholic missionaries, thought that he threatened revolution and sentenced him to death, which the Belgian king commuted to life imprisonment. This proved a martyrdom: Kimbangu's movement was driven underground, but it soon began to spread throughout the colony.¹⁴

1930-1940: DEPRESSION AND COMPULSION

The international economic depression of the 1930s accentuated economic and political trends in the Belgian Congo which were already apparent by 1928: systematic economic exploitation, close co-operation between government and big business, the elimination of several smaller-sized businesses, the development of agriculture. The colony was subjected to an essentially totalitarian regime in partnership with the Société Générale, and African participation in the economy was regulated by coercion rather than by any free market in goods and services.

The depression made a delayed impact on the Congo since in 1930 UMHK was still producing at full capacity (139,000 tonnes), while public expenditure was still sustained by the public works programme. When it came, however, the shock was violent. In 1932, copper exports slumped to one-seventh of their value in

¹⁴ See chapter 3.

1930; meanwhile, the total value of exports had fallen by 55 per cent and that of imports by 70 per cent. In real terms, the gross domestic product fell by 15 per cent between 1928 and 1933. External capital investment almost came to a halt; throughout the 1930s production depended on the reinvestment of profits, public capital, and cheaper labour. Government revenues fell by about a third between 1929 and 1932, yet expenditure was kept up by the need to meet debt charges: these accounted for only one-fifth of expenditure in 1928, but more than half in 1934–5, and of this one-third consisted of guaranteed interest payments on loans for the public works programme. (The abuse of these guarantees by some transport companies was much criticised by a commission of the Belgian Senate.) Budget deficits were made up by a public lottery in Belgium and by grants (700m francs between 1933 and 1937) from the Belgian government, which was concerned to protect its own large investments in mining and other ventures. A special bank was set up to save white farmers from ruin, while transport costs were reduced for the benefit of businessmen. The burden of the depression was largely shifted on to the shoulders of Africans, by compelling them to work where they were most needed (especially on road-building and maintenance) and to grow more crops to offset falling prices.

These measures brought about substantial changes in the pattern of the Belgian Congo's exports. The cash value of agricultural exports fell less sharply in 1930–4 than that of mineral exports. Coffee exports, indeed, increased remarkably steadily throughout the decade; they were mostly produced by Europeans in the eastern Congo, and in 1937–8 they exceeded in bulk those of any other African territory (Madagascar excepted). The value of cotton exports began to rise in 1933 and by 1937 was twice what it had been in 1930; in 1936–9 output averaged nearly two-thirds that of Uganda or the Sudan. About 700,000 people were thought to be growing cotton in 1936. Nonetheless, minerals continued (except in 1933) to yield 60 per cent or more of exports. Gold output doubled in response to rising prices. From 1932 to 1936 gold ranked first among the colony's exports, contributing nearly 24 per cent, and output equalled that from the Gold Coast; in 1939 gold exports were worth two-thirds those from Southern Rhodesia. The Belgian Congo also became Africa's chief source of silver: in 1933–9 output averaged three times that

of South Africa, though its value was slight enough. Tin was now a very significant export: mines in central Katanga and north-east and north-west of Lake Kivu yielded 10,000 tonnes in 1938, about as much as from Nigeria. From 1934 to 1939 tin contributed more to exports than diamonds; output of diamonds increased, but its value showed no increase since the greater part was for industrial use rather than gemstones. By 1937 copper output had surpassed the peak reached in 1930, but it subsequently declined. The total value of exports in 1938 was little more, in real terms, than it had been in 1930, but they now rested on a much wider base.

Transport routes also changed during the 1930s. The completion of the railways linking Katanga to Port Francqui and Dilolo enabled farmers in Kasai and Lulua to meet the food requirements of the mines; maize imports from the Rhodesias ceased altogether in 1933. These railways also meant that copper traffic was largely redirected. In the mid-1920s all copper had been exported via ports on the Indian Ocean: about three-quarters went south through the Rhodesias to Beira while a quarter went east through Tanganyika to Dar es Salaam. From 1928, however, an increasing proportion reached the Atlantic via Port Francqui and Matadi; by 1935 this route handled half the copper traffic, due to specially favourable railway rates. Meanwhile, from 1931 about a fifth of Katanga's copper was carried by the Benguela railway to the port of Lobito, in Angola. The Rhodesian railways were able to retain about 30 per cent of the traffic, since UMHK still depended on them for imports of coal, from Wankie. All the same, the Belgian Congo's national transport network was at last a reality. It was strengthened in 1935 by the creation of a public corporation, Otraco, which replaced the various firms handling transport along the rivers and down to the sea at Matadi; Otraco also took over transport in the Kivu region. The government used it to channel through Matadi exports which might otherwise have been shipped out to the east; it was also a means of controlling transport costs in the interests of employers and monopoly trading firms. Meanwhile, the colony's labour force was also very largely 'national': UMHK retained a tiny group of skilled workers from Nyasaland, but elsewhere in Katanga there were only a few thousand workers from British Africa. The colony's southern border was now an economic as well as a political frontier.

One further structural change was in the relation of imports

and exports. In the 1920s, the former had considerably exceeded the latter, due to lavish investment ventures, but the onset of the depression abruptly reversed this position. As the economy recovered, the cut-back on imports continued, partly because in March 1935 the Belgian (and thus the Congolese) franc was devalued by 28 per cent in terms of gold. This meant that exports earned more in terms of francs, while imports became more expensive. The colonial government therefore imposed duties on mineral and vegetable exports, but reduced import duties; as a result, the contribution of customs duties to ordinary revenue rose remarkably. Meanwhile the value of imports remained well below that of exports: in 1938 it was only two-thirds that of exports. The Congo was in effect repaying the Belgian economy for the investments of the 1920s. One member of the Colonial Council in Belgium remarked in the mid-1930s:

The colony exhausts its resources in artificially maintaining enterprises which leave little real wealth in the country. Production goes on, but the small profits, when there are any, go to pay the interest (and that at a low rate) on capital to investors outside the colony. The mass of people...cannot enrich themselves nor raise, to any considerable degree, their standard of living.¹⁵

It was African farmers who suffered most from the depression. By 1935 prices paid to cash-crop producers were about half what they had been in 1929. Tax rates were reduced, but by no means commensurately: by the mid-1930s, tax absorbed more than half the cash earned in rural areas and it was sometimes commuted into labour service. There were reports of people wearing the skins of wild beasts for want of money to buy clothes. Textile prices fell by half between 1928 and 1933 in line with a general fall in import prices, but this was of much less benefit to farmers than to unskilled workers, whose earnings (in cash and kind) fell hardly at all: indeed, their real wages rose during the depression to 80 per cent of their value before 1914.¹⁶ To some extent, wage-earners may be said to have benefited from the savings made by large employers as a result of the lower prices paid to food-producers. The disparity between rural and urban or industrial incomes persisted through the economic recovery of the 1930s, since African earnings from agriculture continued to be held down by

¹⁵ O. Louwers, quoted in Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division), *The Belgian Congo* (London, 1944), 214.

¹⁶ Peemans, 'Capital accumulation', 187.

coercion and monopoly. Thus as industry expanded once again it could meet its labour needs without serious difficulty and by 1939 the total workforce in private employment (which had sunk to 290,000 in 1933) had risen to 530,000; perhaps 10 per cent of the African population was then living outside the rural areas.

In Ruanda-Urundi the depression made little difference to the export economy since this had scarcely got under way. Exports of cattle rose sharply in 1931–2 but meanwhile the production of cotton, coffee and tin was being developed. The real value of exports rose fourfold between 1930 and 1936, and this growth continued: in 1939 they were worth 6 per cent of those from the Belgian Congo. In the same year, African consumption of imports was two or three times greater than in 1930, though this still owed much to labour migration: not only were many now working in Katanga but migration to Uganda had been stimulated by the devaluation of the franc in 1935. New pressures to work on cash-crops caused local food shortages, but roads built by locally conscripted labour meant that it was possible to prevent the recurrence of large-scale famine.

The systematic application of people to export-production involved renewed efforts both to assess their potential and to improve their physical condition: there were still fears that in some areas population might be in decline. In 1937–8 censuses indicated that the population of the Belgian Congo was 10.2 million and that of Ruanda-Urundi 3.8 million. The government also organised several local demographic surveys; these indicated a slight fall in the overall birth-rate in rural areas during the 1930s, but this was probably offset by falling death-rates; perhaps more significant were the wide local variations revealed. During the decade, the number of European doctors in the Congo doubled, and there was a still greater increase in the numbers of other medical personnel. The number of sick people treated in hospitals and dispensaries tripled between 1930 and 1940. On the other hand, this considerable effort must be set beside the advance of diseases induced by colonial conditions. While the incidence of sleeping-sickness was much reduced, the agglomeration of workers in industrial centres promoted the spread of tuberculosis and venereal disease. The larger companies improved their workers' rations, and rural famines became less common, but many people suffered from malnutrition. Under pressure to

produce for the market, many villagers had no time to grow maize or millet, or to supplement their diet by hunting and gathering; instead, they relied excessively on cassava.

The increasingly authoritarian character of Belgian rule pressed heavily upon Africans, but though it sustained white power and privilege it provoked dissension among Europeans. Government remained in practice the monopoly of an administrative élite, in association with leading business executives and churchmen, though in the 1920s the Colonial Council had instigated modest reforms in the law regarding concessions. Informed interest in the Congo was stimulated in Belgium by meetings of the Colonial Congress, in 1920, 1926 and 1930, and by the Royal Colonial Institute, created in 1928. But there was little opportunity for non-official opinion in the Congo to influence government: it still counted for little in the advisory councils and the only organ of municipal government was in Leopoldville, which from 1923 was run by an official with the advice of Belgian nationals nominated by the vice-governor-general.

The élites of government, business and the church attracted widespread resentment among whites, but officials and company employees hesitated to speak out for fear of losing their jobs, and by 1937 company employees accounted for 60 per cent of the adult male white population (excluding the missionaries); the total white population was 27,800. There was only one trade union, among civil servants, and that was ill-organised. Relatively few whites had a permanent stake in the Congo: most men planned to go back to Belgium. In 1937 women (other than missionaries) and children accounted for less than 40 per cent of the white population, as they had in 1931, when the proportion in Northern Rhodesia was 46 and in Kenya 55 per cent. Only 2,600 white men in the Belgian Congo were self-employed in 1937, and it was these who constituted the core of the settler population. They in turn were widely dispersed, though local newspapers had helped to crystallise a sense of common interest in three regions: Lower Congo, Equateur and western Kasai; Katanga, Lomami and Manyema; Kivu, Kibali-Ituri and Ruanda-Urundi.

The most important of these regional clusters was Katanga, which contained about a third of the colony's white population. It was, moreover, in Katanga that settler politics intermeshed with conflicts within the hierarchy of government. Even after the

creation of a new transport route northwards, whites in Katanga were less closely linked to the rest of the Belgian Congo than to its southern neighbours: it was natural for them to emulate the strident politics of the Rhodesians. And at the highest levels of the colonial regime there was special tension between Katanga and the capital. Heenen, who became vice-governor-general in 1927, had the support of UMHK management, and also of Mgr de Hemptinne, in pressing for the rapid integration of Africans within capitalist society. This approach ran counter to the thinking of most senior officials in Leopoldville and Brussels, who continued to stress the importance of preserving African social organisation. Besides, there was the issue of provincial autonomy, a cause which de Hemptinne, backed by leading businessmen, had strongly argued in 1920. Relations between Katanga and central government had been calm enough during the governor-generalship of Martin Rutten (1923–7); he himself had spent most of his career in the province. But his successor, Auguste Tilkens, was much less sympathetic, and the onset of the economic depression added to the strain. In 1931 settlers in Katanga demanded the right to debate the provincial budget in the provincial council; in 1932 they called for a huge public works programme. But in Brussels and Leopoldville the response to falling revenue was to make drastic reductions in provincial expenditures, including that on rural administration. In 1933 the vice-governors-general were redesignated provincial commissioners and their powers were curtailed accordingly; besides, in the previous year Katanga had been deprived of Lomami district, the chief source of labour for the mines. All four vice-governors-general resigned in protest, and Heenen, before returning to Belgium, seriously discussed proposals for secession presented by de Hemptinne and a group of settlers; nothing came of them. Meanwhile the authority of the governor-general continued to benefit from the long tenure of incumbents. Ryckmans, who succeeded Tilkens in 1934, remained in office until 1946, whereas between 1924 and 1939 the office of colonial minister changed hands sixteen times: only three men held it for more than two years.

As central government strengthened its hold over provincial government, so the latter in turn tightened its control over African subordinates. Official eyes tended in the depression to see chiefdoms primarily as units of production, and chiefs as

taskmasters. A decree in 1933 transformed chiefs into civil servants, who were paid salaries out of local treasuries and forbidden to seek an independent income. Together with local courts, and a staff of local police and messengers, chiefs had to enforce a growing weight of regulations in order to mobilise their people for the colonial economy. Their position came to depend on the oppressive regime of which they were minions, rather than on their claims to customary allegiance. Yet chiefs were more likely than white officials to know how much their subjects could stand. Some became expert at subterfuge: fields by the roadside were cleared but not sown; seed that was sown was previously boiled, so as to avoid all the work that would ensue upon germination. Chiefs might encourage denunciation, but it was also turned against them; depositions became more frequent and hereditary chiefs were often replaced by more literate men who might well have no local political standing. In Ruanda, Belgian claims had already conflicted with those of the king, Musunga, who in any case considered the church a threat to the cult of kingship; he was deposed in 1931 and thereafter Tutsi chiefs were more directly subordinated to white officials. By the late 1930s, officials in Lunda country were inclined to regard the former emperor, the *mwata yamvo*, as superfluous to the needs of local government.

On the surface, urban administration became somewhat less authoritarian, for in 1931 the colonial ministry extended Heenen's innovation of the *centre extra-coutumier* to all major towns. In practice, however, this reform did not mean very much. In Leopoldville whites prevented the creation of a *centre*. In Katanga, Heenen's concern to develop civic leadership among urban Africans was not shared by his successor. White officials were put in charge of the *centre* at Jadotville (Likasi) and at Elisabethville, where the power of the African council was effectively undermined by frequent changes of membership. Not until 1937 was an African *chef de centre* installed at Elisabethville, in belated response to orders from Governor-General Ryckmans, and even then this *chef* was under close Belgian supervision.

The educational system continued to be dominated by the Catholic Church. By 1937 it had received 118,000 hectares in land concessions; Protestant missions, less than 5,000. Catholic missions were agricultural businesses: in 1935 they employed 30,000 wage-earners. Their impact, however, varied greatly: in

1939, the percentage of total population baptised into the Catholic Church was 43 in the apostolic vicariate of Boma, 35 in Matadi, and 26 in south Katanga, but less than 10 in much of the east and north-east. In 1938 there were 222,500 pupils in subsidised schools and another 500,000 in unsubsidised Catholic schools; there were 300,000 in Protestant schools and about 6,000 in 'official' schools run by the government. By any reckoning this outreach compared very favourably with that of school systems elsewhere in colonial Africa, but it held the great majority of pupils just as briefly: in 1939 no more than 8,000 were receiving any sort of post-primary education. Technical training for Africans was relatively widespread, and the depression accelerated the trend among the larger firms to economise by using Africans rather than Europeans for handling machinery, including the driving of railway locomotives. From 1933 Africans could be trained to become agricultural assistants, and from 1936 as medical assistants. Protestant vocational schools concentrated on producing schoolteachers; it was hard for African Protestants to get jobs in government or even the large firms. In any case, the demand for literate Africans in the lower reaches of government was still restricted by the use of whites (as in French black Africa) to do work which in some British territories was done by Africans. Catholic seminaries provided the only general secondary education in the territory, and the only Africans to complete higher education during our period were those — less than thirty — who had become Catholic priests. In 1931 the Commission for the Protection of Natives initiated desultory discussion with the colonial ministry regarding the definition of a category of Africans suitable for *immatriculation*, but no progress had been made by the end of the decade.

These educational strategies precluded the emergence of an African élite literate in French and capable of challenging the colonial order. The only African during our period who is known to have made a detailed anti-colonial critique was an exception who proved the rule: Panda Farnana had been educated in Belgium, worked in the Congo as an agricultural officer from 1909 to 1914, and eventually settled in Brussels.¹⁷ In 1920 Farnana represented an association of expatriate blacks at the first Colonial Congress and upset an apostolic vicar by urging the government to do much more for African education. Farnana also spoke in

¹⁷ See above, p. 231.

Brussels at the second Pan-African Congress in 1921, but the one event in the Congo which can be traced to his initiative was the erection in 1927 of a war memorial in Leopoldville for African soldiers. Strict censorship prevented the circulation of reading-matter not approved by the missions. The one public platform given to more educated Africans was a newspaper, *Ngonga*, in Elisabethville. This was founded in 1934 by the former district commissioner, A. Verbeken; it had an African assistant editor and printed letters of complaint by Africans. Government, business and the Catholic Church were all alarmed, and within a year the paper closed for lack of funds. From 1929 the government developed a counter-espionage network to nip subversion in the bud. Large employers controlled every aspect of life among the workers in their compounds. In these circumstances, organised protest was almost impossible. The only disturbances at UMHK were demonstrations in 1931 by a few hundred workers afraid of being sent home as the company began to curtail its operations.

However, the return of more than 100,000 workers to their home areas during the depression did spread messages of hope and resistance. Kimbangu was still in gaol (largely at the insistence of Mgr de Hemptinne) but his followers founded churches in parts of the north-west and north-east. Immigrants from Northern Rhodesia, mostly traders and domestic servants, who feared expulsion from Elisabethville, responded to the millenarian gospel of Kitawala, an offshoot of 'Watch Tower' movements in British territory. Several were arrested and expelled in 1931, but Kitawala teaching spread north and west along the railway line and provoked further arrests and deportations in 1934. Among the Pende, in Kwilu, there was a widespread response in 1931 to a prophet who called on people to discard European goods and promised the imminent return of the ancestors. The departure of several thousand whites in the depression gave rise to rumours that the Belgians were all about to go home. There were also rumours that Americans would come to free Africans from colonial rule. Myths about Europeans stealing wealth and knowledge from the ancestors of Africans gave expression to anxieties aggravated by the increasing interference of whites in local custom. Africans in the 1930s were likely to regard the white man not as a 'civilising' influence but as an immoral and malevolent being to be feared.

Paradoxically perhaps, the depression had the effect of streng-

thening the settled character of African urban populations. Those thrown out of work were mostly inexperienced single men; among those who stayed, married men often fetched their wives from their home areas. In Leopoldville, where the population sank in 1933 to 22,000 and then rose to 47,000 in 1940, the ratio of men to women fell from over 3 : 1 in the later 1920s to 1.8 : 1 in the late 1930s. There was a similar shift in Elisabethville and the UMHK compounds. Among the self-employed urban population, women worked as petty traders, market gardeners, prostitutes and brewers (Africans had been prohibited since 1912 from buying European alcoholic drinks). Tribal associations helped Africans in towns to survive the worst of the depression. In 1933 there were eighteen in Elisabethville, but thereafter their importance diminished; they were given no political role in the *centre extra-coutumier* and even their own meetings were brought under European supervision. With so little scope for African initiative, it was no wonder that the best-educated, the clerks and teachers, were demoralised and gave vent to their frustration in gambling, drinking and fighting.

CONCLUSION

More than any other colony in Africa, the Belgian Congo was run as a business undertaking, and it is appropriate to attempt some sort of financial reckoning for the period here surveyed. Between 1909 and 1938 the Belgian Treasury spent on the Congo about 180m gold francs (i.e. francs at their value before 1914); of this, 45m paid for the colonial ministry in Belgium and 86m were grants to balance the Congo's budget in 1933–7. This expenditure was offset by Belgian taxes on the debentures and profits of colonial companies based in Belgium. These were substantial. By 1936 the Belgian Congo had attracted 12 per cent of all capital invested south of the Sahara; this was considerably more than in either British East or British West Africa and was exceeded only by South Africa (43 per cent). Three-quarters of the investment in the Belgian Congo (much more than anywhere else) was private capital. There were wide variations and fluctuations in annual rates of return, but over the whole period mines and banks yielded an average of 17 per cent. Investment within a zone that was Belgian in terms of currency and political control was especially valued since Belgium had lost at least 3,000m in

CONCLUSION

gold francs in Russia after 1917, while its scope for investment in China and Latin America was subsequently restricted.

The trade generated by investment in the Congo also benefited Belgium. By the late 1930s Belgium received 75 per cent of exports from the Congo, and 85 per cent of those from Ruanda. Belgium's share of its colony's imports, which had fallen to 35 per cent by 1935, rose steadily to 44 per cent by 1938. The Congo contributed a growing share of Belgium's total external trade. The percentage of Belgium's imports (excluding gold) derived from the Congo rose from less than 2 before 1930 to 4.5 in 1934 and 7 in 1937–8. The percentage of Belgian exports sent to the Congo declined from 3.4 in 1926 to 1.1 in 1934 but rose to 2.3 in 1938. By that time, activities connected with the colonial economy provided some 400,000 jobs in Belgium. Admittedly, the trade of the Belgian Congo was not, in our period, especially impressive if measured against size of territory, population or capital investment,¹⁸ but this reflected the long-term nature of speculation in railways and mining; the real returns were yet to come. Meanwhile, Belgium's colony had come to make a notable contribution to the world's supply of raw materials: by the late 1930s its copper represented 7 per cent of world output, its tin 5, its cobalt 27, its palm-oil 15 and its palm-nuts 13. It was the world's largest producer of industrial diamonds and uranium; its monopoly of the latter was challenged from 1933 by Canada, but an agreement in 1938 secured the Belgian Congo 60 per cent of the market.

These results did much to sustain Belgium's position as a significant, if minor, economic power, but they were achieved at a high cost to Africans, both in material terms and in terms of scope for personal fulfilment. The colony had become a huge industrial enterprise; in some respects it was enlightened and even benevolent, but the whole system was predicated on the continuing concentration of power in white hands, and the regimentation of African life. When Belgium was occupied by Germany in 1940, the Congo once again helped it survive as a force in world politics, but the war and its aftermath imposed new tests on Belgium's capacity to retain the total control which characterised the prevailing Belgian conception of colonial rule.

¹⁸ Of the totals for sub-Saharan Africa, the Belgian Congo accounted for around 11 per cent of land, population and capital investment by the mid-1930s, but no more than 5 per cent of trade.

CHAPTER 10

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

THE METROPOLITAN BACKGROUND

1905–1926

At the beginning of the twentieth century Portugal was an underdeveloped country whose economy was perhaps as typical of the Africa she was purporting to civilise as of Europe. This underdevelopment showed all the signs of being a chronic condition. Of a population of six million, 75 per cent still lived in rural communities producing Portugal's main items of export: wine, fruit, olives, fish, timber and cork. Agriculture belonged to a pre-capitalist age and the peasant obtained a pitiful living alike on the minifundia of the north, where he was proprietor, and on the latifundia of the south, where he was sharecropper or labourer. Backward as her rural economy was, Portugal had become the world's principal producer of cork, sardines and fortified wines. There was a marked tendency to overproduce and the government was continually seeking outlets in the colonies; on the other hand, Portugal remained unable to feed herself and did not produce significant grain surpluses until the 1930s.

The urban population worked in cities which were largely pre-industrial. Agricultural produce and sardines underwent some industrial processing, but in 1920 Portugal's only important manufactured export was cotton textiles. Ninety per cent of her foreign trade was carried in foreign ships; imports of manufactured goods were more than twice the value of exports and the visible trade deficit was only covered by remittances from emigrants. Two-thirds of the adult population were illiterate, and rural poverty and overpopulation caused emigration to run as high as 50,000 a year during the first two decades of the century. Portugal's currency was unstable; it was revised in 1911 and at once began a rapid decline. The escudo, which had exchanged at 7.54 to the pound sterling in 1919, sank to 127.4 by 1924. Annual budgetary deficits were due not so much to overspending by the

THE METROPOLITAN BACKGROUND

cautious republican governments, as to the decline in national income due to inflation. The lack of natural resources, including energy, the failure to save and invest, the small size of the domestic market, the poverty of industrial skills, were all inter-related problems from which there appeared to be no escape. The unrest which these problems created found expression in violent ideological disputes only marginally related to Portugal's economic problems. Monarchists and republicans, clericals and anti-clericals, liberals and socialists, differed little in their approach to economic questions. No land reform was undertaken and the timid interventions of the government in the economy were inept and unproductive.

Like many underdeveloped countries, Portugal in the early twentieth century appeared to be ruled by an oligarchy of lawyers, bureaucrats, academics and military men. Lack of civilian expertise gave great importance to those who had acquired organisational and technical skills in the armed forces. The armed forces were prominent under both the monarchy and the republic which replaced it in 1910. Their place in national life can be gauged from the fact that at the time of the 1926 revolution 23 per cent of the budget was devoted to the armed forces.

Many writers accepted the idea, admittedly imprecise, that the resources of Africa would enable Portugal to generate her own economic head of steam. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, only the tiny island of São Tomé regularly showed a balance of payments surplus and contributed substantially to the colonial exchequer. The other colonies continued to swallow up resources in endless campaigns of pacification. Africa repeatedly confronted politicians with pressing short-term problems which pushed the fulfilment of grandiose imperial ideals into the distant future. Moreover, in spite of strongly protectionist tariff policies pursued by all Portuguese regimes, Portugal's own trade with her colonies was seldom a very large proportion of her total foreign trade: during most of our period it was between about 7 and 10 per cent (if we disregard re-exports from Portugal of colonial produce, which were often substantial).

Portugal felt aggrieved that the powers had denied her full claims to African territory in 1891. Besides, Portugal had made use of chartered companies to stake out imperial claims, and now two-thirds of Mozambique was in the hands of two such

companies, both dominated by foreign capital. Nonetheless, three generations of Portuguese would be told that the greater Portugal exceeded the whole of western Europe in extent, and without doubt her African possessions gave Portugal an international significance she could not otherwise have attained. This international importance became a source of great anxiety. It was known that in 1898 Britain and Germany had signed an agreement in which a future partition of the Portuguese colonies was provided for, and every diplomatic exchange in which Portugal was involved was poisoned by the existence of this 'secret' treaty. The fate of King Leopold's Congo Independent State seemed to lie in wait for Angola whenever the British Foreign Office asked a question about contract labour.

The overthrow of the monarchy in 1910 intensified these suspicions. South Africa appeared to be poised to seize Delagoa Bay, and monarchists gathered in Spain to bring about a restoration. It was suspected, quite correctly, that Britain would not intervene to protect the republic.¹ German designs on southern Angola were quite explicit. Up to 1905 they had pressed for the right to build a railway linking the Otavi mines in South West Africa to a Portuguese port and considered the whole area to be their own sphere of influence, even opposing Portuguese missions of 'pacification'. In 1913 Britain and Germany, groping for a *rapprochement*, renewed their agreement to partition the Portuguese empire and, although the treaty naturally lapsed in 1914, the outbreak of war proved even more dangerous for Portugal, when the Germans raided deep into southern Angola and defeated a Portuguese force at Naulila. Portugal, however, remained officially neutral until March 1916, when she joined the Allies. Some 40,000 Portuguese troops were sent to France and in November 1917 Mozambique was invaded by the Germans, but by the Versailles peace treaty Portugal received no territorial compensation except the minute Kionga triangle in northern Mozambique. Nor did the peace remove the threat to the empire's survival.

After 1918 British and South African dominance was unchallenged in southern Africa and Portugal's position as a virtual client state was extremely precarious. South Africa was quite open about her desire to control Lourenço Marques (Maputo) and used

¹ J. Vincent Smith, 'The Portuguese Republic and Britain 1910-1914', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1975, 10, 4, 707-27.

diplomatic pressure to prevent the completion of the Benguela railway. Meanwhile British capital took control of one chartered company in Mozambique, increased its influence in the other, and obtained a large stake in the railways and sugar industry. In Europe, Spain maintained her hostile attitude to the republic. It was the principal diplomatic achievement of the Estado Novo that, after 1926, this position was reversed and diplomatic support was obtained from both Britain and South Africa at the very time that Portugal was putting restraints on the operations of British capital and missions. Both internally and externally, the Portuguese empire was more secure in the 1930s than at any time in the previous hundred years. Only the Third Reich eyed it jealously but impotently from a distance.

Idealism is a marked trait in Portuguese political thought. The early nineteenth-century constitutions had stated clearly that the colonies were an integral part of the mother country, and liberal statesmen had proceeded to abolish slavery and the death penalty and to accord, at least in theory, equal rights to all Portuguese citizens irrespective of colour. Against this idealism stood the stark realities of conditions in the colonies, where settlers strove for a living in a hostile environment and underpaid officials battled for solvency and order. The needs of these men led to harsher policies, designed to extract labour and revenue from the African population. The labour law of 1899 codified a complete reversal of attitudes, imposing the 'moral obligation' to work and the adoption of Portuguese cultural standards as a pre-condition for the granting of civil rights. A man could evade the application of this law if he was a property owner or pursued a profession, and from these clauses developed the practical distinctions between *civilizados* and *indígenas* (natives) which were eventually codified in the 1926 *Estatuto dos Indígenas*. In 1919 provision was made for demarcating African reserves and allowing the *civilizados* to acquire freeholds but in few areas was there any significant demand for land by whites or *civilizados* and this law was hardly acted upon before 1940. In theory all Africans would eventually become *civilizados* but, as a Portuguese observer was later to write, 'The Lisbon empire builders made the laws, but the local settlers made the rules.'² It was not in the settlers' interest for many Africans to become *civilizados* and thereby escape the obligation

² A. de Figueiredo, *Portugal: fifty years of dictatorship* (London, 1975), 12.

to labour, nor were they willing to treat those who did acquire this status as equals. This fact took away any incentive the Africans might have had to 'civilise' themselves — and few ever did.

In the early twentieth century the army and navy provided most of the colonial administrators. In 1906, however, the *Escola Colonial* was set up to train civil servants and in 1911 the colonial ministry was separated from that of the navy. Until 1907 colonial budgets were manipulated in Lisbon and surpluses in one colony were transferred to meet deficits in another. The colonies sometimes found themselves charged with items of metropolitan expenditure while the Lisbon-based *Banco Nacional Ultramarino* controlled colonial currency and credit. Settlers and governors alike demanded more control over their own affairs and less interference from Lisbon. Devolution of responsibility to the colonies was part of the republican platform in 1910, and in 1914 an organic law was tabled in Lisbon and subsequently implemented in stages up to the end of the republic in 1926. The most controversial aspect of this decentralisation was the concentration of power, after 1920, in the hands of high commissioners who had ministerial rank and enjoyed a position amounting to virtual dictatorship in the colonies. This was reinforced by lack of political continuity in Lisbon: between 1910 and 1926 the offices of prime minister, foreign minister and colonial minister each changed hands three times a year on average.

Colonial autonomy led Lisbon to demand that the colonies pay their way and use their own resources for economic growth. Short-term financial expediency dictated policies which would maximise revenue. The governors of Mozambique saw salvation in the labour contracts with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and in the growth of transit traffic from Beira and Lourenço Marques. In Angola, however, there was no easy solution, and the export of labour to São Tomé was chiefly designed to increase the profits from the cocoa plantations and not to raise Angola's own income. In all colonies the recruitment of black militia proved a cheap and crudely effective way of maintaining a security force; and hut-tax payments propped up colonial budgets while drawing Africans into wage labour and the money economy. These policies proved highly controversial. The South African labour contracts were attacked by those who claimed that the economic growth of Mozambique was being sacrificed at the altar

of the sterling balances. In Angola the republican governors, of whom Norton de Matos (1912–15 and 1921–3) was the most important, became increasingly dictatorial and used their financial autonomy to initiate programmes of public works which placed the state in strong competition with private concessionaires for labour. Not surprisingly, governors were soon to be found interpreting the labour laws in such a way that labour for the government would be compulsory but contracting to private concerns voluntary. Herein lies the clue to the superficially humanitarian and liberal native policies of the stronger governors.

The Estado Novo

The military coup of 28 May 1926 did not immediately alter the situation in Portugal, and it was only in 1928 that a stable government formed round the determined figure of the finance minister, Antonio Salazar. Like his fellow dictators, Salazar was to encourage a powerful mythology in which the chaos and corruption of democratic liberalism was represented as being replaced by order, solvency and a new nationalism which subordinated sectional interests to the common good. In fact, Salazar's accession to power brought with it little that was new in the stock of practical political and economic ideas. The difference was that he made sure of his support within the property-owning classes and armed forces. Fiscal orthodoxy and balanced budgets remained articles of faith which were affirmed simply by cutting and cutting again at state expenditure. There was no money to spare to maintain the infrastructure of communications or basic industries, and the economy showed few signs of growth until after the Second World War. Military budgets, however, increased and in 1937 took up over 30 per cent of the government's expenditure. The dominance of lawyers, academics and generals continued, though within the structure of party discipline which Salazar demanded. Few concessions were made to monarchists or the extreme Catholic groups of the right: the king was not restored nor the church re-established. The most clearly emphasised difference lay in the new regime's attitude to civil rights. Public avenues of criticism and opposition were closed and the lively debate on colonial matters which had marked the republic ceased abruptly.

At first Salazar, like so many finance ministers before him, saw

the colonies as a financial burden Portugal could well do without. However, he was soon to discover that the republic had overcome the worst colonial problems, and had initiated policies which the Estado Novo could adopt with few alterations. The republic had brought to an end the wars of pacification, and military administration had already largely been replaced by civilians. Steps had been taken to restrict the freedom of the concession holders and the Niassa Company had not had its charter renewed. Tariffs and quotas had been manipulated to increase the trade between Portugal and the colonies, while the cotton-growing scheme and the codification of native policy embodied in the *Estatuto dos Indígenas* were both legacies of the republic.

This republican inheritance allowed Salazar to see the political value of the empire as outweighing its economic liability. On to the empire Salazar's Portugal could now project her new nationalism: the Lusitanian civilising mission and the need to make sacrifices for the sake of the empire were convenient ideologies for a fascist state. Not surprisingly, little was said about Portuguese multiracialism. This aspect of the Portuguese tradition was only discovered in the era of African independence movements. Before 1940, the 'civilising mission' was still much as it had been articulated by the great empire-builders of the 1890s. The unity of the colonies with the mother country, rather than development towards independence, was the ideal made explicit in the Colonial Act of 1930. Under the monarchy and the republic, this unity had remained confined to the world of metaphysics. Salazar took steps to add substance to theory. Consequently colonial autonomy became the one tradition of the republic that was totally uprooted. There were to be no more dictatorial high commissioners and the new administrative structures were to be firmly in the grasp of the minister for the colonies and his council in Lisbon. The Colonial Act (1930) and the new Portuguese constitution (1933) helped to establish conformity throughout the empire. The consent of Lisbon was required for loans and for dealings with foreign powers: exchange controls were introduced to restrict colonial purchases from countries other than Portugal. Provision was made for Lisbon to legislate directly for the colonies and the fields of personnel, military law, currency, missions and labour were reserved for metropolitan action. In the colonies the governors-general and the district governors had

MOZAMBIQUE

councils, part made up of senior officials and part of nominees, which had to be consulted before local decrees were issued. The administrative autonomy of concession companies north of the Zambezi was ended in 1929–30; the charter of the Mozambique Company expired in 1941.

For the first time in Portuguese colonial history, the writ of Lisbon began actually to be obeyed in the colonies. The settler and the official were made increasingly aware that they might in reality be called to account for their conduct. Mozambique and Angola ceased to be a rag-bag of separate customs zones, railway corridors and company concessions and began to evolve as integrated states.


MOZAMBIQUE

1905–1916

Apart from forming a single geographical block, Portugal's East African territory had little natural unity. It straggled for 2,000 miles along the coast and 400 miles up the Zambezi; it was intersected by rivers flowing east from the high veldt; and its seaports served regions of the interior which the partition of Africa had made British. Yet Portugal too had gained much from partition: though Portuguese authority had long been confined to a string of dilapidated trading-posts along the coast and up the Zambezi, it now had to be asserted over a vast and virtually unexplored hinterland. Various makeshift arrangements, bearing witness to Portugal's desperate attempts to provide instant effective occupation, were brought together in 1907 to establish a structure that remained unchanged in its essentials until 1929.

For administrative purposes, Mozambique consisted of four blocks of territory. Two were directly subject to the state, while two had been assigned to the Niassa and Mozambique Companies. These enjoyed sovereign rights under charters due to expire in 1929 and 1941 respectively. The state territories (hereafter referred to as 'the Colony') comprised five districts, each based on a historic trading port. Each district had its own distinctive tax, labour and land law, and operated its own customs tariff. In the southern part of the Colony, military rule gave way, after 1907, to civilian administration. In areas with a sizeable *civilizado* population, a local council was set up with limited autonomy.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA



15 Mozambique, 1937

Towns might be ruled either by an elected council or by an appointed municipal commission. Elsewhere, districts under civil administrators were created. Along the Zambezi, administrative expansion was based on the old *prazos* (estates). Those south of the river had been taken over by the chartered Mozambique Company, which since 1902 had begun to replace them by districts. Those on the north bank were nominally in state-controlled territory, but in 1892 they had been converted into concessions whose owners had the right to collect African poll-tax and levy forced labour, in return for policing and 'developing' their *prazos*. The state did, however, directly control one area within the territory of the Mozambique Company: this was the chiefdom of Barwe, which since its conquest in 1902 was administered by the governor of Tete district. North of Quelimane district, Portuguese authority was scarcely acknowledged anywhere in 1905. Inland from Mozambique Island and Angoche, a combination of Makua chiefs and Muslim rulers held out under the skilful leadership of Farelay, a descendant of the old sultans of Angoche. Farelay's power was broken in 1910, but resistance continued further up the coast until 1913. Beyond the Lurio river, the Niassa Company was powerless outside its few coastal forts until after 1910.

Throughout Mozambique, administrators were thin on the ground, while their responsibilities were wide. In 1911 the governor of Tete district and his adjutant had a secretariat of six men; there were six more senior officials in the trade and justice departments, and an inspector in each sub-district. This staff, which included interpreters, was supposed to perform a full range of government duties and to report annually on finance, taxation, prices, roads, trade licences, claims, posts, telegraphs, public health, prisons and meteorology. The main administrative functions were the supervision of the *prazos*, the maintenance of order, taxation and the administration of the labour laws. It is scarcely surprising that the governor wrote in 1912, 'The region of Barwe is too large to be administered directly by a single individual...and however active the official in charge may be, it is not possible for him to assess and collect the head tax in a proper manner within the twelve months of the year.'³ The colonial service in all the

³ *Distrito de Tete: relatório do governador 1911-1912* (Lourenço Marques, 1913), 35; quoted by Malyn Newitt, *Portugal in Africa: the last hundred years* (London, 1981), 55.

Portuguese colonies was bitterly criticised for inefficiency, corruption and every variety of extortion and malpractice. The real problem undoubtedly lay in the shortage of funds to pay the administrators proper salaries; as it was, they mostly resorted to private trade as in the past, while the understaffed police force relied on impressed black militias who terrorised the population in the name of law and order.

On the whole, the extension of European control over Mozambique did not involve large-scale expropriation of land from Africans. In a few areas, notably in the far south, prime farmland had been seized for plantations, but legislation in 1901 recognised the rights of Africans to land that they had habitually occupied or worked and it made provision for them to acquire individual titles after twenty years. It was not until 1918 that the law was revised to enable reserves to be demarcated where tribal tenures alone would apply. A department of 'native' administration was organised in 1907 and charged principally with recruitment of labour, conscription of police, the organisation of justice and the supervision of chiefs. At village level, but no higher, the authority of the government was represented by an African chief (*regulo*), on to whom were loaded all the most unpopular administrative tasks. The chief retained his traditional role in the allocation of land and in customary law but he was also required to assist the government to contract labourers and to collect tax. These duties made the chief unpopular and his position hard to fill.

The population of Mozambique was subject to the 'moral obligation' to work, which had been laid on it by the labour law of 1899. All adults were liable for unpaid work for the government and in addition had the responsibility to be gainfully employed. Chiefs and those producing crops for export were exempted, but all the rest had to contract themselves to an employer. If they did not do so, the state could arrange the contracts itself and unpaid penal labour could be exacted for non-payment of taxes, breach of contract, etc. Government officials frequently recruited labour on behalf of private companies, even though this was technically illegal. Payment for contract labour was laid down in law but workers found themselves subject to fines and deductions; often they had to travel at their own expense and found themselves recontracted at the end of their term. Flogging was common, as

was the molestation of women — particularly by the black police when out on tax-gathering missions. The population responded by voting with its feet and, from the turn of the century, there was a steady exodus of population from the frontier regions. The flight of the population was sufficiently serious for a commission to be established to study the problem in 1908.

The chief consideration in Portugal's attitude to its colonies was that their budgets should balance. Within Mozambique there were concessionaires whose interest lay in the long-term growth of the economy, but at the beginning of the century their influence was still limited. Long-term projects took second place to the immediate need to increase revenue. The quickest way to do this was to service production in territories further inland. As British and Belgian capital intensified the exploitation of minerals in the interior of southern Africa, so the routes to the coast, which were mostly under Portuguese control, grew in importance. To profit from their geographical position, the Portuguese had to divert all available resources to the construction of harbour works and railways. Lourenço Marques was linked to the Rand in 1894 and Beira to Salisbury (Harare) in 1899. The ports grew fast, as did the revenue for the colonial exchequer. Ports and transit facilities were not, however, the only services which British colonies sought from Mozambique. When the Gaza hinterland was occupied after 1895, the Portuguese became aware of the massive extent of labour migration from that area to Kimberley and the Rand. Too weak to prevent this exodus, the Portuguese authorities sought to control and exploit it to the best financial advantage. This was done through a series of agreements which culminated in the *modus vivendi* of 1901 by which a recruiting monopoly was granted to the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) in return for a capitation fee and a specified share of the Rand rail traffic. By 1905 the gold and coal mines of the Transvaal employed about 59,000 men from Mozambique — almost three-quarters of their total workforce.

The *modus vivendi* found bitter critics on all sides. Being free to recruit throughout the Colony, WNLA threatened to deprive it of vital labour reserves and undermine the value of concessions. Migrant labour was alleged by some Portuguese to 'denationalise' the Mozambique workers and lower their respect for Portuguese authority. The Rand magnates, for their part,

feared a Portuguese monopoly over their labour supplies while Natal and the Cape bitterly resented the railway agreements. Southern Rhodesia also protested vigorously at its exclusion from recruiting rights. Even Portuguese who appreciated the fiscal benefits of the *modus vivendi* pointed to the purchases made by migrant labourers in Johannesburg, and the South African liquor they consumed, to demonstrate that mine earnings did little to stimulate Portugal's own commerce. There were also some who thought a mortality rate of 7 per cent per annum among miners unacceptably high. Nevertheless the system was renewed in the Mozambique–Transvaal Convention of 1909 on approximately the same terms: up to 80,000 miners a year to be provided, on 12-month contracts, and 50 to 55 per cent of the Rand rail traffic secured for Lourenço Marques. From 1914 a provision for deferred wage payments increased the flow of sterling into Mozambique and made the arrangement still more favourable for the Portuguese. The Portuguese inspectorate in Johannesburg recorded that between 1909 and 1916 the monthly average of workers employed in the Transvaal ranged from 85,394 to 96,541.

The Mozambique Company had been called into existence to clothe the utter nakedness of Portugal's colonial establishment at a time when the openly predatory imperialism of Germany and South Africa threatened the very survival of Portugal's colony in East Africa. The company proved fairly successful in filling this administrative vacuum but if anyone in Portugal had imagined that the company would also exclude all foreign influence, they were to be much mistaken. In order to launch its administration, the company made a number of sub-concessions which were taken up by foreign capital, while the railway to Rhodesia was built and owned by a subsidiary of Cecil Rhodes's financial empire. A struggle also took place between British and French shareholders for the control of the chartered company itself and in 1913 a substantial South African purchase of shares was engineered by Libert Oury, a director of Belgian origin but British nationality. Oury was to co-operate closely with Southern Rhodesia to secure the development of the railway and the port of Beira, and customs and transit payments were to become the company's chief source of revenue. It is doubtful, however, if the influence of British imperial interests significantly improved the company's performance or altered the course of its policies. These were determined

much more by the logic of its geographical position astride Southern Rhodesia's road to the sea. In one respect, indeed, the Mozambique Company never became as subservient to British interests as the state-administered areas, for in general it reserved its own manpower for local employment: despite diplomatic pressures, WNLA and other foreign contractors were excluded.

From 1903, WNLA recruited in the territory of the Niassa Company, but for some years little of this was actually under company control. Indeed, in 1906 the Yao of Machemba, who had lately moved out of German territory, combined with local Swahili rulers to expel the Portuguese from Palma. In 1908, however, British and South African capital established the Nyassa Consolidated company, which took control of the chartered company and provided it with funds. The aim of this consortium was to obtain contract labour for South Africa; it was therefore in direct competition with the many northern chiefs who still exported slaves to Arabia, with the aid of guns bought from the company. In 1909, the reorganised Niassa Company set about the conquest of the interior, cutting off its opponents' arms supplies and enlisting support among Africans who had suffered from the slave-raiders. In 1912, reinforced by Indian sepoys from British Nyasaland, the company defeated the last major source of resistance, the Yao chief Mataka.

A year later, ironically, the South African government forbade recruitment north of latitude 22°S, in order to reduce the high death-rate on the Rand. This meant that Mozambique north of the Zambezi was thrown open to other labour markets. The Niassa Company promptly agreed to supply Robert Williams with labour for the Katanga copper-mines, but the South African members of the company had no interest in these and most of them sold out to a German consortium in May 1914. After 1910, when Angola temporarily suspended the recruitment of labour for planters in São Tomé, the latter had been allowed to recruit labourers in Mozambique. This traffic exceeded 5,000 men in 1916 but sharply declined after 1917. In 1915 recruitment for work outside Niassa Company territory was halted. Meanwhile, in 1913, Southern Rhodesia had been allowed to recruit up to 15,000 men a year in Tete and Barwe districts.

Migrant labour supported Mozambique's finances in four ways, which can be demonstrated from the revenue figures for 1917 for

the state-administered territories.⁴ First, it enabled Africans to pay hut-tax. South of the Sabi, this was charged at double the rate of the rest of the Colony and absorbed virtually the whole income of many rural areas. Then there were the capitation fees on recruited labour and the railway receipts. These items made up 40 per cent of the Colony's income in 1917. In contrast, rent from the Zambezi *prazos*, the showpieces of domestic economic achievement, brought the state 2.3 per cent of its revenue. Fourthly, deferred payment of wages increased African purchasing power within Mozambique, thus stimulating commerce and customs revenue.

The impact of external demands for labour was far more pronounced in the districts south of the Sabi than anywhere else. Comparatively little labour for use outside the territory was ever recruited from its most populous districts, those of Quelimane and Mozambique. In 1908, when recruitment was possible in all parts of the Colony, nine out of ten migrants to the Rand came from south of the Sabi.⁵ Here, many Thonga and Chopi farmed poor land and had been hard hit by the rinderpest of the 1890s. By the turn of the century, the journey to the mines had become an established part of their way of life. They had to leave wives and children behind, but many signed on for a second, third or fourth contract in order to earn money for the tax, and for the ironware and cloth which they brought back from the Rand. It is likely that south of the Sabi labour migration caused a decline in population in the earlier twentieth century. This could be attributed to prolonged male absenteeism, to permanent emigration and to sickness and death among miners, all of which would also have affected female fertility. Between 1905 and 1912, 87,000 'legal' entrants to South Africa failed to return; tuberculosis, phthisis and syphilis were rife in the mines; and down to 1912 the death-rate on the Rand among workers from Mozambique was never less than 7 per cent per annum.⁶ Missionaries in the south were worried by alcoholism and homosexuality among returning workers, while many Europeans assumed that migrant labour destroyed family life and undermined the authority of chiefs.

⁴ Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division), *A manual of Portuguese East Africa* (London, 1920), 151.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 175-9. Of the 754 men from Niassa Company territory who worked in Katanga in 1914-15, over 20 per cent died there. C. A. Perrings, *Black mineworkers in Central Africa* (London, 1979), 170, 177.

North of the Sabi, the main challenge facing both the government and the concessionaires was how to increase the export of primary products. During the years before the First World War, these were mostly gathered wild by Africans. Up to 1912, rubber was the most valuable export commodity; there were also exports of ivory, wax, mangrove bark and oil-bearing seeds. The Portuguese made repeated but unsuccessful attempts to organise the collection of such products. There were also irregular exports of crops, especially groundnuts, which Africans grew for their own use and marketed when in surplus. The chief source of cultivated export crops were the plantations. Of these, the most important were clustered on both sides of the lower Zambezi and in Quelimane district. In this region, the *prazos* were leased to five companies. On the north bank, the Zambezi Company produced tea, copra and cotton, as well as salt and cattle, while the Boror Company (said to be largely financed from Germany) grew cotton, sisal and copra. The most important plantation crop, however, was sugar, grown along both banks of the Zambezi by companies which were absorbed by a British firm, Sena Sugar Estates, soon after its formation in 1910. By 1905, and up to the mid-1920s, sugar accounted for about a quarter of total exports from all parts of Mozambique, and most of it came from the lower Zambezi. The sugar-growing companies formed a powerful pressure-group opposing foreign labour-contracts. In 1906 their concessions were extended for fifteen years, and in 1909 they brought about the virtual abolition of the government's inspectorate for the *prazos*. Elsewhere, the cultivation of export crops was as yet very limited. Some sugar was grown in the lower reaches of the Buzi, Sabi and Nkomati rivers. Goldmining persisted in Manhica, but throughout the period annual production never much exceeded 10,000 oz. In Tete district, nearly all the *prazos* were leased by the Zambezi Company, which had very little capital and contented itself with subletting its concessions at a profit, closing its eyes to the sub-concessionaires' ruthless exploitation of their tax and labour privileges. From Niassa Company territory there were scarcely any exports: in 1913 they amounted only to £67,000, of which half came from rubber. In the same year, domestic exports from Mozambique Company territory were worth about £500,000; those from the Colony, about £1.2m.

The meagre economic prospects away from the Zambezi

deterred investors and settlers, and thwarted the growth of a railway system which might help to integrate the various parts of Mozambique. Not only were the main lines built to serve South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; the British did their best to prevent the Portuguese from linking the huge Tete district to the coast. Such a railway might have been useful to Nyasaland, but Britain did not wish to see that territory become dependent on any port which would fall to Germany in a future partition of Portuguese Africa. Thus Britain constructed a line from Blantyre to Port Herald whence steamers could carry traffic to the concession seaport of Chinde and avoid Portuguese transit dues. This line, completed in 1908, was extended to Chindio, on the Zambezi, in 1915. Nonetheless, Portugal pressed ahead with a line of its own: between 1913 and 1918 Quelimane was linked to Mocuba, 145 km inland on the Licungo river. In the south, some effort was made to link up the coastal districts, but it was many years before railways played much part in promoting the export of local crops rather than men.

Up to the 1920s many areas of Mozambique were outside effective Portuguese control. Social change was influenced by economic forces emanating from the coast and they often affected inland peoples in a very diluted form. In many parts of northern Mozambique the caravan trade continued until the First World War, carrying rubber but also the more traditional commodities of ivory, slaves and guns. In economic terms 'pacification' meant first and foremost the spread of the bush trader who, in Mozambique, was usually an Indian. These traders bought agricultural surpluses and encouraged African men displaced from the caravan trade to take up cash-crop farming. Among the Makonde cash obtained in this way came to replace firearms and cattle in marriage contracts and the cash-flow was further increased by the earnings from compulsory labour. The growing circulation of cash tended to weaken the customary bonds associated with communal landholding and cattle-keeping, and there was a tendency for the large village to be replaced by the isolated homestead. In this new nuclear family the position of men became supreme and the status of women within the matrilineal family was severely modified.

Nearer the coast the influence of Portuguese and Indians modified African societies in other ways. Owners of coconut

MOZAMBIQUE

plantations encouraged African squatters to harvest the nuts in return for being allowed to till the land. The consequent growth of population in the immediate coastal areas and the general increase in cash-crop farming led to increasing pressure on the best settlement sites. Huts were built near the available water supplies with the result that fields were cultivated at ever greater distances. Around Inhambane distances of up to eight miles might have to be travelled to the fields. The alternative was to live nearer the fields and shift habitation with the seasonal changes in water supply.

1916–1926

Sharing a long frontier with German East Africa, Mozambique was the Portuguese territory most affected by Lisbon's belated entry into the European war, in March 1916. The timing was dictated by the recent British invasion of German territory from the north; if the Germans were expelled from East Africa, Portugal wanted a share of the spoils, especially the tiny 'Kionga triangle' just south of the mouth of the Rovuma river. The frontier commandant immediately occupied the triangle, meeting no resistance, but his attempt in May to cross the Rovuma was a disaster. Soon afterwards, an expeditionary force arrived from Portugal; the British occupied the German ports; and by September the Portuguese held the lower reaches of the Rovuma. In November 1917, however, the German commander, Lettow-Vorbeck, crossed it further upstream, at Ngomano; he crushed a Portuguese force sent against him and swiftly overran other Portuguese outposts in the hinterland of northern Mozambique. In 1918, the Germans pressed south, in search of munitions, as far as the railway at Namacurra; in July they turned back and recrossed the Rovuma in September.⁷ The Germans and their pursuers, British as well as Portuguese, laid a vast region under contribution for food and labour. Many Africans had in fact welcomed the Germans as liberators, and when the Portuguese reoccupied the north they rooted out 'collaborators'. The brutality of this reoccupation provoked protests from British officers,⁸ and caused a stream of refugees into British-controlled territory.

⁷ See chapter 13, p. 667.

⁸ Cf. G. Lardner Burke to Colonial Office (forwarded to Foreign Office), 17 November 1920, Public Record Office (London), FO 371/5491.

Meanwhile the war had also shaken Portuguese control in the far west. In March 1917 they faced rebellion among the former subjects of the *makombe*, the king of Barwe. This was the one part of the Mozambique Company's territory in which the government was able to recruit labour, and the demand for carriers and unpaid labour was greatly increased by the war. The revolt spread rapidly eastwards into Gorongosa and north-west into the country between Tete and Zumbo. It was led by members of the exiled royal house of Barwe, aided by the priests of local spirit cults, but the leaders sought to build a broad alliance and secured the adherence of Nsenga and Chewa on the north bank of the Zambezi. Since the formal end of the Zambezi wars in 1902, the whole area had remained very disturbed; banditry was rife and the warlike tradition of the *chikunda* slave-soldiers was still very much alive. The Portuguese contrived to detach the Ngoni chiefs of Gorongosa and raised a large force of Ngoni auxiliaries; this sealed the fate of the rebellion, but it took the Portuguese the best part of two years to regain control in the hinterland of Barwe.

The first few years after the war saw little real change in the management of Mozambique. Great hopes were pinned on the reforms which in 1920-1 granted financial autonomy to the colonies and sent out Manuel de Brito Camacho, a leading politician in Portugal, to be high commissioner. But the results of this autonomy were an unstable currency and rapid inflation, and in any case Brito Camacho resigned within a year. The territory as a whole continued to be firmly subordinate to the interests of Britain and South Africa. Both blocked or perverted efforts to improve Mozambique's primitive economic infrastructure. Once the war had removed the possibility of a German take-over in the north, the Portuguese renewed hopes of completing a rail link between Quelimane and the Zambezi which might stimulate trade in the interior as well as tapping the trade of Nyasaland. But in 1919 Lord Milner, the British colonial secretary, effectively thwarted this project; alarmed by threats of American commercial penetration north of the Zambezi, he enabled the British-dominated Mozambique Company to build a railway through its own territory from Beira to a point on the Zambezi where it could link up with Nyasaland's transport system. This 'Trans-Zambezia' railway was financed by a loan on which the Nyasaland government was obliged to guarantee the payment of

interest. It was opened in 1923 but carried little local traffic and barely covered its working costs. A railway alone could not ensure economic growth, and the necessary investment was lacking. In 1922–3, Smuts contrived to thwart efforts to raise loans for Mozambique, since any expansion of its own production would undermine South Africa's ease of access to its labour. And in 1922 Smuts sought to renegotiate the 1909 convention which regulated this labour supply. He wished to control the railway to Lourenço Marques and the port itself, and to these ends was prepared to block completion of the Benguela railway in Angola and call on Britain to send a warship to Lourenço Marques. The negotiations failed, the convention lapsed and in 1924 Smuts fell from power. All the same, Mozambique could not manage without its invisible earnings from South Africa, and its men were still willing to go there, if only to avoid forced labour at home.

Once in retirement, Brito Camacho deplored the economic incompetence of the Portuguese government in Mozambique: 'To civilise, for the state, means keeping the heathen in submission, prompt in paying ever-rising taxes, and well-disposed towards military service.' He was scathing about the lack of expertise — the bachelor of theology who managed one company and the poet who had been sent to study cotton-growing; he complained that in 1921–2 the Lourenço Marques area actually imported rice, oranges and other foodstuffs which could easily have been produced locally. He pointed also to the economic stagnation caused by the pursuit of the illusion of cheap labour:

The whites have pledged themselves not to create needs in the blacks, the need to clothe themselves, the need to feed themselves, the need to house themselves...in the certainty that once these needs have been created, wages could not remain what they have been, misery and exploitation pretending to be payment.⁹

In 1922 the situation was described by the British vice-consul at Porto Amelia:

Throughout this country a system of compulsory labour is in force. Some employers manage so far as possible to get their work done by voluntary labour for which they pay reasonably good wages. But in the vast majority of cases they simply send in an application to the local Portuguese authority for a specified number of labourers and he supplies this number or less, according to the circumstances, at a low rate of wages.¹⁰

⁹ Brito Camacho, *Moçambique: problemas coloniais* (Lisbon, 1926), 40, 46, 47, 56.

¹⁰ Hall-Hall to Foreign Office, 13 April 1922, FO 371/8377.

The vice-consul went on to explain that the high commissioner, Brito Camacho, was determined to put an end to this situation; yet he had himself contracted to supply the British-owned Sena Sugar Estates with 3,000 men from Quelimane district. Against this background it is easy enough to explain the continued attractions of seeking work in Southern Rhodesia or South Africa.

The demand for labour within Mozambique was accelerated not only by the military campaigns in 1916–18 but by price-rises for tropical products. Sisal had been planted in some coastal areas by 1914, but wartime and post-war needs encouraged further planting; by the late 1920s it was grown along the coast near Inhambane, in Mozambique district and in Niassa Company territory, and inland on the lower Zambezi. In Mozambique Company territory, sugar continued to be the economic mainstay. The post-war commodity boom boosted the value of sugar exports, and in 1922 the company's total exports exceeded those from the Colony. By this time, sugar-production was in the hands of only two companies, which had become virtually self-governing states: the Companhia Colonial de Buzi and Sena Sugar Estates. From 1920, sugar producers had to deposit 10 per cent of their crop in Mozambique (where much was made into cheap liquor) and sell 75 per cent of the remainder to Portugal, which by 1928 received three-quarters of its sugar needs from the empire. In 1924, out of 100,000 contract workers in Mozambique Company territory, one-third were in the sugar industry. Sugar was, however, a shaky foundation. Prices fell in 1925; there were also disastrous floods, and by 1926 the company's exports were worth only one-fifth of those from the Colony. In that year total exports from Mozambique were worth £2.6m and the main contributor was not a plantation crop at all but African-grown groundnuts, of which exports increased fourfold in bulk between 1914 and 1928.

As for the Niassa Company's territory, conditions there remained as bad as ever. It suffered more than any other part of Mozambique from the war, which may have caused more than 50,000 deaths in the region: forced labour and food requisitions facilitated the spread of disease, especially the influenza pandemic of 1918, while there was a severe drought in 1919. Ironically, the war also caused the territory to become a British responsibility: in 1917 Smuts persuaded the British government to seize the German majority shareholding in the Niassa Company, in order

to complete the extinction of German control along the east coast. And since Britain had helped to finance the Portuguese war effort, it was able to override Portugal's wish to cancel the company's charter; instead, the confiscated shares were sold in 1918 to Sir Owen Phillips, chairman of the Union Castle shipping line. The Phillips regime brought no relief to the company's subjects. In 1919 it launched a campaign against the Makonde, who held out on the plateau until 1922. Men were rounded up for work in the Zambezi sugar-fields, and also on local cotton, coconut or sisal plantations. As in the Colony, administrative officials were grossly underpaid and most engaged in trade or in running plantations, despite attempts to prevent this. Yet European production was virtually negligible. The territory's total exports in 1926 were worth only £115,000, and of these three-quarters consisted of African crop surpluses. Nonetheless, Phillips (who became Lord Kysant in 1923) refused to invest more money in the Niassa Company unless its charter was extended, and this Portugal refused to do. Customs revenue continued to be negligible, and the company paid its way only by increasing African tax-rates almost annually between 1920 and 1927, when it was reckoned that after paying tax the people of Niassa were left with sixpence per head per year. In real terms (allowing for inflation), the rate of tax at first declined but then rose very sharply. Revenue rose in real terms, but the number of tax-payers declined. Portuguese officials and their African assistants resorted to hideous cruelties in order to enforce payment. Flogging, rape and murder increased the stream of emigration into British territory: between 1921 and 1931 more than 100,000 Yao and Makua may have fled to Nyasaland while many thousands of Makonde took refuge in Tanganyika.

1926–1940

The collapse of the Portuguese Republic in 1926 brought no immediate change in the affairs of Mozambique. In 1927 the South African government and mining industry contrived to prevent Portugal from raising a £12m loan for its overseas territories. Thus it was clearer than ever that Mozambique would have to continue to depend heavily on its export of labour to South Africa. Salazar, more concerned to balance budgets than foster growth,

was therefore eager to negotiate a new labour convention while Hertzog, the South African premier, was less grasping than Smuts. The convention signed in May 1928 exchanged a guaranteed tonnage of South African freight through Lourenço Marques for certain restrictions on recruitment in Mozambique. Such labour was to be used only on the Transvaal mines; the annual maximum total was to be progressively reduced from 100,000 in 1929 to 80,000 in 1933; the initial contract was limited to one year and the maximum period of continuous service to eighteen months. In another sphere, however, Salazar finally asserted Portuguese independence: he resisted all attempts by the British Foreign Office to extend the charter of the Niassa Company. It was duly wound up in 1929, without having once paid a dividend. In 1930, Salazar's Colonial Act obliged the Zambezi concessionaires to surrender their *prazos*, thus losing their police and administrative functions and their rights over African labour. Meanwhile, Salazar allowed work to continue on a new railway, crossing Mozambique district from the coast towards Lake Nyasa (Malawi): by 1929 it had reached Nampula, less than a third of the way.

The first impact of Salazar's regime was soon followed by that of the world-wide depression in 1930. This severely damaged Mozambique's transit trade, which was now worth three times as much as domestic trade and was largely sustained by exports from the Rhodesias and Katanga. As elsewhere in Africa, the depression prompted great efforts to offset falling prices by increasing output; as elsewhere this involved much coercion of labour. (In 1928 unpaid labour for the government had been abolished, but in view of prevailing wage-rates this was not an impressive reform.) In 1932 the value of domestic exports from Mozambique was only two-thirds what it had been in 1929 (which in terms of sterling was £3.1m). Yet the value of exports would have fallen much further had not their quantities sharply increased. This was mainly due to the mobilisation of labour in Quelimane and Mozambique districts, which comprised half the total population; by 1933 they contributed 70 per cent of crop exports from the whole of Mozambique. By 1936, when prices had begun to recover, sisal exports from the colony had increased fourfold in bulk since 1928; sisal now comprised one-fifth of Mozambique's exports. The price of sugar had fallen more steeply, and it contributed only 12 per

cent, even though production in the Colony had been much expanded and was now double that in Mozambique Company territory. Altogether, plantation produce made up 36 per cent of total exports. The rest consisted very largely of crops grown or gathered by Africans: groundnuts (the main export) formed almost one-quarter of the total in 1936; much copra was produced by African squatters on coastal concessions, while cashew nuts were grown to meet a rising demand in India.

Meanwhile, the links with South Africa and British central Africa were strengthened. In 1929 Britain had arranged for a railway bridge to be built across the Zambezi at Sena, to link the Trans-Zambezia railway to the line from Nyasaland; it was opened in 1935. As the economies of southern Africa recovered from the depression, so their need for labour revived. By 1934, many Africans from Mozambique found seasonal work in Nyasaland, with African cotton-growers as well as white tea-planters (who by 1940 employed about 5,000 such migrants). In 1934, Southern Rhodesia renewed the agreement of 1913; recruitment was held at 15,000 per year, but after 1936 it was extended outside Tete district, while many men found their own way over the frontier; between 1936 and 1941 the number of African workers from Portuguese territory in Southern Rhodesia rose from 25,000 to 46,000. The labour convention with South Africa was revised in 1934 to allow men from Mozambique to be used by sugar-planters in Zululand as well as in the Transvaal mines. In 1936 the annual maximum for recruitment was raised to 90,000 and in 1940 to 106,000. However, when in 1936 WNLA began again to recruit north of latitude 22°S, this did not directly apply to Mozambique, where the Sabi river remained the northern boundary of recruiting, though many men from the north crossed into Nyasaland to sign on for the Rand.

The continued restriction of WNLA recruiting to the far south reflected the rising demand for labour within Mozambique. This was due partly to increased harbour traffic and public works. The road system, much enlarged in the 1920s, required extensive maintenance, while new railways were under construction. In the north, the line from Mozambique advanced slowly west into productive agricultural country; in the far south, a spur from the Transvaal line was extended in 1935 to serve a projected irrigation scheme in the Limpopo valley. In 1938 work began on a line from

the Zambezi bridge towards Tete, with a view to exploiting the Moatise coalfield. By this time, however, labour was wanted above all for growing cotton. The promotion of cotton-growing had for some years been one aim of Portuguese colonial policy. The expansion of Portugal's textile industry in the early years of the century had been supplied mainly from outside its empire. In an attempt to reduce this drain of foreign exchange, the military government introduced in 1926 a decree designed to boost cotton-production in the colonies. Zones were specified within which Africans could discharge labour obligations by growing cotton, while the right to buy, process and market cotton would be leased to companies. This scheme only began to make progress after 1933, when a minimum price for cotton was introduced, and the main impetus came in 1938 when a Cotton Export Board was set up to provide seed, train experts and conduct research. Between 1935 and 1940 cotton output in Mozambique, mostly from the northern districts, rose from 2,300 tons to 19,000 tons, for which Portugal paid 30 per cent below the world price. The advent of war intensified the drive to produce cotton, which on the lower Zambezi caused the extortion of forced labour from women at the expense of their own food supplies. Intolerable conditions continued to drive many people from northern Mozambique to settle in Nyasaland, especially Mlanje district; even though the British discouraged this in the 1930s, it is likely that in the course of the decade there were at least 50,000 such migrants.¹¹

By 1940 the pressure to produce for export had placed great strain on traditional farming methods and the ecological balance of even the most fertile regions. The concession companies could all command contract labour in generous quantities. As a result they tended to increase output by essentially labour-intensive methods. There was little technical advance and Mozambique became a producer of primary products, many of which, like cashew nuts, had to be sent abroad even for preliminary processing. Factories existed to make fireworks, perfume, bus bodies, ice, tin cans, lime, soap and furniture, and to process maize, tea,

¹¹ This estimate is based on figures for total immigrants resident in Nyasaland in 1931 and 1945, allowing for an element of natural increase: cf. R. R. Kuczynski, *Demographic survey of the British colonial empire*, II (London, 1949), 537-9.

tobacco and sugar. With the exception of sugar, this odd assortment of industries scarcely constituted a sound industrial base.

Hundreds of thousands of men and women were compelled to work for abysmal wages. Few, however, had developed any sense of common identity as workers. While many men must have spent several years, on and off, in the mines of the Transvaal, most of those who returned were tied to rural communities which had been maintained by the women they had had to leave behind; indeed, in the south the role of women in local leadership markedly increased. Officials feared that returning migrants might have been infected with Protestantism or 'Garveyism', and they certainly founded a great many independent churches. The more responsible jobs open to Africans tended to go to immigrants from Nyasaland, of whom there may have been 3,000 in 1935, including foremen on sugar estates and also clerks. It was the dockworkers of Lourenço Marques who protested most consistently: they struck seven times in 1918–21, and struck again in the 1920s and 1930s.

The formal aspects of European civilisation were slow to make any impact on Mozambique. During the 1930s the resident white population increased by a half, but in 1940 numbered only 27,000; there were about an equal number of Indians, Chinese and *mestiços*, most of whom lived in Beira and Lourenço Marques. By contrast, the total population may have been as much as five million. Education began to make some progress after the First World War. A state system was devised to provide free and compulsory instruction for all African children under twelve, leading to technical training at secondary level. European children had the opportunity to go on to the *liceu* which was opened in Lourenço Marques in 1918. A parallel course was offered by mission schools but they too had to teach in Portuguese and, after 1935, state aid was granted only to Catholic missions. In 1931 there were officially 210 state and 254 missionary schools with a combined total of 53,394 pupils. These figures include European children and show that even one year in school was still a rare experience for an African child. The *liceu* had 479 pupils, three of whom were African. The same set of statistics reveals one high-quality hospital in Lourenço Marques, 22 other hospitals and 51 clinics.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

For the vast majority of the African population, health and education facilities in 1940 were no more and no less than they had been before the Portuguese arrival.

As to what Africans thought and said about their condition, we have few clues other than their own actions. There had for some time been printed protests among the few literate *mestiços* and Africans in Lourenço Marques. In 1918 they had founded a newspaper called *O Brado Africano* ('The African Cry') and in 1932 this boldly announced, 'We no longer want to suffer the bottomless pit of your excellent colonial administration...We have the scalpel ready.'¹² But this outlet for subversive thought was soon shut, and the best evidence for popular African opinion in these years seems to be the mordant songs of the Chopi, in the far south, and of the plantation workers on the Zambezi.¹³

ANGOLA

In some ways, Angola had much in common with Mozambique at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ancient seaports were connected by long-established trade routes to the peoples of the inland plateau; the Portuguese provided commercial links to the outside world but their effective rule was confined to a few trading stations. However, there were also important differences. In south-east Africa the plateau had mostly been taken over by the British, whereas in Angola virtually the whole length of the historic trade routes was reserved to the Portuguese. In the long run, this fact was to prove an asset to the Portuguese; in the short run, it was a grave liability. For in Angola, in contrast to Mozambique, population was densest in inland areas far removed from Portuguese settlements in coastal towns and river valleys; transport problems rendered these inland areas hard to control and inhibited economic expansion. Nor did Angola, at this period, have Mozambique's advantage of providing an outlet for mines in the interior, which had stimulated the construction of railways and harbours and provided the territory with an income from transit traffic as well as migrant labour. Thus Angola's economy grew even more slowly than that of Mozambique, though at least

¹² Quoted by James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 305–6.

¹³ See chapter 5, pp. 247–8.

ANGOLA

Angola's lack of invisible earnings obliged the Portuguese there to pay closer attention to the country's own material resources.

1905–1920

In 1905 Portuguese rule in Angola extended little further than it had a century earlier, and the white population was less than 11,000. There were three main areas under Portuguese administration. In the north, there were two historic corridors of Portuguese occupation and settlement: the road from Ambriz to the Kongo capital of São Salvador and that from Luanda, the capital of Angola, along the line of the Kwanza river to Malanje and the Kwango river. Further south, the high plateau east of Benguela had lately been opened up for white settlement: in 1902–4 Portuguese forces had crushed the so-called 'Bailundu revolt' among the Ovimbundu. The third area under Portuguese control was the hinterland of Mossamedes. In the 1850s the town of Lubango had been founded in the cattle country beyond the coastal desert, and the area had been partly occupied by missionaries and Madeiran and Boer settlers; by 1904 the latter numbered about 2,000. In 1905 the Portuguese completed their conquest of the Nkhumbi, but in the previous year the Kwanyama section of the Ovambo wiped out a large Portuguese force, and they remained independent for another decade: they received support from Germans in South West Africa who hoped to seize southern Angola from the Portuguese.

The defeat of the Ovimbundu, who had long dominated the export trade in rubber, ivory, wax and slaves, can be taken as the end of a period in the economic history of Angola. The old export patterns were not quickly superseded, but they clearly had no future. Wild rubber continued to be the main export of the colony in most years until 1916, but its price, after reaching a peak in 1910, rapidly declined. The total value of Angola's exports also peaked in 1910 and in 1913 was only £1m, little more than it had been in 1905. Ivory exports from Benguela had ceased by 1900, due to the extermination of elephant, though they persisted at Mossamedes until 1913. The export of labour was also on the wane. Slaves captured in the far interior had long been shipped to the cocoa islands of São Tomé and Príncipe. Since the late nineteenth century, they had had the status of 'contract labourers'

PORTUGUESE AFRICA



16 Angola, 1939

and over 4,000 went there in 1905, but this trade was under strain for there was now a rising demand for labour within Angola.

Railway contractors were the biggest new customers for Angolan labour. Work on the 'Trans-African' railway had begun at Luanda in 1886; by 1909 it had reached Malanje. In 1904 work began on the Benguela railway which was originally meant to carry out copper from Katanga. This project ran into financial

difficulties when in 1908 the Belgians agreed instead to link the copper-mines to the Rhodesian railway system and the port of Beira, but by 1912 the Benguela line had reached Nova Lisboa (Huambo), which was envisaged as a centre for white settlement on the Ovimbundu plateau. Meanwhile, a railway had been advancing slowly inland from Mossamedes since 1905.

The railways were soon to play a large part in freeing Angola from dependence on the failing rubber trade. But in the first decade of the twentieth century it was far from clear what could replace it. During the nineteenth century, a white plantation economy had grown up, based on coffee, sugar and cotton, but export prices for these had slumped; besides, most white planters and farmers were far from efficient. Coffee output steadily declined from 1895 to 1916, and the 4,000 tons exported in 1910 had all been gathered by Africans from bushes growing wild. Sugar-growing persisted, but in a perverted form; planters mostly abandoned the export trade in favour of making rum for local, and especially African, consumption. For the rest, the main hope of survival in the short run lay in the market for goods and services created by military campaigns, which between 1904 and 1911 may have cost nearly £1m. Besides, it was precisely the poverty of white settlers which created local 'shortages' of labour: few could afford to pay wages sufficient to attract African workers of their own free will. Thus new conquests raised hopes of access to fresh supplies of cheap labour. It had long been customary for district officials and chiefs to supplement their income by conscripting labour for private employers, and taxation provided a further mechanism of compulsion.

In the far south, Portuguese expansion was also stimulated by the activities of German traders and missionaries. The Ovambo nearest the Cunene river were subdued in 1905–7; in 1908 a military expedition set up posts along the German frontier as far east as the Caprivi Strip. The economy of Ovamboland had already been ravaged by rinderpest, in 1897, and by drought, flood and locusts. The imposition of hut-tax in 1907 drove both Ovambo and Nkhumbi to work for wages, while Kwanyama chiefs, though still independent, made contracts with white recruiters for the seasonal export of their subjects. Many Ovambo went south to mine copper or diamonds in German territory, but up to 1915 perhaps 2,000 each year worked on railways in Angola,

though they avoided plantations and coastal fisheries. In the northern hinterland, the Dembo, crippled by sleeping-sickness, were subdued between 1907 and 1910; in the far north-west, hut-tax was imposed in 1906 on the Kongo, who resisted violently over the next five years.

The extraction of labour in Angola, whether for export or for local use, had for several years been fiercely criticised by resident missionaries, notably the Baptists in the north, and by visitors who included the journalist H. W. Nevinson and the cocoa manufacturer W. A. Cadbury. The republican government which took office in Lisbon in 1910 quickly showed some concern, but chiefly in response to the conflicting interests of white business in Angola, the cocoa islands and Portugal. A new governor-general, Coelho, was sent out to Angola, and as a concession to local whites he suspended labour recruitment to the cocoa islands for three years. In 1911, however, rum production in Angola was outlawed, after pressure from the wine trade in Lisbon; planters were offered subsidies to switch from sugar to cotton but were mostly deterred by inadequate transport. In the same year, labour contracts were limited to two years and penalties prescribed for employers who assaulted their workers. But in 1912 Coelho resigned in protest against continued labour abuses, while the governor of Mossamedes, who had also spoken out against them, was removed after intrigue by local settlers and traders. The new governor-general, José Norton de Matos (1912–15), set himself to replace forced labour by free labour, but his achievement was largely rhetorical; if the supply of labour increased, it was due less to improved conditions than to the decline of the rubber trade and droughts which afflicted the south in 1911 and 1914–15. Besides, recruitment to São Tomé was resumed in 1913.

Norton de Matos was less effective as a protector of African workers than as an enemy of those few thousand blacks and coloured people with *civilizado* status. In 1911, just before his arrival, the government had raised the standards for entry to the upper ranks of the civil service; this handicapped candidates from Angola and by 1913 most new appointments were made in Portugal. This was bitterly resented by the *civilizado* group, and a number of them, mostly civil servants, formed a Liga Angolana in 1912 to press for further employment opportunities, equal civil rights and better access to education. Within a year, Norton de

Matos had shut down the press in Angola, and in 1914 he exiled A. J. Miranda, a leader of the Liga, to the Cabinda enclave. The trend towards racial segregation, in fact if not in name, was underlined in 1913 when Norton created a Department of Native Affairs. Its practical importance was very limited, since it lacked the means to achieve its grandiose ends, but it was a sign of growing white determination to prevent Africans gaining access to European civilisation.

The conquest of the far interior continued by slow degrees. In the north-east, military rule was extended in 1910–11 to Mahungo and Kasanje, along the Kwango river. In 1912 an attempt was made to levy tax in the remotest district, Moxico, where a convict settlement had been set up in 1895; this met with firm resistance and for many years the district remained largely beyond Portuguese control. In 1913 there was a rising in the former Kongo kingdom against forced labour; it was led by a Catholic chief, Alvaro Buta, who called for the removal of the Kongo king and burned down the old capital, São Salvador. Buta was captured in 1915 but resistance continued further east until 1918.

By this time, the First World War had given fresh impetus to 'pacification'. Late in 1914 there were clashes between Portuguese and German forces at Naulila. The German surrender to South Africa in May 1915 left the way clear for the Portuguese to complete their conquest of the Ovambo, notably the Kwanyama, tens of thousands of whom had starved to death in recent years due to epidemics and natural disasters. The urgent labour needs of the Katanga copper-mines, under the stress of war, led to the recruitment of men from Moxico in 1917–20, though their conditions in the mines were so dreadful that many deserted and some fled into Northern Rhodesia. Between 1917 and 1920 the vast Lunda region east of the Kwango was finally occupied. On the whole, the world war had the effect of consolidating the white presence in Angola. The white population grew from about 13,000 in 1913 to nearly 21,000 in 1920; it had been swollen by soldiers demobilised after wars of 'pacification' and by the arrival of civil servants with their families. Meanwhile, the war also stimulated African production. Exports of maize tripled in bulk between 1914 and 1918, and mostly reached the coast by the Benguela railway; the proceeds helped to offset the collapse of the rubber trade.

1920–1940

During the first few years after the war, the economy of Angola finally began to give promise of growth. There was no marked increase in external trade, but the basis was laid for later expansion. The pre-war decay of European agricultural production was now made good, at least for the time being, by Africans. Most coffee was still gathered wild, but from 1920 coffee exports began to rise in response both to closer administration and to the post-war boom: in 1924 they exceeded the 1895 peak of 11,000 tons. During the 1920s, coffee was usually the most valuable export; it was followed either by maize or by a wholly new commodity. In 1912 a diamond had been found in Lunda country; mining began in 1916 and exports in 1920. By this time the area had been brought under Portuguese rule, but the real power was the *Companhia de Diamantes de Angola* (Diamang). This was formed in 1920 as an offshoot of *Forminière* in the Belgian Congo, and the government took a 5 per cent shareholding. Diamang was exempted from taxes and duties on imports of capital equipment; and in 1921 it was given prospecting rights for thirty years over most of Angola. Diamang launched a recruiting scheme throughout the colony and soon had a workforce of 10,000. Its early success alarmed the diamond trade in South Africa; in 1922 Anglo American bought a 16 per cent interest in Diamang and made an agreement limiting Diamang's sales on the open market; the London Diamond Syndicate contracted to buy up to 125,000 carats annually.

Meanwhile there was a notable expansion of public works. From 1921 the Angola government had the power to raise loans, and Norton de Matos, who returned as high commissioner, lost no time in doing so. Plans were drawn up for the government to spend £13m, chiefly on ports, railways and the promotion of white colonisation. During the next few years the quay at Lobito was extended; new branches were added to the government-owned railway from Luanda; and the road network on the plateau was much enlarged. Nine thousand settlers were brought out from Portugal, and by 1924 the white population had risen to 36,000. Private enterprise also made heavy investments in Angola. Belgian and American capital joined in drilling for oil in the far north between 1918 and 1931, though with negligible success. The

Mossamedes railway finally reached Sa de Bandeira (Lubango) in 1923, and a line was built a short distance inland from Amboim between 1921 and 1928, to serve coffee plantations. In 1923 work was resumed on the Benguela railway. For a while it faced new financial problems: Smuts feared it as a future rival to the Rhodesia lines, which he hoped to include in a greater South Africa, and in 1921 he had persuaded Britain to refuse to guarantee a debenture issue by the Benguela railway company. But Smuts fell from power in 1924 and Robert Williams began once again to raise funds to complete the line.

Norton de Matos's ambitious deficit-financing was prompted by his determination to create in Angola a climate favourable to the profit motive; so too was his continuing crusade to establish free wage labour. Once more, however, he failed to achieve this by decree. He had some success in controlling the flow of workers to São Tomé, which had revived after the war and numbered over 5,000 men in 1919. But by enforcing the repatriation of such workers after one contract, Norton mainly served the interests of employers within Angola; in any case the price of labour there remained abysmally low. The widespread production of export crops by Africans did not represent much advance in economic bargaining power. Coffee was ungraded, so the price to the producer was minimal, as was that for maize.¹⁴ The condition of Africans was still further depressed — as Norton himself acknowledged — by cheap liquor. What little money they earned was spent, not on bicycles, sewing-machines or school fees but on local rum or imported wine and spirits: it has been reckoned that between 1919 and 1923 Angola imported between 22 and 25 times more alcohol *per capita* than French or British West Africa.¹⁵

It must also be noted that, for all his liberal economic aspirations, the whole tenor of Norton's regime was decidedly authoritarian; in several ways it prefigured the age of Salazar. Ironically, the arena of political discussion was formally widened just before his arrival: in 1921 a legislative council was set up in Luanda, comprising government officials and elected representatives of the main towns and various sectional interests. The latter

¹⁴ In 1928, when the export price for maize was relatively high, it was reckoned that 450 kilos had to be sold to pay taxes for one family: T. A. Barns, *Angolan sketches* (London, 1928), 103.

¹⁵ G. J. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese* (London, 1978), 146.

included both the Liga Angolana and another *civilizado* group, the Gremio Africano. Early in 1922, however, both groups were banned, largely as a result of protests by a coloured magistrate, António de Assis Júnior, against forced labour and the confiscation of African farmland around Golungo Alto. Assis Júnior and many other black or coloured civil servants and journalists were deported, while several were gaoled. Norton de Matos also checked the aspirations of *civilizados* by creating separate branches in the civil service for Europeans and Africans. Meanwhile, he took various measures designed to strengthen Portugal's hold over both whites and blacks. He discouraged German immigration, and new restrictions on landholding by foreigners compounded the difficulties of the Boers in the south, who had already lost a major occupation, transport-riding, as military campaigns ceased and railways were extended. Foreign missionaries were also attacked: printing in African languages and teaching in European languages other than Portuguese were forbidden. Several European associations were banned by Norton de Matos, essentially because he feared the aspirations of settlers towards autonomy or even independence. Finally, Norton tightened the grip of Portuguese bureaucracy over the African population. Civilian officials replaced army officers in outlying districts and their numbers were much increased. Henceforward, the ruler of rural Angola was the *chefe de posto*; chiefs lost their judicial roles and became mainly tax-gatherers and labour-recruiters, while a massive programme of resettlement in new villages broke up old patterns of ethnic association and sought to prevent contact between rural Africans and the *civilizado* clerk or trader.

In June 1924 Norton de Matos was forced to resign. In part, this was due to intrigues by settlers who opposed his labour policies, but it was also due to a financial crisis in Angola. Government borrowing had led to rapid inflation of both currency and credit; this encouraged speculation which soon forced the government's bankers to cease their loans. Angola's crisis was briefly exploited by Alves Reis, who in 1925 founded a new bank for Angola on the strength of banknotes obtained by fraud. In May 1926 the Portuguese Republic came to an end, and the new government soon set up a semi-public Bank of Angola with a near-monopoly in the colony; its operations were largely confined to the issue of currency. However, the Angola govern-

ment was already saddled with a very large debt; in 1928 this amounted to £5.6m, more than half of which was owed to the Portuguese government. Interest payments were postponed, for the economy was scarcely able to support this burden. Between 1924 and 1929 the only exports to increase in volume were those of maize and diamonds. The diamonds, which by 1929 were the most valuable export, were all sold in Belgium, but up to 1927 Portugal bought well over half Angola's exports, including almost all its sugar and cotton; Germany bought a great deal of maize in 1928–9, when total exports were reckoned to be worth £2.6m. The shipment of African produce was assisted by further work on the Benguela railway, which reached the Congo border in 1927; on the other hand, most of the remaining Boers in the south accepted the Union government's invitation in 1928 to return to South Africa.

There was no marked change in Angola's economy between Salazar's accession to power in 1928 and the Second World War. Salazar's own caution, and the effects of the world depression, combined to inhibit further growth until the late 1930s. Diamonds continued to be the principal export, accounting for between a quarter and a third of the total value. Output rose steadily until 1934, when it was limited by agreement with the Syndicate; it was then about one-tenth that of the Kasai diamond fields across the Belgian frontier. Belgian financial interests continued to increase their control of enterprises in Angola, not only in diamond-mining but in cotton and coffee plantations. But such investment in agriculture was slow to show results. There was no significant increase during the 1930s in exports of maize or coffee. This was partly due to factors which held back African production elsewhere: lack of capital and technical innovation, and progressive soil exhaustion. Much coffee was still collected rather than grown; sales were also handicapped by plant disease and by the continuing failure to grade the crop effectively, both of which gave Angolan coffee a bad name. Sugar exports began to recover from the low levels of the late 1920s, due to imperial protection from Portugal, and compulsory schemes pushed up exports of African-grown cotton, though for no commensurate return; sisal began to make a modest contribution. In 1931 the Benguela railway finally reached the Katanga mines and until 1940 carried between one-fifth and one-quarter of their copper exports: in

effect, the traffic thus gained by Lobito was lost by Beira and the Mozambique Company.

Superficially, Angola in the late 1930s was not an especially backward colony. Investment *per capita* may have been higher than in any other territory between the Zambezi and the Sahara, except for the Belgian Congo. In relation to total population, Angola's external trade in 1935 may well have been more valuable than that of Nigeria or the Belgian Congo.¹⁶ There was nothing very remarkable about the lack of local industries for processing exports, or for manufactures. By African standards, however, both Angola and Mozambique, like the Belgian Congo, showed a poor return in the shape of external trade for capital investments, public and private. And there were obvious differences between the Portuguese territories and the Belgian Congo. In the latter, massive investment had been geared, among other things, to the production and transport of a major export, copper, which was valued by industrial economies. There was no such congruence between Angola's railways and harbours and its exports (indeed, its diamonds were exported through the Congo), while huge sums had been spent in the vain search for oil. Moreover, there had been, in the Portuguese territories, scarcely any investment in manpower, in the form of education and social services for even a part of the African population: the only significant exception was the diamond zone in north-eastern Angola, where Diamang enjoyed virtual autonomy and fought sleeping-sickness through a network of hospitals and first-aid posts. By and large, Africans in Angola continued to be gravely enfeebled by sickness, ignorance and alcohol: imports of Portuguese wine were if anything greater in the 1930s than in the previous decade. At the same time, the real cost of living for Africans, which in Luanda at least may have risen by 75 per cent between 1913 and 1933,¹⁷ was further raised by new restrictions, from 1931, on non-Portuguese imports. Over the decade, African real earnings, whether from wages or crop sales, declined even below the levels of the 1920s. In 1930-3 the country suffered not only from trade depression but from terrible droughts and locust invasions: in 1934 Luanda was described in a local newspaper as a population of 'living skeletons'.¹⁸ It was

¹⁶ S. H. Frankel, *Capital investment in Africa* (London, 1938), 202-3, 207; cf. 170.

¹⁷ F. C. C. Egerton, *Angola in perspective* (London, 1957), 108.

¹⁸ Jill Dias, 'Famine and disease in the history of Angola, c. 1830-1930', *Journal of African History*, 1981, 22, 3, 377.

hard for Africans in Angola to escape intolerable poverty by emigrating, for the South Africans offered no refuge and the Belgians were reluctant hosts, but between 1919 and 1934 perhaps 3–4,000 people from Angola annually settled in the north-west of Northern Rhodesia, while in 1932–3 many also migrated there in search of work.

Meanwhile the government had to reduce its expenditure. From 1930 the budget was balanced, but only by postponing payment of interest on the public debt, which thus rose to £8.7m by 1937. There were cut-backs in staff and salaries. The diamond industry provided the state, as a shareholder, with a small but growing income, and also with loans. The improvement of trade after 1935 encouraged some expansion. In 1936 a development loan of £1.8m was authorised, but offers of assistance to new white settlers met with little response; a settlement scheme financed by the Benguela railway company in 1935–7 was no more successful. In 1940 the white population had risen, mostly by natural increase, to 44,000; of these one-third lived in the coastal cities and only 4,300 on farms, compared with 10,000 self-styled traders. Thus in terms of occupation the white population resembled the Asians rather than the whites of East Africa. And it was still rather less than the *civilizado* population, which in 1940 included 23,200 coloured and 24,000 blacks.

The political aspirations of Angolan residents, already checked by Norton de Matos, were further curbed under the Estado Novo. In 1926 the legislative council was replaced by a merely advisory council which (as in Mozambique) comprised five officials and five nominated non-officials who had to be Portuguese citizens. In 1928–30 the leadership of the *civilizados* was emasculated by large-scale deportations. Literate African protest survived primarily in the Liga Nacional Africana: this was dominated by coloured Catholic civil servants in Luanda but in 1938 it presented the government with a wide-ranging statement of African grievances, including a request to be represented in the governor's advisory council.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE

The volcanic islands of São Tomé and Príncipe in the Gulf of Guinea were governed as a separate province.¹⁹ By the end of the nineteenth century, both islands were mainly devoted to the production of cocoa and coffee. These crops were grown on plantations which were mostly owned by banks, companies or private individuals resident in Lisbon. The plantations were largely autonomous; many had a sea frontage and handled the shipment of both exports and imports. The labour was provided by imported contract workers, both men and women. In 1900 there were around 20,000 such workers on São Tomé and 3,000 on Príncipe. Their lives were entirely bounded by the plantation on which they worked; they were housed in barracks and bought only from the plantation store. There was also a substantial population of free islanders: about 18,000 on São Tomé and 1,000 on Príncipe. Most of these were descended from plantation slaves who had been freed in the 1870s, but some belonged to the long-independent community of 'Angolares' formed by castaways in the seventeenth century. The Angolares, who were clustered on the south-east coast of São Tomé, contributed casual labour to the plantations, but the other free islanders avoided such work and in any case were not allowed to squat on unused plantation land. Instead, they made a precarious living from their own small plots, from fishing, and from trade with contract workers: in 1905 a Portuguese complained, 'The freeman is a parasite on the plantation; he lives from what he robs from it and furnishes spirits to the workers in exchange for cocoa, coffee and bananas, and, what is even worse, in exchange for the rations which the worker receives from his boss for his maintenance, for the worker gives everything he has and everything he can rob in exchange for brandy.'²⁰

Up to 1914 the plantation owners did very well. Coffee was of marginal and decreasing importance after 1900, but exports of cocoa rose from 11,482 tonnes in 1900 to a peak of 36,500 in 1913 — around 15 per cent of world output. Some plantations yielded

¹⁹ It also included a tiny enclave in Whydah, a port in Dahomey; this was the fort of São João Baptista de Ajuda, a relic of the slave trade.

²⁰ H. de Mendonça, *A Roça Boa Estrada* (Lisbon, 1905), 45, quoted in E. J. de Carvalho e Vasconcellos, *São Tomé e Príncipe* (Lisbon, 1918), 88.


PORTUGUESE GUINEA

returns of 15 per cent, little of which was spent in the islands. But the hothouse climate so favourable to the cocoa plant also killed people: in 1915–19 annual mortality among workers on São Tomé averaged well over 5 per cent. In 1903 the length of contracts was formally limited to five years, but this rule was slow to take effect: workers either died or were repeatedly recontracted. The high death-rate was offset both by continued imports, which up to 1910 averaged about 4,000 each year, and by natural increase, for enough workers survived to produce children, and these were automatically contracted. The scandal of this ‘modern slavery’, and the methods by which contract labour was obtained in Angola, caused British and German manufacturers to boycott the islands’ cocoa in 1909. Thereafter, workers at the end of their first contract were offered repatriation, which several thousand accepted each year. When imports from Angola were temporarily banned in 1910, recruiters turned to Portuguese Guinea, the Cape Verde islands and Mozambique: Mozambique supplied 8,375 workers in 1915.

After the war, the planters’ fortunes declined. Contract labour had encouraged labour-intensive methods with minimal capital investment, yet the most productive land had already been taken up and the soil’s natural fertility was being exhausted, while disease took hold of the cocoa trees. Between 1914 and 1940 the cocoa worker’s annual output fell from almost one tonne to less than a quarter-tonne. At the same time the number of workers declined, from nearly 40,000 in 1921 to less than 30,000 in 1940, despite continuing imports of contract labour. Uneconomic plantations were abandoned and exports fell from 28,406 tonnes in 1921 to 6,972 in 1940; they remained around 10,000 tonnes throughout the 1930s.

PORTUGUESE GUINEA

Portuguese Guinea (Guiné) consisted of a scatter of trading posts on the estuaries of four rivers; it was an enclave surrounded by French territory. Up to 1913 its main export was rubber, and thereafter groundnuts, mostly grown inland: the coastal regions exported palm-oil, while rice surpluses were often smuggled into Senegal. The provincial government, based on Bolama island, took many years to extend its authority over the mainland. Bafata



17 Cape Verde islands and Portuguese Guinea •

was occupied in 1909, but in the north-west the Balanta and Mandinga, using guns sold by the Portuguese themselves, held out until 1915; their subjection owed much to the ravages of raiders recruited by the Senegalese Abdul Injai, which persisted until 1919. The Bissagos islands continued sporadically to refuse to pay tax, and provoked police raids as late as 1936.

After the First World War, the government began a programme of road-building, which helped to tap agricultural surpluses in the interior while causing the decline of the old riverine towns, such as Cacheu, Geba and Buba. The Balanta people spread into the coastal regions, where they grew rice and came to dominate the fragmented and dwindling Nalu, Felupe and Biafada populations. Portuguese control prevented further expansion by the Fula, but the nineteenth-century wars had already seen these cattle-keepers reach the geographical limits of a pastoral economy. Their chiefs remained in effective control of much of the interior of Guiné, trusted by the Portuguese and benefiting from collaboration with the administration. Indeed, throughout the colony Fula chiefs were imposed on non-Fula populations.

Agriculture remained almost entirely in African hands. The Portuguese sought to raise productivity by distributing improved seed, setting up model farms and building storehouses. They also spread the use of carts and ploughs, adapting the primitive agricultural technology of Portugal to Africa: an interesting and not unintelligent approach. They also worked to improve water supplies and suppress water-borne diseases. By 1940, the population may have numbered around 400,000; exports of groundnuts, which averaged over 20,000 tonnes annually in the 1920s, had risen to 28,000 tonnes. Virtually nothing, however, was done to introduce industries or assimilate Guineans to European civilisation. The influence of the Cape Verde islands continued, as in the nineteenth century, to be more important than that of Portugal. Many poor Cape Verdeans came to Guiné to plant gardens or become artisans, while the administration was also largely staffed by islanders. Only in the Bissagos islands were there European concessionaires: German companies set up plant there for producing coconut-oil and exploiting the extensive palm-groves on the islands. These proved moderately successful until the Second World War, but led to heightened tension with the French.

PORTUGUESE AFRICA

THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

In many respects the Cape Verde islands, like São Tomé and Príncipe, resembled the West Indies rather than Africa. They too had been populated by slaves who had been imported by Portuguese planters, came from different African origins and soon mixed with the Portuguese to develop a Creole culture which was neither African nor European. Finally, although never wholly without a role in Atlantic trade, the islanders depended on the often transient success of one or two export crops.

Island communities have to maintain a particularly sensitive balance between population and resources, and periodic drought has made precarious the survival of human communities on the Cape Verde islands. In 1900 they had about 150,000 inhabitants, but there was a disastrous drought in 1903–4, as a result of which Santiago, the most populous island, lost 13.6 per cent of its population. Most farmland belonged to a few landowners, and former peasants had been reduced to sharecropping; they mostly lived off maize, cassava and beans. There were few export possibilities. In 1905 Senegal imposed a prohibitive tariff on Cape Verde salt; the local coffee was of high quality but extremely vulnerable to drought; and the most dependable export was the barbados nut (*purgeira*), used in animal feed and soap-making; Lisbon manufacturers prevented the islands from starting their own soap industry. After 1910 climatic conditions improved and the population rose, but it fell again in the 1920s. Meanwhile a major service trade was in decline: in the nineteenth century Porto Grande on São Vicente had been used as a bunkering station by ships bound for South America, but by the 1920s the world's shipping increasingly used Dakar and Las Palmas. The bunkering business had been monopolised by British coal-merchants; the Portuguese blamed their high prices for the loss of trade and there were occasional anti-British riots.²¹ Many people emigrated: most went to the USA, but some went on contract to São Tomé and others to French territory and Guiné; there was also a seasonal migration of Cape Verdeans to raise a crop in Guiné on temporary plots.

²¹ Carnegie to Foreign Office, enclosing report by vice-consul in St Vincent, 26 September 1925, FO 371/11094; Petition for protection signed by British community, St Vincent, 28 August 1920, FO 371/5492.

SPANISH EQUATORIAL GUINEA

The depression of the 1930s meant that the islanders were largely denied entry to the USA, while it increased the number of those who returned home. Relief works mitigated the effects of drought in 1931 and 1936, and over the decade the population rose again, to reach over 180,000 in 1940. Annual exports of salt exceeded 10,000 tons throughout the 1920s and 1930s, though the European market for barbados nut collapsed. Some employment was provided after 1936 by Salazar's construction of a concentration camp at Tarrafal, while the French built a flying-boat base in the islands. The census of 1940 recorded only 47 per cent of the working population as engaged in agriculture, and a mere 4.7 per cent in commerce, fishing, mining and industry; 42 per cent were said to be in domestic service.

For all their poverty, the islands came to play an important role within the Portuguese empire. Those who returned from the USA spread the influence of Protestant sects, negro culture and the English language. The closing-off of emigration to America prompted Cape Verdeans to turn instead to Guiné and Angola, where at least some mingled with the tiny *civilizado* bourgeoisie, with significant long-term political results.

SPANISH EQUATORIAL GUINEA

After a brief burst of interest at the turn of the century, Spanish public opinion and politicians turned away from Africa and forgot their colonies. The humiliating loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898 led some Spaniards to hope for compensation in Africa. But Spain had neglected to occupy the large area in the Bight of Biafra to which it had historical rights, and the French had been busily expanding their occupation at the expense of the area claimed by Spain. The treaty of Paris in 1900, which also fixed the boundaries of the Spanish Sahara, left Spain with the little enclave of Rio Muni, a mere 26,000 sq. km out of the 300,000 stretching east to the Ubangi river which the Spaniards had dreamed of. In addition, they still held the islands of Fernando Po (Bioko) and Annobón (Pagalu) in the Gulf of Guinea, ceded by Portugal in 1778. The three territories together made up Equatorial Guinea, the only colony of any real value that Spain retained after the defeat of 1898. Their combined population by the 1930s was reckoned at around 170,000.

SPANISH EQUATORIAL GUINEA



18 Spanish Guinea

Fernando Po, with its fertile and well-watered volcanic soil and natural harbours, was the economic heartland of Equatorial Guinea, but it lagged far behind the neighbouring Portuguese islands of São Tomé and Príncipe in the opening years of the century. The Portuguese colony was the world's largest producer of cocoa before the First World War, with exports reaching a peak of 35,000 metric tons in 1913, compared to just over 4,000 tons for Equatorial Guinea. However, production rose steadily in Fernando Po in the inter-war years, while São Tomé entered into a prolonged crisis. By the 1930s, the Spanish colony was producing some 14,000 metric tons of cocoa a year compared to only about 10,000 tons in the Portuguese islands. A small proportion of Equatorial Guinea's cocoa came from the mainland enclave of Rio

Muni, but the staple export of the enclave was timber. Wild rubber was approximately as valuable an export as timber before the First World War, and when rubber exports collapsed in the inter-war years coffee replaced it as the enclave's second export product. Fernando Po was responsible for over 90 per cent of the colony's exports by value in 1912, but this proportion slowly declined. The tiny isolated island of Annobón, less fertile than Fernando Po and with no natural harbours, contributed little or nothing to the colonial economy.

The greatest constraint to economic development was a chronic shortage of labour. The indigenous Bubi population of Fernando Po, pushed into the interior of the island and decimated by alcoholic addiction, venereal disease, smallpox and sleeping-sickness, refused to work on plantations. They were prepared to labour on well-paid public works in decent conditions, but their own little cocoa farms gave them a considerable degree of autonomy. Moreover, the Bubi were protected from the demands of the planters from the late nineteenth century by the Spanish Claretian missionaries, who were very influential in the colony and eventually organised the Bubi into little mission theocracies reminiscent of the famous Jesuit Reductions of Paraguay. Catholic penetration was furthered by two small insurrections, in 1898 and 1910, which led to the Bubi being disarmed in 1917 and left them dependent on the missionaries.

Rio Muni was the obvious alternative source of labour, but prior to the 1920s the Spaniards only controlled the coast and main navigable waterways. The coastal peoples, who had grown wealthy as trading intermediaries in the slave, rubber and ivory trades, were generally unwilling to labour in plantations, but took on skilled employment and acted as labour recruiters in the interior. The fiercely independent Fang people of the interior only consented to work in Fernando Po if they were certain of good conditions, but it is likely that they sold slaves who were then shipped off as indentured labourers. By 1912 there were nearly 4,000 Rio Muni labourers in Fernando Po and nearly 3,000 of other West African origins.

West African labour was drawn mainly from the Windward coast, but the British authorities banned all recruitment for Fernando Po in their territories in 1900. Liberia thus remained the chief source of West African labour, in conditions which drew

frequent accusations that it was a disguised kind of slave-trade. The Liberian government was desperate for money, as a growing financial crisis threatened the survival of the country as an independent nation, and the local Liberian authorities connived at the widespread evasion of labour-recruiting regulations. In 1914, Spain and Liberia signed an agreement to reorganise the movement of labour and defuse British criticism. Contracts were to be for a maximum of two years and a minimum of one year, repatriation was guaranteed, and there was to be joint supervision of all the clauses covering wages and conditions by officials of both states. Between 1914 and 1930, an estimated 10,000 Liberians went to Fernando Po under this agreement, at an estimated cost per head to the planters of £2 a month, plus the cost of passages. However, the whole arrangement came under increasing criticism in Liberia, whose financial position improved somewhat in the 1920s, and recruiting was restricted and finally stopped altogether in 1930.

With the ending of Liberian imports, the cocoa planters of Fernando Po turned to Rio Muni, Cameroun and Nigeria. It was no coincidence that campaigns were mounted to subdue the Fang in the 1920s, at the time that Liberia was beginning to cut back on recruitment. There were garrisons of the colonial guard throughout the enclave by 1926, and the whole colony was considered 'pacified' by 1935. However, Rio Muni had a small population, officially put at a little over 100,000 in the 1930s, and escape over the frontiers into Cameroun or Gabon was very easy. Moreover, the timber companies needed growing amounts of labour, and the spread of coffee cultivation offered an alternative means of paying taxes. Fernando Po thus continued to suffer from labour shortages. The French only briefly permitted recruitment in Cameroun, and the main source of labour came to be Ibo smuggled in African canoes from Nigeria. The British rather reluctantly made this current of labour migration legal in 1942, in order to control it. It was this agreement which really permitted Fernando Po to make the most of its fertile soil and become one of Africa's most productive agricultural areas after the Second World War.

At the turn of the century, the plantations of Fernando Po were largely in the hands of a black Creole élite, later known as Fernandinos. The British had settled some 2,000 Sierra Leoneans

and freed slaves during their brief occupation of the island in the early nineteenth century, and a small current of immigration from West Africa and the West Indies continued after the departure of the British. To this core of settlers were added Cubans, Filipinos and Spaniards of various colours deported for political or other crimes, as well as some assisted settlers. The mortality among these unfortunate people was exceedingly high, but those who survived swelled the ranks of the Fernandinos. There was also a trickle of immigration from the neighbouring Portuguese islands, in the form of escaped slaves and prospective planters. Although a few of the Fernandinos were Catholic and Spanish-speaking, about nine-tenths of them were Protestant and English-speaking on the eve of the First World War, and pidgin English was the lingua franca of the island. The Sierra Leoneans were particularly well placed as planters while labour recruitment on the Windward coast continued, for they kept family and other connections there and could easily arrange labour supplies.

From the opening years of the twentieth century, the Fernandinos were put on the defensive by a new generation of Spanish immigrants. New land regulations in 1904–5 favoured Spaniards, and most of the great planters of later years arrived in the islands from Spain following these new regulations. The Liberian labour agreement of 1914 favoured wealthy men with ready access to the state, and the shift in labour supplies from Liberia to Rio Muni increased this advantage. The colonial authorities were extremely suspicious of the ‘fifth column’ of black anglophone heretics, and backed their countrymen whenever possible. However, it also appears that many of the Fernandinos fell into debt, particularly when cocoa prices fell after the First World War, and lost their land to their commercial creditors. By 1930, there were some 21,000 hectares of land in European hands and 18,000 belonging to the Fernandinos. In 1940, it was estimated that only 20 per cent of the colony’s cocoa production came from African land, nearly all of it in the hands of Fernandinos.

In addition to individual Spanish planters, there were two large Catalan concerns, which fused in 1926. ALENA was a timber company, based in Tarragona, which was active in Rio Muni from the late nineteenth century and was renowned for its harsh treatment of labour. The Compañía Trasatlántica was a Barcelona shipping company, founded in 1850 for the Cuban trade, which

began operating in Rio Muni in 1887. Differential tariffs ensured that the great bulk of cocoa exported from Equatorial Guinea went to Barcelona, and the Compañía Trasatlántica had a virtual monopoly on shipping to and from Spain. The company also invested in cocoa plantations and pioneered cattle-raising for the local market in the high pastures of the interior of Fernando Po. The only bank in the colony in the 1930s, the Banco Exterior de España, was linked to the ALENA-Trasatlántica group. The Catalan orientation to Spanish colonialism was reinforced by the fact that most Spanish settlers came from Catalonia, and the traders of the capital city, Santa Isabel, depended on credit from Barcelona firms.

Spanish policy towards Africans was inspired by French and Portuguese models, and in 1928 the distinction between native Africans and 'emancipated' Africans was legally enshrined. The great majority of *emancipados* were Fernandinos, but in 1912 1,300 Bubi were classified as 'civilised', and missionary influence increasingly drew the Bubi into the position of *emancipados*. There were also many mulattos in the population, as very few of the 2,000 or so settlers in the 1930s brought their wives with them. Race relations were reputed to be much more relaxed in Fernando Po than on the mainland, owing to the existence of a sizeable *emancipado* community on the island which hardly existed in Rio Muni.

Policy towards the native majority was always highly paternalistic, at least in intention. In 1901, a colonial 'guardian' (*curador*) was appointed by Madrid, directly responsible to the metropolitan government and charged with protecting the indigenous Africans. The *curador* dealt mainly with labour issues, occasionally clashing with other officials, and banned the sale of alcohol to Africans. In 1904, communal African lands were declared to be inalienable, and the native councils first set up in 1880 were reorganised. Each native council was to be headed by a government delegate, with two assistants, one or even both of whom could be Africans. In 1908 the colonial guard was created, with white officers and black troops. All the indications are that the *curador* and native councils were dominated by the planter interests and did little to protect their wards from exploitation. The *curador* was thus replaced in 1928 by the *patronato de indígenas*, a committee headed by the vicar apostolic, with eight official members and four chosen from among the settlers.

The choice of the vicar apostolic to head the new body reflected the position of the missionaries as the only group which made an attempt to win the confidence of Africans and protect them from the worst abuses of the planters. On the eve of the First World War, the Claretians had seven stations on Fernando Po, one on Annobón, and five along the coast of Rio Muni. The Protestants were less numerous, in spite of a head start in the nineteenth century, as the Spanish authorities showed considerable hostility to missionaries who were not only heretics but also insisted on speaking and teaching English rather than Spanish. There was a single American Board Presbyterian mission on the mainland, famous for its hospital, and five English Primitive Methodist stations on Fernando Po. The Methodists made attempts to penetrate Bubi society, but most of their work was with the Fernandinos, and they were peculiar in their refusal to open any schools. Government primary schools were set up in the three main urban centres after 1914, but it was not until the very end of the 1930s that the state began to create a network of rural schools.

At the end of this period, Equatorial Guinea was briefly caught up in the bloody events of the Spanish civil war. Incidents between the 'lay' authorities and the 'clerical' opposition developed in 1936, as some churches were closed and the heady rhetoric of the Popular Front began to be applied to the African majority in the colony. When General Franco rose against the republic, the head of the colonial guard in Santa Isabel pronounced in Franco's favour and declared himself governor-general. The republicans gave way without a fight on Fernando Po, but the governor of Rio Muni refused to follow suit and defeated the levies raised against him by the timber bosses. The right-wing rebels sent a ship from the Canaries, which sank the ship loyal to the republic in Rio Muni. Moroccan troops then seized Bata, the capital of the enclave. Some republicans were captured and shot, but most of them seem to have escaped into neighbouring Cameroun and Gabon. By October 1936, the colony was securely in Franco's hands and contributing money, raw materials and food to the long and bitter campaign against the republic. Franco's victory ushered in a new period for Equatorial Guinea, marked by greater metropolitan interest and investment in its distant colony, but also by more oppressive and more directly racist colonial rule.

CHAPTER 11

SOUTHERN AFRICA

By 1910, three governments held sway in southern Africa over a region as large as India and five times the size of France. The Union of South Africa, created in that year, was a self-governing Dominion in the British Empire; it brought together, under a unitary constitution, the territories of the Cape, Natal, the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal.¹ The British government, which had thereby granted virtual independence to the white people of South Africa, retained responsibility for three adjacent protectorates: Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland. However, these were closely tied to the Union; Basutoland was a mountain enclave within it; and all three were administered by a British high commissioner who until 1931 was also governor-general of South Africa. South West Africa was a German colony, but the best harbour along its coastline, Walvis Bay, belonged to the Union, for the Cape Colony had annexed it before the Germans took over the surrounding territory.

Geographically, southern Africa encompasses huge contrasts. Its watershed, the Drakensberg range, falls abruptly to the east coast and causes monsoon rains to fall over Natal and the eastern Cape. For centuries this coastal belt had been colonised by African mixed farmers; more recently, they had been joined by British planters and Indian workers. Elsewhere, the only important regions for arable farming were parts of the northern plateaux, where Afrikaners had settled, and the south-western Cape, which enjoys a Mediterranean climate: this was the heartland of the Coloured people. Otherwise, the western two-thirds of southern Africa comprise arid grassland, scrub and desert, where annual rainfall varies from 15 inches to little or none. In 1911 there were probably well under 200,000 people in South West Africa and less than 150,000 in Bechuanaland. In sharp contrast, Basutoland may

¹ The process of unification is considered, along with other developments before 1910, in *The Cambridge history of Africa*, VI (1985).

1910–1914

have had as many as 430,000 while Swaziland had around 100,000. In the Union, there were about four million Africans, 1,276,000 whites, 526,000 Coloured and 152,000 Indians.

It was not, however, climate but geology which was to exert the primary influence on the peoples of southern Africa in the twentieth century. Already, the course of economic and social change had been deeply affected by the extraction of minerals: diamonds at Kimberley since 1867, gold on the Witwatersrand since 1886 and diamonds in South West Africa since 1908. By 1910 nearly half the world's gold came from South Africa, and nearly all its diamonds. These facts, which gave the industrialised world a major stake in southern Africa, were made possible both by manipulating local markets in land and labour and by extending the market for labour outwards, to the High Commission Territories, Mozambique and British central Africa. On the surface, the politics of South Africa might appear to be dominated by ethnic conflict, but as its industry continued to expand class interests became more sharply defined. The relations between Afrikaners, Britons, Africans, Coloured people and Indians were moulded by rivalry between mining and other capitalist enterprise, and above all by the demands of capital for assured supplies of cheap labour. The extent to which 'racial' and class divisions in South Africa reinforced or cut across each other is perhaps the most important theme in its modern history.

1910–1914

South Africa

The white political ethos in which Union was established has been called the 'Convention Spirit' — a willingness to form a constitutional arena within which Boer and Briton would coexist and perhaps merge to form a South African nation. The two seats of government symbolised this spirit: the Union's administration was established at Pretoria, in the Transvaal, while the two houses of the Union parliament met in Cape Town. Whites were firmly in control. Only whites could sit in the House of Assembly, and its hundred-odd members were elected according to the existing franchise laws of the constituent territories. These gave the vote to nearly all white adult males. In the Cape, the vote was available

SOUTHERN AFRICA



19 South Africa, South West Africa and the Protectorates, 1920

to all adult males, of whatever colour, who could meet a £75 property qualification and pass a literacy test: thus only four out of five Cape voters were white. The Cape franchise could only be altered by a two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament in joint session. This provision also protected the equal status of English and Dutch as official languages. The electoral system favoured rural voters, who were mostly Afrikaners: an MP in a rural constituency was allowed to represent 26 per cent fewer voters than were required for an urban member. There were few constraints on the power of the House of Assembly. The four constituent territories now became provinces, with councils which were essentially large-scale organs of local government: they could legislate on education, roads and hospitals, but they

had few fiscal powers and depended heavily on central government revenues. The Senate could at most delay legislation, and in any case was largely a creature of the lower house: MPs and provincial councils elected eight senators for each province, while the government nominated eight more. The governor-general normally acted on the advice of the Cabinet; it was thus that he appointed the judges of the Union's Supreme Court, who could only be removed at the request of both houses of parliament. As in the other Dominions, Britain retained final authority over external affairs. For the time being, the defence of South Africa continued to be entrusted to imperial (i.e. British) troops and the Royal Navy, which used Simonstown as a strategic base.

The general election in 1910 brought into power a government headed by General Botha of the Transvaal. His base was a loose coalition of Afrikaner parties, supported by a minority of English-speaking South Africans, though Botha included three in his Cabinet. Once the new government had been formed, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts's *Het Volk*, the Cape's South African Party (including the Afrikaner Bond) and General Hertzog's Orangia Unie merged in 1911 to form the South African National Party. The opposition was divided along class lines. English-speaking Unionists represented commerce, finance, mining and Natal agricultural interests. A small Labour Party, dominated by Englishmen and led by Colonel Creswell, represented the restive white working class, within which Afrikaners were a growing minority.

From the first, the new government sought to influence the direction of economic growth, though the main dynamic was private enterprise, aided by British and European capital and Empire trade preferences. In the first few years of Union, mining generated 27 per cent of national income, agriculture 17 per cent and manufacturing 7 per cent. In 1913 domestic exports were worth £64m; two-thirds of this came from gold and the remainder from diamonds, wool and agriculture. These results were achieved through systematic institutional pressures. Railway rates, which hitherto had been chaotically competitive, were gradually co-ordinated. Farm exports were rated below mineral exports; they were also assisted by a 'tapering rate' which reduced the tariff per ton as distance increased, thus favouring the remoter areas as branch lines were extended. Such discrimination was the more

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Table 3. *South African elections and governments, 1910–1938.*

	Unionist	S. African	National	Purified Nat.	Labour	Independent	Dominion	Other	Government	Premier
1910	39	67			4	11			SA(N)P	Botha
1915	40	54	26		4	6			SAP	Botha
1920	25	41	44		21	3			SAP	Smuts
1921		79	45		9	1			SAP	Smuts
1924		53	63		18	1			NP-Lab Pact	Hertzog
1929		61	78		3 + 5	1			NP	Hertzog
1933		61	75		2 + 2	6		4	Coalition; UP	Hertzog
United Party										
1938		111		27	3	4	8	1	UP	Hertzog

important since in general the productivity of white farming was still low. Most white farmers were poorly educated; their techniques were often inefficient and liable to damage the environment. The Land Bank, set up in 1912, was one result of legislation intended to assist them: it provided a source of capital for fencing, dip-tanks and boreholes, but was used to increase herds and landholdings rather than to improve farming methods.


The most important way in which the government subsidised white enterprise was by helping to mobilise African labour while keeping down its price. This was a principal aim of the Natives Land Act of 1913, which carried out recommendations made in 1905 by the Native Affairs Commission. Hitherto, blocks of land had from time to time been set aside as reserves for exclusive African occupation, especially in Natal and the Cape, but many Africans had become tenants or sharecroppers on white land, while in Natal, the western Transvaal and the Cape a few had been allowed to buy freeholds. The growth of towns and mines had prompted a number of African farmers to produce for the market, and some were able to undercut white competitors. Well before union, the emergence of such a peasantry had been challenged by piecemeal legislation; the Natives Land Act went far to destroy

it. In 1913, Africans owned 7.3 per cent of the country, either communally, as in the reserves, or as freehold. The Act now prohibited Africans from buying land outside such 'scheduled areas', except at the discretion of the governor-general. More immediately important, the Act prohibited sharecropping; it required Africans remaining on white property to provide 90 days' labour each year for their landlord; and it severely curtailed the mobility of farm labour. White farmers began to terminate rental agreements, recognising that their erstwhile tenants were now obliged either to work for them or to seek work elsewhere. For the time being, however, it was impossible to apply the Land Act to the Cape; the Supreme Court ruled in 1917 that it interfered with African voting rights there which were based in part on landownership, and since the Act had not been passed by the two-thirds majority needed to curtail these rights, it was invalid.

The need for cheap labour was acutely felt by the mining industry. The gold mines had for some time been unable to rely on market forces alone to meet their labour requirements. They sold their whole output to the Bank of England at a fixed price; thus the income from sales could not properly reflect the costs of production, which were high, and likely to rise. The gold mines mostly exploited low-grade ores at ever-deeper levels: by 1913 more than 40 per cent of dividends were derived from mines at 4,000 feet or more below ground. Furthermore, the nature of the rock called for elaborate structures to prevent collapse. This meant that mining on the Rand was unusually labour-intensive. Yet the mine companies' wage bills were artificially inflated by the industrial colour-bar, whereby skilled jobs were reserved for whites earning far more than Africans: in 1911 this was embodied in regulations made under the Mines and Works Act. Thus the mines were bent on paying as little as possible for the great mass of unskilled labour which they needed.

To some extent they achieved this by avoiding competition among themselves. Already the high cost of gold production had brought about a concentration of ownership in the industry. Most of the Rand mines, and many coalmines, were owned by six large firms, and these in turn partly depended for finance on profits from the diamond industry, which was almost entirely owned by De Beers. This concentration greatly facilitated collusion among mine-owners to prevent competition for labour and thus minimise

SOUTHERN AFRICA



20 South Africa, 1937

wages. Yet industrial collusion alone was not enough; the power of the state was also needed. Thus in 1912 the Native Recruiting Corporation was given the sole right to recruit labour for the goldmines within the Union and the High Commission Territories. The long-established Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, which recruited in Mozambique and British Central Africa, was forbidden in 1913 to recruit north of latitude 22°S: black miners from the tropics were especially susceptible to pneumonia in the Transvaal winters, and their death-rate (about 70 per thousand per annum in 1911) provoked the Union government to impose a ban which the Labour Party welcomed, since it made

it harder for the mines to replace whites by cheap black labour. By 1916, nonetheless, the Chamber of Mines employed 219,000 Africans, nearly all in the goldmines. About half came from within the Union (mainly the eastern Cape and Transvaal), 12 per cent from the High Commission Territories (mainly Basutoland) and 38 per cent from Mozambique. Of those from the Union and the HCTs, about 60 per cent were recruited on contracts lasting from three months to a year; recruits from elsewhere were bound by contract for up to eighteen months. Within the Union, both recruited and 'voluntary' workers were drawn on to the labour market by the Natives Land Act. In 1911 the Native Labour Regulation Act, consolidating earlier laws, had confirmed that breach of contract by Africans was still a criminal offence, and had outlawed African strikes, even if it also sought to control the treatment of labour by employers and recruiters. The combined effect of all these measures was to hold down African wages to the barest minimum. In 1912 the ratio between the wages of white and black mineworkers (including the latter's rations) was 9 : 1, and over the next decade it steadily increased. African workers, in the mines and elsewhere, were paid, fed and housed only as single men, while their families were left to support themselves as best they could in the reserves.

By 1915 no more than half the African population were living in the reserves: they were tending to become now mere labour reservoirs. The old patterns of shifting cultivation had once been capable of yielding considerable grain surpluses, but under the new constraints a syndrome of impoverishment began to take hold. The pressure of human and animal population increased; soil erosion spread rapidly; and labour migration became the very basis of survival rather than just a means of paying poll-taxes and supplementing income. Government policies were deliberately framed to promote acute land shortages, the lack of cash-crops and extensive migrant labour. Unlike white farmers, Africans had no lobby in parliament to secure credit through a Land Bank. Indebtedness rose sharply; a co-operative movement struggled without official encouragement; there were no railway branch-lines into the reserves; and the retention of the principle 'one man, one plot' meant a decline in family acreage.

The first Union census, in 1911, showed that one in eight Africans, and half the European, Coloured and Indian commun-

ities, were living in towns. The urban Africans exceeded half a million and already comprised a third of the total urban population; there were over 100,000 in Johannesburg alone. For most of them, conditions were very bad. Urban wage structures had been determined when families were maintained by subsistence agriculture. The reality was now likely to be very different. Malnutrition was widespread in the reserves, on white farms and in the expanding slums. In the municipal locations set aside for Africans, sanitation was usually non-existent; the water supply was often an irrigation furrow; and many Africans had to house themselves in shanties built from packing-cases, flattened tins and sacking. The crowded mining barracks at least provided a controlled diet and some recreational and hospital facilities, but from 1903 to 1920 some 5,000 African miners died every year from accidents and disease as tuberculosis spread rapidly. Among the Coloured people of the Cape, conditions were, if anything, rather worse, for they had no land for subsistence agriculture. Malnutrition was endemic and the incidence of tuberculosis at least as high — that is four to six times the rate among Europeans. In addition, alcoholism was rampant, having its roots in the ‘tot’ system of the vineyards where Coloured labourers received two quarts of wine per day as part-payment. The only exceptions to this depressing picture were the small élite of teachers and clerks, and the skilled workmen who came to enjoy some protection within white-run trade unions.

If Africans as well as Coloureds and Indians had been indignant after the Anglo-Boer War at Britain’s failure to extend the Cape’s ‘native’ policy to the northern colonies, they were appalled when early in 1909 the National Convention produced the colour-bar clauses of the draft South Africa Act. A South African Native Convention promptly met to condemn the clauses and exhort Britain to maintain and extend the Cape common roll. When their protests, memorials and a delegation to London failed, the Convention ceased to exist. However, it was soon replaced by the South African Native National Congress, which was formed at Bloemfontein in 1912. This was essentially a middle-class body, with close ties to chiefs. Its members came from all over the country and were dedicated to promoting national rather than ethnic unity; most were lawyers, teachers, clergymen and journalists, though a few were traders and farmers. Some had been to

Britain and the USA; among the latter was the Rev. John Dube, founder of an industrial school in Natal, who was elected president.

There was a growing awareness within Congress of specific economic grievances, especially after the Land Act of 1913, but its members were chiefly concerned to challenge white assumptions that the Union was a white man's country in which there could be no room for black politicians. The Coloured community, mostly resident in the Cape, had expressed its objection to the terms of union through the African Political (later People's) Organisation; this was strongest among urban workers and had socialist sympathies. The APO was led by Abdul Abdurahman, a Muslim of Malay descent with a Scottish medical degree. He had worked closely with W. P. Schreiner and the African representatives on the delegation to London in 1909 and maintained his interest in 'non-European' co-operation. When the first Native Congress deputation arrived in Cape Town in 1912, it met the APO executive and both organisations called for annual consultations. However, Congress resolutions, delegations to parliament and Pretoria, and a further visit to London in 1914, proved quite ineffectual.

While Congress petitioned at home and overseas, more forceful action was taken by the least regarded sections of African society: women and criminals. It was women who first mounted African resistance to the pass-laws. Almost everywhere outside the reserves, every African man had to carry one or more passes, unless he was one of the few 'civilised' men obliged to carry instead a certificate of exemption. Only in the Cape, and there only outside the Transkei, were Africans free of this obligation. Pass-laws enabled provincial governments and local authorities to restrict the movement and residence of Africans in towns and other areas of white settlement; they also helped employers to enforce labour contracts. In 1913, the Orange Free State allowed local pass-laws to be extended to women. The women soon replied: in Bloemfontein, 600 dumped their passes at the mayor's office, and their example was followed in many smaller towns. Hundreds of women were gaoled; Congress took up their cause; and soon afterwards Charlotte Maxeke founded a Bantu Women's League. The campaign succeeded insofar as passes were no longer, in practice, required of women.

A very different response to oppression radiated from the gaol in Pretoria, where by 1910 a Zulu prisoner, Jan Note, contrived to hold sway over a criminal empire that encompassed the Rand. At a time when the Bible was being radically reinterpreted by black South African preachers, Note had found inspiration in Nahum's vision of Nineveh, which rebelled against the Lord. He directed an army of brigands whose own hierarchy of 'magistrates', captains and sergeants mirrored white structures of repression. It was nourished by prisons and mine compounds, for 'miserable wages and endless pass-law convictions ensured that today's proletariat was tomorrow's prisoner'.² By 1913, these Ninevites had gone far to neutralise the black police, and only in 1914 was the government sure it had the upper hand. The Ninevites concentrated their violence on fellow-Africans, but they were in open revolt against a common enemy.

The politics of the Indian community were dominated by Mohandas Gandhi, a barrister who had founded the Natal Indian Congress in 1894 and spent much time in South Africa before finally returning to India in 1914. In 1909 Gandhi went to London to voice the opposition of the Natal Indian Congress to the colour-bar clauses in the draft South Africa Act. In this, of course, Gandhi was at one with the African and Coloured delegates in London, but his strategy was essentially different since he was able to invoke the Government of India's concern with Indians in Africa: in 1911 it was to ban the emigration of indentured labour to Natal. In 1913 the Union government banned further immigration from India, except for wives or children of Indians already domiciled there, and for such men as could meet stringent economic conditions. Gandhi did not quarrel with this in principle, but he and other Indians feared that a judgement of the Cape Supreme Court in 1910 invalidated Indian marriages. They also attacked provincial barriers to Indian mobility within the Union, and a £3 tax on Indians who remained in South Africa when their term of indenture expired (for some 22,000 were still indentured). Gandhi's preferred tactic was non-violent resistance (*satyagraha*), which he had first used in the Transvaal in 1907. In September 1913 Indian women in Natal incited Indian coalminers to strike,

² Charles van Onselen, 'The regiment of the hills — Umkosi Wezintaba', in his *Studies in the social and economic history of the Witwatersrand 1886–1914*, 2. *New Nineveh* (Harlow, 1982), 193.

and a party marched into the Transvaal before being arrested. Smuts came under heavy pressure from both British and Indian governments. The Indian Relief Act of 1914 abolished the £3 tax and affirmed the validity of Indian marriages. Other fundamental issues were avoided. Indians were to exercise voluntary restraint in land purchases, their mobility remained curtailed and their hopes for the franchise were ignored.

While Africans, Coloureds and Indians made plain their discontent with the first-fruits of union, the white community itself was increasingly divided. In the view of Botha and Smuts, the hoped-for nation was to be peculiarly South African, a composite of white elements sharing a common educational system and merging their histories, yet open to the well-springs of western thought. The alternative they feared was a brooding Afrikaner nationalism which would be culturally stultifying, a source of acute political division, a threat to South Africa's military role in the Empire and an obstacle to economic co-operation with Britain. In the longer run, whites would also have to rise above party politics if they were to articulate a coherent policy to deal with the country's black labour force. This view was challenged from within the Cabinet by Hertzog, who thought Botha, Smuts and their followers were far too closely wedded to Britain and to British financial interests in South Africa. This in turn, he argued, led them to a premature drive for white unity which exposed Afrikaners to the threat of anglicisation and the divisiveness of class conflict.

The break came in 1912, when Hertzog challenged the ruling South African National Party to insist on sovereign independence and to put the Union's interests above those of the British Empire. South Africa, he argued, should not be ruled by fortune-seekers, the magnates whose loyalties lay elsewhere. Instead, it should be governed by Afrikaners, a term he carefully defined to include all those whites who were prepared to put South Africa first. Hertzog was obliged to leave the government; support for him soon spread from his political base in the Orange Free State to the Transvaal and the Cape. In January 1914 he became leader of the new Nationalist Party; henceforward the SANP was known as the South African Party.

By this time, the power of mining capital had also been challenged by white labour. Its leaders as yet were mostly

English-speaking, though by 1914 perhaps four out of ten white miners were Afrikaners. Collective bargaining had not been formalised, but white trade unions were being consolidated and syndicalist aspirations were widespread. The struggle focused on the recognition of the mineworkers' union, and in July 1913 it engulfed the Rand. Nineteen thousand white workers came out on strike; imperial troops were called in to help the police; and peace was restored only after Botha and Smuts personally bargained with the Transvaal Federation of Trade Unions (formed in 1911) and promised concessions.

In January 1914, white miners struck in the coalfields of Natal, unrest spread to the railways and the Rand erupted again with mounted commandos forming on behalf of white labour as the call went out for a general strike. This time Botha was not well and the full responsibility fell on Smuts. Seeing the Union as a 'small white colony in a dark Continent ... [where whites] ... must ever be watchful and careful',³ Smuts was determined to assert state authority. Backed by the Unionists, he declared martial law and turned to the fledgling Union Defence Force, established in 1913; this relieved Smuts of the embarrassment of having to rely on imperial troops. Artillery drew up outside the Trades Hall, the strike leaders surrendered and the general strike collapsed. The tense situation was then aggravated when Smuts illegally deported nine labour leaders and so appeared to confirm his collusion with the mine-owners. As a result the confrontation strengthened the ties which were forming between the Labour Party and Hertzog's Nationalists as both parties attacked the Chamber of Mines, foreign capital, Smuts and the South African Party.

The High Commission Territories

The economic conditions of Africans in Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland were not markedly different from those in the Union's reserves. Britain was a reluctant administrator, determined to establish balanced budgets and minimise expenses. The territories were widely regarded as merely sources of unskilled labour for the mines, and their political future was uncertain. The schedule appended to the Act of Union for South Africa made provision for their eventual incorporation, but the Union's policy

³ W. K. Hancock, *Smuts, I. The sanguine years, 1870–1919* (Cambridge, 1962), 369.

of segregation and persistent African opposition to incorporation resulted in continued British administration. This left the chiefs very much to their own devices. In Basutoland, they collected tax and retained 5 per cent of the proceeds as well as fines from their courts. These 'native administrations' were supervised by poorly staffed civil services mainly financed from the South African customs union, to which the territories had belonged since 1903: Basutoland received 0.9 per cent, Bechuanaland under 0.3 per cent and Swaziland just over 0.1 per cent of total customs receipts. The territories' rudimentary transport systems were not much improved. The South African railway network approached the borders of Swaziland and Basutoland. In the case of Bechuanaland it traversed the eastern region *en route* to Southern Rhodesia. Within the territories there were a few sand roads and tracks augmented by bridle paths; the latter were particularly important in the highlands of Basutoland.

Four-fifths of Basutoland consists of rugged mountain terrain and much of the population was concentrated in the lowlands. There was virtually no land alienation; the white population of under 2,000 was occupied in retail stores and the civil service. Basuto exports of grain and wool, first prompted by South African mining in the 1870s, continued to be an important source of cash income. They were however often checked by drought, locusts or lice, and since the 1880s many of the younger men had been going to work in South Africa: by 1911 one in three able-bodied men was out of the country. Bechuanaland's sparse population was largely confined to the east, as the Kalahari, stretching away to the west, was inhabited by small groups of remnant 'Bushmen' and Nama. Tribal reserves and Crown land comprised almost 40 per cent and 60 per cent respectively; 3 per cent of the land had been alienated to 2,000 whites, mostly Afrikaners. Cattle exports, to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, were checked not only by disease but by an almost unbroken drought from 1911 to 1921. Labour migration was at first less pronounced than in Basutoland, perhaps running at half the rate, but it steadily increased. Swaziland, the smallest of the territories, enjoyed a high rainfall and the variety of three distinct climatic zones — the high, middle and low veld. Under Transvaal control from 1894, and under British protection from 1903, the country had experienced massive land alienation as a result of corrupt land

concessions. When, by the First World War, this process was stabilised, less than one-tenth of the country was Crown land, the Swazi had regained a third, and the remainder had been consolidated in the hands of approximately 500 white farmers, many of whom were absentee landlords. The emigration of labour was less common than in Basutoland and Bechuanaland, but likewise tended to increase.

South West Africa

Up to 1908 South West Africa had cost the Germans a great deal of money, and a good deal of blood, for very little return; they had even managed to kill off about a quarter of their African subjects. The coastal hinterland was desert, and the Germans (with the aid of British investors) had had to build railways far inland to reach the main areas of German settlement and production. From Swakopmund one line ran east to Windhoek, the capital; another ran far to the north-east, to the copper mines at Otavi and the well-watered Grootfontein district. In the south, a line linked Lüderitz to Nama country. The relatively populous country of the Ovambo, on the Angolan border, was not yet under German rule. Exports had only twice risen above £100,000; their growth had been drastically set back by the great African revolt in 1904–8 in the central and southern parts of the territory. This cost the Germans £23m and the lives of about 2,000 Germans, mostly soldiers. Von Trotha, the military commander, tried to exterminate his main enemy, the pastoral Herero. Their numbers fell from about 75,000 to 15,000 and some took refuge in Bechuanaland. Among the Nama and the Rehoboth Basters, several communities were reduced by war and starvation to less than half their size.

It is a curious irony that within weeks of the final action in this genocidal campaign the Germans found a major new source of wealth which required much African labour. In 1908 and 1909 diamonds were discovered in gravel beds east and south of Lüderitz. The imperial government soon entrusted all diamond sales to a board controlled by the main German banks. By 1913 diamond exports were worth nearly £2m; they comprised 75 per cent of all exports and over 10 per cent of world diamond output. This was achieved by conscripting the Ovambo who, after the

war, were by far the largest ethnic group in the territory, numbering around 100,000. German officials, aided by German and Finnish missionaries, now made treaties with Ovambo chiefs. The latter were allowed to retain substantial autonomy, but they were given a new role, as labour recruiters. Conveniently for the Germans, the Ovambo were already impoverished by drought, flood and locusts, and by 1910 several thousand Ovambo were going south each year to work for a spell in the mines or on the railways; temporary ‘shortages’ were made up by recruiting from the Cape. As for the surviving Herero and Nama, they had lost all their cattle and were forbidden to replace them; they had also lost their land to white farmers, who now employed them at starvation wages and freely used both whip and gun. By 1911, 90 per cent of the adult male population outside Ovamboland were working for white men.

The new mining economy whetted the German settlers’ appetite for power. Their numbers rose sharply after the war, reaching 14,000 by 1910, though only 1,000 were farmers and many were transients. In 1909 they received a measure of self-government: elective municipal and district councils were created, and the latter (consisting mostly of farmers) elected members for the new territorial council (*Landesrat*). This had limited powers of legislation, but only over settler areas; the governor thus retained control over the main labour reservoir, Ovamboland. Besides, the votes of official council members equalled those of settler members, some of whom were the governor’s nominees. In 1912 the government achieved a surplus, and imperial subsidies were confined to military expenditure; from 1907 to 1915 they totalled £14m. In 1913 the government launched a programme of public investment in white farming; it had already (for military ends) extended the railway through the farming areas south of Windhoek. But economic self-sufficiency encouraged settler hopes of full self-government. Farmers were jealous of the mine companies’ access to labour; they were also disturbed by the government’s occasional lip-service to humane standards of behaviour. Yet the farmers were now outnumbered by white miners and artisans, groups that were given two council seats in 1914. Further constitutional change was cut short by war.

1914–1924

The First World War

In August 1914 the First World War broke out. South Africa, with a German colony on its borders, was at once involved, and the war aggravated the tensions within the Afrikaner community. Botha and Smuts promptly affirmed their support for Britain. The Union Defence Force relieved imperial land forces of their part in the defence of the Union, and at the request of Britain the government organised an invasion of South West Africa, by both land and sea. Parliament gave massive support for such a campaign, and South African troops, conveyed in ships of the Royal Navy, seized the German port of Lüderitz. But the Germans captured Walvis Bay, and further advances by the South Africans were delayed by trouble at home where many Afrikaners, including Hertzog, were firmly opposed to the war. Early in October, Colonel Maritz of the Union army defected to the Germans; soon afterwards, General de Wet raised a rebel force in the Orange Free State and proposed to establish a free South African Republic with German help. By December, Botha had suppressed this rebellion; prudently, he used only Afrikaner troops, and the rebels were for the most part treated leniently. Botha now resumed the invasion of South West Africa, where he had already taken personal command. By the middle of January 1915, South Africans had caused the Germans to abandon the northern ports. Botha now led some 50,000 white troops against only 2,000 German regulars and 7,000 reservists. In arid terrain, without initial control of the railway, the South Africans found rapid movement difficult, but the Germans failed to make the most of this. Botha launched a three-pronged attack from Bechuanaland, across the Orange River and inland from Lüderitz, and soon outmanoeuvred his opponents. He captured Windhoek in May, and the German remnant which had fled north surrendered in July.

Between August and October 1915 a contingent of white South Africans left for the Western Front. The infantry brigade was diverted to Egypt, where it repelled the Turks and the Sanūsī from the western border. The brigade reached France in time for the Somme offensive in July 1916: it was almost wiped out at Delville

Wood. Meanwhile, South African troops had also been sent to East Africa, where Smuts commanded the British imperial forces during most of 1916. Nearly 25,000 white South Africans served in France, and over 30,000 in East Africa; altogether nearly one in five white men in South Africa were enrolled — a higher proportion than for any other British Dominion; 8,551 were killed on active service. Coloured men also carried arms. Late in 1915 they were recruited for the Cape Corps; one battalion first served in East Africa and was sent to Palestine in July 1918. In addition, some 6,000 Cape Coloured served in France as drivers and labourers. In all, 709 Coloured men were killed on active service.

There was no question of allowing black South Africans to fight: the government feared that if black and white became brothers-in-arms they might also find common cause as workers. At the outbreak of war, the Congress sought to prove its loyalty by refraining from political agitation and it offered to raise combat troops for the South West African campaign. The offer was declined; Congress was told that this was a white man's war. This brusque treatment rankled, especially after Maritz's rebellion had revealed the extent of white disloyalty. But in warfare, as in work, the white man needed blacks to fetch and carry for him. Africans were recruited as non-combatant labourers; Congress swallowed its pride and lent its support. Thus over 30,000 black South Africans served in South West Africa and 17,000 in East Africa while, in 1917–18, 19,000 served in France with the South African Native Labour Contingent; this also included 2,000 men from the High Commission Territories. Over 3,000 black South Africans died on military service, mostly from tuberculosis; 615 were drowned when the *Mendi* sank off the Isle of Wight in 1917. For many black men, service in France was of seminal importance: a Sotho recruit later observed,

It was our first experience of living in a society without a colour bar...We were aware, when we returned, that we were different from the other people at home. Our behaviour, as we showed the South Africans, was something more than they expected from a Native, more like what was expected among them of a white man.⁴

For South Africa's economy, the war had very mixed results. The goldmining industry faced mounting difficulties. Gold output, which had risen very fast up to 1912, fluctuated and from 1916

⁴ S. J. Jingoos, ed. J. and C. Perry, *A chief is a chief by the people* (London, 1975), 92–3.

declined. Working costs continued to rise, yet the large inflow of capital in 1909–10 was not matched for another twenty years. From 1916 new mines were developed on the Far East Rand which later did very well, but by 1918 half the goldmining companies were unable to make a profit. Diamond sales fell sharply after 1913; they enjoyed a brief recovery in 1919–20 but did not again reach these levels until the late 1920s. Besides, the benefits of mining to the Union's economy were diminished by the proportion of dividends which left the country and were reinvested elsewhere.⁵ Exports of ostrich feathers from the Cape, worth £3m in 1913, collapsed as they went out of fashion, but wool exports greatly increased. Moreover, wartime shortages due to shipping problems softened the opposition of farmers and businessmen to the growth of local manufacturing industries. Hitherto, these had been mainly confined to construction and basic mining requirements, notably dynamite and some engineering products. Now consumer goods such as footwear, blankets and processed foods were also produced. Between 1911 and 1921 the number of people employed in manufacturing rose from 55,000 to 180,000; by 1922 manufacturing contributed 12 per cent of national income. The mining industry, owned mainly abroad and selling abroad, was little interested in this expansion, but in 1917 a federated Chamber of Industries was formed and soon gained support for protection.

This expansion of production, dramatic when expressed in money terms, must be offset against wartime inflation: whereas the cash value of exports increased by 150 per cent between 1914 and 1920, their real value increased by much less than 50 per cent.⁶ Inflation undoubtedly meant hardship for most wage-earners. White mineworkers, at least, were able to bargain on the basis of their skills, kept artificially scarce by the colour bar and made scarcer still as men went off to war. In 1915 the Chamber of Mines finally recognised the South African Mineworkers' Union, and in 1918 it conceded a status quo agreement whereby the existing lines between black and white jobs were to be maintained. Yet though

⁵ Between 1887 and 1932 about £148m was invested in goldmining from outside the industry; some £120m came from overseas, mostly Britain. The industry itself reinvested a further £63m before paying out dividends, which amounted to £248m. Of this sum, three-quarters (i.e. £184m) went abroad. S. H. Frankel, *Capital investment in Africa* (London, 1938), 89. For government revenue from the goldmines, see below, p. 586.

⁶ Percentage price increases, 1914–1920: imports, 180; South African goods, 104; wholesale, 130; consumer, 78; British consumer, 160.

the wages of white mineworkers rose by 40 per cent between 1912 and 1919, they failed to keep pace with rising prices. For non-whites, inflation on such a scale was disastrous. Their cash wages scarcely rose at all, since they had no bargaining power. Due to pre-war legislation, and in spite of military recruitment, there were more Africans in search of work than ever before. By 1918, some 260,000 were employed on the mines and 255,000 on white farms; the latter, with their families, represented one-third of the rural African population. The fall in real wages for Africans threatened their very survival: when the influenza pandemic swept South Africa in 1918 it attacked an already enfeebled population and may have killed as many as 200,000 blacks.⁷

The emergence of Afrikaner nationalism

The war and its aftermath hastened the growth of Afrikaner nationalism. This was first revealed as a powerful political force by the general election in October 1915. The South African Party of Botha and Smuts was returned to power, but only because, on the issue of the war, it had the support of the Unionist Party. Much ground had been lost, especially in rural districts, to Hertzog's National Party, which opposed the war. The Nationalists won 30 per cent of the poll, as against only 36 per cent for the SAP and 19 per cent for the Unionists. The Labour Party, which was split on the question of the war, gained 9 per cent of the poll but failed to add to its seats.

The rise of Hertzog's National Party gave voice to the cultural and economic aspirations of Afrikaners. Their national identity had been consolidated by their upheavals over the past century, yet after the South African War many were deeply worried about their capacity to sustain a separate culture in the face of the growing power of English-speakers. Dutch had survived in South Africa as a written language, used also in the pulpit and in polite society, but it had long since become archaic; the language spoken by ordinary people of Dutch descent was the *taal*, i.e. Afrikaans. In 1906 an Afrikaans language association was formed, and in the next few years several grammars and a dictionary were published, while a translation of the Bible was undertaken. From 1914

⁷ This disaster is the subject of current research by Howard Phillips, University of Cape Town.

Afrikaans was introduced in schools, and by 1920 it had been accepted by all the Dutch Reformed churches. There was a stream of translations from European classics, poetry flourished, and an anguished prose literature examined the predicament of the *Volk*. Between 1914 and 1917 newspapers in Afrikaans were started in the Transvaal, the Cape and the Orange Free State. The success of the *Helpmekaar* fund which had been established to defend those convicted of rebellion in 1914 stimulated further communal fund-raising. Encouraged by the agricultural boom during the First World War, two insurance companies were launched in 1919. Several cooperatives followed, including a burial society and a winegrowers' organisation. These early initiatives were strengthened by the formation in 1918 of the Afrikaner Broederbond with its commitment to Christian nationalism, its alarm at the cultural malaise in the cities and its political goal of a Calvinist republic. The efforts of this secret society to coordinate the regeneration of Afrikanerdom were in turn conditioned by the Dutch Reformed churches as they added an ideology which focused attention on the need for national coherence, encouraged segregation and helped to insulate Afrikaners from the secularising impact of urbanisation.

The initial position of the largest Afrikaner church, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, was essentially pragmatic. The church, it was argued, had accepted segregated structures in the nineteenth century for practical reasons; harmonious administration of the different races within the one wider community now seemed to require a comparable approach. But meanwhile the distinctive character of Afrikaner society was gravely threatened: the depression of 1904–9 had exposed the problems of 'poor whites', mostly Afrikaner, scarcely able to make a living from the land, while expanding towns brought poor whites and blacks ever closer together. Against this background, a more ideological analysis emerged, influenced by the nineteenth-century Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper. Calvinism had always accepted the political realm as under the sovereignty of God. However, Kuyper emphasised *soweriniteit in eie kring*, God's sovereignty within the separate spheres of creation. These independent spheres of creation, not least the nations of history, had to be respected and their component organisations protected from liberal threats and revolutionary movements. Afrikaner theolo-

gians, working from this base, delineated a range of individual, political, economic and cultural spheres, arguing not only for their separate destinies, but also for Christian National Education as the basis for their coordination and integration in the life of the *Volke*. This doctrine remained contentious within the NGK and at Stellenbosch (where a university was incorporated in 1918), but it made a great impact on the two smaller churches, the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk and the Gereformeerde Kerk. The major academic centre for this Kuyperian ideology became the University College of Potchefstroom in the Transvaal (incorporated in 1921), and it gradually infused the Broederbond.

The emerging contrasts in Afrikaner leadership were underlined when Botha died in August 1919. Smuts now became prime minister. Urbane and intellectual, he lacked Botha's common touch; besides, for the past two and a half years he had been away in London and Paris, first as a member of both the Imperial War Cabinet and the British War Cabinet, and then as South Africa's representative (with Botha) at the Peace Conference. Many Afrikaners distrusted Smuts's close ties within the Empire and his association with European liberalism and secularism. Hertzog, on the other hand, voiced a deepening sense among Afrikaners that they were a persecuted elect. Supported by the Dutch Reformed churches, he proposed the creation of two separate school systems, in Afrikaans and English. Hertzog also intended, through constitutional means, to make South Africa a republic and take it out of the Empire.

In March 1920 a general election dramatically confirmed the appeal of such views: the National Party won the greatest number of both seats and votes. In the towns, the Labour Party defeated many Unionists. Once more, Smuts stayed in power, but only by continuing the alliance with the Unionists. This enabled him to push through a series of measures intended to encourage business while improving the lot of white workers: the government created the Reserve Bank, and sought to improve the transport system, check profiteering in foodstuffs, provide more houses and establish fair rents. The South African and the National Parties held a conference to discuss the possibility of reunion, but it soon broke down, and instead the South African Party absorbed the Unionists. In February 1921 Smuts put this amalgamation to the test of a new election. His record, and his timing, paid dividends:

the Nationalists kept up their strength, but the Labour Party had not yet recovered from the expense of their last campaign and lost more than half their seats. Thus the South African Party returned to power with a large overall majority. But this triumph was shortlived: almost at once, the government was faced with economic crises which exacerbated white sentiments of class and culture and in due course swept Smuts from power.

Protest and repression

The first few years after the war were a time of violent conflict in South African society. The privations of wartime had hurt Africans most, and there was a series of collisions between black and white. Since Africans were excluded from parliamentary politics, strikes and boycotts were their only effective weapons. In 1913 the success of the white mineworkers' strike had prompted some 11,000 Africans to strike too; they were soon forced back to work, but thereafter their material conditions were somewhat improved. In 1915–16 there were several outbreaks of black unrest on the Rand, though checked by the prompt arrest of leaders. Early in 1918, African mineworkers boycotted trading stores on the Rand, in protest against the continuing fall in real wages. Then white municipal workers in Johannesburg successfully struck for higher pay; when some of their African colleagues tried to follow suit in May, over a hundred were gaoled. In June the Transvaal branch of Congress convened a mass meeting and demanded higher wages for African workers on the Rand. There were several small strikes in July, but plans for a general strike on the Rand were suspended when Botha agreed to meet a deputation from Congress. The appointment of the Moffat commission of enquiry raised hopes of reform, but they were soon dashed. The Transvaal Congress leaders testified eloquently to the commission: they denounced the mine companies' recruitment and control of black labour as 'a relic of the slave trade which civilised countries still practise under modified and conventional forms'.⁸ The Moffat Commission, however, accepted the view of the Chamber of Mines that since African mineworkers received free food and lodging there was no reason to increase their cash wages, even though the Chamber ignored their need to buy boots

⁸ Quoted in F. A. Johnstone, *Class, race and gold: a study of class relations and racial discrimination in South Africa* (London, 1976), 193–4.

and clothing, let alone furnish their homes. Thus the Moffat Report offered no encouragement to disfranchised Africans to suppose that they would achieve anything by reasoned protest.

In March and April 1919 the Transvaal Congress organised more militant resistance, in which women took a prominent part; in Johannesburg and Pretoria, though not in the mine compounds, it led massive non-violent demonstrations against the pass-laws. There was still hope that reform might come from outside South Africa: as they dumped their passes, a crowd sang ‘Rule Britannia’ and cheered the king and President Wilson of the USA. Indeed, Wilson’s talk of national self-determination had encouraged the National Congress to send a delegation to the Peace Conference ‘to let them know that there are two nations here, white and black’.⁹ But neither tactic had any success. In South Africa, the government set up a one-man commission and then ignored its proposals for modest changes in the pass-laws. At Versailles, Congress failed to get a hearing. Its delegation went on to London and sought to remind the king of black loyalty during the war, but its ‘Memorial’ was merely referred back to the governor-general. It may have stiffened Britain’s resolve to retain the High Commission Territories, but otherwise the only result of the journey to Europe was to drain Congress of hard-won funds.

Congress was clearly in crisis. Peaceful petition had failed yet again, but few wished to revive more militant tactics. Congress had been founded by men committed to constitutional methods, and concerned above all to see the Cape property franchise extended. Many had qualms about illegal action such as striking or even pass-dumping. By and large, the literate black middle class, conditioned by liberal expectations of individual advancement, feared mass protests and the damage they might do to race relations. The Congress newspaper *Abantu Batho* had fiercely criticised the government, and in 1916 Solomon Plaatje, first secretary of Congress, published his *Native life in South Africa*, a searing attack on the Natives Land Act. Yet in 1918 Plaatje congratulated himself and De Beers on negotiating welfare measures for workers at Kimberley which would immunise them from the ‘black Bolsheviks’ of the Transvaal Congress.¹⁰ In 1919

⁹ *Ibid.*, 176.

¹⁰ Brian Willan, ‘Sol Plaatje, De Beers and an old tram shed: class relations and social control in a South African town, 1918–1919’, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1978, 4, ii, 206.

the National Congress finally published its constitution. In important respects, this was a distinctly conservative document: chiefs were to sit *ex officio* in an 'upper house'; women were allowed only auxiliary membership, without the vote; while the list of methods to be used by Congress did not include industrial action.

The reluctance of Congress to assume leadership of the masses meant that it was soon eclipsed as a political force by the Industrial and Commercial Union (ICU). This was formed in January 1919 by Clements Kadalie, an itinerant worker from Nyasaland, in Cape Town, where in December he brought out 400 dockworkers on strike. The Transvaal Congress was still very active: in January 1920 it instigated a conference with employers on the Rand which yielded slightly higher wages for all but mineworkers. This in turn provoked 72,000 black miners to engage in what the Chamber of Mines admitted was an 'absolutely peaceful cessation of work'.¹¹ The strike was ruthlessly suppressed. Men were driven down the shafts both by false rumours of a return to work and by soldiers' bayonets; three strikers were killed and forty wounded. No significant concessions were made and no overall leadership emerged, while there had been little scope for Congress activity in the mine compounds. But associations of African workers had been formed recently in Port Elizabeth and East London, while Indian and Coloured workers formed trade unions, mainly in Durban. In July 1920 several groups of African workers, including the ICU, were convened at Bloemfontein by Selby Msimang, a founder-member of Congress. This failed to achieve immediate unity, but Kadalie's ICU soon proved the most effective nucleus for a national workers' movement: in August he won a wage rise for some of his Cape Town dockers by merely threatening a strike. In October 20 Africans were killed by police in a demonstration at Port Elizabeth; this led to modest wage increases for municipal employees, but it also provided the occasion for Kadalie to reunite the workers' movement in an enlarged ICU, in which he displaced Msimang.

The government's response to African discontent was not wholly confined to the use of brute force. In May 1920 Smuts admitted that Africans needed constitutional channels of protest and introduced a Native Affairs Act; this provided for the creation

¹¹ Johnstone, *Class, race and gold*, 180.

of tribal councils in the reserves, advisory councils for Africans in urban areas, a Native Affairs Commission (consisting of whites) and territorial conferences of chiefs and council members. This measure implemented an ideology of segregation which Smuts had expounded in Britain; black and white, he argued, could not be governed in the same way and the Union would pioneer a formula for civilising all Africa. The Act found favour with many liberals, in London as well as South Africa, but it did no more than provide a façade of paternalist consultation. Besides, segregation remained economically as implausible as ever. In 1916 the Beaumont Commission had recommended that the land available for African ownership be increased from 7.3 to 13 per cent of the country.¹² Parliament objected; provincial committees proposed a slightly smaller increase, but Smuts did not put this before parliament.

The Native Affairs Act was promptly denounced by the Rev. Z. R. Mahabane, leader of Congress in the Cape, as an evasion of its main demand: the right to sit in parliament. But he also acknowledged that Britain ‘had finally washed her hands of the innocent blood of the Bantu races’.¹³ He was thus obliged, along with other Congress leaders, to consider whether equal rights might after all be compatible in certain ways with the inescapable fact of segregation. There was serious talk of seeking parliamentary representation through a separate electoral roll, and of accepting residential segregation if only the area in which blacks could live as of right was much enlarged and included towns. Once the Native Affairs Act was law, Congress agreed to cooperate with it. If Britain would not help, and if mass action was eschewed, Congress could do no more than talk to such whites as would listen. By now there were several who would, aware that the more conservative Congress members shared their fears of radical leadership among black workers. The scope for such talk was enlarged in 1921: with the encouragement of Dr J. E. K. Aggrey, a black West African member of the visiting Phelps-Stokes Commission,¹⁴ a group of liberal whites in the professions set up in Johannesburg the first of several local and

¹² See above, p. 349.

¹³ Quoted by Peter Walshe, *The rise of African nationalism in South Africa* (London, 1971), 83.

¹⁴ See chapters 3 and 5.

interracial Joint Councils, through which they hoped to bring African wants and aspirations to the attention of white legislators and employers. Several Congress leaders took part in Joint Councils, and also in the biennial European–Bantu Conferences, initiated in 1923 by the Dutch Reformed churches. During the 1920s, the English-speaking universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand (incorporated in 1918 and 1921) introduced the study of African languages and social organisation. Even these universities, however, rarely accepted black students before the Second World War. In 1923 Fort Hare, the college for blacks in the eastern Cape, became a university college, but Africans who wished to study medicine normally had to go abroad. Black doctors were kept away from white patients, and black lawyers were virtually excluded from the South African Bar.

Even if a few blacks did make new white friends, they also moved further from their own people. Congress lost ground both in the towns and in rural areas: chiefs were essentially government employees and risked dismissal by supporting it. This was underlined by the massacre in May 1921 at Bulhoek, in the eastern Cape. The ‘Israelite’ followers of Enoch Mgijima were typical of many millennial groups which had sprung up under charismatic leaders among illiterate people who rejected white authority and the chiefs who had to enforce it. In 1920 the Israelites refused to move from land which a number of Africans held in common. This angered not only these Africans but also white farmers who wanted the Israelites’ labour. The newly appointed Native Affairs Commission concluded that the Israelites would have to be removed by force. Five hundred charged with sticks and assegais against armed police; 163 were killed.

By this time the white community was also under great stress. Those on the land suffered first. In 1919–21 there were severe droughts: such a calamity was by no means without precedent, but it aggravated the cumulative damage done by years of overgrazing and careless veld-burning. The post-war boom lifted the value of agricultural and pastoral exports to a record level in 1919, but prices fell sharply in 1920–1. More and more Afrikaners were driven in desperation to seek ever-scarcer jobs in towns which they still feared as centres of an alien economy and English culture, where distinctions between white and black were all too easily blurred. Between 1911 and 1921 the white population in

urban areas increased faster than that of blacks. This was a phase in what D. F. Malan, Nationalist leader in the Cape, likened in 1916 to another great trek: but this time, he said, it was ‘a journey from Canaan to Egypt’.¹⁵ Lacking the skills of artisans, Afrikaners fresh from the countryside had good reason to fear being undercut in the labour market by black migrant workers whose wages were low just because, unlike unskilled white workers, they retained communal rights to the use of land in reserves and thus, in theory, had an alternative livelihood.

The proletarianisation of Afrikaners combined with the long-term crisis in the goldmining industry to cause an explosion on the Rand. From 1916, gold output steadily declined. In 1919, Britain abandoned the gold standard, and from July the Rand mines were able to sell in the best available market. At first, this yielded a ‘premium’ well above the normal price, but late in 1921 the premium fell sharply, and in any case it simply reflected a depreciation of currency which inflated the cost of mining materials. It now seemed likely that two-thirds of the producing mines would soon have to close. This predicament was at least partly due to the fact that the mine companies’ wage bill for 21,000 whites was almost twice that for 180,000 blacks. Thus in December 1921 the Chamber of Mines abandoned the status quo agreement of 1918 and proposed to replace about 2,000 semi-skilled white mineworkers with blacks.

This plan was political dynamite, for implicitly it threatened most white workers. During the war, about a quarter of the white workforce had gone on active service. The ensuing vacancies in semi-skilled jobs were mostly filled by Afrikaners: by 1922 they numbered three out of four white workers on the goldmines. But here and there, up to 1918, semi-skilled jobs had also been given to experienced Africans, who had shown they could do them quite as well as whites. It was precisely because they knew this that white mineworkers saw the Chamber’s proposal as a new threat to the livelihood, not just of a minority, but of white workers in general. This was underlined when, early in January 1922, whites went on strike in the coalmines to prevent wage cuts: Africans and white officials kept up production much as before, thus showing that most whites were dispensable.

¹⁵ Quoted by D. Welsh, ‘The growth of towns’, in M. Wilson and L. M. Thompson (eds.), *The Oxford history of South Africa*, II (Oxford, 1971), 204.

On 10 January 1922 all white workers went on strike in the goldmines, power-stations and engineering-shops. They were led by a combination of unions involved in the dispute, but Afrikaners also created semi-military commandos. Negotiations proved fruitless. Smuts, concerned above all to maintain the country's key industry, declared on 12 February that the government would use its powers to protect strikebreakers. Thus fortified, the Chamber of Mines rejected a new approach early in March from the unions, who now ceded leadership of the strike to the Council of Action, a group of radicals who had been expelled from the mineworkers' union in the previous year. Their secretary was W. H. Andrews, who had founded the Communist Party of South Africa in 1921. However, Marxist commitment to working-class solidarity, regardless of colour, found no response among white workers who had been willing to scab during the African strike in 1920. Besides, the council's authority was challenged by the commandos, whose fighting mood was further excited when three of their men were killed by police at Boksburg. While the strike itself slowly began to lose support, Afrikaner commandos planned an armed rising both on the Rand and in the surrounding countryside: they resolved to declare a republic. There were white assaults on African miners and Indians, some of whom were killed, and also on the police. On 10 March Smuts proclaimed martial law and surrounded the Rand with troops, planes, tanks and artillery.¹⁶ These forces were at once attacked by the commandos, but within five days the government had secured control of the Rand. Between 150 and 220 people were killed, including 43 soldiers and 29 policemen. Five thousand men were arrested; four were hanged for murder.

Hertzog, the Nationalist leader, was quick to make political capital from this disaster. He pointed to Smuts's repeated use of force: against labour in 1913 and 1914; against Afrikaner rebels; against Africans at Port Elizabeth and Bulhoek; and now on the Rand. 'The Prime Minister's footsteps dripped with blood.'¹⁷ Meanwhile, the mine companies rubbed salt in white wounds. They proceeded to reduce working costs by reducing white wages

¹⁶ The Union government was now in charge of all land-based forces in South Africa; the Imperial Military Command there had been abolished in December 1921.

¹⁷ Quoted from the *Cape Argus* by W. K. Hancock, *Smuts*, II. *The fields of force*, 1919–1950 (Cambridge, 1968), 88.

and dismissing about 2,000 white workers between 1922 and 1924; they also introduced new technology which whites had hitherto resisted: the jack-hammer drill, drill-sharpening machines and the corduroy process of gold-extraction. These measures may have saved the industry, but whites were in no mood to appreciate this, especially when, in 1923, the Transvaal Supreme Court ruled that the Mines and Works Act of 1911 had not specifically authorised racial discrimination and that the colour-bar regulations made under it were therefore invalid. Besides, prospects for white employment were no better in the towns than in the mines. The country still suffered from drought and the world depression of 1920–1, and outside the mining industry there seemed little hope of investment. The Union government's burden of debt had already nearly doubled between 1910 and 1920, while its expenditure, like that of provincial governments, had doubled between 1914 and 1920. In this climate of deepening insecurity, English-speaking and Afrikaner workers drew steadily closer together.

Smuts did what he could to expand the economy. He extended tariff protection to a number of industries; he made plans for a national iron and steel industry, and in 1922 set up the Electricity Supply Commission, an important precedent for state intervention. He also engaged in extra-mural ventures which might bring economic benefits: he sought to increase South Africa's command of the resources of southern Africa. He was especially anxious to gain control of southern Mozambique, which for the Rand was both a source of labour and an export route. At the Peace Conference in 1919 he had hoped that South Africa might be rewarded for its war effort in German East Africa by being given charge of the territory; it could then be traded to the Portuguese for southern Mozambique. This came to nothing, but Smuts tried again in 1922 when he abrogated the Mozambique labour convention of 1909. In an attempt to renegotiate it, Smuts insisted on control both of the railway and of the harbour at Lourenço Marques. The negotiations, however, broke down and the convention lapsed, though recruiting continued.¹⁸

At the same time, Smuts's appetite reached well beyond the Limpopo and even the Zambezi. The Act of Union had allowed for the incorporation of the High Commission Territories and

¹⁸ See also chapter 10, pp. 513, 516–7.

Southern Rhodesia. As to the former, Smuts hoped that his Native Affairs Act of 1920 would persuade Britain to entrust him at least with Swaziland — the only protectorate with a substantial white population. This aim, however, was challenged by the Swazi King Sobhuza II's delegation to London in 1922–3. As for Southern Rhodesia, this was ruled by an increasingly reluctant British South Africa Company. By 1922 Britain was willing to let the whites of Southern Rhodesia decide whether to join the Union or become a self-governing colony. Smuts hoped they would join: they were mostly British and would counter the rising force of Afrikaner nationalism. Besides, if South Africa was extended to the Zambezi, it could renew pressure on Mozambique. But these ambitions also came to nothing: South Africa in 1922 cannot have seemed a very attractive suitor, and in October Southern Rhodesia's whites voted for self-government.

In one quarter, Smuts's zeal for expansion was rewarded: South West Africa. After defeating the Germans, South Africa ruled the territory under martial law. Smuts was determined to hold on to it, mainly for strategic reasons. At the Peace Conference in 1919, he failed to secure its annexation but instead obtained for South Africa a mandate over it from the League of Nations, on the easy terms which he and his British colleagues had secured for the disposal of ex-German colonies. The mandate specified that South West Africa might be governed as an integral part of the Union, and imposed no restrictions on the application of its laws. The Union was enjoined to promote the welfare of its new black wards, but from the first white interests were paramount. While one-third of the German population was repatriated, most of the rest accepted South African citizenship in 1924; meanwhile, whites from the Union had been encouraged to settle and by 1922 formed a majority among the 19,000 whites. Civilian rule began in 1920; for the time being, an administrator from South Africa governed with near-dictatorial powers. The economy was managed, much as before, on the basis of mining and white farming. In 1920 all the diamond fields passed under South African control: they were bought by Consolidated Diamond Mines, a subsidiary of the Anglo American Corporation (a South African mining finance house founded by Ernest Oppenheimer in 1917).

The African population of South West Africa continued to be regarded solely as a source of labour. The territories on the Angola

border remained under separate administration; the supply of Ovambo labour was interrupted in 1917 by resistance from a Kwanyama chief, but this was bloodily suppressed. In 1921–2 isolated tracts of near-desert were set aside as reserves; the Herero and Nama, who had at first hoped that South Africa would restore their lost land, were rudely disillusioned. The Nama were especially angered by a dog-tax intended to prevent them hunting, while one group among them, the Afrikaans-speaking Bondelswarts, asked in vain for the return of leaders exiled by the Germans. In May 1922 the Bondelswarts rebelled; the administrator crushed them with machine-guns and aerial bombardment, killing over a hundred. The Permanent Mandates Commission asked questions, but South Africa escaped formal reproof.

South Africa's new imperialism brought no political advantage to Smuts. So far, its most obvious result had been to tarnish his reputation as a world statesman; it was irrelevant to the immediate problems of most white South Africans. The one way in which Smuts could be sure of improving their lot was by stiffening the structures of segregation. In 1922 an Apprenticeship Act set educational and other qualifications beyond the reach of almost all Africans. In 1923 the Natives (Urban Areas) Act provided for more sanitary, but also more rigidly segregated and authoritarian, settlements for Africans in towns; it embodied the principle, recently formulated by the Transvaal Local Government Commission, 'that the Native should only be allowed to enter urban areas, which are essentially the White man's creation, when he is willing to enter and to minister to the needs of the White man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to minister'.¹⁹ Early in 1924 the Industrial Conciliation Act laid down procedures for collective bargaining and finally provided trade unions with appropriate legal powers. Its definition of 'employee' included Coloured workers and most Indians as well as whites, but it excluded pass-bearing African men, so that any trade unions they might form would be emasculated at birth.

Taken together, these laws were clearly a bid by Smuts to woo white labour, but they did not succeed. Rival segregationists thought they did not go far enough and quite failed to atone for the bloodshed on the Rand in 1922. Moved by a common hatred of Smuts, whom they saw as a tool of big business, the National

¹⁹ Quoted by Hancock, *Smuts. The fields of force*, 125n.

and Labour Parties formed an electoral pact in January 1924. In February, Hertzog announced his solution to the problem of white unemployment: no black man should be given work for which a white man was available. Curiously, this policy for 'civilised labour' did not prevent some African leaders from supporting the Pact. Several saw Smuts as the main enemy, and Congress declared that the Urban Areas Act condemned Africans to perpetual serfdom. In May 1924 Kadalie of the ICU persuaded Congress to support a change of government; he then proceeded to campaign for the Pact among the Coloured voters in Cape Town, though it was denounced by Abdurahman's APO. Smuts had derided Congress as a body of unrepresentative intellectuals, but the charge came ill from him. By April 1924 by-elections had reduced his parliamentary majority from 22 to 8. In June 1924 he went to the country. The Nationalists did best while Labour doubled its seats, so that the Pact enjoyed a comfortable majority. Smuts lost his own seat at Pretoria West.

1924-1940

The years of the Pact

The middle and later 1920s were a period of slow growth in the South African economy. In 1925 government revenue passed the previous peak reached in 1920, and in 1927-9 exceeded £30m. Two-thirds of the value of total exports (£89m in 1927-9) came from gold and diamonds. In 1924 the output of gold (9.6 million fine ounces) exceeded the previous peak of 1916, and it continued to rise slowly until 1932. There was a small, variable premium on the price of gold until the return in 1925 to an international gold standard at the old sterling price. Working costs were kept to the level to which they had been reduced after the failure of the Rand strike;²⁰ from 1926 to the end of our period they were almost as low as they had ever been. This restored the mines' capacity to exploit lower-grade ores at deeper levels: by 1932, 93.4 per cent of dividends from the Rand were derived from mines at 4,000 feet or more below ground, and over half were from mines more than 5,000 feet deep.

The mines had cut costs at the expense of white workers, but

²⁰ See above, pp. 572-3.

the Pact was elected to challenge such strategies. The government formed by Hertzog in July 1924 soon put into practice its 'civilised labour' policy. Creswell took charge of a new ministry of labour, which at once set about strengthening the colour bar in areas of government employment: in the railways and harbours, thousands of African workers were replaced by whites. From 1925 a Wage Board regulated wages and working conditions in industries without recognised trade unions. However, agriculture and domestic service were excluded from its scope, and any minimum wages set had to suffice for 'civilised' life, so that in practice the board was only concerned with unskilled whites. In 1926, after a prolonged struggle in parliament, the Mines and Works Act was amended in order to overturn the Transvaal judges' ruling of 1923: henceforward the government could enforce job reservation through regulations made under the Act. This benefited Coloured as well as white workers, for Hertzog regarded the Coloured community as useful allies for Afrikaners in view of their shared language. Trade unions multiplied rapidly after 1924 and became increasingly bureaucratised; they pursued the interests of white, and also some Coloured, workers through industrial conciliation councils more often than through strikes. In March 1925 Creswell convened a conference of trade union leaders in order to form a new federation, the Association of Employees' Organisations (from 1926, the South African Trade Union Congress). This was open to Coloured and Indian workers in order to draw in unions from the Cape, and to Creswell's dismay the AEO secretary was the Communist W. H. Andrews.

The movement of rural Afrikaners into the industrial nexus of South Africa was given cultural reinforcement in 1925 when Afrikaans supplemented Dutch as an official language. In the same year the protection of white labour was conjoined with another main goal of the Pact, the protection of local capital: new tariff concessions for producers of consumer goods were available only to firms which made special efforts to find work for whites. In the later 1920s the manufacturing sector expanded steadily; it also absorbed white labour nearly twice as fast as black. Meanwhile, the Pact government developed Smuts's earlier plans to establish an iron and steel industry by committing this enterprise, in 1928, to a state corporation (Isacor). The Pact also renewed state intervention on behalf of white farmers: they already enjoyed

preferential railway rates and in 1925–6 received assistance in organising exports of fruit and dairy produce. In 1926 the import duty on sugar was almost doubled.

The other face of these policies was the deepening poverty of Africans. The reserves became even more dependent on income from migrant workers. Reports on reserves in the later 1920s and early 1930s spoke of semi-starvation, endemic typhus, almost chronic scurvy and appalling infant mortality, while land was degenerating into desert. The government made a show of concern with its Native Tax and Development Act of 1925, which on the face of it sought to ensure that African taxes were channelled more systematically towards African welfare. Hitherto, the provinces had levied taxes from Africans in varying ways, and had used them in part to subsidise African schools, which were mostly owned and run by missions. Now a uniform system was introduced. Henceforward, male Africans over eighteen had to pay a general tax of £1 a year; one-fifth of this was to be spent on African education. All such Africans who lived in locations had to pay a further tax of ten shillings towards a Native Development Fund; this was supplemented by an annual contribution of £340,000 from the Union government (which thereby relieved the provinces of their expenditure on African education). Over the next decade there was a marked increase in school enrolment, but in 1932 four out of five African children were still beyond the reach of the school system. The Development Fund made possible new efforts to provide agricultural training, improve livestock and sink boreholes, but its resources were grossly inadequate. In any case, Africans were clearly being taxed far more heavily, in relative terms, than whites: the former were lucky to earn £40 per annum, while the latter paid no tax until annual earnings exceeded £640. Besides, Africans had to bear an increasing tax burden as purchasers of imported goods subject to protective duties: cloth, tea, hoes and blankets (the price of these last rose fourfold in the late 1920s). All in all, the main effect of the 1925 Act was to minimise the responsibility of whites for African welfare and to provide a rationale for excluding Africans from the scope of welfare legislation.

Black Africans sought various forms of deliverance from the hardships aggravated by the Pact government. In 1925 the dismal reserves of the Transkei eagerly welcomed Wellington Butelezi,

a Zulu who claimed to be American and preached Marcus Garvey's gospel of improvement compounded with promises of a speedy black millennium. In 1927 Butelezi was deported from the Transkei, but his influence lived on for a while in schools which challenged the missions. More widespread, though not much more enduring, was the ICU. Kadalie had soon discovered his mistake in supposing that the Pact government would prove more friendly than Smuts to black workers. Some ICU leaders began to look for allies in the Communist Party of South Africa, which after the Pact victory had begun to court black workers since white workers alone seemed unlikely to make a revolution. In April 1925, at Johannesburg, the annual conference of the ICU gave a Marxist tinge to its new constitution; it also made specific criticisms of recent legislation that protected 'civilised labour'. In September the Economic and Wage Commission (which included W. H. Andrews) took note of a memorandum from the ICU which sought to document the inadequacy of African wages, especially on the mines, claimed a role for Africans in shaping their working conditions, and demanded equal opportunities at work. At its 1926 conference, the ICU attacked the government's attempt to divide Coloured and black workers; it also denounced the whole system of labour recruitment. However, disputes over tactics were aggravated by personal rivalries, financial mismanagement and growing black distrust of Communist influence: in December 1926 the five Communists on the national council of the ICU were expelled.

Around this time, the ICU was expanding fast in Natal, Transvaal and the Orange Free State, especially among farm workers and labour tenants: by 1927 it claimed to have nearly 60,000 members. But it was much easier to obtain a first subscription with promises of rapid and radical change than to collect a second, especially in the absence of a union structure based on craft or industry. Only in Johannesburg were such unions to be found; they were first formed in 1927, under Communist influence, among semi-skilled workers more or less settled in town. And while the growth of the ICU strained loyalties and organising skills it also alarmed the government. The Native Administration Act of 1927 placed new restrictions on the movement and association of Africans, extended government control over the administration of justice for Africans, and

allowed officials to by-pass the courts in punishing Africans whom they said were promoting racial hostility. Even before this new constraint, the ICU had failed to provide support for strikes in 1927 by coalminers in Newcastle, dockworkers and tailors in Durban, and railway-workers in Johannesburg. In May 1928 the ICU in Natal split off under the leadership of A. G. W. Champion, a former policeman and mine clerk from Natal; in 1929 Kadalie's supporters formed an Independent ICU based on East London; and a third group, the ICU of Africa, formed around W. A. Ballinger, a Scottish trade unionist whom Kadalie had recruited as an adviser.

Congress had shared the ICU's misplaced hopes that the Pact would prove a lesser evil than Smuts. In 1925 the prestige of Congress was very low. Two years earlier, it had renamed itself the African National Congress (ANC); it now reasserted itself in other symbols: it chose a flag (shortly before the white politicians argued over theirs); and it adopted as its anthem the hymn *Nkosi sikeleli Afrika* ('God bless Africa').²¹ The aspirations of Congress were directly challenged by the Native Bills which Hertzog tabled in 1926. The most controversial proposed to remove African voters from the common roll in the Cape and instead to provide seven white MPs to speak for Africans. Since such a measure would require a two-thirds majority in parliament, Hertzog sought agreement with Smuts, who instead argued for a common franchise so defined as to exclude most Africans.²² The bills were postponed, but remained a grave threat. At first the ANC refrained from doing more than co-ordinate protest with liberals in the Joint Councils and with other non-white communities. In 1926–7 opinion in Congress briefly moved leftwards. James La Guma, secretary in the Cape, had joined the Communist Party of South Africa (and was among those expelled from the ICU in 1926). The new ANC president, J. T. Gumede, looked for help not to Britain but to Soviet Russia, which he visited in 1927–8. Other ANC leaders joined the CPSA, and the Comintern (in line with Lenin's theses on colonialism of 1920) argued that a black republic was a prerequisite for revolution in South Africa. This

²¹ This had been composed in 1897 by Enoch Sontonga, a Xhosa minister at Lovedale.

²² Smuts had returned to parliament in 1925 as member for Standerton, Transvaal. Hertzog did succeed in passing the Immorality Act of 1927, which outlawed extra-marital sexual relations between 'Europeans' and 'natives', i.e. black Africans.

theme was taken up by Gumedé, but it increased friction within both Congress and the CPSA.

The position of Indians in South Africa remained precarious. In 1919 restrictions on Indian enterprise in the Transvaal had been tightened up, and at imperial conferences in 1921 and 1923 Smuts had rejected the claims of Indian delegates that Indians should enjoy full citizenship throughout the Dominions. In 1924 Natal deprived Indians of the municipal franchise and placed new restrictions on Indian trading and landholding. Moreover, Indians, like Africans, seemed to threaten white jobs, and many whites wanted Indians to be deported to India — which most had never seen. Smuts and the Pact both wished to enforce segregation on Indians in towns, but the Government of India intervened and joined in talks with the Union government at Cape Town in 1926–7. The ensuing agreement outlined a scheme for assisted voluntary repatriation while making it easier for the wives and children of Indian immigrants to follow them into South Africa. The plan for urban segregation was dropped, and the Union government undertook to promote the health and education of Indians. However, these decisions had little practical effect; the chief result of the agreement was the establishment in South Africa of an ‘agent-general’ of the Government of India.

In 1929 a general election was due. Hertzog chose to campaign on the issue of ‘native policy’. He sought a popular mandate for his Native Bills, for which Smuts’s SAP had refused to supply the required majority. The unrest articulated by the ICU and the communists inspired Hertzog to warn of a ‘black peril’. Smuts stressed his own commitment to white supremacy by looking to the creation of a white-ruled Dominion stretching from the Cape to Kenya; a Nationalist manifesto denounced him as ‘the apostle of a black Kaffir state, of which South Africa is to form so subordinate a part that she will know her own name no more’.²³ The election in June gave the Nationalists an overall majority of seats, even though their percentage of the vote was only 40.4 as against 48.6 for the SAP. Creswell’s Labour Party had already split up, and altogether lost ten seats: the cause of ‘civilised labour’ had made Nationalists of many white workers.

²³ Quoted in L. E. Neame, *General Hertzog: prime minister of the Union of South Africa since 1924* (London, c. 1934), 270.

Depression and fusion

The world trade depression which began late in 1929 made a profound but ambivalent impact on South Africa. By 1931 the total value of exports fell by nearly a quarter to £65m. The percentage contributed by wool declined from 16 to 9, and by 1932 wool prices had slumped to a quarter of their level in 1927–8. Diamond prices were on average halved between 1928–30 and 1932; the percentage of total exports contributed by diamond sales (which were mostly to the USA) fell between 1929 and 1933 from 13 to 2.3; production in South Africa was temporarily halted in 1932. The fortunes of the gold industry were very different. Its working costs were lowered by the depression of prices for other goods, while the price of gold remained fixed. Output and sales continued to rise slowly. In September 1931 Britain abandoned the gold standard, but at first Hertzog's government refused to follow suit; partly influenced by the mining industry, it argued that any gain from higher sterling prices for gold would be offset by higher prices for imports, since Britain was the Union's chief trading partner. Nonetheless, the possibility that South Africa would eventually follow Britain's example prompted speculators to transfer capital abroad. By the end of December 1932 the scale of this outflow frightened the South African government into abandoning the gold standard. In the course of 1933 the sterling price of gold rose by 50 per cent. Contrary to earlier fears, there was no significant rise in import prices, since devaluation had been very widespread: the USA abandoned gold in April 1933. Thus in terms of its major export, at least, South Africa did well out of the depression and was to do still better as the decade wore on.

In the short term, however, the depression caused widespread suffering in South Africa. White farmers, and their black workers, were hard hit by the collapse of agricultural prices. The government stepped in to stem a flight from the land with a series of protective measures: in 1930–1 wheat, maize and dairy produce received export bounties and price subsidies, and in 1933 meat-marketing controls were introduced, while the sugar tariff was redoubled. But the government's ability thus to redistribute wealth was restricted by falling revenues in 1930–3. And to the handicap of contracting markets were added the afflictions of

terrible droughts in 1930–1 and 1932–3: tens of thousands of livestock died. The ‘poor white problem’, a particular concern of Afrikaner politicians and churchmen, thus became graver than ever. The Carnegie Commission which surveyed it in 1928–32 reported that one in five Afrikaner men were poor whites, in the sense of being unable to obtain a livelihood. However, it was black rather than white workers who were first laid off by urban employers and, unlike whites, blacks were under pressure to return to drought-stricken reserves. Even on the narrowest calculation of white self-interest, the physical condition of Africans was alarming. In 1930 the government appointed a commission to examine how employment among unskilled whites was threatened by the very low wages accepted by black migrants. The commission reported in 1932 that the root of the problem lay in the frequently abysmal poverty of the reserves, where an average annual income for a family, in both cash and kind, was worth £14. Rural wages quite failed to provide African workers and their families with a diet ‘consistent with reasonable maintenance of health’, and one member of the commission (the chairman of the Wage Board) considered that the condition of African farm labour amounted to serfdom.²⁴

The depression, by aggravating racial conflict, intensified the new government’s determination to suppress opposition. Already, in June 1929, it had condoned whites in Durban who had started a riot at the ICU office in which eight people were killed, after Africans had protested against the municipal beer-brewing monopoly. The minister of justice, Oswald Pirow, sought to terrorise Africans into subservience; in November 1930 he led armed police in Durban who attacked compounds at dawn with tear-gas under the pretext of rounding up tax-defaulters. In the previous May, an amendment to the Riotous Assemblies Act gave the government sweeping powers to deal with anyone whom it claimed was promoting ‘racial hostility’: these powers were soon used against farm-workers in the western Cape, Kadalie on the Rand, Champion in Natal, and leaders of the CPSA. The CPSA, moreover, was divided in 1931 by new directives to detach itself from black ‘reformists’ and instead mobilise both black and white masses for revolution; several white trade unionists were expelled.

²⁴ *Report of the Native Economic Commission, 1930–1932* (UG 22–32), 69; C. W. de Kiewet, *A history of South Africa: social and economic* (London, 1941), 230.

Meanwhile, there had been mounting pressure within Congress to dissociate itself from the Communists, and in April 1930 Gumede was replaced as president by the deferential Pixley Seme. But those in Congress who still had hopes of constitutional advance received a new rebuff in 1930–1, when the voting power of Africans in the Cape was devalued, first by the enfranchisement of white women and then by the exemption of whites from the ‘civilisation’ franchise test. African rights were further eroded by lawyers in 1934 when the Court of Appeal held that the government did not need parliamentary authority to introduce separate but (in theory) equal social services. It was also in 1934 that the Court of Appeal, in rejecting a challenge to the Riotous Assemblies Amendment of 1930, implicitly denied that judges had any right to criticise legislation; this pronouncement was soon to have a marked impact on judicial behaviour.

For all its severity against Africans, the Hertzog government’s handling of the economic crisis lost it a good deal of white support. It was determined somehow to muster the two-thirds majority needed to push through the Native Bills, but it seemed most unlikely to achieve this on its own at the next election. However, many Nationalists were now much readier than they had been to contemplate alliance with Smuts’s SAP. In the 1920s the two parties were at odds over the issue of South African autonomy. For the Nationalists, it was vital that the Union’s membership of the British Commonwealth should be the result of choice, not constraint. At the Imperial Conference in 1926, Hertzog asserted South Africa’s right to secede, and in effect he had his way: he influenced the drafting of Balfour’s definition of Dominion autonomy. In 1927 South Africa set up its own department of external affairs. In 1931 the offices of governor-general and high commissioner were separated while the Statute of Westminster formally enacted the legislative sovereignty of South Africa and the other Dominions. In March 1933 Hertzog and Smuts took this accomplished fact as the basis for a wide-ranging agreement on policy, and formed a coalition government; Smuts became minister of justice and deputy prime minister. A general election in May returned a massive majority for the coalition and opened the way to a fusion of the two leading parties. Early in 1934 parliament passed a Status of the Union Act which used the Statute of Westminster to confirm South African

independence, and in particular its right to conduct its own foreign policy. By September the Nationalist Party and the SAP had merged in a new United Party. Republican-minded Nationalists feared fusion and 19 MPs followed D. F. Malan in forming a Purified Nationalist Party; a few English-speakers, by contrast, feared that fusion would encourage republicanism and, led by Colonel Stallard, formed a Dominion Party.

The gold boom

During the middle and later 1930s the South African economy expanded very considerably, chiefly as a result of the favourable market for gold. Between the end of 1933 and 1939 the price rose by a further 22 per cent. Goldmining became more important than ever to the country's economy. Between 1932 and 1939 the annual value of gold sales rose from £50m to £99m and usually accounted for around three-quarters of total exports, as compared to about a half in the previous decade. Since working costs remained roughly stable, large profits were made. The rate of return on goldmining capital increased and between 1933 and 1940 the annual value of dividends was usually at least double the average for the later 1920s.²⁵ These short-term gains made it possible to secure the future of the industry in the longer term: from 1933 to 1938 it not only reinvested £12m but attracted new capital worth £63m. Due to the growth of local finance houses, notably the Anglo American Corporation, a substantial proportion of this new capital was contributed by South Africans, whose percentage of mining shares rose from 14 in 1913 to about 40 in 1937.²⁶ This money was chiefly devoted to deepening existing mines and developing new ones: work on the Far East Rand continued, while from 1933 the Far West Rand was opened up. This work did not begin to affect output significantly until the end of the decade; indeed, output actually fell in 1933–4 and returned to the 1932 level only in 1937, since high prices rendered it economic

²⁵ In the decade before the revaluation of gold, the rate of return was around 11 per cent, scarcely more than that for British equities; but by the mid-1930s the return on South African gold was 16 per cent while that on British equities fell to 8 per cent. S. H. Frankel, *Investment and the return to equity capital in the South African gold mining industry, 1887–1965* (Oxford, 1967), 8, 44, 124.

²⁶ S. H. Frankel and H. Herzfeld, 'An analysis of the growth of the national income of the Union in the period of prosperity before the War', *South African Journal of Economics*, 1944, 12, 2, 112–15; Frankel, *Capital investment*, 93 n.2, 103.

to mill lower grades of ore. But between 1932 and 1937 the effective mining area of the Rand was increased fourfold. Meanwhile, the diamond industry began to expand once more; the South African cartel was reorganised in 1933 and up to 1937 the value of sales slowly rose, though throughout the 1930s annual output remained lower than in almost any year since 1880.

The prosperity of the goldmining industry was promptly exploited by the government. The state was already the residual owner of the country's gold resources: since 1908 it had gained revenue from the industry not only by levying income tax but by issuing mining leases which yielded a share in profits on a sliding scale. In 1925–7 government revenue from the goldmines was about 23 per cent of their gross profits. In 1933 the revaluation of gold encouraged the government to introduce an excess profits tax. Between 1932–3 and 1933–4 total government revenue rose by almost one-third to £37.6m, of which 33 per cent came directly from goldmining (compared with 8 per cent in 1913). In 1934–6 total direct government income from the goldmines was 42 per cent of taxable profits and around three-quarters of the value of dividends (compared with just over one-third ten years earlier).²⁷ In 1935 the goldmining industry claimed that the burden of government levies was far heavier than that on gold-producers in the USA, Australia or Canada, and the tax system was further revised to increase incentives to exploit lower-grade ores and thus extend payable reserves. Thereafter, government receipts from goldmining gradually declined, but between 1933–4 and 1938–9 they amounted to £82m — more than four times their value in the period between 1923–4 and 1928–9.

The expansion of goldmining, and the greatly increased share of the state in its fortunes, had far-reaching effects. Between 1932 and 1940, national income rose by about three-quarters, and in real as well as cash terms, for prices rose little. Swollen revenues enlarged the government's capacity to shape the economy. Increased spending on public works boosted the construction industry, and better roads lowered transport costs. There were also augmented resources available to finance the apparatus of protection for South African producers. The state-owned iron and

²⁷ The rate of actual tax (as distinct from tax income from mining leases and credits to the government loan account) amounted to 26, 29 and 28.5 per cent for these years. Cf. Frankel, *Capital investment*, 86, 97–8, 113, 116.

steel industry came into production in 1933. The value of manufacturing output doubled between 1929 and 1939, when it represented 18 per cent of national income; this growth was due to protection, to the investment of mining profits and to the establishment of South African branches by British and US firms. The structure of agricultural subsidies continued and in 1933-7 was extended to wool-producers. Between 1910 and 1936 the government spent £112m on agriculture, almost wholly for the benefit of white farmers.

The huge investment in white farming produced very mixed results. The total output of white farmers increased, but more slowly in the 1930s than in the 1920s. Subsidies cushioned inefficiency as well as innovation, and they encouraged the use of marginal land to the point of exhaustion, so that on white as well as black farms soil erosion reached alarming proportions. The real significance of state aid to white farming, as to manufacturing, was political rather than economic. Hertzog's government was much concerned to stem the drift of Afrikaners from the land. The industrial boom increased the number of white wage-earners by 100,000 between 1932 and 1939, while the white rural population steadily declined. Though the 'poor white problem' was fast disappearing, controls were still needed to prevent unskilled white workers from being undercut by blacks. It was thus important that the demand for jobs by unskilled whites fresh from the land should not outstrip the capacity of employers to pay wages appropriate to whites. In 1935 the Labour Department spent £800,000 on subsidising job-creation for poor whites. The Marketing Act of 1937, which further extended government powers of farm subsidy, was specifically intended to narrow the gap between white incomes on towns and farms.

The increased output which was encouraged by farming subsidies required more use of African labour. White farmers who had retained African squatters owing labour-rent increasingly sought to replace them with full-time wage labour. Supplies were not hard to find. The black population was steadily growing²⁸, yet the carrying capacity of the reserves was declining, especially after the droughts of the early 1930s. Between the wars there was an

²⁸ See table 4. Average annual rates of population increase (percentages), 1921-36: Coloured, 2.32; black, 2.29; Asian, 1.90; white, 1.86. White immigration reached a peak, at over 10,000, in 1936; it was partly offset by emigration.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Table 4. *South Africa, population (percentages in parentheses).*

	1911	1921	1936
'Natives'			
Total ¹	4,019,006	4,697,813	6,596,689
Reserves ²			2,420,349
White farms ²			2,053,440
Urban areas: total ^{4,7}	508,142 (12.6)	587,000 (12.5)	1,141,642 (17.3)
women ^{5,6}		147,293	356,874
under 14 ^{5,6}		87,000	226,944
Johannesburg: total ^{8,9}	101,971	118,652	231,889
women ¹⁰	4357	12,160	60,992
women employees ¹⁰		5633	24,781
'Whites'			
Total ¹	1,276,242	1,519,488	2,003,857
Rural areas ²	617,956	671,980	696,471
Urban areas ²	658,286	847,508	1,307,386
Coloured			
Total ¹	525,943	545,548	769,661
'Asiatic'			
Total ¹	152,203	165,731	219,691
Urban population			
Total ³	1,477,868	1,755,795	3,009,531
White ³	658,286 (44)	847,508 (49)	1,307,386 (43.4)
'Native' ^{4,5,6}	508,142 (34.3)	587,000 (33)	1,141,642 (38.0)
Coloured ^{5,6}		249,968 (14.4)	414,907 (13.8)
'Asiatic' ^{5,6}		51,209 (3.0)	145,996 (4.8)

¹ *Official yearbook of the Union of South Africa*, no. 22 (1941), 984.

² *Ibid.*, 398.

³ *Ibid.*, 993.

⁴ *Union yearbook: statistics for the period 1910-25* (1927), 863.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 864.

⁶ *Report on 1936 Census*, vol. IX (UG 50, 1938).

⁷ *Report of the Native Laws Commission* (UG 28, 1948), 6.

⁸ J. P. R. Maud, *City Government* (1938), 384.

⁹ *Report on 1946 Census*, vol. X (UG 51, 1949), 78ff.

¹⁰ Gaitskell, as cited on p. 590, n. 32.

overall, if still very gradual, decline in agricultural productivity in the reserves.²⁹ And despite the great increase in government revenue after 1934 there was no reduction of African taxation. By 1937 there were 400,000 Africans working on white farms (as against 360,000 in 1930), and once there they were frequently tied

²⁹ Steep decline dates only from the 1950s: cf. C. Simkins, 'Agricultural production in the African reserves', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1981, 7, 2, 256-83.

down not only by pass-laws but by cash debts and much-prized grazing rights. The latter helped workers to support families: altogether, there were over two million Africans living on white farms in 1936. But the combined effect of immiseration in the reserves and artificial barriers to mobility was to depress real farm wages even below their value in 1910.

Other fields of employment expanded fast. Between 1929 and 1939 the black workforce in manufacturing nearly doubled, while that on the mines rose by one-third to 424,000, the first major increase since 1907-10. During the worst of the depression, from 1929 to 1933, the Transvaal mines reduced their reliance on contract labour from Mozambique³⁰ in favour of men from within the Union, of whom only 40 per cent were contracted by labour recruiters. In the same period, the proportion of mine-workers from the Cape in the Transvaal rose from 30 to 43 per cent, even though by 1935 one-third of job-seekers from the Transkei were rejected by the mines on medical grounds. Meanwhile, the recent discovery of a sulphonamide drug provided a cure for the pneumonia to which mineworkers from the tropics were specially prone. In 1934, under pressure from the mine companies, the government allowed a gradual resumption of recruitment north of latitude 22°S, and by 1939 the Transvaal mines employed some 20,000 men from central Africa, mostly from Nyasaland. On the goldmines, increasing mechanisation underground widened the scope for white workers: by 1939 there were 43,000, almost twice as many as in the later 1920s. However, there was no marked change in real wages for either black or white mineworkers, which in 1941 were much the same as they had been in 1911.³¹ This was broadly true of workers in other industries and in government or municipal employment. Annual wages for black workers in manufacturing averaged £41 to £46 in 1924-37; mineworkers earned two-thirds as much.

By and large, the boom in goldmining had the effect of intensifying existing trends towards white proletarianisation and black dependence on wage labour. Between 1921 and 1936 the number of whites in urban areas increased by a half, yet that of blacks in urban areas doubled. Moreover, there were clear signs that Africans were tending increasingly to make their homes in

³⁰ A new labour convention had been made with Portugal in 1928; cf. p. 516.

³¹ F. Wilson, *Labour in the South African gold mines, 1911-1969* (Cambridge, 1972), 46.

towns. Whereas in 1921 there were three black men for every black woman in towns, in 1936 the ratio was only 2.2:1, and a larger proportion of urban Africans were children. African settlement had gone much further in some towns than in others: in Port Elizabeth, the sexes had long been evenly balanced. The patterns of urbanisation were clearest on the Witwatersrand. By 1937 the total population of the area was over a million, and over half were Africans. Most Africans in employment were housed by their employers, usually as single men (as on the mines); they were certainly transient. But the increase in African urban employment meant more opportunities for self-employed Africans such as retail traders, craftsmen and herbalists. Besides, there were said to be over 90,000 Africans 'living by their wits', without any obvious source of income. And the 60,000 who lived in Johannesburg's municipal locations consisted mostly of families; they were regarded by officials as permanent residents. Between 1921 and 1936 the black female population of Johannesburg increased fivefold, and less than half were in white employment (mostly as domestic servants). Over 500 Africans had bought land in areas set aside by the municipality for 'non-white' owner-occupiers, while others owned plots outside the city boundary.³²

Segregation

The growth of African urban settlement between the wars sharpened racial antagonism. The more stabilised Africans threatened white jobs; the *Lumpenproletariat* threatened social order. There was increasing pressure to keep Africans out of towns, except as temporary wage-earners. In 1930 there were 40,000 convictions under the pass-laws, and the government empowered municipal authorities to exclude women who could not prove they had accommodation. But there was also wider-ranging debate on the place of Africans in South African society. Hertzog's Native Bills became a focus for the discussion of segregation at all levels. The 1926 bills had been referred to a parliamentary committee which included the member for Zululand, G. Heaton Nicholls,

³² Ray E. Phillips, *The Bantu in the city* (Lovedale, 1938), xxiv, xxvi–xxvii; Deborah Gaitskell, "Christian compounds for girls": Church hostels for African women in Johannesburg, 1907–1970', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1979, 6, 1, 48. Neither the 1913 Land Act nor the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act applied to urban areas.

a leading sugar-planter. In 1931 Nicholls (echoing recent statements by Smuts) argued that the only way to prevent African proletarianisation and consequent class war was to strengthen the economic resources of the reserves and foster African 'race pride' by restoring the power of African chieftainship. In these objectives he had the support not only of the Zulu royal family but also of John Dube, the ANC leader. Dube, like other educated Zulus, was related to a chiefly family and in the 1920s made common cause with the richer African farmers who themselves employed wage labour and shared white fears of the ICU. Such Africans also had an interest in playing down class-conflict, and to this end sought both to relieve mounting pressure on land and to strengthen attachment to traditional rulers. In 1931 Dube told Nicholls that Africans wanted land, not votes, and he toured the Union to gain African support for Nicholls's plan to couple the disfranchisement of black voters in the Cape with a large extension of the reserves and special funds for their development.

Hopes that segregation could be given some such positive content received little encouragement from the bills presented to parliament in 1935. The Native Trust and Land Bill finally adopted the recommendations of the Beaumont Commission in 1916 to increase the extent of 'scheduled areas' in African ownership by about 75 per cent.³³ But this reform was hedged about with qualifications. Africans might continue to buy land within the enlarged scheduled areas, but out of their own pockets; all the remaining additional land would eventually be bought for communal ownership through a government fund, and occupation would be conditional on satisfying official standards of land use. Thus chiefs, who distributed communal land, were favoured at the expense of prospective African freeholders. Besides, much of the additional land was already occupied by Africans living on white property, so that the bill's effect on land scarcity was slight. Furthermore, Africans in the Cape were finally prohibited from buying land from whites outside scheduled areas. At the same time, the bill obstructed African farming on white land; it outlawed cash tenancies and extended to 180 days the period of service which could be exacted from labour tenants. The political

³³ This figure takes account of some 2.5 million acres bought by Africans since 1913 with the governor-general's permission: cf. T. R. H. Davenport, *South Africa: a modern history* (London, 1977), 336; the real gain was thus only 63 per cent.

segregation of Africans was adumbrated by the Natives Representation Bill. This proposed to disfranchise African voters in the Cape and outlined a separate structure of African representation. For each province, one white senator would be chosen by an electoral college consisting of chiefs, headmen and other African local authority officials; these colleges would also elect twelve members of an advisory Natives Representative Council, which would also include four nominated members and six officials.

The bills provoked concerted African criticism. In December 1935 an All-African Convention at Bloemfontein brought together delegates from numerous organisations. Congress members of all shades of opinion were prominent; already Dube was disenchanted with segregation and declared: 'The Government is trying to replace what it has already destroyed — our tribal system.'³⁴ Communists also took part; since the advent of Hitler, their party line had swung round again to favour a broad popular front. In February 1936 Hertzog received a deputation from the AAC headed by D. D. T. Jabavu, leader of the Cape Native Voters' Convention. More persuasive, however, were a group of Cape MPs whose support was needed to pass the bills. They induced Hertzog to allow Africans removed from the Cape common roll to elect instead three whites to the lower house. With this alteration, the Native Bills obtained the necessary two-thirds majority in April and became law.

Within parliament, the most powerful attack on the Natives Representation Bill in its final form had come, not from the Nationalist opposition, but from a Cabinet minister, J. H. Hofmeyr (then in charge of education, the interior and public health). More consistently than Smuts, Hofmeyr believed that relations between black and white in South Africa should be guided by the principles of trusteeship proclaimed by colonial regimes further north. Trusteeship was, of course, a cant word freely used for political advantage; it was Hofmeyr's merit to point this out:

I have always regarded trusteeship as implying that at some stage or another, the trustee is prepared to hand over the trust to his ward. I have yet to learn that the European trustee in South Africa contemplates any such possibility. And that being so, I find it very difficult to reconcile the use of the word in

³⁴ S. Marks, 'The ambiguities of dependence: John L. Dube of Natal', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1975, 1, 2, 179.

relation to a Bill for which it is claimed that it is going to make South Africa safe for European civilisation...This Bill says that even the most educated Native shall never have political equality with even the least educated and the least cultured White or Coloured man. This Bill says to these educated Natives: 'There is no room for you, you must be driven back upon your own people.' But we drive them back in hostility and disgruntlement, and do not let us forget this, that all that this Bill is doing for those educated Natives is to make them the leaders of their own people, in disaffection and revolt.³⁵

Interestingly, Hofmeyr did not choose to resign after making this notable prophecy (though he did resign, on a lesser issue, two years later). More important, though, was the question whether 'educated natives' would make do with what little they had been given. The All-African Convention met again in June. Jabavu compared the loss of common-roll voting to the recent Italian invasion of Ethiopia: both events had scratched the 'European veneer and revealed the white savage beneath'.³⁶ Yet both ANC and CPSA leaders agreed to participate in elections under the new system, and Congress organisation began to revive in response to this practical objective.

Segregation was intensified in 1937 by the Native Laws Amendment Act. This empowered the Union government to prevent employers housing Africans on their own premises, to restrict African entry to towns and to enforce the removal of unemployed Africans; the latter measures were a corollary of artificial wage-fixing³⁷ and also served to increase the supply of labour to white farmers. Restrictions were also placed on the African right to buy urban freeholds. Belated efforts were made by municipal authorities to provide housing for African workers, but the cost was artificially inflated by the use of white labour. The Slums Act of 1934 did not apply to Africans, and in general their living conditions in towns remained miserably cramped and unhealthy: not only proper shelter but basic sanitation was frequently denied them.

In this social climate, it was not to be expected that the state would make more generous provision for African education; this was widely feared by whites as a threat to jobs and political supremacy. The subsidies which financed most of the mission schools' recurrent expenditure were still mainly derived from

³⁵ 6 April 1936; quoted by Alan Paton, *Hofmeyr* (Cape Town, 1964), 227–8.

³⁶ *Presidential Address to the All-African Convention* (Lovedale, 1936), 3.

³⁷ See below, p. 395.

African taxation. In 1939 the state spent £2 a year on each black pupil, compared with £25 on each white pupil. In the Cape, schools were free for Africans; elsewhere, they had to pay annual fees of around 15s. School enrolment continued to increase in Johannesburg and the Orange Free State, but in the Union as a whole only one in three black children of school age was attending school in 1939. Moreover, a black child in Natal or the Transvaal was half as likely to be in school as one in the Cape, where the Methodists (the largest white-run church among Africans) had made special efforts. Besides, few black children spent more than three years in school, and classes of over a hundred were commonplace. A white child was ten times more likely than a black child in a primary school to advance to secondary education. This expanded rapidly in the Cape in the later 1930s, but by 1939 there were still barely 5,000 Africans in secondary schools throughout the Union, and most were in the first year; another 1,500 were in industrial schools. In 1939 there were 162 students at Fort Hare, and 31 obtained degrees or diplomas.

Overstretched mission schools could clearly do little to repair the damage done to African societies by the demands of capital and the defence of white supremacy. Migrant labour undermined marriage and parental authority; absent fathers lost touch with ancestral spirits; and in both town and countryside the sense of community was eroded. In 1937 the Natives Representative Council called for more schools in towns as a means of curbing lawlessness among the young; its pleas were echoed by some white administrators. But though schools might make little difference to most Africans, the churches which ran them radiated a great, if often indirect, influence. Among people whose social relations had been disrupted by industrialisation and the colour bar, Christianity exerted a powerful appeal as a source of social solidarity as well as personal faith: in 1936, half the African population was recorded as Christian. Of these, about a third (one million) belonged to some 500 independent churches, which flourished in the reserves, on white farms and in the towns, especially on the Rand. For literate Africans, running a church of their own went some way towards fulfilling aspirations that were thwarted by paternalist white missionaries as well as by politicians. Many more were drawn to 'Zionist' churches in which they could find emotional release in song and dance from the harsh

discipline of wage-labour, and whose prophets practised faith-healing. 'And death comes to the Bantu location. It comes often. Then the Church is close at hand, and its fellowship, in a strange and bitter world, is reassuring and full of warmth.'³⁸

Meanwhile African workers were improving their defences. While white trade unions doubled their strength between 1934 and 1939, a growing minority of black workers were also becoming more settled in towns and were thus more amenable to organisation. In 1935 a white Communist, Max Gordon, reinvigorated the one surviving African union on the Rand, helped to found others and enlisted practical aid from white liberals. African unions were still denied any legal right to negotiate with employers, but they could exert some leverage. From 1930, industrial councils of white unionists and employers had been able to protect whites from undercutting by setting minimum wages for African labour, and by 1938 the wages of some 10,000 Africans were so regulated. From 1937, moreover, the Wage Board was able to recommend wages below a 'civilised' (i.e. white) standard. African unions pressed for minimum wage determinations and had some success in claiming wages due but not paid. By 1939 there were over twenty African unions in the Transvaal and as many more elsewhere. White union leaders in the South African Trades and Labour Council³⁹ called for the recognition of African unions. The government now favoured this as a means of control, but it was thwarted in 1940 by concerted opposition from the mine companies who feared a breach in their hitherto effective barriers to African union activity.

There were also new attempts to articulate protest across rather than along the lines of 'race'. In the Coloured community, many younger people were more impressed by Communism than by the vain efforts of the APO to gain entry to the white ruling class. In December 1935 Abdurahman's daughter, Mrs Z. Gool, helped to found a National Liberation League to fight on behalf of Africans and Asians as well as Coloured people: this was also a direct challenge to the racially-exclusive ANC. In 1936 Communists helped Coloured and African workers to form a single union in the docks and railways at Cape Town; in 1937 Asian and

³⁸ B. G. M. Sundkler, *Bantu prophets in South Africa* (London, 1948, 2nd ed. 1961), 86; see also chapter 3.

³⁹ This had replaced the Trade Union Congress in 1930.

African ironworkers struck together in Durban, and soon afterwards Asian and African sugarworkers formed a union in Natal. In 1938 the NLL created a workers' Non-European United Front and in March 1939 a demonstration by the Front in Cape Town induced the government to veto provincial plans to enforce urban segregation. Meanwhile, the Front also attracted younger Indians who were tired of the intensely communal politics of the South African Indian Congress; when Indian rights in the Transvaal, already curbed in 1932, were further circumscribed in 1939, the Front organised passive resistance.

Divided rulers

The wealth derived by South Africa from the gold boom in the 1930s was chiefly used to intensify the colour bar and protect the material living-standards of whites, especially Afrikaners. Nonetheless, old tensions within the white population became ever more acute. Fusion in 1934 had been supported by most English-speaking whites but by only half the Afrikaners. The preponderance of the United Party in parliament was less significant than the growing strength of Malan's Purified Nationalist Party. This acknowledged that about as many Afrikaners now lived in towns as on farms. More than ever before, Afrikaners were directly threatened not only by black labour but by the economic and cultural hegemony of English-speaking whites. These still dominated South African business and industry, the civil service and the professions, and their press, closely linked to mining interests, enjoyed a near-monopoly in the major cities. There was, moreover, the danger presented by labour leaders who invoked 'foreign' notions of class conflict in order to unite workers across linguistic, and even racial, divisions. In opposing such enemies, the Purified Nationalists had full backing from the Broederbond, which Malan himself joined in 1933. The Broederbond played a crucial, if covert, part in the creation of new Afrikaner institutions: in 1934 the Volkskas Bank and a railwaymen's union; in 1937 the *Transvaler* newspaper (edited by H. Verwoerd). And among the most militant, the defence of Afrikanerdom involved attacks on Jews, who by 1940 formed about a fifth of the white population of Johannesburg and were feared not only as powerful businessmen but also as radicals in trade unions. In 1937 the Purified Nationalists sought (though in vain) to ban Jewish immigration.

While Malan's party put Afrikaner integrity above white unity, the ruling United Party pursued an uneasy compromise between alliance with Britain and dreams of a Greater South Africa. In 1933 Hertzog renewed his attempts in 1924–6 to secure the incorporation in the Union of the High Commission Territories, though subsequent discussions with Britain had no practical result. Both Smuts and Hertzog regarded the Union as the ultimate guarantor of white civilisation in Africa, and it was in that capacity, as well as in support of the League of Nations, that South Africa joined New Zealand in pressing for full sanctions against Italy after its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. The attitude of the Fusion government to Hitler's Germany was ambivalent. It was united in opposing German claims to South West Africa, and Smuts was also much alarmed by German ambitions in Europe, but he now had little influence on foreign policy. South Africa increased its imports from Germany, mainly at the expense of Britain, and by 1938 Germany was the principal customer for South African wool.⁴⁰ This trend was especially furthered by the pro-Nazi Oswald Pirow, who had been a ruthless minister of justice in 1929–33 and thereafter combined portfolios for defence and transport. Pirow nationalised South Africa's airline in 1933 and equipped it with German aircraft; by 1937 he had expanded the airline's operations at the expense of Britain's Imperial Airways, not only within the Union but northwards as far as Kenya. Yet South Africa's coastline was still defended by the British navy, and the Union spent comparatively little on its own army and airforce, despite a sharp rise in defence spending in 1937.

In the general election of 1938, the Purified Nationalists launched a fiercely xenophobic campaign and increased their seats from 20 to 27; they did still better in terms of votes. Later in the year they had a further opportunity to advance their cause in the centenary celebrations for the Voortrekkers, from which Hertzog was excluded (he had condemned the Broederbond in 1935). The election was also notable for the advent to parliament of the first whites to represent Africans. Of the three elected in the Cape, Margaret Ballinger and Donald Molteno at once proved trenchant reporters on the condition of Africans and hard-hitting critics of the government; they explicitly opposed the system whereby they

⁴⁰ However, of the Union's three principal trading partners, it was the USA which most rapidly expanded its trade with the Union during the 1930s; its exports of motor vehicles and chassis increased threefold.

were elected, and were the only whites to be formally associated with the ANC. Two of the senators, Edgar Brookes and J. D. Rheinallt Jones, were also diligent spokesmen for African interests, though they reflected the tension, characteristic of the Joint Councils and the Institute of Race Relations (founded in 1929), between a theoretical liberal commitment to the 'assimilation' of Africans and a more pragmatic, if paternalist, acceptance of segregation.

Britain's declaration of war against Germany in September 1939 was a turning-point in white South African politics. Hertzog stood out for neutrality, both to assert South African independence and to promote white unity: many Afrikaners felt that the war was no concern of theirs, while others openly supported the Nazis. Smuts pressed for alliance with Britain as vital to South Africa's security (and its mandate over South West Africa). The House of Assembly gave Smuts 80 votes and Hertzog 67. Smuts became prime minister and leader of a diminished United Party whose support was now concentrated among English-speakers. Hertzog's career was over; Malan's Purified Nationalists now emerged as the principal Afrikaner party. The battle-lines of the post-war years were being drawn.

South West Africa

Conditions in South West Africa were unaffected by South Africa's responsibility as a League of Nations mandatory. Both black and white local interests were subordinated to those of the Union. In 1925 whites were given representation in a legislative assembly with powers still less than those of provincial governments in the Union: the administrator remained virtually supreme. There was no appreciable economic growth between the wars. Export values failed to match those of 1913 (£3.5m) except in 1930 and 1938–40. The production of diamonds, now in South African ownership, was strictly regulated to suit the convenience of South African producers: output was restricted in the early 1920s and exports virtually ceased between 1931 and 1935. Exports of copper and lead from Tsumeb, near Otavi, were resumed in 1925 but more or less suspended from 1932 to 1937. White farmers received official assistance, however, and special aid was provided for Boer emigrants from Angola after 1928. By 1935 white farmers

possessed twice as much land as in 1913, and by 1937 the total white population numbered 31,800, of whom two-thirds spoke Afrikaans and one-third German. The long drought from 1930 to 1934 killed half the country's cattle, but meanwhile karakul sheep had been introduced on white farms, and by 1937 the revenue from the export of their pelts, worth over £1m, exceeded those of diamonds. By then, however, South West Africa had become heavily indebted to the Union, which between 1926 and 1937 lent over £2.5m; nearly half of this was to meet deficits on ordinary expenditure, and revenue exceeded £1m only in 1937-8.

The African population — some 280,000 by 1937 — became ever more dependent on working for wages, though on average these were still lower than in the Union. In 1926 a monopoly was created for recruiting labour in Ovamboland, and from 1935 this distributed workers to white farmers as well as to the mines. Migrancy rates were very high, except when mining virtually ceased in the early 1930s. Pass-laws were applied to all males over fourteen, and from 1928 chiefs might be deposed without right of appeal; by 1937 all seven Ovambo chiefs had been thus replaced. From 1923, reserves were demarcated, but they constituted a very inadequate subsistence base and they supported only 25,600 people (including 8,400 Herero). African taxes paid for missionary schoolteachers and some small improvements in the reserves, but in 1936 the total expenditure on Africans, including their administration, was only £51,000, barely one-third of the cost of white education. In the same year, a government-appointed commission advised that 'more active steps be taken by the Mandatory for the development of the Non-European races...[as] enjoined by Article 22 of the Covenant...and that financial appropriations be made for the purpose'. The Union government replied that 'the knowledge that [Natives] must depend on themselves [was] in itself a useful lesson'.⁴¹ From time to time South Africa's administration was queried and criticised by the Permanent Mandates Commission, but they were powerless to effect change, or even to make their own inspection of the territory.

⁴¹ E. Hellmann (ed.), *Handbook on race relations in South Africa* (Cape Town, 1949), 752-3.

The High Commission Territories

In Basutoland, African farming had benefited from high prices for wool and grain during the First World War; thereafter, total exports exceeded £1m only in 1928, and throughout the 1930s were never worth half as much. Drought and depression forced up the rate of labour migration: from 1929 to 1933 there was a rapid increase in the proportion of Transvaal mineworkers from Basutoland, and this proportion remained 13 per cent or more as the mines continued to expand their labour force. In 1936 there were in the Union 78,000 men and 23,000 women from Basutoland, out of a total population of 662,000: at least half the adult male population was absent. Similar trends could be observed among the much smaller populations of Swaziland and Bechuanaland, where in the late 1930s average absentee rates were about 40 and 30 per cent respectively. Swaziland's commodity exports, mainly of tin and tobacco, were slight, yet by the 1930s the country depended heavily on imports of food. In 1924 exports from Bechuanaland, as also from the other protectorates, were obstructed by a Union regulation banning imports of light-weight cattle. In the late 1930s, cattle exports from Bechuanaland increased, due partly to the growth of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, while the gold boom stimulated mining at Tati. By 1940 the value of commodity exports had risen to £446,000, but even so labour migration was also on the increase.

The protectorates, then, remained economic appendages to South Africa: indeed, from 1932 their workers on the Rand paid tax in Johannesburg. Yet there were also belated signs that Britain was developing a greater sense of responsibility for them. While the Privy Council rejected, in 1926, a Swazi claim to land alienated in 1907, successive British governments resisted the Union's wish to incorporate the protectorates. Britain was not obliged to do more on this issue than consult African opinion, but when Amery, as Dominions and colonial secretary, visited the protectorates in 1927 he was left in no doubt of African opposition to incorporation, and this was intensified by South Africa's segregation laws of 1936. Instead, administration was slowly adapted to resemble more closely British colonial practice elsewhere in Africa. The effect of the depression on already exiguous local revenues occasioned investigations on behalf of the Dominions Office by

Sir Alan Pim. His reports on Swaziland (1932), Bechuanaland (1933) and Basutoland (1935) exposed past British neglect and criticised the extent to which chiefs had become the autocratic henchmen of white administrator-magistrates, at the expense of indigenous forums of consultation. Pim recommended that local African authorities should be made more accountable, in line with the implementation of indirect rule in other British territories. In Bechuanaland an attempt in 1934 to standardise judicial procedures was strongly resisted by the senior chiefs of the Ngwato and Ngwaketsi, but from 1938 chiefs were paid salaries out of ‘native treasuries’ instead of commissions on tax collected. In Basutoland, similar reforms were also set in train in 1938; in Swaziland they were deferred until the 1940s. There was a more immediate response to Pim’s recommendations for economic assistance. In one sense this was already a matter of routine: budget deficits were made up by British grants-in-aid, which for Bechuanaland and Swaziland were substantial in the 1930s. But the protectorates also secured finance for capital expenditures from the Colonial Development Fund. Between 1933 and 1941 Bechuanaland received £181,000 in grants for water-development; from 1936 to 1940 Swaziland received £83,000, partly for dams to improve grazing; while in 1936 Basutoland received an interest-free loan of £160,000 to combat soil erosion. Such sums were scarcely extravagant, but measured against annual budgets⁴² they were more generous than allocations from the Fund to other parts of British colonial Africa.

⁴² Ordinary revenue in 1935–6: Basutoland, £321,689; Bechuanaland, £132,513; Swaziland, £102,752.

CHAPTER 12

BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

At the beginning of the twentieth century the main engine of change in Central Africa was the British South Africa Company, founded by Cecil Rhodes. In 1889 it had received from the British government a charter to exercise powers of administration in the region. During the next decade its agents invaded most parts of the mineralised tablelands between the middle Limpopo, the Zambezi–Congo watershed and Lake Tanganyika; the Company thereby gained private possession of virtually all mineral deposits throughout the sphere assigned to it by international treaties. South of the Zambezi, in what from 1898 was called Southern Rhodesia, gold and the temperate climate of the uplands attracted white settlers, who seized much African land. North of the Zambezi, the Company's sphere consisted by 1900 of two territories: North-Western Rhodesia, with communications running south, and North-Eastern Rhodesia, with communications running eastwards to the Shire valley. They were united in 1911 to form Northern Rhodesia. In 1905 the western border of the Company's northern sphere, hitherto disputed by Portugal, was settled by arbitration. Its eastern border was formed by the highlands sloping down to Lake Nyasa (Malawi). These highlands, and the country straddling the route to the lake up the Shire valley, had been taken over by the Foreign Office and designated the British Central Africa Protectorate; this was transferred to the Colonial Office in 1904 and called Nyasaland from 1907. The territory contained dense clusters of population; there were no minerals of consequence but much land had been alienated by whites in the Shire highlands. By 1901 its white population numbered 314, as against perhaps a million Africans; in North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia there were about 600 whites and possibly some 800,000 Africans; in Southern Rhodesia there were also around 800,000 Africans but about 11,000 whites. The Rhodesias were linked to the outside world by a railway system

BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA



21 The Rhodesias and Nyasaland, 1935

effectively owned by the British South Africa Company. By 1902 a line ran north from Vryburg, in South Africa, to Bulawayo, Salisbury (Harare) and the port of Beira in Mozambique. By 1905 the line from Bulawayo to the coalmine at Wankie (also owned by the Company) had been taken across the Zambezi as far as a lead and zinc mine at Broken Hill.

The Company's authority in Southern Rhodesia had been badly shaken by the scandal of the Jameson Raid in 1895 and the prolonged and widespread risings among the Ndebele and Shona in 1896–7. The British government asserted itself by posting a resident commissioner to Salisbury, the capital; he was responsible

to the high commissioner in South Africa. Vigilance slackened after the retirement of Sir Marshall Clark in 1905, but some surveillance of the Company's administration of Africans persisted. Under Sir William Milton, the administrator of Southern Rhodesia from 1898 to 1914, the practice of appointing settlers to administer Africans was largely abandoned. From 1898 elected settlers sat in a legislative council, but they were elected on a 'common roll', as in the Cape: the franchise was nominally colour-blind even if in practice scarcely any Africans could meet the stringent qualifications in terms of literacy and property. More important, a professional department of 'native affairs' was created, which differed from that in Nyasaland only in the fact that its members tended to be recruited from South Africa rather than Britain and were less frequently moved about. In North-Western Rhodesia a heterogeneous collection of South African frontiersmen continued to serve, but in the north-east a pensionable civil service was quickly established, largely recruited from Britain.

Whatever their background, officials sought to maintain their rule cheaply while stimulating production for export. As elsewhere, they sought to achieve both purposes by exacting the payment of taxes in cash, which by 1905 was usual in most of central Africa. Hitherto, the peoples of the region had taken part in overseas trade principally as suppliers of luxury goods such as gold dust and ivory. Now they were sought as labour for the gold, copper and coal mines of central and southern Africa and as producers of food and cash-crops: food for the workers in the mines, tropical staples for the international market. One aspect of the change was the drastic reshaping of regional economies: the severing of nineteenth-century links with the East African coast and the growing integration of the northern territories into the mining economy of the south. Another was the increasing influence of international, non-African events, exemplified most dramatically by the crushing impact of the First World War and later of the depression in the 1930s. Central Africa in the twentieth century was thus a periphery of the economies of South Africa and the West, its inhabitants subject to economic and political fluctuations over which they had little control. But at no time did they lose the capacity to influence the character of the economic and social environment in which they were forced to operate.

THE COLONIAL ECONOMY

THE MAKING OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY, 1905–1914

At the turn of the century, the goldmining industry of Southern Rhodesia was in crisis. Early hopes of a 'second Rand' had been disappointed and in 1903 the London market for Rhodesian mining shares collapsed. The British South Africa Company belatedly began to encourage small workers, since few economies of scale could be achieved where gold deposits were small and reefs unpredictable. Labour costs were cut to the bone; where possible, Africans were employed as skilled labour, yet their wages were reduced by minimising competition among employers. From 1903 the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau (RNLB) recruited workers on long contracts, especially north of the Zambezi, and the number of African mineworkers in Southern Rhodesia rose from 17,300 in 1906 to 34,500 in 1912. By 1909 over 500 small mines were being worked; capital began to flow back into the industry and the value of gold output rose from £1.1m in 1904–5 to £3.6m in 1913–14; usually it accounted for 90 per cent of exports.

The reconstruction of the mining industry was accompanied by an attempt to develop white farming. Before 1905 or so, whites and their black workers had largely relied for food on African produce. By 1899, 15.8 million acres had passed into white hands, but most had been left vacant, pending a rise in land values. The company now sought to hasten this process and increase traffic on its railways by promoting white farming. From 1908 settlers were sought in Britain and South Africa; land prices were reduced far below those in South Africa; training schemes for new farmers were introduced and in 1912 a Land Bank was set up to provide loans for white farmers. Few settlers in fact possessed the combination of capital and skills which the company sought to attract. More than nine-tenths came from South Africa, a higher proportion than had originally been intended. Yet while many white farmers failed, others prospered. Their total numbers rose from 545 in 1904 to 1,324 in 1911; they were cultivating less than 184,000 acres in 1914 but had made significant advances. Throughout much of Mashonaland they grew maize, initially to feed African mineworkers but from 1909 for export to Britain as well. Cattle-ranching expanded, on the basis of herds seized in the 1890s both from the Ndebele and from Mpezeni's Ngoni in North-Eastern Rhodesia. Whites also began to grow tobacco,

which offered a quick return on capital and could be successfully cultivated on sandy soils rather than on the rich red loams to which settlers had previously been attracted. For a brief period from 1909, tobacco-production expanded rapidly but by 1913 the South African market had been saturated, prices fell and the infant industry virtually collapsed.

By this time competition between European and African farmers was intensifying, with Europeans seeking to convert the local population into cheap reliable labour, while African farmers sought to produce more foodstuffs to meet the mounting demand. Only in the 1930s was there a significant overall decline in the production of grain per head of African population. But in some areas, such as Victoria District, even before 1914 the weight of taxation and rents, combined with poor communications, had turned previously prosperous peasants into poverty-stricken migrant workers. White settlers criticised the company for having set aside some 20 million acres as reserves for Africans, even though these were on the fringes of white-owned land and mostly remote from the main markets. In 1915 a commission under Sir Robert Coryndon recommended that the reserves be reduced by one million acres while also being deprived of much fertile land in exchange for poorer land: these measures were eventually approved by Britain in 1920.

For the British South Africa Company, its territories north of the Zambezi were essentially appendages to Southern Rhodesia. Gold deposits were insignificant and the surface deposits of copper oxide, once worked by Africans, were too poor to attract large-scale investment, though whites began some small-scale mining at Kansanshi and in the Hook of the Kafue. The Company mainly valued Northern Rhodesia as a source of labour for the mines of Southern Rhodesia. Hut-taxes, payable in cash, served to prise out workers; from time to time African police burned the homes and crops of defaulters; and agents of the RNLB collected men from district headquarters. The copper-mines in Katanga also sought to recruit men in Northern Rhodesia, which suited the company inasmuch as its railway, which was linked to Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) in 1910, carried coal north from Wankie and exported Katanga's copper to Beira. But the labour requirements of Southern Rhodesia remained paramount over both those of Katanga and those of white farmers in Northern

Rhodesia. A small number of whites produced food for the Katanga mines on the tsetse-free plateau alongside the railway; others settled near the south end of Lake Tanganyika or combined ranching with tobacco-planting near Fort Jameson. Africans squatting on white farms were, as in other territories, legally obliged to work for their landlords for a certain period. Nevertheless, from 1910 the RNLB was allowed to recruit on white estates.


In Nyasaland also, the interests of white settlers clashed with those of employers further south. In the 1890s officials had encouraged the development of plantations in the Shire highlands, but by 1902 their prospects were clouded by high transport costs, low productivity and a slump in coffee prices. Planters turned instead to flue-cured tobacco and cotton. In 1903, under pressure from the Transvaal mines, the Foreign Office allowed the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) to recruit in Nyasaland as well as Northern Rhodesia, while the RNLB also entered the territory. In 1908 recruiting for South Africa was temporarily halted, due to the high mortality of 'tropical' labour on the mines.¹ In the same year a railway was opened from Blantyre to Port Herald, on the lower Shire; it was extended to the Zambezi in 1915.² The value of Nyasaland's exports rose from £87,000 in 1905 to £201,000 in 1913, when tobacco contributed almost half. Meanwhile, local policy had reaffirmed support for the hundred-odd white planters. From 1908 they normally had a representative in the newly formed legislative council, where from 1911 six officials confronted six nominated non-officials (one of whom represented 'African interests'). In 1911 the new governor, Sir William Manning, imposed a ban on recruitment within Nyasaland by both WNLA and the RNLB; this lasted until 1936. Work-seekers who went south without passes were liable to fines and imprisonment.

These measures, however, did little to stem the flow of labour out of Nyasaland. Its officials could not seal its lengthy frontiers, and its southern neighbours naturally refused to outlaw the employment of migrants without passes. Besides, there was every reason for men to seek work outside Nyasaland — as some 25,000 did by 1911. There was little scope for Africans to grow cash-crops.

¹ See chapter 11, p. 550.

² See chapter 10, p. 510.

BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA



In the Shire highlands, Yao and Manganja supplied food to white estates. In 1911 the British Cotton Growing Association encouraged African production by opening ginneries at Port Herald and Karonga. The results were promising, but the government obstructed African cotton-growing in Blantyre and Zomba districts, the main areas of white production. This helped depress wage-levels on white plantations, which were lower than anywhere else in southern Africa. Africans living on the extensive tracts alienated to whites were tenants-at-will, forced either to grow cash-crops at a price fixed by the local planter, or to provide labour in exchange for rent and taxes — a practice known as *thangata*. Planters could exact such servitude partly because the law approved it but also because it offered at least some hope of subsistence to the wretched Lomwe villagers (known pejoratively as Nguru) who fled to the Shire highlands from still worse conditions in Portuguese territory.³ Once in Nyasaland, such Lomwe were trapped; they were not simply temporary labour migrants but permanent emigrants who had brought their families, and these were liable to eviction if their menfolk sought work elsewhere. Thus the Lomwe were at once the most exploited group within the protectorate and also, in a sense, the most crucial: their very cheap labour made possible Nyasaland's own modest exports of commodities and also stimulated its exports of labour.

The new economic order bore hardly on many of those who had organised local exploitation in the nineteenth century. The slave-trade was suppressed: by 1912 Company officials had halted the export of men from north-western Northern Rhodesia to Angola and the cocoa plantations of São Tomé. The ivory trade was crippled by customs duties and restrictions on African ownership of guns. The Yao, around the southern end of Lake Malawi, had lately been prosperous caravan traders; instead, they tried cotton-growing but transport cost too much. They thus turned to wage labour, first as unskilled porters, then as policemen and as soldiers with the King's African Rifles, for whom they usually provided half of Nyasaland's two battalions. Yet the system they upheld impoverished their home: by 1938 the once-thriving country of the Yao chief Makanjira could no longer feed itself and was designated a 'distressed area'. Colonial rule also

³ See chapter 10, p. 505.

undermined regimes which had relied on raiding, tribute levies and the accumulation of cattle. Whites took much land from the Ndebele and the Ngoni kingdom of Mpezeni, and confiscated cattle from them and from Gomani's Ngoni. The sale of the remaining Ngoni herds was checked by the spread of tsetse from about 1905, the result of official protection of game and the concentration of villages to facilitate colonial control. Both Ngoni and Ndebele were largely drawn into migrant labour, and their agriculture suffered from lack of manpower. Eastern Northern Rhodesia and parts of central Nyasaland sank into an ecological crisis, as game increased (following a ban on African use of guns), the bush expanded and sleeping-sickness spread.

For the rulers of the Lozi kingdom, on the upper Zambezi, the colonial economy was at first less damaging. They lost no land to white settlers, and special treaties concluded with the Company in 1898 and 1900 had preserved important privileges, even if these were later reduced. From 1906 Lozi chiefs received a fixed percentage of taxes; they also benefited from their ownership of mound sites in the fertile Zambezi flood plain and their control of cattle and tribute. The end of domestic slavery in 1906 deprived councillors of a valuable source of cheap labour, but it did not much affect the king, who retained some rights to tribute labour in his fields. The cattle of Lozi herds had largely escaped the rinderpest epidemic which had swept through eastern and southern Africa in the 1890s; they were thus in much demand from mines and white farms. King Lewanika, the most substantial cattle-owner, also grew maize and vegetables for sale to whites and had canals dug to increase the area of fertile land. In 1915, however, the Lozi cattle-trade was suddenly checked, following an outbreak of pleuro-pneumonia which officials sought to control by banning stock movements. With the loss of an income from cattle, Lozi rulers became increasingly dependent on government pensions. Labour migration sharply increased, which impeded labour-intensive tasks such as canal-digging.

The peoples of northern Nyasaland were also obliged to seek cash through wage-earning, but were better placed than most to do so. The schools of the Scottish Livingstonia Mission imparted skills of language and literacy which enabled northern Nyasas to obtain positions of comparative privilege in the labour centres of Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Katanga, as well as gaining

a high proportion of the salaried posts open to Africans in Nyasaland.⁴ Mission-sponsored schemes for agricultural advance were largely unsuccessful in an area where, by the 1930s, half the able-bodied men were absent from their homeland. But by remitting money home in order to buy education for their families, northern Nyasas were able to maintain a certain freedom of choice in relation to the labour market which other Central Africans were denied.

The southward flow of labour migrants across the Zambezi was partly due to the early success of Africans in Southern Rhodesia in producing for the market. It has been estimated that in 1903 their sales of grain and stock were worth £350,000, nearly three times their earnings from wages.⁵ Most were Shona: some, like the Duma of the south-east, added the production of maize for the colonial market to a continuing internal trade in grain to their neighbours, the Hlengwe. Others, like the Shangwe of the Inyoka country, expanded the production of indigenous tobacco for sale to white traders. By 1914 this enabled the Shangwe not only to pay their hut-tax but to buy clothing, blankets, beads and enamel ware. In a few places, especially near Salisbury and Bulawayo, Sotho and Zulu evangelists bought land on which they employed wage labourers to grow vegetables for the urban market. Sales of ploughs to Africans expanded rapidly. All the same, increases in production resulted mainly from rising inputs of labour, so that the consequences for indigenous economies were not entirely beneficial: hunting and village crafts suffered, and habits of ecological control were neglected in the pursuit of cash incomes.

For all the transforming effects of colonial rule, many Africans were touched only marginally by them before 1914. So few administrators were posted to the northern province of Nyasaland and the huge areas beyond the line of rail in Northern Rhodesia that the payment of tax was often avoided. As late as 1921, many people in the Balovale, Kalabo and Nalolo districts near the Angola border were said to have never paid tax. Some local industries were undoubtedly injured by competition from imported mass-produced goods sold by store-keepers — Indians in

⁴ See below, p. 617.

⁵ G. Arrighi, 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianisation of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', in G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, *Essays on the political economy of Africa* (New York and London, 1973), 185, 225.

Nyasaland, Jews and Greeks in Northern Rhodesia; but others survived and even flourished. Fish from the Luapula were supplied to neighbouring cultivators, as of old, as well as to the Katanga mines. High transport costs could insulate local industries from overseas competition. Salt-production persisted near Mpika, in Northern Rhodesia, and on the shores of Lake Chilwa in Nyasaland. In parts of central and western Northern Rhodesia, iron hoes continued to be made and in the 1930s were regarded as better than imported German hoes.

CLASS, RACE AND POLITICS, 1905–1914

The birth of the new economy was associated with the emergence of new forms of racial and social division. For the infant settler communities, racial dominance was as much a matter of economic necessity as of cultural preference. White farmers and mine-owners were at one in requiring regular supplies of cheap, unskilled labour, and to this end they agitated for measures that would reduce the capacity of Africans to function as independent agricultural producers and that would force them into taking employment with whites. Though a formal structure of racial discrimination in economic affairs was not completed in Southern Rhodesia until the 1930s, many elements existed in practice from the early years of the century. Europeans in all three territories were provided with privileged access to land and were supported by discriminatory taxation systems aimed at forcing Africans into European employment. Public funds were largely devoted to European activities. An informal colour bar existed throughout industry, devised not only to protect European workers from African competition, but also to limit the social costs that employers were required to bear.

Maintenance of white supremacy thus became the central, if largely undiscussed, imperative of settler politics, though conflicts of interest occurred where English-speakers clashed with Afrikaners and workers with their employers or where small farmers and large mine-owners competed for African labour. The 'farmers' revolt' of 1911–12 in Southern Rhodesia is a notable example. When a labour-tax was levied on employers to meet the administrative costs of the RNLB, more than 800 white farmers refused to pay on the grounds that the bureau benefited only the

monopolising companies. Several farmers went to gaol before the government abandoned the measure. Settlers frequently criticised the policy of the British South Africa Company concerning railway rates and mining royalties, and the Company's claims to the ownership of unalienated land. Several sectional interest groups were formed to press the claims of farmers, mine-owners and businessmen. As the economic strength of Southern Rhodesia's national bourgeoisie grew, so their political influence widened. Elected representatives in the legislative council were conceded a *de facto* majority by the Company in 1907. The next year, with the election to the council of Charles Coghlan, a Bulawayo lawyer, they obtained a leader of stature who was to guide them to self-government; their majority was further increased in 1914.

While settlers sought to extend their influence over the central government, African wage-earners in Southern Rhodesia were involved in a desperate struggle for survival. Most were migrant workers, employed as miners or on European farms and paid as single men on the comfortable assumption that their families could sustain themselves through subsistence cultivation near their villages. Wages tended to fall during the period of reconstruction in the mining industry from 1903 to 1912 and living conditions also deteriorated as the number of miners increased. Overcrowding became a basic feature of compound life; hospital provision was virtually non-existent on the smaller mines and even on the larger mines was frequently confined to a hut staffed by an unqualified orderly; food supplies were so inadequate that scurvy became common; pneumonia and dysentery also spread through the squalid, draughty compounds. In 1906 the death-rate among African miners averaged 76 per 1,000 and in the next year 153 black miners out of every 1,000 in the Gwanda district died, scurvy being the greatest killer. With mortality rates so high, criticisms from settlers and missionaries in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia could not be entirely ignored, and from 1908 government labour legislation began to be enforced with the aim of reducing the death-rate in the compounds, and thus protecting Southern Rhodesia's labour supply. By 1912 the death-rate had fallen to 35 per 1,000; ten years later it was down to 21. But while genuine improvements in food supplies and medical treatment took place the results should not be overemphasised. Only 16 of

the 488 mines in Southern Rhodesia in 1913 were said to have 'good, properly equipped hospitals'; hundreds of cases of scurvy continued to occur.⁶

Wherever African wage-earners were employed in large numbers — on the railways or in the public works department as well as on the mines — compounds were created to facilitate labour control. The central problem facing employers was how to coerce the first generation of workers into meeting industrial demands, while at the same time preventing them from using their collective muscle to press for improvements in living standards. The solution arrived at — the compound system — derived from innovations at the Kimberley diamond-mines in the 1880s, but it developed some distinctive Rhodesian features. While most compounds offered open access to traders and local farmers, some compounds in the larger mines had a closed inner core in which were housed the workers most likely to desert. These were the men who had been bound by labour recruiters to long-term contracts (a system known locally as *chibaro*, slavery), as opposed to the monthly contracts offered to the 'voluntary' workers who were engaged at the mine itself. Within the compound area the manager, supported by the compound police, exerted a quasi-military form of control, fining, gaoling and whipping workers in the drive to increase production and eliminate inefficiency. This system was sustained by the use of the Masters and Servants Act which made it a criminal offence to break a labour contract, by pass-laws which hindered the free movement of labour and by the widespread readiness of government officials to disregard assaults made by Europeans on Africans in the normal course of work. Where prosecutions could not be avoided, settler juries demonstrated a reluctance to convict. Time and again, white miners charged with culpable homicide were found not guilty on the grounds that their African victims suffered from 'enlarged spleens', a common consequence of malaria.

Yet if the path to effective organisation was scattered with daunting obstacles, labour migrants were by no means passive victims of the new industrial economy. Independent workers exchanged news of wages and working conditions in different parts of the labour market, and used this information to determine

⁶ Quoted by Charles van Onselen, *Chibaro. African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900–1933* (London, 1976), 39.

where they should work and with whom. Despite the constraints of the pass system, desertion from unpopular employers frequently took place, the general tendency being for workers to percolate southwards to the higher wage economy of the Rand. Though formal combination was largely lacking among miners prior to the 1920s, discontent was expressed through 'loafing', slowdowns and acts of minor sabotage, and several strikes took place — for example at the Ayrshire mine in August 1908, as a protest against wage reductions, and again at Wankie colliery in 1912, when about a hundred men were involved. Worker consciousness at an embryonic level was thus clearly revealed, though it manifested itself more effectively in the informal acts of individual workers than it did in strikes and other larger-scale protests which employers, supported by the state, were able to suppress.

It has often been asserted that military considerations were of little importance in explaining the maintenance of European rule in Central Africa.⁷ The comment is valid in the sense that few policemen and administrators were employed and that outlying regions were only lightly patrolled, but in other respects it is highly misleading. Most officials shared with Sir Ian Hamilton, the inspector-general of the British Overseas Forces, the belief, expressed in 1911, that 'for years to come it is by the sword and rifle alone that the white man must retain his hold on the country'.⁸ Control over the balance of power was jealously preserved through rigorous restrictions on African ownership of firearms and through the establishment of colonial armies. The British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia was an élite para-military force consisting in 1913 of 550 whites (an exceptionally large figure by colonial standards),⁹ plus 600 black constables armed not with rifles but with knobkerries. They could rely on the support of virtually all European males, some of them active in the Volunteers or in rifle clubs, as well as of the semi-official compound police, strategically placed in the mines and townships. One of the two Nyasaland battalions of the King's

⁷ See, for example, Lewis H. Gann, *Central Africa: the former British states* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1971), 102–3.

⁸ Quoted in Martin Chanock, *Unconsummated union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa 1900–45* (Manchester, 1977), 21.

⁹ In contrast, there were only 332 European policemen and soldiers employed in the four British West African colonies in 1939. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, 'The thin white line: the size of the British colonial service in Africa', *African Affairs*, 1980, 79, no. 314, 39.

African Rifles (KAR) was permanently stationed at Zomba whence it made periodic sweeps through the country. Some 750 Africans armed with rifles served in the Northern Rhodesia Police in 1912 and took part in various shows of strength and punitive expeditions.

Military superiority provided the basis of colonial rule; informal collaboration ensured its continued success. Even in Southern Rhodesia where white settlers, 'the ideal prefabricated collaborators',¹⁰ acted informally as agents of the ruling power, the effective functioning of the labour system was dependent on African intermediaries — 'boss-boys', messengers and policemen — and further north the influence of such men was still more deeply felt. Office messengers played a large part in the day-to-day running of administrative districts, and in return they were rewarded with favours: wages that were higher than average, and exemption from manual work. Chiefs in theory were little more than underpaid policemen before the 1930s, but in practice they relieved the colonial authorities of responsibility for hearing civil disputes among Africans, and also assisted in the collection of taxes and in the recruiting of labour for the government. Mpezeni II was so anxious to bolster Ngoni authority against the counter-claims of his Chewa subjects that he actively assisted in recruiting carriers during the First World War. Though the powers of the Lozi monarchy were drastically reduced between 1898 and 1911, Lewanika continued to ally himself to the Company and in 1916 raised 2,000 men to act as military porters.

African responses to colonial rule were conditioned by the growing differentiation taking place within and between societies from the early years of the century. Colonial capitalism developed unevenly, so that Africans were drawn in different ways and with different skills into the new economy. Even among underground miners, distinctions existed between the despised *chibaro* workers, usually drawn from peripheral areas uninvolved in cash-crop farming, and 'voluntary' workers whose knowledge of market conditions equipped them to reject the advances of the labour recruiter. Where different levels of skills were required, the distinction became much clearer. Production processes in the

¹⁰ A phrase coined by Ronald Robinson, 'Non-European foundations of European imperialism', in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the theory of imperialism* (London, 1972), 124.

mines and railways, together with the bureaucratic needs of the government, ensured that some Africans were employed as clerks and hospital assistants and others in skilled or supervisory positions as foremen, machinists and the like. Western education, the virtual monopoly of Christian missions up to the 1930s, was thus an important differentiating factor; it was particularly accessible to 'Nyasas' from the sphere of influence of the Livingstonia Mission in the Northern Province — comprising 60 per cent of all schools in the protectorate in 1906. By 1915, more than 800 students had passed through the Overtoun Institution, most of whom followed a spell as teachers in mission employment with work as clerks and interpreters for the governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland or for the mining companies of the south. Other centres of educational influence were established in the Shire highlands, by the Blantyre Mission, and in the Lozi heartland, where the foundation of the government-sponsored Barotse National School in 1906 provided a valuable stimulus to the work of the Paris Missionary Society. Training institutions were also founded south of the Zambezi, for example at Mount Silinda and Nenguwo (renamed in 1915 the Waddilove Institution) and at Epworth close to Salisbury. But in general Christian education was slow in getting under way in Central Africa, for while missions spread widely in the aftermath of colonial occupation, many were newcomers weakly rooted in the local environment and active in the provision only of the most elementary training.

For many villagers in those marginal areas regarded as labour reserves by the colonial authorities, small-scale protests against labour recruitment and tax-collection constituted the main political response to colonial rule. In North-Eastern Rhodesia, 'malcontents' attempted to escape the authority of headmen, chiefs and white officials by settling next to gardens deep in the woodland. Labour recruiters were sometimes attacked. Armed resistance, provoked by the imposition of tax, took place among the Bisa in 1903, the Gwembe Tonga in 1909 and the southern Lunda in 1912. As chiefs were drawn into the colonial administrative structure, rural discontent was most frequently articulated by religious leaders. Prophets in southern Nyasaland in 1907, and again among the Gwembe Tonga in 1909, denounced the payment of taxes and called for the removal of Europeans. In Southern

Rhodesia, African collaborators were also sometimes attacked. In 1904 the rainmaker Manyanga was quoted as stating that 'the Native Messengers [policemen] would no longer trouble the natives... That if the whites were driven from the country the messengers would disappear with them and that those who did not side with him would also disappear with the whites.'¹¹

In those few districts where Christian élites were strong African resistance took a different form. The growth of literate groups provoked tensions between them and those who were unable to gain admission to school or church, but were likewise enmeshed in a settler labour economy. Among the Tonga and Tumbuka of northern Nyasaland, from the early years of the century, Christian sectarianism provided the outlet through which the resentment of the unprivileged was expressed. In 1908 the return of the Tonga migrant, Elliott Kamwana, from South Africa to his homeland precipitated an outburst of Christian millenarianism.¹² Drawing on the Watch Tower teachings of Charles Taze Russell, Kamwana denounced established authorities, clerical and secular, and promised salvation at the approaching millennium in October 1914, when all those who accepted his message would come into their own. Within a few months more than 9,000 converts had been made, most of them people who were frustrated by their failure to get into the church and resented Livingstonia's monopoly over western education. Though Watch Tower suffered with the deportation of Kamwana in 1909, the needs of the disadvantaged continued to be proclaimed in northern Nyasaland by Seventh Day Baptist pastors, in particular Charles Domingo. Domingo, a prize product of Livingstonia's educational system, looked beyond the creation of Christian communities to the establishment of a rival network of schools offering to the poor and isolated what the mission had been unable to provide. The experiences of his poverty-stricken parishioners informed his critique of colonial society. 'Nyasaland Europeans are as *cruel as anything*,' he wrote in an angry indictment of conditions on settler estates. For if labourers refused to work on the Sabbath (Saturday), 'they will be *dismissed* from the employment, and will *fail* to get some money to pay for their hut tax. The *native police will come*, and arrest them;

¹¹ Quoted in Charles van Onselen, 'The role of collaborators in the Rhodesian mining industry, 1900-1935', *African Affairs*, 1973, 72, no. 289, 414.

¹² See pp. 151-2.

they will be severely punished for their *disobedience* and Christianity will not sweeten them.’¹³

While the disadvantaged sought to reunite societies divided against themselves by western influence, clerks, teachers and other members of the educated élite more frequently tried to maintain and extend privileges gained during the early years of the century. In centralised kingdoms, where vestiges of political authority survived, educated Christians combined with sections of the aristocracy in pressing on the government plans for ‘tribal’ improvement. Though Lewanika’s plans for making his kingdom strong and economically efficient were largely frustrated by the British South Africa Company, he continued right up to his death in 1916 to associate himself with those modernising influences which he believed would strengthen the monarchy. In 1904 he invited black South African missionaries of the African Methodist Episcopal Church to Barotseland in an unsuccessful attempt to establish better schools than those provided by the Paris Mission. When the scheme collapsed, he changed his tactics and from 1906 joined with mission-educated Lozi, in particular the chief councillor Mokamba, in sending petitions to the British high commissioner complaining about the Company’s encroachments on Lozi sovereignty and the small percentage of hut-tax that went to the royal exchequer. In Matabeleland too, the idea of monarchy became a focus for political activity. Two sons of Lobengula, educated in South Africa, became for a short time up to 1910 the centre of a campaign for the restoration of the Ndebele kingship. Educated Christians in Bulawayo argued for the strengthening of the Ndebele state.

Black settlers from South Africa were the most experienced exponents of the politics of privilege, but they too sometimes gravitated into schemes for ‘tribal’ improvement. From the 1890s a stream of South African drivers, store assistants and interpreters had moved into Southern Rhodesia. Anxious to escape from the disabilities imposed on the indigenous population, they formed a number of associations to press their claims on the government. Loyalty to Britain was loudly proclaimed along with such moderate requests as that they should receive exemption from the pass-laws and be allowed to walk on the pavements of towns (a

¹³ Quoted in John McCracken, *Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 1875–1940* (Cambridge, 1977), 216–17.

privilege reserved for whites). The Company's contemptuous rejection of these petitions bred a sense of disillusionment, and by the First World War individual black settlers were rejecting their alliance with the whites in favour of African contacts. John Hlazo, the leader of a group of 'colonial boys' settled by Rhodes at Bembesi as a buffer against the Ndebele, is a typical example. When the Company attempted to evict him and his followers from their land in 1916, Hlazo reacted by turning to more radical tactics. He hired a South African lawyer, Alfred Mangena, to fight his case and then joined Mangena in the Matabele Native Home Movement of the early 1920s, led by Nyamanda, the son of Lobengula. New kinds of expertise from the south thus entered into Ndebele politics and influenced their subsequent direction.

THE PRESSURES OF WAR

The outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Germany in August 1914 had important repercussions for many of the inhabitants of British Central Africa. Skirmishing began almost at once on the long border separating Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from German East Africa, but the scale of operations remained small until the start of the British invasion of the southern highlands of Tanganyika in May 1916.¹⁴ As the invasion proceeded, the overall commander, General Smuts, came to recognise that the white troops upon whom he had mainly relied were unable to cope with the demanding climatic and physical conditions. In consequence African troops, mostly from the KAR, were largely employed in the final, most arduous stage of the campaign, the pursuit of Lettow-Vorbeck's army through Portuguese East Africa and back to Northern Rhodesia. When the war ended on 18 November 1918, a week after the signing of the armistice in Europe, von Lettow's troops were still in the field and heading south from Kasama.

The war had an uneven impact on the region. In Southern Rhodesia the effect was comparatively slight. Out of a white population of 27,000, 5,000 white men volunteered for service in Europe or East Africa but only two battalions of African troops were recruited along with a handful of porters. At no time did the war spill onto Southern Rhodesian soil. The northern

¹⁴ See chapter 13, p. 666.

colonies, however, were deeply and destructively involved. Some 15,000 soldiers, about half the total strength of the KAR, were recruited in Nyasaland; 1,741 died on active service. Nyasaland also supplied 197,000 military porters, most of whom served for only limited periods. In Northern Rhodesia, 3,500 troops and between 50,000 and 100,000 porters were recruited, the great bulk from the north-east of the country. With the intensification of the war from 1916, districts which had previously avoided all but minimal contacts with the colonial state were fully exposed to its brusque demands. Villages in Northern Rhodesia within forty miles of the border were arbitrarily uprooted. Policemen press-ganged reluctant recruits in nocturnal raids. Large quantities of cattle and grain were impounded for military use. Chiefs and headmen called upon to recruit were confronted with an agonising dilemma. Those, like Mpezeni II of the Fort Jameson Ngoni, who complied with government demands reaped the hatred of their subjects, but those who refused to provide porters risked being deposed. Once the invasion of Tanganyika began, conditions for carriers deteriorated. Supplies had to be carried over vast distances, medical attention was virtually non-existent, food was in short supply. According to official figures, deaths among carriers from Nyasaland on active service amounted to less than 5 per cent,¹⁵ but many of the survivors returned home starving, disease-ridden and exhausted, to succumb during the famines of 1917 and 1918 which were caused largely by the requisitioning of food supplies.

The intensity and persistence of the war affected families far from the battle-front. As the price of imported goods became prohibitive, bark cloth replaced mass-produced textiles in many homes and locally smelted hoes reappeared. In Southern Rhodesia, the war increased demand for maize and cattle, thus buoying up African farmers in spite of white competition; it was the post-war slump in 1921 which tipped the scales against them. In the Shire valley, in Nyasaland, African cotton output increased up to 1916, only to fall away with the drain of manpower to war service. Mining flourished in the Rhodesias. In the south, gold output reached its all-time peak in 1914–17. War needs stimulated the production of base metals; by 1916 chrome contributed 8 per cent of Southern Rhodesia's exports, while in Northern Rhodesia

¹⁵ G. W. T. Hodges, 'African manpower statistics for the British forces in East Africa, 1914–1918', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 109.

copper was exported from Bwana Mkubwa in 1916–18 and lead from Broken Hill was the territory's chief export from 1917 to 1925. This activity, and the rapid growth of copper output in Katanga, was fuelled by increased coal-production at Wankie. But as import prices rose, such efforts were only made possible by tightening still further the screws on African workers. In village and mine alike, war-work critically lowered resistance to disease. In September 1918 the influenza pandemic swept through Southern Rhodesia, killing 7 per cent of black mineworkers. In November it reached Blantyre; some 17,000 deaths were reported in or near the principal European stations of Nyasaland, and thousands more died in villages where doctors could not reach them.

It is difficult to generalise about the effects of the war on African attitudes. Some soldiers, attracted to the army in the early years by skilful propaganda and the offer of above-average wages, developed a lasting sense of regimental loyalty. It was through the efforts of such men, returning from Tanganyika, that the new, military-style *beni* dance societies were spread throughout Central Africa in the 1920s. For many others, however, wartime service was an embittering experience. John Chilembwe, the American-trained pastor of the Providence Industrial Mission in the Shire highlands, expressed a widely held view when he complained in November 1914 that 'the poor Africans who have nothing to own in this present world, who in death, leave only a long line of widows and orphans in utter want and dire distress, are invited to die for a cause which is not theirs'.¹⁶ Though the fundamental explanation for the short-lived rising led by Chilembwe in January 1915 must be sought in the grievances of landless Lomwe labour-tenants on European estates, who were driven to revolt by the hopelessness of their economic predicament, there is little doubt that resentment against forced African participation in the war was an important subsidiary factor.

Other manifestations of anti-war feeling took a wide variety of forms. The millennial doctrine of Watch Tower had been introduced by Nyasa migrants to the Southern Rhodesian mines about 1910. Seven years later it was carried into the far north-east of Northern Rhodesia which had been particularly disrupted by

¹⁶ Quoted in George Shepperson and Thomas Price, *Independent African* (Edinburgh, 1958), 235.

the war. Hundreds of Mambwe flocked to join the movement, which rejected not only colonial authority but the authority of chiefs as well. In Nyasaland too, Watch Tower services reflected a mood of resentment. 'The white men say the war is finished, where are your children?', went one Watch Tower hymn, with the grim refrain: 'You may shave your heads', that is, 'you may go into mourning'.¹⁷ Some Nyasas, most of them independent farmers, looked to the village-based Nyau secret society to defend them against alien cultural influences, though many more turned to mission Christianity, whose increased popularity was related in part to the increased responsibilities given to African pastors and evangelists during the war. Clerks and teachers used native or welfare associations to protect their limited gains. Based on Livingstonia and Karonga, where the first association had been founded by mission graduates in 1912, these bodies spread and took on a new, more aggressive character in the immediate aftermath of the war. Members called unavailingly on the government to reward their military efforts and complained at its failure to prevent the fall in real wages caused by the growth of inflation. 'It is unquestionable to everybody,' an association minute recorded in 1921, 'that natives since the hideous war broke out, find great difficulty in supporting themselves and find that goods in stores are beyond their means.'¹⁸

WHITE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1918–1940

In the decade before 1923 the main issue of white politics in the Rhodesias was the creation of a new form of government to replace chartered company rule. Even before the war the Company had expressed reluctance to continue carrying the burden of administration indefinitely, and this feeling intensified when in 1918 the Privy Council decided that ownership of unalienated land was vested in the Crown, not the Company. Since the Company had failed to achieve the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, which settlers in both territories opposed, it looked increasingly to union with South Africa as the best means of obtaining adequate financial compensation for its assets. This

¹⁷ Quoted in McCracken, *Politics and Christianity*, 226.

¹⁸ Malawi National Archives S1/210/20, Minutes of the Mombera Native Association, 26–27 September, 1921.

policy was actively supported by the South African prime minister, Smuts, who hoped that Southern Rhodesia's incorporation into the Union would be an important step in South Africa's northward march into the interior of the continent. It was also favoured in the British Colonial Office, where the view was held that union would strengthen imperial and anti-republican interests in southern Africa generally. However, many whites in Southern Rhodesia aspired instead to 'responsible government' (which in effect meant self-government for the white minority). Farmers, anxious to prevent the Rand mines from competing for African labour on equal terms, founded the Responsible Government Association in 1917 and under Coghlan's leadership it gained the support of most European artisans. In the constitutional referendum of 1922 the cause of responsible government prevailed by 8,774 votes to 5,989. Tobacco farmers anxious to penetrate the South African market combined with Company officials, wealthy businessmen and Afrikaners to swell the Unionist vote, but popular distrust of big business and of Afrikaners gave the victory to Coghlan. Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing colony in October 1923, though in theory at least the franchise remained colour-blind, while (again, in theory) some restrictions were placed on the powers that the elected assembly could exercise over African affairs. A year later Northern Rhodesia was transferred to the control of the Colonial Office; since the total white population was less than 5,000, it was agreed that there could be no question as yet of self-government. The chartered company retained its railways and its mineral concessions, thus remaining the largest commercial force in the region.

The change of government in Southern Rhodesia did not result in any sudden change in direction. Once responsible government had been won, Coghlan widened the base of his support by introducing several former Unionists into his Cabinet. Under his leadership and that of H. U. Moffat, who succeeded him as premier in 1927, a cautious policy was followed aimed at safeguarding the interests of foreign, in particular mining, capital as well as those of white farmers. The country's overseas trade still depended heavily on mineral production, and this was concentrated in a few firms. Gold exports continued to predominate, though during the 1920s the average annual output was only two-thirds that in 1914-17. Nine goldmines accounted for more

than two-thirds of output; the total number of goldmines fell from 466 in 1923 to 290 in 1929. By then, Southern Rhodesia had become one of the world's principal sources of asbestos and chrome, which together contributed £1.5m to exports (almost a quarter of the total); the greater part came from three mines. During the mid-1920s coal-production expanded very rapidly, and by 1929 the mining industry as a whole employed 47,000 Africans and 1,700 whites. Its preference for cheap food was countered by the government's concern to protect white farming and thus encourage further white settlement. White ranchers in the south-west captured the market for cattle in Katanga from whites in Northern Rhodesia, but this counted for little compared with South African resistance to importing food from Southern Rhodesia. For a while, the best hope for white farmers seemed to be tobacco: from 1919, tobacco from the Rhodesias and Nyasaland enjoyed preference over American tobacco in the British market. The tobacco boom of 1926–7 lifted exports to over £1m; it quickly collapsed, but the government rescued farmers by purchasing their unsold crop. Between 1921 and 1931 the white population increased by a half to just over 50,000.

In Northern Rhodesia, the first years of Colonial Office rule also favoured white settlers. Sir Herbert Stanley, the first governor, had been resident commissioner in Salisbury, and he looked to settlers to rescue the territory from chronic indebtedness. In 1925 a legislative council was set up, including a minority of settlers elected on a franchise which effectively excluded Africans. Between 1928 and 1930, land was set aside for whites along the line of rail and around Fort Jameson and Abercorn, and some 60,000 Africans were moved into reserves. The country shared in the tobacco boom of 1926–7 and though the Broken Hill mine encountered problems in producing lead, its zinc and vanadium constituted the chief exports in 1928–30. By then, however, it seemed clear that the most likely source of future prosperity was copper. The rapid expansion of electrical and automobile industries after the First World War caused a sharp rise in world demand for copper. In 1922 new capital was invested in Bwana Mkubwa mine and the British South Africa Company adopted a policy of granting exclusive mining concessions to large firms. Mining financiers in South Africa and the USA took a new interest in the copper deposits around the headwaters of the Kafue

river and with advanced prospecting techniques revealed the existence of huge ore-bodies of copper sulphide, mostly far below the surface deposits of oxides to which mining had hitherto been confined. By 1930, four large new mines were being developed: Mufulira and Roan Antelope, controlled by the American-dominated Rhodesian Selection Trust; and Nkana and Nchanga, controlled by Ernest Oppenheimer's Anglo American Corporation, the largest of the South African mining finance houses. Bustling company towns grew up at each of the mines; roads and feeder railways were constructed. By 1930 nearly 4,000 whites and 30,000 Africans were at work on mines in Northern Rhodesia; the total white population had risen to 13,000.

In Nyasaland, the scope for white enterprise was sharply reduced. In the post-war slump, many estates failed and the initiative in cash-crop production passed to African farmers. By 1929 some 47,500, mostly in Lilongwe and Dowa districts, were producing two-thirds of Nyasaland's output of tobacco, which from 1917 to 1937 remained its chief export. Europeans, who numbered less than 2,000, concentrated on capital-intensive, flue-cured tobacco and on tea, mostly grown on company estates which still employed Lomwe workers from Mozambique at starvation wages. Such immigrants also worked for African cotton-growers, mainly in the Shire valley, and enabled them to achieve preponderance during the 1920s. But the interests of both white and black farmers were firmly subordinated to grand imperial strategy. In 1919 Britain arranged for the British-dominated Mozambique Company to build a railway through its own territory from Beira to Chindio, Nyasaland's outlet on the Zambezi. This had no commercial justification; it was only intended to reinforce British influence in Mozambique.¹⁹ Yet the railway was financed by a loan on which the Nyasaland government was obliged to guarantee interest payments. The line was opened in 1923 but scarcely covered its working costs, despite freight charges which seriously handicapped producers in Nyasaland. Exports between the wars reached a peak in 1927, when they were worth £963,000; annual revenue was seldom more than £350,000. The government was only able to service the railway loan by borrowing in turn from the British government: this loan (which was at least interest-free) amounted to £1.2m by 1936.

¹⁹ See chapter 10, p. 512.

The world trade depression in the early 1930s made an immediate and prolonged impact on Central Africa. Southern Rhodesia weathered it best, thanks to the rise in gold prices which followed Britain's departure from the gold standard in 1931. Small workers were attracted back to the industry; by 1936 the ten largest mines produced only 37 per cent of total output and this was rising steadily: though it never reached the 1916 peak, by 1939 it was worth over £6m (60 per cent of all exports). Lower-grade ores became profitable and African employment in the industry doubled during the decade. By contrast, asbestos- and chrome-mining was set back severely, though the former expanded rapidly from 1935. Meanwhile, the onset of the depression had intensified white impatience with the British South Africa Company's enjoyment of mineral rights; in 1933 they were bought by the Southern Rhodesian government for £2m.

For farmers, both white and black, the depression threatened disaster. Many white farmers in the late 1920s were still undercapitalised and inefficient, too poor to risk technical innovation and dangerously vulnerable to fluctuations in price. As demand for their products slackened, their fear of African competition increased and they turned to the government for help. Almost half the legislative council were or had been farmers, and from 1930 the government began to intervene in the marketing of maize, tobacco and dairy produce; it tried to sustain domestic prices and promote exports by enforcing and financing improvements in quality. Many white farmers were saved from ruin by loans from the Land Bank. Tobacco-growers, handicapped in 1930 by South Africa's protective import quota, were much helped when Southern Rhodesia joined Britain in leaving the gold standard. This gave their product an important advantage over American tobacco in sterling markets and exports to Britain expanded considerably even though yields per acre were half those in the USA and Canada.

The most far-reaching measure of protection for white farmers, and indeed other white businessmen, was the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. This largely incorporated the recommendations of the Morris Carter Land Commission, which had been set up in 1925 in response to the desire of most whites to prevent Africans from buying land adjoining their own. Under the Act, 49 million acres (just over half the total land area), including all urban land, were reserved for European use or purchase. Outside

the existing reserves for Africans, 7.4 million acres were set aside as Native Purchase Areas; most were in low-lying, tsetse-infested border country. Africans on European land who were not employed as agricultural labourers were given six years to quit. This measure was not fully enforced, partly because many white farmers still required the services of their African tenants and partly because the reserves could not accommodate all those threatened with expulsion; yet over the next decade as many as 50,000 additional Africans may have been crowded into the reserves.

Despite its assistance to white farmers, Moffat's government faced rising opposition. There were widespread complaints against high railway rates, and many white artisans had lost their jobs. In 1933 the Reform Party, led by Godfrey Huggins, a Salisbury surgeon, replaced the Rhodesia Party in office. Huggins's overall majority was soon threatened by dissent within his own party, and in the interests of stable government it mostly joined the Rhodesia Party in forming the United Party; under Huggins, this governed Southern Rhodesia for the next 20 years. The all-white Labour Party retained five seats, but it was effectively neutralised in 1934 by the Industrial Conciliation Act, which extended the framework of economic segregation from the countryside to the towns and mines. The Act was modelled on South African legislation of 1924; it protected white artisans by obliging employers in townships to pay skilled black workers at the same rates as whites while at the same time excluding Africans from membership of recognised trade unions. Provision was made for the training of white apprentices in a variety of trades; African youths were deliberately excluded. In the same year, the government revised the maize marketing system in order to protect the smaller white farmer against both the larger farmer and the African producer. Both these measures, like land apportionment, had required and received the assent of the British government.

In one sense, the apparatus of economic protection for whites was clearly segregationist, but its effect was to make blacks and whites ever more interdependent. Restrictions on African production and combination kept down the price of African labour, and the number of black wage-earners rose from 179,000 in 1931 to 300,000 in 1941 (about twice the rate of increase in the previous decade). Most were still 'alien natives', but the

proportion of Southern Rhodesian blacks continued to rise. It was under such pressure of movement from the land that Huggins sought, in the Native Registration Act of 1936, to emulate South Africa by allowing Africans into towns only if they could prove they had work there or had official permits. When it suited him, Huggins claimed he wanted Africans to be able to rise up a social 'pyramid' alongside that for whites, but little was done to bear this out. Although government revenue had risen by 1939 to £3.5m (which in relation to total population may have been three times that of Northern Rhodesia), this was very largely spent on whites, of whom over a third had been born in the country. The prospects for an African middle class were still very dim. By 1938 only 834 Africans had obtained holdings in Native Purchase Areas. In the reserves, the best efforts of a few agricultural demonstrators could not offset the effects of overcrowding and labour migration. There was no appreciable increase in African maize-production. Greater government provision for African health and primary education was a matter of enlightened self-interest, but even the latter was opposed by many whites, and there was no question of introducing secondary education for Africans.

For Northern Rhodesia, the crucial feature of the depression was the slump in copper prices from late in 1929. The small mine at Bwana Mkubwa had to close, but the big new mines were at a comparative advantage, for they were relatively low-cost producers favoured by high-grade ores. They had to reduce their workforce drastically, but production began at Roan and Nkana in 1931 and at Mufulira in 1933. The price of copper in London rose sharply from 1935 to 1937, due partly to a producers' restriction agreement and partly to growing demand from both Britain and Germany as they rearmed. In 1938 the Copperbelt's output was 213,000 tons, over 13 per cent of the non-communist world's total, and sales were worth almost £9m, some nine-tenths of total exports.

This spectacular growth brought limited gains to Northern Rhodesia. It did not, as yet, do much to stimulate the economy. The mines imported their equipment. They did enlarge the internal market for maize and cattle, but spending-power did not, in this period, increase sufficiently to stimulate local manufacturing. The mine companies' industrial strategy was founded on a dual wage structure and labour-intensive methods of production.

From 1931, suitable unskilled labour was plentiful and therefore cheap, though it was paid better on the mines than elsewhere. White wages, by contrast, were relatively high, since they had to compete with those on the Rand: in the late 1930s the ratio between average white and black earnings was 30 : 1. By the same token, however, there were relatively few whites in the industry: just over 2,000 in 1938, as against 20,000 Africans. Nor did government revenue increase in line with copper sales: between 1929 and 1937 it rose by only a half, to £1m. The British South Africa Company exacted royalties from the mine companies regardless of other production costs; by 1940 total royalties paid since 1923 exceeded £1m and largely compensated the company for the deficits of its administration before 1924. Dividends, first paid in 1935, amounted by 1941 to £7m, rather less than a third of the sum invested in the industry. Taxes were payable in Britain, where the mine companies were domiciled, and only a half-share was forwarded to Northern Rhodesia: in this way, between 1930 and 1940 £2.4m was retained by the British government.

Northern Rhodesia escaped from deficit in 1935 but at the cost of drastic cut-backs: its finances had incurred the additional strain of moving the capital from Livingstone to Lusaka in that year. In 1937 the Colonial Office despatched Sir Alan Pim to find ways of reducing government expenditure and expanding sources of revenue in Northern Rhodesia. Pim's wide-ranging report underlined the artificial burdens of royalties and shared taxation, and the costs of using whites for jobs for which Africans could have been trained. He argued the need for much greater government investment in African welfare: medical services were 'most inadequate', African education was 'very backward and needs extra provision on a considerable scale', and technical assistance to African farmers was almost non-existent.²⁰ This neglect was aggravated by the effects of the reserves policy of the previous decade. The intended new wave of white farmers had not materialised; the land set aside for them reverted to tsetse-infested bush, while reserves became overcrowded and suffered serious food-shortages. Even outside the reserves, production was handicapped by distance from markets and infertile soils. Most households depended on some share in the earnings of migrant workers.

²⁰ *Report of the commission appointed to enquire into the financial and economic position of Northern Rhodesia* (Colonial, no. 145, 1938), 335.

By 1936 more than half the able-bodied male population was away from home and the 60,000 employed within Northern Rhodesia were outnumbered by those employed outside it, mainly in Southern Rhodesia but also in the goldfields and sisal plantations of Tanganyika.

Thus the general poverty of the African population in Northern Rhodesia was due to a combination of natural endowment, industrial strategies and public policy. Although the white population did not exceed 15,000 throughout the 1930s, it exerted considerable influence. Livingstone and Ndola were both municipalities run by elected local authorities and white rate-payers dominated urban local government elsewhere. In 1938 non-officials (all but one of them elected) were given parity of representation with officials in the legislative council and Roy Welensky, a leader of the white railway workers' union, became a member. There was no official colour bar, but neither the government nor the mine companies were eager to antagonise white workers by enlarging opportunities for Africans. In 1938 the government spent more on a thousand white schoolchildren than on its budget for African education, and its first junior secondary school for Africans was opened only in 1939. Most officials were extremely reluctant to see Africans settling in towns; despite the rapid growth of the Copperbelt they firmly believed that Africans there should only be short-stay visitors. The African strikes in 1935²¹ provoked some overdue public discussion of the question, but the modest administrative reforms which followed reflected the belief that even in towns and mines Africans should remain subject to 'tribal' authority. One of the few white critics of this view was Stewart Gore-Browne, a farmer who in 1938 was nominated to represent African interests, and at this stage he was closely allied to Welensky in pressing for some form of white self-government and an end to the burden of mineral royalties and imperial taxation.

Nyasaland in the 1930s suffered not only the effects of the depression but a tightening of the strait-jacket of railway finance. Rates on the Trans-Zambezi railway increased,²² but the government compelled planters to use it and several were ruined.

²¹ See below, p. 640.

²² In 1931 a 2,000lb bale of cotton cost £1 15s od. to transport from Rusape, in Southern Rhodesia, to Beira, but £4 19s od. from Chiromo, in Nyasaland, to Beira, an almost identical distance; and the latter rate was repeatedly raised.

Meanwhile, the British government had given its backing in 1929 to plans for a railway bridge across the Zambezi, while preventing the one thing which might have made it pay — the development of the Moatize coalfield, opposite Tete, which would have challenged Welsh exports to South Africa. Once again, the financing was underpinned by Nyasaland, which paid interest on debentures out of loans from the Colonial Development Fund. When the bridge was opened in 1935, Nyasaland's public debt had swollen to over £5m: this was relatively the heaviest such burden in British colonial Africa, for in that year revenue was only £422,000 and exports worth only £736,000. Between 1930 and 1936 the number of Africans employed within the territory fell from about 80,000 to 50,000 (many of whom were immigrants), and in the latter year as many as 120,000 people from Nyasaland were employed outside its borders. The railway was extended in 1935 from Blantyre to Lake Nyasa, but this had much less effect on the revival of export values in 1934–8 than the expansion of tea-planting due to a favourable international quota secured in 1933; in 1938–9 tea briefly replaced tobacco as the chief export commodity. As elsewhere at the time, the government tried to shore up its revenues by increasing African cash-crop production, but in 1936 it formally acknowledged its dependence on labour exports, in agreements which regularised the recruitment of workers for Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. No great changes in numbers resulted, but the government was now able to control migration more easily and ensure that Nyasaland received some return from the contribution made by its workers elsewhere.

For most Central Africans the decade of the 1930s was bleak. Yet there were important gradations and exceptions within the overall pattern of rural deprivation. Villages were indeed often half-emptied of their men: in northern Nyasaland and eastern and north-eastern Northern Rhodesia the absentee rate was between 40 and 60 per cent. This strained the capacity of those who remained to grow food for themselves, but some communities were able to cope better than others. In northern Nyasaland, the lakeside Tonga adjusted to the loss of male labour by netting fish and cultivating cassava, which women could grow with little or no male assistance. In the woodlands of Northern Rhodesia, male labour was essential for bush clearance and tree-logging. This could be secured if, as among the Mambwe, the men of a village

WHITE POLITICS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

were related to each other, for this facilitated plans to co-ordinate departures to labour centres and thus minimise their impact on local production. Among the Bemba, with different traditions of kinship and marriage, the men of a village were seldom related and such co-operation was much harder to achieve. Tree-cutting was neglected; plots were over-worked; productivity declined and with it resistance to disease. This cycle was all too common, but there were also Africans who continued to make themselves more or less independent of wage-earning. In Northern Rhodesia, mining development in the 1920s had stimulated commercial food-production in reserves near the railway line. Some Plateau Tonga applied lessons learned at missions or on white farms and bought ploughs for growing maize: a few even employed wage labour. In 1935 settler fears of African competition engendered a Maize Control Board to protect their sales, but by then the export market was reviving and African maize sales rapidly increased. With the growth of African fire-cured tobacco-farming in the Lilongwe district of Nyasaland, tsetse-infested bush was put under cultivation and the fly was forced to retreat.

TRIBAL IDENTITY AND THE GROWTH OF MODERN POLITICS, 1920-1940

To an extent that has often been underemphasised by historians, the growth of African politics in the inter-war years was related to the evolution of tribal consciousness. 'Tribe', like 'nation' which it closely resembles, is an ambiguous term applied not only to members of some past or present political organisation (a kingdom or a chieftaincy) but also to people speaking a common language or sharing some other cultural trait. Tribal identity thus implies an attitude of mind rather than membership of an actual social organisation, and as such is subject to constant redefinition. Only occasionally between the wars did it involve men's continued allegiance to a pre-colonial political unit. More frequently it meant the formation of new, but not yet nationalist, forms of cultural and political association.²³

It was in centralised kingdoms still retaining elements of pre-colonial political authority that tribal consciousness first

²³ This definition derives from the discussion of 'tribe' in Andrew Roberts, *A history of Zambia* (London, 1976), 65-6. My analysis of modern tribalism is influenced by John Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), 318-41.

prompted modern political action. In Matabeleland, Lobengula's eldest son, Nyamanda, succeeded from 1918 in drawing together a loose coalition of Ndebele aristocrats to restore the Ndebele monarchy. Helped by the Ethiopian church leader, the Rev. Henry Reed Ngcayiya, he drew up a petition to the king of England calling for the creation of an Ndebele homeland under the protection of the British crown. However, this was rebuffed both by Rhodesian administrators and by the British high commissioner, Prince Arthur, and after October 1921 Nyamanda allowed his campaign to lapse. In Barotseland, Yeta III followed the example of his father, Lewanika, in contesting the British South Africa Company's claims to land in north-western Northern Rhodesia and in calling for imperial protection. In composing his numerous and well-argued petitions, he was helped by educated young advisers, including several of his own sons. After the advent of Colonial Office rule in 1924, Yeta gradually gave up his demands for the restoration of former royal authority, contenting himself with extracting more money from the government for his personal use. Among the northern Ngoni of Nyasaland, the monarchy became the focus for a more sustained anti-colonial protest. When the Ngoni accepted British sovereignty in 1904 the governor, Sir Alfred Sharpe, agreed that the Ngoni paramount, Mbelwa, should retain a wide span of powers denied to other Nyasa chiefs. In 1915, however, these powers were abolished and Mbelwa was deported to the Southern Province after refusing to raise men for the Carrier Corps. Four years later the foundation of the Mombera Native Association by a group of clerks and teachers educated by the Livingstonia mission provided the impetus for the start of a long campaign aimed at restoring Ngoni self-respect through the re-establishment of the old monarchical system. The association secured the return to his homeland in 1920 of the banished paramount, and persuaded the government in 1928 to elevate his successor, Lazaro Jere, to the position of principal headman. Not till 1933, however, was the major aim of the association achieved with the official recognition of Lazaro under the new system of indirect rule as the area's 'native authority'.²⁴

²⁴ This and the succeeding paragraph follow the interpretation of H. Leroy Vail, 'Ethnicity, language and national unity: the case of Malawi', in P. Bonner (ed.), *Working Papers in Southern African studies* (Johannesburg, 1981), 121–63.

The revival of pre-colonial political institutions was accompanied by the emergence of new forms of tribal or ethnic identity. The growth of Tumbuka consciousness in Nyasaland is a particularly striking example. The pre-colonial Tumbuka were a heterogeneous people sharing a common language but lacking any overall political or cultural unity. However, the Overtoun Institution of the Livingstonia Mission became something of a culturally unifying influence among northern Tumbuka villages and teachers who tried to reduce the influence of their former oppressors, the Ngoni. When the government sought chiefs to assist in collecting taxes and recruiting labour they put forward the claims of Chilongozi Gondwe, an educated policeman, who was appointed Chief Chikulamayembe IX in 1907. Although the authority of Chikulamayembe chieftaincy had been effective only in the northern part of Tumbuka country prior to its destruction during the Ngoni conquest, this did not deter the new chief and his supporters from claiming a much more glorious heritage. Livingstonia-educated intellectuals, notably the telegraph clerk Saulos Nyirenda, wrote histories of the Tumbuka exalting the role of the Chikulamayembes, and these accounts were reproduced by the missionary, Cullen Young, in numerous influential publications. Colonial administrators began by opposing the new chief's claims but were gradually won over to his side. When indirect rule was introduced in Nyasaland from 1933 the Chikulamayembe was recognised as native authority for the district north of the Ngoni sphere.

Taking Central Africa as a whole, four features stand out in the evolution of tribal identity. The first is the importance of government administrative policy. In the early years of colonial rule chiefs with very few exceptions were looked upon as no more than administrative assistants to the district officer. As time passed, however, the need for a more effective system of control in the rural areas led to a gradual enhancement in their position. From 1912 principal headmen were appointed in Nyasaland with a limited range of administrative powers, and from the mid-1920s further steps were taken to introduce indirect rule in the northern territories, though not in Southern Rhodesia. Native treasuries were set up in Nyasaland in 1934, and in Northern Rhodesia in 1937, but in contrast to those in Tanganyika they were not empowered to collect tax. Native courts were established for

settling a wide range of cases which hitherto chiefs had often dealt with unofficially, and administrative powers were vested in an official hierarchy of native authorities, appointed on the assumption that they were the legitimate hereditary rulers of their tribes. The paradoxical result was the creation of tribal bureaucracies bearing little resemblance to the political units of pre-colonial days. Official chieftaincies were foisted upon peoples such as the Plateau Tonga who had lacked hereditary chiefs, while the dispersed chiefdoms of the Bisa and others were grouped under new paramounts.

A second influence on the development of tribal identity was the role of mission education. Before the First World War Robert Laws at Livingstonia and Alexander Hetherwick at Blantyre had attempted with some success to introduce ambitious programmes of literary education into their central schools, using English as the medium of instruction. But in the 1920s, when the demand for schools was becoming more widespread, these assimilationist policies were discarded in favour of the more adaptive, tribally-orientated approach associated with the American-based Phelps-Stokes Commission which toured East and Central Africa in 1924. Missionaries rejected Laws's vision of a university at Livingstonia drawing students from all over Central Africa in favour of more modest projects aimed at agricultural and village improvement. Government education departments, founded from the mid-1920s, gave priority to the Jeanes training schools established at Domboshawa, Domasi and Mazabuka, which emphasised community development. Though educated Africans frequently criticised these measures, many accepted the assumptions behind them. The most influential African writers of this period were mission-educated historians such as Yohanna B. Abdallah, Y. M. Chibambo and Samuel Ntara, the authors of three impressive tribal histories setting out the achievements of the chieftaincies with which they were most closely associated.

Language policies reinforced the tribal approach. The success of scholars such as Edwin Smith and W. H. Murray in committing to writing Ila, Chewa and other African languages inevitably had the effect of reducing variations in dialect and producing a limited number of basic languages, each with their limited range of educational and religious texts. No single language was used in schools throughout the region. Instead, a variety of official

provincial languages emerged: Tumbuka in the Northern Province of Nyasaland, Nyanja in the south, Lozi in Barotseland, Bemba in north-eastern Northern Rhodesia — each of them providing a focus of regional identity for peoples entering a larger society. In Southern Rhodesia linguistic identity developed on two separate levels. As individual mission societies consolidated their influence in particular districts a number of district dialects were created — Karanga in the Fort Victoria region and Ndau on the eastern frontier among them — and these dialects in their turn became associated with certain cultural and even ethnic traits. At the same time, with the emergence of rival Shona dialects came the demand for a single unified literary language. In 1931 Professor Clement Doke presented his scheme for a common orthography, and though dialect divisions were not thereby obliterated, a boost was given to the slow movement towards a wider Shona identity.

A further influence was the growth of labour migration and in particular the creation of urban locations. Increased demand for agricultural products during the First World War had stimulated African commercial farming in Southern Rhodesia. But when prices for maize and cattle fell in 1921 many Africans were forced to become wage labourers, whether on white farms or in towns: by 1931 there were 20,000 black workers in Salisbury and 16,000 in Bulawayo. Prostitution flourished in the larger towns; overcrowding in the locations became intense. Most workers remained migrants, returning every two or three years to their villages; but a growing minority, many of them Nyasas, succeeded in overcoming official disapproval by settling permanently in the compounds or urban locations along with their wives and children. By 1927 the average length of service of alien Africans on the Shamva mine was estimated at from eight to ten years; over 1,200 women and children were living in its various compounds.

Urban residence brought in its wake an awareness of cultural diversity. Burial and mutual-aid societies founded in the aftermath of the war frequently reflected the ethnic solidarity of their members, though in some cases, for example that of the Nyasaland Burial Society, membership extended beyond an ethnic core to comprehend the citizens of a territory. This process was intensified by regional discrepancies in skill or experience. Employers used simple 'tribal' stereotypes in their assessment of the capabilities

of African workers, consigning Tonga migrants from the Kariba valley to unskilled labouring and Nyasas to work as clerks, and these evaluations were sometimes accepted by the workers themselves and became the basis for factional disputes. In Bulawayo, faction fights between Ndebele and Shona in December 1929 reflected the hostility of settled local workers against unskilled immigrants who threatened to undercut their wages. Clashes between Bemba and Nyasas on the Copperbelt in the same period mirrored antagonisms between underground and white-collar workers.

These factional disputes were one among several factors hindering the development of an effective labour movement in Central Africa. During the 1920s new forms of religious and recreational organisation, in particular the Watch Tower movement and the *beni* dance societies, grew in popularity in the Southern Rhodesian compounds. But though their leaders were occasionally called upon to articulate worker demands, the real interests of these organisations lay elsewhere. Watch Tower's appeal remained largely confined to a minority of literate Nyasas; *beni* provided welcome recreational relief but not an economic or political ideology. More ambitious, though hardly more effective, was the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). Founded in Cape Town in 1918 by the Nyasa migrant Clements Kadalie, the ICU became in the 1920s the most powerful African protest movement in South Africa.²⁵ In 1927 a branch was founded in Bulawayo by Kadalie's fellow Nyasalander, Robert Sambo, and though he was deported within a matter of weeks Sambo's work was carried on by a small group of local organisers, among them 'Sergeant' Masotsha Ndhlovu, the general secretary of the ICU in 1929, and Charles Mzingeli, the organising secretary in Salisbury. Meetings were held in most important industrial centres, but it was hard to make contact with the more isolated mining compounds and there was little attempt after Sambo's deportation to mobilise agricultural labourers. Lacking an effective trade-union role, the ICU functioned mainly in the public square as a vehicle for exhortation and speech-making. Leaders who were not deported were subjected to government harassment and arrest. By the early 1930s, following a disastrous split in the parent union in South Africa, it had virtually collapsed, though

²⁵ See above, pp. 568, 579–80.

memories of its activities continued to be treasured into the 1940s and 1950s.

In the absence of effective African trade unions, industrial action by black workers in Southern Rhodesia met with only sporadic success. Wartime price-rises sparked off a series of shortlived strikes in the Wankie colliery and in the goldmines in the early 1920s, and they were followed by a further period of labour agitation in the mid-1920s, culminating in the spectacular strike at Shamva mine in September 1927 when 3,500 workers came out. These strikes, however, though revealing a growing solidarity among sections of the workforce, also exposed the relative powerlessness of the workers when faced by the combined strength of the mining companies and the settler state. Armed police were rushed to Shamva on lorries at the first sign of trouble and in the face of their intimidatory tactics the strike quickly collapsed. As labour supplies became more abundant in the 1930s, strike action by workers was brought virtually to a halt.

Only on the Copperbelt in this period did African workers organise themselves on a sufficiently large scale to challenge their employers. This was partly due to the nature of the new mining industry. In contrast to Southern Rhodesia, where mines tended to be small and dispersed, capital and labour in Northern Rhodesia were concentrated in a comparatively small area and news of conditions on one mine soon spread to the others. Many of the Bemba-speaking workers, who constituted about half the African labour force, had previous experience in the mines of Katanga and Southern Rhodesia. Even men new to wage labour quickly became conscious of their exploited positions when brought into close association with the highly-paid white miners, mainly from South Africa, who monopolised most 'skilled' jobs in the industry. Moreover, the emergence of a minority of proletarianised African mineworkers living with their wives and children in the mining towns accelerated the development of a class identity. In theory the mine companies and the government agreed in the mid-1930s on the desirability of keeping most African workers as migrants dependent for support in sickness and in periods of industrial depression on the help they could receive from fellow villagers. In practice, however, the companies by 1930 were already providing limited accommodation for married workers, and this trend was intensified following the

depression when some workers were given jobs requiring substantial training, previously held only by whites, as a means of reducing the wage bill.

In 1935, and again in 1940, African mineworkers on the Copperbelt organised strikes, each marking a stage in the growth of solidarity and in understanding of the economic system. The strike in May 1935 was sparked off by the announcement of changes in the assessment of poll-tax which discriminated against the urban areas. The strike spread from Mufulira to Nkana and then to Roan Antelope where riots broke out and six strikers were killed by the police. Bemba-speaking workers took a leading role, partly, it has been suggested, because the closing of the frontier with the Belgian Congo in 1934, and hence the halting of the fish-trade between the Luapula and Katanga, made them keenly aware of their precarious industrial existence.²⁶ The 'tribal elders' appointed at Roan Antelope since 1931 as representatives of African interests were not used by the strikers in their attempts to negotiate with the management. But the elders at Roan were active in mobilising support for the strike, a role taken elsewhere by prominent members of the *beni* dance societies.

Government and management responded by initiating regular meetings to discuss African labour; by extending the system of tribal elders to all mine compounds; by seeking the views of chosen Africans through urban advisory councils; and by creating urban courts whose members were chosen by chiefs, in the hope that 'tribal custom' would thus be maintained among urban workers. White mineworkers responded, in 1936, by forming their own trade union, which obtained agreements from the mine companies that reinforced the unofficial industrial colour bar. In 1940 white workers at Nkana and Mufulira struck in protest against the rise in the cost of living caused by the war. Their demands were largely conceded, and African workers at both mines soon followed their example: basic wages for Africans had not risen from the level to which they had been reduced in the depression. This time, the leading roles were taken by black foremen with considerable experience of, and commitment to, industrial employment: it was they who most resented the colour bar on the mines. There was rioting at Nkana; 17 workers were killed, and Britain despatched a commission of enquiry. As a result, wages were slightly raised, a differentiated wage structure

²⁶ C. A. Perrings, *Black mineworkers in Central Africa* (London, 1979), 212-13.

gave some credit for African skills, and further investigations of workers' conditions were put in hand.

It was not, however, worker protest but the growth of voluntary associations between the wars which created a basis for the emergence of nationalist parties in Central Africa after 1945. In this, two social groups played leading roles: black South African teachers and farmers in Southern Rhodesia and Livingstonia-trained Nyasas in the north. Both attempted to ally themselves with other educated Africans and to articulate local demands, with the result that the associations differed in character from one district to another.

In Southern Rhodesia it was the debate over the constitutional future of the colony that led to the foundation of the first association. Abraham Twala, a South African evangelist, rejected Nyamanda's tactics of petitioning the British government to establish direct rule over African areas in favour of a strategy aimed at involving Africans directly in Southern Rhodesian politics. Through his efforts the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association (RBVA) was formed in January 1923 with the aim of organising the small number of Africans on the common roll to win concessions from the Responsible Government Party. In practice, African voters were too few in number (only 39 as late as 1938) to exert influence in any parliamentary seat. Nevertheless the RBVA achieved a certain local popularity in Matabeleland, notably through the efforts of Martha Ngano, an outstanding speaker and organiser, who toured the rural areas denouncing land shortage, dipping and destocking and calling for better education. In Mashonaland, South African emigrants combined with Shona capitalist farmers in establishing the Rhodesia Native Association (RNA). Local Christians in Gwelo banded together in forming the Gwelo Native Welfare Association. Individual members of the associations played an active part in bringing evidence to the Morris Carter Commission and in criticising its proposals, but in the absence of an effective popular base their impact was inevitably limited. Despite attempts in 1929 to bring the various groupings together in a permanent Congress movement, the associations remained regionally divided, with the RNA representing élite Shona interests and the RBVA functioning effectively only in its Matabeleland constituency. Not till 1936 did the moderate Bantu Congress finally emerge following discussions

between delegates from the different associations headed by the RNA. Aspirations towards territorial unity were certainly expressed, but in a respectful, non-militant manner. Popular support was still most effectively aroused where the tribal card was played. Many Ndebele in the early 1930s turned away from territorial politics to the Matabele Home Society which combined its campaign for the restoration of the monarchy with demands that Ndebele workers in Bulawayo should be protected against the Shona incomers.

The spread of associations throughout the northern territories took place in two main phases in the inter-war period. During the post-war economic crisis of the early 1920s, Livingstonia graduates were active in establishing rural associations at Mwenzo in the remote north-east of Northern Rhodesia and in the three most northerly districts of Nyasaland. A Representative Committee of Northern Province Native Associations was formed in Zomba by a government clerk, Levi Mumba. Complaints were forwarded to the central government concerning the behaviour of colonial officials, and the need for government assistance in the expansion of African cash-crop farming and retail trade. In 1929 a second phase began. Rural associations tended to dwindle in importance following the Nyasaland government's decision to work more closely with tribal authorities, but new urban associations were founded by government clerks in various towns on the Northern Rhodesian line of rail and in the Southern Province of Nyasaland, and these were sometimes effective in exposing the most outrageous examples of racial discrimination or in persuading the government to improve transport facilities in the townships. Nothing came of the attempt in 1933 to form a United African Welfare Association of Northern Rhodesia but, unlike the situation in Southern Rhodesia, there was little rivalry between the northern associations and, in Nyasaland, a good deal of co-operation among them. Where government employees constituted the majority of their membership, their criticisms tended to be muted, but where, as in the Central Province of Nyasaland, shopkeepers and tobacco farmers dominated the meetings, demands for freedom from economic control (and also, paradoxically, for government assistance), were expressed with a vehemence that attracted the tacit support of many of the smaller farmers.

On one major issue the northern associations could claim to have scored a distinct success. This was the question of 'closer union'. In 1928 the Hilton Young Commission explored the prospects for closer union in East Africa, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This prompted the Southern Rhodesian prime minister, Moffat, and several settlers in Northern Rhodesia to express their preference for an amalgamated Rhodesia. The commission, however, concluded that such union would not be in the interests of Africans and in 1930 the Labour colonial secretary, Lord Passfield, reaffirmed the principle that African interests should prevail in any conflict with those of immigrant races.²⁷ This had little effect on colonial governments, but it reinforced the belief of settlers in Northern Rhodesia that their salvation must lie in union with the south, as did the shock of the African strikes on the Copperbelt in 1935. Many whites in the south also supported amalgamation, which now offered hopes of a share in the new-found wealth of the Copperbelt. In January 1936 a conference at Victoria Falls of settler representatives from both north and south called for early amalgamation of the Rhodesias and 'complete self-government', i.e., the removal of Britain's reserve powers in the south. Meanwhile, in April 1935, all three governors in Central Africa had agreed with Huggins, the Southern Rhodesian prime minister, on the need for closer inter-territorial co-operation in several fields. These converging pressures induced Britain, in 1937, to appoint a Royal Commission to consider closer co-operation or association between the Rhodesias and also Nyasaland, whose labour was crucial to the whole region.

The commission was chaired by Lord Bledisloe, a former governor-general of New Zealand, and included MPs from the three main British political parties, a businessman, and the former director of East Africa's unified postal system. In 1938 the commission took evidence from whites in all three territories, and also from African groups north of the Zambezi, though not in Southern Rhodesia. The African evidence came from native authorities, welfare associations, teachers, civil servants and mineworkers. All voiced emphatic and often well-argued opposition to amalgamation. Most had seen the south for themselves and knew that even if some Africans there were materially better off

²⁷ See above, p. 64, and below, p. 687.

than those in the north, they were consistently denied opportunities to make the most of their abilities; besides, they had lost most of their land and were harassed by pass-laws. The commission was impressed by its African witnesses and duly reported that 'the striking unanimity, in the northern territories, of the native opposition to amalgamation...[is a factor] which cannot in our judgment be ignored'. The commissioners were divided as to the inherent desirability of amalgamation but agreed that it should be postponed for the time being, since the subjection of so many people to a unified government against their will 'would prejudice the prospect of co-operation in ordered development'.²⁸ Within a year, the Second World War cut short further discussion of the question. The commission's equivocal and irresolute report did not by any means close the door on white hopes of amalgamation,²⁹ but it did give Africans in the north some reassurance that their opinions mattered, and in Nyasaland, at least, its enquiries had served to strengthen among African leaders a growing sense of territorial, if not yet national, identity.

Faced from the late 1920s with increasing economic deprivation, few of Central Africa's rural inhabitants found much assistance in the new associations. Instead, they took refuge in a variety of religious movements which appeared to offer more convincing answers to the problems that now confronted them. Misfortune was still commonly believed to derive principally from the action of witches. But whereas in the nineteenth century the welfare of the land was a primary religious concern, by the 1920s the welfare of individuals appears to have grown more important, a development associated with the enhanced importance bestowed on an active, interventionist High God in most people's systems of belief. Millennialist ideas took root, and though some of the prophetic movements that resulted were of a localised nature, others spread over the greater part of the region. Specially important were the ideas of the New York-based Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society (Jehovah's Witnesses), whose literature foretold the imminent end of the world in its existing form. Outside the mines of Katanga and Southern Rhodesia where they

²⁸ Quoted in Richard Gray, *The two nations. Aspects of race relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland* (London, 1960), 177, 193.

²⁹ W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth affairs*, 11. *Problems of economic policy 1918-1939*, part 2 (London, 1942), 124-7.

appealed mainly to a literate minority, African Watch Tower preachers were influential up to 1920 only in scattered districts of Nyasaland and in the north-east of Northern Rhodesia. But in 1924 returning migrants from the Wankie colliery evoked a massive if transitory response in the Luapula valley. This was followed over the next few years by a succession of waves of popular enthusiasm in northern Mashonaland, between 1925 and 1929, and among the Lala of Northern Rhodesia where Tomo Nyirenda's witch-killing exploits in 1925–6 gained the movement unwelcome publicity. Watch Tower doctrines appealed in the early 1930s to the exploited Wiko people of Barotseland, resentful of Lozi domination. Elsewhere, the supervisors appointed in the mid-1930s to Zomba and Lusaka from white South African Watch Tower congregations probably weakened the movement through their repudiation of the practices of many rural congregations which had taken on a character of their own.

While Watch Tower preachers prepared for the Second Coming by seeking in a number of different ways to restructure rural societies, movements of witchcraft eradication concentrated instead on cleansing those societies once and for all of evil. Long before the twentieth century, generalised attempts to eradicate witchcraft appear to have occurred occasionally in a number of societies as alternatives to more conventional procedures of detecting individual witches. But with the establishment of colonial rule, confidence in these conventional procedures was weakened by the outlawing of the poison ordeal which chiefs had previously used to test individual cases. And further tension was created during the depression with the return home of thousands of unemployed migrants, many of whom found difficulty in reconciling the achievement-orientated assumptions of the new economic order with the community-orientated morality of the village. The result was the emergence of a number of witchcraft eradication movements, directed, so it has been suggested 'not so much against individual sorcerers...but against sorcery as a frame of reference and an institution'.³⁰ By far the most popular and the most far-flung was the *mchape* movement of 1933–4. The movement originated in the Mlanje district of Nyasaland, whence it was carried by vendors selling medicine into Northern Rhodesia,

³⁰ W. M. J. van Binsbergen, 'The dynamics of religious change in western Zambia', *Ufahamu*, 1976, 6, 3, 81–2.

Tanganyika, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia. Those who gave up all charms and drank the medicine were promised freedom from all witchcraft, with the threat that those who attempted witchcraft thereafter would suffer instant death. In village after village a sense of communal purification was achieved, though inevitably it failed to last for long.

The desire for healing that existed within the *mchape* movement was even more prominent in the Spirit-type churches of Southern Rhodesia, the area of Central Africa least affected by *mchape*. Spirit healing can be traced in southern Africa from its roots in the evangelical tradition of the Dutch Reformed Church, through contacts with American evangelists, to the creation in South Africa of a large number of Zionist churches. In Southern Rhodesia the key agents were workers returning from the south where they had been attracted to the Zionist message. In the 1920s they introduced Zionism into western Mashonaland and by the 1930s were attracting a substantial following, predominantly among Shona cultivators previously uninvolved in mission Christianity. The Vapostori movement of Johanne Maranke in eastern Mashonaland obtained particularly widespread support. Led by a charismatic prophet famed for his healing powers, the Vapostori combined a radical assault on many traditional approaches to misfortune with an appeal 'to the fundamental notions of healing, prophecy and exorcism which had formed the basis of Shona traditional religion'.³¹ By 1940 adherents received communion from the founder at over a hundred sites.

It is an indication of the substantial inroads that Christianity had made in Central Africa by the 1930s that, though disillusionment concerning the transforming power of the Gospel was at its height during this period, many Africans followed orthodox paths in their search for religious initiative. The leaders of the independent churches founded in northern Nyasaland between 1928 and 1934 possessed theological views not dissimilar from those held in the Presbyterian church from which they had broken, along with a passionate belief in the virtues of modern economic and educational training. Their answer to the collapse of the migrant labour economy was thus not a withdrawal into passive millennialism but rather a desperate if unavailing struggle to create independent schools and colleges of a quality sufficient

³¹ T. O. Ranger, *The African voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1930* (London, 1970), 221.

to supply Africans with the techniques that mission education was not providing. In 1934 the independent church leader Y. Z. Mwase founded the Nyasaland Black Man's Educational Society, 'to improve and develop the impoverished condition of the black man...by starting a Purely Native Controlled high school or college'. Such organisations met with little practical success, but they were significant as attempts by Africans to take the process of improvement into their own hands.³² Under such ministers as Hanoc Phiri in Nyasaland and John Membe in Northern Rhodesia, networks of schools were established under the control of the African Methodist Episcopal Church and rivalled those of the older missions. Even where Christians did not leave the mission churches, they were often active in such urban centres as the Copperbelt and the Harare township of Salisbury in creating interdenominational churches virtually independent of missionary control.

For all the variety of African initiatives in the inter-war years, colonial authority remained secure in 1940. Bodies such as the Bantu Congress of Southern Rhodesia or the grandly-named Northern Rhodesia African National Congress, founded among the Plateau Tonga in 1937, were still primarily élite accommodationist bodies incapable of exerting effective pressure on the government. Urban unrest was still too disorganised, small-scale and sporadic to cause more than occasional inconvenience. The answers sought in rural areas tended to draw people away from confrontations with the authorities, though the colourful imagery of independent Watch Tower preaching, with its emphasis on the arrival of black Americans in aeroplanes and the consequent removal of the whites, struck discordant notes that the government would have preferred not to hear.

At a deeper level, however, there are indications to suggest that the network of local alliances so carefully woven in the earlier years of the century was becoming badly frayed in the 1930s. For reasons that have still not been adequately explored, African policemen and soldiers appear to have been largely untouched by the widespread crisis of confidence in the colonial order that spread through the ranks of African intermediaries. But many chiefs, upon whose shoulders responsibility in the local areas had been placed, were not immune to the infection. The success of

³² For further details, see McCracken, *Politics and Christianity*, 283.

Watch Tower, 'first of the twentieth-century mass movements to demonstrate the collapse of chiefly power',³³ gave warning of the paradox that the more authority colonial officials transferred to chiefs, the less respect they could expect from their African subjects. Ila chiefs opposed to the activities of Watch Tower prophets in 1934 were either compelled to accede to public demand or else were forced from office. *Mchape* vendors organised village ceremonies whether chiefs co-operated or not. As government intervention became more active in the aftermath of the depression, so the weakness of their agents was exposed. Several Plateau Tonga farmers responded positively from 1936 to the introduction of the so-called Kanchomba system, which employed farmers to demonstrate improved agricultural techniques to their neighbours. But by introducing a measure of compulsion into its proposals for stemming soil erosion, the agricultural department placed a burden on its African intermediaries that would eventually provoke resistance. So resentful were growers in central Nyasaland at the low prices paid for their tobacco by the government-controlled marketing board that in 1937 they burnt their crops and upset their baskets on the roads.

³³ Ranger, *African voice*, 212.

CHAPTER 13

EAST AFRICA

By 1905, the British and the Germans had occupied several strategic points in East Africa. They were the latest of many intruders from overseas. The coast and the offshore islands had long shared in the commerce of the Indian Ocean. The expansion of trade in the nineteenth century quickened the flow of Arab immigrants and also prompted Indian traders to settle among the black, and mostly Muslim, Swahili-speakers of the East African littoral. The British government intervened in Zanzibar and up-country mainly to secure the western flank of its Indian empire: well into the twentieth century it continued to regard East Africa as an appendage to India. But both British and Germans also came to colonise the hinterland. The British had recently completed the Uganda Railway, which ran from Mombasa through scrub and desert to the temperate uplands south of Mount Kenya, across the great Rift Valley and down to the shores of Lake Victoria. The western part of this line skirted the populous countries of the Kikuyu and Luo, and lake steamers completed the link between the coast and the kingdom of Buganda. Here the scope of British initiative was constrained by an agreement reached in 1900 with a ruling élite already converted and educated by Christian missionaries. But either side of the Rift there were fertile and lightly occupied highlands which attracted white farmers, especially from South Africa, while British planters moved into western Uganda (the name used by the British for both Buganda and much of the surrounding territory). Meanwhile, German planters and farmers clustered round the hills of Uluguru and Usambara, and the lower slopes of Kilimanjaro. As yet, there were few white immigrants, but their governments assumed that they had a crucial role to play in promoting economic and cultural change, while the settlers themselves expected a share in government. At the same time, colonial rule in East Africa attracted a new wave of Indian traders, and also Indian clerks and

EAST AFRICA



23 East Africa, 1935

COLONIAL CONSTRUCTION

artisans. At home, of course, Indians were a 'subject race', and Europeans tended to treat them as such in East Africa. But they were also feared as possible rivals: Indians too contributed modern skills, and many identified themselves with European efforts to 'civilise' Africa. In 1905 it remained to be seen whether immigrants would be given effective political roles in East Africa: if they were, the question of racial balance would clearly be hotly debated. Beyond this, however, white settlement raised a still more fundamental issue: the balance to be struck in assigning land, labour and capital as between Europeans and the indigenous African population. How this should be resolved was still very much an open question.

COLONIAL CONSTRUCTION, 1905-1914

The consolidation of colonial rule

Between 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War, the colonial governments in East Africa extended their grasp over most of the region. At the same time they were placed on a more regular footing than hitherto. In the heat of the Scramble, Britain and Germany had had to run up their respective flags hundreds of miles from the coast, and each Foreign Office had hastily improvised local administrations from whatever personnel lay to hand: mainly army officers, civil servants borrowed from the metropolis and adventurers rescued from ruined chartered companies. It took several years to establish routines of command and recruitment.

The British ruled three territories: the protectorates of Zanzibar and Uganda, and the East Africa Protectorate (the future Kenya). All three were subject to legal codes compiled for India by British reformers in the nineteenth century. Such law controlled those spheres of greatest interest to immigrants: taxation, communications, property, criminal law and procedure.¹ In 1905 Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate were transferred from the care of the Foreign Office to that of the Colonial Office. In 1907 the northern frontier of the East Africa Protectorate was defined by agreement with Ethiopia; the capital was moved from Mombasa to Nairobi, near the 'white highlands', and the legal status of

¹ The substance of these Indian codes was retained until after 1930, when Britain began to replace them.

slavery was abolished. By 1908, the government had largely completed its conquest of the most densely populated parts of the territory: Kenya Province, around Mt Kenya, and Nyanza Province, bordering Lake Victoria. British control in Nyanza had for years been disputed by the Nandi people, athwart the railway line, but they were subdued in 1905, after losing 600 warriors and their chief ritual leader. In 1905 and again in 1908 the British invaded the country of the Gusii and killed over 400 men. But it was many years before the British were able to administer the nomadic herdsman who roamed the vast arid countries to the north and east. By 1914, attempts to tax the southern Turkana had ended in failure. East of Lake Rudolf (Turkana), a Northern Frontier District was formed in 1910, while a post was set up on the borders of Italian Somaliland; but the purpose of such efforts was chiefly to fly the British flag in the face of rival European powers.

Administrative expansion in Uganda followed a somewhat similar pattern. In 1905, British authority was still almost entirely confined to the lake kingdoms, and even there it was patchy. The alliance with the Christian oligarchy in Buganda was firm enough, but in 1905 a senior official was assassinated in Ankole and its agreement (modelled on that with Buganda) was suspended for seven years. In Bunyoro, resentment against intruding Ganda chiefs provoked the despatch of British troops in 1907, though this crisis was resolved by negotiation. Further east, Ganda 'sub-imperialism' loomed still larger: by 1905, Semei Kakungulu had carved out a kingdom of his own between Lake Kyoga and the populous slopes of Mt Elgon (Masaba). Over the next two years, the British took over the existing Ganda structure of administration, though Ganda chiefs were redesignated 'agents' and Kakungulu himself was transferred to Busoga, where he helped to introduce a unified administration among its numerous small chiefdoms. Between 1909 and 1912, British officials were posted throughout most of northern Uganda, among the Iteso, Langi and Acholi; in 1911, a military post was set up in Karamoja to suppress the gun traffic across the Ethiopian border. Throughout these districts, and indeed on Mt Elgon, British rule was mainly imposed by force: there were no large-scale actions as in the East Africa Protectorate, but frequent 'punitive' expeditions were despatched to subdue the numerous small-scale polities.

Meanwhile, the Scramble had left some unfinished business. In the north, the Sudan border was precisely defined for the first time in 1914: it lay well to the south of the line sketched by Johnston in 1900, since there was no longer any hope that the Nile might serve as a trade route for Uganda. On the other hand, the Sudan transferred to Uganda the West Nile district, where a British official was posted to Arua in 1914. In the far south-west, it was a sudden need to forestall possible Belgian claims which in 1909–10 prompted the assertion of British authority among the hills of Kigezi. For a decade this was resisted by the followers of Muhumusa, the female leader of the Nyabingi spirit-possession cult.

In theory, Zanzibar (together with the nearby island of Pemba) was a protected 'native state'; in practice, British officials had made major inroads upon the power of the ruling Arab minority. The sultan himself was only 17 at his accession in 1902; a British regent was appointed; and the administration of the sultan's household was firmly separated from that of the islands. Between 1904 and 1907 the consular jurisdictions exercised by the USA and various European states were brought to an end. In 1905–6 the British consul-general was given powers of local administration comparable to those of a colonial governor; in 1908 British judges were given control over the sultan's courts; and many new posts were created for British civil servants. In 1913 Zanzibar was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, and its chief administrator, now termed a Resident, was placed under the general supervision of the governor of the East Africa Protectorate. A year later, a relic of Indian judicial imperialism was removed when appeals from Zanzibar courts were transferred from Bombay to the East African Court of Appeal, set up in 1902.

By 1905 the Germans had established some sort of presence in most parts of their vast East African colony, but their control was very uneven. They had just completed one short railway, from Tanga to the plantations of Usambara, and were building another, from the capital, Dar es Salaam, to Morogoro. Elsewhere, their transport depended on head-porterage. The coast and its immediate hinterland were under civilian rule. Further inland, the Germans confronted huge areas of sparsely-populated light woodland. There were a few pockets of dense African settlement, but in contrast to the British territories these were situated along the

fringes of the colony and far apart from each other. Thus German rule expanded in the form of isolated defensive outposts rather than as a continuous web. Many inland districts were run by army officers from massive forts. They ruled by force and were greatly feared, but over much of the country their authority was far from being accepted.

This was generally true in the south-east, where the Maji Maji rising began in July 1905. It was triggered off by the resistance of Matumbi villagers near the coast to a scheme for compulsory cotton-growing; it spread rapidly inland, among the Ngindo, Mbunga, Bena and Ngoni. By March 1906 the rising had been largely suppressed, though some rebels held out until August 1907. On the German side, some 400 were killed, including 15 whites; in retaliation the Germans laid waste large areas and starved whole peoples into submission. Over 200,000 people may have died as a result of the rising, and much of the south-east was permanently depopulated. This catastrophe hastened a review of German administration. In 1906 the colony received its second civilian governor, Freiherr von Rechenberg, a Prussian diplomat. He at once embarked on a policy of reconstruction specifically intended to preclude the possibility of another rebellion. He sought to secure African obedience through economic incentives rather than violence, and expanded the scope of civilian administration. Meanwhile, relations with the home government were reorganised: in 1907, colonial affairs were transferred from the German Foreign Office to a new and independent Colonial Office, and in 1911 a separate colonial service was set up. Even so, the growth of more centralised colonial government was a slow process. In 1914, soldiers still ruled two districts (Iringa and Mahenge) and even civilian district officers were no mere tools of the governor's will. The telegraph was gradually extended inland, but in practice most district officers enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and many also acquired great local prestige: by 1914 seven had ruled the same post for seven years or more. And the Germans never subdued the densely populated mountain country in the far north-west. In 1911 they killed 548 Ha but then decided that the rest were not worth taxing. From 1907–8, Residents at the Tutsi courts of Rwanda and Burundi tried to extend their control over surrounding chiefdoms. In 1912 resistance to Tutsi rule north of Rwanda was brutally suppressed, but taxes were first collected only in 1914.

The growth of an export economy

For colonial governments, the taxation of Africans was both a direct and indirect means of increasing revenue. Their expenses were rising all the time, yet they were expected in Europe to pay their own way as soon as possible. In the long term, the surest way of increasing revenue was to tax imports, but this meant expanding exports which in turn meant inducing people to earn cash incomes through production for export. Hence the payment of taxes in cash was gradually made compulsory; throughout the region the unit of currency was the Indian rupee. But in 1905 the export trade of East Africa was very limited and in urgent need of new initiatives. As yet, European enterprise was thin on the ground. The great bulk of the region's exports were produced by Africans, and it was the fruit of hunting and gathering as much as husbandry. In Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate, ivory, hides and skins loomed largest; in German East Africa, wild rubber, followed by hides and skins. Grain, copra and coconuts were exported from Malindi and Mombasa on the northern coast, but Zanzibar was the only territory whose main export was a cultivated crop — cloves; and these were already widely grown there and on Pemba island. There was clearly little prospect of expanding production in this range of commodities: indeed, ivory and wild rubber were rapidly wasting assets. If exports were to increase significantly, other lines had to be found. Various experiments were made, but most attention was given to cotton, simsim (sesame), coffee, sisal and plantation rubber; the last two called for skills and capital confined as yet to Europeans.

Up to 1914, the exports of Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate came almost entirely from African producers. In Uganda, large-scale white settlement was never likely: the climate was unsuitable, and in Buganda, the heart of the territory, African land rights were firmly entrenched by the 1900 agreement. For Sir Hesketh Bell, governor from 1905 to 1910, the best hope of raising revenues lay in persuading Africans to grow cotton. Between 1908 and 1914, cotton exports increased nearly sevenfold in value, to £331,000, rising from one-third to two-thirds of total exports, even though the population had recently been gravely reduced by sleeping-sickness. This cotton was mostly grown by a mass of small producers who still grew their own food: those in Buganda and Busoga led the way, but by 1914 much cotton

was coming from Teso. There were a few European planters, mostly in Buganda: by 1914 these produced *arabica* coffee worth 5 per cent of total exports, but as yet little of their rubber was ready for tapping.

In the East Africa Protectorate, African cultivation was also assisted, though here its main function, in the eyes of most senior officials, was to tide the colony over while infant European enterprises gathered strength. Attempts to promote cotton in Nyanza province failed, partly because the local people found it easier, and more immediately profitable, to grow simsim. By 1913, this was the territory's second export, following hides and skins. The value of simsim exports was only a quarter of Uganda's cotton exports, but much was also sold at home and in any case Nyanza also exported maize. In 1913 it was reckoned that 70 per cent of agricultural exports were produced by Africans. Europeans had indeed begun to grow coffee in the highlands, but in 1914 this accounted for only 4 per cent of total exports, now worth £444,000 (three-quarters of Zanzibar's). Sisal and rubber plantations near the coast had scarcely come into production. Revenue in 1914 was £985,000, more than three times that of Uganda.

In German East Africa the export of cultivated crops was much further advanced by 1905 than in the British territories. This was due mainly to the efforts of Europeans. Since 1892, they had planted sisal between Tanga and the foot of the Usambara hills; by 1905 it had also been planted in the far south, near Lindi. Sisal became the territory's chief export in 1907–8 and again in 1913, after an upswing in world prices. Between 1909 and 1912 a temporary boom enabled *ceara* rubber to take the lead: since 1900 it had been planted by many settlers near Morogoro and in the Tanga–Usambara region (where British companies now bought out several German owners). Europeans also predominated in the production of coffee: at first this came from plantations in Usambara but by 1911 far more was being grown on Kilimanjaro. Meanwhile, African farmers, mostly in Buhaya in the north-west, were producing one-third of coffee exports. European enterprise was less important in cotton-growing: grandiose schemes failed in Sadani and Kilosa, whereas the price rise of 1905–7 encouraged the Sukuma to take up cotton, and Africans around the lower Rufiji to persist with it despite the experience which had sparked off the Maji Maji rising. Nonetheless, by 1913 European enterprise

contributed over half the colony's total exports (now worth nearly £2m).

The growth of an export trade in cultivated crops duly increased the revenues of East African governments, and diminished their dependence on tax-payers in Europe. The East Africa Protectorate ended this in 1912, and Uganda followed in 1914: they had received respectively £2.8m and £2.5m as grants-in-aid. In German East Africa the imperial subsidy was confined from 1907 to military expenses: from 1904 to 1914 grants-in-aid totalled £2.5m. Meanwhile, governments increased their capacity to create infrastructures for further economic expansion: administration, technical services, communications. Such investment was most conspicuous in German East Africa, where in 1905 the railway system was far less developed than in British territory. The Uganda Railway (financed by an interest-free loan from Britain which was never repaid) not only carried African export crops from the British territories; it provided the cheapest route between the coast and the populous German districts to the south and west of Lake Victoria. This challenge was soon taken up. In 1907–8, to improve military mobility and also further his policy of boosting African export production, Governor Rechenberg obtained a loan to extend the Dar es Salaam–Morogoro line to Tabora and on to Lake Tanganyika. This ‘central railway’ was intended to carry produce from the Nyamwezi peoples, and from Rwanda and Burundi; it was completed in 1914 and a branch to Lake Victoria was begun. Meanwhile, in 1910–11, pressure from German settlers provoked the extension of the Tanga–Usambara line up to Moshi, near Kilimanjaro. By 1914, out of a total revenue of £823,000, 32 per cent was spent on servicing railway loans. This investment killed off the old caravan traffic and diverted the territory's external trade from Bagamoyo and Zanzibar to the deep-water ports of Tanga and Dar es Salaam, which could harbour ships from Europe. This helped to boost Germany's share of its colony's trade from around one-quarter in 1902 to over a half in 1912.

By providing railways, the imperial governments took a leading part in placing the resources of East Africa on the world market. But private enterprise was also crucial. In German East Africa, white smallholders rapidly increased in the years of the rubber boom: by 1912 the colony's white population numbered

almost 5,000 (compared with just over 3,000 whites in the East Africa Protectorate). The upswing in sisal favoured the larger plantations and helped to confirm the predominance of the German East Africa Company, which attracted investment from German financiers and had interests in banks and railways as well as mines, plantations and the import-export trade. In the British sphere, import-export was dominated by the Uganda Company and Smith, Mackenzie. But the most important entrepreneur was the Indian middleman. Immigrants from the Punjab, Gujerat, Kathiawar and Cutch spread out from the towns of East Africa and far up-country, sometimes ahead of the colonial administrators. Their commercial skills, possessed as yet by few Africans, and their readiness to live more simply than most Europeans, enabled them to play a vital part in the region's external trade: they bought African crops for resale to European firms and sold tools, bicycles, textiles and other consumer goods imported from abroad. Outstanding among Indian traders was Allidina Visram, an Ismaili whose business, based on Mombasa, included branches in German as well as British territory. Indians also played key roles in service trades, as artisans, clerks, and also as lawyers. By 1911 there were nearly 12,000 Indians in the East Africa Protectorate, about 7,500 in German East Africa, 2,200 in Uganda and nearly 9,000 in Zanzibar.

Politics and social change

During the decade preceding 1914, both European and Indian immigrants came to occupy an increasingly important place in the economies of East Africa. But if they were to retain and improve on their positions, they needed to take a share in government. European settlers were especially anxious: if they were to survive, let alone prevail over, African competition, they needed privileged access to land and labour. The former presented no great difficulty: in both the East Africa Protectorate and German East Africa much land had been alienated to whites by the end of 1905 (when the Nandi gave up a large area), though the British did not succeed in confining the northern Masai south of the railway until 1913. In the East Africa Protectorate, areas of African occupation adjoining white property were defined as 'reserves' and these were supposed to meet both present and future African needs. The

most pressing problem was labour. European farms and plantations, many quite new, needed a great deal of unskilled labour, but few employers were willing or indeed able to pay wages sufficient to bring labour forward without some form of compulsion. Many of the 11,000 Kikuyu who lost land in Kiambu, near Nairobi, stayed on as 'squatters', whose rights to graze or cultivate now depended on working for the new white owners. But Africans who could grow crops for cash were often lost to the labour market, and even those who lacked this option preferred to work for employers other than farmers or planters, whose peak demands tended to coincide with the busiest months in the African farmer's year.

Various means were found to bring labour forward. All governments made use of compulsory labour for public works: in German East Africa since the 1890s, in Uganda from 1908 and in the East Africa Protectorate from 1910. The scale and terms of such employment varied, but it benefited private employers as well by depressing the market price of labour. Over much of the region, as in southern Africa, labour recruiters roamed, seeking to bind Africans to the work they least wanted. In the East Africa Protectorate, labour-hungry settlers demanded that Africans be deprived of their land, taxed more heavily, or simply compelled to work by law. By and large, neither the colonial nor the British government offered much resistance to such pressure. Many officials set more store by settler hopes than African achievement and they failed in practice to protect Africans against the violence of white employers. Meanwhile, in 1907, two non-official Europeans were nominated to the new legislative council. One was Lord Delamere, the chief settler spokesman, who saw this as only the first step towards eventual European self-government. And Delamere, like other settlers, felt that European prosperity was threatened not only by the scarcity of African labour but by the ambitions of Indian immigrants. The latter far outnumbered the Europeans; some of them also sought to buy land; and an Indian businessman, A. M. Jeevanjee, was nominated to the legislative council for 1909–11: in 1910 he urged that the territory be annexed to the Indian Empire. Since it was British policy to broaden unofficial representation, political controversy in the East Africa Protectorate focused for many years on a struggle for power through the council between Europeans and Indians.

In German East Africa, European settlers were nominated to a Governor's Council from 1904, but this meant little since full control of the budget was vested in the Reichstag (the German parliament). So while German settlers formed local associations and pressure groups, they pursued their ambitions most effectively through allies in Germany. There they were confronted, from 1906 to 1910, by an unsympathetic colonial secretary, Bernhard Dernburg who, like Governor Rechenberg, looked to African production as the best hope for East Africa. Yet from 1908 Dernburg began to yield to the settlers' friends in the Reichstag. The whip continued to be used freely against African workers: it has been calculated that in 1911–12 there were, on average, five floggings a week at every district office in German East Africa.² This was scarcely the free market in labour which Rechenberg had hoped to create. Besides, when Rechenberg left East Africa in 1911 prices for exports strongly favoured European producers. Their commanding role in the economy — far more impressive than that of their counterparts further north — was acknowledged by the new governor, Schnee: in 1912 he allotted to settlers 12 out of 16 seats in his advisory council. In the same year, Schnee restricted Indian immigration, and in 1914 Indians were denied the vote in elections to the new town councils of Dar es Salaam and Tanga. Nowhere in East Africa had either imperial government taken a firm decision for or against further white settlement, but Germany's colony was well on the way to becoming a 'white man's country'.

In areas of European enterprise, relations between black and white mainly rested on the use or threat of violence. But these were mere enclaves, mostly clustered near the major centres of government or railway lines. To hold down the huge expanses of East Africa with the limited forces available, more subtle forms of control were needed. Colonial rule was consolidated with the aid of African allies, to whom the necessary powers of coercion were delegated. In Uganda, the expansion of the Ganda was curbed and harnessed to the purposes of British officials, but they introduced a supposedly Ganda model of hierarchical administration and found local leaders to staff it as territorial chiefs and headmen, even where such roles were quite new, as in the north-east and south-west. The judicial and fiscal roles of chiefs

² John Iliffe, *Tanganyika under German rule, 1905–1912* (Cambridge, 1969), 106.

were defined by ordinances in 1909, and they also became pillars of the export economy; in the early years, Uganda's cotton was mainly grown by collective effort under the chiefs' personal direction, and chiefs exacted a share of the proceeds as a new form of tribute payment. In the East Africa Protectorate there were virtually no territorial chiefs, and at first the British delegated low-level justice and taxation to 'headmen' who were either prominent local men, such as priests or 'rain-makers', or else former caravan leaders, traders and mercenary soldiers. Since such new-found political authority was often disputed, the minor judicial powers of headmen were transferred in 1911 to councils of elders. But as junior administrators, headmen steadily enlarged their powers: from 1912, for example, they were able to levy unpaid labour for public works, while informally many served as labour recruiters for private employers.

The Germans also relied heavily on African assistants. Along the coast they had inherited the literate administrative staff of the Zanzibar sultanate: town governors or *liwalis*, and their subordinate *akidas*. Under German rule (as on the British coast), the *liwalis* retained authority over Africans in towns, while *akidas* were appointed in some rural districts, mostly along the coast, where they collected tax and settled minor disputes. By 1913, many *akidas* had been educated at post-primary government schools for Africans in Tanga, Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam; these also produced clerks for government service all over the country. The Germans, in short, tightened their grip on the country by fostering the growth of a Swahili bureaucracy, much as the British in Uganda relied primarily on Ganda men and methods. However, the closest parallel to Buganda itself in German East Africa was to be found in other lake kingdoms, those of the Haya. Here the emergence of chiefs as tax-collectors and promoters of coffee-growing owed much to their long association with one district officer, Stuemmer, who ruled at Bukoba from 1904 to 1916. There was a similar *entente* between Gunzert, at Mwanza from 1906 to 1916, and chiefs of the Sukuma, who disseminated cotton-cultivation, though Gunzert used his own staff to collect tax. Elsewhere, a varying balance was struck in the delegation of power as between chiefs and government staff. When choosing chiefly allies the Germans tended, after the Maji Maji rising, to favour those who had remained 'loyal' then, such as the Hehe

chiefs, at the expense of those who had assisted their initial conquest.

By 1914, alien rule had caused profound changes in the economic life of most East Africans. Little trace now remained of the trade patterns characteristic of the later nineteenth century. Not only was the caravan trade dead; railways, and Indian traders, enabled imports from Europe to undercut the products of African industry; no less important, European manufacturers were learning how to meet African requirements. In 1907, Nyoro hoes were still being sold over much of Uganda and even in the eastern Congo; within a few years they were replaced by hoes from Germany or Britain. Apart from some outlying pastoralists, nearly all African production was now devoted to food-crops or to the new range of exports fostered by the colonial powers. Some people grew export crops on their own land; this could notably enrich chiefs who already controlled the use of land, as in Buganda and Buhaya. Other people, less fortunate, exhausted former exports, such as ivory or wild rubber; for them, as for people quite new to the export economy, the best hope of cash usually lay in wage-employment. Some might be able to do seasonal labour, as porters or construction workers, but many Nyamwezi, for example, were conscripted to work for months at a time on distant sisal plantations. Many Kikuyu left their own homes to colonise, as squatters, empty land which Europeans had lately taken from the Masai. Some wage-earners managed to save enough to invest in African production: thus Luo began to buy ploughs and Kikuyu bought livestock. Cash could also be obtained by growing surplus food to meet the needs of wage-earners, or to stock government famine reserves: rice-growing replaced rubber-collection in Ulanga; simsim was grown by the Langi, and maize in Nyanza (as also in the 'white highlands'). The domestic market for food was rapidly expanding: by 1912 there were over 85,000 wage-earners, at any one time, in the East Africa Protectorate; in 1913, there were 192,000 wage-earners in German East Africa, and almost half of them were on plantations. In some areas their absence from home was beginning to leave its mark. In the woodlands south of Lake Victoria, human and cattle diseases in the 1890s had caused much land to be abandoned; tsetse fly moved in and spread sleeping-sickness among people and cattle. This process was aggravated by large-scale labour migration: plantation

workers especially tended to be away from home just when they were most needed, and cultivation suffered in consequence, thus hastening the retreat of men from advancing tsetse frontiers.

The economic contrasts within and between African societies were overlaid by cultural distinctions introduced or intensified by Europeans. By 1914, mission schools had in some areas produced a first or even second generation of African teachers, clerks, evangelists and also priests; in Uganda, Bishop Tucker encouraged African leadership in the Anglican Church, in which 33 Africans had been ordained by 1914. Many of these educated men were the children of chiefs: literacy, like cash crops, could give new strength to an old regime; yet schools also opened new paths of advance to the hitherto unprivileged. To a large extent, of course, the advance of cash-crops and literacy went hand in hand: Ganda, Luo and Haya farmers were best able to pay the fees charged by most mission schools, and many also made voluntary contributions. As yet, the Bible was the one book to make much impact even on the handful of newly literate Christians, though already, among the Ganda, this had influenced ideas of history as well as religious belief.

There was no challenge to the colonial order from educated Africans, though in 1914, in central Nyanza, the Nomia Luo Mission was founded to build schools free from white missionary influence. Violent resistance came from the grass-roots: most fiercely in the Maji Maji rising of 1905, but also in the Nyabingi movement in south-western Uganda, and in 1914 from the Gusii in South Nyanza and the Giriama on the coast. Central to each of these was a local religious cult; in the case of Maji Maji, this briefly united a huge area in common ritual and action, but the rebels aimed at a very local, small-scale independence. The terrible vengeance wrought by the Germans after Maji Maji made the facts of European power more starkly plain in their territory than anywhere else in East Africa. Yet neither there nor elsewhere was this power passively accepted. Many opposed the extortion of unfree labour by deserting from recruiters' gangs or their place of work. In German territory, especially in the north-east and south-east, Islam gained much wider adherence than Christianity.³ And as horizons expanded, new forms of solidarity were taking shape. The colonial towns were racially segregated (for Indians

³ See chapter 4, pp. 198, 213.

as well as for Africans) but they were nonetheless windows on a wider world. They were still small, but growing fast: by 1911, there were 17,000 people in Nairobi and 21,000 in Dar es Salaam. Most of the Africans were probably short-stay migrants, but they were likely to return home with a keener sense of ethnic identity, as well as experience of a new kind of poverty and a better acquaintance with the immigrants from overseas.


THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914–1918

The East African campaign

In August 1914, Britain and Germany went to war. The German government had no intention of fighting in East Africa. There, its defence force (*Schutztruppe*) was precisely that: 218 Europeans and 2,542 *askari* (African soldiers) faced 73 Europeans and 2,325 *askari* in the King's African Rifles, drawn from the East Africa Protectorate, Uganda and Nyasaland. Schnee, the German governor, thought his colony indefensible and hoped to preserve neutrality. But the *Schutztruppe* commander, Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, considered it his business to divert enemy troops away from the conflict in Europe. The British, for their part, were mainly concerned to prevent German warships from threatening communications with India, and at first the India Office took charge of the war in East Africa. On 8 August, the British navy shelled a wireless station near Dar es Salaam. Lettow-Vorbeck, in defiance of Schnee, promptly grouped his forces near Kilimanjaro and captured Taveta, just inside British territory. The British then set about the invasion of German East Africa. However, they grossly underestimated the fighting power of Lettow-Vorbeck's African troops and sent against them some of the weakest units in the Indian army, under mediocre commanders. On 3 November part of this force landed at Tanga but withdrew after heavy losses, while the rest were rebuffed far inland, at Longido.

Soon after these reverses, the British War Office took control of operations in East Africa but gave them low priority and a long stalemate ensued, though in June 1915 the British captured Bukoba, on Lake Victoria. In July the Germans surrendered in South West Africa; this released South African troops for use

THE FIRST WORLD WAR



24 The East African campaign, 1914-18

elsewhere. In February 1916 General Smuts took command of the British imperial forces in East Africa; these now included the King's African Rifles, British and Indian regiments, and white South Africans. Together they outnumbered the forces of Lettow-Vorbeck by nearly five to one. In March 1916 Smuts launched a new invasion from the East Africa Protectorate. He crossed into Tanganyika near Kilimanjaro and captured Moshi, but he had yet to encounter the main German forces. Despite his greatly superior strength, Smuts was reluctant to risk battle with them; instead, he deployed the Allied forces in an attempt to encircle Lettow-Vorbeck. One column went after the Germans towards the central railway, while Smuts himself advanced down the Pangani valley; he captured Tanga in July, and Dar es Salaam fell in September. Meanwhile the British took Mwanza in July, and General Northey, advancing from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, captured Iringa in August. In the west, the Belgians took Ruanda in May and Tabora in September. The German garrison at Tabora escaped and eventually joined Lettow-Vorbeck at Mahenge, near the Rufiji valley. Smuts now tried to surround the Germans by taking Kilwa and moving inland, but in December he was checked at Kibata.

Smuts's elaborate design played into Lettow-Vorbeck's hands. The Germans and their *askari* were masters of bush warfare and drew their pursuers across rugged and thinly peopled country during the worst of the rains. In October 1916 a British intelligence officer wrote in his diary, 'What Smuts saves on the battlefield he loses in hospital, for it is Africa and its climate we are really fighting, not the Germans.'⁴ By the end of 1916 the Allied forces were gravely depleted by sickness, and most British, South African and Indian troops were replaced by West Africans and new recruits to the King's African Rifles. Early in 1917 Smuts left East Africa. Heavy rains delayed further operations, but in July the British began a new advance inland from Kilwa and Lindi. In October, the column from Lindi finally confronted Lettow-Vorbeck at Mahiwa. This was the fiercest battle of the campaign. Lettow-Vorbeck escaped into Mozambique, but with a much reduced force: his colleagues from Mahenge surrendered rather than starve. Lettow-Vorbeck had little ammunition left, but for another year he kept on the move in northern Mozambique, where

⁴ R. Meinertzhagen, *Army diary 1899-1926* (Edinburgh and London, 1960), 200.

British forces pursued him in vain. In July 1918 he threatened Quelimane, on the coast; in September he doubled back northwards and recrossed the Ruvuma; in October he crossed into Northern Rhodesia. There was nothing to stop him reaching Broken Hill when news of the armistice in Europe, in November, obliged him to surrender.

The impact of war

Smuts's strategy, and Lettow-Vorbeck's brilliant evasions, had combined to inflict full-scale warfare on East Africa for two and a half years. This was a personal triumph for von Lettow-Vorbeck: his soldiers — never more than 15,000 — compelled the Allies to deploy about 140,000 troops, nearly half of them Africans. British imperial forces lost more than 10,000 men, two-thirds of them from disease; the *Schutztruppe* had lost about 2,500. But for the peoples of East Africa, the campaign was an appalling disaster. Each side devastated large areas of German East Africa to provide food for fighting men, and the whole region, together with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, was forced to supply both soldiers and porters for the war effort. On each side, at least one out of every ten soldiers from East Africa died on active service, but the death-rate among porters was twice as high, and there were far more of them. The newly built railways of East Africa were of limited value in the fighting, since they mostly ran from east to west, whereas the main thrust of Allied advance in 1916 was from north to south. Motor vehicles were little help; there were few roads and they were useless in the rains. Tsetse flies killed off draught animals. For the most part, munitions and supplies had to be carried by porters, whose food had to be carried by yet more porters. Of the East Africans recruited for the British imperial forces, such followers outnumbered soldiers by 20 to 1. Supplies for followers were miserably inadequate, and at least one in five died, usually from dysentery or malaria. Altogether, well over three-quarters of a million East Africans served in the war; over 100,000 never returned.⁵

⁵ See G. W. T. Hodges, 'African manpower statistics for the British forces in East Africa, 1914-1918', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 101-16. The mortality percentage rates among those porters and medical staff who served with the British imperial forces, taking account of those classified as 'missing, presumed dead', were 22 for the East Africa Protectorate, 20 for occupied German East Africa, 16 for Zanzibar

The mass conscription of Africans as porters had far-reaching effects throughout East Africa. Many areas were virtually emptied of men, and food-production was crippled. Women continued, as always, to bear the brunt of sowing and harvesting as well as grinding, but without men to clear new land they were often obliged to cultivate existing plots to the point of exhaustion. Yet it was just when the burden of war was heaviest that the region suffered drought and disease on a scale which recalled the disasters of the 1890s. Late in 1917 the rains failed throughout East Africa, and they failed in Uganda a year later. Famine was widespread: in the East Africa Protectorate it was partly relieved by food imports from India and South Africa, but in parts of eastern Uganda, in 1918–19, one in four may have died of starvation, while in Dodoma district one in five died of famine between 1917 and 1920. Lack of food lowered resistance to diseases spread by returning porters. In 1917, at least 10,000 died in Uganda of cerebro-spinal meningitis, while plague and smallpox also killed. Towards the end of 1918, East Africa succumbed to the influenza pandemic: this may have killed as many as 80,000 in German East Africa, 25,000 in Uganda and 50,000 in the East Africa Protectorate. One doctor reckoned in these terrible years that over one-tenth of the Kikuyu people died of famine or influenza, or while serving as porters. Yet this was not all: disease deprived many of their chief store of wealth. Rinderpest, which had swept northern Uganda in 1911, reappeared in western Uganda in 1918 and within two years killed over 200,000 cattle. Veterinary surgeons would have saved them, but the war had stripped governments of staff. Even then the cycle of destruction was not complete: the death of people and cattle during the war meant that large areas once cultivated and grazed now reverted to bush, thus allowing the further advance of tsetse fly and sleeping-sickness. In 1913 it had been reckoned that one-third of German East Africa was infested by tsetse: by 1924 the proportion was nearer two-thirds in what had become Tanganyika.

The disasters of the war years inevitably retarded the growth of East Africa's export trade. Yet it continued, except in German territory. There, many settlers had been ruined by the collapse of

and 8 for Uganda. About 22,000 African soldiers were recruited from the British East African territories, of whom about 2,500 died; over 12,000 were recruited for the *Schutztruppe*, of whom about 1,800 died.

rubber prices in 1913, when vast new plantations in South-East Asia came into production. When war broke out, all exports were thwarted by a British naval blockade; after the British occupation, exports (chiefly of sisal) were resumed. In Uganda, cotton output scarcely increased, but European-grown coffee ranked second among exports in 1915–17, contributing 16 per cent, while rubber exports steadily grew: Uganda's planters, unlike those in German East Africa, had chosen to grow *Hevea brasiliensis*, the same high-quality rubber as that which came from South-East Asia. In the East Africa Protectorate, hides and skins provided more than a quarter of total exports in 1918, but so now did sisal: the coastal plantations came into production just as the war began to boost demand for rope and twine. Soda ash provided 15 per cent of exports: this came from European works at Lake Magadi, to which a branch line was built with a British loan just before the war. Coffee exports had slowly advanced, but formed less than 10 per cent of the total.

The export production of the war years was encouraged by high prices, but import prices also rose, and in any case exports were sustained, like the military campaign, by stretching resources of labour to the limit. These pressures greatly increased the tensions already inherent in East African society. Government and private employers drew closer together in attempts to co-ordinate the extraction of yet more labour. In the East Africa Protectorate, a war council was set up in 1915 which was dominated by settlers: this reduced carriers' pay and in 1916 strengthened legal controls over labour; in the same year, African taxation was increased. These measures maintained European production for the market while crippling that of Africans. The effect was most marked in Nyanza Province, which before the war had been the main source of export crops but which then was heavily drained of both men and cattle. It must also be noted that during the European war a small but ugly war was waged by both Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate against Turkana herdsmen, whose raids by 1917 seemed to threaten European farms. Between 1915 and 1918 some 800 Turkana were killed, while far more were starved into submission: they lost 400,000 cattle to the British.

At home, no less than on war service, Africans suffered growing deprivation and frustration. Yet war was also a great teacher. Mass mobilisation swept African men into organisations

of a scale, complexity and discipline such as few had ever known. There was an abrupt exposure to European technology: men were trained to handle radios, rapid-firing guns and motor-vehicles, while a few became NCOs and even warrant officers. And alongside the European hierarchy of military power Africans created organisations of their own which mirrored it: the *beni* dance societies. These had originated on the northern coast around the turn of the century; the war sharpened the element of military parody, increased the need for the mutual aid they offered, and spread their popularity far inland, among both armies. There were but two societies: the Marini for soldiers and the Arinoti for porters, but by the end of 1919 both had branches in all the main towns of East Africa and the Marini leader, a former *akida*, issued commands throughout the region from his headquarters at Iringa: he was known as Bismarck. There was, moreover, at least one field in which Africans were able to supplant European leaders during the war. Both sides interned and deported missionaries of enemy nationality, and many African congregations were left to fend for themselves. Where, as among the Lutherans, there were no African priests, teachers took charge, and under their guidance several young churches learned self-reliance. When missionaries came back after the war, they were often slow to recognise such proof of African ability, but Africans were now less willing to take for granted the need for white leadership.

Thus for all the physical destruction of the war years, people all over East Africa were discovering new powers within themselves and exerting them in spheres far wider than family, clan or chiefdom. They were also increasingly familiar with the large-scale structures of colonial rule. In the next few years, white men were to take major decisions about the place of Africans in the colonial order of East Africa, but Africans too had thoughts on this and were soon to give voice to them.

TERRITORIAL CONTRASTS, 1918–1930

Between the war and the world-wide depression of 1930, there were substantial changes in the material basis of life in East Africa. External trade increased very considerably, and the region shared in technological innovations which were then transforming the

industrialised world. Most important, motor-transport became cheap enough to make possible the large-scale movement of goods and people away from the few railway lines. It was in this period that large numbers of Africans became purchasers of imports, especially hoes, bicycles, saucepans, boots and shoes, paraffin, salt, tinned food, tea, sugar and cigarettes. A small but growing number of Africans began themselves to engage in retail trade, helped by savings from the sale of cash-crops and by skills learned from immigrants. Greater dependence on external trade heightened African sensitivities to economic fluctuations, especially among teachers, farmers and traders who aspired to British material standards of living and increasingly compared their own fortunes with those of their chiefs and those of immigrant communities. At the same time, governments interfered much more than ever before: not only were their officials more mobile, but rising revenues enabled their numbers to be greatly increased. This growth in economic and administrative activity had the very important if unmeasurable effect of helping to reverse the general decline of population which seems to have been more or less continuous over most of East Africa from the 1890s to the 1920s. Mortality, disease and infertility were checked by better medicine, hygiene and clothing, by famine relief, and by the increased cultivation of maize and cassava. Yet the region's modest growth in wealth after the war was distributed very unevenly. This was partly due to growing divergencies in the politics of the various East African territories. In the aftermath of war, earlier assumptions were reappraised, and decisions were taken which tended to sharpen territorial differences in social policy. These decisions were prompted both by the immediate effects of the war and by the impact of the economic depression of 1920–1; they were also influenced by competing pressures on the British government from India and from British friends of South Africa.

Tanganyika

The effects of war were most obvious in the former German colony. At the end of 1918, the greater part of it was in British hands; the Belgians had retreated from Tabora in 1917, though they still occupied the far north-west. The Peace Treaty with

Germany in 1919 placed the territory under a mandate from the League of Nations. The Belgian share of this was confined to Ruanda and Burundi; the rest was assigned to the British, who named it Tanganyika Territory.⁶ In July 1922 the terms of the British mandate were confirmed: Britain obtained full powers of legislation and administration; it was pledged to prevent slavery (which the Germans had never abolished), forced labour for private gain, trade among Africans in arms and liquor, and abuse of African land rights. Subject to these conditions, the territory could be incorporated in a federation or customs union.

The stated aim of the mandate was to assure the primacy of 'native interests', but there was no provision for enforcement. The best safeguard of African liberties was provided not by paper promises in Europe but by recent changes in Africa. In 1914, European settlers were well on the way to becoming the dominant political force in German East Africa. The British invasion in 1916 obliged them to abandon farms and plantations, and the rubber trade had already been crippled by competition from South-East Asia. Sir Horace Byatt, the British civilian administrator, cleared the country of German nationals between 1917 and 1922, when the white population was half what it had been in 1914. Several estates were sold or leased, mainly to British firms, Greeks and Indians, and rubber estates were replanted with sisal. Exports of sisal were slowly resumed but hampered by lack of shipping, and the price fell in 1921. Sisal remained the chief export, but its importance temporarily declined in relation to African-grown crops, mainly coffee and cotton, but also groundnuts, which ranked second among exports in 1921 and 1923. Whereas in 1913 Europeans had contributed over half the country's exports, in the early years of the mandate well over half was produced by Africans. Still more important, the nature of European production changed. By the early 1920s sisal was the only crop grown in large quantities by Europeans, and it could only be grown in steamy lowlands unsuited to permanent white settlement; besides, much was produced by companies financed from abroad with a lesser stake in the territory than independent planters.

The position of Europeans in Tanganyika was thus undermined at the very period when Britain was framing new policies under the mandate. In 1921 the Colonial Office agreed that Tanganyika

⁶ This partition thwarted South Africa; see above, p. 573.

should be a 'black man's country' on broadly West African lines and, while much basic law was taken from Indian codes, Nigerian models influenced plans for land law and African administration. The policy of indirect rule, elaborated by Lugard into a doctrine, was now to be adopted in Tanganyika. The first step in this direction was taken on strictly financial grounds. In 1920–2 Britain had to give the territory grants-in-aid worth £408,000; it therefore insisted that new means be found to increase revenue and reduce expenditure. Byatt thought this could best be done by increasing government's share of the proceeds from sales of African cash-crops. Hitherto, much of this income had been paid to chiefs as tribute; henceforward, chiefs received a salary from government while tribute payments were commuted to a monetary tax additional to hut- or poll-taxes. In 1925 a new governor arrived: Sir Donald Cameron, who had served in Nigeria for 17 years. Cameron at once set about the introduction of indirect rule, whereby chiefs became paid agents of local 'native administrations' rather than of the central government. A native administration comprised three bodies: a native authority, whether chief or council; a native court; and a native treasury, which collected tax, forwarded a percentage to the central government and used the rest to pay the staff of the native administration. It was hoped that native administrations, in close touch with the people, would prove more efficient in prising taxes out of African pockets than officials of central government; it seemed certain that they would be cheaper.

For Cameron, indirect rule was not just a means to more efficient administration; it was also a way of training Africans to take part eventually in territorial politics. But this was a long-term aim. Like most of his colleagues, Cameron firmly believed that Africans should not become 'bad imitations' of Europeans, but develop along 'their own lines'. It was widely assumed that this meant fostering the 'tribe' as the largest unit of African society, and several of Cameron's subordinates tried to group native administrations into tribal paramountcies, in the belief that they were thereby repairing damage done by German rule to African institutions. In practice, indirect rule often meant the introduction of chiefs and paramounts without any traditional standing, but such innovation was seen as a stage in a distinctively African path of evolution. This approach influenced Cameron's views on

African education, which echoed those of many missionaries and also the Phelps-Stokes Commission which visited East Africa in 1924: schools should make Africans 'useful members in their own community life'.⁷ It was in this spirit that the government began to assist selected mission schools. In 1925 it refused to help Africans learn alongside Indians, since this might give Africans 'political ideas'. In the same year, it founded a school at Tabora, but for ten years entry was restricted to the sons of chiefs and headmen.

Indirect rule provided new scope for African abilities, but it was clearly far from being a programme for indiscriminate African advancement; in important respects, it was a policy of segregation. This was underlined in 1929, when the native courts became part of a judicial pyramid from which professional advocates were excluded and in which appeal lay through district and provincial commissioners up to the governor, and not to the High Court.⁸ There was nothing incongruous in the fact that Cameron simultaneously sought to promote white settlement. In 1925 Britain and Germany resumed normal relations, which meant that Germans were once more entitled to settle in Tanganyika. Many small farmers from Germany regained property on Kilimanjaro, while others took up leases around Iringa, in the southern highlands, where they vainly sought to make fortunes from coffee. It therefore seemed highly desirable, both to Cameron and the Colonial Office, that British settlers with a modicum of capital and experience should be encouraged as a counterweight to the Germans. In 1930–2 a survey team specified certain areas as suitable for white settlement. Some preference was given in the later 1920s to European coffee cultivation: Africans were denied assistance in growing the more profitable *arabica* variety except on Kilimanjaro, where it was already firmly established. Imperial loans were obtained for railway extensions, not only from Tabora to Mwanza but also from Moshi to Arusha, which was seen as a centre for white farming. The economy became increasingly dependent on European enterprise: while the total value of exports was nearly quadrupled between 1921 and 1929 (when it was £3.7m), the contribution of sisal rose from 22 per cent in 1921–3 to 40 per cent in 1929. This was achieved by accelerating

⁷ Thomas Jesse Jones, *Education in East Africa* (New York, n.d.), xvi.

⁸ Kenya followed suit, in 1930; Uganda, in the end, did not.

the flow of migrant labour from the remotest population clusters in the south and west; the Ha were first systematically taxed in 1923, and in 1926 a labour department was set up to supervise labour migrants in transit. Meanwhile Europeans once more obtained political representation and so too, for the first time, did Indians. In 1926 a legislative council was formed, comprising thirteen officials and seven nominated unofficials; five of the latter were British whites and two were Indians, who in this context were also British; non-British European residents were specifically excluded. In 1929 two more unofficial whites and one Indian were added. There was no revival of elections in urban government, but Europeans and Indians were nominated by officials to township authorities.

It was Indians who pioneered political action on a territorial scale in Tanganyika. Their meagre representation in the legislative council was no measure of their importance. During the war they had suffered greatly from the collapse of external trade, but afterwards the Tanganyika government drew heavily on India for English-speaking clerks and artisans. As exports revived, Indian traders increased, and a few bought sisal and coffee plantations. By 1931, when the European population was 8,200, there were 25,000 Indians — four times their number in 1912. Meanwhile, in 1918, an Indian Association had been formed, and in 1923 it helped to organise a closure of Indian and Arab shops throughout the territory: this obliged the government to abandon an attempt at closer supervision of traders' accounts.

The reassertion of the Indian presence had far-reaching effects among Africans: it stimulated their awareness of belonging to a single colonial territory and prompted them to organise accordingly. Ironically, the conditions for this were created by colonial policy. Colonial officials might envisage African progress in terms of tribes, and see the legislative council as the exclusive concern of immigrants, but the British themselves had already sponsored the advance of 'detribalised' Africans. When the Tanganyika government began looking for English-speaking staff at the end of the war, it found them not only in India but among Africans educated by British missions. Since the late nineteenth century, the Universities' Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) had been sending Africans from the mainland to Kiungani, on Zanzibar, for training as priests or teachers. The German government had

distrusted such African Christians and gave them few jobs; instead, they had favoured literate Muslims. When the British took over, they soon gave key posts as government clerks and interpreters to graduates of Kiungani and the Church Missionary Society school at Mombasa, and also to educated Africans from Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and Uganda. Such men resented the predominance of Indians in the middle grades of the civil service and the preferential treatment of Indian clerks. To challenge this, in 1922 both Christians and Muslims in Tanga founded the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association; in 1925–7 the branch in Dar es Salaam led a systematic if unsuccessful campaign to improve terms of service and achieve parity with Indians. In its early years, TTACSA mainly represented a coastal élite, but its stronghold was the capital and framed a perspective of the territory as a whole.

Meanwhile, educated Africans up-country were also coming together: their field of action was the tribe, but their tribes were economic communities rather than the administrative constructions of colonial officials. In 1924 the Bukoba Bahaya Union was formed by clerks in opposition to coffee-rich chiefs, and a similar rivalry among the Chaga inspired the Kilimanjaro Native Planters' Association, founded in 1925. This protected its members against Asian coffee-traders by dealing through a single agent; it also resisted threats of European encroachment and in 1929 even sought representation in the legislative council. Such fears and rivalries exposed the contradictions inherent in the compartmentalised structure of Tanganyika society; they were to become more urgent as the structure was stiffened by a new economic depression.

Kenya

In the East Africa Protectorate, in sharp contrast to Tanganyika, white settlers were much more powerful at the end of the war than at the beginning. Several had played key roles in government, and most were well placed to take advantage of the post-war commodity boom. By 1919 coffee contributed 25 per cent of exports, and from 1920 onwards it was the country's leading export, usually followed by sisal. High prices for both crops encouraged further expansion, to which the main obstacle seemed

to be a shortage of African labour. This was due to the ravages of war. Men who had survived and recovered were busy putting their own farms back into commission; they were in no mood to continue working for white men. So further measures were taken to conscript them. In 1918 the Resident Natives Ordinance compelled African squatters to work for their landlords for at least six months of the year. In 1919 General Northey, a veteran of the East Africa campaign, became governor, and he soon issued circulars instructing district officials to 'persuade' labour to come forward. Meanwhile, the settlers' position had been strengthened by the colonial secretary, Lord Milner, as part of a broader strategy for entrenching British hegemony in eastern Africa. In the legislative council, eleven (out of thirty) seats were to be filled by election among the 9,000 Europeans. The 25,000 Indians were allowed to elect two members but refused to do so; the Arabs were given one nominated member. Britain also supported the settlers' plan to double their numbers by offering farms on easy terms to ex-servicemen. In 1920 the territory was renamed Kenya Colony;⁹ this had no constitutional significance but allowed the government to raise a loan of £5m in London, in order to improve Mombasa harbour and extend the railway into Uganda through European areas in the western highlands. In the same year, African taxes were increased by one-third, and the Native Registration Ordinance tightened the grip of both employer and tax-collector by obliging every adult male African to carry a registration certificate (*kipande*).

At the end of 1920 the post-war boom collapsed; besides, most people, of whatever colour, suffered losses as a result of the conversion of East African currency from the Indian rupee to sterling. For many Africans, wages were now the most likely source of cash: economic circumstances pulled them on to the labour market even as recent legislation pushed them. It has indeed been reckoned that by 1922 an African had to work four times as long as in 1910 to earn his tax money.¹⁰ Thus when in 1921 the Colonial Office insisted that Northey withdraw his

⁹ The coastal strip remained, as before, a protectorate, under the entirely nominal suzerainty of the sultan of Zanzibar. In 1925 Kismayu and territory west of the Juba river was transferred to Italian Somaliland, to fulfil an agreement made with Italy in 1915.

¹⁰ R. L. Tignor, *The colonial transformation of Kenya. The Kamba, Kikuyu and Maasai from 1900 to 1939* (Princeton, 1976), 183.

circulars, it made little real difference, for labour was now cheap and plentiful. In the same year a judge ruled that, since Kenya was a colony, Africans could not own land as Europeans could; they were mere tenants-at-will of the Crown. Meanwhile, settlers showed that civil disobedience could succeed: they mostly refused to pay an income-tax imposed in 1920 and it was withdrawn in 1922. Against the steady advance of settler power, Africans now began to organise resistance. In June 1921 a Kikuyu telephone operator in the Treasury, Harry Thuku, founded the Young Kikuyu Association. This campaigned both in Nairobi and in Kikuyu reserves against the *kipande*, tax increases, forced labour and land alienation. In March 1922 Thuku was arrested and deported to the coast; this caused a riot in Nairobi in which over twenty Africans were killed. By this time, Thuku's grievances were also being voiced by Luo chiefs and by a Young Kavirondo Association. This last included many Anglicans who until 1921 had belonged to the Uganda diocese, in which they had enjoyed a high degree of self-reliance and autonomy. The Luo meetings were taken seriously by the government, and in August the recent tax increases were abolished. In 1923 the government sanctioned the transformation of the Young Kavirondo Association into the Kavirondo 'Taxpayers' Welfare Association, which under the leadership of the Anglican Archdeacon Owen addressed itself for some years to local self-help as well as to carefully worded protests.

Meanwhile tensions between Europeans and Indians became acute. In 1919 Northey had bluntly told the Indian Association in Nairobi that European interests must be paramount, and early in 1922 the new colonial secretary, Churchill, encouraged Europeans to look forward to eventual self-government. But the government of India, hard-pressed by nationalists, compelled the British government to think again. In mid-1922 Northey was replaced by the more flexible governor of Uganda, Robert Coryndon. Whitehall now proposed to mollify Kenya's Indians by creating a common roll for elections to the legislative council. This frightened a group of white settlers into plotting rebellion: plans were made to kidnap the governor. Early in 1923 the British government arranged talks in London, at which settlers and Indians sought to buttress their rival claims by championing the rights of the African majority. Their bluff was called: after


suggestions from J. H. Oldham, secretary of the International Missionary Council, the colonial secretary, now the Duke of Devonshire, issued a White Paper which declared: 'Primarily Kenya is an African territory...the interests of the African natives must be paramount.'¹¹ In face of widespread settler opposition, Indians were assured the right of unrestricted immigration and were offered five (instead of two) communally elected seats in the legislative council; but they scornfully ignored this concession until 1933.¹² The Arabs gained one elected seat, while an official seat was filled by the senior Arab *liwali* on the coast. African interests were to be represented by one nominated European, a missionary. Nobody had won, but tempers cooled as commodity prices began to rise again. The prospects for European farming were also much improved by the reduction of rates for carrying maize on the railway, which from 1922 was run by a South African director, advised by a settler-dominated council. From 1923 tariffs protected wheat and dairy farmers, and in the same year the legislative council set up a finance committee to approve the budget; on this, settlers outnumbered officials by eleven to three. In 1923-4 there was a sudden influx of new settlers: white landowners increased by one-half.

The middle 1920s were the best years in our period for European farming in Kenya. There was little white immigration after 1924, and in 1928 only one-eighth of the 'white highlands' were cultivated. All the same, between 1920 and 1929 the area under white cultivation increased between three- and four-fold; the white population rose to 16,000. Export values rose fairly steadily and in 1930 were almost twice those of 1921 (which had reflected the height of the post-war boom). These exports were mostly marketed by Europeans; the African contribution, which had been greatly reduced by the war, rose to 25 per cent in 1925 but then declined, and consisted largely of hides and skins. Between 1924 and 1927 the value of simsim exports, mainly from Kavirondo and the coast, reached record levels but thereafter fell away rapidly. Since 1916 Africans had been officially discouraged from growing coffee, potentially the most lucrative export crop. There was, of course, an important home market for food-crops; the Kipsigis, for example, sold plenty of maize to their European

¹¹ *Indians in Kenya*, Cmd. 1922 (1923), 1.

¹² Meanwhile, some Indian seats were filled by nomination.

EAST AFRICA



25 Kenya: the White Highlands, 1935

and Masai neighbours, making increasing use of ploughs as well as water-mills. In general, however, African agriculture was handicapped by lack of capital, low productivity and inadequate transport. Coryndon proclaimed a 'dual policy' whereby both European and African agriculture would be promoted, but between 1921 and 1930 the agriculture department was run by yet another South African, Alex Holm, who openly championed white farmers: between 1925 and 1929 the proportion of its budget devoted to Africans was halved. Besides, African access to meat markets was restricted by the decision to combat disease in African-owned cattle through quarantine measures rather than mass inoculation, even though African pastoralists, such as the Kamba, Samburu, Turkana and Masai, regularly sold part of their herds: indeed the Masai supplied Nairobi with much of its meat. To the anger of many district officials, it became ever clearer that

African taxation was being spent, not on African welfare but on subsidies for frequently inefficient European farming: not only through technical aid but through the cost of tariff protection, road-building and uneconomic railway rates. Indeed, railway costs were deliberately increased; the government raised new loans to build expensive branch lines between 1924 and 1929 throughout the white highlands. One such line benefited Kikuyu reserves, and the line to Kisumu was extended further into Luo country, but to build all these railways the government was obliged to enlist forced labour.

Thus in the course of the 1920s white settlers in Kenya came to regard the colonial government as a friendly partner rather than a potential enemy. Their hopes of territorial self-government had been dashed in 1923, but since then they had received many material benefits from the imperial connection; besides, they were given a large measure of local self-government on municipal and district councils set up in 1929. These favours to the settler community were the price which Britain made Kenya's Africans pay for the assurance that their interests would be 'paramount' — that the colony would not be formally handed over to immigrants. For the time being there was no sustained African criticism of this bargain. The demarcation of new reserves in the mid-1920s temporarily allayed African fears for their land. By and large, most articulate Africans during the 1920s were concerned with the balance of power within their own communities rather than at the centre. They were anxious to improve their access to European culture and its associated responsibilities, but they sought this by exploiting local tensions and solidarities: as in Tanganyika, the most ardent 'improvers' were among the most dedicated 'tribalists'.

Once the agitation of 1922 had subsided, it was Christian missionaries and government-appointed chiefs, quite as much as settlers, who came under attack from African teachers and farmers in central and western Kenya. In 1925 the government introduced partly elective local native councils (LNCs), which obliged chiefs to share power with their literate subjects. The councils were soon used to press home the attack on missionaries, whose primary schools failed to satisfy African demands for education that would fit them for leadership. In 1926, with government aid, Protestant missionaries opened Alliance High School in Kiambu, but what

many Africans wanted was government schools in which missionaries would no longer be able to interfere with African customs, an especially sore point among the Kikuyu. The Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), formed in 1924, was devoted not only to the cause of higher education and the redress of economic grievances but to the defence of Kikuyu culture, and it strove to promote a sense of Kikuyu unity as a basis for communal progress. Thus the conflict with the missions in 1929 over the Kikuyu practice of clitoridectomy crystallised aspirations both towards freedom of cultural choice and towards a new sense of ethnic loyalty. It was no paradox that in the same year Kikuyu LNCs raised over £20,000 to build their own schools while Johnstone (later Jomo) Kenyatta, secretary of the KCA, editor of the country's first African newspaper and a champion of clitoridectomy, called for 'a methodical education to open out a man's head'.¹³

Uganda

In 1918 there was still no official agreement as to the relative importance of African and European enterprise in Uganda's future. But the hundred-odd European planters were very hopeful. During the war they had mostly prospered. Exports of coffee and rubber substantially increased, both in value and in bulk. They still formed only a small proportion of total exports (together they amounted in value to 10 per cent in 1918–19), but in 1920 the planters were sufficiently encouraged to press, like white farmers in Kenya, for special assistance from government at the expense of African producers. They had friends in high places: the chief justice, Morris Carter, and a South African governor, Robert Coryndon (1918–22). In 1921 Coryndon introduced a legislative council in which five officials were joined by two nominated Europeans; one nominated seat was provided for the Asian community, who until 1926 boycotted it in protest. In the same year, Churchill, as colonial secretary, approved long-standing proposals to make available for alienation large areas in the three kingdoms bordering Buganda.

These soon proved hollow victories, for meanwhile export prices had collapsed. The depression, and the East African

¹³ Quoted by T. O. Ranger, 'African attempts to control education in East and Central Africa, 1900–1939', *Past and Present*, 1965, 32, 67.

currency crisis, ruined several businesses and abruptly exposed the essential frailty of white enterprise in Uganda. Like the coffee-farmers of Kenya and Tanganyika, the Uganda planters were unhealthily dependent on extremely volatile overseas markets; they too had grown accustomed to government collusion in keeping down wages; and their transport costs were highest of all. When their luck ran out, they found that the Uganda government was only a fair-weather friend. For in Uganda, in sharp contrast to Kenya, African cash-crop production had come through the war relatively unscathed: indeed, in the Eastern Province it had markedly increased. Cotton had been valued as a contribution to the war effort, and low-cost African production had powerful champions, including S. S. Simpson, director of agriculture from 1911 to 1929. When disaster struck European producers in 1921, Simpson's arguments gained new force, and in 1922 Coryndon abandoned his plans for land alienation; he also abolished forced labour. This sudden volte-face was paralleled in London, where Churchill was replaced by the Duke of Devonshire. Henceforward, the Colonial Office was committed to furthering African production in Uganda. In this, it responded to pressures from Humphrey Leggett, chairman of the British East Africa Corporation, which had long co-operated with the Uganda Company in processing and marketing Uganda's cotton. On a visit to East Africa in 1908, Leggett had encouraged cash-cropping in Nyanza, and it was partly due to his influence that the Colonial Office in 1922 recalled Northey from Kenya and caused the annulment of African tax increases.

The belated acceptance of African production as the foundation of Uganda's economy was dramatically reflected in export patterns during the 1920s. Between 1923 and 1929 cotton exports more than doubled in bulk and their value rose from £2m to £3.3m; in 1925 they were worth £4.7m and accounted for 93 per cent of all exports. These achievements were partly due to improved productivity following research promoted by the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation from 1923. Meanwhile the Uganda government began to assist Africans to grow coffee. *Arabica* had already been promoted among the Gisu, on Mount Elgon; elsewhere, *robusta* was grown, and by 1929 Africans were producing the greater part of coffee exports (which amounted to 4 per cent of all exports). In sharp contrast, European enterprise stagnated: a

few rubber estates survived, but from 1926 their exports dwindled to near-insignificance. However, prosperity rewarded two Indian businessmen who began producing sugar in Buganda and Busoga in the 1920s: they met a rapidly growing African demand and had no need of overseas markets.

The post-war boom, and the rapid recovery from the slump of 1921–2, boosted revenue (£1.5m in 1925) and made possible a marked increase in government expenditure. Civil administration was extended to Karamoja in 1921;¹⁴ in 1922 a technical school was opened at Makerere, near Kampala, and in 1924 an education department was set up, while a variety of jobs in the civil service hitherto reserved to Indians were opened up to Africans. In 1928 Uganda was finally linked by rail to the coast: in that year the new line through the Kenya white highlands was extended west as far as Busoga; a branch line struck north to Teso, and the main line reached Kampala in 1931. A network of motorable feeder roads was built, and there was a notable expansion of medical and veterinary services.

For many Africans in Uganda, the 1920s were a period of relative prosperity and promise. But it was also a decade of growing tension and conflict. In the first place, it witnessed — as in Tanganyika — a change in the relations between chiefs and the colonial government. In the lakeside kingdoms, chiefs who had allied with the first British officials were rapidly giving way to younger men, among whom the British now favoured those who were not only literate but could speak English. Indirect rule through ‘native authorities’ was gradually introduced, and in Uganda this often meant new curbs on chiefly power: salaries replaced tribute and tax-rebates, and the younger officials tended to regard chiefs as junior civil servants rather than as potentates in their own right. In 1924 the government forbade the extension of *mailo* allodial tenure outside Buganda, where it had facilitated the concentration of wealth and power within the Christian oligarchy. Following agitation led by clan heads, the *lukiko* (parliament) of Buganda was induced in 1927 to set a legal limit to the levies of chiefs and other landlords on their tenants.

Thus one trend in official policy in Uganda after 1922 was to shelter the mass of small producers not only from rival European enterprise but also from the exactions of African aristocrats.

¹⁴ In 1926 Uganda transferred to Kenya the Turkana country west of Lake Rudolf.

Another sort of protection was much less popular. The fundamental political issue in this expanding agricultural economy was the price paid to growers of the main cash-crop, cotton. This was subject to the play of forces between the growers, the middlemen (mostly Indian, though by 1920 several were African) and the ginners (among whom Indians outnumbered Europeans by 1925, following a boost in exports to India and Japan). By the late 1920s, the ginners' attempts at collusion to secure local monopsonies provoked heated opposition from growers and middlemen: this was expressed both by occasional refusals to plant cotton when prices were unduly low and by protests from the Ganda *lukiiko*, the Young Busoga Association and the Association of Uganda Farmers. The government, however, was more inclined to further the interests of established businesses, in the name of 'rationalisation', than to expose African growers and traders to both the risks and windfalls of a free market. A ginners' scheme in 1929 for restricting the price paid to growers was thwarted only when a poor harvest compelled them to compete for the diminished crop.

If the growth of the cotton economy intensified old tensions between chiefs and subjects, and introduced new ones between growers and ginners, it also underlined geographical contrasts of wealth and poverty. For various reasons, including their remoteness from the major transport routes, the northern and western districts became sources of labour rather than cash-crops. In the early 1920s the expansion of public works and private enterprise increased demands for labour even as the power of chiefs and officials to conscript it was eroded. Thus the government promoted recruitment in Acholi and West Nile, while by 1925 there may have been 10,000 immigrants from Ruanda-Urundi in Buganda: many were working for Ganda cotton-farmers. In 1928, famine drove 35,000 people from Ruanda-Urundi to Buganda, while another 20,000 entered from Tanganyika. By 1930, some of the migrants were settling on plots of their own in Buganda, but most went home; and the territory's increasing dependence on cheap, short-stay labour tended to depress wages generally.

Closer union

Britain's acquisition of Tanganyika under mandate had far-reaching implications for British policy throughout eastern Africa. The fact that Britain now ruled three large contiguous territories in East Africa prompted moves to draw their governments closer together. In 1920 the East Africa Currency Board was set up; in 1927 Tanganyika adopted the customs tariff in force in Kenya and Uganda, and all three territories agreed on the free movement of local products across their own borders; this promoted a regional trade in foodstuffs. But any substantial moves towards political unification would depend on co-ordinating social policy. After the Devonshire White Paper on Kenya of 1923, it seemed as if, at least in theory, all three mainland governments were committed to giving priority to African interests. In practice, the balance between the communities in Kenya was very much an open question, and the terms on which closer union might be achieved became a matter of keen debate. In 1924 a parliamentary commission visited East Africa, chaired by a Conservative spokesman on colonial affairs, W. Ormsby-Gore. While broadly in favour of white settlement, the commission advised against federation, in view of opposition from the territorial Indian associations. Instead, from 1926, the mainland governors and senior officials began to meet more or less regularly to discuss matters of common concern.

More was at stake, however, than regional co-operation or even union. Tanganyika, after all, supplied the final link in a continuous chain of British control or influence reaching from the Cape to Egypt. The expulsion of the Germans had revived visions of a British ascendancy in East and Central Africa based on British colonies of settlement: in time, the region might comprise one or more Dominions modelled on South Africa and closely associated with it. Smuts was one such visionary; another was Milner's disciple Leo Amery, who from 1924 to 1929 was colonial secretary. In 1925 Amery appointed as governor of Kenya Sir Edward Grigg, who shared his hopes, and in 1927 Amery despatched a new East Africa Commission comprising Sir E. Hilton Young, Sir George Schuster, Sir R. Mant and J. H. Oldham. This move back-fired: in their report of 1929 all but the chairman opposed closer union, unless in the form of a high commissioner with power to override local legislatures on matters

of African policy, while they favoured a common electoral roll — the main demand of Indians in Kenya. Soon afterwards, a Labour government was returned to power in Britain and the new colonial secretary, Lord Passfield, issued two White Papers on East Africa which broadly supported the Hilton Young majority report. The White Papers were submitted for approval to a joint select parliamentary committee which reported late in 1931, after the Labour government had fallen. The committee, dominated by Conservatives, returned to much the same position as Ormsby-Gore's commission: it advised against closer union, in view of local hostility, but it also opposed a common roll, and it stressed the importance of European enterprise. In the later 1930s, settler fears that Tanganyika might be handed back to Germany prompted further pressures for closer union, but the original deadlock persisted: no plan which would please white settlers would be accepted by East Africa's Indians, and throughout the deliberations their case had been pressed on the Colonial Office by the Government of India, which in the last resort counted for more than the 'South African' lobby.

In the short term, at least, the chief result of the controversy was to aggravate communal suspicions in East Africa and crystallise African thought on questions of territorial policy. The commissions of 1924 and 1927 both received submissions from African organisations, and the parliamentary committee of 1931 heard evidence in London from African witnesses. They were carefully chosen by the colonial governments but included such influential men as Martin Kayamba, founder of the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association; Serwano Kulubya, treasurer of Buganda; and Chief Koinange of the Kiambu Kikuyu. This was the first time black East Africans had been given an official platform to speak on major political issues, and they joined in recording well-argued objections to any scheme which might enlarge the political scope of white settlers.

DEPRESSION AND STRAIN, 1930-1940

In 1930 the world's commodity markets collapsed. East Africa was hard hit. Between 1929 and 1932 world prices for sisal, coffee, maize and hides fell by 70 per cent while cotton prices fell by over 60 per cent. To some extent the region benefited from efforts elsewhere to counter the depression. From 1932, Empire prefer-

ence provided some shelter for producers of coffee and sisal. The abandonment of the gold standard by Britain in 1931 and by the USA in 1933 caused the price of gold to rise by two-thirds between 1931 and 1935: this stimulated the exploitation of East Africa's scattered deposits and by 1938 gold was the second largest export from both Kenya and Tanganyika. In some fields, moreover, the local response to falling export prices was increased production, which curbed the decline of export values. Meanwhile, some imports became cheaper. Despite imperial preference, East Africa was prevented by the Congo Basin treaties¹⁵ from discriminating against cheap Japanese manufactures, and these were now available in large quantities. In the course of the 1930s Japan captured much of the East African market for cotton and silk goods, and for the great mass of consumers this was clear gain. In general, however, import prices fell less sharply than those of exports. At the same time, the burden of fixed obligations became relatively much greater than hitherto: on reduced incomes, most Africans had to pay as much tax as before, while most European farmers had large debts to service. Governments were in the same predicament: between 1929 and 1932 their revenues fell on average by 15 per cent but they too had fixed debt charges to pay, and also pensions, so there were cut-backs in administration and social services, while investment in new public works came to a halt. Financial constraints reinforced the political arguments against any comprehensive scheme for closer union in East Africa, though in 1930–1 the mainland governments agreed to increase protective duties on imports, and in 1933 the postal and telegraph services were unified in the interests of economy. By 1935 export prices had revived, and in 1936–7 export values finally surpassed the highest levels achieved in the 1920s, but this growth was not sustained. The mood of retrenchment persisted throughout the decade. In 1940 total government revenue was 14 per cent higher than in 1929, but this and other resources had to be distributed among more and more people: the populations of East Africa may have risen by as much as 14 per cent between 1931 and 1939, when there were probably 6.5 million in Tanganyika, 4.8 million in Kenya, 4.2 million in Uganda and 230,000 in Zanzibar.¹⁶

¹⁵ See Lord Hailey, *An African survey* (London, 1938), 1341–3.

¹⁶ These are extrapolations from the first East African census of 1948: see D. A. Lury, 'African population estimates: back projections of recent census results', *Economic and Statistical Review* (Nairobi), 1965, 16, viii–xii.

Tanganyika

Of all the East African territories, Tanganyika suffered most from the depression. Between 1929 and 1931 exports slumped from £3.8m to £1.7m, and government revenue (around £2m from 1925 to 1929) fell by a quarter. The government already spent one-quarter of its revenue on debt charges, but it had to borrow heavily in 1932 from the British Treasury, which enforced stringent economies. At the same time, the railway lost its share of the Katanga copper traffic (which in 1930–1 supplied half its freight earnings) to the new Benguela railway. The slump was mainly reversed by increasing production of coffee and cotton, which between 1930 and 1936 rose in volume by 90 per cent and 300 per cent respectively. The production of sisal, which takes seven years to mature, expanded more slowly. Thus in 1932–5 there was a rise in the relative importance of African production, which in the later 1920s had tended to decline. From 1936, however, Tanganyika's exports clearly owed more to European than to African production. Sisal remained the principal export; in 1936–7 (as in 1929–31) it exceeded 40 per cent of the total. And from 1931 gold became steadily more important: by 1940 it accounted for almost a quarter of total exports (now worth £5m). Alluvial panning had begun in Lupa district, in the southern highlands, in 1922, but in the 1930s the bulk of the country's gold output came from reef-mining: in the Lupa area; at Sekenke, east of Tabora; and at Geita and around Musoma, near Lake Victoria. Alluvial gold at Lupa attracted several hundred 'diggers', including some Africans, but the industry was mainly in the hands of a few companies with mining interests elsewhere. By the later 1930s it employed well over 25,000 men — several thousand more than the copper-mines in Northern Rhodesia.

Economic difficulties prompted the Tanganyika government to strengthen its links with expatriate business. The depression halted the net growth of the European community, but emigration was offset by a continuing influx of German smallholders, which in turn reinforced the solidarity of British officials and settlers. In 1930 the Tanganyika Sisal Growers' Association was formed, mainly to reduce wages; its president was the unofficials' leader in the legislative council, and in 1937 British settlers dominated a government commission on labour. In 1938 a committee of

unofficials advocated government aid for increased white settlement; this found favour with the new governor, Sir Mark Young, who in 1939 appointed three white unofficials to the executive council. He also appointed one Indian: an acknowledgement of the importance in the legislature of the richer Indian businessmen, doctors and lawyers. Since 1929, moreover, Indian schools had enjoyed increasing government support, which partly offset the great hardships endured by Indian traders during the depression.

To Africans, the 1930s brought no such compensations. For all but a few it was a lean decade of contracting opportunities and growing regimentation. In 1932 the government launched a 'plant more crops' campaign, but it was chiefly directed at those areas in the north and north-west where export crop-production was already established; it was not intended to check migration from the principal 'labour reservoirs' in the south and west. In any case, the campaign exposed more clearly than ever before the inherent contradictions of indirect rule. Revenue from cash-crops enabled native authorities to enjoy limited fiscal autonomy, but the more people grew them the more their interests diverged from those of their chiefs. The government determined crop prices for growers, and increases in production, especially of Sukuma cotton, often had to be enforced by chiefs. The persistent decline in coffee prices aggravated tensions between chiefs and other farmers. On Kilimanjaro, the coffee farmers' trading association was taken over by the government in 1931, and in 1937 there were riots in protest against the way in which it was manipulated. In the same year there were riots in Buhaya, provoked by new rules for coffee-growers, government opposition to African middlemen, and the unpopular behaviour of certain chiefs. Elsewhere, there had been efforts to organise coffee sales and beat down Indian buyers, but finance was lacking to form true co-operatives. Besides, there was a large and widening gap between the great mass of cultivators and the small minority of farmers who produced the great bulk of African cash-crops, with the help of seasonal labour and sometimes ploughs.

Meanwhile, the expansion of expatriate enterprise greatly increased the number of wage-earners: this doubled between 1927 and 1936, when 244,000 Africans were employed by non-Africans. About one-fifth of these workers came from Burundi, Northern

Rhodesia and Mozambique, and as always it was those migrants from furthest afield, with least hope of an alternative livelihood, who were most willing to perform the exceptionally unpleasant task of cutting sisal. Real wages mostly held firm during the depression, but they tended to fall after 1935. In 1937 dockworkers struck at Tanga; in 1939 there were dock strikes at both Tanga and Dar es Salaam, and that at Tanga spread to a nearby sisal estate. These protests brought no concessions, but they indicated a growing awareness of shared predicament among a nucleus of workers who had been dependent on wage labour for several years.

Resistance to economic crisis was least evident in food-growing areas, such as Bonde or Ukaguru. The growth of the labour force enlarged the market for local food-crops, but continuing high transport costs rendered them still less profitable than export crops. Educated clerks were far less likely to take up maize or rice than coffee or cotton, and local leadership suffered in consequence. To be sure, the depression did evoke a popular response in several remote and impoverished rural areas, but on the plane of ritual rather than political action. In 1933, the *mchape* cult of witchcraft eradication briefly appeared in the far south-east and west, as in Central Africa, to offer an answer to current misfortune where missionaries and colonial officials had clearly failed.

The government did little to encourage the growth of African leadership which might widen discussion of the country's discontents. Before his departure in 1931, Cameron had joined Martin Kayamba in proposing the formation of provincial African councils. But Cameron's vision was not shared by his successors, for whom indirect rule became an end in itself. There was no platform on which officials could exchange views with the African Association. This had been formed in 1929, in Dar es Salaam, in order to voice opposition to closer union among British-educated civil servants, veterans of the German regime and the main African groups in the capital (where by 1931 there were 35,000 people). Cameron himself warned the civil service members not to engage in 'politics', and fears for their jobs in the depression further unnerved them. The association tended to become a club for the urban élite and was soon challenged by the more radical civil servants and traders of the Tanganyika African Welfare and Commercial Association: this was founded in 1934–6 by a Ganda

shopkeeper, Erica Fiah, who in 1937 started *Kwetu*, the country's first independent Swahili newspaper. But the African Association formed branches in a few up-country towns; it assimilated the energetic Bukoba Bahaya Union; and it extended to Zanzibar, where in 1939 delegates from most parts of the territory attended the association's first territorial conference. A year later another conference was held in Dar es Salaam, and it renewed the request for provincial councils: 'in a word, we are now claiming for a voice in the Government'.¹⁷ The request was rebuffed; but it could not be sidestepped much longer. In 1938 the government had begun to contribute funds to Makerere College, in Uganda, where school certificate courses had been introduced in 1933. By 1939, despite drastic cuts in education since the depression, nearly fifty Africans from Tanganyika had found their way to Makerere. These students came from all strata in the African layer of colonial society, and from all over the country. There could be no question of confining their horizons to the bounds of a native administration.

Kenya

In Kenya, the depression compelled a partial reappraisal of the economic role of European settlers. The elaborate framework of subsidies erected to help them in the 1920s presupposed high prices for their exports and a rapid expansion of production. But in 1929 much of Kenya suffered both drought and a locust invasion, and the value of coffee exports fell by one-third. In 1930, despite the world depression, Kenya's exports were worth more than ever before (£3.3m), due to record harvests of coffee and maize. But between 1931 and 1934 a prolonged drought combined with falling prices to halve the value of exports. By 1940 they had risen to nearly £4m, but this recovery was largely due to new commodities. Coffee remained the principal export, but in 1938–40 it was closely followed by gold: by 1940, the output of gold from reef-mining in different parts of Kavirondo was worth £650,000, though already the volume was beginning to decline. From 1935 Kenya's third export by value was tea, mostly grown in the south-western highlands by firms financed from London. By 1938, sisal was followed by pyrethrum (a daisy which yields insecticide and is especially suited to the Kenya highlands).

¹⁷ Quoted by John Iliffe, *A modern history of Tanganyika* (Cambridge, 1979), 419.

Meanwhile, the need to boost exports as prices fell had undermined both official and settler objections to African production. By comparison with the earlier 1920s, the African share of production for export declined. Nonetheless, after falling to 9 per cent in 1931 it rose to between 15 per cent and 20 per cent after 1933, and this revival was mainly due to the energetic promotion of cotton in Nyanza. At the same time many Europeans abandoned maize-farming, their least profitable enterprise, in favour of dairy-farming, and African maize-growers filled the gap. Many Kikuyu also began to grow wattle trees (*mimosa*): these cost little land or labour and could be either consumed or sold for fuel or building-material, while expatriate firms extracted their tannin for treating leather. In 1934 the government even began to encourage a very few Africans to grow coffee, though pyrethrum was reserved for Europeans.

The impact of the depression, and ensuing changes in the structure of the export economy, provoked new tensions both between government and the various racial communities and also within them. In 1931, just before leaving Kenya, Grigg set up a Land Bank which helped to rescue indebted white farmers who had been abandoned by the commercial banks. But revenue, which had risen by 1929 to £3.3m, was 10 per cent less in 1932. The new governor, Sir Joseph Byrne, promptly made cuts in expenditure without consulting settler politicians, while the railways required bulk exports to pay their way. The government had saved white farming as such, but it could no longer help the least efficient. By the end of the decade, one in five white farms had failed, and perhaps one-third of white-owned land was idle or hardly used. In 1936, following a critical report on Kenya's finances by Sir Alan Pim, income-tax was again imposed on whites. The British government was anxious not to strain settler loyalty too far (the Italians had recently occupied Ethiopia) and in 1937 it appointed a governor, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, much more ready than Byrne to plead their case. But over the decade the government showed increasing interest both in low-cost African farming and in planters with ties to overseas capital, as opposed to the smaller European farmers who leaned most heavily on the state. And whereas such farmers tended to see African producers as rivals, planters were glad to buy their maize, while their cotton was welcomed by British trading houses.

The enlargement of scope for African production was not, however, matched in the political sphere. In 1927 and 1931, African witnesses to enquiries on the question of closer union had called for direct representation in the legislative council. Once closer union had been firmly shelved, both Africans and Indians ceased for a time to fear that Kenya was about to be handed over to white settlers, and their concern over communal balance in the council diminished. In 1933 elected Indians finally took the seats allotted them,¹⁸ and in 1936 an Indian unofficial was appointed to the executive council. The government remained firm against admitting Africans to the legislative council; instead, a second European was nominated in 1935 to represent African interests, but in fact this was done much more effectively by an Indian member, Isher Dass. By this time, economic adversity was drawing certain Indians and Africans closer together. In 1935 and 1937 new regulations for the marketing and transport of crops aided monopoly purchasers, such as the Kenya Farmers' Association (a European co-operative) at the expense of both Indian and African traders. In 1935 Indian artisans formed a trade union which two years later led successful strikes in Nairobi and may have encouraged subsequent strikes among African workers, though the Kikuyu Central Association maintained an attitude of somewhat detached interest.

Land, however, was the most ominous source of tension in the 1930s. In the course of the decade, several factors combined to create serious land shortages for the first time. Population was increasing; African families in the reserves needed more land for cash-crops; and squatters were moving back into the reserves from white farms. Many settlers now preferred to obtain their labour from non-resident wage-earners rather than from squatters occupying potentially valuable grazing land, and in 1937 the grazing rights of squatters were severely restricted. Yet the government made little effort to ease pressure on the reserves. In 1930, at the insistence of the Colonial Office, a Native Lands Trust Ordinance had strengthened the legal security of African reserves, but in 1932 it was modified to facilitate European access to the Kavirondo goldfields. Attempts to check the rapid exhaustion of soil in Kamba country by destocking provoked fierce protest in 1938, in which Kamba herdsmen were backed by the Kikuyu

¹⁸ Indians also filled communally elected seats in the two municipal councils: in Mombasa from 1929 and in Nairobi from 1936.

Central Association. In the same year the total area of reserves was increased by almost 1,500 sq. miles following a recommendation of the Morris Carter Land Commission appointed in 1932. But much of this land was of dubious quality, and only 15 sq. miles were added to the congested Kikuyu reserves. Besides, in 1939 the Highlands Order-in-Council stressed that this was a 'final settlement'; outside these reserves, Africans were permanently denied land rights while it seemed clear that in practice, if not in law, Indians would continue to be excluded from the white highlands. Against this measure, the KCA and KTWa composed a joint protest, read by Isher Dass to the legislative council; a year later, the KCA was proscribed as subversive.

Land scarcity in central Kenya aggravated social differentiation. In the first decades of colonial rule, this process had been most conspicuous in a territorial perspective: African leadership had shifted decisively from the coast to the interior. Land alienation and the abolition of slavery had crippled the pre-colonial coastal plantations, and Muslims had mostly rejected such education as was offered by missions and government: the latter only began to provide for Koranic teaching in 1924, and for Arabic in 1938. For many years, therefore, jobs on the coast requiring literacy in English tended to be given, not to Arabs or Swahili, but to Indians, especially Christians of Goan origin. In Mombasa, the increasing use of Luo and Kikuyu migrant labour depressed wages and housing conditions, which in 1939 provoked a series of brief strikes. Up-country, Muslim Swahili and Christian freedmen from the coast had enjoyed a headstart in petty trade, government and teaching, but they were soon supplanted by locally educated men. This process was reinforced from the 1920s by the tendency of settlers and officials, for political reasons, to prefer local Africans to Indians both as skilled employees and as traders in the reserves. By 1930 Alliance High School was beginning to turn out teachers and clerks for government and the railways, while a few went on to Makerere; in 1939 one Alliance man became the country's first African doctor. As a Masai, he was very much an exception; more than half the pupils at Alliance were Kikuyu, and it was not until 1938 that secondary courses were started in Nyanza. Next year the unpredictable Archdeacon Owen was calling on the government to reduce aid for higher education, since it was giving rise to a new privileged class.

There was certainly a growing division between haves and

have-nots, especially among the Kikuyu. Their mixed farming had in pre-colonial times been based on an open land-frontier; it was now constrained within increasingly crowded reserves. For chiefs and others with secure access to land, a comfortable living could be made from maize and wattle; in the early 1930s such men also greatly enlarged their herds with livestock bought cheap from drought-stricken neighbours. But this meant even less land for former squatters returning to the reserves; most in effect exchanged white for black masters or chanced their luck in town. Land rights had long been bought and sold among the Kikuyu; in 1938 a meeting of Local Native Councils proposed a land register as a step towards the establishment of titles. A growing élite with bourgeois aspirations was closing ranks against the disadvantaged.

Uganda

In Uganda, as elsewhere, the collapse of export prices in 1930 was countered both by increased production and by diversifying the range of exports. The rise in cotton output outlasted the depression: it doubled between 1929 and 1938. This was made possible by special circumstances in Buganda and Teso. During the depth of the depression Ganda farmers had cut down their use of migrant workers, but by 1938 they employed about 50,000, while another 28,000 migrants paid rent as tenants to Ganda farmers. In Teso, ploughs had proved easy to use, and cotton output rose as they were more generally adopted. Among the Langi, by contrast, cotton output stagnated after 1931. Their well-wooded country was unsuited to the plough, and there was no labour for hire, so that further production for export could only be at the expense of food-crops. Besides, there were many farmers in Buganda who found that *robusta* coffee yielded a better return on labour than cotton, even though coffee prices fell throughout the decade. Meanwhile, the government continued to assist the rapid expansion of *arabica* cultivation in Bugisu, and by 1938 it was also widely grown in Ankole and Kigezi, which had long lacked an export crop. Throughout the 1930s coffee contributed between 6 and 10 per cent of total exports and in 1938 coffee exports weighed 14,000 tons, as much as Tanganyika's and not much less than Kenya's. Sugar exports also rose sharply (until checked by international quotas in 1937), while tobacco-

production expanded in Bunyoro and West Nile districts. European rubber estates survived, but several planters began to replace coffee with tea. From 1936 gold (mostly from alluvial deposits in the south-west) ranked third among exports, contributing 2–3 per cent; together with tin, from southern Ankole, it accounted for some 10,000 wage-earners.

The expansion of African export crop-production was much more pronounced in Uganda than in either Kenya or Tanganyika, but official strategies were not fundamentally very different. The government's chief concern in the depression was to protect both its sources of revenue and the country's leading business firms. In Uganda, this meant above all strengthening African capacity to produce for the market, even at the expense of labour supplies from the north-west or south-west. The government could do this precisely because labour continued to flow in from other territories. In 1936, for example, some 20,000 men from Tanganyika entered Uganda in search of work, while 90,000 came from Ruanda-Urundi, spurred on by the recent devaluation of the Belgian franc. In the following year, there were on average 83,000 unskilled wage-earners at any one time in Uganda, excluding those on Ganda farms: the total number employed was around 130,000 — as compared with 180,000 in Kenya. The government did nothing to check the country's growing dependence on cheap, underfed, short-stay labour, which for the time being suited nearly all employers, whether European, Asian or African. In other respects, however, there was sharp conflict between the economic interests of African farmers and non-African immigrants. In the name of 'quality control', and under pressure from the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, the government finally entrenched local monopsonies in cotton-buying, whereby the price to the grower was jointly fixed by officials and ginneries. As export prices revived, it was the ginneries, not the growers, who gathered the profits. Meanwhile, a marketing ordinance severely obstructed African trade in most other cash-crops. Africans were thus largely denied the opportunity to accumulate capital and develop the skills of the entrepreneur. By 1940, despite exports worth over £5m, Uganda's economy was approaching a dead end. There was little scope for expansion on existing lines, since most of the better land was now exploited, while erosion was already a cause of concern.

Despite the firm limits set to African economic enterprise, Uganda's people suffered less hardship in the 1930s than other East Africans. This was partly due to the more ample resources of government. Though revenues never much exceeded the level reached in 1929 (in 1937 they rose to £1.9m), the burden of foreign debt was comparatively low. Between 1928 and 1938 that part of the budget devoted to public works and social services rose from 38 to 51 per cent, and spending on education was doubled. In the 1920s and early 1930s the government was much concerned, as in Kenya, to train Africans to replace Indians as government clerks. But Sir Philip Mitchell, who became governor in 1935, brought a new emphasis on academic education and helped to set Makerere on the road towards its post-war evolution into a university college.

Mitchell also brought views on indirect rule refined by long experience in Tanganyika; he sought both to broaden the social base of native authorities and to extend the autonomy of the Buganda government. And it was above all the central fact of Buganda's pre-eminence (reflected in the preponderance of Ganda at Makerere) which defined African political horizons. Buganda offered Ganda its own broad avenues to power, while non-Ganda thought mainly in terms of creating new ethnic communities which might rival Buganda's relative wealth and independence. There was widespread protest against cotton monopolies, but it was highly localised. The most energetic African organisations of the 1930s were perhaps the Bagishu Welfare Association and the Young Bagwere Association, both of which voiced the resentment of chiefs and teachers against local Ganda settlers. In contrast to Kenya, or even Tanganyika, there was no clear central stage for political conflict: neither Europeans nor Indians found occasion to make the legislative council a forum of serious debate. Despite the country's small size and compact shape, even the most educated Africans had little, if any, sense of territorial identity by 1940. This trend towards regional solidarities was strengthened in the schools. In 1927 the mainland governments agreed to promote Swahili as an African lingua franca, but in Uganda this aim was thwarted both by the Ganda and by a general missionary preference for local vernaculars. Official policy was more successful in Kenya, but it was only in Tanganyika — in continuation of German policy — that both missions and government collabo-

rated to make Swahili the medium of instruction in primary schools, with far-reaching consequences for the future.

Zanzibar

In marked contrast to mainland East Africa, the economy of the Zanzibar Protectorate scarcely expanded at all between 1905 and 1940. There was no significant increase in output of the principal crop, cloves. Thus the territory's domestic export earnings depended almost entirely on the vagaries of weather and prices. The latter were highest in the early 1920s; the ensuing decline continued until just before 1940, when exports were worth £900,000. Re-exports from the mainland, which the Germans had begun to close off, revived when the British took over Tanganyika, but they fell away rapidly after 1930. Revenue, worth £589,000 in 1923, declined thereafter and stagnated throughout the 1930s. The absence of growth was due to various factors: the relatively inelastic market for cloves; the fact that much of the better land was already under cloves by 1905; and the chronic indebtedness of many Arab plantation-owners. This had its roots far back in the nineteenth century, and arose from the planters' lack of frugality, the high interest rates charged by Indian financiers, and the extreme volatility of clove prices. By 1914 senior protectorate officials considered that Arab planters should be replaced either by African smallholders or by Europeans. Nothing came of the latter idea, but indigenous Africans did in fact gradually buy up Arab land. By the early 1920s self-styled 'Swahili' owned nearly a quarter of the clove trees on Zanzibar island and half those on Pemba (which throughout the period exported more than twice as much as Zanzibar).

Despite this fundamental shift in economic power, the government sought to shore up the Arab planters. Even in the days of the slave-trade, they had depended heavily on seasonal wage-labour. With the abolition of slavery, contract labour had been imported from German East Africa, and in the early 1920s supplies of mainland labour were stepped up, especially since local Africans were turning to copra-production for their cash income. By 1924, when the total population was around 220,000, about 20 per cent were mainlanders (of whom perhaps a third were of slave origin). They formed the base of a social pyramid which

became ever more rigidly stratified along lines of colour. In 1925 the Zanzibar government was detached from that of Kenya and in 1926 a legislative council was set up, comprising ten officials and six nominated unofficials; the latter represented Europeans, Indians and Arabs. From 1927 a Clove Growers' Association (CGA), assisted by the government, helped to reduce both marketing costs and wages.

The depression brought indebted planters to the verge of ruin: by 1933 it was reckoned that half the clove trees in the protectorate were mortgaged to Indians. In 1932 a financial report by Sir Alan Pim attacked the government's excessive employment of Europeans and Indians and its general neglect of the African population. But his call to provide Africans with better education and more responsible jobs in local administration went unheeded; as on the mainland, the government refused to make use of literacy in Swahili in Arabic script, even though this was widespread among Africans. The chief concern of officials was to retain the confidence of Sultan Khalifa (reigned 1911–60) and the Arab minority. Between 1934 and 1937 the CGA was reorganised and given a complete monopoly of exports. A moratorium was declared on Arab or African debts to Indians, who were also effectively prevented from buying land. In 1937 Indians in both Zanzibar and India boycotted the clove-trade and sales were halved, to the advantage of producers in Madagascar. In 1938 a new Resident reduced the power of the CGA and associated Indians with its operations; meanwhile (after consultations with the Indian government) the Zanzibar government undertook to guarantee debt repayments.

This crisis was the only real shock sustained by Zanzibar's social system between the wars. The African majority was deeply divided, despite the prevalence of Sunni Islam and the Swahili language. Those who had become clove-growers on their own account aspired to social assimilation as Arabs. Many of the indigenous population lived on the edge of the cash economy, as fishermen and subsistence farmers, but only those on Zanzibar island had suffered large-scale dispossession by Arabs. Besides, the indigenous population as a whole was inclined to despise the mainlanders, who carried out the most menial work on plantations and in Zanzibar town. The African Association, formed in 1934, was a welfare society for mainlanders on the island; it had contacts in Tanganyika, but not until 1939 was a Shirazi Association

formed to represent the indigenous majority, first in Pemba and later in Zanzibar.

Conclusion

By 1940 the similarities between the territories of East Africa were perhaps as striking as the differences. The depression had halted the growing divergence in social policies apparent in the more expansive climate of the 1920s. True, Uganda was still committed to small-scale African production; Kenya and Zanzibar to the primacy of immigrants' estates; Tanganyika to an uneasy compromise between African production and alien plantations. But underlying these contrasts was an increasing official commitment to the interests of overseas, and especially British, capital, as against the claims of local capital or African farmers; there was also a growing dependence on cheap migrant labour. Throughout the region, the colonial order involved varying degrees of segregation in employment, education and urban residence. The early hopes fastened on white settlement had been dimmed, but white acceptance of the much larger Indian presence was scarcely more than a grudging concession to the Government of India. For Africans, indirect rule could be both shelter and prison. Increasingly, officials sought to 'protect Africans from themselves': in much of Tanganyika (as earlier in Uganda) this meant removing thousands of people into anti-tsetse concentrations, often on poor land, and expanding game reserves. In Mahenge district, hillside rice-cultivation was banned in 1937 in order to prevent erosion: there was famine the following year.¹⁹ Thus the hard-won knowledge of African farmers might well seem discounted. Besides, there was as yet little room in the colonial order for the best-educated Africans, and virtually none for African businessmen or permanent town-dwellers. The leading towns of East Africa had grown rapidly in the 1920s, and by 1938 there were 65,000 in Nairobi, 60,000 in Mombasa, 45,000 in Zanzibar town and perhaps 40,000 in Dar es Salaam. For most town-dwellers, conditions were very bad and getting worse. Part of the problem was urban unemployment (the other face of rural impoverishment), but official neglect was more serious, since it was rooted in prejudices largely impervious to economic fact.²⁰

¹⁹ L. E. Larson, 'A history of the Mahenge (Ulanga) District, c. 1860-1957' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1976), 300-1.

²⁰ Cf. chapter 1, p. 50.


CHAPTER 14

ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN

Ten years after defeating the Italians at Adowa in 1896, the Christian monarchy of Ethiopia was more powerful than it had been at any time since the fifteenth century. Recent territorial expansion had brought its frontiers to the extremities of the Ethiopian plateaux, which contained the most fertile and populous parts of north-east Africa. One-quarter of the Somali people were incorporated in Ethiopia. The rest were nominally subject to Britain, France and Italy, who had annexed to their colonial empires the whole of the sea coast. Between them, Britain and Italy claimed vast tracts inland but had occupied very little. The Italians had held on to the fertile highlands of Eritrea, which had once been part of the Ethiopian empire; elsewhere, except for riverine strips in Somali country, the European territories permitted little more than seasonal grazing. Thinly spread, the Somali and 'Afar pastoralists were still largely independent in 1905. Aside from the Christian empire of Ethiopia and the narrow band of European control, the only political centre towards which wider loyalties might gravitate was the Islamic reform movement led by Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdallāh Ḥasan. This seemed capable of creating a successor to the confederations of Muslim farmers, both riverain and highland, which had prospered in the Horn for several centuries until the mid-nineteenth century.

The demography of north-east Africa has received little serious study, and it is possible to make only the most tentative observations. By 1905 there were probably no more than two million people left outside the Ethiopian empire, whose population was estimated by informed foreigners in the early twentieth century as between eight and thirteen million. Later guesses, when not patently distorted for political reasons, indicate little growth, though European doctors attested to a very high birth-rate among cultivators. A smallpox epidemic swept from the northern Somali coast through southern Ethiopia to the White Nile in 1904–5.

ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN



26 Ethiopia and Eritrea, c. 1930

Cholera raged virulently in 1906 and the influenza pandemic struck in 1918–19. Cattle plague wiped out herds along the border with British East Africa in 1908 and in the Rift Valley in 1918. Animal and human disease remained endemic, though in Ethiopia the only famine comparable to that which had devastated the empire in the early 1890s occurred in 1913–14 and was limited to Tigre in the north. Thus the apparent stagnation of population, even in the best-endowed parts of north-eastern Africa, must reflect the high rates of infant mortality and the continued short life-span, of about forty years, which was noted by European doctors.

Despite the creation of new international frontiers, considerable migration continued within north-eastern Africa. Eritrean hunters were prominent on the south-western frontiers of Ethiopia, where elephant survived and raiding persisted. The drift of population out of the more overworked lands of the northern highlands, principally towards the Rift, continued. These migrants brought plough-cultivation of cereals into lands where for more than two thousand years *ensete* (the ‘false banana’) and other crops, including some cereals, had been intensively cultivated by hoe and digging-stick. Great tracts of forest were now burnt off to permit cultivation and to make easier the control both of pests and of the local population. The effect on food-production of cultivation by the new techniques or the use of dung from plough-oxen is not known. The ecology, however, was much changed in the generation after the great campaigns of expansion.


Much of the territory added to the Christian empire from the later 1870s had been subject to earlier emperors, though Oromo (Galla)¹ migration and conquests had greatly altered the population in large parts of the best agricultural land since the later sixteenth century. West of the Gibe (Omo) and south-east of the Awash in Harar province, little of the new territory had previously been part of the Christian empire. Moreover, Islam and animism predominated in the regions completely new to the empire;

¹ The name ‘Galla’ is used in all foreign literature and in Amharic, but many Oromo object to it as a pejorative term adopted by their neighbours and equivalent to ‘pagan’; others, especially those of Wallo, regard Oromo as referring only to their pre-Islamic ancestors, though this is not the view of the Muslim Oromo of Harar. The use of ‘Galla’ among educated Ethiopians is now offensive and is no more appropriate in English than ‘Abyssinia’, which Ethiopians formally dropped on joining the League of Nations, in favour of the Greek name borrowed in ancient times.

elsewhere in Ethiopia they were minority religions. The provinces north of the capital, Addis Ababa, had long been Christian, and there Muslims tended to be landless traders. In the east, Islam continued to spread, especially among Oromo peasants and herdsmen in the highlands of Harar and Arussi. In the south and west, among the Sidamo, Kaffa, Walamo or Maji, local notables often adopted Christianity and learned the Semitic language, Amharic, which for centuries had been the language of the Christian court. But ordinary peasants in the south and west, unless converted already to Islam at the incorporation of their districts into the empire, clung to their traditional religious beliefs and customs in opposition to the intruders, whom they called 'Amhara' (or, less often, 'Sidama'), meaning Christian outsiders, regardless of their actual origins. The non-Oromo of the south-west also retained their distinctive culture in opposition to the Oromo who for two centuries and more had been pressing down on them.

The ethnic composition of the imperial administration and of the veterans settling in lands of conquest has been little studied. Enough, however, is known to make one wary of facile contrasts between Amhara and subject peoples. It certainly meant a great deal to have been associated in some way with those who managed the annexations of the later nineteenth century. Exemption from all taxes, except the tithe on cultivated land, was granted to veterans and other soldiers, governors and their agents, and local Oromo, Walamo and other notables, who had allied with the emperor Menelik and his generals. Taxes were collected, and partly retained, by agents both of the emperor and of provincial governors. Such agents were also military commanders, whether of imperial troops or their own armed retainers. Southern tax-payers, called *gebbbar*, were tied to particular officials and soldiers rather than to land. The latter exacted bribes and labour services (sometimes on tax-free estates); as judges of their own *gebbbar*, they also levied court fees. Peasants in the Christian north had similar obligations, but they were modified by well-established corporate rights of usufruct; they shared with their lords a common language, religion and social code; and unlike most southerners they had acquired firearms.

Menelik's own position as emperor was by no means unquestioned. An ancient line of emperors had been overthrown in 1855;

Table 5. *Kings of Shoa and emperors of Ethiopia.*

Menelik's immediate predecessor, Yohannes IV (d.1889), had been a warlord in Tigre; while Menelik himself had been king of Shoa. There was thus no established imperial dynasty, and despite common resistance to the Italians at Adowa there were important divisions within Christian Ethiopia. Provincial gentry commanded widespread allegiance; many in Tigre had been associated with Yohannes; and in any case Tigrigna-speakers were distinguished not only from Shoans but from Amharic-speakers in general both by language and by pride in the greater antiquity of Christian culture in the area of Adowa and Aksum. Nonetheless, revolts in 1898-9 and 1909 by a son and grandson of Yohannes were speedily crushed with the ready assistance of rival Tigrean lords. The imperial government also commanded the loyalty of the northern Amhara, whom Menelik cultivated through his wife

Taytu, a noblewoman of Simien-Yejju with supposedly Oromo antecedents. The autonomy of the Amhara of Gojjam, under an Oromo–Amhara family which had established itself in the eighteenth century, was curtailed on the death, in 1901, of Tekla Haymanot. The growing wealth of the capital and its great resources of manpower in the provinces reinforced the prestige won by Menelik and his commanders at Adowa, and in the wars of expansion. This in turn owed much to the expert use of rifles: during the early 1900s, some 500,000 rifles, including many repeating weapons, were said to be in use, though by no means all were under the government's direct control.

Compared with pastoralists near the coast, the Ethiopians seemed safe from further European assaults: high on the plateaux, they commanded most of the region's principal trade goods and resources. In fact, their security was precarious. The Europeans enjoyed far better communications. Even before the railway from Djibouti began to reach inland towards Addis Ababa, in 1897, it was often faster to travel from northern Ethiopia to Massawa, in Eritrea, and thence to Addis Ababa by way of a Somali port than to make the direct journey overland. The wars with Italy in 1887–9 and 1895–6 had shown that goods and men could more easily arrive in northern Ethiopia from Naples than from Addis Ababa and the southern provinces. Moreover, Ethiopia was exposed to European economic penetration as never before. During the decade that followed Menelik's decline in health in 1906, both Africans and foreign intruders were much impressed by the possibility that Europeans would complete their partition of north-east Africa by absorbing Ethiopia; in retrospect, it may seem that economic penetration and indirect forms of domination were still more important.

ETHIOPIA, 1905–1920

Economic conditions

Coffee exports were Ethiopia's chief motor for economic change. In 1910 over 3,000 tons were carried on the French-owned railway which since 1902 had linked the French port of Djibouti to the plains north of Harar. Coffee had long been grown in the highlands of Harar province, while its extensive grazing lands

yielded rapidly increasing exports of hides and skins. The railway did not reach Addis Ababa until 1916, but for several years agricultural products from the country further west had been directed towards the railway by local traders, officials and foreign concessionaires. Ivory was also shipped out via Djibouti, though by 1914 Ethiopia's elephant population had been gravely depleted. From 1907, the country's second most important outlet (though far behind Djibouti) was the British enclave at Gambela, in the far west, whence goods were shipped by river to the upper Nile: this permitted a short boom in wild rubber from western Ethiopia. By contrast, Ethiopian trade through the Red Sea ports of Massawa and Zeila sharply declined. The railway from Djibouti carried inland large quantities of iron, both in corrugated sheets and in bars for reworking by local smiths. In Addis Ababa, by 1906, it was only local cloth woven from cheap imported yarns which held its own against imported cloth. In the countryside, local textiles maintained their popularity but everywhere, from the coast to the Nile watershed, Indian and American cottons were eagerly sought. From 1905 banking, and the issue of money, was monopolised by the Bank of Abyssinia, a subsidiary of the British-run Bank of Egypt. Within the towns, the currency continued to be the imported silver Maria Theresa dollar; elsewhere, barter and payment in kind prevailed, and coin remained scarce until the late 1930s.

The rapid increase in external trade prompted Menelik to improve his customs administration. To this end, he sought to direct the trade of the south-western provinces towards the capital, where municipal officials were selected for their knowledge of European as well as local business practices. By 1905 Addis Ababa was the chief market of north-eastern Africa and by 1910 its population outnumbered the 40,000 of Harar, which hitherto had been the only large town in the region. A few officials in the capital became rich in money through taxation, trade licences and concessions; they lent money to both Ethiopians and foreign traders. Nonetheless, it was foreigners who made the most of the new opportunities for middlemen. The railway itself was the most glaring example. In 1902, the French owners had ceded control to the French government in return for an annual subsidy. In 1908 Menelik committed Ethiopia to the unequal Klobukowski treaty with France, in order to reduce French control over sections of

the railway within Ethiopia and to break a financial deadlock which had halted construction since 1902. The treaty limited Ethiopian taxes on French goods to 10 per cent; moreover, it gave Frenchmen and their numerous French protégés the right to trial in Ethiopia by their own consul while French law would apply in mixed cases with French defendants. Most-favoured-nation clauses automatically extended the limitation on customs duties to imports from other European countries and the United States. Extra-territorial privileges were soon claimed by all foreigners, including the many hundreds of British-protected Somali, Indians and Arabs from Aden who, after 1900, with Greeks and French-protected Armenians and Levantines, controlled the bulk of foreign trade and were also settled in the larger market towns as craftsmen.

Menelik's love of new things did not often bring about actual change even at the height of his personal prestige after Adowa. In permitting the railway to be built and foreign diplomats to reside in the capital, and in much else, he had to override the conservative prudence of his whole court. The decline of his health in 1906 and the external threat which then revived also explain the incompleteness of his reforms. Some of Menelik's targets were simply not practicable. Imported cartridges remained cheaper than those made locally from imported materials by the foreigners who received concessions from 1907. Sometimes Menelik failed to practise what he preached. Although he had chartered the Bank of Abyssinia he did not himself use it and continued to hoard silver dollars as other men of means did. Admittedly, he circumvented clerical opposition to the European curriculum in the palace school he had founded in 1905, by bringing Copts from Egypt in 1906 to teach the new subjects (in French); and in 1908 he expanded his school into Ethiopia's first secular institution of higher learning. Yet he provided no means at all for carrying out edicts of 1907–8 which exhorted parents to send children of both sexes to be taught to read and write at their parish churches. Rinderpest had caused terrible losses to herds and plough-oxen; yet throughout Menelik's reign no one was sent abroad to become a veterinarian or to learn about modern agriculture. He was fascinated by machinery, which his courtiers disdained, but once imported much of it was stored away or fell idle. When the first automobile arrived in 1907, Menelik sent two

Ethiopians to Germany to learn to drive, but the only motor road was a short one built in 1902 for hauling timber for his buildings.

For all these limitations, there were two technical advances which had lasting effects. In 1904 Menelik was visited by an Eritrean printer with ten years' experience on the Swedish mission's presses. He offered to put to work equipment then stored in the palace and to bring from Europe whatever else was needed to begin government printing in Ethiopic type. Menelik promptly commissioned him. And since 1898 Menelik had contrived to link the capital to the provinces by telephone and telegraph through exploiting the wish of the French and Italians to link their legations to their Red Sea colonies. With the expansion of this network after the turn of the century, provincial officials found themselves tied to the court as never before.

The succession struggle

The principal work of Menelik's last years of active government was to keep European imperialism at bay while the problem of the succession was solved. In order to secure recognised boundaries, Menelik had been obliged in 1897 to abandon to French Somaliland the salines which supplied all southern Ethiopia with edible salt, and to agree in 1902 not to interfere with the waters of the Blue Nile without consulting the British. In 1900 Menelik had formally surrendered highland territories which Italy had annexed to Eritrea in defiance of earlier treaties; in 1908 he ceded to Italy more of the Red Sea littoral and also Lugh, in the south-east. These frontiers survived both world wars. Meanwhile, in May 1906, Menelik had his first stroke. Although he quickly recovered, the representatives of France, Britain and Italy came to him in a group and told him that their governments had agreed to ensure the empire's integrity, if that could be done. They had also agreed that, should it fall apart on his death, they would co-operate in dividing Ethiopia into three spheres of influence. Menelik remonstrated, but he had no means of curbing their impertinence, though Germany, Austria, Belgium and the USA had been encouraged to open legations and consulates in Addis Ababa. The colonial powers who controlled Ethiopia's outlets rarely acted together in the thirty years following the signing of the Tripartite Treaty in December 1906. Nevertheless, their claim to be able to

settle Ethiopian questions by common accord was a warning that Ethiopia had gained no more than a respite by its frontier treaties.

The question of the imperial succession was certainly a major problem: it was not fixed by any accepted rule, and in any case Menelik's most direct heir was his grandson Iyasu, born in 1898. Iyasu's mother was a daughter of Menelik; his father was Ras Mikael, the great provincial lord of the Oromo of Wallo, who in 1878 had been forced to give up Islam for Christianity by Menelik's predecessor Yohannes IV. To prepare for a minority, Menelik gave his household officials ministerial titles in 1907–8 and instructed them to act in unison. In mid-1908, Menelik was partly paralysed. Two further strokes in 1909 left him wholly incapacitated, and in October Iyasu was publicly proclaimed heir under the regency of a prominent Shoan.

These plans for a peaceful transfer of power did not succeed. The regent died in 1911, more than two years before Menelik himself. To free themselves from supervision, the ministers humoured the thirteen-year-old Iyasu's demand to act on his own. He disdained to learn about administration, and he flouted convention by appearing in public in Muslim dress, by eating with Muslims and by visiting mosques on Muslim holidays. 'You are fat, old and useless,' he told his grandfather's officials, while boasting of how he would despoil them all.² During a long tour in 1912, Iyasu enslaved and butchered animists west of Kaffa and along the Sudan border. In 1913 and 1915–16, however, he behaved with equal cruelty towards Muslims — the 'Afar, 'Ise Somali and Karayu Oromo — on his return from tours east of the capital. This behaviour hardly bears out those who accused Iyasu of showing undue favour to Muslims suffering discrimination.³ Nor does it justify later claims that Iyasu was a pioneer of secular nationalism: he sought popularity by persecuting the converts of European missions, but he gave generously to Ethiopian churches. Iyasu left routine affairs in Addis Ababa in the capable if avaricious hands of the most successful of the

² Gebre Egziabcher Elyas, 'Ye-Tarik Mastawesha, 1901–1922 [1908–9 to 1929–30 Gregorian]', Amharic MS. no. 23, fol. 28, National Library, Addis Ababa: quoted in Aby Demissie, 'Lij Iyasu. A perspective study of his short reign', unpublished senior essay, Department of Social and Political Science, Addis Ababa University (1964), 25, which also quotes a similar boast from an informant.

³ Mahteme Sellassie, *Zegre neger* (2nd ed. Addis Ababa, 1969–70), note 'A', 719–22.

'men of money', Haile Giyorgis Abba Mulat, whom Menelik had made minister of commerce and foreign affairs. Haile Giyorgis supervised the continuation of legal and administrative reforms which Menelik had initiated. His most powerful colleague was the minister of war, Habte Giyorgis, a former war-captive of lowly Gurage–Oromo origins whom Menelik had promoted to be commander of the imperial vanguard after Adowa. Habte Giyorgis held numerous fiefs for the upkeep of imperial regiments; he was also deeply respected for his probity and his contempt for the aping of foreign manners. Until 1916, Habte Giyorgis quashed conspiracies which threatened to prevent the carrying-out of Menelik's last will.

All the same, Iyasu's long absence from the capital to tour the southern provinces gave those he had alarmed opportunities to conspire. The First World War helped to crystallise the conflicts at court. In 1915 conservatives were provoked into supporting the Central Powers when they heard that France and Britain had drawn Italy to their side by making generous promises at Ethiopia's expense. British failure at Gallipoli in 1915–16, and the initial success of the Germans at Verdun early in 1916, swayed Iyasu himself to oppose the Allies. By this time, the loyalty of his war minister, Habte Giyorgis, was strained to breaking point, both by Iyasu's caprices and by his favouritism towards Haile Giyorgis. Iyasu made another powerful enemy by dismissing Yegezu Behabte, also a 'man of money'. In June 1916 the latter, together with a Shoan commander whom Iyasu had offended, began to organise a coup. Habte Giyorgis joined the conspiracy and drew Iyasu's elder cousin, Tafari, into it.

Tafari, born in 1892, was the son of Menelik's first cousin Makonnen, governor of Harar until his death in 1906. Tafari grew up in that cosmopolitan market town and was tutored by Ethiopian Catholics of the French mission there before attending Menelik's school. Some thought the young Tafari malleable, if not actually pusillanimous: his reserve and discretion were compared unfavourably with Iyasu's impulsive behaviour, which conformed to Ethiopian ideas of a prince of mettle. However, Tafari was made governor of Harar in 1910 and in 1911 Iyasu rewarded his loyalty by giving him his niece, Menen, in marriage: Tafari thereby secured a valuable link in Wallo, north of Addis Ababa. But in 1915 Iyasu incited the Harar garrison to petition against

Tafari for curbing their freedom to deal with the local Oromo. In August 1916 he ordered Tafari to accept transfer to the remote and plundered provinces of Kaffa and Maji, in the south-west. It was this demotion which induced Tafari, as he later admitted, to join the conspirators. In taking this step, Tafari was encouraged by Habte Giyorgis, who hoped thereby to preserve the imperial dynasty and probably reckoned that Tafari's long association with French missionaries and British traders would ensure that the coup would have the backing of the Tripartite Powers.

On 27 September 1916, soldiers and officials from the southern provinces attended court for the great annual feast of the Invention of the True Cross. Iyasu was in Harar. The conspirators, influenced by Allied propaganda, charged him with apostasy to Islam and demanded his deposition in favour of Menelik's surviving daughter, Zawditu. Tafari was appointed her heir, with some powers of government; the province of Harar was returned to him. In response, Iyasu's father, Ras Mikael, mustered a vast and well-armed force in Wallo and marched it to Segelle, within 50 kilometres of the capital. It was defeated on 22 October by Habte Giyorgis and thousands died. Meanwhile, jealousy of Mikael had prompted the Tigreans and northern Amhara, and also some Oromo in Wallo, to help the new government, or at any rate to hold aloof. In the south, the conspirators had swiftly mobilised support by using their control over the railway, telegraph and telephone, and they obtained fresh supplies of arms through the foreign legations. Iyasu himself remained a fugitive until 1921; he died in prison in 1935. It was not until 1930 that a provincial magnate once more sought to question the right of those in the capital to decide who should rule.

The birth of reformism

Among the educated men who sought employment at court in the early twentieth century, there were some who did not share the complacent optimism of most of their countrymen after Adowa. These people, who came to be known as the Young Ethiopians, were much impressed by what they had learned of Europe. Few had actually been there, but several had contacts with the colonial territories bordering Ethiopia while most had studied foreign languages and other new subjects in mission

schools or the new state schools. The Young Ethiopians argued that it was science and technology which had made Europeans so formidable on both land and sea. Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 was hailed as proof that the skills of Europeans could be learned and turned against them, but the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911–12 drew attention to the failure of the Ottoman empire to meet the new challenge. Some writers railed against resident foreigners as profiteers; all decried immorality as wasteful and debilitating.⁴

Insofar as the Young Ethiopians had a programme, it was set out in the writings of Gebre Heywet Baykedagn. Born in Tigre in 1886, he was educated by the Swedish mission in Eritrea and sent to Germany and Austria; he was 19 when he first visited Addis Ababa. In 1909 he was exiled to the Sudan, where he worked for British intelligence and wrote an essay criticising Menelik, while praising his own friends Haile Giyorgis and Yegezu Behabte as exemplary advisers. Gebre Heywet recommended changes which went far beyond whatever fiscal and administrative reforms were contemplated by these bitter rivals. He outlined proposals for ending illiteracy, teaching Ethiopians European skills, codifying the law, fixing all taxes in cash, paying salaries to officials and the army, limiting the number of soldiers and subjecting them to training such as he had witnessed in the Sudan, creating a centralised administration of civilian bureaucrats, fostering internal trade and replacing the imported and scarce Austrian dollars with a national currency.⁵ The leader Ethiopia needed, he told the British, was 'a man of order, energy, intellect and experience...who is both a friend of Progress and Absolutism'.⁶ For the Young Ethiopians, the monarchy was to be strengthened as an instrument of reform and national unity.

In 1911 Gebre Heywet returned to Ethiopia and became Iyasu's palace treasurer and head of customs at Dire Dawa. This practical experience helped to refine his earlier protest against European manufacturers. In a second essay, he asked rhetorically 'Are we

⁴ Poems collected in 1913 in J. I. Eadie (ed. and tr.), *An Amharic reader* (Cambridge, 1924), 193–241.

⁵ Gebre Heywet Baykedagn, 'Atse Menelike-na Ityopya', *Berhan Yebun* (Asmara, 1912), 354–5; Luigi Fusella (tr.), 'Menelik e l'Etiopia in un testo del Baykadan', *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli*, 1952, 4, 140–3.

⁶ Central Record Office, Khartoum: Intelligence 2/19/155, fol. 98ff, Gebre Heywet Baykedagn, 'Ras Tassama and the future of Abyssinia', n.d. [March 1910].

Ethiopians to be called free?’⁷ He condemned the profligacy common among all classes with any cash in the towns, but warned that as long as the Bank of Abyssinia merely facilitated foreign trade, it helped merchants bleed the country. Until Ethiopians could trade on equal terms with Europe as the Japanese did, they were no more truly free than any other African people. ‘We have forgotten nearly half of what we knew without learning anything new since the Europeans began coming to our country and are likely to forget the rest because of the building of the railway to Addis Ababa.’⁸ He called for less uniform tariffs, to encourage the import of machinery, until textiles and other local industries could re-establish themselves. Further improvements in communications would cripple the economy, he predicted, unless they aided internal exchanges.

From 1914, Gebre Heywet had sided with Tafari Makonnen and discussed his ideas with him. Thus when Tafari took the title of regent at Zawditu’s coronation early in 1917, the progressives had high hopes. For the most part, however, they were unfulfilled. In 1918–19, with the help of mutinous junior officers, Tafari rid himself of Yegezu and other ministers, but the powerful Habte Giyorgis remained and with other reactionary councillors shared authority with Tafari on Zawditu’s behalf. Gebre Heywet himself died in the influenza pandemic of 1919 and his reforming ideas did not begin to take effect for another decade.

THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1905–1920

Until the 1920s, European control in the Horn of Africa was largely confined to a few seaports: Djibouti, Zeila, Berbera, Mogadishu and Brava. The chief power among the Somali was Sayyid Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh Ḥasan. In his youth he had studied in Arabia and joined a new and radical Sufi brotherhood, the Ṣālihiyya, whose doctrines he introduced to Somali country. In 1899 he had declared a jihad against Christians, both British and Ethiopian, who sought to dominate Muslim Somali, and also against those Somali who served the Christians. He defeated a

⁷ Gebre Heywet Baykedagn, *Mengeste-na ye Hezḥ Astedader* (2nd ed. Addis Ababa, 1961–2), 79.


⁸ *Ibid.*

series of British and Ethiopian expeditions before withdrawing in 1903–4 to Illig, near the mouth of the Nogal river. By 1905, when British Somaliland was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, the protectorate had cost over £5m in military expenses. The Sayyid (whom the British called ‘the Mad Mullah’) now turned his attention to the south: it was in about 1905 that he wrote a treatise for the guidance of the Bimal clan, who for some time had resisted the Italians at Mogadishu. In this treatise, the Sayyid denied that European rule had increased population, prosperity and justice, as was claimed by traders and those who hired camels or worked for the British and Italians. He condemned the imitation of the dress, grooming or manners of Europeans, the study of their books, or participation in their celebrations; in fact, he urged complete withdrawal from all contact with Christians. He also deplored the Somali love of local shrines, and their use of the mild narcotic *chat*, grown in the highlands of Harar, while he denounced the veneration of saints practised among the Qādiriyya brotherhood, which had a large Somali following.

Early in 1905 the Sayyid signed a treaty with the Italians, who undertook not to interfere with the dervishes⁹ camped along the lower Nogal, as long as they remained at peace. Almost at once, however, these dervishes raided the sultanate of Obbia, which was nominally under Italian protection. Since the sultan of Obbia had long been at odds with Sultan ‘Uthmān Maḥmūd of the Majerteyn, the latter supplied the Sayyid with arms; the dervishes also received, from the Warsengeli Darod, arms smuggled from French Somaliland. Far to the south, in 1905–7, several Somali from the Benadir coast went to visit the Sayyid and became dervishes while also obtaining rifles. Meanwhile, the Sayyid received some support in Ethiopia, where the Tripartite Treaty had turned Menelik against the Sayyid’s European enemies. In 1907, Menelik sent an emissary to Illig, and dervish agents visited Harar in 1908 and 1909. This *rapprochement* was interrupted by Menelik’s last illness, but it is likely that Ethiopian commanders sold arms to the dervishes while raiding other Somali in order to bring the basin of the upper Webi Shebele under the control of Harar.

⁹ ‘Dervish’ was a term applied by Somali to adherents of the Ṣālihiyya brotherhoods; it is derived from the Turkish form of a Persian word for ‘mendicant’.

THE HORN, 1905–1920



27 The Horn of Africa, c. 1930

Early in 1908 a dervish force advanced down the lower Webi Shebele; it was repulsed by the Italians, who also forced the Bimal finally to submit. In September, the Sayyid renewed his jihad; ignoring his treaty with the Italians, he attacked Obbia, while his Warsengeli allies attacked British-protected Isaq who had so far rejected the jihad. The Sayyid's reputation, however, was already somewhat tarnished. It suffered severely when in 1909 he contrived the assassination of the Sufi Shaykh Uways b. Muḥammad of Brava, a leader of the Qādiriyya who spoke out against the dervishes and was revered for his sanctity all along the East African coast. A brutal purge on the lower Nogal in the same year also alienated supporters of the Sayyid, and he was said to have been disowned by his former teacher, the founder of the Ṣāliḥiyya. Warsengeli attacks on the northern Majerteyn drove Sultan 'Uthmān Maḥmūd in 1910 to negotiate a more binding treaty of protection with Italy, and in 1911 Obbia also accepted an Italian Resident, caught as it was between the dervishes and the northern Majerteyn. Meanwhile, to cut their losses, the British had withdrawn their forces to the coast and instead armed some of their neighbours. Among these were the Dulbahante Darod; this was the clan of the Sayyid's mother (his father came from the Ogaden Darod), but they had been alienated by his great harshness. Dervish raids on both Dulbahante and Isaq, and the distribution of British arms, exacerbated warfare between and within clans. Many were driven from their usual grazing land, and in 1911–12 famine killed perhaps one-third of the population of British Somaliland.

In 1912 the Sayyid proudly asserted his Pan-Somali ideals in a letter to the Isaq: 'Neither am I of the Dolbahante, the Warsengeli, the Mijertein, nor the Ogadein...I am a dervish.'¹⁰ In August 1913 his followers defeated the camel corps which the British had begun to recruit. The Sayyid enlisted stonemasons from Yemen to build a great fort at Taleh, on the upper Nogal, ringed by other stone forts to resist camel-mounted attacks. From 1914 an effective blockade prevented the Warsengeli from smuggling arms, but in 1915–16 there was once again the possibility of a formal understanding between the Sayyid and

¹⁰ Quoted in Robert Hess, 'The poor man of God — Muhammad Abdullah Hassan', in Norman Bennett (ed.), *Leadership in eastern Africa. Six political biographies* (Boston, 1968), 91.

Ethiopia, following Iyasu's interferences in Harar and his approaches to the Turkish enemies of the Tripartite Powers. The Sayyid began to negotiate for arms with Iyasu, who sent him a German armourer, but in October 1916 Iyasu fell from power. Meanwhile the Sayyid had made overtures to the Turks in southern Arabia, but these produced no substantial result before the war ended in 1918. In January 1920 the British camel corps, with Somali levies and RAF aircraft, attacked the Sayyid's forts; Taleh fell after a brief siege. British-protected Isaq pursued the survivors across the Ethiopian frontier. The Sayyid himself fled to the upper Webi Shebele, where in December he died, a victim of the influenza pandemic. Influenza and smallpox ravaged the remnants of the community who turned to local Ethiopian authorities for relief.

The Sayyid left no political heirs. He had exerted his influence through the personal mediation which the pastoral Somali expected of any holy man. He had proudly denied seeking to create a theocracy, and one of his last poems deplored the calamity for the Somali, who had no formal government, of being subjected to their neighbours' institutions. Sayyid Muḥammad's legacy was in fact his poetry, and it was rendered impervious to colonial domination both by his mastery of language, in Somali and Arabic, and by the attachment of the Somali to poetry as a way of propagating ideas. For all the fury of religious debate and his devastating castigation of Somali opponents, the Sayyid's vision of an independent Somali nation emerges clearly. As he crossed into Ethiopia in 1920, he warned his people once more against the Unbelievers:

Somalis, arise from sleep!
Do not be dazzled by their gifts.
They'll wrest your weapons from you ...
They'll take away your stock ...
They'll snatch your money and your land ...
... what sort of country can it be
Where people fall into slavery to them ...?¹¹

Through his poetry, the Sayyid held sway long after his death.

¹¹ B. G. Martin, *Muslim brotherhoods in nineteenth-century Africa* (Cambridge, 1976), 194; variant translation in Abdi Sheikh-Abdi, 'Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan and the current conflict in the Horn', *Horn of Africa*, 1978, 1, 2, 61.

When in 1919 the League of Nations' Covenant outlined a scheme of international mandates, all factions in Ethiopia feared that this would be extended to their own country. Members of Empress Zawditu's party wished Ethiopia itself to join the League, believing that this would serve to silence the charges of maladministration by which the British and Italians had disguised their territorial ambitions. The regent Tafari, however, considered that membership would oblige Ethiopia to undertake reforms beyond its power and so lead to international supervision. French sponsorship secured Ethiopia's admission to the League in 1923, but its envoys were indeed required to produce regular evidence of action against both household slavery and the slave-trade. Thus on the eve of Tafari's first visit to Europe, in 1924, an edict was published forbidding the sale of slaves and providing for gradual emancipation, though in fact progressives gave priority to relieving peasants from labour services and arbitrary payments.

Tafari did much to promote the discussion, if not the implementation, of new ideas by founding a new press in 1923. This published Gebre Heywet's second essay, 'State and public administration', in 1924, while progressive ideas were exchanged in two Amharic weeklies which first appeared in 1924 and 1925 at Tafari's instigation. Contributors expected Europe's science and technology to supply economic improvements, as distinct from the curiosities and personal comforts which had tended to satisfy Menelik. They also believed that the central government's share of taxes could be increased by restricting the obligations of farmers to local officials and their armed retainers and to government troops and veterans. Tafari, however, had to reckon with the fact that Habte Giyorgis and the other Shoan commanders who had made the coup of 1916 were among the principal beneficiaries of unregulated forms of taxation. Tafari therefore concentrated on completing Menelik's attempts to channel trade through Addis Ababa and to subordinate provincial customs to a ministry of commerce staffed by the mission-educated and others familiar with European accounting procedures. This was, as it happened, an immediately lucrative alternative to the overhaul of agricultural taxes.

Throughout the 1920s the growth of exports kept pace with rapid increases in imports. Rail shipments of coffee rose to nearly

7,000 tons in 1922, when a great deal of coffee from western Ethiopia came on to the market. In 1924, the railway carried 12,000 tons of coffee, more than Angola's exports and nearly as much as East Africa's. More than half came from Harar, but during the next decade the proportion from producers west of Addis Ababa often surpassed that from the eastern plateaux, while by 1930 some 3,000 tons were exported westwards from Gambela. Ivory had ceased to be of any importance. Foreign concessionaires made large investments in mining equipment, but the amount of alluvial gold produced each year in the 1920s hardly exceeded the 12,500 oz which Menelik received in tribute in 1904. The quantity of hides and skins brought for sale, however, rose dramatically as prices recovered from the post-war depression.

How the great expansion of coffee exports was achieved is one of the many questions of internal economic change that call for research. As late as 1930, only 10 per cent of exports from the eastern plateaux came from the area of the biggest European plantations leased at the end of Menelik's reign.¹² Elsewhere, wage labour was negligible, except on the railway where Ethiopians took over all jobs other than in management and supervision. A few governors ordered large numbers of coffee trees to be planted even where this was not customary. In the south, all *gebbar*-owning officials made greater efforts to collect cultivated and wild coffee as taxes and feudal dues. Local trade was given a boost where *gebbar* had to barter other crops for coffee or for stock to be sold for cash to commute payments. There was however no significant change in methods of production, nor was processing well developed. At Harar town, high quality was maintained by grading coffee before shipment, but such care was exceptional. Most of the crop arrived unsorted at Djibouti, where it was then sorted by Somali women. Likewise, even the most elementary treatment of hides was left to be done at the coast. Thus the value of Ethiopia's exports rose much more slowly than the mere quantities suggest: their total value was reckoned to be £1.8m in 1912, but no more than £2.8m in 1928–9, whereas the export values of the Sudan, Kenya and Uganda increased more than tenfold during this period.¹³

¹² 'Les forêts caféières de l'Ouest-Ethiopie' and 'Le tirage du café à Djibouti', *Le Courrier d'Ethiopie*, 18 and 25 March 1932.

¹³ The real value of Ethiopian exports probably increased very little over this period, if inflation is taken into account.

Most of the government's cash came from taxing foreign trade. Cash revenues rose by more than 25 per cent between 1925 and 1929 to 15m silver dollars, which in 1928 was worth US\$7m or nearly £1.5m.¹⁴ This was several times the annual cash income that it was estimated Menelik received in 1902–4.¹⁵ Nonetheless, by comparison with its colonial neighbours, Ethiopia's resources importing costly skills, materials and machinery were slim. In opening a second high school for boys in Addis Ababa in 1925, Tafari spent half a million silver dollars, but his projects for road building and other improvements were starved of finance by his own opponents. Charily, he made use of American, British and Swedish missionaries to obtain a second hospital in Addis Ababa and a few free clinics and elementary schools for the provinces. But Habte Giyorgis and the empress stopped him from importing aeroplanes, both because they feared to increase his power and because they suspected that improved communications aided Ethiopia's enemies. Plans to retrain government troops came to no more than the employment as drill sergeants of Eritrean and Ethiopian veterans of neighbouring colonial forces.

In December 1926, the empress's party was thrown into disarray by the deaths of Habte Giyorgis and the bishop, Matewos. Another conservative became the new minister of war, but he did not receive his predecessor's extensive lands. Instead, in 1927–8, Tafari obtained many of them for himself and his lieutenants, while he had secured the governorship of Wallo earlier in the 1920s. Meanwhile, a new city police force of some 5,000 men had been raised by Nasibu Zemanel, a former student of the Menelik school whom Tafari had appointed mayor of Addis Ababa in 1922. On foundations laid by Haile Giyorgis before 1909, Nasibu copied the municipal administration and police which he had seen in operation while consul in Asmara from 1919.¹⁶

Tafari's growing predominance was resented both by Empress

¹⁴ Records of the United States Department of State, National Archives, Washington DC (hereafter cited as State Dept., file and document numbers), 884.77, Franco-Ethiopian/14, enclosure, Colson to White Corporation, New York, 2 January 1931.

¹⁵ Public Record Office, London: FO 401/8, MacGillivray to Bank of Egypt, Addis Ababa, 14 March 1905; gold and cash worth \$1m or £200,000 sterling on average.

¹⁶ Gullelate Walde Maryam (*Basha*), 'Ye-Kantiba Nasibu ye-acher Tarik', Amharic Ms. no. 216, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University (hereafter IES). The author was a retainer of Nasibu who died in exile in 1937.

Zawditu and by the remaining conservative leaders. Early in 1928 Tafari put his authority as regent to the test by summoning the veteran General Balcha from Sidamo to the capital. Balcha responded by marching his numerous troops to Addis Ababa; he made his obeisances to the empress but snubbed Tafari. The latter, however, contrived with the aid of Nasibu's police and gifts of cash to disperse Balcha's men, and Balcha himself was gaoled. In September, the empress's party made one more bid for supremacy: the commander of her bodyguard sought to detain Tafari on the pretext that he had betrayed the country by negotiating with Italy for a motor road through Wallo to Assab. Once more, the city police (with timely help from Tafari's wife Menen) saved the regent. His supremacy was acknowledged when at the end of the month Zawditu was obliged to crown Tafari *negus*, or king.

Tafari was now in a much stronger position to pursue a programme of innovation. In 1929–30 he obtained aeroplanes from France; the pilots who brought them instructed Ethiopians how to fly them. More than the telegraph and telephone, the tiny imperial airforce exposed the provinces to close supervision. During 1929, trucks were driven for the first time from Addis Ababa as far as the great coffee market in Jimma, across the Gibe, and to those in Wollega. Companies were already being formed to build motor roads for conveying export crops both to the railway and to Gambela. In the same year, Tafari opened the first of two government agricultural stations. In 1929–30, the regent's press published the first book in Amharic on modern agriculture, by Tekle Hawaryat Tekle Maryam, who had studied in Russia before 1917 and in France and, like Tafari himself, was one of Ethiopia's few improving farmers.

Such concern for the principal economic activity of nearly all Ethiopians reflected a fundamental shift in outlook; and the regent's determination, as king, to exercise power in new ways provoked a final reaction from the old guard. The initiative was taken by Ras Gugsa Wele, who had been Zawditu's husband until her coronation in 1917. Tafari and the Shoan commanders had then rusticated him to the governorship of Amhara country between the Tekeze and Lake Tana. Under pressure from his followers, Ras Gugsa finally rebelled in 1929. He called for help from the *ras* of Gojjam, Hailu Tekle Haymanot, whose ruthless taxation and speculation in town property had earned him the

nickname 'Dollars' Hailu.¹⁷ Hailu encouraged other northern leaders to join Gugsä, but himself made ready to go to the capital. In March 1930, not far to the east of his own capital at Debre Tabor, Gugsä joined battle near Mt Anchim with imperial forces from Wallo and Addis Ababa, who were aided by Gugsä's ambitious nephew Ayalew Berru.¹⁸ The regent's one serviceable aircraft observed the rebels deploying and prevented the government forces from being surprised. The French pilot also bombed the enemy camp, causing great damage. At the end of five hours' bitter fighting on the ground, Gugsä Wele and many of his men were dead; government losses were comparatively modest. Their artillery had proved unwieldy, but deadly use was made of a special corps of the regent's bodyguard armed with heavy machine-guns. The battle of Anchim, together with that of Segelle in 1916, signalled the end of a military balance which, since the seventeenth century, had permitted provincial leaders in the Christian empire to wear down the monarchy by civil war.

Two days after the battle of Anchim, the ailing Empress Zawditu died. Tafari was proclaimed emperor on 3 April 1930 with the throne-name Haile Sellassie I. He was crowned on 30 October, in elaborate ceremonies calculated to impress the special envoys of the European powers, the USA, Egypt and Japan and the great number of foreign journalists who were also invited to attend.

THE COASTAL TERRITORIES

Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, 1905–1935

Italy's first colony, Eritrea, was not in itself of much significance. The total population was estimated in 1935 to be 600,000, of whom about half were Christian farmers and half were Muslim pastoralists. The Christians mostly lived in the highlands which projected north from the Ethiopian plateau. They shared a language with Ethiopians in Tigre, across the Mareb river, and

¹⁷ Tekle Eyesus (*Alega*), 'Ye-Gojjam Tarike Nagast', IES, Amharic Ms. no. 254, fol. 148; State Dept. 884.00/259, Addis Ababa, July 1932, quoting Heruy Walde Sellassie, the foreign minister, on the value of Hailu's confiscated properties.

¹⁸ Asfew Tesemma (*Grazmach*), 'Ye-Ras Gugsä Wele ye-acher Tarik', IES Amharic Ms. no. 849; *Berhane-na Selam* (10 April 1930) repeated in *Le Courrier d'Ethiopie*. State Dept. 884.00/205, Addis Ababa, May 1930.

throughout the colonial period a sense of continuing attachment to Ethiopia was kept alive both by Orthodox clergy and by European missions. There was also much continuity in land tenure and local government: many families who had been prominent in the nineteenth century were still powerful in 1941. Some, however, were displaced by former *askari* and local rivals who enjoyed Italian favour; and in general the Italians gave no support to the claims of older families against those of more recent settlers. Muslim and other pastoralists were subjected to more fundamental changes. Italian administrators imposed a peace which weakened the hold of noble herdsman clans over their serfs; the latter increasingly refused to milk for noble patrons, to render labour services or make gifts of livestock and cash. It was, indeed, the pastoralists who were drawn most fully into the cash economy in the earlier twentieth century, though Eritrea's own exports of hides and butter counted for less than its re-export trade. Massawa had been eclipsed by 1910 as an outlet for Ethiopian exports, but the total value of Eritrea's foreign trade continued to rise, due to re-exports such as coffee from the Yemen or Djibouti. As yet, the highlands contributed relatively little to the colonial economy, and for many years Eritrea had to import grain from northern Ethiopia. But the basis for further change was laid in 1908, when a railway was opened from Massawa to the highland capital, Asmara, whose population was then around 10,000.

In 1922 the Fascist leader Benito Mussolini became prime minister of Italy. This did not cause any abrupt change of policy in Eritrea. Already, men from both Eritrea and Ethiopia were being recruited to help Italian armies reconquer the hinterland of Libya. In the course of the 1920s the Fascist regime extended the railway westwards from Asmara to Keren and Agordat; the aim was primarily strategic, but there were hopes that it would encourage the cultivation of cotton and coffee along the lower Mareb, on land which had already been irrigated and attracted immigrants from Ethiopia. By 1930, groups of pastoralists were adopting agriculture near the Sudan border. From 1928 to 1933 the port of Massawa was improved, and from 1929 some of the better agricultural land was confiscated to facilitate Italian settlement. Few white farmers arrived, however, and exports still failed to match the rising volume of imports. The colony depended heavily on subsidies from Italy. The administration was

needlessly expensive, for at all levels it was staffed mainly by Italians. African education, which was fostered in the 1920s by mission–state co-operation, was sharply curbed in 1931, when Africans were excluded from government secondary schools. From 1932, Swedish and American missionaries were refused entry, and the remaining Swedes were expelled in 1935. By this time, there were some 2,000 Eritreans in state elementary schools and another 950 in Catholic schools or seminaries. Those who wished to continue their education, or to seek careers other than as interpreters or junior clerks, looked to Addis Ababa.

The advent of Fascism made a more immediate impact on Italian Somaliland. Of its million or so inhabitants, perhaps one-tenth were cultivators, and these were concentrated near the Benadir coast. In 1920 Italian administration was still largely confined to this region; two-thirds of the colony, including the northern sultanates, was virtually independent. The first Fascist governor, Cesare de Vecchi, arrived at the end of 1923, determined to bring the whole territory under direct rule. He armed the colonial police with machine-guns and artillery, and brought in Eritrean *askari* officered by Italians. In 1925 the sultanate of Obbia was surrounded and quickly subdued; the sultan himself was deposed and sent to Mogadishu. Further west, Hawiyya clans, who had fought against Sayyid ‘Abdallāh’s dervishes, vainly proclaimed, ‘All Muslims are one’.¹⁹ The sultan of Majerteyn offered fierce resistance and held out until the end of 1927. Meanwhile, in July 1925, Britain had transferred to Italy the port of Kismayu together with its hinterland west of the Juba river. The whole territory was divided into seven provinces. Selected chiefs and local notables became minor salaried officials, but their authority was undermined by government-appointed judges who administered customary as well as Islamic law.

De Vecchi’s ruthless energy was also applied to agriculture. Here he was encouraged by the success of a concession company founded in 1920 by the Duke of the Abruzzi, which produced cotton, sugar, bananas, oil and soap along the Shebele river. De Vecchi irrigated a large area further down the river, near Merca, and issued concessions to Italian firms and settlers. In both schemes, labour was employed on a sharecropping basis; local cultivators had little incentive to take part, and forced recruitment

¹⁹ R. Hess, *Italian colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago, 1966), 151.

was common. By 1932, the value of cotton and banana exports exceeded that of hides and skins, while salt was exported on a large scale from an extraction plant at Ras Hafun. Even so, as in Eritrea, total exports fell far short of imports, which included much cloth from Italy and grain from Kenya. Banana cultivators had to be rescued in 1935 by the creation of an Italian monopoly: consumers in Italy had to buy Somali bananas, which cost twice what other Europeans paid for bananas from Central America or the Caribbean. Even after de Vecchi's departure in 1928, and the conclusion of his costly campaigns, annual government expenditure (around 100m lire a year: £1m in 1928) was three times local revenue. Part of this went on medical services and on aid to mission schools, but as in Eritrea Africans were discouraged from secondary education. Even in the elementary schools, there were no more than 1,300 pupils in 1934.

British Somaliland, 1920–1940

Italy's portion of Somali territory was a major part of its overseas empire; it was also a stage on which to advertise the virtues of Fascism. British Somaliland was a very small part of a far larger empire, and it attracted minimal attention or investment. Most of the population (350,000 in the mid-1930s) were herdsmen, though by 1920 some clans of the 'Ise and Gadabursi had adopted plough-cultivation from Sufi communities at Hargeisa (who in turn had imitated Somali farmers on the Jigjiga plain). The imposition of peace from 1920 enabled both human and animal populations to recover, and many herdsmen migrated to Ethiopia in order to escape interference by the British. When direct taxation was introduced in 1921, it met such resistance in the camel corps and among officially backed clan elders that troops had to be called in from Kenya and Nyasaland. Throughout the 1920s, military expenditure averaged £50,000 a year. Livestock and hides supplied the bulk of domestic exports. The colonial budget required annual grants-in-aid from the British Treasury; this imposed stringent limits on expenditure, which was usually less than £200,000 a year. Harold Kittermaster, the governor from 1925 to 1931, did what he could to channel funds into productive investment. An agriculture department was set up; stock-dips were built and groundnuts and cowpeas distributed to prospective

farmers. But in 1927–8 a terrible drought killed off herds; it was followed by a locust invasion; and well into 1930 famine relief was a first priority. Meanwhile a motor road was built from Berbera through Hargeisa to the Ethiopian border, in an attempt to divert traffic from the Djibouti railway, but in the early 1930s only 5 per cent of Ethiopia's foreign trade passed through the northern Somali ports. Geological surveys revealed no mineral wealth. However, Kittermaster obtained money for well-boring from the Colonial Development Fund, and water development eventually insured the country against a recurrence of the natural disasters of the 1920s.

On Kittermaster's departure, the Colonial Office asked the Committee of Imperial Defence to discuss the future of this burdensome possession. The Foreign Office ruled out either self-government or the transfer of the northern Somali to Italy. The British government also rejected an Ethiopian scheme, first proposed in 1919, whereby Ethiopia would receive a corridor to the coast, including Zeila, in exchange for grazing lands in the Ogaden used by clans who straddled the frontier. Instead, the new governor was merely instructed to retrench. Somali clerks, some of whom had been trained at Gordon College in Khartoum, began to agitate against the lack of employment, the neglect of agriculture and education, and the levying of fines and customs dues. This unrest culminated in 1937 in the formation of the Somali Officials' Union, which demanded better pay. In 1934 the 'Isse protested against British and Ethiopian boundary survey teams but were swiftly crushed from both Zeila and Harar. After 1934, the transit trade benefited from the Italians' desire to minimise their use of the French railway for shipping goods to occupied Ethiopia. The government was able to revive the veterinary service and in 1938 it opened a school, for teaching agricultural science, mathematics, geography and Arabic. Shaykhs denounced the headmaster as a godless polluter, and urban riots in 1937 forced the government to abandon plans both to introduce secular education in Koranic schools and to use Roman script for teaching the Somali language.

French Somaliland, 1905–1940

The French territory comprising Djibouti and its immediate hinterland was called the Côte Française des Somalis (CFS); in fact

THE COASTAL TERRITORIES

most of it was inhabited by the 'Afar, though the port of Djibouti (like Zeila) was in the country of the 'Ise Somali. In 1931 the total population of the territory was around 70,000. The colony's only important export was salt, but the railway to Ethiopia yielded substantial revenues in customs and port fees: by 1935, over two-thirds of Ethiopia's foreign trade passed through Djibouti. The port attracted a great variety of immigrants: in 1913, when its population numbered 17,000, there were only 3,500 'Ise Somali and 1,500 'Afar from within the territory. There were 1,000 Europeans and Indians, about 2,000 Arabs working in suburban market-gardens or on the railway, and a small number of rich Arabs controlling much of the town's property and trade. The other town-dwellers were 'Ise and Gadabursi Somali from British Somaliland and Ethiopia. This pattern persisted, and communal tensions were to inflame the first elections after the Second World War. Little money was spent on either the administration or the welfare of the African population, though by the 1930s the government subsidised Catholic mission schools which gave primary education and craft training to a few hundred pupils. It was not till 1928 that the French established a police post in the interior away from the railway. This was at Gobad, south-west of the Bay of Tajura, and it had long been needed to stop the 'Afar being dispossessed by 'Ise raiders of the best grazing land in the colony. 'Afar raiding across the unmarked Franco-Ethiopian frontier went unchecked. The 'Afar ports on the northern shore of the Bay of Tajura, opposite Djibouti, were unpoliced and attracted the slave-trade when other outlets were being blocked: until about 1930, at least 300 or 400 slaves were exported each year to Arabia by this route. As late as 1925, the coastal slave-trade was in the hands of descendants of the notorious nineteenth-century slave-trader and French protégé, Abū Bakr of Zeila.²⁰ Officials paid little heed to Yemeni Arabs who imported, through Tajura, Turkish rifles abandoned in 1918; these, and salt from the northern 'Afar, were sold to Ethiopian slave-traders.

²⁰ PRO FO 401/19, no. 67, enclosure, report of Philip Zaphiro on a visit to Djibouti, September 1925; FO 401/21, no. 60, enclosure 1 and FO 401/27, no. 95.

ETHIOPIA, 1930–1936

The limits of reform

Between 1928 and his coronation as emperor late in 1930, Haile Sellassie made a series of crucial decisions designed to fortify the monarchy. He took steps to introduce a written constitution, to recruit instructors for the army from Europe's smaller states, and to reform the empire's finances. Fiscal reform was an urgent priority. In 1930 the emperor estimated that taxes were worth altogether between 40 and 50 million silver dollars, but only one-third were collected in cash. The exchange rate had fallen by a third since the beginning of 1929, and by 1932 the value of silver dollars in US dollars was half what it had been in the 1920s. Two-thirds of the cash revenue came from customs, but in 1929 the price of hides and skins fell, and that of coffee plummeted during the next year. In 1931, with prices still falling, exports earned half what had been fetched by the lesser quantities of 1928.

The fall of world prices for Ethiopia's exports, the extravagance of the coronation, and the high salaries promised to foreign advisers threw the government into dire crisis. Haile Sellassie had, before his accession, decided to buy out the Bank of Abyssinia, but late in 1930 bankers in New York and London refused a short-term loan for this purpose. Instead, the money was raised by selling off government stocks of trade-goods and cartridges from state arsenals. Meanwhile, the emperor had recruited a financial adviser in the USA, Everett Colson, who remained until 1935. Colson was determined to free the Ethiopian government from the rigid rates of duties prescribed by the Klobukowski treaty of 1908; in 1931 he secured the introduction of excise taxes which weighed most heavily on imported luxuries. Colson also sought to deprive foreign business of consular jurisdiction. Under his guidance, a special finance committee undertook reform of the currency and drafted a code for the mixed court. Colson advised this committee how to force the railway company to scale down discriminatory freight rates, especially on imported petrol, and to pay fully the Ethiopian government's annual dues; he also proposed a variety of other self-financing schemes.

Colson was much helped on the finance committee by a former assistant of Gebre Heywet's from the Dire Dawa customs, the

Catholic-trained Tigrean, Gebre Egziabeher François (or Desta), and by an Eritrean, Lorenzo Taezaz, whom Nasibu Zemanel had induced to leave Asmara ten years earlier to escape racial discrimination. At the time of the coronation, Lorenzo was called back from France, where he was finishing his studies in law. During a brief tenure as minister of finance from 1931, Tekle Hawaryat also served on this committee. However, the independence of mind shown by these three men, and their outspoken attack on the personal manipulation of funds which underlay imperial patronage, provoked the rise of younger conservatives, men who were experienced in the bureaucracy and had some knowledge of European languages but were wholly submissive to the emperor. Tekle Hawaryat was shunted off to Geneva early in 1933, by which time the illiberal Yegezu Behabte had returned to full favour.

In July 1931 Haile Sellassie proclaimed the empire's first constitution. In preparing for this, he had originally consulted Ras Hailu of Gojjam, the two grandsons of Yohannes IV and other Christian noblemen. They, however, had demanded hereditary governorships and guarantees of their role as intermediaries between the emperor and his subjects. Haile Sellassie ignored these requests and instead commissioned Tekle Hawaryat to draft a constitution. Tekle Hawaryat took that of Japan as his model, while giving still further scope to imperial authority. He aimed to bring representatives of the numerous lesser men of local influence to Addis Ababa to co-operate with the emperor; he believed that this would ensure approval in the countryside for new laws.²¹ The constitution provided for a two-chamber parliament, in which senators were appointed by the emperor, while deputies were nominated by local notables. When Haile Sellassie opened parliament in November 1931, he urged its members to learn about each other's home districts and thus enlarge their sense of Ethiopian nationality. The new deputies, however, opposed plans for more stringent property-taxes and the withdrawal of silver coinage. In 1932 a decree from the palace cautiously tried to define the obligations of *gebbar*, but nothing

²¹ An interview with him in 1963 is quoted by John Markakis, *Ethiopia. Anatomy of a traditional polity* (Oxford, 1974), 271n., 273. A long speech from 1931 is quoted in Edward Ullendorff (tr.), *The autobiography of Emperor Haile Sellassie I. 'My Life and Ethiopia's progress 1892–1937'* (Oxford, 1976), 186–200.

was done to fix precisely how much the peasantry of the older Christian provinces owed to their officials.

Educational progress was very slow. In 1934, 4,200 Ethiopians attended state schools in Addis Ababa; only a few hundred had advanced beyond elementary grades. Some went abroad for further study, as did a few pilots and officer-cadets; most went to France or the USA. There were a dozen government elementary schools in the provinces and some 2,000 pupils in mission schools. Both state and mission schools introduced European languages and a better knowledge of geography and mathematics. But the spread of literacy in Amharic and Arabic was mainly due to the tuition offered by monks, village priests and a few shaykhs. True, Amharic literature flowered in the early 1930s: printing presses in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Asmara produced edifying accounts of foreign travel, historical essays, practical manuals and short didactic novels, including one about the conflict between the older, tradition-bound generation and the younger people returning from study abroad.²² But readership for the new literature must have been small: the joint circulation of the two leading Amharic papers was only 700, which was also that of the most popular European-language newspaper, *Le Courrier d'Ethiopie*.

There were substantial improvements in transport. Between 1927 and 1935, 200 trucks were imported for commercial purposes, and by the latter year more than 2,000 km of dry-weather motor roads radiated from the capital; other roads linked the eastern highlands to the railway, connected Harar to the Berbera trunk road and, for strategic purposes, crossed the Ogaden. All the same, the cost of motor-transport remained so high that traders not dealing in coffee often preferred mule caravans. This was partly due to the tolls and trucking monopolies by which road construction was financed; it was also due to the very high cost of petrol shipped by rail, despite Haile Sellassie's attempt to undercut the price of Anglo-American distributors at Aden by importing petroleum products from the Soviet Union. A further factor was the high level of railway freight rates: from 1925 to 1935, the railway company's receipts averaged twice its running expenses, despite the world depression.

²² *Addis alām* (The new world) (Addis Ababa, 1931/2), by Heruy Walde Sellassie, who was foreign minister, 1931–5.

The Young Ethiopians and other progressives were disappointed in their expectation that a liberal-minded ruler would implement the social and economic policies advocated by Gebre Heywet. By the early 1930s the slave-trade had been driven underground and in places actually suppressed, but though manumission was much publicised there were still many slaves.²³ The theory that peasant productivity could be increased by new incentives remained a pious hope, while there was still no real entrepreneurial class. In 1932 the emperor sent his American educational adviser back to Ohio to seek funds for a university that would help create an Ethiopian business and professional class. But the local base for fostering the growth of a bourgeoisie was minimal. There were a few unsuccessful Ethiopian attempts to form companies, to supplant foreign commission agents, build roads for the coffee-trade and extract minerals for export. Foreigners owned almost all the few manufacturing and processing plants: bakeries, distilleries, brick and soap factories, flour mills, tanneries and a vegetable-oil press. No effort was made to produce a local substitute for the Indian jute bags in which merchandise was generally packed for carriage by mule or rail. As the taste for sugar increased, so did sugar imports, though cane grew wild in many places. The government did import machinery for a cotton-textile factory, but this had still to be assembled in 1935. Letters in the Amharic press repeated Gebre Heywet's warning that Ethiopia was being transformed into a dependency of Europe and the USA (though by 1934 Ethiopia's chief trading partner was Japan). Others noted the risks of replacing animal energy by imported fuels rather than domestic hydro-electric power. And both 'progressives' and 'conservatives' had cause for alarm in the state of the country's defences. In 1930 a Belgian military mission arrived to retrain the emperor's bodyguard as an officer corps for a new imperial army. Swedish instructors arrived in 1934 and opened a military academy. But the import of sophisticated arms and motor-transport quickly outstripped the government's cash reserves, while by 1935 modern training had done little more than raise standards of turnout among a few thousand soldiers.

²³ Bogale Walelu, *Ye-Walamo Herzb Tarike-na Barenetem endet endetewegede* (The History of the people of Walamo and how slavery was abolished) (Addis Ababa, 1963–4), 56; 'L'Afranchissement des esclaves', *Berhane-na Selam*, 21 August 1930; Robert Cheesman, *Lake Tana and the Blue Nile. An Abyssinian quest* (London, 1936), 185; PRO FO.403/454 enclosure, fol. 60, interviews at Gore on slavery by C. Walker, September 1923.

The Italian invasion

Mussolini, like many other Italians, was determined to avenge the ignominy of Adowa: Italy's place in the sun was not complete without possession of Ethiopia. During the early 1930s, Italian agents sought to subvert Ethiopians who might especially resent Shoan hegemony. In the south, Somali irregulars in Italian employment infiltrated far up the Webi Shebele and into the eastern Ogaden. By 1934 the Fascist government had plans to encroach on Ethiopia from both north-east and south-east. Then, in December, an Ethiopian escort of the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission clashed with Italian-officered Somali troops at Walwal, in territory which according to an Italian agreement with Menelik was part of the Ethiopian Ogaden. Mussolini immediately seized on this incident as a pretext for 'the destruction of Ethiopia's armed forces and its total conquest'.²⁴ Ethiopia's protests at the League of Nations in Geneva were stifled by the determination of the British and French not to disoblige the Italians. Help was forthcoming, ironically, from Nazi Germany: at this stage Hitler was eager to stir up trouble for Mussolini, who resented Nazi ambitions in Austria. In July 1935 Haile Sellassie arranged for a shipment of arms from Germany, after vainly appealing to the USA.²⁵ By this time, however, Mussolini had sent large quantities of war materials to Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and the Fascists began to enlist the unemployed; eventually, over half a million soldiers and labourers were sent from Italy to East Africa. In October, Italian forces in Eritrea began to move into Tigre. The League of Nations reluctantly declared Italy an aggressor and imposed economic sanctions, but these were so restricted as to be useless unless war was prolonged. For this task, Ethiopia's military resources were far less adequate than they had been in 1895–6 when challenged by a less completely industrialised Italy.

The Italian armies in the north-east took Adowa in October 1935 but then came to a halt. Mussolini had entrusted them, not to a serving army officer, but to the elderly Fascist leader De Bono,

²⁴ G. Rochat, *Militari e Politici nella preparazione della campagna d'Etiopia. Studio e documenti 1932–1936* (Milan, 1971), 377.

²⁵ Esmonde M. Robertson, *Mussolini as empire-builder. Europe and Africa 1932–36* (London, 1977), 103, 110–11, 127–9, 152–3, 182.

who was exceedingly cautious. He was replaced by Marshal Badoglio, who eventually launched an offensive in February 1936, against the three large Ethiopian armies concentrated in Tigre, which comprised some 150,000 men. The Italians dropped poison-gas bombs from the air, but this atrocity was not decisive: their aircraft probably did more harm by preventing the Ethiopians from using their favourite tactics of surprise attack and envelopment. The invaders were also greatly helped by the fleets of trucks which reached the front along newly-built roads. Their superiority in firepower was overwhelming: the Ethiopians had no heavy machine-guns and far too little ammunition. As each of the three armies in Tigre was defeated in turn, bombers and fighter planes pursued the survivors relentlessly until they disbanded. Few but the commanders themselves reached the second line of defence, a reserve army between Wallo and Tigre. This, under the command of the emperor himself, was defeated at Maychew at the end of March. In the south, in the Ogaden, Graziani led an invading force from Somalia, and had it not been for his excessive caution the poorly-organised Ethiopian forces under Nasibu Zemanel would also have collapsed. The emperor called on his subjects to take to guerrilla warfare, but he met with no response; in the north, survivors simply went home. He wished to move the capital to the Sudan border, but failed to sway a defeatist majority in his council. On 1 May, Haile Sellassie and his family boarded a train for Djibouti; four days later, Badoglio occupied Addis Ababa. On the Fascist side, some 2,000 Italians and 3,000 African troops had been killed. Ethiopian losses are not known, but according to observers on both sides they were much higher. Of the Ethiopian high command, only the emperor and his cousin, the liberal Ras Imru Haile Sellassie, had demonstrated any capacity for handling great bodies of light infantry, while the Italians had avoided the blunders which had given Menelik's seasoned generals and riflemen their chances at Adowa.

Ethiopia's cause seemed hopeless. At the end of June, Haile Sellassie reached Geneva and made a prophetic address to the League, but by now the Ethiopian question had been eclipsed by Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland. Sanctions were lifted at the end of July. Haile Sellassie took up residence in England, but in April 1938 Britain recognised the Italian annexation. At the beginning of 1937, the last of the imperial forces mobilised in the

south were being tracked down by the Italians and by new units of Ethiopian irregulars (*banda*); around Addis Ababa, one of these was led by Ras Hailu of Gojjam. In July 1937 the ageing Balcha and other Shoan commanders tried to liberate the capital; they failed miserably. Ras Imru had gone to set up a free government in the west, but he surrendered in December. Everywhere, local notables submitted to representatives of the Italian regime.

ITALIAN EAST AFRICA, 1936–1941

The Fascist regime

The conquest of Ethiopia gave the Italians nominal control of a vast empire in north-east Africa. This was now welded into a unified structure under a viceroy, whose capital was Addis Ababa. Within the frontiers of Italian East Africa, new administrative borders were drawn in order to encourage regional affinities and undermine loyalties to the Ethiopian empire. Eritrea was enlarged to include the Tigrigna-speakers south of the Mareb and Belesa rivers, and most of the 'Afar in the lowlands north of the Awash. Italian Somaliland absorbed the Ogaden and other Ethiopian territory inhabited by Somali, though the 'Ise and other Dir clans at Jigjiga and along the railway to Dire Dawa were left under Harar. That province was extended west to the Rift lakes, to encompass the eastern Oromo. A Galla-Sidamo province, centred on Jimma, included the other Oromo, along with the Kaffa, the Walamo, the Semitic-speaking Gurage and other peoples west of Addis Ababa. The Amharic-speakers south of the Tekeze, together with those of Gojjam and parts of Wallo and Shoa, were placed in an Amhara province with its capital at Gondar. To break the supremacy of Amhara and Amharicised notables and soldiers in southern Ethiopia, the Italians proclaimed an end to slavery and to tenures similar to serfdom. However, few slaves left their masters; their only alternatives were to join *banda* or road-gangs. The southern peasantry were relieved of the extortions of the emperor's officials and garrisons, but the semi-elected village heads (who were retained as in Eritrea) had to provide regular quotas of conscript labour at miserable wages, while Italian commanders and *banda* requisitioned ruthlessly. At the same time, the Italians readily recruited Amhara and Amharicised men as a

‘soldier race’. Many pre-conquest officials in Harar and Galla-Sidamo also contrived to ingratiate themselves and recovered something of their former property and status.

The Fascist regime considered that literary education for Africans would simply turn them into ‘misfits’. The narrow policies already pursued in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland were now extended to Ethiopia. The functions of elementary schools were confined to the teaching of hygiene, crafts and agriculture and the indoctrination of future *askari*. To further the policy of dividing the population, Koranic schools were opened. Above the lower grades, education was restricted to the training of interpreters and courses about Italy for elementary schoolteachers. In 1938, when boasting abroad of their ‘civilising mission’, the Fascists could point to no more than 10,600 African pupils in the whole of Italian East Africa, scarcely more than had been in school in the three territories in 1934. Ethiopia’s few high schools were closed to Africans, non-Italian missionaries were expelled, and Africans who had already received some further education were admitted only to the lowest clerical posts. In the long run, these measures proved even graver setbacks than the Fascists’ systematic murder of Africans who had studied abroad.

Invasion was followed by immigration. Between 1935 and 1939 perhaps 200,000 Italians either volunteered or were conscripted for temporary wage labour in East Africa. The newcomers were concentrated in the towns, especially in Eritrea. Many found work in offices or motor-repair shops. Italy provided unstinting credits for a huge road-construction programme, which gave employment to unskilled immigrants as well as Africans. An all-weather road was built from Addis Ababa to Assab and also Massawa, which became once more the chief port of north-east Africa. By 1939, many Italian workers had gone home, but there were still 54,000 Italians in Asmara — more than half the total population, which was roughly equal to that of Addis Ababa in 1935. The rationale for immigration, urban growth and road-building was political and military rather than economic. The costs were largely borne by the Italian tax-payer. A few hundred Italian colonists were settled at great expense on mechanised farms, but they failed to produce even the 8,000–9,000 tons of wheat which Ethiopian farmers had marketed annually before 1935. In 1937–8 the tithe was reimposed on Ethiopian cultivators, who shifted from their

preferred grains to growing wheat for sale to government agents. Even then, the 70,000 tons of wheat marketed in 1938–9 fell short of the needs of the white population, and much had to be imported. All kinds of other food were also imported, including eggs and Brazilian coffee: paper lire were unacceptable either to the people who harvested wild coffee in the west or to plantation-workers on the eastern plateaux. Coffee exports, which had exceeded 22,000 tons in 1931–2 and 1934, steadily fell to 6,500 tons in 1939. Almost all construction materials were imported, including timber, while dependence on imported fuel was vastly increased by the expansion of motor-transport and the use of petrol-generated electricity. The few new industries, such as cement works, survived only on subsidies, for they were unrelated to production for export. Such extravagance could not last, and in 1939–40 subsidies for public works were slashed. The road system rapidly became unusable once repairs ceased to be made to damage caused by rain and heavy use.

Resistance and liberation

Despite their crushing defeat of Ethiopia's imperial armies, the Fascists' control of Italian East Africa was very patchy. Within Ethiopia itself, only Harar and parts of the south-west were peaceful enough to tax. Traffic along most main roads was regularly ambushed, and the Italians were besieged by numerous popular revolts. Various motives inspired the 'patriots', as rebels against the Italians were called by British sympathisers. Many in Tigre and along the Sudan frontier sought to revenge wrongs done by individual Italians and *banda* leaders. In south-eastern Gojjam, professional bandits provided the backbone of revolt, while in Kaffa and the far south-west scattered resistance was led by elephant-poachers. In the older Christian areas of the north, resistance was often just a continued assertion of the desire for independence from Addis Ababa, though it never went quite as far as to challenge Haile Sellassie's imperial title. Resistance was perhaps more surprising in Walamo and among the Oromo of western Wollega, where the *gebbar* system had been especially harsh; as it happened, the expulsion of British and American missionaries, and attempts to suppress the Amharic Bible, provoked the emergence of evangelical churches underground.

Insurrection became general in 1937, in reaction against the Fascists' reprisals for an attempt in February, by two Eritreans, on the life of the viceroy, Graziani. He promptly unloosed a regime of terror that was intended to extinguish all sentiment of Ethiopian nationality. Thousands of Africans were killed, including those who had acquired technical skills, and many Shoa clergy. In November Graziani was recalled, and in an effort to conciliate the clergy the Italians arranged the election of the first indigenous head of the Ethiopian church since the country's conversion in the fourth century.²⁶ This had little success: many priests joined the men and women who were taking up arms in the countryside and receiving supplies from urban workers. Some partisan groups had strong dynastic links with the exiled emperor. Northern Shoa was dominated by Abebe Aregay, an officer of the imperial bodyguard whose maternal grandfather had been Menelik's most famous Oromo general. South-west of Addis Ababa, the Oromo rallied in mid-1937 to their kinsman Geresu Duki and his father, a veteran of Menelik's campaigns.²⁷ In Gojjam, patriot leadership was strongly democratic: commanders were elected by local committees of defence who sternly rebuked notables reluctant to take up guerrilla warfare.²⁸ At the end of 1937, the Italians admitted that they controlled no more than half the province of Amhara, including northern Shoa and Wallo. Even for Eritreans, the exiled emperor came to symbolise the sense of a thwarted nationality. Some 50,000 Eritrean soldiers were serving outside their territory's former borders, and their morale was severely strained by the need to police so many centres of rebellion; it had already been undermined by increasing racial discrimination and their belief that Libyans, whom they had once helped Italy to conquer, had greater access to political rights. Many Eritreans deserted, and helped partisans to use newly-captured modern weapons.

Resistance, then, was widespread, but it was not well co-ordinated. The number of full-time partisans greatly increased

²⁶ Hitherto, the metropolitan (*abuna*) of the Ethiopian Church had always been an Egyptian nominated by the Coptic Patriarch of Alexandria.

²⁷ Tabor Wami, 'The life and career of Dajjazmach Garasu Duki', unpublished senior essay, History Dept., Addis Ababa University (1972).

²⁸ Yohannes Birhanu, 'The patriots in Gojjam 1936–1941. A study of [the] resistance movement', *ibid.* On elections in Begemder: Tegew Agegne, 'The patriots of Libo, 1936–41', *ibid.* (1973) citing informants and appending numerous Amharic Mss.

during each rainy season, when airpower and motor-transport were of less use to the Fascists, but partisan commanders sought to operate on their own and vied with each other for recruits. Messages from the emperor encouraged hopes that he would obtain aircraft and other heavy equipment abroad, and in 1938–9 his envoy Lorenzo Taezaz entered Ethiopia from the Sudan. Lorenzo toured Gojjam and Begemder and on his return to England told Haile Sellassie that the prospects for revolt were excellent, but the partisans' rivalries persisted. By the end of 1939, their efforts had reached a stalemate: the Fascists were negotiating truces with partisan leaders whereby the latter were to be left alone to administer their own districts in return for not attacking Italian outposts or traffic.

A new phase began in June 1940, when Italy declared war on Britain and France. The British government enabled Haile Sellassie to fly to Khartoum. In July the Fascists captured Kassala; in August they overran British Somaliland. A British mission from the Sudan made contact with partisans in Gojjam, but not until October did the Sudan government agree to allow the emperor to return to Ethiopia as leader of a war of liberation. In January 1941 a three-prong attack was launched against Italian East Africa. Indian and Sudanese forces invaded Eritrea from Kassala. Forces from South, East and West Africa invaded Italian Somaliland from Kenya. Haile Sellassie entered Gojjam with Orde Wingate's 'Gideon Force', an army of Ethiopian patriots officered by miscellaneous whites. In March the African divisions in the south took Jiggiga and Harar; in April they captured Addis Ababa. On 5 May, Haile Sellassie re-entered his own capital. By this time Eritrea was in British hands and Jimma, the capital of Galla-Sidamo, was being encircled by patriots. When Gondar fell in November, to combined British and patriot forces, the war of liberation came virtually to an end. The emperor's future role was questioned by the British military administration of 'occupied' Ethiopia, headed by Sir Philip Mitchell, but the Anglo-Ethiopian agreement of January 1942 confirmed Haile Sellassie's position as head of state.

This personal success for the emperor was due in large part to the scale of African resistance. The partisans had not been able to free the country unaided, but they had compelled the Italians to retain massive forces in East Africa; by 1940, these comprised

90,000 Italians, and perhaps more than 100,000 Africans (including *banda*). Between the war of invasion, in 1935–6, and the war of liberation in 1941, Fascist forces lost 5,000 dead and more than 9,000 wounded.²⁹ By harassing the Fascists within their empire, the patriots checked Italian ambitions to conquer the Sudan. They also exhibited, on the emperor's triumphant return, a degree of loyalty and Ethiopian solidarity which surprised even sympathetic outsiders. As a result, they helped to ensure that liberation, albeit with aid from the British Empire, would restore the pre-war Ethiopian government with its political independence and territorial integrity largely intact.

²⁹ Alberto Sbacchi, 'The price of empire: towards an enumeration of Italian casualties in Ethiopia 1935–40', *Ethiopianist Notes*, 1978, 2, 2, 39.

CHAPTER 15

EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN


EGYPT

Britain's occupation of Egypt, unlike that of most of her territorial acquisitions in Africa, was from its beginning in 1882 meant to be temporary. Protestations to this effect, both to Egyptians and to European governments, nevertheless failed to mask the reality of British control. The importance of Egypt to Britain's world power seemed to increase with each year of occupation, and was formally recognised in the Entente Cordiale of 1904. After that date European pressure to end the occupation ceased, and the British were allowed an even more direct role in Egypt's administration. Formally the Egyptian government retained its authority, and British policies continued to be hampered by the Capitulations and other apparatus of internationalism. But throughout the period under review, Britain retained ultimate control in Egypt, whether endowed with it legally or not. That control was successively embodied in an agent and consul-general, a high commissioner, and an ambassador, over what evolved from an Ottoman province to a protectorate and finally an independent state. The political history of the period, and much that was influenced by it, was therefore dominated by Egypt's relations with Britain.

POLITICAL CHANGE

The departure in May 1907 of Lord Cromer, who as agent and consul-general since 1883 had wielded British power in Egypt, symbolised the end of an era. Under his grim but efficient rule the sound financial administration had been provided which was required for an end to foreign occupation; the absence of political and, to a lesser extent, educational reforms served as the excuse for the occupation's continuance. In the early days British experts had been employed in small numbers to advise Egyptian officials;

EGYPT: POLITICAL CHANGE



28 Egypt, 1939

gradually those officials became mere figure-heads, and 'advice' could not be refused. The familiar and seductive argument of efficiency was invoked by Cromer to justify a huge increase in both the number and the scope of these British employees, whose claims to expertise were often unfounded. After his departure Cromer's tenure would be recalled as the heyday of British power, when political order and stability, backed up by 'the Lord's' enormous prestige, had ensured material progress. But to much of Egyptian opinion his rule, however orderly, was not merely soured but epitomised by the incident at Dinshaway in 1906 when, after the death of a British officer in a scuffle between his hunting

party and some villagers, sentences of inordinate severity were imposed: four villagers were executed and four sentenced to life imprisonment. This 'example' devalued much of the credit with the *fallāḥīn* that twenty-five years of British rule was supposed to have accumulated, and the political ineptness exposed by the affair could be accounted for only by an enormous gulf between the burgeoning British official class and the Egyptian people as a whole.

Cromer was succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst, who had served under him as financial adviser to the Egyptian government. Supported by a new Liberal government in London, Gorst attempted to effect a policy of reform which he had long sincerely nourished, by which the authority of representative institutions would be enhanced and the relations between the residency and the palace harmonised. The insignificance of the so-called general assembly and legislative council had reflected Cromer's disdain for Egyptian abilities; his dislike for Khedive 'Abbās Ḥilmī II (a grandson of Ismā'īl) had been openly expressed. Gorst was successful in repairing the personal relations between the British resident and the khedive. But support for the monarch was incompatible with the development of representative institutions; and that development itself was belittled by nationalists and condemned by the powerful British official class.

Gorst resigned, an embittered, dying man, in 1911, to be succeeded by Lord Kitchener. It was widely expected, eagerly by his British subordinates, that his regime would represent a swing of the pendulum back to the days of Cromerian autocracy. This expectation was only partially fulfilled. While it was true that Kitchener would entertain little opposition to his policies, those policies did contain germs of liberality. Towards the end of his tenure a new legislative assembly (*Jam'iyya tashrī'iyya*) was created. This assembly was misnamed, and was hardly democratic, but it served as a forum for opposition to the government and the occupying power, it provided useful political experience for its members, and it endowed them with a legitimacy that proved valuable in the future. But other policies of Gorst, including the decrease in British personnel and the *rapprochement* with the palace, were abandoned.

The development of Egyptian politics between 1905 and the outbreak of the First World War was frustrated by a lack of unity

in the face of the all-pervasive fact of British occupation, and by a lack of mass involvement. The premature death in 1908 of Muṣṭafā Kāmil, the founder of the influential political newspaper, *al-Liwā'*, removed from the scene a commanding personality difficult to replace. His Ḥizb al-Watani (National Party), officially established in 1907 but with much older origins, appealed to a numerically small middle-class, and declined under the leaders who succeeded him. The Ḥizb al-Umma was established in 1907, with British support, as a counter to Muṣṭafā Kāmil. In its journal, *al-Jarīda*, edited by Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid, the Ḥizb al-Umma put forward views similar to but more moderate than those of the National Party. Both called for an end to the occupation, but the Ḥizb al-Umma emphasised cooperation with the British in the meantime, as the way towards social and educational reform. The least influential of these political groups was the Constitutional Reformers, also founded in 1907. Shaykh 'Alī Yūsuf, editor of *al-Mu'ayyad*, led this group, which was identified with the promotion of the khedive's political interests. These and other groups were in fact not parties at all, but the 'circles' of more or less influential political thinkers and activists. Moreover, they paid little or no attention to social and economic issues insofar as these were separate from the overriding issue of national independence. Among minor groups founded during this period were the National Free Party (1907), the Nobles' Party (1908), the Party of Independent Egyptians (1908), and the Young Egyptian Party (1909).¹ For the establishment of a modern political party with mass support Egypt would have to wait until 1918.

The outbreak of the First World War raised anew the question of Britain's anomalous status in Egypt, which was technically still a Turkish possession. The Ottoman empire's entry into the war in November 1914 necessitated some formal solution: annexation was rejected, and on 18 December a protectorate was declared. On 19 November Khedive 'Abbās Hilmi, who was visiting Istanbul, was deposed, and his uncle, Ḥussayn Kāmil, succeeded with the title of sultan. Kitchener was appointed secretary of state for war in London and Sir Henry MacMahon came to Cairo as 'high commissioner'. To ease Muslim apprehensions, the British authorities promised that Britain would undertake alone the defence of Egypt, that Egyptians would not be called upon to

¹ Jacob Landau, *Parliaments and parties in Egypt* (Tel Aviv, 1953), 142–6.

participate in the war, and that progress would be made towards Egyptian self-government. In the event, none of these promises was kept. An Egyptian Labour Corps, established in 1916, benefited from the services, often involuntary, of some 1.5 million Egyptians. Egypt became a base for large Allied armies, the presence of which produced economic dislocation and its inevitable social consequences. The question of Egypt's future status was complicated by the war, which reinforced in the British official mind the crucial importance of Egypt to imperial communications. Increased British interest in Egypt thus coincided with a sharp decline in Egyptian support for, and eventually acquiescence in, the occupation.

On 13 November 1918, two days after the armistice in Europe, the high commissioner (Sir Reginald Wingate, who had succeeded MacMahon in 1917) received at the residency Sa'ad Zaghlūl and two associates. Zaghlūl had served as a government minister, and before the war had been elected a vice-president of the legislative assembly, where he acted as a spokesman for opposition to the government. Now he and his Wafd (delegation) put to the high commissioner the case for Egyptian independence and requested permission to proceed to London for talks with the authorities there. The Foreign Office refused permission and, after a period of rising tension, Zaghlūl and his colleagues were interned in Malta. The ensuing violent disturbances throughout Egypt were eventually put down by force under the new high commissioner, Lord Allenby. Zaghlūl was released and proceeded to the Paris Peace Conference where he was ignored by the Allies. Like previous political groups in Egypt, the early Wafd centred around one man. But there were in this case important differences. The Wafd became an organised mass movement, born of the frustrations engendered during the war, uniting Muslims and Copts, and led by a charismatic hero, Zaghlūl, who was to dominate Egyptian politics until his death in 1927. Further, the Wafd succeeded in establishing a claim to unique status as the standard-bearer for Egyptian independence.

The revolt of 1919 was also notable in that it was linked to a public expression of a change in the status of Egyptian women. Debate over that status, although limited to the upper classes, had been under way for a generation. Gradually, however, especially after 1919, female emancipation came to be viewed not simply as

another foreign idea, but as a necessary step towards national independence. Gains were made, in education and employment, throughout the inter-war period.

The suppression of the 1919 revolt was followed by a period of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. But the aims of British imperialism and Egyptian nationalism were incompatible, and Zaghlūl barred the way of agreement between the British and any Egyptian ministry. It was in order to break the impasse created by this opposition that Allenby wrested from an unwilling British government a declaration of Egyptian 'independence' in February 1922. This declaration reserved, pending future negotiations, four points to the discretion of the British government: the security of British communications, the defence of Egypt, the protection in Egypt of foreign interests and minorities, and the Sudan. The Wafd's rejection of this spurious sovereignty was waved aside, and Egypt was officially declared independent on 15 March. The sultan, Aḥmad Fu'ād (a son of Ismā'il), who had succeeded in 1917, took the title of king of Egypt. In April a commission under Ḥusayn Rushdī Pasha, the wartime prime minister, was appointed to draft a constitution. Based on the Belgian constitution of 1830–1, this was promulgated on 19 April 1923. It reserved to the king important legislative and executive powers. Islam was established as the state religion. A bicameral legislature was set up, the lower house of which, the chamber of deputies, was to be elected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage. Although the Wafd opposed the drafting and promulgation of the constitution, it vigorously contested the first parliamentary elections, held in two stages in 1923 and 1924. Returned with a resounding victory at the polls, much to the chagrin of the British and the king, Zaghlūl formed a Wafd government in January 1924.

The period of constitutional government that began with the first Wafd ministry was characterised by a trilateral struggle for dominance among the politicians, the palace, and the residency. Parliamentary democracy was inevitably prejudiced by the continuing British presence and the overweening ambitions of the king, who was jealously vigilant of his position. The Reserved Points of the 1922 declaration became the subject of a series of negotiations, the failure of each of which reinforced Egyptian bitterness and British intransigence. Whatever compromises the British were prepared to make, they would not concede military

control of the Suez Canal and a real share of power in the Sudan, where the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was a euphemism for British rule. However the Egyptians mitigated their own demands, no government could expect to survive a compromise on these crucial questions of sovereignty. The intervention in Egyptian affairs of the British high commissioner, often in reference to one of the Reserved Points, lent an air of pretence and a sense of cynicism to parliamentary proceedings.

The first Wafd government, and Zaghlūl as prime minister, were soon confronted with these facts. More at home in opposition than in government, Zaghlūl was unable to reconcile the demands of implacable nationalism with the reality of British power. Negotiations in the autumn of 1924 were fruitless, despite the advent in Britain of a Labour government, presumed to be more amenable to Egyptian demands. In November the British sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian army and governor-general of the Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, was assassinated in Cairo. The ensuing crisis resulted in the forced evacuation of Egyptian troops and officials from the Sudan, the virtual exclusion of Egyptian participation in the Condominium, and the resignation of Zaghlūl's government. A new government under Zīwār Pasha quickly came to terms with the British and relations were restored. In the election of March 1925, however, the Wafd was victorious, despite its enemies' attempts to arrange the results, but British opposition prevented Zaghlūl's return to power, and the king prorogued parliament. Another general election, in May 1926, resulted in a third Wafd victory. This time Zaghlūl took up the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, while a government was formed by 'Adlī Pasha Yaghan, the leader of the Liberal Constitutionalist Party, which had been established in 1922. Zaghlūl died in 1927, and was succeeded by Muṣṭafā al-Naḥḥās, who became prime minister in 1928 after two short-lived governments.

Meanwhile negotiations with the British over the Reserved Points continued. A draft treaty agreed in 1927 between the Liberal Constitutionalist prime minister, Sarwat Pasha, and Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British foreign secretary, came to nothing because of the Wafd's opposition. A similar fate befell a draft concluded by the Labour foreign secretary, Arthur Henderson, and Muḥammad Maḥmūd Pasha, in June 1929. The

British government now realised (as Allenby had in 1922) that negotiations were pointless with a government unsupported in parliament. Maḥmūd's government resigned, and in elections in December 1929 yet another Wafd victory resulted. Al-Naḥḥās, as prime minister, took up negotiations with the British, which failed over the familiar issue of the Sudan. Al-Naḥḥās resigned in June 1930, to be succeeded by Ismā'īl Ṣidqī Pasha. The 1923 constitution was thereupon abrogated, to be replaced by one even more respectful of the executive. Ṣidqī established a new party, the Ḥizb al-Sha'b (People's Party) as a vehicle for his and the king's determination to destroy the Wafd. The Wafd and the Liberals reacted by joining in a National Pact (March 1931) against the palace-Ṣidqī combine, and boycotted the rigged elections of June 1931. Ṣidqī presided over an increasingly ruthless regime until, his purpose having been served in King Fu'ād's design, his government fell in January 1933. The results of this long series of manoeuvres and intrigues were the temporary assertion of the palace's supremacy and the justified disrepute of the traditional politicians.

The failure of constitutional government was one reason for the appearance in the late 1920s and early 1930s of extremist organisations which rejected the non-ideological bases of Egypt's political system. The Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*), established in Ismā'īliyya in 1928 by Ḥassan al-Bannā', a teacher, quickly grew from its beginnings as a religious society into a quasi-political party with a mass following. It was to reach the height of its power and influence in the 1940s. Young Egypt (*Misr al-Faṭāḥ*), founded in Cairo in October 1933, grew similarly from a students' patriotic society into a fascist organisation with its own paramilitary arm, the green-shirts. The rise and popularity of totalitarian regimes in Europe seemed inspiring to some in the jaded political atmosphere of Egypt. A Communist Party, however, established in the early 1920s, attracted little support.

King Fu'ād's victory in 1933 proved to be shortlived, as disparate events combined to favour the reintroduction of the 1923 constitution. The importance to the British of a treaty settlement with Egypt that would have the support of an elected Egyptian parliament was emphasised by political developments in Europe and by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935. British pressure for a return to parliamentary government was

supported by the Wafd, and in December 1935 the 1923 constitution was reinstated by decree. The elections of May 1936 returned another Wafd government under al-Naḥḥās. Negotiations with the British thereupon proceeded quickly. A Treaty of Alliance was concluded in August 1936, and won overwhelming approval in the Egyptian parliament. The desire of both sides finally to reach an accord was obvious in the provisions of the treaty. Only one of the Reserved Points was conceded by the British, that of the protection of minorities and foreigners. The Sudan's status, which had proved to be a stumbling block on previous occasions, remained the same. In some significant and some symbolic ways Egypt won concessions. The British garrison, to be stationed in the Canal Zone only, was limited to 10,000 men. Egypt was free to conduct her own diplomatic affairs and, more importantly, assumed control over her own military. One result of this was the opening up of the Military Academy to a wider social class. A convention held at Montreux in April–May 1937 resulted in the abolition of the Capitulations. With British support, Egypt entered the League of Nations. The high commissioner was to be entitled 'ambassador'. For the first time since the First World War, the issue of Anglo-Egyptian relations ceased to be the prevalent one in Egyptian politics. But the struggle for supremacy between the palace and the Wafd was not yet settled. It was to continue with increased bitterness under King Fārūq, who succeeded at the death of his father in 1936, and it was to lead eventually to a disastrous British intervention in 1942.

ECONOMIC CHANGE

The political events of the inter-war period involved directly only a small minority of the population. Developments in other areas had more immediate impact on the great and growing mass of Egyptians. The period under review witnessed a huge expansion in Egypt's agriculture. The visible legacy of Britain's occupation rests to a great extent on the large engineering projects which extended the area of cultivation and allowed perennial agriculture in the delta and Middle Egypt. The Aswan Dam, completed in 1902, was heightened in 1912, and again in 1933. Dams or barrages were constructed at Asyūt (1902), Zifta (1903), and Isna (1908). Two projects to supply lift drainage in Lower Egypt were

begun in 1913, but were postponed during the First World War. These were completed in the late 1920s. A fall in agricultural productivity, which began at the end of the nineteenth century, continued: the average yield per hectare of cotton fell from 612 kg in 1895-6 to 477 kg in 1910-14. This was attributable in part to the exhaustion of the cultivated soil which resulted largely from the extension of perennial agriculture and the lack of proper drainage. The problem was exacerbated during the war by the difficulty in importing chemical fertilisers. As against the fall in productivity, the total size of the cotton-crop continued to increase, and during most of our period cotton accounted for 80 per cent of exports. The British war effort, by requisitioning labour and farm animals, contributed to agricultural difficulties. But the war also had its positive effects. More attention was paid to increasing the supply of home-grown food crops and to the more efficient cultivation of cotton. Interest in diversifying the economy was stimulated by the fall in the price of cotton early in the war. The great rise in the money value of the cotton-crop during and immediately after the war must be offset against the rapid inflation of the period, but even in real terms there was a marked increase in export values, and this contributed to the reduction of the country's foreign debt.²

In the late 1920s, agricultural investment increased. An Agricultural Credit Bank was established in 1931. The Anglo-Egyptian Nile Waters Agreement in 1929 fixed the amounts of Nile water to be used by Egypt and the Sudan, an arrangement favourable to Egypt. Important new irrigation projects included the Nag Hammādi Barrage (1930), a rebuilt Asyūt Barrage (1938), the Muḥammad 'Alī Barrage (1939), and the Jabal Awlia Dam on the White Nile south of Khartoum (1937). By 1939 drainage facilities had been extended to about two-thirds of the cultivated area of the delta. Agricultural productivity recovered, and increased by

² Cotton exports in 1913 were worth £E30m.

	1913	1920	1924	1928	1932	1938
Total exports (£Em): 32		85	66	55	25	29

Between 1914 and 1920 wholesale prices in Cairo rose by 216 per cent and consumer prices by 136 per cent; in the 1930s wholesale prices were around or below their 1914 levels, whereas consumer prices were around 30 per cent above them.

35 per cent overall between the wars. Improved yields were due not only to the large hydraulic schemes undertaken, but also to better seeds, methods and machinery, and a rapidly increasing use of chemical fertilisers. The supply of these increased from about 23,000 tons in 1905–9 to over half a million tons in 1935–9.³ The reliance of Egypt on one main cash-crop, cotton, was mercilessly exposed at times of world financial crisis. Thus in 1907, 1921, 1926, and at the time of the great depression there were widespread effects in Egypt, with the debt-ridden peasant being hardest hit. The precariousness of his position may be seen by reference to the size of his holding. By 1913, 1,411,000 farmers owned only 555,000 hectares; by contrast, some 12,500 landlords held 944,000 hectares.

Transport was somewhat improved during the period. The contribution of the state railways to the national budget was a factor in their expansion, as also in the relative neglect of other land and water transport. By 1939 there were some 9,000 kilometres of roads in the settled parts of the country. In 1933 an airline began operations.

Industrial development lagged far behind agricultural expansion. The nature of the British occupation, the views of its officials, and the demands of the British and world economies all favoured the agricultural sector as the focus for development. Egyptian long-term interests were subordinated to those of French and British bond-holders, Lancashire industrialists and Egyptian landowners. The Egyptian élite continued to view land and property as the natural outlet for capital investment. Therefore not only were their own investments directed towards the agricultural sector; so were the policies of the governments they controlled. A rapid rate of growth in industrial investment during the last phase of Cromer's rule relied heavily on foreign capital. This continued to be the rule during other periods of growth. In the 1920s and 1930s a recognition of the dangers of reliance on cotton, long articulated by the nationalists and others, became more widespread, and this was reflected in a change in government policy to encourage and protect local industries. Protectionism,

³ Samir Radwan, *Capital formation in Egyptian industry and agriculture 1882–1967* (London, 1974), 127–34. See also Alan Richards, 'Agricultural technology and rural social classes in Egypt, 1920–1939' in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Haim (eds.), *Modern Egypt: studies in politics and society* (London, 1980), 56–83.

which had been eschewed by British administrators, was finally adopted from 1930. The establishment in 1920 of Bank Miṣr, controlled and managed by Egyptians, indicated a commitment, on the part of a rising Egyptian entrepreneurial class, to economic as well as political independence.⁴ Although most prominent in textiles, Bank Miṣr established a diverse group of industrial and service companies. At the start of the Second World War, however, agriculture remained dominant in the Egyptian economy: over two-thirds of the country's workforce was still on the land.

Attempts at organising industrial labour were from the 1920s only partially successful. Strikes were a feature of the 1919 revolt, and began an identification between organised labour and the Wafd which continued throughout the inter-war period. Times of economic recession naturally stimulated unionisation, as after the First World War and during the great depression when layoffs, reduced wages, and increased mechanisation combined to worsen the already appalling condition of the industrial labour class. The close association between the Wafd and organised labour resulted, however, in an even greater hostility towards labour demands by anti-Wafd governments, notably the Ṣidqī regime in the early 1930s. Such labour legislation as was promulgated was often ignored by an owner class insulated by its identity with the political élite. Attempts at forging a truly independent labour movement failed: a Labour Party established in 1931 disappeared in a matter of weeks. The relatively small numbers of industrial workers, the still minor contribution of industry to the country's economy, and the suspicion attached to unionism, further restricted the success of the labour movement.⁵

The growth of Egypt's population during this period was steady. According to census figures, the population grew from 9,715,000 in 1897 to 15,933,000 in 1937. Migration to large cities, especially Cairo and Alexandria, greatly accelerated. It is in relation to population figures that the results achieved in national income, standard of living, and productivity must be judged. Similarly, the expansion of education reflects the surge in population. The neglect of education by the British was a major cause

⁴ Radwan, *Capital formation*, 168–92.

⁵ See Marius Deeb, 'Labour and politics in Egypt, 1919–1939', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1979, 10: 187–203.

of complaint by nationalists. After formal independence in 1922 education received special attention; in 1923 free compulsory education was introduced for children between the ages of seven and twelve. The number of school students rose from 324,000 in 1913 to 942,000 in 1933, and enrolment in government secondary schools rose during the same period from 2,500 to 15,000. In 1913 there were some 31,000 girls in school; by 1934 their number had risen to 255,000. But in 1937 illiteracy, which had stood in 1907 at some 92.7 per cent, had declined only to 85.2 per cent. An expansion of opportunities for university and higher technical education was restricted by the inability of the country to absorb all of its graduates.

By 1940 Egypt's position had changed radically, for better and for worse, from that of 1905. Her formal independence in 1922, and greater autonomy in 1936, had been bought at a price which included tacit abandonment of her nineteenth-century territorial acquisitions south of Wadi Halfa. Her one mass nationalist political party, the Wafd, had, in the face of long opposition from the palace, purchased power at the price of ideological integrity; having reached an agreement with Britain in 1936, the Wafd forfeited the almost automatic support it had once claimed as the true nationalist party. Egypt's government, however constrained by British influence and interference, and whether Wafdist or pro-palace, served interests often incompatible with those of the mass of Egyptians. A phenomenal growth in agricultural production was accompanied by a huge increase in population; a small élite was further enriched as teeming millions struggled on the margins of subsistence. With a shared conservatism, foreign occupiers and local aristocracy ignored or belittled industrial development, and then cruelly exploited those Egyptians on whose labour it depended. A sense, among those in power, that poverty was endemic in the valley of the Nile, and that Egypt's people were as they ever had been, often seemed justified by the inability of the country to produce a political life reflective of the national interest. Egypt experienced before most countries in Africa the disillusionment that attends a nominal political independence which fails to bring with it either economic independence or social equality, both of which in Egypt were precluded by foreign interests and local masters. Some of the issues outstanding on the eve of the Second World War would

be resolved only after the 1952 revolution, while others continued to be critical.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

THE WINGATE ERA, c. 1905–1919

The Anglo-Egyptian 'Condominium Agreement' of January 1899 did not alter the juridical status of the Sudan as an Egyptian dependency; but it did enable the British to create an administrative structure whereby a handful of British officials controlled the Sudan through a mainly Egyptian bureaucracy, supported by Egyptian troops and Egyptian financial subvention. Egyptian ministers were however excluded from the oversight of this administration, whose effective head was Lord Cromer, the agent of British overrule in Egypt. Cromer treated the governor-general (from 1899 to 1916 Reginald Wingate) as a mere executive subordinate. Until Cromer's retirement in 1907 Wingate was given very little discretion in administrative policy; and until about 1914 virtually none in finance, which was controlled directly from Cairo. The internal structure of the administration was in 1905 still essentially that of an improvised 'civil affairs branch' of the Egyptian army, directed by Wingate as military commander-in-chief. Direct responsibility for local administration was in the hands of Egyptian military officers appointed as *ma'murs*.⁶ British officers on secondment to the Egyptian army were detailed to the 'civil side' as province governors, and as travelling 'inspectors' of the administration of *ma'murs*. Most British officers did not serve on the 'civil side' for more than three or four years; but by securing extended secondments for a few selected officers, Wingate gradually built up a small quasi-permanent cadre of experienced soldier-administrators. A few British civilians were employed as senior professional experts, notably in law and education; and from 1900 British civilian graduates were recruited, very sparingly, as administrative probationers. But until about 1918 the key administrative positions were held by a small inner ring of British military officers⁷ on virtually permanent attachment to the 'civil side'.

⁶ A generic term meaning simply 'subordinate'.

⁷ Though perhaps the most influential member of this 'inner ring' was the Habsburg subject Rudolf Slatin, inspector-general of the Sudan, 1900–14.

The Sudan, apparently united by the Nile waters, was in fact a territory of multiple diversity. North of the 'frontier of Islamisation', in 1905 very approximately the tenth parallel, this diversity was transcended by a common Arab-Islamic culture and by common experience of Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist political control. The old tribal kingships of the middle Nile had long been destroyed; and the tribe retained little or no importance as an effective political unit, except sometimes among nomads. Even as a category of self-identification, the tribe was for many Muslim Sudanese less important than allegiance to Mahdist Islam or to a Sufi religious brotherhood (*ṭarīqa*; pl. *ṭuruq*). South of the tenth parallel, the Sudan was a mere aggregate of the numerous and extremely diverse African peoples within its arbitrary frontiers. Scattered patches of incipient Arab-Islamic acculturation, discernible in the 1870s, had hardly survived the collapse of Turco-Egyptian administration in the 1880s and the subsequent failure of the Mahdists effectively to control the southern Sudan. The powerful Nilotic peoples,⁸ perhaps two-thirds of the southern population, were notoriously impervious to all alien influences. Southern peoples with previous experience of 'governments' saw them as ruthless predators, but not usually as irresistible or invincible. Since 1840 a succession of governments had come to the south; but they had also gone, their going often hastened by southern resistance. Many southern peoples did not expect this latest government to be any more permanent.

From the outset, British administrative practice tended to accentuate the contrast between north and south. Until 1906 the overriding priority in the south was the protection of its still debatable frontiers from encroachments by other powers; and in this local epilogue to the Scramble for Africa, administration proper was almost completely neglected. After 1906, there seemed little point in devoting to these 'large tracts of useless territory'⁹ resources urgently needed in the north, where the rapid extension of effective administration seemed essential to the security of the government. In the north, small-scale Mahdist or millenarian risings occurred almost annually until about 1912. Some of these were indeed hardly more than gestures of resistance by obscure and isolated enthusiasts. But to Wingate every one of them was

⁸ Here used to denote the Anuak, Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk (and not 'Nilo-Hamites' or 'Paranilotics').

⁹ Salisbury Papers, Cabinet Memoranda, Cromer to Salisbury, 5 November 1897.

the first spark of a potentially uncontrollable Mahdist conflagration. Any failure to detect and extinguish these movements 'in their inception' might be fatal.¹⁰

Wingate was prompt and severe in crushing these uprisings. But his British garrison was tiny (never as many as 800 men); and his Egyptian and Sudanese troops, though numerous, were not necessarily reliable. By 1905 Wingate was profoundly convinced that long-term security lay in making government acceptable to the governed. The edge of 'fanaticism' could be blunted by ostentatious deference to Islam, by official support of secular notables, and by the creation of material prosperity. Above all, taxation must be very light: it was conventional wisdom that the Mahdiyya had been fundamentally a protest against extortion. In the interests of security, Cromer and his successors were willing to subsidise the Sudan from Egypt. In 1905, Egypt defrayed all military expenditure in the Sudan, and nearly a third of civil expenditure. But even in 1913, when the Egyptian *civil* subvention ceased, 'direct taxation on natives' contributed only 19 per cent to a revenue of £1.5m. The main source of revenue, contributing no less than 60 per cent in 1913, was 'trading receipts' — reflecting government's position as a major commercial concern with a monopoly of modernised transport and communications.

In the northern Sudan, taxation fell mainly on the cultivator. Nomad pastoralists paid 'tribute', a lump sum based on virtually uncheckable self-assessment and regarded by all concerned mainly as a symbol of submission to government. Irrigable land was taxed by area and quality. Rainland crops were visually assessed for the traditional 'tenth' (*ushr*), often paid in kind until about 1908; Wingate usually remitted *ushr* in regions where the cost of collection in kind exceeded its value. In the south there was no systematic taxation until 1910. One or two pastoral groups paid tribute, which they saw as 'buying' government's goodwill and protection. Otherwise, government made 'light' demands for provisions and labour, usually against payment. These demands were not however usually perceived as light; and the meagre payment offered¹¹ rarely obviated the need for coercion. Yet if

¹⁰ Wingate to Gorst, 3 May and 10 May 1908: cited by Muddathir 'Abd al-Raḥīm, *Imperialism and nationalism in the Sudan* (Oxford, 1969), 90.

¹¹ 17 milliemes (1.7d) per day for carrying in Maridi District in 1910: C[entral] R[ecord] O[ffice, Khartoum], Intel. 2/26/214, G. S. Jackson, note on Maridi District, 1 April 1910. This compares with a rate of 40–50 milliemes a day for unskilled labour in the northern Sudan.

EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN



29 The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1937

The heavy black line shows the northern boundary of the Southern Provinces

Steamer services to the south: All season: Khartoum–Juba; Khartoum–Meshra er Rek. Seasonal (July–October): Khartoum–Wau; Khartoum–Gambela (Ethiopia)

government was to operate at all in the south, it could hardly demand less. In the north, Wingate sometimes abandoned unpopular taxes as not worth the disaffection they provoked. There was no room for this flexibility in the south.

The south had no exports other than a vestigial and largely illicit trade in ivory. The north had gum arabic, which did not even require cultivation, but merely collection from acacia scrub on rainland fallows. Between 1901 and 1906 exports, averaging about £370,000 a year, consisted mainly of gum. By 1912, railway and harbour development (at Port Sudan, which became operational in 1907) had boosted exports to nearly £1.5m and had encouraged diversification. Gum, the production of which had more than doubled since 1906, was still the most valuable single export; but important contributions were now being made by oil-seeds (especially sesame), cattle, small stock (sheep and goats) and cotton. Since 1898 political stability, modernised transport and light taxation had greatly stimulated the traditional economy without significantly distorting it. But this miracle had been performed at the expense of Egypt. The £5.4m of capital which had created the railway and port facilities had come as interest-free loans from Cairo. Between 1902 and 1913 the Sudan accumulated an adverse trade balance of £10m — almost exactly the sum received from Egypt in capital grants and contributions to revenue.

With considerable support from Cromer, Wingate resisted proposals to attract foreign capital by concessions of land. Without opposing such concessions in principle, he insisted that hasty action, before Sudanese rights had been clearly established, would be politically very dangerous. In fact, after 1904 Wingate almost always refused to register sales of rural land, and after 1906 of urban land, to non-Sudanese. Except for some blocks in Khartoum itself, almost all land owned by individuals became Sudanese freehold; tribal rainlands and nomad ranges were vested in government as trustee for the users. Wingate safeguarded not only the Sudanese cultivator's land, but also his labour-force. This consisted of his family and his slaves; agricultural wage labour hardly existed. Ownership of slaves was socially as well as economically important; without slaves, a cultivator might be shamed by having to put his womenfolk to field-work instead of keeping them in decent Islamic seclusion. After 1898, large

numbers of agricultural slaves had deserted their masters for wage labour on government building projects. Cultivators showed their discontent; and government became uneasy at the growth of a rootless ex-slave proletariat in urban areas. In 1905, in order to 'ration' labour and control its movement, a central labour bureau was set up; from about 1904 an official register of slaves and slave-owners was gradually being compiled. But slave desertion continued; and in 1908 a Mahdist revolt in the Gezira, dangerously close to Khartoum, was seen as a protest at the failure of government to check desertion effectively. After 1908, 'domestic slavery', always tolerated by government, was officially supported and even enforced. Runaway slaves were 'induced' to return to their masters, usually by offering the alternative of indefinite imprisonment as 'vagabonds'. By taking no effective action to close the slave-register, government connived at new enslavements. Slavery ultimately succumbed, not to government action, but to competition from the cheap and plentiful wage labour offered by West African pilgrims slowly working their way to the Muslim holy places.

Government's approach to Islam was at first guided exclusively by the '*ulama*', whose leaders it accepted as official advisers in 1901; it therefore tended to define Islamic orthodoxy rather narrowly. Mahdism was in principle proscribed as a criminal heresy, but in practice only its outward manifestations were suppressed. At the same time, even strongly anti-Mahdist *ṭuruq* were suspect as 'unorthodox' and probably 'fanatical', and were refused official recognition. However, 'Alī al-Mīrghani, the leader of the large and powerful Khatmīyya *ṭarīqa*, evidently regarded a government of deferential anti-Mahdist infidels as the best available safeguard against a revival of Mahdism, which had suppressed all *ṭuruq* as obsolete and superfluous. By 1912 'Alī al-Mīrghani had been accepted by Wingate as the 'principal religious notable' of the Sudan. Meanwhile, though continuing to proscribe Mahdism as a cult, government ceased to penalise Mahdists who had in practice abandoned revolutionary militance; by 1914 many such Mahdists had re-emerged as notables in good standing with government. From 1912, a series of amnesties for Mahdist political prisoners coincided with a decline in millenarian insurgency; and in 1916 'Abd al-Rahmān, the Mahdi's post-humous son and the heir to his charisma, decided to pursue his

political ambitions as a notable under government rather than as a religious revolutionary. Government recognised him as a religious notable in return for his co-operation in countering Pan-Islamic propaganda from Istanbul. He carried his followers with him; to most of them, Turks in Istanbul were indistinguishable from the Turco-Egyptians whom the Mahdi had denounced as apostate oppressors. His devotees, deprived of their potential role as a revolutionary army, could find another only by gradually approximating to the familiar pattern of a Sudanese *tariqa*.

In 1914 the rains and the Nile flood alike failed; but the consequent famine was less than catastrophic thanks to Wingate's famous purchase of grain from India. There followed four years of sustained and unprecedented prosperity, with good rains, good Niles and a brisk external demand for Sudan products, especially grain and livestock. Grain exports rose from virtually nil in 1913–14 to nearly 85,000 tons in 1917; cattle exports quadrupled to over 39,000 head. The value of all exports rose from an average of £1.33m in 1911–14 to £4.2m in 1918. Even allowing for inflation, which had by November 1919 increased pre-war prices by a factor of about 2.7, during each of the four years 1915 to 1918 the real value of Sudan exports seems to have been 20 to 25 per cent higher than the average for 1911–14. Significantly, 1915–18 was the one period before the mid-1930s when the Sudan enjoyed a favourable balance of foreign trade. Most of the profits of the export boom remained in Sudanese hands. The increase in revenue from £1.5m in 1914 to £2.8m in 1918 — modest enough even at its 'face value' — becomes a considerable decrease when adjusted for inflation.

By 1918 northern Sudanese society had become prosperous by local standards without perceptible loss of stability. Its only articulate spokesmen were still the religious and secular notables: a deeply conservative group who were perturbed by the possible repercussions in the Sudan of the Egyptian revolution of March 1919. Secular revolutionary leadership was a threat to the position of religious notables; the social-revolutionary tendencies briefly discernible in Egypt were distasteful to all notables. The explicit claim of the Egyptian nationalists to absolute sovereignty over the Sudan was totally unacceptable to 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi and his followers; and for many non-Mahdist Sudanese it revived

unpleasant memories of the heavy-handed incompetence of Turco-Egyptian administration in its final phase. The Sudan government had created prosperity and had sometimes visibly modified its policies in deference to Sudanese wishes. It supported the notables, and showed respect for Islam; in the absence of any generally acceptable Islamic alternative, good Muslims could give it their temporary *de facto* support.

In April 1919 the leading religious notables publicly affirmed their support for 'the British [*sic*] government'.¹² In July 1919, largely to reassure Sudanese opinion of Britain's determination to maintain her predominance, a delegation of notables was received in London by King George V. By 1921 'Abd al-Rahmān was suggesting the replacement of the Condominium by a purely British administration committed to preparing the Sudan for ultimate independence; he was tactfully silent about the identity of the Sudan's prospective ruler. Although some of his supporters wished the British to fix a time-limit for their tutelage, this essentially gradualist neo-Mahdist nationalism was at first given a guarded welcome by government. 'The Sudan for the Sudanese', as an indefinitely remote goal, was a useful antidote both to inconvenient Egyptian claims and to more radical varieties of nationalism.

The south

Since the early 1900s there had been little large-scale use of military force in the north, except in 1916 in the rapid and comparatively bloodless conquest of the previously autonomous sultanate of Darfur. In the south, however, punitive expeditions were still a routine administrative expedient, sometimes even within the very restricted zones of settled administration. Government was both violent and ineffective, and could not offer to southern Sudanese the inducements that had pacified the north. True, in the south the British had inherited a very unstable situation created by the collapse of the Turco-Egyptian administration in the 1880s and the subsequent violent and confused local struggle for power and resources; and the participants in this struggle were not prepared to abandon it at the behest of a government which few believed had come to stay. But government's own behaviour added a large new increment of violence.

¹² 'Alī al-Mirghani, 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi and others to Governor-General (Lee Stack), 23 April 1919: cited by 'Abd al-Rahīm, *Imperialism and nationalism*, 98-9.

Frontier security seemed too urgent to wait upon the peaceful persuasion of Africans; government 'punished' those who opposed the passage of troops by laying waste their country. These operations were rarely followed by settled administration. Africans were not permanently impressed by punitive expeditions, however severe, which almost always ended in 'retreat' by government; and indiscriminate depredations, both by troops and by local 'friendlies', often extended the area of potential resistance.

In 1906 Wingate attempted to forbid military expeditions into unoccupied territory unless they could be followed by settled administration. But he provided no funds for administrative extension. Attempts to raise revenue locally, by officers ignorant alike of southern languages and of the very existence of 'tribes without rulers', were sometimes disastrous. In 1910 supposed 'chiefs' of the chiefless Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka failed to produce the cattle due under a newly-imposed herd-tax. The administration's response was to raid Dinka cattle indiscriminately, by military patrols which 'behaved as if in enemy country'.¹³

British officers in the south found it hard to break the habit of regarding administration as synonymous with military operations; and some of them gained an unsavoury reputation as 'bloodthirsty medal-hunters'.¹⁴ But the violent dynamics of southern politics repeatedly created situations where administration seemed impossible but military intervention unavoidable. Tax-paying groups became disaffected if they were not protected against their unadministered neighbours. Attempts to reduce conflict by establishing tribal frontiers between Nilotic pastoralists committed government to the permanent maintenance of transitory situations; and to punitive action against groups perceived as aggressors when these frontiers collapsed under the pressure of ecological or other fluctuations. After 1910, the acquisition of firearms from Ethiopia disrupted for a decade the balance of power among Nilotics. The Anuak, on the Ethiopian border, used their newly-acquired firearms to raid the Nuer. The Nuer, who had just begun to pay 'a light tribute' as insurance against this very danger, demanded government protection;¹⁵ but punitive expeditions

¹³ [Sudan] A[rchive] D[urham], 202/10/1, C. A. Willis, 'A brief survey of the policy of the government in the Upper Nile', [? June] 1927.

¹⁴ SAD 298/1, J. J. Asser to Wingate, 12 October 1910: cited by G. Warburg, *The Sudan under Wingate* (London, 1971), 152.

¹⁵ CRO Intel. 1/8/39, G. S. Symes, 'Note on the arms traffic', 28 November 1911.

were ineffective against the inaccessible Anuak. In 1912 the Nuer, now also armed with rifles, began to retaliate against the Anuak, and to recoup their cattle losses by raiding tax-paying Dinka. From 1913 repeated punitive expeditions against the Nuer confiscated many of their cattle; but until about 1920 these losses seem simply to have increased Nuer pressure on the Dinka, who were not effectively protected. A rising by the administered Aliab Dinka in 1919 was merely the most visible symptom of very widespread Dinka discontent.

In 1920 the Aliab were punished by operations of almost genocidal severity; and government was waging full-scale war against the eastern Nuer, who persisted in raiding the weak 'Burun' peoples on the Ethiopian frontier. Resistance was now on an unprecedented scale: groups which normally acted quite independently joined forces against government, whose authority even over administered Dinka, now often armed with rifles, had been severely shaken. In 1920 the newly-appointed governor of Mongalla, the least unmanageable of the three southern provinces, found it 'in such a muck-up state [that] he doesn't know where to start'. Other officials were no less despondent and frustrated. One wrote, apropos of the Aliab affair, 'until we can properly administrate, would it not be better not to attempt to do so at all?' Another pointed out that Khartoum had not only denied resources for anything but punishment but had never formulated intelligible administrative objectives: officials were 'at a loss to know what to try for or how to proceed'.¹⁶ In 1920 Khartoum bluntly condemned as 'a failure' two decades of British administration in the south.¹⁷ For southern Sudanese it was not merely a failure; it was a catastrophe.

This self-criticism led to some limited improvement. But only in 1922 did Khartoum begin to provide adequate resources for effective and constructive administration. In 1920-1 the prophet

¹⁶ Middle East Centre, Oxford, L. Phillips (Inspector, Mongalla Province), private letter, 24 April 1920: cited by M. W. Daly, *British administration and the Northern Sudan, 1917-1924* (Leiden and Istanbul, 1980), 41. CRO Intel. 2/30/249, R. G. C. Brock, Intelligence Report no. 7, May 1920, cited by R. O. Collins, 'The Aliab Dinka uprising and its suppression', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1967, 48, 86. CRO Equatoria 2/3/10, E. R. Sawyer to C[ivil] S[ecretary], 16 December 1919, quoting memorandum (? 1919) by C. H. Stigand, governor Mongalla Province: cited by C. E. Sevier, 'The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Southern Sudan, 1919-1939' (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1975), 123-4.

¹⁷ CRO CivSec 1/9/31, W. Sterry (acting governor-general) to V. R. Woodland (governor, Mongalla), 23 September 1920.

THE SUDAN: POLITICAL TENSIONS

Ariandhit had created among the Bahr al-Ghazal Dinka an unprecedented unity which seemed to threaten security throughout the province. The vastly increased scale of southern opposition now seemed a threat comparable with earlier Muslim 'fanaticism' in the north. It was no longer possible to neglect southern administration in the simple faith that southern resistance would always be too 'primitive' and chaotic to shake the fundamental security of government.

POLITICAL TENSIONS AFTER 1919

Meanwhile, new tensions were arising in the northern Sudan. Though government had been careful not to disturb social stability, northern Sudanese society was not immune to the effects of sharp economic fluctuations, the emergence of a Western-educated intelligentsia and, above all, the continuing crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Moreover, government lost some of its sureness of touch after Wingate's departure for Egypt in 1916. His successor Lee Stack (1917–24), risen from the ranks of officer-administrators, did not inherit Wingate's unique personal authority; and the key administrative posts were now at last falling to civilians, some of whom decried Wingate's methods as unimaginative carrot-and-stick, too ready to defer to the material interests of the Sudanese. Although Stack did not share these views, they were by about 1920 influential enough to provoke Sudanese complaints that government was becoming less responsive to the wishes of the governed; and resentment at a change of attitude for which there seemed no justification.

Anglo-Sudanese relations were further soured by the financial and economic difficulties of the early 1920s. In 1920 there was a sharp increase, doubtless justified by inflation, in the rates of taxation and of railway freights. But in 1921 the export boom collapsed: in that year exports fell to £2.3m (1918: £4.2m), and the balance of trade showed a £3.5m deficit. In spite of the 1920 tax increases, revenue declined by 20 per cent between 1920 and 1922. The urban economy was severely depressed; yet, in the metropolitan area at least, prices and especially rents remained far above pre-war levels. Meanwhile, government was faced by apparently insuperable problems, due partly to its own technical mismanagement, in financing the capital works for the Gezira

cotton-production project. True, in 1922 London preferred to guarantee a further British loan rather than accept the political risk of leaving a vast half-finished dam to bear all too imperishable witness to British incompetence; but in return for its bounty the Treasury insisted on rigid economy in the Sudan.

The main victims of the 1922 'economy drive' were the government's literate Sudanese employees. Their salaries, which had never remotely kept pace with inflation and had been further eroded by higher taxation since 1920, now suffered an actual reduction; their privileged access to interest-free building loans, particularly valuable at a time of grossly inflated rents, was abolished. Promotion was very severely restricted; some officials were actually demoted. Others, on the government's own admission efficient, were dismissed as redundant on reduced pensions. Meanwhile, the British administrative establishment was being rapidly expanded. Sudanese officials looked upon government not merely as an employer but as a patron with a duty of generosity, especially in hard times. In the early 1920s government forfeited the goodwill of young educated Sudanese just as they were emerging as a coherent and politically conscious group.

Western-style education was no novelty in the northern Sudan. It had been effectively introduced as early as the 1860s, largely because the traditional Sudanese Koranic school (*khalwa*) did not normally produce leavers employable as government officials. After the interruption of westernised education during the Mahdiyya the new government, anxious to replace expensive Egyptian officials by Sudanese, hastened to open 'primary' schools which selected their entrants from *khalwa* leavers. But the *khalwas* were officially regarded as nurseries of ignorance and 'superstition'; and their teachers, the *fikis*, were suspected of inculcating 'the wildest fanaticism'.¹⁸ It was as much to combat 'fanaticism' as to provide better entrants for the primary schools that in 1905 government began to open Western-style elementary vernacular schools (*kuttabs*). *Kuttab* education, as an agency of general enlightenment, was allowed to expand much more rapidly than primary education. By 1918 there were over 6,000 boys in *kuttabs*, but fewer than a thousand in primary schools. The Khartoum 'model' primary school, with its associated post-

¹⁸ Wingate, cited by M. O. Beshir, *Educational development in the Sudan, 1898-1956* (Oxford, 1969), 30.

primary training courses for teachers and specialised officials, had been housed in the Gordon College buildings since their completion in 1903.

By about 1920, however, government was becoming less afraid of fanaticism than of too much enlightenment. There was also disquiet at the proliferation of 'half-educated' *kuttab* leavers, ill-qualified for official employment but likely to be radicalised by their failure to find it. The Sudanese *kuttab*-schoolmaster, probably 'conceited' and possibly subversive as a result of his Gordon College training, replaced the *khalwa fiki* as the demon-figure of British official mythology. From 1920 the government ceased to open new *kuttabs*; instead, it developed so-called 'improved *khalwas*' which did not attempt to teach the elementary curriculum. Policy towards primary education and the tiny secondary sector, which were under much more direct British supervision than the *kuttabs*, remained for the time being less restrictive. By 1918 Gordon College had introduced an element of academic secondary education into its post-primary training courses. After the Egyptian revolution of 1919 it seemed more desirable than ever to replace Egyptian officials by Sudanese; and in 1924 Gordon College shed its primary section and became a vocational secondary school, offering two years of general education followed by two years of specialised training.

However, by 1920–1 many British officials had become suspicious of education at any level. Rather than produce more Sudanese officials, they preferred to delegate administrative powers to 'tribal shaykhs' as the 'natural leaders of the people'. This school of thought was not yet completely predominant; but in 1922 certain very limited powers were delegated to 'nomad shaykhs'. Meanwhile, British administrative officials had long ceased to be mere inspectors of the administration of *ma'murs*. From 1919 the British administrative cadre expanded very rapidly; except to some extent in the southern Sudan, its members were now no longer transient seconded officers, but permanently appointed civilians. From 1921 they were collectively styled the Sudan Political Service, and in 1922 the title of district commissioner was introduced. These developments left no place for the *ma'mur* as a responsible administrator. *Ma'murs*, now increasingly Sudanese, became closely supervised assistants to the DC; between the district commissioner and the shaykh, they might soon be

squeezed out completely. Sudanese military officers also feared for their careers. Government intended, as soon as it could afford to dispense with the Egyptian military subvention, to replace the Egyptian army in the Sudan by a smaller and completely separate force, whose commissioned officers might, it was feared, be exclusively British.

In 1920 a few young educated Sudanese, angry at the political complaisance of their elders, had formed the Sudanese Union Society, a clandestine nationalist group opposing continued British tutelage. But their propaganda had little visible effect; and the society soon became almost inactive, until in 1923 a group of its more militant members, organised as the White Flag League, gained Egyptian nationalist support for a programme of unity with Egypt and open confrontation with the Sudan government. In January 1924 Sa'ad Zaghlūl had formed the first Wafd government in Egypt; and in June the White Flag League began a series of demonstrations in Khartoum, Omdurman and other towns. British officials saw the League simply as a puppet of Egypt. The League's most prominent leader, the young officer 'Alī 'Abd al-Laṭīf, was of Dinka extraction; government therefore assumed that it was dominated by that always suspect group, Islamised southerners who had risen through education but were not fully integrated into northern Sudanese society. In fact, the League's membership was a representative sample of young educated Sudanese; and it included the sons of some distinguished families. The rank-and-file of the demonstrators were however of a different class: small shopkeepers and self-employed artisans ('*suq* riff-raff' to British officials), who were hit by the urban economic recession and 'stagflation' of the early 1920s. Not only did the persistent high cost of shelter and bare subsistence increase their own overheads; it also absorbed most of the purchasing power of their potential customers. Tailors, carpenters, shoemakers and butchers (as retailers of a 'luxury' food) seem to have suffered particularly severely.

The demonstrations of the League were in themselves no great threat to government. They were suppressed, and the rather sketchy organisation of the League destroyed, without recourse to measures so drastic as to alienate moderate Sudanese opinion. The notables, shocked at the usurpation by mere striplings of their prerogative of leadership, publicly supported the government;

'Abd al-Rahmān and the neo-Mahdists — and not a few others — were totally opposed to the League's programme of unity with Egypt. But the League's militance, if not always its programme, gained it the sympathy and admiration of most young educated Sudanese, alienated from a government that seemed to treat them with systematic hostility. Moreover, the League's members and sympathisers included many military officers; and notable support would avail little against mutinous troops. In August 1924 the spectre of a general mutiny was raised by an armed demonstration of the Sudanese officer-cadets, reputedly the 'best-disciplined, most contented and most loyal' unit in the army.¹⁹ British disquiet was increased by incidents of insubordination, among both Sudanese and Egyptian officers, in certain outlying garrisons; and in November there was a more serious incident in Khartoum, during the crisis which followed the assassination of Stack in Cairo and the consequent British demand for the evacuation of all ethnically Egyptian troops from the Sudan. Two Sudanese platoons, led by Sudanese officers, attempted to join forces with certain Egyptian units that were resisting evacuation. The mutineers were promptly — perhaps over-promptly — crushed by British troops, which had been recently reinforced to two-battalion strength.

No other Sudanese troops became involved, and the civilian population remained quiet. After the final evacuation of Egyptian troops, the Sudanese units were reorganised as the Sudan Defence Force, whose officers held their commissions from the governor-general, not the king of Egypt. Suspect officers were excluded; and persistent British fears of dangerous disaffection among the rank-and-file proved quite unfounded. Civilian militancy collapsed no less completely, and showed no sign of revival even when the imprisoned White Flag leaders were released in 1929. British official opinion attributed this collapse simply to the expulsion of the Egyptian organisers of sedition; but the League's strategy of using Egypt against Britain was destroyed by the British show of force not only in Khartoum, but in Cairo, at the end of 1924. Moreover, the Sudanese militants were numerically weak, politically very naive, and isolated from a rural population which

¹⁹ Director of Intelligence (C. A. Willis) to Stack, 16 August 1924: cited by G. M. A. Bakheit, 'British administration and Sudanese nationalism, 1919-1939' (Ph.D thesis, Cambridge, 1965), 91.

knew no leaders other than the religious and tribal notables. The intelligentsia was in 1924 still too thin a soil to nourish a robust nationalist movement.

In the interests of Anglo-Egyptian relations, and to the disgust of the Sudan government, London insisted on retaining the legal form of the Condominium after 1924; and the Cairo embassy remained the channel of official communication between London and Khartoum. But control of the Sudan government by the Cairo agency or embassy, on the wane ever since Cromer's retirement in 1907, now became vestigial. Cairo's financial control had already become more and more nominal after the cessation in 1913 of the Egyptian civil subvention. After 1924, no revival of financial control was entailed in the acceptance of Egypt's offer of £750,000 a year for military purposes: Khartoum would accept the money only as an unconditional contribution to general revenue, and rendered no account of its expenditure. London now regarded the Sudan, rather than Egypt, as the principal bastion of British hegemony in the Nile valley; and on the affairs of the Sudan the views of the governor-general now normally carried more weight than those of the Cairo embassy. Moreover, precisely because the Condominium had been retained, 'London' still meant the Foreign Office, not the Colonial Office. The Foreign Office had no machinery for the detailed supervision of Sudan administration; and so long as the Sudan remained quiet and solvent, it normally intervened as little as possible. The Sudan government therefore enjoyed between the wars a quite exceptional degree of freedom from metropolitan supervision and control.

In 1921 Stack had prescribed a 'dual-agency' administrative policy which, while delegating minor powers to shaykhs, also provided for the increased employment of educated Sudanese officials. The events of 1924, and Stack's death, completed the victory of those who saw in delegation of powers not merely a useful expedient in outlying regions but a political weapon against 'half-educated officials, students and town riff-raff'.²⁰ After 1924 government systematically mobilised the rural and tribal notables against the intelligentsia. It also attempted to mobilise them against Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi, whose rapid rise to

²⁰ CRO CivSec 1/9/30, note by C. P. Browne (governor, Berber), tabled at Northern governors' meeting, 24 February 1920.

affluence and major political influence had disconcerted the British. He organised his now extensive estates, and his adherents, by an elaborate 'administration' modelled on, and tacitly rivalling, that of government. In 1924, by organising the opposition of the 'sound elements' to the White Flag League, he had constrained government to accept him as a national leader rather than as a mere religious notable. Unlike many religious notables, he did not keep the intelligentsia at arm's length but actively courted them; and some were ready listeners after the fiasco of 1924. His agents were active among rural shaykhs, in some regions by now an integral part of government's administrative machinery. He could, it was thought, still raise a revolutionary army from his devotees among the 'fighting tribes' of the western Sudan.

By 1926 'Abd al-Raḥmān seemed to be the one unifying force capable of creating and leading a really formidable nationalist movement. In spite of his continued professions of support for government, some members of the Political Service believed that the Sayyid was moving towards open confrontation, and demanded drastic action against him. When Geoffrey Archer, Stack's successor, persisted in a personal policy of co-operation with 'Abd al-Raḥmān, a cabal of senior officials forced him into resignation. The scare of 1926 was certainly excessive, perhaps deliberately exaggerated. For all his dynamic and even flamboyant political style, the Sayyid was essentially a cautious gradualist, who sought political influence in order to make government ultimately dependent upon his support and goodwill. After the fall of Archer, the draconian measures apparently contemplated against the Sayyid turned out to be comparatively minor administrative pinpricks. Quite possibly the primary target of the 1926 operation was not 'Abd al-Raḥmān but Archer, who was actively opposing the preponderant influence acquired under Stack by a small oligarchy of very senior officials.

Indirect rule

The advocates of indirect rule sanctified their political objectives by fulsome professions of respect and support for authentically Sudanese institutions; but they flouted Sudanese realities by taking as their model the emirates of northern Nigeria. In practice, however, between 1922 and 1926 no serious attempt was made

to apply this model. By 1926 there were literally hundreds of petty native administrations with very limited powers²¹ and closely supervised by the now ubiquitous DCs; the powers delegated had not been those of DCs, but of *ma'murs*. There was some speculation about the possible consolidation of native administrations under 'four to six great overlords';²² but most political officers were content with a system which checked the proliferation of Sudanese officials without hampering close British control. However, Archer's successor John Maffey (1926–33) saw grave dangers in this half-hearted system of indirect rule. Maffey came from India; and he attributed the political turbulence of British India, as compared with the Indian Native States, to the absence in British India of indigenous autocracies acting as 'a shield between the agitator and the bureaucracy'. He proposed to construct such a shield in the Sudan by creating strong 'native states', between which the whole country would be 'parcelled out into nicely balanced compartments, protective glands against the septic germs' of nationalism. He demanded immediate action, unhampered by the 'fetish of efficiency', before Sudanese nationalism recovered from the setback of 1924.²³

There was some initial shock among the Political Service at Maffey's ruthless subordination of administrative efficiency to political manipulation, and some fear that over-hasty action might actually provoke unrest. However, a few senior British officials soon became enthusiastic converts, sometimes more dogmatically rigid than Maffey himself. The majority, though hardly sharing Maffey's vision of Indian Native States in the Sudan, supported his programme with the tacit proviso that it must not entail dangerous 'loss of efficiency'. But the practical application of the programme proved far from easy. Maffey had originally insisted that the powers of his Sudanese autocrats should derive from 'a true native and traditional basis'.²⁴ This implied internally coherent, probably tribal, units. But even in Kordofan and Darfur,

²¹ These NAs had been set up under the 'Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, 1922'; but they were by no means confined to purely nomad groups.

²² CRO CivSec 1/20/60, minute by H. A. MacMichael (CS 1926–34) on Bence-Pembroke (governor, Darfur) to CS, 15 November 1926: cited by Daly, *British administration*, 186.

²³ CRO CivSec 1/9/33, memorandum by Maffey, 1 January 1927. Printed in part by R. O. Collins and R. L. Tignor, *Egypt and the Sudan* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967), 127–8.

²⁴ CRO CivSec 1/9/33, Maffey *ut supra*; minutes by MacMichael, 10 and 24 January 1927; by Maffey, 14 January; MacMichael, circular to governors, 27 January 1927.

the least unpromising regions for Maffey's experiment, units large enough to qualify as possible native states were hardly ever tribally homogeneous. The tribal criterion soon had to be abandoned in favour of merely regional units, which frequently amalgamated very disparate groups in a way which was anything but 'native and traditional'.

The existing 'native and traditional' functions of tribal shaykhs were almost everywhere very rudimentary; but, as governors complained, it was quite impossible to discover what powers Sudanese rulers had exercised before the Turco-Egyptians had introduced the bane of bureaucracy a century earlier. Yet the dogmatists insisted that native administrations must not sully their traditional purity and create a 'bastard system' by exercising functions, or using procedures, of exotic Western origin.²⁵ There was consternation when some shaykhs began to 'ape central government' by introducing modern technology and office procedures into their administrations. But cooler heads warned of the dangers of alienating shaykhs by compelling them to remain 'traditional' willy-nilly; and it soon became clear that the native administrations could hardly develop at all unless some 'aping' of central government was condoned.²⁶ Nor was a satisfactory general solution ever found for the now acute problem of the division of power between the British administrator and his native administrations. In 1927 Maffey had attempted to cut this knot by insisting on masterly inactivity: 'a Political Officer's best work is often that which he leaves undone'. But DCs were well aware that they risked their career if an unsatisfactory native administration provoked visible disaffection within their district; and by 1931 official emphasis had returned to the 'steel frame' of province and district administration within which indirect rule must always operate.²⁷

Even in rural areas, indirect rule remained incomplete and patchy. Along the Nile north of Khartoum, where the institutions

²⁵ CRO CivSec 1/9/38, J. A. de C. Hamilton (DC, Northern Kordofan), 'Note on Native Administration', May 1931 — 'a bastard system with the worst elements of both parent stocks'; F. C. T. Young (Assistant CS), minute on foregoing, 15 June 1931.

²⁶ CRO CivSec 1/9/38, Young *ut supra*; P. Ingleson (acting governor, Kassala) to MacMichael, 25 October 1931; minutes by MacMichael and Maffey, 10 November; R. E. H. Baily (governor, Kassala), statements to Young and to Maffey, 27 and 29 November; minutes by MacMichael and Maffey, 30 November 1931.

²⁷ SAD 403/9, note by Maffey, 31 January 1927. CRO CivSec 1/9/38, Hamilton, 'Note on Native Administration', February 1931.

of the pre-1820 statelets had vanished beyond recall, it could exist, at best, only in a very diluted form. Here the bureaucracy itself had become 'traditional'; and indeed acceptable, for it was by now increasingly manned by this region's educated sons. It was quite impossible to resuscitate the old tribal kingdoms under the obscure descendants of half-forgotten dynasties. But the development of indirect rule was everywhere crippled by the extreme economic weakness of its units; and by their lack of skills (whether traditional or modern) in handling finance. As late as 1938 only 9 out of 26 native administrations had a budget. Maffey's native administrations were much larger and often much more effective than their petty predecessors of the early 1920s; but they remained mere organs of rural local government, not even embryos of genuine native states.

At this modest level, the inherent contradictions of indirect rule were less embarrassing; and British officials were able to use the system to create a style of administration, careful, conscientious, busy with small improvements but essentially static, which was often very acceptable to conservative rural communities. These methods also relegated to the background the ultimate political objectives of indirect rule, which were not publicly avowable and which government took great pains to conceal.²⁸ All the same, this less ambitious system sealed off the rural areas very effectively from contamination by educated political influences. In this closed environment British administrators of the 1930s, confident of their unshakable grip upon the rural (or 'real') Sudan, felt impregnable secure. With some justification, they attributed the prevailing security and tranquillity less to Maffey's visionary ideas, about which most of them remained sceptical, than to their own practical administrative skills; and they became intransigent partisans of the system of native administration which they themselves had created.

This system imposed a veto upon any form of development

²⁸ Not only from its Sudanese subjects, but from British 'departmental' officials and junior administrative officials; and even from other British colonial administrations. CRO CivSec 1/12/40, statement by D. Newbold (governor, Kordofan) at northern governors' meeting, December 1934; CivSec 1/9/39, Hamilton, Circular on devolution for administrative probationers, 23 April 1933; CivSec 1/9/36, Chief Secretary Uganda to CS, 25 February 1929 and minutes by C. A. E. Lea and MacMichael; CS to Chief Secretary, Uganda, 18 March 1929. Cf. MacMichael's sceptical and suavely hostile survey of the prospects for self-government in his *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (London, 1934), 72-5.

THE SUDAN IN THE 1930S

which could not operate through its very unsophisticated machinery: it was anathema to create bureaucratic structures which would compete with native administrations. This danger could best be averted by restricting the production of potential bureaucrats. From 1926 to 1937 the education department was headed by seconded political officers. Between 1930 and 1936 secondary enrolment at Gordon College was almost halved, and the college's already heavy vocational bias was strengthened. Some province governors were anxious to replace elementary schools entirely by *khalwas*; one of them complained that the *kuttab* made Sudanese boys 'far sharper of wits than the average European boy'.²⁹ But even the 'improved' *khalwas* had proved so ineffective that some expansion of elementary education was unavoidable. However, the elementary curriculum was heavily diluted by practical subjects with a rural bias; and the *kuttab* was made to resemble the *khalwa* as closely as possible in equipment (or lack of it), and in the dress of its pupils and teachers, who were forbidden to wear European clothes. In the mid-1930s the control of elementary education was transferred to its most hostile critics, the province governors. In 1937 an independent commission of inspection found the Sudan's schools inferior to those in British East African territories.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE 1930S

The Gezira Scheme and the economy, 1925–39

In 1919–20, just before commitment to indirect rule had hardened into dogma, government had become irrevocably committed to its very antithesis — the Gezira Scheme for large-scale irrigated cotton-production. The scheme required very precise timing and co-ordination of agricultural operations: the tenants had to respond — as Sudanese said, 'like soldiers on parade' — to the detailed day-to-day instructions of British managerial staff. The votaries of indirect rule deplored the socially levelling effects of the scheme (no tenant could have more than two standard holdings); and pressed for the allocation of multiple

²⁹ CRO CivSec 1/9/37, R. Davies (assistant CS), 'Further steps in devolution', 23 December 1929; J. G. Matthew (secretary for health and education), memorandum, 18 June 1930. CivSec 1/9/38, R. V. Bardsley (governor, Blue Nile) to CS, 23 November 1930.

holdings to notables, who should be given supervisory powers over lesser tenants. But the commercial syndicate that managed the scheme successfully resisted these notions as economically ruinous. In July 1925 the Sennar Dam was completed, and between 1926 and 1931 the area under cultivation more than doubled, to nearly 700,000 acres. Already by 1928 Gezira cotton represented about £2.5m of the Sudan's £6m of exports. Government's 40 per cent of the Gezira proceeds usefully exceeded its expenditure on water-supply and debt-service. The tenants, formerly rain-cultivators, had improved their standard of living: in addition to their own 40 per cent share, they were exempt from direct taxation and self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs and animal fodder. Some British officials, fanatics for the preservation of the 'traditional' Sudan, despised these merely economic benefits as 'gross and materialistic'.³⁰ But no sane government could ignore them.

In 1930 and 1931, however, a collapse in both the price and yield of Gezira cotton dangerously aggravated the general economic depression. In these two years the government's Gezira losses totalled over £1.5m; and the monetary return to the tenants shrank to zero. Only the fringe benefits, and the unfailing supply of water, kept tenants on the scheme at all. Overall government revenue shrank from nearly £5m in 1929 to £3.5m in 1932; the 1931 and 1932 budgets were balanced only by drawing £1.2m from reserves. Exports collapsed from nearly £7m in 1929 to under £2m in 1931. Appeals to London for financial help, not justified this time by the emergency of a half-completed dam, were stonily rejected; instead, from 1931 to 1934 a Treasury official (H. E. Fass) was seconded to Khartoum as financial secretary, to ensure that the Sudan did not default on its debt-service. The revenue shortfall was met by the usual cuts and redundancies, which this time hit British as well as Sudanese officials.³¹ Imports were halved (from £6m to £3m) between 1930 and 1932, mainly it seems by the cessation in procurement of capital equipment for Gezira extension. But ultimate disaster was inevitable if the Gezira continued to generate enormous losses; and the gradual liquid-

³⁰ A. Gaitskell, *Gezira: a story of development in the Sudan* (London, 1959), 202, citing W. P. D. Clarke (assistant financial secretary), memorandum, 16 January 1929.

³¹ The reduction in initial salary for Gordon College 'graduates' entering the bureaucracy provoked in September 1931 a brief student strike — the solitary instance of overt opposition by the intelligentsia between 1924 and 1938.

ation of the scheme was seriously considered. However, even with cotton prices less than half those of the later 1920s, a restoration of the pre-1930 level of yield would make the enlarged scheme economically viable by sheer bulk of production. By 1935, after some discouraging setbacks, the relevant agronomic and ecological problems had been solved. Thereafter the Gezira produced every year about £3m worth of cotton — and of foreign credits, which enabled imports to recover to £6m without an unfavourable balance of trade. By 1937, overall revenue had recovered at least to its pre-depression peak.³² Only about 10 per cent of it was now raised by direct taxation; higher levels of consumption were reflected in the buoyant yield of indirect taxation, which was by now contributing about a third of the revenue. But the largest single source of revenue, contributing over 17 per cent, was still the Egyptian contribution of £750,000 a year.

The southern Sudan and 'Southern Policy', 1925–39

The economic crisis stifled at birth any early possibility of development in the southern Sudan, now at last under settled and peaceful administration; and by the time the depression had lifted, administrative techniques had been evolved which were incompatible with any significant development. After 1922, resident and accessible DCs, with an increasing knowledge of local languages, had begun to experiment with courts of southern notables applying local custom, in the hope that some of these notables would ultimately emerge as 'chiefs' of intelligibly organised groups. In spite of the persistent delusion that acephalous peoples had somehow 'lost' their original tribal organisation, these experiments were successful enough to restore the shaken morale of British administrators; and also to imbue them with an implacable hostility to the dissemination of Islam in the south. Down to the mid-1920s British officials had been far from unanimous in opposing Islamic influences; some of them believed that these influences might facilitate administration by pro-

³² Thanks to the general fall in prices, the revenue may in real terms have equalled the pre-depression peak before 1937. Moreover, in this period the published figures for revenue do not always represent the full amount collected. Thus in 1935 the published figure was £4.10m; the amount actually collected was £4.56m. Cf. Public Record Office, Foreign Office 407/219/8357 [J 1680/1680/16], M. Lampson (Cairo) to A. Eden, 11 February 1936.

moting more 'civilised' and intelligible modes of socio-political behaviour among Southern Sudanese. By the later 1920s, however, all Arab and Islamic influences were officially seen as corrosive solvents of the 'tribal discipline' that the administrators were striving to create; and, after 1924, as potential vehicles of the politically dangerous 'Northern Sudanese outlook'. These views were increasingly shared by senior officials in Khartoum.

In 1927 Maffey discovered that the south could not give birth even to 'traditional' native states without some educational and economic development. He was dissatisfied with the progress of southern education, which had been left entirely to missionary enterprise and which government had only just begun, very scantily, to subsidise. But the Political Service convinced Maffey that a government system with northern Sudanese teachers would be politically dangerous. Grants-in-aid to missions were therefore considerably increased, and school enrolments rose from under 800 in 1926 to over 2,600 in 1930. In 1930, the entire Nuer people were, at Maffey's insistence, at last brought under settled administration after their final resistance had been crushed by a major military campaign. In the same year, government formally resolved to isolate the south completely from all Arab and Islamic influences; and, behind this barrier, to 'build up self-contained tribal units with structure and organisation based on indigenous customs, traditions and beliefs'.³³ This policy implied the early replacement of northern Sudanese officials and employees by non-Muslim, English-speaking southerners. The production of these officials would require the rapid development, as a 'vital feature of general policy',³⁴ of southern education.

Educational expansion duly took place until 1932. It then ceased abruptly until the early 1940s. This was no mere side-effect of the economic crisis. There was in fact little decline in the funds allotted to southern education, and by 1935 the shortfall had been more than restored; but whereas until 1931 the missions had been encouraged to attempt comparatively 'advanced' instruction, from 1932 they were in effect told to teach as little as possible and to concentrate on 'character-training' by hard agricultural work. Between 1932 and 1938 there was an actual decline in the number

³³ CRO CivSec 1.C.1., MacMichael, Circular to southern governors, 25 January 1930. Printed in Muddathir 'Abd al-Rahim, *Imperialism and nationalism*, 244-9.

³⁴ CRO CivSec 1.C.1., MacMichael *ut supra*, part I, sub-para A(b).

of literate southern employees. Education as a 'vital feature of general policy' could be abandoned because governors and DCs (most of whom had never much liked it) had developed techniques of administration which made educated southerners not merely superfluous but positively dangerous. Especially among Nilotics, administration was not merely a matter of DCs giving orders and 'chiefs' carrying them out. Nilotics had abandoned resistance on the tacit condition that administration should operate through their own institutions. Peaceful administration depended upon relations of confidence between DCs and the ritual or other experts who were the custodians of these institutions. These relations would have been disrupted by the intrusion of educated southerners, often (so DCs said) 'drawn from families who have no tribal or social status'.³⁵

Economic development was minimal. A little rain-grown cotton was produced, usually under compulsion because the prices offered were no incentive. When compulsion was abandoned, production usually collapsed. Of course, any significant economic development would have threatened the objectives and methods of 'Southern Policy' hardly less than educational expansion or religious conversion — including conversion to Christianity, which many DCs unofficially discouraged, while government denied to converts any exemption from tribal custom and 'discipline'. However, conversion was hardly yet a significant factor: not until about 1940 could the missions begin to count their flocks in thousands rather than hundreds. 'Southern Policy', in theory directed to gradual social evolution, 'building on conditions as they exist',³⁶ in practice inhibited all evolution. It accentuated ethnic exclusiveness and Nilotic ultra-conservatism. It did not 'develop' tribal structures: it fossilised them. It soon became no more than a technique for the maintenance of total immobility; by the early 1940s even its staunchest supporters could give no intelligible explanation of its ultimate objectives.³⁷ Its sole virtue — but not a negligible virtue in the southern Sudan — was that it kept the peace with a minimal use of force.

³⁵ CRO CivSec Bahr al-Ghazal 1/5/28, handing-over notes by DC Yirrol District, 1935: cited by Sevier, 'Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the Southern Sudan', 242.

³⁶ CRO CivSec 17.A1/2, A. G. Hickson (resident inspector, Southern education) at the 1933 Educational Conference.

³⁷ '*Solvitur ambulando*' was the reply of Martin W. Parr (governor, Equatoria, 1936–42) to a DC who pressed the question in 1941: CRO CivSec Bahr al-Ghazal 1/1/1, Parr to G. L. Elliott-Smith, 29 April 1941.

Symes, the economy and the intelligentsia

Stewart Symes, who replaced Maffey in 1934, deplored the 'Chinese Wall' between north and south and denounced as a negation of trusteeship a policy that deliberately prevented development. But he took no decisive action. Indeed, he discouraged expenditure in the south in order to concentrate on the comparatively promising north, where he was demanding a complete reversal of administrative policy. Symes, once Wingate's private secretary, shared Wingate's zeal for material improvement; he also believed that some form of Sudanese self-government could no longer be indefinitely delayed. The only rational administrative policy was 'nation-building' — preparing the Sudan for self-government by closer national integration, supported by major economic and educational development. Indirect rule must be dismantled wherever it accentuated internal division, or frustrated development in the interests of a static rural conservatism. Development could not be achieved without the co-operation of educated Sudanese, who must as soon as possible begin to replace all except the most senior British officials, and whose confidence must be gained by emancipating them from the political ghetto to which Maffey had confined them.

To the Political Service this programme contradicted all the received truths; and Symes was often surprisingly tactless in his presentation of it. British administrators were shocked not only by Symes's attack on indirect rule and his proposed partnership with the intelligentsia; they were also remarkably hostile to his enthusiasm for economic development, in which some governors saw nothing but exploitation and the corruption of rustic virtue by 'whiskeyfied Scotch engineers'.³⁸ Their anxiety was misplaced. Symes had no inkling of how to initiate economic development. He created no agency specifically responsible for promoting it. A miscellany of projects from various quarters was considered by an inter-departmental Board of Economics and Trade, on which each department represented had in effect a power of veto. This structure very effectively frustrated development; but sometimes Symes frustrated it himself. In 1939 a political officer submitted

³⁸ D. Newbold (governor, Kordofan) to F. Cottrell, 11 July 1934; printed in K. D. Henderson, *The making of the modern Sudan. The life and letters of Sir Douglas Newbold, KBE...* (London, 1953), 66–8.

a thoughtful and lucid proposal for a modest degree of import-substitution by state-sponsored and tariff-protected textile manufacture. Symes, all too well coached by his financial secretary F. Rugman (1934–44), forbade discussion of this paper as a ‘quack solution based on false economics’ contrary to the principles established by Adam Smith.³⁹ Meanwhile Rugman, a cautiously defensive financier ideologically opposed to ‘socialistic’ state enterprise, invested the government’s considerable surpluses in London.⁴⁰

In the administrative and educational spheres Symes was a little, but not much, more successful than in economic policy. In 1937 he put through, against considerable opposition, local government ordinances which in principle abolished the status of native administration as ‘a thing apart’ and brought it into a structure common to the entire northern Sudan. But the governors simply refused to accept Symes’s proposed legal reforms, which would have extended the competence of the legal codes and the professional judiciary at the expense of the judicial powers both of shaykhs and of administrative officials. Nor did Symes achieve any genuine ‘substitution’ of Sudanese for British officials, in spite of complaints that he was creating an ‘Anglo-Sudanese’ Political Service and ‘swamping’ the native administrations with hordes of Sudanese bureaucrats. The figures for ‘Division I’ officials tell their own story:⁴¹ between 1935 and 1939 the number of British officials rose from 441 to 553, while that of Sudanese officials rose from 6 to 28. Genuine Sudanisation was of course impossible without major educational improvement. This too Symes hardly achieved; but he did get education moving again after its long stagnation. Secondary enrolment at Gordon College rose from under 300 in 1936 to over 500 in 1940. In 1936 the College began to shed its vocational courses, and in 1938 boys were successfully entered for the Cambridge School Certificate. In 1939–40, under a director of education, Christopher Cox, who was an Oxford don,

³⁹ CRO CivSec 1/5/11, M. W. Parr to A. J. Gillan (CS), 13 February 1939, enclosing memorandum by P. J. Sandison, 10 February; comments by financial secretary’s office (J. W. E. Miller), 7 March; minute by Gillan, 11 March; ‘Minutes of a meeting at the Palace’, 14 March 1939, citing Symes’s introductory remarks.

⁴⁰ In 1937 income from investments was £221,000, or nearly 5 per cent of revenue. In 1939, after paying off £3m of the 1919–21 5.5 per cent Gezira loan (and in effect converting another £2m to a loan at 3.25 per cent), Rugman still had nearly £6m in reserve.

⁴¹ Bakheit, ‘British administration and Sudanese nationalism’, 249–54, 261.

not a member of the Political Service, higher education in arts and science was inaugurated.

By 1939 the Sudanese intelligentsia had awakened from its long political hibernation. Its leaders were no longer the now middle-aged radicals of 1924, but a new generation of 'earnest young men',⁴² eager for intellectual self-improvement, whose study-groups and 'little' magazines had become more overtly political in response to Symes's relaxation of censorship and to the deeply resented failure to consult Sudanese opinion before the conclusion of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. But their political demands were still very modest: they asked for more consultation, and more education to enable them ultimately to replace the British as administrators. Very few of them yet thought in terms of popular political mobilisation; and they prided themselves on their freedom from 'sectarian' religious loyalties. But this studiously moderate behaviour did not placate the Political Service. The intelligentsia, unlike the most bluntly argumentative shaykh or notable, openly questioned the British administrator's status and professional self-image as a 'benevolent baron'.⁴³ This attitude, however politely expressed, was a genuine political challenge as well as an affront to professional self-esteem. Yet in 1938 the Political Service accepted the official recognition of a representative organisation of the intelligentsia. True, government explicitly refused to recognise the Graduates' General Congress as a 'political body' or as representing any but its own members. But Symes could hardly have secured even this limited recognition without the backing of his Civil Secretary, J. A. Gillan, whom the Political Service trusted as one of themselves.

Gillan had no particular sympathy with educated Sudanese: indeed, he thought them 'tiresome', and their ideas 'half-baked'.⁴⁴ But they now seemed important enough to make it worth government's while to prevent their alignment with either of its major potential enemies: Egypt, and 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mahdi. After 1936, government was very apprehensive of revived Egyptian influence — although in fact the Egyptians wrote off

⁴² Muddathir 'Abd al-Raḥīm, *Imperialism and nationalism*, 112.

⁴³ Sir James Robertson, as an administrative probationer in 1922, was told that he 'should model [his] behaviour on that of a "genial baron"': J. W. Robertson, *Transition in Africa* (London, 1974), 7.

⁴⁴ J. A. Gillan, 'Preliminary note on native representation', 11 November 1936: cited by Bakheit, 'British administration and Sudanese nationalism', 298–300.

Congress as a mere British puppet, and virtually ignored it until 1940. But ‘Abd al-Raḥmān was once more ardently wooing the intelligentsia, who for all their professed repudiation of ‘sectarian’ leadership were strongly attracted by his political activism and ‘progressive’ image; and discouraged by the chilly reticence and unyielding Islamic conservatism of his rival ‘Alī al-Mīrghani. The latter, with less than a tithe of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s enormous income of some £30,000 a year and far less talent as a public figure, seemed quite unable to compete. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān’s influence seemed ubiquitous, not only among the intelligentsia, but among leaders of minor *ṭuruq* and many secular notables; he had even ‘captured’ some of the native administrations. Government feared the complete eclipse of ‘Alī al-Mīrghani, whom it still regarded as its most reliable political friend. It now had to seek friends where it could find them: perhaps the timely recognition of Congress would make government, rather than ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, the patron to whom the intelligentsia would look for favours. Gillan saw recognition, and persuaded the Political Service to see it, almost entirely as a tactical move against the over-mighty Sayyid; and, for good measure, against Egypt.

The ‘Symes revolution’ petered out, a revolution mainly on paper. Apart from some modest educational development, very little had actually been done to satisfy the hopes that Symes had raised among the intelligentsia; and by 1939 Symes himself seems to have grown weary of the struggle. He no longer talked to educated Sudanese about the future of the Sudan, apparently preferring bird-watching or the poetry of Wordsworth as topics of conversation. Gillan’s farewell public speech in July 1939 was a depressing homily on the dangers of anything but the most glacial slowness in ‘nation-building’. Disillusioned young men deserted Congress in droves: it lost half its membership between 1938 and 1940. Yet by mid-1939 Symes had put comparatively early self-government irrevocably on the agenda of practical politics. Self-government could no longer be dismissed, as in 1938 by one province governor (and not a particularly reactionary one), as merely a dream which might, or might not, be realised in some ‘dim future’.⁴⁵

⁴⁵CRO CivSec 57/2/7, W. D. C. L. Purves (governor, Northern Province), handing-over notes, 22 January 1938, sheet 12.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the expansion of the northern Sudanese economy since 1905, only in the Gezira had there been significant structural change. Here change had been radical indeed, transforming rain-cultivators into cogs in a vast incomprehensible machine, and putting them on a dizzy switchback of unfamiliar affluence and all too familiar poverty. Elsewhere the economy had been stimulated, but hardly transformed, by the railway, the motor-lorry (from the later 1920s), and the increasing use of diesel-powered pumps. An industrial economy hardly existed, apart from the railway workshops at Atbara and the harbour installations at Port Sudan. Even non-industrial urbanisation seems to have been determined largely by the railway system. Towns off the line of rail, even when administrative centres, showed little growth; but El Obeid, after it became in 1911 the railhead for the populous but totally unmodernised province of Kordofan, seems to have grown even faster than Wad Medani, with the vast Gezira scheme on its doorstep.

The Western-educated intelligentsia had been generated not by the growth of the economy but by the administrative needs of government. By 1939, in spite of restrictive educational policies, this group was much stronger, both numerically and in intellectual formation, than in 1924. Its leaders had undergone a more intense exposure to Western intellectual influences through secondary education at Gordon College, and often by private study thereafter. Contrary to the hostile British stereotype, this exposure had not usually weakened, but strengthened, their conscious loyalty to the Sudan's Arab-Islamic heritage. Nor was the intelligentsia 'upstart' or 'rootless'. Many of its members were sons of notables or of traditionally learned families; and most educated Sudanese of provincial origin maintained, through their extended family, strong links with their homeland.

For most northern Sudanese, the strongest integrating force was still allegiance to one of the great religious sayyids; an allegiance so powerful that it soon became the main determinant of political alignment, including for a time that of the intelligentsia who professed to have repudiated it. Compatible with this allegiance was widespread membership of smaller and more 'homely' *turuq*. These, for most Muslim Sudanese, filled the role

THE SUDAN: CONCLUSION

of the friendly societies and mutual-aid associations which have often been important elsewhere in Africa but never became so in the Sudan. Where the tribe did remain the dominant category of identification, its dominance usually reflected strong ethnic and linguistic divergencies (as with the Fur and the Beja), or the imperatives of nomad ecology. In the south, tribalism and ethnic exclusiveness, bolstered by 'Southern Policy', remained totally and statically dominant, unchallenged as yet by economic development, education, Islam or Christianity. They would probably have been dominant even without artificial bolstering. The British did not invent or 'manufacture' Nilotic ultra-conservatism; they accommodated themselves to it, and used it.

In 1939 there was little obvious sign of radical change in northern Sudanese social structure or political behaviour. This was true even in the Gezira, where British romantic reactionaries had greatly exaggerated the levelling effects of the scheme. Tribal structures had hardly existed in the Gezira; and secular notables were far less important than the leaders or agents of local or national *turuq*, allegiance to which was unaffected by the scheme's regimentation of its tenants. The intelligentsia, firmly rooted in traditional society and as yet in traditional religious loyalties, hardly constituted a new 'class'. The one genuinely revolutionary force, militant millenarian Mahdism, had been moribund since about 1918 and had long been dead by 1939. Yet there is also an air of Indian summer, of calm before the storm, about the later 1930s. British administrators, like Douglas Newbold 'going on steadily and sanely'⁴⁶ in Kordofan, or even Gillan using Congress as a pawn in his political strategy, had no inkling of the rapidity with which the intelligentsia were to emerge as the standard-bearers of a militant and intransigent nationalism; and ultimately as an independent force capable of challenging the political leadership of the two great religious sayyids.

After about 1920, the British rulers of the Sudan became intensely concerned to control its long-term socio-political development. Wingate's administrative policy was decried as unimaginative and unconstructive because he had been content merely to repress overt resistance and to promote material improvement as the best foundation for security. Yet, ironically, it was Wingate's success in interesting Lancashire and Whitehall in the

⁴⁶ Newbold to Cottrell, 30 March 1938: printed in Henderson, *Modern Sudan*, 81–2.

Gezira cotton project that initiated the one major structural change in the economy. And it was Wingate's bargain with 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdi which enabled the Sayyid to embark upon the restructuring and 'modernisation' of Mahdism, certainly the most important political development in the Sudan between 1918 and 1937. Maffey and Symes, in spite of their very different objectives, were both of them highly manipulative rulers. The absence alike of overt Sudanese political opposition after 1924, and of positive metropolitan direction of policy, seemed to leave them a free hand to mould the Sudan into shapes that seemed good to them. But as Archer's fate had demonstrated, they could not afford to lose the confidence of the Political Service, a body which auto-recruitment and single-territory service had endowed with a very uniform collective psychology and an unshakable professional solidarity. Ideologists like Maffey and Symes had to operate within the strict bounds set by the imperatives of practical administration as seen by the Political Service. Maffey's reactionary fantasies were accordingly diluted into something less high-flown that practical men could handle; and most of Symes's alarming innovations were successfully obstructed.

The apparent omnipotence of government was largely an illusion. Would-be political manipulators and social engineers ignored at their peril the realities of Sudan society. Maffey ignored the lack of adequate economic and political foundations for his proposed native states; and he had no magic wand that could transform the *naxir* of the nomad Kababish into the *akbond* of Swat or even the emir of Kano. Nor could Symes disentangle the intelligentsia from sectarian and nationalist politics and transform them almost overnight into virtually non-political administrative and professional experts. The Sudan was not mere clay to be shaped and moulded by the superior wisdom of the British. In fact, government could manipulate only to a very limited extent the tough and resilient network of loyalties that held northern Sudanese society together. The strongest of these, 'sectarian' religious allegiances, it could indeed play off one against another; but it could do nothing to modify their focus or their intensity. Nor was it so easy to mobilise regional or tribal loyalties as 'protective glands' against nationalism. Some regional or tribal groups — the Nubians, the Danaqla, the Shāyqiyya, for example — combined very strong, 'clannish', internal solidarity with an

THE SUDAN: CONCLUSION

aptitude for 'modernisation' and very active participation in national politics by their educated members. As a divisive force, tribalism often damaged the 'protective glands' more than it damaged Sudanese nationalism. Small but intransigent tribal groups, insignificant at the national level, were often insuperable obstacles to the political evolution of multi-tribal native administrations. Government could usually prevent the 'Nuba' of the northern hills or the Hawawir from openly defying the *naḥir* of the Kababish; it could never transform them into loyal, or even cooperative, members of the Kababish Confederacy.⁴⁷ The pace and direction of social and political evolution were determined by forces essentially uncontrollable even by an autocratic government, whose naively arrogant pretensions to mould the future of the Sudan were fundamentally ineffective and irrelevant.

⁴⁷ These reflections are based upon personal observation of the Kababish NA in 1948, when it was still probably in as good working order as it had ever been. Already by the later 1930s many British officials were uneasy at the failure of NAs to develop satisfactorily or to evoke loyalty from their subjects. One senior official feared that they were degenerating into 'native agencies similar to the old German "akida" system in East Africa': CRO CivSec 1/12/40, note by J. A. Reid, 16 January 1938; cf. Bakheit, 'British administration and Sudanese nationalism', 267–71.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS

GENERAL

For the years covered in this volume, accessible source materials are far richer than for any other period in the history of Africa. Most of the continent was continuously under the control of literate governments whose archives, in Europe and Africa, have largely survived. Governments have varied greatly in their willingness to open their archives to scholars, but a major advance was made in 1967 when the closed period for access to central government records in Britain was reduced from fifty to thirty years: overnight, key sources for the inter-war period became available to historians. Meanwhile, a mass of documentation had been created by missionaries, businessmen, teachers, journalists and scholars working in Africa. Much of this is still very incompletely known, but there are a number of published guides to archives and other manuscript collections; some are listed below, on p. 880, and others in connexion with appropriate chapters. Government publications are, with a few exceptions, excluded from the bibliographies in this volume. British territories under the Colonial Office issued government gazettes, annual reports, statistical *Blue books*, legislative council proceedings and occasional law reports and digests. In addition, reports of commissions and committees of enquiry were published locally and in London. A growing quantity of such documents, together with newspapers and archival records, are being reproduced in microform: a partial list is given in the general bibliography.

The secondary literature on our period has mostly expanded in line with the availability of source material, and it has been necessary to economise in listing it. In general, items are cited only once; where they are relevant to more than one chapter, cross-references are given in the bibliographical essays. Most items bearing specifically on one region are listed in the appropriate

regional bibliographies, but those concerned with Christianity, Islam and other aspects of African culture are listed in the bibliographies for chapters 3, 4 and 5. Essays published in collections are not normally listed separately; cross-references are supplied in the bibliographical essays. An attempt has been made to complement, rather than duplicate, bibliographical guidance that is readily accessible (as in histories of regions or territories); special emphasis has thus been laid on the most recent literature. Periodical articles which are largely subsumed in books have been excluded, as have many articles published in regional journals; articles have, however, usually been cited in preference to the authors' doctoral theses. In any case, the latter have usually been excluded if listed in McIlwaine's inventory of theses for British and Irish universities (1978). Theses on Africa for universities in the USA are periodically listed by University Microfilms International; other aids to finding theses are listed on p. 881, among general bibliographies. It may be noted here that the bibliographies are in general the most useful sections of the *African historical dictionaries* (Metuchen, NJ). By 1984 these covered nearly forty countries, but they are very uneven in quality and most helpful for the period since *c.* 1950; few have been listed in this volume. Research on our period appears in a large number of journals; those which are concerned with the whole of Africa include the *Journal of African History*, the *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, *African Affairs*, *History in Africa* and *African Economic History*. The quarterly *International African Bibliography* is compiled at SOAS, London. Asamani has listed contributions to periodicals and other collective publications in Western languages between 1885 and 1965.

While written sources are far more abundant for our period than ever before, other types of historical evidence became increasingly important. Colonial rule and capitalist enterprise caused a huge expansion and elaboration of building and engineering works. This aspect of Africa's material inheritance from alien regimes has received little attention from historians: relevant items are listed in the bibliographies for North Africa (Béguin, Betts), Nigeria (Akinsemoyin and Vaughan-Richards, Home, Mohammed), South Africa (Herbert), Mozambique (de Lima) and Ethiopia (Rigotti). Many buildings from our period have already vanished, but the physical appearance of Africa and

its inhabitants was frequently recorded by the camera, though photo-journalism was all too rare. Many books listed in the following pages are illustrated with photographs, though as yet few books on Africa have been devoted to historical photographs; those listed in this volume cover Algeria (Musso), Douala, Cameroun (Soulillou), the Belgian Congo (Luwel), Burundi (Collard and Celis) Mozambique (Lobato, Rufino), Johannesburg (Benjamin), Southern Rhodesia (Baxter and Turner, Mazikana and Johnstone). There are many photographs in Macmillan's handbooks for West and South Africa. Light (p. 883) records aerial views of Africa in 1937–8 which vividly illustrate innovations in land use. Some relevant photographic collections have been catalogued, e.g. those of the Royal Anthropological Institute, the Royal Commonwealth Society, the Royal Photographic Society and the Middle East Centre, St Antony's, Oxford. There are descriptions of important collections in France (Rabut) and Belgium (Luwel).

Film must also be considered as evidence for our period. Moving photographs were taken before 1900 in Egypt and South Africa, and in 1911 Comerio made some film of the Italian invasion of Libya. Between the wars, several ethnographic and commercial travel films were made in Africa, while tourists occasionally used cine-cameras. By the 1930s, when sound tracks were possible, films were made in Africa for a variety of educational, commercial and political purposes. The Italian invasion of Ethiopia was filmed from both sides, and Becker (p. 982) has compiled an excellent documentary from such material. Gutsche (p. 961) has chronicled film-making in South Africa, while Low and Smyth (pp. 889–90) refer to British work. Listed here are some relevant filmographies and a major archival guide; Roberts has made a preliminary study of film made in Africa during our period.

Some of the sounds of the period have been preserved: ethnographers made sound recordings in German East Africa in 1906 and Nigeria in 1909–12; in southern Africa, Tracey made field recordings in the 1930s, while African music was recorded commercially. Catalogues by Tracey himself and by Stone and Gillis help to show what was done and where it survives. Recently historians have made much use of the tape-recorder when interviewing those who witnessed the period, whether as rulers

or ruled. It need hardly be stressed that, whether preserved in recorded or written form, such oral testimony can be of particular value to the historian seeking to understand African experience during our period, though already much of it has moved beyond the reach of all but the longest memories.

Of the general reference works on Africa listed here, some are contemporary surveys, some are academic symposia, and a few treat a particular subject in relation to Africa as a whole. The section devoted to international relations comprises works whose main concern is with Africa as a factor in relations between countries outside it: this is in effect a bibliography of the 'continuing Scramble'. Studies of bilateral relations between African territories and other countries are listed in the appropriate regional bibliographies. Official collections of diplomatic documents covering our period have been published by Britain, France, Germany and Italy; Vogel indicates the relevant British command papers. Brownlie provides a guide for the study of international frontiers in Africa; see also Bono, and studies for Ethiopia (Hamilton), East Africa (McEwan) and the Belgian Congo (Jentgen). Toynbee documents frontier revisions in the 1920s. Relevant studies of Britain's imperial concerns during our period include Beloff, Gallagher and Darwin. The growth of Italian imperial ambitions has been surveyed by Miège and Zaghi. Pick documented the role of one German businessman in furthering his government's aims in Africa.

For the years before 1914 there are relevant studies of the foreign policies of Belgium (Willequet) and Italy (Bosworth). The Moroccan crisis of 1911 has received much attention (Allain, Barlow, Barraclough, Parsons; see also Rivet). European intentions towards Ethiopia in the early twentieth century are discussed by Caplan, Keefer, J. C. Robertson and Marcus (1975) (p. 984). Relations between Britain and Germany on African questions before 1914 (of special concern to Portugal) have been examined by Hatton, Langhorne and Vincent Smith, and in essays in the collection edited by Gifford and Louis (p. 883). Britain's external relations in West Africa are considered by Ekoko and Osuntokun. France's aims in Africa during and after the First World War are examined by Andrew and Kanya-Forstner; for Italian aims at this period, see Caroselli, Cole, Costanzo and Hess. The treatment of Africa by the Paris Peace Conference was reported by Beer,

Woodrow Wilson's colonial adviser; there are also academic studies by Curry and Louis (see also Louis, p. 976). On the African mandates, the chief authorities remain Wright and Logan. For the immediate post-war years there are studies of Morocco (Ayache) and Ethiopia (Buccianti). McCormack has investigated the international rivalry caused by the development of air travel between the wars. Britain's reactions to German colonial irredentism have been discussed by Crozier, Ekoko, Louis and Watt; see also Ageron, Hildebrand (p. 889) and Kienzie (p. 962). The imperialism of Fascist Italy has been studied by Mack Smith, Rainero, Bessis and E. M. Robertson; the international consequences of its ambitions in Ethiopia have received much attention (Baer, Hardie, Harris, Iadarola, Laurens, Spencer, Toynbee (1936), Waley, Wilkin). Other studies of Ethiopia's external relations between the wars are listed on pp. 912, 909 (Ross, Scott, Weisbord, Work) and pp. 982-5 (Bairu Tafla, McCann, Marcus (1983), Rochat, Rouaud, Steffanson and Starrett). On Liberia's external relations, see especially Schmokel and Uhomoibhi (p. 948).

I. THE IMPERIAL MIND

The bibliography for this chapter is divided into two sections, for primary and secondary sources. The former include relevant works published during our period; many of these, and their authors, are discussed in the chapter and do not require notice here. Mention should however be made of the principal periodicals in which thinking about Africa was circulated during our period: the *Journal of the (Royal) African Society* (1901-), *Africa* (the journal of the International African Institute, 1928-), *L'Afrique française* (1891-1960), the *Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten* (1888-1919), the *Koloniale Rundschau* (1909-1943), *L'Africa Italiana* (1882-1940) and Belgian publications listed on p. 840. Easterbrook lists most books in English on Africa published during our period; there is also a useful bibliography in Hetherington. A great variety of documents relating to British colonial Africa has been collected by Rhodes House Library, Oxford; see Frewer and Byrne (p. 880). Two British reference works are specially relevant to this chapter: *Who's who* and the *Dictionary of national biography*, but for our purposes the latter is seriously deficient, despite the commitment of an early editor to embracing 'all branches of the

nation's and the empire's activity' (Second supplement, I, vii). The reader will find one-third of the relevant colonial governors, and also Coupland, Laws, Nevinson and Seligman; but he will search in vain for the anthropologists Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, Rattray and Edwin Smith, nor will he find Sir John Harris (of the ASAPS), the linguist Alice Werner, the journalists Morel and Steer or the educationists A. G. Fraser, A. I. Mayhew and Hanns Vischer.

Sources for the history of imperial thought and organisation in France and Belgium are indicated in the essays accompanying chapters 7 and 9. There is no scholarly study of Italian imperial organisation; the works listed here by Cesari and Marinucci and Columbano are essentially celebratory (cf. Triulzi, p. 985). There is, however, relevant material in Bosworth, Mack Smith and Miège (pp. 884–5). The German colonial system has been examined by Woodruff Smith (who concentrates on the German background) and by Gann and Duignan; for a view from East Germany, see essays by Stoecker in his collection. Solf's travels in West Africa are the subject of an essay by Newbury in the collection by Gifford and Louis (p. 883), which also has a long bibliographical essay by Strandmann and Alison Smith. There is a biography of Dernburg by Schiefel. Schlunk, an inspector of missions, compiled a full statistical report on education in the German colonies, but German government schools in Africa await their historian. The persistence of German ambitions for an overseas empire after 1918 has received much attention, notably from Schmokel, Hildebrand, Kuma N'Dumbe and contributions to Stoecker's collection by Rüger and Ballhaus (see also Crozier, p. 884). German colonial sentiment was celebrated by von Stuemer and Duems. Westermann's symposium represents the survival of a philanthropic tradition into the Nazi era.

The structure and personnel of British government in Africa before 1914 have been vividly portrayed by Gann and Duignan, though they virtually ignore the important if transitory role of the Foreign Office. There is as yet no academic study of the Colonial Office as an institution during our period, though official perspectives are recorded by Fiddes and Parkinson (and for the Dominions Office by Garner). The duties of the district officer were outlined by Stigand, who served as one in the Sudan. The organisation and staffing of colonial governments have been

described by officials (Bertram, Furse, Jeffries, Masefield); Heussler's study has been supplemented by prosopographical research (Kirk-Greene, Hughes and Nicolson) and by studies of the Gold Coast (Kuklick), Nigeria (Heussler, Nicolson), Tanganyika (Heussler) and Sudan (Kirk-Greene, Mangan). Some of this work is over-respectful; a valuable corrective is supplied by Ehrlich's reflections (p. 892) on the narrow economic horizons of British administrators. Morris and Read (p. 975) pioneered archival research into the use of law as a branch of colonial government; see also Adewoye (p. 938) and articles by Morris. Aspects of local legal change, especially in the Gold Coast, are illustrated by Allott; see also Chanock (p. 972).

Much the best outline of British official thought about colonial government in our period is Kenneth Robinson's *The dilemmas of trusteeship*; it is also worth consulting Perham's long introduction to the Oxford *History of East Africa*, vol. II. For the years before 1914, there are studies of the Colonial Office in action by Hyam and Hatton. The relevant volume of the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (Benians *et al.*) is little help, nor are biographies of colonial secretaries (e.g. Marlowe on Milner, Cross on Cunliffe-Lister). Amery's memoirs contain more to our purpose than his published diaries. There is a useful thesis by Baldock on colonial policy in the early post-war years; see also Constantine (p. 891). Ronald Robinson considers official reactions to settler claims between the wars; arguments over East African issues are also discussed by Brett, Cell, Clayton and Savage, Gregory and Wylie (pp. 974–80). Tinker's study of Indians overseas is relevant in this connexion, while D. A. Low has noted some Indian roots of British African policy. Killingray has pioneered the study of British military aims in Africa during our period. B. C. Roberts's survey of British colonial labour policies has been supplemented by the archival research of the Newburys (on the ILO), Tarrant and Banton. For British thought about African education in our period, the best general guide is still Ashby; Lyons is superficial. More research is needed on what was taught (cf. Kelly, p. 926), and on the institutional links between Britain and Africa. Selections from key texts are provided by Scanlon. Advice from white well-wishers to African teachers in Bechuanaland (Dumbrell) illustrates a prevailing ethos. Hussey was an educational administrator in the Sudan, Uganda and Nigeria. On the Phelps-

Stokes Fund there is King's East African study (p. 975) and an article by Berman; on the Carnegie Corporation and teacher-training for Africa, see Goodenow. The connexions between education and the use of mass media for propaganda have been explored by Smyth in relation to Northern Rhodesia; she has also looked specifically at British colonial film policy. Notcutt and Latham directed the BEKE in eastern Africa. On the presentation of Africa in cinemas elsewhere, consult Richards, Rachael Low and (on the Belgian Congo) Jadot (p. 950). Briggs is helpful on the origins of broadcasting for Africa. Ranger (1983 and p. 971) has looked at the links between the cult of royalty and the ideology of indirect rule. Reese and J. M. Mackenzie note attempts to increase British awareness of empire. The use of science for colonial government has been discussed by Worboys; on tropical medicine, see Maegraith and Manson-Bahr. Duignan and Gann (p. 881) sketch the organisation of colonial research, and Hargreaves sheds light on the origins of the African Research Survey.

The only attempt to survey unofficial as well as official British thought about Africa between the wars is Hetherington's brief outline. Willan has illuminated the workings of the ASAPS. Attitudes in and around the Labour Party are examined by Gupta; A. J. Mackenzie focuses on British Marxists. Opposition to German colonial claims in the late 1930s was voiced by Amery and Steer; see also Farson's account of travels in South West and equatorial Africa. Only two books by whites in English in our period paid any serious attention to movements of black solidarity in Africa: Buell's *Native problem* and a tract by Thwaite, though Hailey gave an important lecture on the subject. The anthropological and linguistic scholarship of the period is comprehensively listed for most of black Africa by Jones (p. 881); listed here are influential works by Delafosse, Frobenius, Seligman and Evans-Pritchard. On the growth of social anthropology in Africa, consult Forde, Kuper, Kenneth Robinson (1980) and essays in Asad's collection, especially those by Richard Brown (on Godfrey Wilson) and Wendy James. There are also studies of Rattray (McCaskie), Frobenius (Ita), the missionary ethnographers Junod (Harries, p. 957) and Gutmann (Winter), and German-Austrian 'culture history' (Zwernemann). Fage has surveyed historical work in our period. On the study of African languages, see Cole

and Hendrix. Willett (p. 912) considers early European appreciation of African art; on Belgian reactions, see Jadot, in the ARSOM *Livre blanc* (p. 948), and on French artists, Laude. Cendrars introduced African folklore to a non-specialist readership. Africa occupies a good third of Nancy Cunard's huge anthology recording 'the struggles and achievements, the persecutions and the revolts against them, of the Negro peoples'. The literature on European fiction about Africa is remarkable for quantity rather than quality. Ridley's general survey stops in 1914. Nwezeh is useful on German novelists (who are also noted by Howe). On English writers, see Killam and Milbury-Steen (who also comments on Delavignette); on Joyce Cary, Echeruo and Mahood. On French fiction, see works by Astier Loutfi, Cairns, Fanoudh-Sieffer, Lebel and Steins (pp. 922-4); on Belgian colonial fiction, Périer (p. 951); and on Portuguese colonial writing, Moser (p. 954).

2. ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY

The bibliography for this chapter largely consists of works dealing with sub-Saharan Africa in general or with more than one of the regions covered in this volume. It includes a few major regional studies and also the limited literature concerning banking and currency in British colonial Africa and South Africa. Otherwise, literature with a specific territorial or regional focus is excluded and may be found in the appropriate regional bibliographies. Guidance on French, Belgian and Portuguese Africa may be found in the essays and bibliographies for chapters 6, 7, 9 and 10.

Government records are of exceptional importance for a period in which governments played so large a part in the cash economy. Much economic information was published by governments (see p. 788); most of this was created through departmental routine, but further light was shed in the 1930s by the financial enquiries of Sir Alan Pim (that by his French counterpart, Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, was not published: see pp. 380-1). A wide range of statistics was furnished by British colonial *Blue books* and by the official yearbooks of Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa. For territories outside English-speaking Africa, the reports of the British Department of Overseas Trade (1921-) can be

specially useful. Between the wars, economic surveys and statistical abstracts were published by the Colonial Office, the Board of Trade and the League of Nations. The first, and in some respects still the most useful, assemblage of statistics for sub-Saharan Africa during our period is to be found in Frankel (1938), though the recent excellent handbook by Mitchell covers the whole continent and ranges more widely in time and topic. As yet, little academic attention has been devoted to the collection and collation of historical statistics for individual African countries: so far, the only substantial contributions are appendices to studies of Nigeria (Helleiner) and the Gold Coast (Kay and Hymer).

Business records relating to sub-Saharan Africa are discussed by Hopkins (1976). Local trade directories have their uses, and many firms are described in Allister Macmillan's handbooks on West, East and Central Africa, and on the major cities of South Africa. Missionaries and social anthropologists were sometimes valuable witnesses to the material conditions of Africans, in towns as well as in the countryside, though here the memories of Africans themselves can be important, if fragile, source material.

The study of economic change in English-speaking Africa during our period can be said to have passed through three phases. In the first, lasting until after the Second World War, it was primarily a matter of analysing contemporary problems. This phase yielded a wealth of still valuable research, notably by Frankel, Hancock, Leubuscher and other contributors to Perham's collections on Nigeria. Hailey's *African survey* encompassed a wide range of economic topics. Other relevant work, not specifically concerned with Africa, includes pre-war studies by Clark and Rowe; see also Yates. The second phase, lasting into the 1960s, was less fruitful. At a more or less general level, numerous relevant analyses of colonial economic conditions were offered, principally by W. Arthur Lewis but also by Bauer, de Gregori, Hammond, Hazelwood, Kamarck, Meyer and Neumark. However, few professional economic historians were attracted to Africa. Pioneering work was done on colonial East Africa, but South Africa and West Africa were comparatively neglected. The paucity of recent research on our period was thus a source of weakness in Duignan and Gann's collection on colonial economic history (1975); Gann's own essay on Germany is more relevant than most for our purposes. During the 1970s there was a revival

of academic interest in our period. Much research was addressed to the study of 'political economy' and denied the existence of economic history as a separate subject. Much recent work, moreover, has been directed either towards highly localised problems or towards the elaboration of grand theory (for a critique, see Hopkins, 1975). There has thus been a tendency to by-pass work of the 1930s and 1940s in which the assumptions were essentially liberal and the focus territorial or metropolitan. For this reason, we must still often look to this earlier work for enlightenment on the economic machinery of the colonial system and its operation. Meanwhile, the best introductions to our subject remain the relevant chapters in Hopkins's path-breaking survey of West African economic history and in Munro's economic history of sub-Saharan Africa.

Recent concern to integrate economic and political history has been specially fruitful in the study of African labour, and has also begun to relate this to agricultural history (cf. Palmer and Parsons and Iliffe's history of Tanganyika). Liberal thought on colonial labour was represented in the 1930s by Orde Browne, Greaves and Read and by van der Horst on South Africa; for the views of post-war economists, see Elkan, Berg and Kilby. Newbury provides a brief historical survey (in the Duignan and Gann collection). The history of labour law in colonial Africa has been strangely neglected, but there is a detailed study of official thought and action in Kenya by Clayton and Savage. Arrighi's Marxist study of labour in Rhodesia did much to stimulate research in central and southern Africa. Studies of mine labour in this region, most notably by van Onselen, have begun to influence work on West Africa. The impact of demands for labour upon African commercial agriculture in the eastern Cape has been studied by Bundy. Crop-centred history has been essayed in Nigeria by Berry (cocoa) and Hogendorn (groundnuts). Wider-ranging surveys are offered by Hogendorn and Yudelman in Duignan and Gann's collection; see also Tosh, and essays in Rotberg's collection. At a still more general level, there are relevant works, not specifically historical, by Allan, Johnston and Pim (1946); on specific crops, see Jones, Miracle, Whitford and Anthony, and Wickizer. Masefield has written a history of the British colonial agricultural service (p. 890); on land law, see Biebuyck and Meek. The size and physical condition of African populations is still a new

subject. A massive beginning was made in Kuczynski's critical analyses of official population statistics; recent research has been presented to conferences in Edinburgh and there is a bibliography by Gregory *et al.* Patterson and Pyle have outlined the spread of influenza in 1918–19. Ford's study of the trypanosomiasis explores in magisterial detail their implications for men and animals. More recent work on the colonial history of disease and medicine has been collected by Hartwig and Patterson, Sabben-Clare *et al.*, and Janzen and Feierman; there are also bibliographies in these fields by Feierman and Patterson. On alcohol, see Pan.

The study of commercial organisation and practice, and business history in general, now seems the least developed area in the historiography of our period, despite the foundations laid by Hancock on West Africa, Mars on extra-territorial firms in Nigeria (Perham, 1948) and Stahl on East Africa. Hopkins (1976) has made a comprehensive survey of sources, secondary literature and problems for further research. The field is still dominated by authorised histories of individual firms, a genre in which academic detachment can be hard to sustain and in which the politics of business tends to be given more prominence than economic performance. Relevant examples are Gregory on Anglo American (see also Alford and Harvey), Davies on Elder Dempster, Pedler on the origins of UAC, and the histories of major banks by Crossley and Blandford, Henry and Fry. On Unilever's African operations, Fieldhouse is more informative than Wilson. Leubuscher made an economic study of the West African shipping trade, and there is also a scholarly history of the American Farrell Line's business with Africa (Albion). The labour strategies of Union Minière have been stringently analysed by Perrings. On banking, the academic authorities remain Newlyn and Rowan, Sayers, Arndt and de Kock. Currencies are discussed in articles by Hopkins, Ofonagoro, McCarthy and Hogendorn and Gemery. Drummond (1981) investigates South Africa's departure from the gold standard. Relevant studies of public finance in British colonial Africa are on Nigeria, by Mars, Pim and Bower (Perham, 1948) and Carland, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone (Cox-George). The British Admiralty described African railways in 1919. The leading study of their economic significance in our period, since Frankel's work on South Africa, is Huybrechts', for the Belgian Congo; Katzenellenbogen has studied the financial diplomacy

behind the Benguela railway (p. 950). The growth of British colonial development policy has been studied by Killingray, Constantine, Abbot, Meredith and Morgan; Hancock and Drummond (1972) supply a wider imperial context. Official paternalism is criticised by Frankel and Ehrlich. Brett illuminates the metropolitan dimension in East African policies; for West Africa in this context, see Bowden and Nworah (pp. 937, 941) and Wardle (p. 894). Most of the literature on businesses based within, rather than outside, Africa is listed in the regional bibliographies, but we may note here Iliffe's exploratory survey of the emergence of African capitalism.

3. CHRISTIANITY

Evidence relating to the activity of expatriate Christian missionaries in Africa is extensive and, for the most part, well-preserved and accessible. Much of this data has still to be exploited by historians, but already it has provided the basis for several scholarly and useful studies. The recovery and analysis, however, of African initiatives and responses, and of the encounter between Christianity and African societies and cosmologies, is a task fraught with far greater difficulties and, apart from some significant pioneer studies, this is still largely an unexplored field. It presents an urgent challenge to historians, for so much of the evidence, both oral and documentary, has yet to be recorded, collected and safeguarded.

There are several major bibliographical guides to material relating to the main missionary societies. For Catholic missions, two volumes of the monumental *Bibliotheca missionum* cover Africa during this period. From 1933 onwards the *Bibliografia missionaria* lists contemporary studies. Although for Protestant missions there is no single work comparable to the *Bibliotheca missionum*, the *International review of missions* (Geneva, 1912–) with its bibliographical sections is a useful counterpart to *Bibliografia missionaria*. The bibliography of African church history edited by Walls is an important starting-point, and for the Independent churches Turner's bibliography of new religious movements supplements the earlier publication by Mitchell and Turner. The *Journal of Religion in Africa* publishes and reviews much relevant work.

The long-established Protestant and Anglican missionary societies are well served by standard histories and biographies. Their archives, spread throughout Western Christendom, are often kept in good order (e.g. guides by Keen, Jenkins, Craig) and these can be supplemented by denominational (e.g. Lambeth Palace Library) and ecumenical records (notably those of the International Missionary Council now partly at Geneva and partly at SOAS). Yet the historian of twentieth-century, as opposed to nineteenth-century, Africa is often at a disadvantage. Several of the societies maintain a fifty-year closure, their standard histories are generally less informative on more recent developments, and missionary periodicals in the twentieth century are in general far less rewarding than their earlier issues (though some new trends in Catholic missionary thought are reflected in the periodical *Africanae Fraternalae Ephemerides Romanae* (Rome 1932–48)). In addition to further studies of these main-line societies, more attention could usefully be focused on the range of missions, Fundamentalist, pentecostalist and others, which since 1900 initiated or greatly expanded their activities in Africa. Where these initiatives were individual or evanescent, the documentation is often in danger of destruction or dispersal. Sometimes, however, the records of these missions are accessible to the sympathetic scholar, and the work in Africa of even some of the larger groups (e.g. the Salvation Army, the Seventh Day Adventists) still awaits chronicling, let alone analysis, while the opportunities for such research are perhaps even greater in North America than in Europe.

The principal Vatican agency, the Sacred Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (or Propaganda Fide), has still not opened its archives beyond the pontificate of Leo XIII (1878–1903). Until this policy is modified, historians must rely mainly on the records of the various Catholic missionary societies. The main archives of most of these are now located at their generalates in Rome; some orders, however (for example, the Jesuits), retain extensive additional holdings in their various provinces.

This documentary material, dispatched or subsequently brought back to the home base, varies enormously in its significance for the historian of Africa. Much of it is primarily concerned with mobilising recruits and financial resources. Yet often this task has

far-ranging implications for missionary activity in Africa, and historians of these missions cannot neglect the study of the home base, both in its organisational and intellectual aspects. The problems of organising the home base in the twentieth century have been studied in some mission histories (e.g. Hewitt, Metzler) and in some specialised theses with particular reference to Africa (Cooke, Hogan; see also Alladaye). The developing theological implications of missionary activity are surveyed in G. H. Anderson, the ecumenical background is presented in Hogg, and some of the intellectual and racial assumptions which have influenced missionaries in Africa during the twentieth century have been examined by Linden and Wright. Works relating to the political position of the churches in Europe also often illuminate their attitude to Africa (e.g. Binchy).

Much of the massive documentation in missionary archives has, however, merely an indirect link with the actual development and nature of missionary activity in Africa, let alone of African Christianity. Information on developments in Africa itself is provided in these archives by correspondence from missionaries, special enquiries and reports, and most usefully of all in those, unfortunately rare, cases where station diaries have been kept and preserved. As a whole, for the period 1900–1940, this missionary documentation has been used, in conjunction with material from colonial archives, perhaps most effectively in studies which have sought primarily to throw light on the political implications of missionary activity in Africa (Oliver, Slade, King (p. 975), Markowitz, McCracken, the Sandersons (p. 993), Berger, Der, Engel, de Vries). Many aspects of this political dimension remain obscure, and there are notable gaps for the former French territories, in particular French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar. Little as yet has been published on Christianity in Ethiopia during our period, but see Arén, Cotterell (on the Sudan Inland Mission), Mikré-Sellassie and Shenk.

Any attempt to assess African Christianity must also draw upon the sources available in Africa and in particular those provided by Africans: sermons, hymns, memoirs, records, correspondence, baptismal rolls, rites, cures, prayers and oral memories. Most obviously this has been recognised in the case of the Independent and Separatist churches. The pioneer works by Sundkler (1948) and Shepperson and Price have been followed by many other

3 CHRISTIANITY

notable studies: on West Africa, by Turner, Peel, Webster, Baëta, Haliburton, Shank, Bureau (1971), Paulme; on East and southern Africa, Welbourn and Ogot, Daneel and Sundkler (1976). The use of African sources, both oral and written, has also distinguished some of the most significant studies of African Christianity in the mission-connected churches during this period (e.g. Taylor, N. Smith, van Slageren, Pirouet, Tasie, Tuma). They have also been used in biographies of leading African Christians (E. W. Smith (p. 912), Ayandele, Hymans (p. 910)) and in analyses of mission education (J. Anderson, Kipkorir (p. 978), Shepherd); other studies in this field are listed in regional bibliographies. Detailed historical studies of African Catholicism in the twentieth century are still rather rare. Müller with his use of Divine Word archives is valuable on Togo for the period before 1914, likewise Storme and Kratz on early aspects of some missions in the Congo; Linden (1974 and 1977) has made excellent use of White Fathers and other sources, and Waliggo's thesis is outstanding for the wealth and range of his oral and documentary materials. African Christianity in this period must also be seen as part of a wider and much longer process of religious change in Africa. Among historians, Ranger has most notably drawn attention to several aspects of this dimension (1972 and 1975), Bureau (1962) and Bhebe have presented pioneer monographs, and some studies by anthropologists are of particular significance (Murphree, Horton, Wilson, Sangree, Janzen and MacGaffey). Although most of the major studies by modern African theologians were published after this period, several are of importance for historians (e.g. Mbiti, Setiloane), and the impact of Christianity is a major theme in the literature of African poets and novelists, many of whom were the recipients of missionary education during this period.

4. ISLAM

This bibliography, like the associated chapter, is focused on sub-Saharan Africa: materials on North Africa and the Sudan are listed in relation to chapters 6 and 15. By contrast with the nineteenth century, our period has received little attention from historians of Islam in black Africa, and the collection and preservation of relevant primary source materials has been correspondingly neglected. (Even in North Africa, the colonial

officials who described Arabic libraries were seldom interested in contemporaneous accounts in Arabic of European occupation, or early exchanges between Muslim populations and Europeans.) It is likely that many Arabic manuscripts survive in private hands. Glimpses of the potential value of such material can be obtained from the 'Fonds Shaykh Mousa Kamara', dating from 1920–45 (catalogued in Diallo *et al.*), the private library of Shaykh Sidia Baba (d. 1927) in Mauritania (partly catalogued by Massignon and now maintained by the shaykh's sons), papers of the Kano merchant Umaru Falke (1893–1962) (described by Mohamed and Hay and now housed at Northwestern University with the Paden collection (cf. Saad)); and Swahili and Arabic materials at the University of Dar es Salaam (catalogued by Allen). Relevant materials have also been discussed or listed in the journal *Kiswahili* and its predecessors, the *Research Bulletin* of the Centre of Arabic Documentation, Ibadan, the *Interim Reports* of the Northern History Research Scheme, Zaria, and the *Research Review* of the Institute of African Studies, Legon, Ghana. A collection of Somali poetry (Andrzejewski and Lewis) and a study of the subject (Said Samatar) are listed on pp. 909–912; listed here are studies of Islamic verse in Hausa (Hiskett) and Wolof (Samb). As yet, no systematic effort has been made to catalogue writing from south of the Sahara that was published in North Africa, nor have the Arabic presses in sub-Saharan Africa been described.

Books and articles on Islam south of the Sahara have been listed by Zoghby. Pearson's *Index Islamicus*, covering contributions to periodicals and other collective publications, is issued quarterly and from 1976 monographs have been included; several consolidated lists have been published. There are also relevant bibliographies for South Africa (Hampson), Tanzania (Nimtz), Zaïre (Rossie), the Aḥmadiyya movement (Wintoki) and Murid literature (Diop).

There are few monographs specifically on twentieth-century Africa, and studies which deal with Islam on a regional or national basis are seldom informed by the Arabic materials noted above. We thus know more about historical processes with which Islam was associated than about change within Islam, the faith, in our period. Sociological studies help to fill this gap, but of its nature this literature tends towards particularism, with little emphasis on historical process. Much the most useful general essay is the

introduction by I. M. Lewis to *Islam in tropical Africa* (1966), but only eight pages are devoted to our period. Readers of Trimingham's various regional surveys should be wary of a set of concepts (Islam as 'alien' to Africa, ethnic variation in Islam, racial determinants upon Islamic practice) that have consistently flawed this author's prodigious contributions. For discussion of major currents of change in the wider Islamic world during our period, the reader is referred to studies by Hourani and Kerr.

The attitudes and policies towards Islam of colonial administrations, in matters of politics, education and law, can be documented from a wide range of contemporaneous accounts and scholarly studies. It was during the first two decades of this century that Islam was most feared by colonial officials as a possible basis for concerted opposition to their rule, and most later studies rely heavily on research that dates from the first half of our period. Cruise O'Brien provides a good analysis of policy in French West Africa up to 1914; there are also brief studies of British policy in the Sudan (Warburg, p. 994) and Nyasaland (Greenstein). On French West Africa the leading official expert, Paul Marty, published a series of reports on Islamic leaders and their followings in each colony; some of these first appeared between 1911 and 1921 in the *Revue du monde musulmane*, and the last (on Niger) came out in 1931. In the 1920s two other colonial officials, André and Tomlinson, emphasised the continuing dangers of Islam. One problem which greatly vexed colonial governments, millenarianism, has been well treated by Clarke (1980) in the West African context. The incorporation of Islamic legal systems into colonial government has been methodically surveyed by Anderson; useful notes on Islamic legal practice during our period appear in Schacht's articles on northern Nigeria and East Africa; see also Ubah. Islamic education in colonial Africa has as yet received scant attention: Hubbard (in Brown and Hiskett, p. 882) looks briefly at northern Nigeria, which has also been the focus of studies of the impact upon Muslims of Western education: cf. Graham (p. 897), Tibenderana (p. 942) and Gbadamosi (1967); see also Fisher (1961).

Regional, national or local studies tend to deal with Islam in our period either in terms of the aftermath of nineteenth-century movements or as the prelude to nationalism after the Second World War; rarely is Islam the focus of historical accounts of our

own period. Regional studies of Islam in West Africa, each of which include chapters on the colonial era, include Trimingham (1959, 1962), Gouilly, Clarke (1982) and Moreau; the two latter are the most helpful. There is only one study devoted to Islam throughout a colonial territory: that by Audouin and Deniel on the Upper Volta, though our period is well treated in Cruise O'Brien's account (1975) of Islam in Senegalese politics. Triaud has written articles on Niger (p. 929) and the Ivory Coast; see also Adeleye and Fika (pp. 938–9) on reactions to British intrusion in northern Nigeria. Gbadamosi (1978) and Ryan focus on Yoruba communities, and Paden and Tahir on Kano; Works's study of Hausa communities in Chad centres on the *ḥājj* (on which see also Birks). Sanneh briefly treats Jahanke communities in the early twentieth century, and Bravmann's book on West African art includes an excellent study of Islam in northern Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The origins, influence and growth of the Aḥmadiyya in West Africa have been thoroughly documented by Fisher (1963). Trimingham's surveys of the Sudan (p. 994) and Ethiopia include chapters on the colonial era; see also an article by Crummey, Trimingham's East African study, and books by Lewis on Somaliland (p. 987) and Salim (p. 979) and el-Zein on the Kenya coast. Becker made a pioneering study of Islam in East Africa; more recently, Alpers, in Ranger and Kimambo (p. 900) and Aziz have specifically focused on the expansion of Islam into the East African interior, and Walji (p. 977) has studied the Ismā'īlīs in Tanganyika.

The Islamic brotherhoods are the subject of the largest single body of scholarship that pertains directly to our period. During the colonial era these studies tended to take the form of inventories of Sufi brotherhoods in particular areas, such as Willis on the Sudan (p. 994), Lewis on Somaliland, Chailley *et al.* on French-speaking West Africa, and André and Drague on North Africa. Studies by historians and social scientists who have moved beyond these inventories include the classic works on the Sanūsiyya by Evans-Pritchard and Ziadeh. Abun-Nasr has traced the expansion of the Tijāniyya with special reference to West Africa. The brotherhood which has received most attention in sub-Saharan Africa is the Murīdiyya in Senegal, a consequence of the Murids' role in nationalist politics; major studies include Sy, Cruise O'Brien (1971), Dumont and Copans. A particularly significant

4 ISLAM

populist offshoot of the Tijāniyya in this period, the Hamalliyya, has been the subject of a book by Alioune Traore and an account based on colonial administrative reports by Alexandre, in Rotberg and Mazrui (p. 883). Our period is well covered in Hiskett's study of recent developments in West African Sufi communities, which refers particularly to Hausa adherents of the Tijāniyya. Most recently, Brenner has studied the thought of one Tijāni who joined the Hamalliyya. In East Africa the brotherhoods have received less attention, but those in Tanzania in this century have been well studied by Nimtz (1980), while Martin has surveyed the life of Shaykh Uways, one of the most influential Sufi leaders on the coast.

The preponderance of articles over monographs on Islam during this period, and the general paucity of material in contrast to that on Christian missions, indicates the limited extent of research on Islam during the first forty years of this century. Part of the colonial inheritance which has much influenced the historiography is the adoption of ethnic, regional or national perspectives; one topic in great need of attention is Pan-Islamic movements and sentiments during our period. To tackle such questions, much attention must first be devoted to recovering and cataloguing manuscript and printed material on Islam in twentieth-century Africa; only then will we be able to appreciate the full significance of Islamic expansion in Africa during that period.

5. AFRICAN CROSS-CURRENTS

The bibliography for this chapter is divided into two sections, for primary and secondary sources. The former comprise works by Africans and other blacks written during our period, together with the most relevant autobiographies. Books published only in African languages are not included. Even so, the list is far from being comprehensive: it is intended only to draw attention to the more substantial and representative publications. Few actual books were produced by black African writers during our period. Non-fiction usually appeared in the form of pamphlets, which often originated in addresses or newspaper articles; fiction commonly took the form of novellas rather than novels. For such material, only the most detailed bibliography could avoid being misleading, and it is unfortunate that no such work exists. Brief

selections from authors of our period are included in an anthology by Dathorne and Feuser. Several Africans, including Azikiwe, Caluza and Kenyatta, contributed to Nancy Cunard's polemical anthology *Negro* (p. 886), as did Padmore (who gave her much help). Newspapers to which Africans contributed have been very incompletely preserved. Howell lists various aids to locating such material; guidance is also provided in studies of the press referred to below, and in bibliographical essays for regional chapters.

Books by Africans on political questions came in our period chiefly from South Africa, British West Africa and Ethiopia. Most such books are now very scarce, but extended extracts, along with related documents, have been gathered by Langley. In the list for the present chapter, the mainstream of the African National Congress in South Africa is represented by Jabavu and Plaatje; see also Mahabane (p. 963). Nzula wrote in Moscow. In British West Africa, ideas about nationalism were developed in the Gold Coast by Attoh-Ahuma, Casely Hayford, Mensah Sarbah, de Graft Johnson and Danquah (who returned from London to become a state councillor in Akim Abuakwa, where his brother was paramount chief). Curiously, none of the Lagos élite wrote on politics at book-length; their pamphlets are represented here by the Rev. Patriarch J. G. Campbell's demand for African advance in the civil service. Solanke was the Yoruba founder of the West African Students' Union in London, where he settled; Azikiwe, an Ibo, made an academic study of Liberia while teaching at Lincoln University in the USA. Blyden, a Liberian by choice, produced his last work in retirement in Sierra Leone. In East Africa, we need note only Kayamba, from Tanganyika, and Mockerie, from Kenya; the latter, with Kenyatta, vainly sought to represent the Kikuyu before a parliamentary committee in London in 1930–1. In Ethiopia, Gebre Heywet Baykedagn (tr. Fusella) and Afewerq Gebre both criticised Menelik in exile, while the international crisis of the 1930s prompted a thesis by Work and a symposium by Melaku Beyene. From French-speaking Africa, the only writers to be noted here are Guèye and Lamine Senghor. Among black writers of the diaspora, the West Indians Scholes and Padmore both settled in London; Ras Makonnen recalls the Pan-African scene there in the later 1930s. Many of Marcus Garvey's papers have recently been republished, along

with related contemporary material. Partington has compiled a bibliography for DuBois.

Collective biography was an important medium for the assertion of cultural solidarity: it was practised in South Africa by Mveli Skota and Mancoe, and in British West Africa by Attoh-Ahuma, Sampson and Deniga; Hutchison compiled a poetic variant of the genre. Few individual biographies were published: see examples by Jabavu in South Africa, Mwase in Nyasaland, Mademba in French West Africa and Asfa Yilma in exile from Ethiopia. However, much history was written by West Africans: traditions were recorded by Samuel Johnson, Egharevba, Tamakloe and Njoya, among others; relations with the British were reviewed by Sarbah and de Graft Johnson wrote an inspirational textbook. Elsewhere, the principal African historians were J. H. Soga (South Africa), Kagwa (Uganda) and the Ethiopian chronicler Guèbré Sellassié (p. 983). Norris presents two histories from Mauritania. Duse Mohammed's history of modern Egypt may be noted here in view of his association with black Africa and his editorship in London of the *African Times and Orient Review* (1912–14, 1917–18; reprinted 1973). The leading African writers on African social institutions were Soga (South Africa), Abdallah and Chibambo (Nyasaland), Kagwa and Nyabongo (Uganda), Kenyatta (Kenya), Danquah (Gold Coast), the Yoruba authors Ajisafe, Delano, Fadipe and Solanke, and the French-speaking Dim Delobsom, Hazoumé, Mamby Sidibé, M'Ba and Quenum; the black official Felix Éboué, from French Guyana, was also an amateur ethnographer. Several Africans published collections of proverbs and folk-tales; it is enough here to list Ephraim Amu's pioneering work in notating the music of African songs. Dictionaries were compiled in the Gold Coast by Tamakloe, in Soudan by Moussa Travelé, in Cameroun by Moumé-Etia and in Gabon by Raponda-Walker (a priest who also published many articles on botany in the 1930s). Tovalou-Houénou, in Paris, mingled amateur philology with cultural Africanism.

Little fiction by Africans appeared in European languages during our period. Among works in English, we need note only Mofolo and Plaatje (South Africa), Ntara (Nyasaland), Nyabongo (Uganda) and Casely Hayford (Gold Coast). The two last wrote veiled autobiography rather than novels; the same is true in

French-speaking Africa of Diallo, but novels were written there by Couchoro, Diop, Hazoumé and Maran (a black official from Martinique). In Portuguese, the only relevant novelist was Assis Junior. Black South African poetry from our period is well represented in the anthology by Couzens and Patel. In German East Africa, Abdul Karim wrote a Swahili verse chronicle about the Maji Maji rebellion; in Ethiopia, Eadie collected several poems in 1913 which extol modernity, exemplified by Japan; and Bankole Awoonor-Renner, from the Gold Coast, celebrated communism in verse. References to the oral poetry of the period must here be confined to that of Isaiah Shembe (see Sundkler, p. 964), Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh Ḥasan (Andrzejewski and Lewis), and praise poems for five Tswana chiefs (Schapera).

Autobiography is a rich source for the intellectual history of black Africa. The three examples listed here (Matthews, Nkrumah, and the Somali text edited by Pankhurst) are primarily relevant to this volume for their accounts of experience overseas. African autobiographies were collected in the 1930s by Perham and Westermann. Other works are listed in regional bibliographies: for Senegal (Guèye), Nigeria (Akiga, Awolowo, Azikiwe, Okafor-Omali, Smith), South Africa (Kadalie, Sachs), Southern Rhodesia (Vambe), Kenya (Thuku, Kindy), Ethiopia (Haile Sellassie, Gidada), Sudan (Babikr Badrī).

Much of the secondary literature on which this chapter is based is listed in bibliographies for regional chapters. There has been no systematic research on black people in Britain during the first half of the twentieth century since Little's pioneering study, and no large-scale work has been published on the migration of Africans to other countries overseas in this period. A forthcoming collection by Page surveys African experience of the First World War. The patterns of movement stimulated by the search for education may be elicited from books by Ashby, Mayhew and Murray (pp. 887–8) and Jones and Shepherd (pp. 898, 901), and from regional studies of French West Africa (Bouche), Sierra Leone (Sumner), South Africa (Kerr), East Africa (Goldthorpe) and Uganda (Carter). Roelker describes a Kenyan's education in South Africa and England. For African students in the USA, consult King (1971), studies of Aggrey by Smith and King (1969), of A. B. Xuma by Ralston and of Banda by Short; and the

autobiographies of Azikiwe (p. 938), Matthews and Nkrumah. Bond has written a history of Lincoln University.

There is more guidance on language policy than on language use in our period, but see Afigbo (1981) (p. 938) and Whiteley (p. 975). For the press, whether African or non-African, one must turn to regional studies, varying greatly in aim and quality, for Senegal (Boulègue), Dahomey (Codo Coffi, Lokossou), Togo (Guillaneuf), the Gold Coast (Jones-Quartey), Nigeria (Omu), Belgian Congo (Berlage), Angola (Lopo), Mozambique (Dias, Friedland), South Africa (Switzer, Cutten), Southern Rhodesia (Gale), Northern Rhodesia (Smyth), Uganda (Scotton), Tanganyika (Pipping-van Hulten, Westcott).

Only three historians, Amar Samb (p. 904), Cornevin and Jadot, have attempted surveys of African writing in our period which encompass all genres. Relevant studies of African writers of non-fictional prose are confined to Senegal (Diop, p. 903; and Amar Samb), Hausa theologians (Hiskett, p. 904), Yorubaland (Law) and Buganda (Rowe, Twaddle). There is however a considerable literature on 'creative writing'; it includes a bibliography (Jahn and Dressler) and a biographical dictionary (Herdeck), though both represent English work better than French. Gérard has made indispensable surveys of work in African languages, and there are also studies of literature in Arabic (Amar Samb (p. 904), Goody), Hausa (Hiskett (p. 904)), Amharic (Kane, Molvaer) and Xhosa (Jordan). Peires notes the power of missionaries over Africans seeking publication. English-language literature in South Africa has been sensitively studied by Couzens. There are guides to work in French (Blair, Kesteloot) and Portuguese (Hamilton); Lyall (p. 958) provides a contemporary account of poets in the Cape Verde islands.

Much less attention has been paid to the history of the performing arts; little has been written on the history of oral poetry and song. Tracey led the way in southern Mozambique, though his work has recently been reappraised by Vail and White, who have themselves done research on the lower Zambezi. There is a book by Said Samatar on Somali poetry, and an article by Mwakasak on Nyakyusa oral poetry; Opland discusses the Xhosa poet Mqhayi. African music receives extensive coverage in the *New Grove dictionary of music and musicians* (1980, 20 vols.), but

the syncretic music of our period is very unevenly treated; for South Africa, see Malan's *Encyclopaedia* (p. 963). A tentative beginning was made by Kirby, in Schapera (p. 964), but it was left to Coplan to reveal the rich history of African entertainment in Johannesburg. Jones and Ranger illuminate respectively musical and social aspects of dance modes in eastern and Central Africa. In the Gold Coast, Nketia made a musicological study of 'highlife'; Collins placed it in a wider historical context; and Bob Johnson's story has been told by Sutherland. On the theatre in Nigeria, see Adedeji. One attempt to adapt African music for mission use is described by Jans.

On the plastic arts, there is an outline survey by Mount, a few useful pages by Willett, and Bravmann's important study of Islamic influences in West Africa (p. 903); otherwise, the relevant literature deals only with carving among the Yoruba (Carroll) and Lega (Biebuyck), painting in the Belgian Congo (Périer) and the Kamba souvenir trade (Elkan). It must be hoped that Vansina's new book will prompt others to remedy this neglect.

Popular critiques of colonial rule are best known through studies of popular movements in the Rhodesias and East Africa (Cross, Ranger) and the Belgian Congo (Joset, Mulambu, Sikitele, Vansina, Verbeek); some studies of Christian independency (e.g. Sundkler on South Africa) are also illuminating. Literate élites have received due attention: there is a general survey by Kilson in Gann and Duignan (1970; p. 883), while much may be learned from studies of Senegal (Johnson), Sierra Leone (Spitzer), Nigeria (Mann), Angola (Samuels and Wheeler), Johannesburg (Couzens and Bonner, in Marks and Rathbone), Tanganyika (Iliffe). There are several relevant biographies, most notably of Plaatje (Willan) and Chilembwe in Nyasaland (Shepperson and Price) but also of Kenyatta (Murray-Brown), Panda Farnana in the Belgian Congo (Bontinck), Atangana in Kamerun (Quinn), Macaulay in Nigeria (Tamuno) and Danquah in the Gold Coast (Twumasi). Biographical collections are still more useful: for West Africa (Macmillan), the Gold Coast (Ephson), South Africa (Gerhart and Karis, in Karis and Carter), Tanganyika (Iliffe), Kenya (King and Salim); see also the series edited by Julien (p. 883) and the *Encyclopaedia Africana* (p. 882). The growth of the professions among black Africans is best documented for Nigeria: see Adewoye on lawyers and Fajana on teachers; studies of the press in West Africa have already been mentioned. There is no need

here to recapitulate the many references in regional bibliographies to studies of workers' movements. The social history of sport among black Africans has only just begun to receive close attention (Couzens). There is however a rapidly growing literature on the colonial experience of African women. The collection by Hay and Wright includes articles on our period by Chanock, Mann and Wells; other recent relevant studies concern Nigeria (Mann, Mba, Ifeka-Moller, Van Allen), South Africa (Gaitskell) and Kenya (Bujra, Hay, Strobel, White). It should moreover be noted that during our period five monographs were written specifically on African women south of the Sahara (and six on women in North Africa).

The appeal of educated West Africans to the imperial conscience has been surveyed by July, and by Kimble in his study of the Gold Coast. Willan's biography of Plaatje is essential for South Africa; see also Walshe's history of the ANC (p. 965). The study of transatlantic intellectual links was pioneered by Shepperson. Jacobs considers black American attitudes to the partition of Africa; she has also studied black American missionaries in Africa (p. 898). On Booker T. Washington and Africa, see Harlan, and also King (1971); on Aggrey, see Smith and King (1969). The development of Pan-African ideas and meetings has been magisterially reviewed by Geiss; there is a much slighter study by Esedebe (see also Fiesi). On Duse Mohamed, see Duffield; on Garvey, Cronon, Weisbord and Okonkwo (p. 938); on the Harlem renaissance, Huggins. Langley's excellent book explores the intellectual history of French as well as of British West Africa. Studies of African thought in France also include Hymans's biography of Senghor, a thesis by Spiegler (p. 926) and works listed on pp. 923–4 by Merlo, Sagna, Sow and Sy; also relevant is O'Melia's thesis on French Communists (p. 923). Soviet Russia's contacts with black Africa have been examined by Wilson; on its first ventures into African studies, see Darch and Littlejohn. On Communism in South Africa, see also Bunting and Johns, and on the British scene, Mackenzie (p. 889). African networks in London in the 1930s are further illuminated in biographies of Padmore (Hooker) and Kenyatta (Murray-Brown); see also Savage, and Rohdie (p. 944). The impact of the Ethiopian crisis on Africa and on blacks in the USA and the West Indies has been studied by Asante, Ross, and Weisbord.

6. THE MAGHRIB

The essential guide to both bibliographies and archives is the *Arab Islamic bibliography*, edited by Grimwood-Jones *et al.* (1977). Archival sources in the British Isles are listed by Matthews and Wainwright. There is a guide by Giglio to the records of the Italian foreign and defence ministries down to 1922. (This is especially important since in 1944 the British destroyed the records of the governor-generalate in Tripoli up to 1938.) Pearson's *Index Islamicus* is an indispensable resource. On Islam in North Africa, there is a recent annotated bibliography by Pessah Shinar. In 1930 bibliographies were produced by the Ministère de la Guerre for North Africa, and by the Gouvernement-général of Algeria. Between 1921 and 1962 a comprehensive 'Bibliographie marocaine' was published in *Hespéris* and its successor *Hespéris-Tamuda*. National bibliographies of Algeria and Tunisia, produced by their respective Bibliothèques nationales, have been in progress since 1963 and 1969. Libya is well served by Hill (1959) and Schlüter (1972 onwards). Books published on the whole of North Africa have been comprehensively listed and extensively reviewed in the *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord* (Aix-en-Provence, 1962–), which has a special section for works in Arabic. Landau has reviewed Soviet and East European writing on Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. An excellent critical bibliography of French North Africa in the period of this chapter is provided by Julien (1972), and an important classified list of works on its society and economy by Despois (the first two editions are especially important for works published during the period). Hodges provides the most extensive bibliography of the western Sahara. There are historiographical reviews for Algeria (Johnson) and North Africa (Brett) in the twentieth century.

France, as the major erstwhile colonial power in North Africa, holds most of the major collections of archival and other primary source material. The archives of the former government-general of Algeria are held in the Archives d'Outre-mer at Aix-en-Provence; those of Tunisia and Morocco are in the Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Quai d'Orsay. Those of the ministry of war, at Vincennes, are an important source. The Bibliothèque nationale has collections of newspapers, official publications and statistical material. Other institutions with

important holdings are CEDAO, CHEAM, CNRS, CRESM, ENA, FNSP and IIAP. In Italy, a large portion of the relevant archives is the collection of the Osservatorio Rurale, at Florence, in the Istituto Agronomico per l'Oltremare. The *Statistiques générales/ Annuaire statistiques* for Algeria, Tunisia (from 1913) and Morocco (from 1925) are now available on microfiches as are the reports and surveys of economic and commercial conditions compiled by British consuls in North Africa from 1921 onwards. Originally published by the Department of Overseas Trade, they cover the Spanish and Italian as well as the French territories, despite their title in the microfiche edition, *Economic surveys of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco*. Among periodicals, the *Revue algérienne, tunisienne et marocaine de législation et de jurisprudence* (1884–1962) is an indispensable record of French legislation.

Up to the mid-1950s, the secondary literature on our period was mainly concerned with North African society and economy. Since the achievement of independence, the main emphasis has been on politics, and from a very different point of view. Nonetheless, historians have continued for the most part to deal with individual countries; general histories of the region remain scarce. North Africa figures in a wider context in Roberts, Hardy, and Issawi; Libya in Miège. The three editions of *North West Africa* by Barbour and Knapp are good but necessarily brief on our period; so too is Abun-Nasr. De Leone is more substantial on the history of European settlement, but patchy. Among surveys of French North Africa, we may note Guernier, Despois's human geography (especially its first edition) and Julien's pioneering history of the rise of nationalism. Among more recent work, Hermassi should be read for his historical analysis, and there are several essays on North Africa in Coquery-Vidrovitch's symposium on the depression of the 1930s. There are several relevant reference works. The *Encyclopédie coloniale et maritime* (1947–8) provides background information on Algeria and the Algerian Sahara, Morocco and Tunisia; for the French Sahara, consult Capot-Rey. Girault sets out the legal foundations of the French regimes. The *Encyclopaedia of Islam* is useful. The biographical series *Les Africains* (Julien *et al.*) includes ten relevant essays (volume numbers are shown in parentheses): Algeria is represented by Ben Badis (2), Emīr Khaled (4), M'hammed ben Rahal (8), Messali Hadj (9); Tunisia by Tahar Haddad (7) and M'hamed Ali (11); Morocco by 'Assū

ū-Bā Slām (5), El-Glaoui (8), Mā'al-'Aynayn (12) and Allal el-Fassi (12).

There are a number of relevant works dealing with French imperialism in general or with its metropolitan background. The following are listed on pp. 921–3: studies of pressure groups and policies (Andrew *et al.*, Persell); colonial theory (Betts, Girardet), the École Coloniale (Rigollot), public opinion (Ageron), the French Communist Party (Moneta, O'Melia), colonial armies (Clayton, Marks, Nelson) and the influenza pandemic of 1918–19 (Gouzien, Huot *et al.*). Listed here are studies of anti-colonialism in France between the wars (Liauzu, 1982), debate among French socialists on North Africa (Zangar) and Algeria (Ageron, 1972) and in the French parliament (Mouton), French left-wing opinion on the Rif War (Slavin) and the North African policy of the Popular Front (Nouschi). Studies of European diplomacy concerning North Africa are listed on pp. 883–6: on Morocco, Allain, Barlow, Barraclough and Rivet; on Italian imperialism, Bessis, Bosworth, Caroselli, Cole, Hess, Mack Smith, Rainero, E. M. Robertson and Zaghi.

On Algeria, the outstanding works are those of Ageron (1964, 1979); conventionally French and Muslim points of view are expounded by C. Martin and Lacheraf. Vatin's survey is very useful, while Bourdieu remains a good introduction. The immense Saharan territories are covered by official publications (Gouvernement-général). On Tunisia, Kassab's book is part of a four-volume history; Poncet surveys the history of European settlement; and Bourguiba (1954) gives his own account. On Morocco, A. Ayache (1956) weighs up the protectorate: Brignon *et al.* is a textbook; Julien is idiosyncratic but valuable. García Figueras surveys the Spanish zone. On Libya in general in our period there is little apart from Wright. On the Spanish Sahara, some relevant information can be got from Baroja, Hodges, Thompson and Adloff, Mercer, and Rezette.

Until about 1922, the histories of Algeria and Tunisia under French rule were distinct from those of Morocco and Libya, both still in process of conquest. Ageron has made a massive study of the problems of Algeria's Muslim population; see also Nouschi (1961). More recently, Christelow and von Sivers have looked at the advantages of the Muslim élite. Charnay examines Muslim attitudes, Confer the movement for Muslim civil rights and Merad

(1969) the beginnings of Islamic and Arabic nationalism. On Tunisia, de Montety (in a study written in 1939) and Cannon consider the evolution of Tunisian society and attitudes. Ziadeh, Lejri and Green discuss the origins of Tunisian nationalism, as do studies by Tlili (1978), Liauzu (1970–5), Rainero and Sammut, which stress the role of the immigrant European workers. On the First World War there is a recent study of Algeria (Meynier), contemporary studies of Algeria and Tunisia (Demontès) and a study of North Africa (Bernard). On the constitutional question after the war, see on Algeria: Ageron (1970, 1972) and Kaddache (1973); on Tunisia: Taalbi and Goldstein.

Pre-protectorate Morocco is best treated by Burke, but see also Terrasse, and Parsons (p. 885). Morales Lezcano covers French and Spanish colonialism to 1927. Urban and rural society around the time of partition has been extensively described: see Brown, Le Tourneau, the collection edited by Gellner and Micaud, Hoover, Joffé and contemporary accounts, for example the volumes published by the Mission scientifique. The conquest of the Saharan region of Morocco is dealt with by Dunn (1977) and Trout; the great caids of the High Atlas by Montagne (1930) and Maxwell; see also Rivet. Lyautey and the imposition of French control is the subject of Scham and Bidwell; see also Burke (in Gellner and Micaud) and Pennell (1985) for comparison with the Spanish zone. García Figueras has examined Spanish policy in Africa up to 1912.

Despite a large contemporary literature, Libya before the Fascist period is much less accessible. Cachia surveys the country under the Ottomans. On the first few years of Italian occupation Malgeri, Kraïem and Hess (p. 884) supplement De Leone and Miège. Evans-Pritchard is masterly on the Sanūsi of Cyrenaica, whose fame has been at the expense of Tripolitania, though resistance there has now been studied by Barbar. Four papers in Joffé and McLachlan are especially helpful.

The inter-war years in North Africa are the subject of Berque's eccentric masterpiece. Works published before the depression, including those to celebrate the Algerian centenary year 1930, provide a colonialist view of economy and society at the moment of what Berque calls 'the false apogee' of French North Africa. Work of this kind on Algeria includes Demontès (1922–30), Bernard, *Les Cahiers du centenaire de l'Algérie*, and Gautier;

Morocco was treated by Goulven, the *Résidence générale*, Boutin, Graux, Hardy and Bernard. Comparable work on Tunisia came from the *Résidence générale* and Despois; Scemama (1938) surveyed the position after the depression. British Admiralty handbooks usefully describe the three French North African countries on the eve of the Second World War. Among later works, Brémard describes the regional organisation of Morocco, while Stewart studies its economy and Gallissot European settlement. Benachenhou considers the evolution of the Algerian economy in the period as a stage in underdevelopment. Studies of social change in town and country are represented for Algeria by Ageron (1972) and Lawless and Blake; for Morocco by Montagne (1951), Adam, Waterbury, Vinogradov, Abu-Lughod and Seddon; and for Tunisia by Plissard, Sammut (1977) and Kassab (1979). Early accounts of Italian settlement in Libya include Despois, Moore, and Zoli; recent studies include Ballico and Palloni, Johnson and Segré.

The final conquest of Cyrenaica was described triumphantly by Graziani and witnessed in 1930 by a Dane (Holmboe); since then (apart from Evans-Pritchard), it has mainly interested Libyans writing in Arabic, but see Rainero. The Rif War has attracted more widespread attention. Woolman's study was followed by an important symposium (*Colloque*) and studies by G. Ayache, Fleming and Pennell (1985). The final occupation of south-eastern Morocco in 1934 was described at the time by Spillmann.

Le Tourneau covers the rise of nationalism in French North Africa after the First World War; see also Allal el-Fassi. The important role of metropolitan parties and politics in this story is becoming increasingly apparent, though no work of synthesis on the subject has appeared as yet; in relation to Algeria, see Ageron (1972), Sivan (1976) and Koerner, as well as Nouschi and Zangar (p. 914). Algerian politics between the wars have been studied by Ohneck, Lee, Richardson and Kaddache, who has made a special study of nationalism; see also Nouschi (1962) and Mahsas. Merad (1964) examined the important question of the Muslim press before going on to study the movement for Islamic reform (1967). Sivan (1978) looks at the origins of the *Étoile nord-africaine*, and Zagoria at the career of Messali Hadj, whose memoirs have since been published. Ageron (1973, 1975, 1979) discusses various events of the 1930s.

For Tunisia, there are contemporary accounts of political

problems in the 1920s by Monchicourt (under the pseudonyms 'Rodd-Balek' and 'Cave'). Kraïem (1975) and Liauzu (1978) describe the important trade-union movement in the country, which Kraïem (1976), Sammut (1978) and Kraïem and Sammut (1979) relate to that of the nationalists. Kraïem (1976, 1981) and Tlili (1977, 1980) look at the socialist and communist background. In addition to Lejri's history of the nationalist movement, Tlili (1973) discusses the movement in the 1920s; Mahjoubi (1976) and Tlili (1976) consider the failures of 1922, and Kraïem (1975), Mahjoubi (1976) and Tlili (1980) the events of 1924–6. By contrast, there is little on the movement in the 1930s and the rise of the Neo-Destour apart from Bourguiba (1954) and Garas, and published documents: Bourguiba (1967) and the official history (*Mouvement national tunisien*); however, see Nouschi. Kraïem (1981) and Tlili (1979) look at aspects of the situation immediately before the Second World War. Memoirs of the 1930s have been published by Cohen-Hadria and Rachid.

For Morocco, there are relevant histories of colonial policy (Hoisington), nationalism (Halstead) and the trade-union movement (A. Ayache, 1982), and a study of Allal el-Fassi (Gaudio). Abun-Nasr treats the movement for Islamic reform, Brown (in Gellner and Micaud) the affair of the Dahir Berbère, and Ihraï-Aouchar the ever-important topic of the nationalist press. Fleming (1982) is a reminder of the Spanish zone and its relationship to the Spanish civil war.

Travel literature on Algeria and Tunisia in this period is generally bland, but sometimes of interest: see, for example, Grant and Grant, and Bodley. The numerous accounts of Morocco also decline in value after 1912. Harris is a last survivor of the old, O'Connor a good representative of the new style. Hardy (1930) is an anthology. On Libya, Forbes is famous for her visit to Kufra; Griffin and Denti di Pirajno, both medical doctors, trace the passage from high adventure to routine administration; Steer was a critical British journalist. Holmboe has been mentioned.

Brief note must be made of other varieties of historical testimony. Musso has assembled a photographic record of colonial life in Algeria, and Arnaudès recounts the annals of the Algiers opera. Béguin and Betts open up colonial architectural history. Guidance regarding imaginative literature in Algeria is given by Déjeux; Ostle (in Knapp) surveys North African writing in Arabic. Much relevant French fiction was produced in our

period. Writers such as Robert Randau (the official Arnaud), Louis Lecoq or Ferdinand Duchêne are of considerable historical interest albeit of little literary merit. In 1931–2 Henri de Montherlant wrote a major anti-colonial novel in Algiers and the work of Jean Amrouche presaged the great development of North African writing in French after the Second World War.

7. FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

There are excellent guides to archival and library sources for African history in France in the Unesco series; these are listed on p. 880. Unfortunately, the guide to archives stops in 1920, as do Charpy's inventories for the archives of French West Africa (see Maack). In 1974–6 some useful reports appeared in *History in Africa* on archives in Cameroun, Niger, Gabon, Mali, Chad and the Central African Republic; see also Deschamps for Gabon. There are two surveys of source materials of all kinds: Gardinier (in the Gifford and Louis collection) and Coquery-Vidrovitch and Moniot (1974). Further guidance may be found in Traillon, Joucla (on West Africa) and the bibliographies of Suret-Canale (1964/1971) and A. G. Hopkins, *An economic history of West Africa*.

In Paris, the records of the ministry of war are kept at the Château de Vincennes. Those of the ministry of colonies are in the National Archives, Section Outre-Mer; in 1986 they will be moved to the record office at Aix-en-Provence, which also has the archives of the government-general of French Equatorial Africa. Records of the government-general of French West Africa may be consulted on microfilm at the National Archives in Paris. Most Catholic missions have now deposited their archives in Rome, but records have been retained in Paris by the Holy Ghost Fathers as well as the Maison des Missions Évangéliques, and in Lyon by the Missions africaines. As for the records of the French import-export firms, access to these is still difficult.

In West Africa, the national archives of Senegal are of outstanding importance. Among the rest, the fullest and best organised are those of Mali, the Ivory Coast and Guinée; those of Niger have just been opened, while those of Bénin (Dahomey) are still being catalogued. In Equatorial Africa, little remains in Brazzaville except land registers. In Gabon, the national archives

are still being organised, but in Chad records from all over the country have been assembled at Djamena. For the territories formerly under mandate, the German colonial archives at Potsdam are a major source. The archives of Cameroun, at Yaoundé, have been well arranged, though in Togo only the German records have so far been catalogued. In each territory, valuable local records may still be found in regional centres: for examples from the former Upper Volta, see Marchal.

Many local newspapers for the period may be consulted in Paris, either in the Bibliothèque Nationale or in the National Archives, Section Outre-Mer; the latter also holds, in the records of SLOTFOM, collections of press-cuttings concerning anti-colonial activities between the wars. The West African newspapers for the period have been deposited at the Institut Fondamental de l'Afrique Noire (IFAN), Dakar, which has a good inventory; Boulègue and Guillaneuf give details of the press in Senegal and Togo respectively. Among the numerous relevant periodicals of the period, special mention should be made of the *Bulletin de l'Afrique française* and its supplement, *Renseignements coloniaux*.

Official publications of central importance include the *Bulletin officiel des colonies*; the *Journaux officiels* of the two federations and of the individual territories; the *Annuaire statistique*, especially for French West Africa and Madagascar; and the *Comptes définitifs* of each territory or group of territories. Complete runs of all these serials may be found in the library of the Section Outre-Mer, National Archives, Paris. Colonial statistics of external trade are patchy: there is a complete series up to 1914 (*Statistiques commerciales pour l'année...*), but thereafter they are limited to 1920–8 (*Renseignements généraux sur le commerce des colonies françaises en...*). The *Bulletin mensuel de l'agence économique de l'AOF* first appeared in 1922; the *Bulletin économique de l'AEF* in 1925. The Laboratoire 'Tiers Monde' at the University of Paris-VII has compiled an exhaustive record of colonial budgets and trade for the years 1900–40 or later.

In addition to routine official publications a few more personal works should be mentioned here. In 1923 Sarraut published a detailed statement of his economic strategy as minister for colonies. A posthumous collection of van Vollenhoven's writings includes circulars for West Africa from 1917 and earlier papers on general colonial policy (two of the latter were reprinted in

Delavignette and Julien). There is a well-known *apologia* by Delavignette (1939/1946), who served in Niger and Upper Volta in 1923–31 before occupying various key posts in colonial affairs in Paris. Angoulvant chronicled the French conquest of the Ivory Coast, while Reste reviewed his own governor-generalship in French Equatorial Africa.

The first French colonial governor to publish informal memoirs of his career was Deschamps (1975), who up to 1940 served in Madagascar, Paris and Djibouti. For the reminiscences of an official in the Ivory Coast up to 1914, see Simon; for those of a businessman in French Equatorial Africa, 1924–31, see Crémieu-Alcan. The letters of Mgr Augouard are an interesting, if deeply prejudiced, source for the French Congo. Among reports by non-official visitors, the best known is the journal kept by the novelist André Gide of his tour in 1925–6 through Moyen-Congo, Ubangi-Shari and Chad; this was in fact commissioned by the ministry of colonies (see also studies by Chadourne and Michaud). In 1929 the journalist Albert Londres recorded the horrors of recruitment for the Congo-Océan railway. M. Leiris kept a journal while secretary to Griaule's ethnographic expedition from Dakar to Djibouti in 1931–3; a journal by the linguists Charles and Marguerite Le Coeur covers their route through Niger and Chad in 1933–4, and in 1934 the English writer Geoffrey Gorer made perceptive observations in French West Africa. In 1935 the University of London instigated an enquiry into educational practice in French-speaking Africa (Mumford and Orde Browne). Records of African views are disappointingly few: see Tovalou-Houénou, Lamine Guèye's thesis of 1921, a pamphlet by Lamine Senghor and two essays by Léopold Senghor from 1937–9 (these works are listed, with other African writing in French, on p. 906). Guèye later wrote his memoirs, and our period is partly covered by the autobiographies recorded in Niger by Olivier de Sardan, and in Soudan (Mali) by Amidou Magasa; we may also note here Hampaté Bâ's semi-fictional biography of a pseudonymous Bambara who served as an official interpreter in Soudan from 1912 to c. 1925. Fiction itself should not be ignored. René Maran, a black civil servant from the Caribbean, won the Prix Goncourt in 1921 with a novel, *Batouala*, based on experience in Ubangi-Shari. Céline drew on impressions gained in Cameroun in 1916–17 (as a trading agent) and 1925 (as an epidemiologist for the League of Nations). Delavignette's service in Upper Volta is

reflected in his *Paysans noirs* (1931). There are studies of the colonial factor in French fiction by Lebel, Howe (p. 889), Fanoudh-Sieffer, Cairns and Steins, and of African writing in French by Blair (p. 909). There is unfortunately no French-language selection of primary materials on French black Africa though translated extracts on our period may be found in Hargreaves's *France and West Africa*.

Until a few years ago, scholars were denied access to French colonial records later than 1920. The best books in our field are mostly concerned with the period before 1914, and there are many questions on which it is still necessary to turn to older works whose authors were confined to printed sources and were influenced by colonial attitudes. In recent years, however, the unpublished sources for the inter-war period have been quarried by several younger historians, many of them African. Some of their first results have appeared in periodicals, notably *Cahiers d'études africaines*, the *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer* and the *Journal of African History*, but much remains in unpublished theses. These are listed here extensively, since the last relevant consolidated guide (Dinstel, p. 881) concluded in 1961 (though see CARDAN, p. 881). Specially important are theses written on Senegal for the University of Dakar and those written for the University of Paris-VII, mostly on the socio-economic history of twentieth-century Africa. They may be consulted in the research library of the Laboratoire 'Connaissance du Tiers-Monde', UER Géographie, Histoire et Sciences de la Société, Paris. The author of chapter 7 is heavily indebted to several of these works; the archival research on which they are based has brought to light much of the new material presented in that chapter.

The most comprehensive survey of the whole period is Suret-Canale's excellent work, though Buell (1928) and the more orthodox Roberts (1929) are still worth consulting on a wide range of subjects. For an attempt to see the period in a longer historical perspective, see Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976). *France and Britain in Africa*, edited by Gifford and Louis, includes relevant essays on mandates, administration, economics, and education by Austen, Cohen, Deschamps, Fieldhouse, Gifford and Weiskel; see also the collection presented to Brunschwig (p. 882). Girardet (1972) examines French awareness of the colonial empire; Betts (1978) is a brief but wide-ranging survey.

The first general history of French West Africa was that of

Delafosse (1931); for more recent studies of the whole region see Hargreaves and Chailley. Useful background material on both French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa is provided in four volumes of the *Encyclopédie coloniale et maritime* (1949–51) and in the handbooks produced for the British Admiralty in 1942–3; see also the works of Thompson and Adloff. For a recent historical survey of French Equatorial Africa, see Austen and Headrick; see also Terrier (1931), Bruel (1918, 1935), and the work of the geographers Maurette and Sautter. The advent of political independence prompted general histories of Cameroun, Chad, Dahomey and Togo, but these should now be used with caution. More recent is Kalck's history of Ubangi-Shari, which draws on a much longer thesis, and Manning's work on Dahomey. Coquery-Vidrovitch's study of French Congo covers most of our period. Fuglestad and Salifou have written theses on Niger, and Pambo-Loueya on Gabon. The biographical series *Les Africains* (Julien *et al.* p. 883) includes essays (volume numbers in parentheses) on Amadu Bamba (2), Atangana (5), Diagne (12), Guèye (3), S. Hamahullah (9), Karnou (4), Matswa (11), Njoya (9), and Wongo (11).

It is over half a century since the last attempt was made to examine the evolution of French colonial government in Africa both at the regional and at the metropolitan level (Roberts, 1929). For some reflections on supposed contrasts with British policy and practice, by a retired governor, see Deschamps (1963). Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1974) consider colonial pressures on French legislators; Persell examines the 'colonial lobby' in France. There is no adequate study of the French colonial ministry in our period. On the French colonial service in Africa, see Cohen; on the *École coloniale*, Rigollot. There is a short eulogy of van Vollenhoven by Mangeot (1943), a biography of Maurice Delafosse by his daughter (Delafosse, 1976) and essays on colonial governors, Delavignette, Éboué and Ponty, in the collection edited by Gann and Duignan (p. 883). For reference material on colonial legislation, see Girault, and Rolland and Lampué. On French West Africa, there are essays on land law (Hugues, Demaison) and studies of African law and custom (Robert; Comité d'études); for a recent sceptical analysis of 'customary' law in Senegal, see Snyder. The only general military history is that of Denis (1931).

on French Equatorial Africa, but Echenberg has studied military conscription in French West Africa and a survey of the French military in Africa is expected from Clayton.

At the territorial level, there are studies of colonial administration over all or most of the period for Dahomey (Asiwaju, Lombard, Moseley), the Ivory Coast (Amon d'Aby), Senegal (Zucarelli), Togo (Péchoux), northern Cameroun (Burnham), Congo (Aissi, Bafouetela) and Ubangi-Shari (Weinstein; see also his biography of Governor Éboué). African politics in the communes of Senegal have been well studied up to 1920 by Wesley Johnson (1971). Anti-colonial resistance in Dahomey throughout the period has been examined by Anignikin (see also Suret-Canale, 1964); for migration out of the Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, see Asiwaju, and Nazi Boni (p. 923). Several studies of the period have focused on particular peoples: the Gurunsi and Mossi of Upper Volta (Duperray, Skinner); the Mawri of Niger (Piault); the Beti of Cameroun (Quinn); the Kugni and Kongo of Congo (Boussoukou-Boumba, Kinata Côte); the Bandia of Ubangi-Shari (de Dampierre); the peoples of eastern Chad (Moukhtar); the Fang of Gabon (Fernandez).

For the economic history of the period, Marseille (1984) is essential on metropolitan factors. Coquery-Vidrovitch, in Brunschwig (p. 882), compares French West and Equatorial Africa. There is reference material for the earlier years in French West Africa in Cosnier (1921). On the Ivory Coast see Kipré and Yayat d'Alepe (up to 1919); on Senegal, Mbodj and the quantitative analysis by Vanhaeverbeke. Investment in French West Africa has been examined by Coquery-Vidrovitch (1977); she and Laurens-Berge have also studied the big trading companies in the region. For big business in the Congo, see Rey (1971) and Coquery-Vidrovitch (1972). On railways, see Faur (French West Africa) and N'Jazry (Senegal); on public works in the Ivory Coast, Semi-Bi (1973), and on copper-mining in Congo, Ndinga-Bo. African traders in Niger have been studied by Baier. The provident societies of French West Africa were described by Boyer in 1935; for those in Senegal, see also A. Sow. On the forest resources of French black Africa, see Bertin (1918–20/1929).

There are general studies of social change in relation to the Ivory Coast (Semi-Bi) and Souanke, in the northern Congo

(Robineau); see also accounts of Dakar (Seck), Brazzaville (Frey), Porto Novo (Tardits) and Douala (Derrick) and Kipré's study of urbanisation in the Ivory Coast. Demographic studies have been attempted for the Congo, by Koumba-Bayengoula, and for the Ivory Coast, by Domergue. The latter has also studied the medical history of that territory, while that of Cameroun and Chad has been examined by Delancey and Azevedo in the collection by Hartwig and Patterson (p. 892). There are theses on railway workers in Dahomey (Cocou) and on forced labour in Senegal (B. Fall); Cordell and Gregory have studied labour migration in Upper Volta. On education in French West Africa up to 1920, there is a magisterial study by Bouche (1975) and a brief survey of the whole period by Sabatier. For education in Senegal, see also Blakemore in Battle and Lyons (p. 882); for Guinée, Johnson in Brown and Hiskett (p. 882); for the Ivory Coast, Allangba. There are studies of missionary schools in Guinée (Donkoure), Soudan (Harding) and Gabon (N'doumé Assebe), and also of education and administration in Dahomey up to 1920 (Garcia, 1971). Other studies of the Christian impact (listed on pp. 895–902) focus on Dahomey (Alladaye, Hardy), Ivory Coast (Bée, van Slageren, Welch), Togo (Grau, Debrunner), French Equatorial Africa (Villemagne), Cameroun (Bouchaud, Bureau, Hallden, Ngongo), French Congo (Andersson); there is an overall survey by Sartorius. Studies of Islam are listed on pp. 903–5. There is still too little to set beside Gouilly's account of Islam in French West Africa: Triaud's work on the Ivory Coast, Cruise O'Brien's book on the Murids of Senegal and Traore's thesis on Hamallism in West Africa. African voices were often prominent in the colonial press: there are theses on Dahomey (Codo Lokossou) and Togo (Guillaneuf).

For the years before 1914, Brunschwig (1966) provides a stimulating sketch of French expansion; see also Coquery-Vidrovitch in Gann and Duignan (1969, p. 883). The importance of African questions for French politics up to the First World War has been examined by Andrew, Grupp and Kanya-Forstner, and by Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1971, 1976); for the role of socialists and anti-colonialists, see Suret-Canale (1978) and Thomas (1960). Rabut (1979) considers attempts to control the concession companies. On French colonial theory during this period, see Betts (1961); for French West Africa, see Forgeron

(1920) and Cruise O'Brien's study of the Muslim factor in French policy-making (p. 903). Michel (1974) examines Mangin's (1910) arguments for a *force noire*; Balesi surveys black troops from French West Africa up to 1918.

There are now studies of colonial conquest and administrative expansion in the Congo (Mazenot) and Gabon (Berre, Mangongo Nzambi); there is also a more restricted study of Dahomey (Pinçon). Other scholars have concentrated on African reactions to 'pacification'; in Mauritania (Ba), Senegal (Klein, Roche), the Ivory Coast (Chériff, Weiskel, Wondji), Niger (Idrissa), Chad (Moukhtar). There is much material on economic change before 1914 in studies already mentioned which range well beyond that date. Bobrie has investigated the costs of French conquest. For some reflections on French colonial trade before 1914, see Marseille (1976). Mangolte has studied the railway from the Guinée coast to the Niger. Bouche (1968) throws valuable if indirect light on early labour history in French black Africa; Betts and M'bokolo have studied the social implications of disease in Dakar.

Debate in France on the role of her colonies in the First World War has been examined by Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1981). Marc Michel's outstanding study of French West Africa's involvement in the war (1982) was preceded by articles on recruitment in that region (1973), the search for overseas troops in 1918 (1971) and the political effects of war in Senegal (1974). Crowder provides a brief survey for West Africa. There are articles on the social effects of recruitment in Guinée (Summers and Johnson), Dahomey (d'Almeida Topor), the Ivory Coast (Domergue, 1976; Picciola); there is a thesis on Cameroun by Ngande. Resistance movements during the war have received special attention: in Dahomey (Garcia, 1970), Upper Volta (Hébert), Niger (Fuglestad, Salifou, Triaud) and Cameroun (Quinn). The Harris movement in the Ivory Coast has been studied by Bureau, Haliburton, Paulme and Shank (see pp. 896–901). On the influenza epidemic of 1918–19, see the reports of 1920–1 by Gouzien and Huot *et al.*

Research on the inter-war years has recently greatly increased. French hopes of colonial gains during and after the First World War are discussed by Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1981). Ageron considers relations with Germany (p. 883) and French public opinion; on African troops in occupied Germany, see Nelson and

Marks. Moneta and O'Melia examine the views of the French Communist Party on the colonial question. For African anti-colonial activity in France, see Langley (p. 911), Sagna, Sow and Sy. On the 'German question' in Cameroun, see Joseph and Derrick. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1979) offers a general review of French colonial policy between the wars; Cohen (1972) looks at that of the Popular Front; Ageron, Michel and Marseille have contributed to a symposium on French attitudes to empire in the later 1930s. Michel discusses the reformist approach of Delafosse to 'native policy' in 1919; Labouret criticised orthodox ideas about chiefs in 1931; and there is a thesis by Auchnie on chiefs in Senegal. On the conference of colonial governors-general in 1936, see Marseille (1977); on the Popular Front's attitude to forced levies in West Africa, see Bernard-Duquenot. There are theses on the impact of the Popular Front in Senegal (Bernard-Duquenot; see also Person) and the Ivory Coast (Lomme), and on Cameroun between the wars (Tchoualle).

For some general reflections on the economic history of the inter-war period, see Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976, 1978) and Durand. Investment in French colonies is examined by Dresch, Bobrie and Marseille (1974, 1977); for colonial links with the French cotton industry, see Marseille (1975). Poquin considers the external economic relations of French black Africa. The depression of 1930 and its aftermath is the theme of several studies. Some have been collected by Coquery-Vidrovitch (1976): these include papers on public investment (Bobrie), the Bank of (French) West Africa (Zinsou-Derlin), the trading firm of Peyrissac (Robin), Dakar (Lakroum), the Ivory Coast (Braibant), Guinée (Trentadue), Togo (Batsch). Articles published elsewhere concern West Africa (d'Almeida Topor, on wage labour), the Ivory Coast (Tiacoh) and Senegal (Mersadier); industrialisation in Senegal is treated in a thesis by Fall.

The economic and social condition of Africans was the subject of some valuable enquiries between the world wars, culminating in reports on French West Africa by Moreau (1938) and Labouret (1941). A study of sleeping-sickness in this region appeared in 1924 (Vassal); there is a thesis by Domingo on preventive medicine in Dahomey since 1914. In 1938 there was an anonymous report on food supplies in the French colonies; this can now be supplemented by articles on food production in Cameroun

(Guyer) and on the great famine of 1931 in Niger (Fugelstad), as well as the study of famine in Gabon in Sautter (1966). There are theses on banana plantations in Guinée (Brouwer) and on agricultural 'colonisation' in Chad (Moussabou). For cattle-keeping in French West Africa, see Mathis (1946). In 1933 Mercier reported on forced labour in French Africa; there is a thesis on forced labour and migration in Cameroun (Koufan), while Sautter has examined the human cost of the Congo-Océan railway. The growth of wage labour has been studied in relation to Senegal (Lakroum) and Cameroun (Chatap; see also Kaptue); the impact of the 1930s depression on Africans in Guinée (Trentadue) and towns in the Ivory Coast (Kipré) and Cameroun (Kouo). The only white community to have been studied in detail over the inter-war period is that of the Ivory Coast (Tirefort).

Hitherto, research on the politics of African labour between the wars has concentrated on Senegal, where the railway strikes of 1919 and 1938 have been studied by Thiam (1977, 1972), while Bernard-Duquenet (1977) has examined the beginnings of trade unionism in the 1930s. On the popular protest in Porto Novo in 1923, see Ballard and Anignikin; on African politics in the communes of Senegal, see Thiam (1976) and Cissojho. The roots of African nationalism in popular thought have been studied in a thesis by Merlo; a thesis by Spiegler considers nationalist thought in French West Africa before 1939, while Owona discusses its emergence in Cameroun; Codo Coffi's thesis on the press in Dahomey is also pertinent, as is Hymans's biography of Senghor (p. 910). The revolt of the Baya, in French Equatorial Africa, in 1928–32, is the subject of a thesis by Nzabakomada; see also Michel (1966) and Burnham and Christensen. Matswa's movement in French Congo is described by Sinda. Coquery-Vidrovitch, in Julien *et al.* (p. 883), vol. 11, examines Wongo's revolt in Gabon. Education between the wars has been studied by Welé (Senegal) and Mvondo Nyina (Cameroun); Kelly considers the teaching of history in French West Africa.

Madagascar

In Tananarive, the archives of the Malagasy Republic (AMR) house the records of the central government. These include correspondence with the provinces, but this is not an adequate

basis for studying local history. Apart from files on chambers of commerce, the AMR hold few business records, though they and the Académie Malgache have collections of local newspapers. Several ecclesiastical bodies in or near Tananarive possess important archives: the Roman Catholic archbishopric, the Jesuits, the Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar (formerly the London Missionary Society), the Anglican and Norwegian Lutheran churches.

In Paris, the archives of the ministry of colonies contain abundant material on the political history of Madagascar (duplicating much of that in Tananarive) and on economic affairs since 1930; the records of the Inspection générale des colonies are also highly relevant. The record office at Aix-en-Provence holds material on political affairs and possesses the fullest set of annual district reports (though even this has serious gaps); here also are reports from departments and from inspection missions between 1925 and 1940, but none from governors-general between 1915 and 1940.

There is as yet no guide to archival materials for Madagascar. There is however a comprehensive bibliography by Grandidier, continued by Fontvieille, and a very full list of periodicals concerned with Madagascar, based largely on the holdings of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris (Poitelon *et al.*) The history department of the University of Madagascar publishes the journal *Omaly sy Anio* ('Yesterday and Today'); this began in 1975 and each issue has included material on the period 1905–40.

The only French administrators in Madagascar to have published memoirs for this period are Olivier (governor, 1924–30) and Deschamps (p. 986), who served there in 1926–30 and much of 1933–8. Mannoni's celebrated psychological study of colonial relationships was based on experience gained as an ethnographer. Marcuse offers impressions of Sakalava country in 1911–12.

Our period receives relatively little space in the general histories of Madagascar by Boiteau, Deschamps and Ralaimihoatra; Brown gives it five pages. There is as yet no general study of Madagascar under colonial rule. For general reference, see (in chronological order of publication) Délelée-Desloges, Rusillon, *Encyclopédie de l'Empire français*, Isnard, Robequain, Thompson and Adloff, Rajemisa-Raolison.

The administrative evolution of the colonial government has

7 FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

been studied by Massiot; there is also a thesis by Richard on the administration of Augagneur. For earlier studies of French rule, see Olivier and You; for a recent critical appraisal, Fremigacci (1978). Slawecki has studied French policy towards Chinese immigrants. On the local impact of the Popular Front government in France, see Koerner (1974). The Malagasy role in colonial administration is examined by Fenard and Condominas. There are relevant essays by Schlemmer and Randrianja in Raison-Jourde's collection on kingship. Studies of Christianity are listed on pp. 897–902: on relations between church and state, see Vidal; on Malagasy Protestants, Mondain, Koerner (1971) and Gow.

There are several early studies of economic change (Loisy, Fauchère, Gayet). On forced labour, see Fremigacci (1975); on Madagascar during the First World War, see Garbit (the governor in 1914–17); Gontard (1969) and Esoavelomandroso (1975); the last named has also studied African reactions to measures against plague between the wars. On the depression, see Prunières. There are recent articles on food supplies (Feugeas), business (Jacob and Koerner) and local ironworking (Fremigacci); see also essays by Waast and Fauroux in Sautter *et al.* Economic reference material for the period may be found in Razoharinoro-Randriamboavonjy.

On official language policy in education, see Esoavelomandroso (1976). For the roots of Malagasy nationalism see Kent, Daman-ntsoha, Rabemananjara (J. and R. W.) and Solohery Ranarison; on Ravoahangy, see Tronchon; on Ralaimongo, Domenichini.

Schlemmer has made a study of the colonial period among the Menabe of western Madagascar. Various other regional studies, mostly sociological, are useful for the period: on the Androy (Decary), Antaisaka and the south-east (Deschamps, 1959), Sakalava (Fauroux) and Tanala (Linton).

8. BRITISH WEST AFRICA AND LIBERIA

There are several useful territorial bibliographies: for the Gambia (Gamble); the Gold Coast/Ghana (Cardinall, Johnson, Witherell and Lockwood); Nigeria (Aguolu, Baum); Sierra Leone (Luke, Williams); Kamerun/Cameroons (De Lancey) and Liberia (Holsoe, 1971, 1976). There are lists of government publications for Nigeria (Lockwood), Sierra Leone and the Gambia (Walker) and Liberia (Holsoe, 1968). There are also various regional and

thematic bibliographies: for Asante (Afre), the Ewe (Arkaifie, Zielnica), the Niger Delta (Ombu), labour in Nigeria (Orimalade), anthropology and language study in Nigeria (Ita), urbanisation (Simms), politics in the Gold Coast/Ghana (Agyei), medicine in West Africa (Tetty). For the economic history of West Africa, see the bibliography in Hopkins (1973) and his articles on business history (listed on p. 893).

For guides to archives in Europe and the USA, see above, p. 880. For archives in the Gambia, see Gailey (1968); for Ghana, Henige and Dumett (1974); for Sierra Leone, Howard (1966); for Kamerun, Mohammadou; for Liberia, Foley. There are brief reports on archives in Ghana, Cameroun and Liberia in *History in Africa* (1974, 1976, 1978). A list by C. Fyfe of the Sierra Leone archives is in the library of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London. In 1961–3 the Nigerian National Archives produced a series of mimeographed lists of records for particular departments and topics: outside Nigeria, the largest holdings of these are at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London.

For the former British territories, the relevant government records have been preserved at the Public Record Office, London, and in the archives of the new African states. Official correspondence and memoranda concerning German Togo are divided between the colonial archives in Potsdam, the National Archives of Ghana and the Archives Nationales du Togo (whose German records have now been catalogued). Official records for Kamerun are preserved in Yaoundé and Potsdam; those of the British mandate are in Buea and London. Those for Liberia are in Monrovia, while the US National Archives in Washington, DC are also important. On the relevant business and missionary records, see the bibliographical essays for chapters 2 and 3. Papers of the (Royal) Niger Company and of John Holt and Co. have been deposited at Rhodes House, Oxford; there is a full report on the former by the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts.

For the Gold Coast, Metcalfe provides a useful selection of documents, chiefly from official records; their political emphasis is complemented by Kay and Hymer's collection of economic source material. For West Africa, Newbury provides few documents for the period but his statistical appendices are relevant, as are those of Talbot and Helleiner for Nigeria. Official ideas on colonial government are expounded in Lugard's *Dual mandate* (p.

887) and compilations for Nigeria by Kirk-Greene (1965, 1972). Published recollections of the period by former officials are mostly superficial, but there are thoughtful reflections on Nigeria by Temple and Crocker; see also the memoirs of Sylvia Leith-Ross. Two journalists wrote books worth listing here: E. D. Morel, who visited Nigeria in 1910, and Lethbridge, who toured West Africa in 1920. Margery Perham recorded her tour of West Africa in 1931–2. On Liberia, Sibley reports on a tour in about 1925 on behalf of educationists in the USA; Strong describes social conditions and customs in the report of the Harvard scientific expedition of 1926–7; the novelist Graham Greene travelled through Liberia in 1935. The weekly *West Africa*, founded in 1917, provides a conspectus of opinion, black and white, official and unofficial. Other newspapers, and works by leading African publicists, such as Danquah and Azikiwe, are cited in the essay for chapter 5. The reminiscences of Azikiwe and Awolowo shed light on the period, while those of Okafor-Omali and Akiga offer valuable impressions of rural Nigeria. Akiga (a Tiv) is represented in Westermann's collection of African autobiographies (p. 906), which also includes one from Benin, four from Togo and one from Sierra Leone. In 1949–50 Mary Smith recorded at length the autobiography of a Hausa woman, Baba, who was a young girl at the turn of the century. Chinua Achebe's novel *Arrow of God* is set in Ibo country after the First World War.

Introductions to the period may be found in Crowder (1968) and Ajayi and Crowder (1974). Hopkins (1973) provides a lucid, illuminating and extensive analysis of economic change during the period. For other surveys, notably that by R. L. Buell, see works listed on pp. 882–3. Much research on the period appears in the *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* and the *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*.

The best general survey of any one territory throughout the period remains Coleman's study of Nigeria; the period is very briefly treated in Crowder's *Story of Nigeria* and the histories of the Gambia by J. M. Gray and H. Gailey. Bourret provides an introduction to the inter-war years in the Gold Coast. The official handbooks for the Gold Coast (Maxwell) and Sierra Leone (Goddard) are useful; the Nigeria handbook (eleventh edition, 1936) is less so, but was supplemented by numerous local gazetteers compiled by district officials (cf. Kirk-Greene, 1972).

The economic history of British West Africa during our period

was pioneered by McPhee (1926) and Hancock (1942 p. 892), whose work still repays study; they were followed by Bauer's classic investigation of oligopoly (1954, p. 891) and by Perham's collections of essays on the economy of Nigeria (1946, 1948). Szereszewski offers a perhaps over-ambitious analysis for the Gold Coast. Ekundare's economic history of Nigeria is analytically weak but contains much official data; Howard's contentious study of the Gold Coast must be handled with care. For the colonial finances of Sierra Leone, see Cox-George and Sibanda; Kaniki provides a general survey of the 1930s. Government economic management in the Gold Coast is examined by Cox-George, Bening and Sederberg; Agbodeka and Meredith assess Guggisberg's schemes. Carland considers government finance in Southern Nigeria before 1914, and Ikime the finances of native administration in northern Nigeria. Newbury (in the collection for Brunschwig: p. 882) considers the economics of amalgamation in Nigeria. On transport, see Gould (Gold Coast) and Hay, Njoku and Walker (Nigeria). There is a history, by Fry, of the Bank of British West Africa, and studies of currency in Nigeria by Hopkins and Ofonagoro (see pp. 892, 894). The starting-point for colonial demographic history remains Kuczynski's sceptical analysis of official statistics. On disease in the Gold Coast, see Scott, Patterson and essays by Brown and Patterson in the collection edited by Hartwig and Patterson (listed on p. 892); there is a history, by Schram, of the health services in Nigeria.

Economic historians of colonial West Africa have understandably concentrated on the production and marketing of the main cash-crops. Polly Hill's sociological approach to cocoa-farming in the Gold Coast is now complemented by Gunnarsson's quantitative study, while Berry and Hopkins provide specifically historical studies of cocoa-farming in Nigeria. For cotton-growing, see Cowley and Nworah (Nigeria), and Dumett (Gold Coast); for Tiv benniseed (*simsim*), Dorward; for groundnuts, Hogendorn (Nigeria) and Jeng (Gambia); for the oil-palm, Ekechi, Martin, Meredith and Usoro (Nigeria) and Makannah (Sierra Leone); for livestock, Patterson (Gold Coast). On the growth of co-operatives in Nigeria, see Adedeye. Hopkins (1966, 1977) has examined the careers of African traders and businessmen in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, while the business activities of Duse Mohammed Ali have been studied by Duffield (p. 910).

Fascinating profiles of West African businessmen may be found in Macmillan's compendium *The red book of West Africa* (1920). Cocoa hold-ups in the Gold Coast have attracted several historians: see, e.g., Milburn, Howard, Ehrler and Miles, and also Southall.

The history of expatriate business in our period is still too little known. Munro has studied British rubber interests in West Africa and Newbury the commercial activities of the Niger Company; Ofonogoro has used the John Holt papers. The study of the United Africa Company was pioneered by Mars in Perham's collection on Nigeria (1948) but has not been greatly advanced by Pedler or the histories of Unilever by Wilson and Fieldhouse (pp. 894, 892). The West African Shipping Conference and Elder Dempster (the dominant British shipping firm) are better known through the work of Leubuscher and Davies (pp. 893, 891). On tin-mining in Nigeria, see Freund; on diamond-mining, Greenhalgh (West Africa) and Kaniki (Sierra Leone); on the search for petroleum in Nigeria, see Carland.

Cadbury's operations in the Gold Coast are the subject of a thesis by Southall. Kaniki and van der Laan have studied Lebanese traders in Sierra Leone. As for the history of African labour in our period, this too has only recently been undertaken. In Nigeria, the tin-mines have been studied by Freund and Morrison, and the railways by Oyemakinde and Mason (in Gutkind *et al.*); for the Gold Coast, there are studies of the gold mines (Crisp), and forced labour in the north (Thomas). For Sierra Leone, there are studies of official labour policy (Amolo), and worker protest (Conway and Denzer). The social history of labour in Nigeria was pioneered by Osoba's article on migration; Igbafe has written on the transition from domestic slavery in Benin, and the growth of a working-class in Lagos is explored by Hughes and Cohen (in Gutkind *et al.*).

The central administration of Nigeria has been examined by White. Hailey's survey of local government in British West Africa is still useful for reference. The study of indirect rule in Nigeria may still begin with Perham (1937); see also Bull (in Robinson and Madden, p. 890). Nicolson's more recent survey is highly critical of Lugard and his influence. For southern Nigeria, Tamuno (1972) has studied the early phase of colonial rule and Adewoye (1977) the judicial system. There are over-respectful studies of colonial officials in northern Nigeria (Heussler) and the

Gold Coast (Kuklick); and major biographies of Lugard (Perham, 1960) and Guggisberg (Wraith); that of Cameron (Gailey) is disappointing. A biography of Clifford, by A. J. Stockwell, is imminent; meanwhile, see Gailey's essay in Gann and Duignan's *African proconsuls* (p. 883), which also includes an essay on Lugard by Flint. Tamuno has studied the Nigerian police. Home and Mohammed consider town planning in Nigeria. The colonial impact on indigenous polities has attracted much research. Crowder and Ikime provide some early examples from different parts of West Africa. For Nigeria, there are studies of the Yoruba (Asiwaju, Peel), Oyo (Atanda), Benin (Bradbury, Igbafe), Itsekiri (Ikime), Ibo (Afigbo), Idoma (O'kwu), Tiv (Dorward), Hausa (Fika, Smith); for the Gold Coast, the Asante (Busia, Tordoff) and Dagbon (Staniland), and in Sierra Leone, the Mende (Abraham). There are also several local studies addressed specifically to African protest: in Nigeria, of Oyo (Atanda), Abeokuta (Ausman, Gailey), western Ibo (Igbafe), Aba (the Ibo women's war) (Ifeka-Moller, Van Allen; see also Mba), Satiru (Adeleye); in the Gold Coast, Cape Coast (Shaloff), Akim Abuakwa and Kwahu (Simensen).

The first studies of territorial politics were devoted to the legislative councils of Nigeria (Wheare; see also Tamuno, 1966) and the Gold Coast (Wight; see also Priestley). On the growth of a modern political élite in the Gold Coast, see Kimble's massive study; see also Asante, Edsman, Rohdie, Denzer, and Spitzer and Denzer. Politics in Lagos have been examined by Cole; see also Tamuno (1975) and Duffield. On Sierra Leone, see Kilson, Spitzer and Harrell-Bond *et al.* Macaulay, Carr and Casely Hayford are discussed by July. The West African and international dimensions of politics during the period are surveyed by Langley; see also Asante, Geiss (p. 910), Okonkwo, and Kilson (in Rotberg and Mazrui, p. 883). On the press and its control in Nigeria, see Omu; for the Gold Coast, see Ekwelie, Jones-Quartey, Shaloff and Twumasi. The only historical survey of education throughout British West Africa (Hilliard) is brief and descriptive. For Sierra Leone, education in our period is treated at length by Sumner, but it has still to receive extended treatment in relation to the Gold Coast or Nigeria. There are valuable studies of important personalities: Aggrey (Smith, King, pp. 911–12) and, for Nigeria, Vischer (Graham, p. 897), Carr (Fajana) and Ojo-Cole (Olusanya).

For Nigerian education see also Allen, Fajana, Gbadamosi (p. 904), Hubbard (in Brown and Hiskett, p. 882) and Tiben-derana. For the Gold Coast, see Foster and Thomas. Mba has studied the political activity of women in southern Nigeria, while Mann has focused on the female Christian élite in Lagos. Other studies of the Christian impact on British West Africa during our period are listed on pp. 895–902. For Nigeria: Ayandele (1966, 1970), Boer, Cooke, Crampton, Ekechi, Graham, Grimley and Robinson, Isichei, Jordan, Mitchell, Peel, Tasie, Turner and Webster. For the Gold Coast: Baëta, Bartels, Breidenbach, Debrunner, Der, Grau, Jenkins, Mobley, Parsons, N. Smith.

The impact of the First World War on Nigeria has been studied at length by Osuntokun (1979); on wartime unrest there, see also Atanda (1969) and Ausman; on demobilisation, Matthews; on the Gold Coast, see Killingray, Lucas, Cox-George and Gannon; on Sierra Leone, Cox-George; on the Gambia, Hatton. On West African carriers, see Killingray and Matthews; on military recruitment in the Gold Coast, Thomas (1975). There is an official history of the RWAFF by Haywood and Clarke; on the Nigeria Regiment, see also Barrett. Studies of the West African campaigns and their results are cited below.

For contrasting perspectives on the general background to German West Africa and the British mandates, see works by Gann and Duignan (p. 888) and by Stoecker (p. 890); see also the compilation by Gifford and Louis (p. 883); Newbury's contribution to the latter considers the German colonial secretary's tour of West Africa in 1913. Military operations in the First World War are reviewed by Moberly and by Osuntokun. Kuczynski surveys demographic data for Togo and the Cameroons under German and British rule.

There are general histories, of Togo by Cornevin, and of the Cameroons by Mveng and Eyongetah and Brain. The latter rely heavily on Rudin's classic study of German rule in Kamerun. Knoll's brief survey of German Togo is superficial; it should be supplemented by Amenumey, Darkoh and W. D. Smith's essay on governor Zech in Gann and Duignan (p. 883). Seitz's voluminous memoirs are listed on p. 966. Economic change in Kamerun has been carefully studied by Hausen and Wirz; for studies of Duala, see Austen and Rüger. The plantations are discussed by Michel, and the health of plantation-workers by

Delancey, in Hartwig and Patterson (cf. p. 892). On German administration, see Chilver (in Gifford and Louis, p. 883) and Quinn (1972); for biographies of prominent Africans in Kamerun, Laburthe-Tolra (Julien vol. 5: p. 883); Quinn (1980) and Ritzenhaler. The partition of Kamerun is discussed by Osuntokun, and British administration by Chilver (in Robinson and Madden, p. 890), Chilver and Kaberry and Gardinier (in Gifford and Louis, p. 883). Studies of Christian missions in Togo (Debrunner, Müller) and Kamerun (Berger, Hallden, Lantum) are listed on pp. 895–99.

Liberia

The best survey of the period remains Buell's *Liberia*; see also his *Native problem* (p. 882). For more recent studies of Liberia's external relations see Akingbade, Schmokel, Sundiata, Akpan and Uhomoibhi. Brown remains the best survey of Liberia's economic history, though there is a detailed study by Chalk of the 1927 Firestone agreement; see also Chaudhuri. Sundiata has examined the export of Liberian labour to Fernando Po. The politics of the Americo-Liberian élite are illuminated by Liebenow; its relations with indigenous societies are examined by Akpan, Davis, Freeman and Haliburton; for the ethnography, see Schwab (based on a tour in 1928); and on Christianity, Cason (p. 896).

9. BELGIAN AFRICA

The Belgian Congo

The basic guide to sources is Vellut (1974); see also the ARSOM *Livre blanc*, Walraet, Bustin (1971) and Stengers (1979). From the inception of Belgian colonial administration, in 1908, the archival sources are very rich. They are not, however, very accessible. In Zaïre, colonial records are dispersed among different government offices; there is a national archives service but it is very short of resources. For details, see Jewsiewicki (1980), Harms, Reeve and *Likundoli* 4 (1976): *Archives et Documents*. Archives in Brussels are described by Dickerman and Northrup. Those of the central government of the Belgian Congo were transferred at independence to Brussels, but they are closed to researchers. The archives of the Belgian colonial ministry, in the Archives Africaines, Brussels, are subject to a thirty-year rule; a guide is

available from the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (van Grieken-Taverniers). The Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, holds some public records and many private papers, including those of the Baptist Missionary Society (cf. Luwel, 1954). On specific mission records, see de Craemer and Raskin (pp. 896, 900); on business records, Peemans and Lefevre. Some of the most important archives are outside Belgium, for example those of the Congregation of Propaganda Fide in Rome; Protestant societies in the USA, Great Britain and Sweden; Tanganyika Concessions and Lever, in London. The de Ryck collection of Zaïre colonial documents is housed in the Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

There is a considerable literature by residents, visitors and travellers; cf. Périer. Belgian publications in this category have so far been little used, while work published elsewhere has been virtually ignored. For the early 1920s, the accounts by Daye and Chalux are the best known, but Marcossou, an American journalist, should also be consulted. Several books resulted from a tour of research or official enquiry (e.g. de Leener, Wauters (J. and A.), Anet). Franck (1924) defined colonial policy on retiring as colonial minister. Ryckmans used the radio in 1934 to tell the Belgian public about the Congo. The reminiscences of retired civil servants are useful, though they were often published for polemical reasons: cf. Bourgeois and Lippens, and also Moulaert (1950). Several former magistrates also published memoirs; Dellicour, Jadot, Segaert. There are few memoirs by Catholic missionaries (see de Montpellier d'Annevoie); there are more by Protestants (e.g. Springer), but their primary aim was to raise funds abroad. Since the managerial personnel of the Belgian Congo continued to be international in composition throughout the 1920s, even their published records must be sought all over Europe and North America.

There is a large unpublished secondary literature. Our period has been studied in over a hundred *mémoires de licence* presented by students in the history department, Faculté de Lettres, Université Nationale de Zaïre (UNAZA), Lubumbashi. They may be consulted only there, though some have been deposited at the Bibliothèque Africaine, Brussels. Several relevant *mémoires* and theses have also been submitted to the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) and the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB);

these may be consulted locally under certain conditions. Lists of unpublished *mémoires* and theses by Zaïrians have appeared in *Likundoli* and *Recherches zaïroises*; recent research in Zaïre has been described by Verhaegen (1977).

There are several periodicals specialising in the Zaïre region which have published the results of research on our period. From Lubumbashi: *Études d'histoire africaine*, *Likundoli* (série *Enquêtes* and série *Archives*), *Problèmes sociaux zaïrois* (*Bulletin CEPSE*). From Kinshasa: *Zaïre-Afrique*, *Cahiers des religions africaines*, *Études zaïroises* (1968–1973: *Cahiers zaïrois de la recherche et du développement*), *Cahiers économiques et sociaux*. From Brussels: *Cahiers de CEDAF*, *Bulletin de l'ARSOM*. From Louvain: *Cultures et développement*, *Enquêtes et documents d'histoire africaine*. From Tervuren: *Afrique-Tervuren*. Fundamental sources for both the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi are the newspapers of the period, in Belgium and Africa (cf. Berlage), and contemporary journals specialising in colonial questions (e.g. *Congo* (1920–40), *Bulletin des juridictions indigènes* (1933–64), *Bulletin de l'Institut Royal Colonial Belge* (1930–57), *Le Trait d'union* (1932–), *Bulletin de la Société Belge d'Études et d'Expansion* (1907–), *Bulletin agricole du Congo* (1910–61), as well as the numerous missionary journals.

As general works of reference, the compilations produced by the British Admiralty in 1919 and 1944 are still useful; see also the *Encyclopédie*, Franck, (1930) and the *Essor économique belge*. Hostelet is of little value for our period. The ARSOM *Livre blanc* comprehensively summarises colonial activities and the growth of knowledge. The most recent general histories of Zaïre are by Tshimanga and Cornevin; more useful for our period are older works by Anstey and Merlier. Since 1970, there has been so much research on our period that a new attempt at synthesis is needed; articles by Vellut (1975) and Jewsiewicki (1976) indicate possible new directions. For the Belgian background, there is a collection of essays by specialists (Bartier *et al.*), which includes one by Stengers on Belgium and the Congo.

As yet, there are no published surveys of the period for specific regions in terms of territory rather than tribe. It would be most interesting to focus work on the 'natural' regions of the colonial economy, which straddled territorial frontiers: e.g. the copperbelt of Katanga/Northern Rhodesia; Kivu/Uganda; Bas-Congo/French Congo; Kasai/Northern Angola. For Katanga, a start has

been made by Perrings; see also Fetter. The problems of urban history are discussed by de Saint-Moulin; there are studies of Leopoldville (Whymys), Elisabethville (Cornet, 1961) and Stanleyville (Verhaegen).

The economic history of our period is now comparatively well understood. Much of the best work is focused on Katanga, but recent research has advanced our knowledge of other areas. Peemans has made an excellent analytical survey of the colonial economy; see also his contribution to Duignan and Gann (p. 891), and Vandewalle and Jewsiewicki (1976, 1977). Jewsiewicki and Vellut have written on Katanga for Palmer and Parsons (p. 894) and on agriculture and mining for Birmingham and Martin (p. 882). Fieldhouse has outlined the history of the HCB (p. 892); see also Nicolai. The economics of industrialisation have been studied by Gouverneur (who is chiefly concerned with UMHK; see also George and Gouverneur). For transport, see Huybrechts and Lederer; Katzenellenbogen has studied the diplomacy of railway investment. The growth of a proletariat among Africans working both for UMHK and on the copper-mines of Northern Rhodesia has been analysed by Perrings, who relates this to changes in mining technology and strategies for the deployment of labour, as well as to the rural economy; see also Higginson. There are studies of Kasai (Tshundolela Epanya), compulsory cultivation (Mulambu-Mbvuluya) and the upper Uélé (including the Kilo-Moto gold mines) (Bakonzi). In general, however, much work remains to be done on the colonial labour market: Lux provides an introduction, while UNAZA *mémoires* contain much detailed information that calls for synthesis. For agricultural history, see also Miracle, Cornet (1965) and the jubilee volume of the *Bulletin agricole*.

For the economic history of Belgium during our period, see Baudhouin. The role of the colonial economy in Belgium, and that of the Belgian economy in the Congo, require further investigation; a beginning has been made by Stengers and by Joye and Lewin, followed by recent UCL *mémoires* prompted by Vellut; see also Vanderlinden, and van der Straeten on Jules Cousin. As for work by colonial writers, Delcommune's is a massive piece of special pleading, but there is much of value in later work, despite its biases: e.g. *Essor économique belge*, Mottoule, van de Putte.

Colonial medical services have been described by Dubois and

Duren, but the historical study of public health, as of nutrition and food supply, has only just begun (cf. Lyons); Schwetz provides a valuable starting-point, and see also Cornet (1971). For early ventures into the historical study of systems of food production, see Jewsiewicki (1975, 1979); for the demographic history of our period, see Sabakinu and UNAZA *mémoires*.

The international significance of the Belgian Congo, up to 1914, is discussed by Cookey and Willequet (pp. 884, 886); colonial frontiers have been examined by Jentgen (p. 885). Reberieux has looked at socialist reactions in Belgium to its take-over of the Congo. For the study of metropolitan doctrine and policy, the foundations have been laid by Stengers (cf. *mémoires* of UCL, ULB). At the level of African realities, as shaped by local political structures and European pressures (business, the church, etc.), useful work has been done by Bishikwabo (1975), Bustin, Depelchin, Dimandja, MacGaffey (1970), Nicolai, Salmon, Smith, Turner, Vansina (1969, 1972) and others. However, the broad spectrum of administrative institutions has been analysed only at either extremity: the metropole (Lutumba, Vanhove, *mémoires* of UCL, ULB), and the *territoire* (sub-district) (UNAZA *mémoires*). In between, a great gulf encompasses the government-general, provinces, districts and consultative bodies (though provincial councils have been studied in UNAZA *mémoires*). For studies of African administration by colonial officials, see Grévisse and Guebels; for a partial view of Belgian administrators, see Cornet (1971); there are essays on two governors-general – Rutten (Fetter) and Ryckmans (Norton) in the collection edited by Gann and Duignan (p. 883). For contemporary studies of legislation and administrative structures, see Baumer, Heyse, Magotte and Sourdillat. The participation of Congolese forces in the First World War was recorded by Moulaert, Muller and the Belgian official war history.

Contributions to social history include rural studies by Mulambu and Sikitele, and urban studies by Fetter (1974) and Sabakinu. For reflections on the growth of ethnic identities, see Mumbanza. The social history of Europeans in Belgian Africa and its metropolitan circles awaits serious investigation, though relevant points may be gathered from Stengers, Fetter (1976) and Jewsiewicki (1979). Research on education has been pioneered by Feltz (on rural mission schools) and Dimandja (on Methodist

schools in Kasai and Katanga). Yates has written on language policy.

Biography is still at an elementary stage, whether for Europeans (ARSOM, van der Straeten, Hutchinson) or Africans (Bontinck, *Encyclopaedia Africana* (p. 882), UNAZA *mémoires*). Two of the autobiographies recorded by Turnbull span our period. There is an urgent need for the study of contemporary awareness of the colonial experience; current research, directed towards large-scale social or economic processes, has tended to stress impersonal forces at the expense of individual perceptions.

Most studies of the Christian impact are listed on pp. 895–902. For general surveys of Christian mission activity, see Braeckman, Meeus and Steenbergen, Pirotte and Slade; for Bible translation, see Bontinck. African experience of mission activity is stressed by Mumbanza; there are other localised studies on Kasai (Shaloff, Storme), Kwango (Denis), the middle Congo (Thiel) and lower Congo (Andersson, Kratz, Lagergren, and Janzen and MacGaffey). On the influence of Kimbangu, the chief relevant works are by Martin, Ustorf, Munanyi and Raymaekers and Desroche. For Kitawala, see Cross and Greschat. There are bibliographies of Kongo prophet movements (Geuns, p. 897) and of Islam in Zaïre (Rossie, p. 904). There are special studies of particular popular movements by Mulambu, Sikitele and Vansina (1971, 1973); see also Joset and Verbeek.

The collections and records of the Musée Royal, Tervuren, and the Institut des Musées Nationaux de Kinshasa offer plenty of scope for students of art and material culture, though the former have been preoccupied with aesthetic questions while recent historical studies of material culture and music remain unpublished. The study of African philosophy still lacks a historical dimension but repays attention: cf. *Cahiers des religions africaines*.

Ruanda-Urundi

The official archives for the period are in the same case as those for the Belgian Congo. National archive services exist but are scarcely in operation, and records are dispersed among local administrative offices. The archives of the Belgian mandatory administration have been deposited in various offices in Brussels, and also at Geneva; there is also a useful collection of documents

at the University of Florida, Gainesville. For missionary archives, see references for the Belgian Congo. There is a bibliography for both territories by Clément and a more recent one for Ruanda by d'Hertefeldt and de Lame; for Burundi, some guidance is provided by Weinstein. For serial publications, see references for the Belgian Congo.

There is no general history of Ruanda during our period, but Gahama has supplied one for Burundi. Lemarchand deals cursorily with the period. Louis (p. 976) briefly discusses the Belgian occupation; for the military operations, see Belgium... *Les Campagnes coloniales belges*, and Boell (p. 974). There are accounts from the first years of Belgian rule by de Briey and Shantz, and from the end of our period by de Lacger. Frontiers and the mandate are considered by Jentgen; judicial administration by Vanhove; and feudal analogies by Chrétien, who has also studied the revolt in Burundi in 1934. Economic history consists essentially of studies of famine (Lugan) and migration to Uganda (Chrétien). The political role of the White Fathers has been examined by Linden and des Forges. Codère has used African autobiographies to study social change. On education in Burundi, see Greenland.

IO. PORTUGUESE AFRICA

It is only quite recently that scholars have been able to use the records created by Portuguese governments concerning their African colonies during our period. Even now, access to the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino in Lisbon is controlled by a fifty-year rule, and there is at present no public catalogue for records since 1835. Archives in Angola have been described by Birmingham; Vail and White have used business as well as government archives in Mozambique. Government publications (listed by Gibson) include legislation, trade and census statistics, and reports by a variety of officials. Capela has edited documents relating to the export of wine to Mozambique. Vasconcellos compiled handbooks for the colonies in the early part of the century. Reports by former Portuguese officials to the International Colonial Institute (see p. 887) were published in French: see, for example, Lisboa de Lima on Angola. The Mozambique Company published regular statistical reports. The best collection

of newspapers from Mozambique is in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, and its files of *O Africano* and *Brado Africano* have been microfilmed for CAMP (see p. 881).

Much can be learned from archives in countries with special interests in Portuguese Africa. British government records have been exploited by Duffy and Smith and (on Mozambique) by Vail, White and Neil-Tomlinson. Until 1916 annual reports by British consuls in Portuguese Africa were printed for Parliament; thereafter, the Department of Overseas Trade published consular reports every few years on economic conditions in Angola and Mozambique. Archives in Zimbabwe (Ranger, Isaacman), in Belgium and Namibia (Pélissier) and in France (Clarence-Smith) have also been pressed into service. Some use has been made of the records of foreign missionary societies: for Angola, the *Congrégation du Saint-Esprit* (in Paris) and the American Board; for Mozambique, the UMCA (at the SPG in London).

There is no comprehensive bibliography for Portuguese Africa, though Gowan has recently listed much Portuguese and English material for Angola and Mozambique. Gonçalves has listed relevant material in the most important Lisbon library. Martin provides a selective bibliography for Angola; Costa and Rita-Ferreira list older material on Mozambique. Guiné and the Cape Verde islands are well served by McCarthy.

There is a very large contemporary literature on Portuguese Africa in our period; it was almost a national duty for officials who served there to bring their work to public notice. There is, indeed, a glaring contrast between the abundance of such material and the paucity of recent scholarly studies; in this, the bibliographical situation of Portuguese Africa is the reverse of that of British tropical Africa. The primary literature listed here is inevitably a somewhat arbitrary selection, intended mainly to indicate its variety. Military memoirs of 'pacification' are represented for Angola by Almeida, Castro, Pereira d'Eça, Roçadas; for Mozambique by Massano de Amorim; for Guiné by Teixeira Pinto. Martins describes Portugal's part in the East African campaign against the Germans. Former governors-general are represented for Angola by Couceiro, Norton de Matos (who was attacked in print by Cunha Leal) and Sousa e Faro; for Mozambique by Freire de Andrade and Camacho. Costa was a medical officer in São Tomé; Teixeira and Galvão were senior

officials in Angola; da Silva had been one in Mozambique. Lyne was a British official who reorganised Mozambique's department of agriculture. Ferreira Pinto was a settler in Angola; Saldanha and Almeida were landowners in Mozambique anxious to keep labour cheap there. In the early part of the century there was debate over alcohol in Angola (Coutinho) and concessions in Mozambique (Alvares, Durão). Vilhena, who wrote on these and other issues, had served in Mozambique and became minister of colonies in 1917. Trenchant criticism came from abroad: cf. Cadbury, Harris, Nevinson, Ross and Böhm. Nevinson's report stands out among travellers' accounts of Angola; others worth consulting include Barns and Statham. Muralha was one of the few Portuguese to travel in Africa. Lyall visited Guiné and Cape Verde; Maugham was a British consul in Mozambique. Jessen led a German geographical expedition to western Angola in 1931–2. Among anthropological studies made during the period, that by Childs (an American missionary) of the Ovimbundu in Angola sheds most light on colonial conditions, though in Mozambique da Cruz was observant of economic change while Junod made a pioneering study of a witchcraft-eradication cult which flourished in 1914–15, and Harries has reminded us that Junod's novel *Zidji* (1911) is strongly critical of European colonialism.

The metropolitan background may be approached through recent books in English (Clarence-Smith, Gallagher, Robinson, Wheeler) as well as through the standard history of Portugal by Marques. On Salazar, see Kay's biography and the article by Smith. Duffy (1967) has reviewed the controversy over Portugal's colonial labour policies early this century. European diplomacy concerning Portuguese Africa is examined by Langhorne, Vincent Smith and Willequet (all listed on pp. 885–6). Financial links with the colonies are illuminated by Paixão and by Bloom's book about Alves Reis.

The secondary literature on Portuguese Africa is still very patchy. The best starting-point in English for our period was once Duffy (1959) but is now Newitt (to which the author of the present chapter is much indebted). Gaspar sketches the course of white immigration. As yet, there are no general histories of individual territories which give much space to our period. Even now, the handbooks produced in 1920 for the British Admiralty and

Foreign Office retain some value, as does one on Angola originally commissioned by the German Colonial Office (Marquardsen). The best introduction to Angola in our period is Clarence-Smith's chapter in Birmingham and Martin (p. 882); see also his article, and books by Bender, Carreira, Henderson and Wheeler and Pélissier. Much of relevance can be learned from Pélissier's encyclopaedic study of colonial conquest and nationalism. More specialised studies worth noting here are by Clarence-Smith on the south, Felgas on the far north, Dias on famine, Samuels on education, Katzenellenbogen on railways (p. 950), Soremekun on American missions (p. 901), Wheeler on colonial governors (in Gann and Duignan (1978), p. 883), Samuels and Wheeler on the African élite (in the Chilcote collection). On the Roman Catholic Church, see Gabriel (p. 897). Basic data on Protestant missions in Angola is given by Tucker (p. 902), and on the history of the press by Lopo.

An outline of the modern history of Mozambique has recently been supplied by the Isaacmans; a four-volume history of the country is now in progress at the Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo. There are major studies of conquest and resistance (Pélissier) and the lower Zambezi area (Vail and White; see also p. 912); there are also articles by Vail and Neil-Tomlinson on the chartered companies, and by Vail on railway policy. There is an administrative history of the early twentieth century by Moura. Northern Mozambique before 1914 is treated by Machado and Galligan. The exchange with South Africa of labour for rail traffic has been studied by Katzenellenbogen; see also van der Horst (p. 965), Rita-Ferreira and Eidelberg; Young (in Palmer and Parsons, p. 967) notes some effects. Penvenne has pioneered the history of labour in Lourenço Marques; Pereira de Lima has written about its buildings and also on railway history. Macmillan gives some facts about business firms, and Dias about newspapers. Friedland sketches the course of literate African protest. There is a study by Lopes of Franciscan missions (p. 899); Moreira's handbook (p. 899) stresses Protestant activity.

For Guiné, there is a valuable article by Cunningham, but otherwise little beyond Barreto on the early part of the century, Castro's yearbook, and the *Boletim Cultural da Guiné Portuguesa* (1946-). The Cape Verde islands are better supplied: their

demographic and economic history has been examined by Brito and Carreira. Research on São Tomé in our period has scarcely begun; see meanwhile Tenreiro.

Spanish (Equatorial) Guinea

The best general history of Equatorial Guinea available is by Ndongo Bidyogo. Liniger-Goumaz has compiled a bibliography (1974) and also a historical dictionary in English (1979) which is sometimes weak on chronology. The handbook published in 1920 by the British Foreign Office is still very useful. Sundiata discusses the Liberian, and Osuntokun the Nigerian, labour issues, while Pélissier (1964, 1968) has interesting details on this period. The exhaustive geographical works of Unzueta y Yuste (1944, 1945, 1947) include much historical and general information.

II. SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa

The historiography of our period reflects important changes in the intellectual life of South Africa. Between the two world wars, South Africa's social and economic problems were keenly studied at the country's infant universities. In the decade following the First World War, the economic dimensions of contemporary 'racial' conflict were scrutinised by a young historian, W. M. Macmillan (1919, 1930). Professional economists, notably S. H. Frankel, investigated the infrastructures of South African industry and agriculture, and the *South African Journal of Economics* was founded in 1933. In the 1930s, sociological research was initiated both by universities and by the South African Institute of Race Relations. Some of this work was informed by a belief that Africans should be integrated in the economic and political structures of South Africa regardless of colour. In 1941 de Kiewiet provided an outstanding analysis of modern South African history from this point of view; it was soon reinforced in Britain (Hancock, 1937, 1942). But well before the Second World War broke out, the growth of a local school of liberal historiography had been stunted by the departure of de Kiewiet to the USA, and Macmillan to Britain. For a whole generation after the war, their conception of history as social change in the broadest sense was little in evidence in South Africa. While

economists and sociologists continued to work on contemporary problems, few historians concerned themselves either with the twentieth century or with most of their country's inhabitants. In the 1960s no professional historian could be found to contribute to those parts of *The Oxford history of South Africa* (Wilson and Thompson) which deal with our period: they consist of a series of topical chapters which preclude any clear perception of interacting forces of change within a given period.

By the late 1960s, however, a new generation of South African historians was becoming aware of work in tropical Africa on the history of Africans and of the relevance of Marxist thought to South Africa's modern history. Several research students based themselves on universities overseas, chiefly in Britain. In the course of the 1970s much argument was addressed to the problems of analysing South African history in terms of conflict between classes rather than races (see, for example, Legassick, 1975). These new emphases are acknowledged in a recent general survey of modern South African history (Davenport, 1977), though like the *Oxford history* it sidesteps the challenge of integrating economic and political history. Such integration, however, is characteristic of much recent research, both within and outside South Africa, and the University of the Witwatersrand has properly become an important base for the study of South Africa's modern history. Most of this work has first appeared in print either in locally published collections or in Britain, in the *Journal of Southern African Studies* (1974–); the *South African Historical Journal* (1969–) has also carried numerous articles on our period.

Limited bibliographical assistance may be obtained from Muller *et al.*, Musiker, and the South African Library; and guidance on the Transkei from Kalley. Pollak and Pollak list relevant theses up to 1975. There is a masterly descriptive bibliography by Schapera of the literature on black South Africans up to 1940. For work on Asians in South Africa, see Greyling and Miskin. Little of the older literature on our period is listed in the present work; see the bibliographies in Wilson and Thompson, and Davenport. There is a short historical dictionary (Saunders). All but a few entries in the four-volume *Dictionary of South African biography* (de Kock *et al.*) refer to whites. The *Handbook* edited by Hellmann in 1949 comprises 35 essays on aspects of all but the white communities. Much statistical and

other information may be found in the official yearbooks of the Union government; that for 1941 summarises much material for the whole period, as does *Union statistics for fifty years*.

The public records of South Africa were until recently controlled by fifty-year rules; these are no longer universal. There are central archives in Pretoria and provincial and municipal archives; none have published comprehensive guides to their holdings, but there is a central computer-listing. For papers in private collections relating to the 'political' history of whites there is a guide by Geyser, Coetzer and Le Roux (who have also compiled bibliographies in this field); see also Tyrrell-Glynn. The University of the Witwatersrand (see Cunningham) holds papers of W. Ballinger, J. H. Hofmeyr, S. M. Molema, Howard Pim, Sol Plaatje, J. D. Rheinallt Jones, A. B. Xuma, the Anglican church, the TUCSA and the Garment Workers' Union. Papers of A. W. G. Champion are held both by (and available on microfilm from) the Universities of the Witwatersrand and Cape Town; there are also some at the University of South Africa. Business and mission archives for our period have so far been used chiefly by historians working in Johannesburg and Natal; records of the Chamber of Mines and the Standard Bank have been especially important. Many newspapers produced by whites in South Africa are held by the British Library. Much of the black press has disappeared, but Switzer and Switzer provide an admirable guide both to what was published and where it survives. Wilson and Perrot have published an extensive selection from the files of the most important mission periodical. Special efforts have been made to collect originals or copies of scarce South African materials for libraries in London (Willan, 1980) and Northwestern University, Illinois (Wynne). A small number of contemporary publications, collections of unofficial printed documents and relevant autobiographies are mentioned below in the context of the related secondary literature. Numerous official publications are listed by Wilson and Thompson. The reports, some by South African academics, for the Carnegie Commission of 1928–32 on the 'poor white problem' extend into education and psychology. Only one traveller's account is listed here: Margery Perham's journal of her first tour of research, in southern Africa in 1929–30.

The literature on parliamentary politics is dominated by two

remarkable biographies: Hancock on Smuts and Paton on J. H. Hofmeyr. Also listed are biographies of Creswell (Creswell), Hertzog (Pirow) and Tielman Roos (Brits). Voluminous selections from the papers of Smuts and Merriman have been published, speeches of D. F. Malan (Pienaar and Scholtz) and a source book on parties and policies (Krüger). Heaton Nicholls published his memoirs. On the parties themselves, there are studies by Malan and Lass; Kentridge's memoirs throw some light on the Labour Party. The growth of Afrikaner nationalism has been studied, from various perspectives, by Moodie, Stultz, Hexham and O'Meara; there is now a massive history in Afrikaans of the Nationalist Party (Geyser *et al.*). On women's suffrage, see Walker; on Cape farmers, Bouch; on the 'flag controversy', Saker. Shimoni has made the first serious study of South Africa's Jews in our period. South Africa's external relations have been examined by Hancock (1937), Mansergh, Warhurst (p. 970), Keiser, Stevens, Chanock and Holland. On the economic ties with Mozambique, see Katzenellenbogen (p. 957); on relations with Germany, Watt (p. 886) and Kienzle. The Union's military efforts in the First World War were duly chronicled (General Staff). The political implications have received much attention, e.g. from Garson; on Africans in uniform, see Willan (1978) and Grundy. Tatz's study of policies regarding land and franchise has been largely superseded by research focused on specific themes and regions; see, for example, studies of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act by Davenport (1970) and Wells (in Hay and Wright, p. 910). The connexions between economic change and ideology have been explored by Bozzoli, and inform studies of liberalism by Legassick (1976) and Rich; see also Kallaway. Liberal anxieties about African 'culture contact' are revealed in the collection edited by Schapera. Hoernlé, Brookes and Ballinger illustrate contrasting liberal attitudes to segregation. Cell provides a succinct summary of recent reinterpretations in this field.

For many years, much the most helpful exposition both of policies towards Africans and of their responses was Buell's pioneering survey (p. 882). In 1948 Roux produced a partisan and partly autobiographical account of resistance activities. A more scholarly and wider-ranging study in this genre came from Simons and Simons in 1969; it was soon followed by Walshe's history of Congress. This can now be supplemented by Bonner's work on

the Transvaal (in Marks and Rathbone) and by Willan's outstanding biography of Sol Plaatje (which is also the best general introduction to the first two decades of our period). Source material for the history of African politics includes publications by Mahabane, Jabavu (p. 908) and Plaatje (p. 908); much has also been published in the series edited by Karis and Carter, which includes a volume of short biographies. For the history of Asian politics, see Swan, Pachai and Keiser, and Gandhi's own account; the implications for the Union's external relations were studied by Hancock (1937). Little research has been specifically directed to the Coloured community during our period. However, the country's 'racial' divisions are necessarily transcended by the literature on the Communist Party of South Africa. The committed accounts of Roux and of Simons and Simons are complemented by the work of foreign academics: Johns (p. 911) and Wilson (p. 912). There are biographies of S. P. Bunting (Roux) and Moses Kotane (Bunting, p. 909). Nzula's work is listed on p. 908.

There has been curiously little research on the legal history of South Africa in our period, though important insights may be gained from Corder, Dugard and A. Sachs (who examines both judicial attitudes and penal statistics). Simons made a pioneering but unpublished study of criminal law and its administration; his work on the legal status of African women also throws much light on our period. Rose Innes, Chief Justice from 1914 to 1927, left an autobiography. Basic reference works include Hahlo and Kahn, and Bisset and Smith. Jones and Griffiths comment on extracts from labour legislation. There is a bibliography by Roberts. The *South African Law Journal* was founded in 1901. Warner and Whitfield document the evolution of 'native law'; the latter makes frequent reference to decisions of the native appeal courts (which in 1929 were extended from the Transkei to all provinces); see also Lewin. For a contemporary official view of 'native administration', see Rogers.

Extracts from source materials on economic change are presented by Hobart Houghton and Dagut. The secondary literature is still dominated by the work of S. H. Frankel; see also Schumann on business cycles, Richards on the iron and steel industry, and Katzen on the economic impact of the goldmining industry. Works on banking (by Arndt, de Kock and Henry) and on currency (by Drummond) are listed on pp. 891–3. Much of the

literature on the major mining firms is, however informative, apologetic: cf. Cartwright's business histories and Gregory's biography of Sir Ernest Oppenheimer. More direct light is cast by the correspondence of Lionel Phillips, a director of Wernher, Beit & Co. (Fraser and Jeeves) and by the recent analyses of Yudelman and Innes. There are recent studies of the growth of industrial protection (Kaplan), capitalist farming, especially in the 1930s (Morris), African agriculture (Simkins) and electrification (Christie). Much other relevant work is embodied in regional studies cited below.

The first scholar to investigate the growth of a black working class in South Africa was Leubuscher; her work was ignored in the narrowly economic study by van der Horst. Twenty years later, Doxey made a study of the industrial colour bar, and meanwhile several members of labour movements wrote highly personal histories (e.g. Walker and Weinbren). After yet another decade, Wilson examined the economic factors bearing on the wages of black workers in the goldmines. In the course of the 1970s, there was a notable upsurge of interest in labour history. The mobilisation of black labour was surveyed by Lacey; the white working class was studied at length by Davies, and nine essays in the collection edited by Webster are concerned with our period. Most attention has been paid to the Rand and Johannesburg; besides Johnstone's book on black and white mineworkers and Katz's on white craft unions before 1914, there are studies by Johnstone, Bonner and Davies (in Bozzoli, 1979), by Moroney (in Marks and Rathbone), by Lewis and by Adler. Oberholster has written in Afrikaans on the white miners' strike in 1922. Dockworkers in Durban have been studied by Hemson, clothing workers by Nicol and African military labour by Willan. On the ICU, see Johns (in Rotberg and Mazrui, p. 883), Wickins, Bradford, and the reminiscences by Kadalie, Coka and Jingoos.

The literature on the urban Transvaal extends well beyond that specifically concerned with labour. In the late 1930s there were studies of the government of Johannesburg (Maud), economic and cultural change among its African population (Phillips), social relations in an African slum (Hellmann) and the experiences of a migrant healer in that slum (W. Sachs), while the external details of white commercial and social life were documented by A. Macmillan. For forty years this heterogeneous body of work had

no sequel bearing on our period, apart from the official history of one mine township (Humphriss and Thomas). Then van Onselen made studies of several social groups on the Rand before 1914; Proctor wrote on Sophiatown (in Bozzoli, 1979), while other relevant essays appeared in Bozzoli (1983). On rural South Africa, there are two major studies which span the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: Bundy on the eastern Cape and Beinart on Pondoland (studied by Monica Hunter in the 1930s); see also these authors' joint study of the eastern Cape between the wars. On the rural Orange Free State, see Keegan and Matsetela (in Marks and Rathbone) and Keegan (in Bozzoli, 1983). Zulu politics in our period, first analysed in microcosm by Gluckman, are the subject of important articles by Marks; in the 1930s, Reyher recorded the reminiscences of a recently estranged wife of the Zulu king.

Much work on social and cultural change is embodied in studies with a local focus. Among studies with a territorial perspective, there is a massive but narrowly conceived history of education by Malherbe (with a long bibliography); see Kallaway's collection, and Rose and Tunmer. There is an excellent history by Murray of the University of the Witwatersrand in our period. The histories of Lovedale and Fort Hare have been written by former principals: Shepherd (p. 901) and Kerr. Much may be learned about educational history from the autobiographies of Brookes, W. M. Macmillan, Z. K. Matthews (p. 905) and Paton. There is no published history of medicine in South Africa, but there is a history of nursing (Searle) and Frack's memoirs describe medical work among poor whites between the wars. The activities of women have recently received some attention, notably from Gaitskell and Walker. The outstanding study of African independent churches in South Africa is by Sundkler; other relevant studies of Christianity, by Brown, Mills, Pauw, Schlosser, Setiloane and Strassberger, are listed on pp. 896–901. Regrettably, there has been no history of the South African press since Cutten's thesis fifty years ago. There are, however, more recent histories of radio (Rosenthal), cinema (Gutsche), scientific research (Brown), art and architecture (Fransen) and architecture in Johannesburg between the wars (Herbert). Chapman has compiled a representative anthology of poetry. No references are given here to important novels written in the 1920s by William Plomer and

Pauline Smith, but there is an article by Wade on Sarah Gertrude Millin, a prolific novelist and biographer. Studies of African literature (by Couzens, Gérard, Jordan and Peires) and of African music (by Coplan) are listed on pp. 908–11, along with several books by black writers; see also Malan's *Music encyclopaedia* and the contributions of Couzens and Coplan to Marks and Rathbone.

South West Africa

The best bibliographical guidance is provided by Eriksen and Moorsom. There is no adequate history of the territory throughout our period, and historians have only just begun to use local archives. There is, however, an excellent book on German rule by Bley, based on records in Germany, as well as a rather simplistic study by Dreschler of African resistance. Seitz, the governor from 1910 to 1915, left extensive memoirs. On Ovamboland, see Clarence-Smith and Moorsom. The cession of a mandate to South Africa has been discussed by Louis (p. 885, and in Gifford and Louis (p. 883)) and Smith. The most recent survey of the inter-war period is that of Cockram; see also Swanson (in Gifford and Louis) and Dale; and for a contemporary report, Toynbee. Relevant documents have been published by Braum and Dugard. Freislich has made a detailed study, based partly on interviews, of the Bondelswarts rebellion, and there is an article by Pearson on the Rehoboth Basters' doomed bid for independence in 1925; documents on both incidents have been assembled by de Walldt. For the territorial budget, see Krogh; on labour, Moorsom; and on Christianity, Engel, de Vries, Loth and Schlosser (pp. 897–902). Glimpses of white society may be found in Levinson. Three visitors in the 1930s. Farson (p. 886), Hardinge and Steer (p. 887), drew attention to local Nazism. British consular reports throw light on political as well as economic conditions.

The High Commission Territories

There is a bibliography by Parsons, and an outline history by Halpern; relevant articles are published in *Mohlomi* (Roma, Lesotho, 1979–) and *Pula* (Gaborone, Botswana, 1978–). For contemporary views on the threat from the Union, see Barnes, and Perham and Curtis. Kuczynski (p. 967) discusses the demo-

graphic evidence, and Hailey describes local government institutions. For Basutoland, there is an excellent bibliography by Willet and Ambrose, a historical dictionary by Haliburton and an authorised mission history by Ellenberger (p. 897). For Bechuana-land, Schapera's research as both social anthropologist and historian is of fundamental importance for our period, as is Parsons' work on economic change among the Ngwato under Khama; see also biographies of the Ngwato regent Tshekedi Khama by Benson (1960) and Crowder (forthcoming). For Swaziland, there is a bibliography by Nyeko and a biography of Sobhuza II by Kuper; Crush examines land segregation and Packard traces links between disease, famine and migrancy.

12. BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

The most recent surveys of the region in our period are essays by Phimister and Vail in the collection edited by Birmingham and Martin (which has helpful bibliographies); these largely supersede earlier regional studies, though Hancock's pioneering essay on the regional economy of southern Africa (p. 961) is still worth pondering, as is Gray's *Two nations*. There are several relevant essays on African involvement in capitalist agriculture in the collection edited by Palmer and Parsons; Ranger and others have queried some of its underlying assumptions; see also essays by Palmer and Vail in a collection edited by Rotberg (p. 894). Fetter has recently attempted a geographical approach to the economic history of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Macmillan's 1931 handbook provides information about numerous business firms. Kuczynski (p. 967) remains the essential starting-point for any discussion of demographic change, as does Ford (p. 892) for any examination of the changing relationship between men, animals and the environment, though Gelfand's territorial studies of medicine and disease are superficial. The links between religious, social and political change in the region during our period were first explored by Shepperson and further illuminated by Cross's work on the Watch Tower (p. 896) and several essays in the collection edited by Ranger and Weller (p. 900); see also Ranger's work on *mchape* and *beni* (pp. 967, 975). The Isaacmans raise interesting questions about resistance to colonial rule; Hooker made an early study of welfare associations; and Rotberg traced

the growth of resistance to colonial rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Hailey remains a necessary guide to local government in the northern territories. Margery Perham (p. 963) kept a journal of her travels through the region in 1930. Much research on the period has been published in the *Journal of Southern African Studies*.

Southern Rhodesia

The National Archives of Zimbabwe, in Harare, are among the best in Africa. They include many non-official manuscripts (cf. Baxter and Burke) and also photographs, films and tapes; an oral history programme has lately been initiated. Access to government records is controlled by a thirty-year rule; there is a guide by Baxter to those of the British South Africa Company, and other useful guides by Walker, and Willson and Passmore. Due to its peculiar constitutional status, Southern Rhodesia never produced blue books or reports for the territory as a whole (its trade statistics between 1906 and 1930 were published by the South African customs administration), but it published official year-books in 1924, 1930 and 1932, and the statistical yearbook of 1938 is listed here. Copious bibliographical assistance is provided by Pollak and Pollak; see also Pichanick *et al.* Relevant local journals include *Rhodesian History* (1970–) and the *Rhodesian Journal of Economics*.

In many ways the most penetrating account of Southern Rhodesia early in this century remains the contemporary study by the Belgian lawyer Henri Rolin. Gann provides a detailed and highly idiosyncratic survey ending in 1934; Blake's polished narrative dismisses most developments in our period as 'not very interesting' (p. xiii). Constitutional change has been described at length by Palley. The white power structure has been analysed, from a variety of perspectives, by Leys, Arrighi and Murray; see also Henderson, Hummel and Mackenzie. An early legislator, Ethel Tawse-Jollie, expounded her views in print. There is a perceptive biography of Huggins by Gann and Gelfand. Relations with Britain, South Africa and the northern territories have been discussed by Chanock, Warhurst and Wetherell. Kosmin has told the story of Jewish settlement, and Lee has looked at the beginnings of white trade unions. There are studies, by no means definitive, of the police (Gibbs) and the press (Gale), and

outmoded books on the Native Affairs Department (Maclean) and the earlier history of Salisbury (Tanser).

The best short overview of economic change is Phimister's chapter in Birmingham and Martin. Arrighi's pioneering analysis of the proletarianisation of Africans farming for the market influenced contributors to the Palmer and Parsons collection, though it has recently been criticised by Mosley in a comparative study which presents much statistical material. Palmer has examined the evolution of land policies (appending a very full bibliography) and Weinmann the growth of agricultural research. A thesis by Machingaidze shows how settler farming was aided and subsidised by government. Clements and Harben trace the fortunes of the tobacco industry. There is a penetrating analysis by Phimister of the marketing problems facing cattle ranchers, and Keyter discusses the effects of maize control. For a study of white farming in one district, see Hodder-Williams; Hylda Richards provides one farmer's testimony for the 1930s. Zachrisson has studied a reserve in which Africans found a continuing market in nearby mines, while Rennie has looked at the history of black tenant-farmers. The only study of the railways (Croxtan) is narrowly technical, but the mining industry and mine labour have been treated in numerous publications by van Onselen and Phimister; see also Bowen's production histories of twenty mines. Research on other sectors of employment has scarcely begun. Mittlebeeler's study of Africans and the criminal law does little to illuminate the problems of African workers.

Ranger (1970) pioneered the study of African opinion in our period, quoting extensively from the archives. The experiences of educated Africans are recounted in several works that blend history with biography or autobiography, such as those by Vambe. For the impact of missions and education, see Bhebe, Dachs and Rea (pp. 895–6) and Atkinson, and a wide-ranging thesis by Rennie (p. 900); see also Steere and Ranger on A. S. Cripps. Independent churches are discussed in detail by Daneel, Dillon-Malone and Murphree (pp. 896–99).

Northern Rhodesia

The National Archives of Zambia (see Graham and Halwindi) have been much used by historians of our period. There is a

comprehensive bibliography by Rau, while Rennie has compiled a preliminary catalogue of manuscript collections. Current research is noted in the annual bulletin *History in Zambia* (1970–); local journals include *African Social Research* and the *Zambia Journal of History* (1981–).

The best introduction to the country's history is by Roberts, who also provides an excellent annotated bibliography. The most detailed survey of the first half of the twentieth century is by Gann (1964). Davidson remains the best guide to white politics in our period, though Rotberg has written a biography of Gore-Browne. There are recent theses on government propaganda (Smyth), the impact of the First World War (Yorke) and legal change (Kanganja). Chanock (in Hay and Wright, p. 910) shows 'customary' law being invented. Slinn examines the history of mineral and mining rights. Key issues in economic change have been illuminated by an economist (Baldwin), but three studies made in the 1930s remain valuable: the Merle Davis collective report on the social effects of copper-mining, Audrey Richards's study of the Bemba rural economy and Sir Alan Pim's report for the Colonial Office. The history of the mining industry has attracted much research. For the Anglo American mines, see Gregory (p. 960) and Bancroft; Coleman contributes a technological study focused on Nchanga, and Cunningham a narrowly focused account of mining finance. The economic strategies of mine companies, in relation to their use of labour and technology, are discussed by Perrings (p. 951), who also examines the responses of African workers; see also Epstein, Henderson and Berger. By comparison, white mineworkers and farmers are still too little known. Kanduza has written on the tobacco industry; Winifred Tapson's memoirs illuminate white society on and off the line of rail.

On African agriculture, Allan (p. 891) and Hellen must be consulted. Patterns of change in African rural societies may be traced in a number of monographs: Caplan and Hermitte (Lozi), Barnes and Rau (Ngoni), Dixon-Fyle and Vickery (plateau Tonga), Watson and Meebelo (the north-east); see also articles by van Horn and Muntemba (in Palmer and Parsons), Vail and Musambachime. The history of education has been studied in institutional terms by Snelson and Coombe. Works relating more specifically to the Christian impact are listed on pp. 896–902; they

include monographs by Bolink, Garvey, Taylor and Lehmann, and Rotberg, and contributions by Cook, Hastings and Ranger to the collection edited by Ranger and Weller. Much of Cross's thesis on Watch Tower deals with Northern Rhodesia. Van Binsbergen boldly essays a model of religious change.

Nyasaland

Access to the National Archives of Malawi was very restricted during much of the 1960s and 1970s. Boeder (1979) provides an annotated bibliography, but there is no adequate overall historical survey. Some relevant work has appeared in the *Society of Malawi Journal* formerly the *Nyasaland Journal*) and the University of Malawi's *Journal of Social Science*. There is little to our purpose in the collection edited by Pachai (1972) but plenty in that by Macdonald. Pachai (1973) derives from radio talks. The outstanding work on our period is also one of the earliest: the biography of John Chilembwe by Shepperson and Price (see also Shepperson's contribution to Pachai (1972), and work by the Lindens and D. D. Phiri). Other aspects of religious independency are discussed by Lohrentz and Shepperson. A wide range of African responses to Christian missions is discussed in books by Linden and McCracken; see also Stuart and Thompson (pp. 901–2). The political role of mission élites is stressed in articles by van Velsen and Tangri; Chanock (1975) stresses that of African farmers, K. M. Phiri explores Afro-American connexions and Vail the growth of tribal identity. Books by Bandawe, Kadalie (p. 961) and Mwase (p. 908) throw much light on African attitudes and experience.

Economic history has only recently received much attention. The growth of labour migration has been outlined by Boeder; see also Makambe, and the story by Ntara (p. 909). As yet, archival research has added little to studies in the 1930s of the effects of labour migration by Read and by the government's own commission of enquiry. However, Dean's work on the African tobacco industry has now been supplemented by several studies of African agriculture: Chanock (1972), Vaughan (1982), Mandala, McCracken (1983). Land policies have been outlined by Pachai (1978) and Vail has shown how far railway policies were from serving Nyasaland's economic interests. Research into the

structures of colonial authority is still in its infancy. For changes in local government, see Barnekov as well as Hailey, and for legal change Wanda; Chanock has looked sceptically at the administration of 'customary' law. McCracken (1982) and Vaughan have examined aspects of the application to government of 'expertise'. The impact of the First World War has been summarised by Page; see also Moyse-Bartlett (p. 975) and de Guingand's reminiscences of KAR service in 1926-7.

13. EAST AFRICA

Archives relating to East Africa in our period have been much used by historians. They are described in Harlow and Chilver, and there are guides to the government archives of Kenya (Gregory *et al.*) and German East Africa (Tanzania National Archives). Other German government records are kept in Potsdam and (for Ruanda-Urundi) Brussels. Microfilms of many records in Kenya's archives are available at Syracuse University, NY, and Rhodes House Library, Oxford; Syracuse also has microfilms of many East African newspapers, while East Africa is well represented in the manuscript collections at Rhodes House. There are comprehensive territorial bibliographies for Kenya (Webster *et al.*) and Zanzibar (Bennett). The earlier literature is extensively listed in Harlow and Chilver; see also the historiographical essay by Strandmann and Smith in Gifford and Louis (p. 883).

Relevant documents have been published by Low on Buganda, and by Mungeam, on Kenya. Useful contemporary handbooks for East Africa were compiled by the *East African Standard* and Macmillan. Several administrators published memoirs, for example Götzen, Methner and Schnee (German East Africa), Archer (p. 986), Dundas and Mitchell (various British territories), Bell (Uganda) and Lumley (Tanganyika); so did von Lettow-Vorbeck and two medical men, Cook (Uganda) and Carman (Kenya). Meinertzhagen, a British army officer, published selections from his diaries. British rule and settlement in Kenya were criticised by two retired officials, Leys (a doctor) and Ross (an engineer). Settler experiences were recorded by two Germans, von Byern and Prüsse, and by four women in Kenya, Blixen, Carnegie, Simpson and Grant (ed. Elspeth Huxley), of whom all but the last had left by 1931. Among accounts by visitors, Weule's

report on southern Tanzania in 1906 may stand as an example of German ethnography; Schuster (p. 887) served on the Hilton Young Commission; Julian Huxley toured East Africa in 1929 and Margery Perham in 1929–30. For Kenya, there are two African memoirs, by Thuku and Kindy, and for German East Africa reminiscences recorded by Kootz-Kretschmer and by Tanzanian students (in Gwassa and Iliffe). Kayamba's autobiography appeared in a collection by Perham (p. 906); books by Kayamba, Kenyatta and Mockerie are listed on p. 908.

Despite a now voluminous secondary literature, the essential introduction to the region in our period remains the Oxford *History of East Africa*, vol. II (1965), edited by Harlow and Chilver. There are also relevant essays on immigrant communities and their impact in vol. III (1976), edited by Low and Smith; this includes political and statistical data for the period since c. 1920. There are several other works which refer to two or more territories: on frontiers (McEwen, p. 885), regimental history (Moyse-Bartlett), railways (Hill), business firms (Stahl, Munro), economic policy (Brett), banking (Henry, p. 892), the First World War (Boell, Hordern and Stacke, Mosley, Hodges; see also Belgium, Moulaert and Muller, listed on pp. 948, 951). The best account of the 'closer union' debate is Gregory's study of the 'Asian question' (on which see also Tinker (p. 890), Rai, Mangat); Baumhögger's account of regional integration breaks off in 1927, though a sequel is promised. Hailey described the structures of indirect rule; Morris and Read examine its legal implications. Beck represents medical history at its narrowest, but there is much relevant material in Ford's study of the tsetse-fly (p. 892), as in Kuczynski's demographic work (p. 967); cf. also Lury. Listed on pp. 898–902 are relevant studies of missionary work (Oliver, Heremans, H. Smith) and African Christian initiatives (Pirouet, Welbourn). On education, Furley and Watson have written administrative rather than social or intellectual history; wider perspectives are explored by Goldthorpe, King and Ranger (1965). Gulliver presents some relevant material on the growth of tribal identities; Ranger (1975) surveys the spread of *beni* dance societies; Whiteley the expansion and use of Swahili; and Lonsdale the widening of political horizons. Relevant articles have appeared in local publications: the *Uganda Journal*, *Tanzania Notes and Records*, *Kenya Historical Review*, *Transafrican Journal of History*.

The best introduction to German East Africa is Iliffe's *A modern history of Tanganyika*; this draws on much recent research as well as on Iliffe's own earlier study of Rechenberg's governorship, and it offers a more careful analysis of ecological change than Kjekshus. There is useful economic data in Tetzlaff; see also Gann's essay in Duignan and Gann (p. 891). German administrators have been studied by Gann and Duignan (pp. 883, 888); there are also accounts of scientific research (Bald and Bald), the press (Pipping-Van Hulten) and language policy (Brumfit). Austen made a pioneering study of colonial rule in Mwanza and Bukoba districts; other regional studies include Ekemode, Larson, Shorter, and Gwassa's work on Maji Maji (see Ogot, p. 975; and Ranger and Kimambo, p. 900). Louis remains the only general study of German rule in Ruanda-Urundi; there are briefer studies of Ruanda by Chrétien and Lugan. Ryckmans' account of Burundi was written on the spot in 1918. Relevant work on Christian missions, by Eggert, Linden, Nolan, Sicard and Wright, is listed on pp. 897–903, and an article by Martin on the Qādiriyya on p. 904.

Iliffe's history of Tanganyika is the most comprehensive study of social change under colonial rule for any part of black Africa. Other works deal more fully with aspects of colonial government. On the civil service, see Morris-Hale (and also Heussler); on economic policy, Leubuscher and McCarthy (who has also written on currency: p. 893); on indirect rule, Austen (in Gifford and Louis, p. 883). There is a biography of Cameron (Gailey, p. 939). Sweet and Shivji look at the law on land and labour. Liebenow's study of the Makonde throws much light on our period; other regional studies, by Austen, Larson and Shorter, have been listed under German East Africa. Rogers examines Chaga coffee-growing; Ranger, missionary medical work in the south-east; Wilson, relations between generations and the sexes in the south. Iliffe has brought together thirteen relevant biographies of Africans; see also Westcott. Relevant studies of Christianity (listed on pp. 897–903) include Eggert, Hellberg, Wilson, Wright and Ranger (1971, and in Ranger and Kimambo). Nimtz's study of Sufism is listed on p. 904. Work on Asian communities is largely confined to Walji's thesis on Ismā'īlīs. The collection by Kaniki and Gwassa (based on lectures at the University of Dar es Salaam) focuses on external economic and cultural pressures. Much useful

information may be gathered from the handbooks edited by Moffett.

It has been easier for foreign scholars to work in Kenya than perhaps anywhere else in independent Africa, and much research has also been done by Kenyan historians. The secondary literature is thus very large: there are at least thirty unpublished doctoral theses concerning our period, and many relevant articles have appeared not only in journals but in *Hadith* (ed. Ogot), the proceedings of the Kenya Historical Association. However, knowledge has not always been advanced in proportion to effort, and the Oxford *History* (especially chapters by Wrigley and Bennett) is less familiar than it should be, even though it remains the only general study of Kenya's colonial past.

White settlement has attracted much research since Weigt's pioneering work and Elspeth Huxley's biography of Delamere. There are studies of the early years (Sorrenson, Mungeam), the 1920s (Redley), economic performance (Mosley, Yoshida) and labour recruitment (van Zwanenberg). Lonsdale and Berman probe the contradictions for government in assisting settlers while dependent on African production; Wylie shows the Colonial Office caught in cross-fire. Clayton and Savage examine official labour policy in magisterial detail; see also Savage and Munro, and Berman and Lonsdale. Stichter outlines the growth of migrant labour. A collection by Rotberg (p. 894) includes essays on coastal labour (Cooper) and pastoralism (Spencer). Kitching has investigated African strategies for combining farming with wage labour. Swainson throws some light on expatriate business firms; Ghai and McAuslan on the administration of justice; and Wolf on recruitment to the police. The history of Asians in Kenya is insufficiently understood; meanwhile, see Soff and Spencer as well as Gregory (p. 974). Language policy has been studied by Gorman, and other aspects of educational history are treated by Heyman (in Battle and Lyons, p. 882), Kipkorir and Schilling as well as King (p. 975), Anderson and Greaves (pp. 895, 897). The history of Christianity may be traced in several other works, listed on pp. 897–902, by Gratton, Lonsdale, Macpherson, McIntosh, Murray, Sangree, Strayer, Wanyoike, Ward, Welbourn and Ogot. Biographical essays, mainly on Africans, have been collected by King and Salim and by Kipkorir; see also Murray on Owen, Roelker on Mathu (p. 912), Murray-Brown on Kenyatta (p. 911).

Much research in Kenya has been focused on particular areas or ethnic groups: the coast (Salim, Cooper, p. 982), Giriama (Brantley), Kamba (Munro, Newman, Tignor), Kikuyu (Coray, Feldman, Kanogo, Rosberg and Nottingham, Tignor), Luo (Hay), Masai (King, Tignor), Nandi (Ellis), Nyanza (Fearn), Somali (Turton, Dalleo (p. 986)), Taveta (Frontera), Turkana (Lamphear), western Kenya (Lonsdale, in Rotberg and Mazrui (p. 883); Bode and van Zwanenberg, in Ojuka and Ochieng'; Ogot and Ochieng' in Ogot (p. 975)). The study of Africans in towns has been pioneered by van Zwanenberg, Bujra and White (Nairobi) and Strobel (Mombasa); the three last-named, like Hay, discuss the experience of women.

Historical research in Uganda was given a head start in the 1950s by scholars based on Makerere College and the East African Institute of Social Research, but by 1970 it had become virtually impossible. More than elsewhere in East Africa, the student must look to work done a generation ago. Fortunately, this is of high quality: the essays by Low, Ehrlich and Pratt for the Oxford *History*; Low and Pratt on Buganda; Powesland on migrant labour (see also Richards), Wrigley on cash-crops and Gutkind on the Ganda capital. These writers had in turn been able to draw upon valuable compilations by officials: Thomas and Scott, Tothill, and Thomas and Spencer. Former officials have made fundamental studies of legal change (Morris) and land policy (West). Much other research on our period has had a regional focus. Tosh's work on Lango gives rare insights into the politics of a society where chiefs were a colonial innovation; other areas studied include Ankole (Doornbos), Buganda (Morris, Twaddle), Bukedi (Twaddle), Bunyoro (Dunbar), Busoga (Nayenga), Karamoja (Barber), Kigezi (E. Hopkins, in Rotberg and Mazrui (p. 883); Turyahikayo-Rugema), Lugbara (King), Teso (Vail, Vincent), Toro (Ingham). Some of these studies reflect the 'radical pessimism' of many Africanists in the 1970s, and Mamdani offers a modern history of Uganda in terms of class formation: he pays special attention to the economic role of Asians (see also Jamal). There have been several studies of the Christian impact (listed on pp. 897–902): by Gale, Hansen, Pirouet, Robins, Taylor, Tuma, Vignato and Waliggo. Oded has studied an African Judaic movement. On education, see Carter, McGregor and Motani; on African writing, Rowe and Twaddle (p. 912); on the

press, Scotton. Soff has examined the control of sleeping-sickness.

For some years after independence it was very hard to do research in Zanzibar. There are several outlines of our period (Flint, in the Oxford *History*; Bennett, Lofchie), but only two special studies: Gregory on Asians (p. 974) and Cooper on the plantation economy. On local government, see Hailey (p. 967).

14. ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN

Ethiopia

Menelik's introduction of European-style administration created a mass of paper. Something of what the Italians removed in 1936–40 has been returned, but the organisation of a national archive is still in progress. A few state papers, together with private records in Amharic and Arabic, have been deposited at the National Library and in the Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University. The university's law faculty began an archive of Ethiopian law (Selamu Bekele and Vanderlinden), but this mostly covers the period since 1945. Macomber and Getachew Haile have catalogued 1500 out of nearly 7000 Geez and Amharic manuscripts microfilmed jointly by the patriarchate of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library, St. John's Abbey and University, Collegeville, Minnesota; these include information on land and taxation. Records of the former mission to the Oromo are kept at the Ethiopian Catholic Church, Adama, Shewa. Arén (p. 895) indicates the papers inherited by the Ethiopian Evangelical Church (Mekane Yesus) from its Protestant missionary founders.

Italian records of the Fascist occupation are stored at the ministry of foreign affairs in Rome: see the guide by Giglio and Lodolini listed under UNESCO on p. 880. British diplomatic records illuminate the internal as well as external history of Ethiopia (cf. Caplan, p. 884), but such possibilities are not indicated in the UNESCO volume of French archives. Those of Belgium and Sweden (the other countries most involved with Ethiopia before 1940) have also yet to be probed (though see Norberg). The archives of the USA are more important for Ethiopia than appears from the otherwise exhaustive guide by

South (p. 880). The Ottoman archives contain documents on Ethiopia's relations with the Central Powers in the First World War: see Orhonlu. The continuing value for our period of files in the Central Records Office, Khartoum, has been demonstrated by Triulzi (1974) and Bahru Zewde.

There are three recent bibliographies on Ethiopia (Alula Hidaru and Dessalegn Rahmato; Brown; Prouty and Rosenfeld), but none supersedes Marcus (1972) or the bibliographies appended to de Coppet's edition of Guèbré Sellassié, Coffey or Pankhurst (1968). The wealth of Ethiopian materials for the first decades of the twentieth century was first revealed by Garretson (1978), though there is a catalogue by Wright of early printed books in Amharic, updated by Strelcyn (in the collection by Tubiana). Cerulli and others contributed inventories of Amharic publications to *Oriente Moderno*: these are cited by Gerard and Kane (pp. 910–11). For Russian travellers before 1914, see Darch.

A few early edicts were published, with translations, by Eadie (p. 909); from 1924, edicts were regularly printed in the French-run weekly *Le Courrier d'Ethiopie* (1913, 1917–36), but an official gazette did not appear until 1936. A collection of edicts and documents spanning the period 1910–40 was edited by Mahteme Sellassie, a former minister of the pen. There is a chronicle of Menelik's reign by his chief secretary, Guèbré Sellassié; it concludes in 1909. Other contemporary publications by Ethiopians are listed on p. 909: for the views of a critic in exile, see Afewerq Gebre. The writings of Gebre Heywet Baykedagn are a fundamental source for the thought of the Young Ethiopians; the essay on Menelik has been translated into Italian by Fusella. In the 1930s Ernest Work (p. 909) wrote a doctoral thesis in Ohio on Ethiopia's external problems; Melaku Beyene pleaded his country's cause as the exiled emperor's special envoy to the USA. The leading Amharic weekly newspapers of the period were *Aemro* (Intelligence) (1924–35) and *Berhane-na Selam* (Light and Peace) (1925–35); the only complete collection of these is in the British Library.

Haile Sellassie set down his own recollections when in exile; they were published a year before his overthrow in 1974 and on several important subjects are disappointingly reticent. The first volume, translated by Ullendorff, goes up to 1936. Other memoirs in Amharic, not translated and not listed here, include first-hand

accounts of resistance to the Italians by Feleqe Dagne and Tadesse Zewelde. Gandar Dower recorded interviews with partisans, and the autobiography of Gidada, an Oromo mission teacher, recounts his conversion and the sufferings of his church under Fascism.

Steffanson and Starret have published selections from relevant records of the US State Department. Britain published one consular report on economic conditions in 1929–31. Rochat's critical study of the Italian invasion includes 200 pages of official records for 1932–6. The Ethiopian ministry of justice published Italian documents captured after the liberation, along with testimony from survivors. Orhonlu's collection of Ottoman records on Ethiopia includes many on the period 1900–1917.

There is a wide-ranging, though little-known, study of Ethiopia by Rein, a German who made several extended visits from the Sudan. Foreign residents left a rich and varied literature. The doctor and pharmacist Merab provides a fund of information and gossip about Addis Ababa from 1908 to 1914 and during the 1920s. The trader Zervos was a brother of Ras Tafari's doctor; he gives an encyclopaedic, if not always accurate, description of government departments, merchants and the foreign communities, as well as brief sketches of each province, and articles on aspects of the economy. Paleologos was a customs official in the capital in the 1920s. The events of 1928–30 were described by Zoli, then governor of Eritrea, on the basis of Italian documents and his own enquiries in Addis Ababa. The diaries of John Melly, a British medical missionary in Addis Ababa from 1934 to 1936, were posthumously edited by Nelson and Sullivan. The Italian doctor Borra served as a go-between in 1934–5.

For the provinces before 1936 there are several valuable reports. The explorer Montandon gave a careful account of the country west of Kaffa before its destruction by government garrisons. The archaeologists Azaïs and Chambard made close observations of Oromo and Gurage customs, and the linguist Cerulli also travelled among the Oromo. Walker, the British consul in Wollega, knew Amharic well and published an excellent study of social custom and common law; his successor Hodson's accounts of the west and south-west are more opinionated. Darley, a British army officer, gave a highly coloured picture of the slave-trade in the south-west in 1909 and 1919; Cheesman, the

British consul near Lake Tana in 1925–34, reported the limited success of abolition. The anthropologist Marcel Griaule traversed northern Ethiopia in 1932–3 and his secretary Leiris published a journal.

Accounts of the war of 1935–6 were soon published by the successive commanders-in-chief for Italian East Africa, de Bono and Badoglio, and also by Graziani. From the Ethiopian side there are accounts by Konovaloff, a White Russian officer, and by Macfie, a British Red Cross officer. The invasion was well described by Steer, correspondent for *The Times* (who quotes at length from Konovaloff), and the Italian journalist Poggiali kept a candid diary of the first eighteen months of the occupation; the memoirs of the officials Lenzi, Pierotti and Nasi are also revealing. The Fascist administration commissioned descriptive local reports and these have some value: cf. Brotto, Lifonti, Moreno. The invasion prompted articles by two foreign residents: Spencer (p. 885), who succeeded Colson as financial adviser to the emperor, and Sandford, who had farmed near the capital since 1922.

Two general works of reference, both elderly, are worth listing here: the bulky *Handbook of Abyssinia* produced in 1917 by the British Admiralty, and the conscientious guidebook for Italian East Africa published in 1938 by the Consociazione Turistica Italiana (p. 986). There is a short historical dictionary (Prouty and Rosenfeld). The most recent, though not the most reliable, general history of Ethiopia came from Poland in 1971: Bartnicki and Mantel-Niećko. In English there is still no adequate general history of the country. The brief sketch by Jones and Monroe was rushed out at the time of the Italian invasion and has not been revised. There is much more detail in Greenfield, but this is a contentious and essentially dynastic narrative which is in any case more useful for the period since 1950. Perham's study of Ethiopian government includes much material on the years before 1936, though it is unduly preoccupied with legal appearances. Marcus's survey of Menelik's reign concludes with a summary of what Allied diplomats said about Iyasu. Most academic studies of Ethiopian politics during our period have been exclusively concerned with external relations. Listed here are studies of Ethiopian relations with Germany by Scholler (in the Tubiana collection) and Baïru Tafla. Other works are listed on pp. 883–6: on Britain and Italy, Iadarola and Toynbee; on the years

before 1930, Buccianti, Caplan and Keefer; on the 'Abyssinian crisis', Baer, Hardie, Harris, Laurens, E. M. Robertson, Toynbee, Waley; on British policy, J. C. Robertson; on Ethiopia's frontiers, Hamilton (see also Barber, p. 980). Ross and Scott (p. 912) discuss relations between black Americans and Ethiopia. The collection of conference papers edited by Tubiana includes ten on our period; among the subjects treated are the revolt in Wollega in 1902–12 (Triulzi), the Bank of Abyssinia (Genoino) and the Versailles Peace Conference (Labrousse). The collection edited by Hess includes articles on Gebre Heywet Baykedagn (Caulk), the inter-war economy (Marcus), northern Sidamo (McClellan) and resistance to Italian rule (Sbacchi). There are seven relevant papers in Rubenson's collection, and material on the Young Ethiopians in the collection by the pseudonymous Addis Hiwet.

Recent literature on Italy and Ethiopia in the 1930s has been critically reviewed by Triulzi. Italian preparations for invading Ethiopia have been examined by Rochat. The story of the war itself has recently been told by Barker, del Boca, Coffey and Mori; see also Rouaud. Pankhurst and Sbacchi have written extensively on the war and on the occupation; most of their articles are listed by Prouty and Rosenfeld. There is an important compilation film on the war by Becker. Quaranta's book is Fascist propaganda despite its foreword by Lord Hailey. Other relevant works are listed below under 'coastal territories'. The war of liberation is placed by Bongiovanni in the context of Italian history. Del Boca includes a sympathetic account of Ethiopian resistance, but this is likely to be superseded by a forthcoming study in English, based on Patriot papers, by Tsehay Berhane Sellassie. Not listed here are Amharic histories of resistance by Tadesse Zewelde and Gerima Tefere.

The analytical study of Ethiopia's modern economic history has scarcely begun, though Pankhurst's unsystematic compendium (1968) is a useful introduction to published materials. Loepfe has made a study of the financial diplomacy behind the building of the Djibouti railway; like Garretson's history of Addis Ababa, this is more concerned with the years before 1905. There is a helpful study of Ethiopian land tenure by Mantel-Niećko. Stahl offers a provocative interpretation of the past century. There are local studies of Shoa (Berhanou Abbebe) and Sidama (McClellan); for Arussi during our period see Braukämper. For land tenure in

Eritrea, see below under 'coastal territories'. Greek traders have been studied by Natsoulas, and Swedish activities by Norberg. Religious history includes studies of foreign missions, e.g. by Arén and Cotterell, and theses by Shenk and Mikré-Sellassie on the Ethiopian Church (pp. 895–901). Crummey has studied a prophetic shaykh (p. 903). Teshome Wagaw, de Marco and Pankhurst have written on educational history, while Gérard, Kane and Molvaer (pp. 910–11) contribute to the history of Amharic literature. Biography has been a favourite medium for both Ethiopian and foreign writers. Relevant Amharic authors, not listed here, include Heruy Walde Sellassie, Mahteme Sellassie and Haile Giyorgis; see also obituaries in the newspaper *Addis Zemen* (June 1947, February 1964). Works in English include studies of Menelik and Iyasu (Marcus) and Haile Sellassie (Princess Asfa Yilma, p. 909; Mosley). Aleme Eshete has investigated Russian exiles. For Eritrean biography, see Puglisi as listed under 'coastal territories'. The Ethiopian section of the *Encyclopaedia Africana's* biographical dictionary (see p. 882) does not do justice to the available materials. Numerous articles on aspects of our period have been published in the *Ethiopia Observer*, the *Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, *Northeast African Studies* and *Rassegna di Studi Etiopici*.

The coastal territories

There is no account of archives in Somalia, but the Italian archives (cf. p. 866) throw much light on its internal history; relevant records in Europe, the USA and Kenya are surveyed by Dalleo. The Italian archives include much material on Eritrea, and the British archives contain not only material on British Somaliland but also retrospective accounts of Eritrea set down by Italians after their defeat in 1941. Records left there by the Italians are not accessible (apart from fragments appended to student theses at Addis Ababa) and the condition of Lutheran records of Eritrea is uncertain, but the Catholic cathedral at Asmara has kept the archives of the former bishop apostolic to northern Ethiopia: see da Nembro (p. 900). As for archives in Djibouti, some may have been transferred to Aix-en-Provence, and the records of the French colonial ministry are important for the area (cf. Picquart).

There is a bibliography of the Horn by Marcus (1972), listed under Ethiopia. For Italian Somaliland, Mohamed Khalief Salad

is helpful, while the bibliography in Castagno lists published Somali texts by Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh Ḥasan and others; see also Somali Republic and Istituto Italo-Africano. For Eritrea, see Kassahun Checole; early printed books from Eritrea are discussed by Strelcyn (in the collection on Ethiopia edited by Tubiana).

Texts and translations of poems by Sayyid Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh Ḥasan are included in Andrzejewski and Lewis (p. 909). From the British side, there are memoirs by Rayne (a district officer) and Archer (deputy commissioner, 1913–22). De Vecchi wrote his own account of his belligerent governorship; Cimmaruta, a *banda* commander, gave his own version of events at Walwal. Further views by senior officials are expounded by Zoli (1937) and Kittermaster.

For Somali history in general, Lewis provides a good introduction, though the 1980 edition makes no use of recent research; there is a useful historical dictionary by Castagno. The Arab factor has been examined by Hersi. There is as yet no study of any pastoral people in north-east Africa which parallels Dalleo’s analysis of economic change among Somali migrants to Kenya. The career of Sayyid Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh Ḥasan has been surveyed by Hess (1964, 1968), while Martin places him in the context of Islamic history; see also Lewis (p. 904), Said Samatar (p. 912) and Turton (p. 979).

The official guide to Italian East Africa is still useful (Con-sociazione Turistica), as is the collection of essays edited by Sillani. The fullest recent history is by del Boca. More general studies of Italian empire-building, by Bosworth, Costanzo, Hess, Mack Smith, Miège, Robertson and Zaghi, are listed on pp. 884–6. The Italian foreign ministry’s series *Italia in Africa* includes accounts of agriculture (Bologna *et al.*) and the administration of justice (Mellana, 1971–2) in Italian East Africa; de Marco’s study of Italian education policy does not analyse its impact on Africans. There is little specifically on Eritrea in our period: apart from essays on its economy in the collections edited by Sillani and Tubiana (see p. 985), there are only accounts of its peoples by Nadel and Pollera; brief studies of land tenure by Nadel and Villari; some relevant biographies in Puglisi’s compilation; and da Nembro’s study of Capuchin missionaries (p. 900). Italian Somaliland is better served. There is much detail on Italian rule in Barile and Corni; see also Grassi. Among recent studies, both

Pirone and Hess (1966) concentrate on the Italians. Maino has made a close study of the Duke of the Abruzzi's schemes. Guadagni contributes studies of early colonial law.

Kakwenzire's thesis is the first academic study of British Somaliland in our period; see also Fatoke. There is little more on the French colony. It is enough to cite here Picquart's article on the arms trade before 1914; a study of the Afar in 1935–7 by an official, Chailley; two articles on the 'Isa Somali by Bertin; brief reminiscences by Deschamps, the governor in 1938–9; a few pages on our period by Oberlé, Martineau and Thompson and Adloff, and a survey of the scanty literature by Clarke.

15. EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

Egypt

There is a comprehensive guide by Matthews and Wainwright to the location of both official and private papers in Britain. For the study of administration and Anglo-Egyptian relations, the chief primary sources are the records of the Foreign Office, the War Office and the British Residency, in the Public Record Office, London. Egyptian government records are mostly housed in the National Archive of Egypt in Cairo (*Dār al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmīya*). The annual reports of the British representative were published as command papers, and the British Department of Overseas Trade regularly issued economic reports on Egypt between 1921 and 1939. Among publications by British participants during the period, the most important are those by Cromer, Lloyd, Russell Pasha, Storrs and Wavell. Hurewitz has published a few relevant diplomatic documents. For the memoirs of a prominent Egyptian, see Youssef.

The fullest general survey of the period, though largely concerned with politics, is provided by Vatikiotis, who appends an introductory bibliography. Much illuminating detail and argument may be found in Berque's monumental, if idiosyncratic, social history of Egypt from the 1880s to 1952. For the latter part of our period, the most recent short survey in French is that by Colombe (1951). There is no very recent comprehensive bibliography for our period, but Pearson (p. 904) lists the periodical literature and Sauvaget remains invaluable for earlier work. There is a substantial historiography in Arabic, mostly by Egyptians;

this is not listed here but some impression of it may be gained from references by Berque and Vatikiotis, and Gran indicates more recent trends.

For the development of Anglo-Egyptian relations, see Marlowe, the Chatham House study, Caddy and Darwin; for the wider diplomatic background, see Monroe. Tignor has studied British administration up to 1914; there is also a study of Gorst by Mellini. On the army, it remains necessary to consult Elgood. Egyptian politics between the wars has recently been surveyed by Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot; Deeb and Terry address themselves to the Wafd and Harris to the Muslim Brotherhood; see also Guirguis, Landau, Safran and Zayid. The collection edited by Holt includes essays on the Egyptian National Party (Goldschmidt), the 1923 constitution (Kedourie) and law reform (Anderson). Ziadeh has studied western-orientated lawyers in our period. On the political roles of women, see Lutfi (1978) and Philipp: on 'Young Egypt' see Jankowski; on communism, Laqueur. Nationalist thought has been studied by Ahmad, who complements the pioneering and wider-ranging work of Hourani. There are short biographies of Zaghlūl, Hoda Chaaroui and the writer Taha Husayn in Julien's collection *Les Africains*, vols. 6, 9, 10 (see p. 883 above).

The only recent economic history of the whole period is by Radwan; Crouchley's 1938 survey is still useful, and Issawi provides relevant statistics. Owen's major study of cotton concludes in 1914. On landowners, see Baer; on peasants, Ayrout. There are relevant studies of agriculture (O'Brien, in Holt's collection; Richards), planning and banking (Davis, Tignor).

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

The policy files of the central administration are well maintained and easily accessible at the Central Record Office (*Dār al-Wathā'iq*) in Khartoum, which also holds many provincial policy files, though few from districts; its holdings of central departmental files (e.g. on finance, education or medical services) are very patchy. The printed *Sudan Intelligence Reports* (1898–1924) are useful. The governor-general's annual reports were published as British *Blue books* (and until 1920 as part of the annual report of the British representative in Cairo). The local working papers of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate were in 1977 still held at the

Sudan Gezira Board headquarters at Barakat, Gezira Province. Matthews and Wainwright (p. 880) indicate the whereabouts of source materials in Britain. Relevant holdings in the Public Record Office are located in the files of the Foreign Office, usually under Egypt. The Sudan Archive at the University of Durham contains many collections of private papers, including those of Wingate, Slatin, Gillan, Newbold and Robertson, and some of those of MacMichael; it also holds records of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. Other relevant private papers are held in Oxford, at the Middle East Centre, Rhodes House and the Bodleian Library.

The two major general bibliographies, by Hill (1939) and Abdel Rahman El Nasri are now of limited use for the study of our period; Daly's judicious select bibliography (1983) is indispensable. A subject and author index to *Sudan Notes and Records*, vols. 1-55 (1921-55) has been published (Khartoum, 1983). Hill's biographical dictionary (second edition, 1967) is indispensable, but its value for our period is limited by its omission of persons living at the time of its first publication (1951). The anonymous *Sudan Political Service* does not of course include 'departmental' officials; it also omits the numerous officer-administrators who served before c. 1920, except for those permanently transferred to the Political Service, and it omits certain 'contract DCs', a category mainly recruited between 1918 and 1930.

The best brief introduction to our period is provided in Holt and Daly (1979), a revision of Holt's *Modern History of the Sudan* (1961) which takes account of recent research on the Condominium. The most satisfactory work specifically devoted to the Condominium period as a whole is still Muddathir 'Abd al-Raḥīm (1969), though it concentrates rather narrowly on political and constitutional history and should be read in conjunction with more recent specialised studies.

Work on the Sudan as a problem in Anglo-Egyptian relations has made little progress for lack of reliable information on Egyptian policy: the relevant records in Egypt have not been explored. However, Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim (1977) has used the British archives to elucidate the Anglo-Egyptian discussions on the Sudan in 1936, and there has been considerable interest in the Sudan government's relations with the British government and with the agents of British overrule in Egypt: cf. Warburg (1971),

Daly (1980, 1983) and G. N. Sanderson (in Bābikr Badrī). The social origins, educational background and professional ethos of the Sudan Political Service have been investigated by Collins (1972), Kirk-Greene, Mangan and Grandin (who bases her treatment on replies to a questionnaire administered to certain former members of the service). Relevant reminiscences by former officials include Jackson, Davies and Boustead; much more revealing, however, is the selection by Henderson and Owen of the more printable versified persiflage, satire and invective composed, originally for private circulation, by British political officers. Henderson's valuable *Life and Letters* of Newbold is unfortunately still unique.

The structure and policies of Wingate's administration, especially in the northern Sudan, have been carefully analysed by Warburg (1971); G. N. Sanderson (in Bābikr Badrī) traces its origins as an improvised 'civil affairs branch' of the Egyptian Army. The role of Slatin is perceptively sketched by Hill (1965). Bukhari illustrates Wingate's preoccupation with internal security. Islamic resistance is investigated by Cudsi and by Hassān Ahmed Ibrahim (1979); a very different Islamic response is exemplified in Bābikr Badrī's memoirs. By far the best general treatment of the period between the wars is, most unfortunately, still unpublished: Bakheit's 1965 thesis. For the economic and political crises, and the policy fluctuations, which marked the governor-generalship of Lee Stack, Daly (1980) is a reliable and perceptive guide. For the crisis of 1924, Bābikr Badrī is a virtually unique Sudanese testimony; Schuster (p. 887) sheds important light on the friction between the governments of the Sudan and Britain. On the White Flag League, Bakheit is still indispensable, though see also 'Abd al-Karīm al-Sa'īd (in Arabic), Muddathir 'Abd al-Raḥīm (1969), Beshir (1974) and Daly (1980).

The years from 1925 to 1939 were dominated by the rise of neo-Mahdism and the development of 'sectarian' politics; and, after the brief fiasco of Archer's governor-generalship, by the sharply contrasted policies of Maffey and Symes. On Archer, see his own memoirs (p. 986), those of Schuster (p. 887), and G. N. Sanderson (in Bābikr Badrī). On neo-Mahdism, Bābikr Badrī and Ṣādiq al-Mahdī are valuable testimonies; Bakheit (1965) is supplemented, but not superseded, by Beshir (1974), Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim (1974, 1977) and Warburg (1978). However, until

work can begin on the records of 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdī and 'Alī al-Mīrghanī, our picture of northern Sudanese politics between the wars will remain essentially that painted by the Sudan government's intelligence service. For the theory and practice of indirect rule under Maffey, Bakheit (1965) is still essential. There is surprisingly little else of substance, at all events for the northern Sudan. Currie was an informed and perceptive contemporary critic; his title is deceptively innocuous. Grandin offers a rather abstract analysis which nevertheless exposes some of the fundamental contradictions of Maffeyan indirect rule. The personality and policies of Symes are not greatly elucidated by his own memoirs. Bakheit's rather too laudatory tone is usefully corrected by Collins (1983).

Educational policy and development under the Condominium have been usefully surveyed by Beshir (1969); see also G. N. Sanderson (in Bābikr Badrī), L. M. Sanderson on source materials (1963) and girls' education (1968), and, on education in the southern Sudan, Sanderson and Sanderson. Contemporary testimony includes Bābikr Badrī (himself a distinguished educationist), Currie, Hussey (p. 887) and Griffiths. On the development of intelligentsia politics and the revival of nationalism, Muddathir 'Abd al-Rahīm (1969) and Beshir (1974) both add significantly to Bakheit. There is important Sudanese testimony in Arabic for this period: the combined reminiscences of Muḥammad Aḥmad Maḥjūb and 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad; of Aḥmad Khayr; and of al-Dardīrī Muḥammad 'Uthmān. The growing political importance of the Sudanese press in this period is briefly but pithily traced by Maḥgoub Mohamed Salih; the chief publications were *Ḥaḍārat al-Sūdān* (1919–38), *Al-Naḥḍa al-Sūdāniya* (1930–32) and *Al-Fajr* (1934–7). Nordenstam illustrates the traditional elements, both Islamic and other, in the value-systems of young educated Sudanese. For aspects of Islam other than neo-Mahdism, and for the religious brotherhoods (*ṭuruq*), see Willis, Trimmingham, Voll, Hayder Ibrahim and Abdulla El Tayib; for popular Mahdism in the far west (Dār Masālīt), Kapteijns.

Too much of the economic, and especially financial, history of the Condominium remains unpublished or simply unexplored. Adel Amin Beshai provides an interesting econometric exercise but does not reveal what one most wants to know. Daly (1980) is valuable on the financial crisis of the early 1920s; MacMichael

(1934), albeit an official apologia, is still useful on that of the early 1930s. Neither of Stone's monographs on economic development before 1914 has been effectively published. For the Gezira scheme, Gaitskell is still indispensable, but much remains to be done on the political 'pre-history' of the scheme and on relations between the Plantations Syndicate and the government. An economic history of the scheme, by 'Abd al-Wahhāb 'Abd al-Raḥīm, remains unpublished, as does the work of Omar Mohamed Osman Abdou on the economic significance of transport, not covered by Hill (1965). On the crucial transition from slave labour to wage labour, see McLoughlin, Warburg, and a thesis by Hargey; on immigration from western Africa, see Isam Hassoun, Balamoan and, with special reference to the *ḥājj*, Birks (p. 903). Barbour surveys recent population shifts. There is a scanty literature on public health and the history of disease: see Squires, Ahmed Bayoumi, Maurice, and an essay by Hartwig on relapsing fever in Hartwig and Patterson (p. 892).

The history of the southern Sudan under the Condominium has too often been written either without much reference to the general policies and problems (especially the financial problems) of the administration; or else by historians whose primary interest is in the north and who are rather out of their depth in the south. Warburg (1971), while authoritative for the north, is perfunctory and not always reliable on the south, and the impressionistic studies of Beshir (1968) and Muddathir 'Abd al-Raḥīm (1968) are valuable mainly for their rich documentary appendices. More recently, Collins (1983) has combined a detailed and intimate knowledge of the southern terrain and its history with an ability to see the south and its problems through the eyes – often negative, or merely negligent – of the Khartoum policy-makers. Sanderson and Sanderson illustrate the importance of constraints emanating from the north for educational and religious policies in the south; they also examine in detail the role of Christian missions. Sevier's thesis has some useful material on the inter-war period but an over-rigid thematic arrangement tends to obscure the evolution of policy. Testimonies by officials include Comyn, Stigand and Fergusson; for other contemporary testimonies, see Santandrea (a missionary), Darley and Wyndham.

For early southern resistance and the disastrous British reaction to it, see, besides Collins (1971), Cudsi, and G. N. Sanderson in

Brunschwig (p. 882). Collins (1983) devotes considerable attention to two usually neglected regions: the turbulent frontier with Ethiopia and the even more turbulent south-eastern corner of the Sudan, which was never effectively administered. The local politics of the frontier have also been analysed by Bahru Zewde (p. 982). For the history of specific southern peoples see Deng (Dinka), Johnson (Nuer) and Evans-Pritchard and Reining (Azande). The economic history of the southern Sudan is a record of at best stagnation and failure (cf. Tosh, Catford) and at worst catastrophe (cf. Hødnebo). The origins of the Zande scheme, the one major project actually to produce results on the ground, are investigated by Reining, and also by Collins (1983).

Other than the south, there are two regions of the Sudan with a local history of more than merely local significance. One is the far west: Darfur has been closely studied by O'Fahey and Theobald, while there is an admirable history of Dār Masālīt by Kapteijns. The other region is the Nuba mountains: Cudsi has studied early Nuba resistance, Salih, L. M. Sanderson and Ahmed Abdel Rahim Nasr aspects of administrative policy, and Husmann cultural change. Most of the earlier writing on both northern and southern local and 'tribal' history during the Condominium hardly aspires above the level of chronicle. Guides to this literature, mostly published in *Sudan Notes and Records*, will be found in G. N. Sanderson (1963) and, for the south, in Collins (1983). More recently, the attention both of historians and social anthropologists has focused on the effects (sometimes intended, sometimes not) of comparatively strong central government upon the political and economic structure of rural and nomadic communities: cf. Abbas Ahmed Mohamed, Cunnison, Kapteijns and Talal Asad.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GENERAL

Guides to archives

- Byrne, Wendy S. *Manuscript collections (Africana and non-Africana) in Rhodes House Library, Oxford. Supplementary accessions to the end of 1977 and Cumulative Index*. Oxford, 1978.
- Duignan, P. *Handbook of American resources for African studies*. Stanford, 1966.
- Frewer, L. B. *Manuscript collections of Africana in Rhodes House Library, Oxford*. Oxford, 1968. Reprinted 1971.
- Manuscript collections of Africana in Rhodes House Library, Oxford: Supplement*. Oxford, 1971.
- Guides to materials on West African history in European archives*. London, 1962–73.
- Hannam, H. ed. *The SCOLMA directory of libraries and special collections on Africa in the United Kingdom and Western Europe*. 4th ed. Munich, 1983.
- Lötzke, H. and Brather, H. S. eds. *Übersicht über die Bestände des Deutschen Zentralarchivs, Potsdam*. Berlin, 1957.
- Matthews, Noel and Wainwright, M. D. ed. J. D. Pearson. *A guide to manuscripts and documents in the British Isles relating to Africa*. London, 1971.
- Penfold, P. A. *Maps and plans in the Public Record Office: 3. Africa*. London, 1982.
- Pugh, R. B. *The records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices*. London, 1964.
- Simpson, Donald H. ed. *The manuscript catalogue of the Library of the Royal Commonwealth Society*. London, 1975.
- South, Aloha. *Guide to federal archives relating to Africa*. Waltham, Mass., 1977.
- UNESCO. International Council on Archives, Zug (Switzerland).
1. *Quellen zur Geschichte Afrikas südlich der Sahara in den Archiven der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. 1970.
 2. *Espana. Guía de Fuentes para la Historia de Africa Subsahariana*. 1971.
 - 3–4. *Sources de l'Histoire de l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara dans les Archives et Bibliothèques françaises*. 1971, 1977.
 - 5–6. *Guida delle Fonti per la Storia dell'Africa a sud del Sahara esistenti in Italia*, ed. C. Giglio and E. Lodolini. 1973–4.
 8. *Guide to the sources of the history of Africa south of the Sahara. Scandinavia. Sources in Denmark, Norway and Sweden*. 1971.
 9. *Guide to the sources of the history of Africa south of the Sahara in the Netherlands*. Ed. M. P. H. Roessingh and W. Visser. Munich, Paris, London, New York, 1978.

GENERAL

Bibliographies

- Africa since 1914: a historical bibliography.* Santa Barbara, 1983.
- Africa south of the Sahara: Index to periodical literature 1900–1970.* Boston, Mass., 1971. 4 vols.
- Asamani, J. O. *Index Africanus.* Stanford, n.d. [1973].
- CARDAN (Paris). *Bibliographie française sur l'Afrique au sud du Sahara* (1968–1976), 1969–1977;
Bibliographie des travaux en langue française sur l'Afrique au Sud du Sahara: sciences sociales et humaines (1977–), 1979–
Inventaire de thèses et mémoires africanistes de langue française (1966–76), 1969–77;
Répertoire des thèses africanistes françaises (1977–9), 1980–82.
- Dinstel, Marion. *List of French doctoral dissertations on Africa, 1884–1961.* Boston, Mass., 1966.
- Duignan, P. and Gann, L. H. *A bibliographical guide to colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa (Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960, vol. 3).* Cambridge, 1973.
- International African Institute. *Cumulative bibliography of African studies* [1929–1972]. Boston, Mass., 1973. 3 vols.
- Jones, Ruth. *African bibliography series: ethnography, sociology, linguistics and related subjects.* London, 1958–61. 4 vols.
- Kohler, J. ed. *Deutsche Dissertationen über Afrika.* Bonn, 1962.
- McIlwaine, J. H. St J. *Theses on Africa, 1963–1975, accepted by universities in the United Kingdom and Ireland.* London, 1978.
- Maurer, Barbara and Schwarz, Klaus. *Hochschulschriften zu Schwarzafrika, 1960–1978. Deutschland–Österreich–Schweiz.* Freiburg, 1979.
- Pearson, J. D. ed. *International African Bibliography cumulation 1973–1978.* London, 1982.
- SCOLMA. *Theses on Africa accepted by universities in the United Kingdom and Ireland* [1920–1962]. Cambridge, 1964.
- Sims, M. and Kagan, A. *American and Canadian doctoral dissertations and master's theses on Africa, 1886–1974.* Waltham, Mass., 1976.
- Sluglett, P. *Theses on Islam, the Middle East and North-West Africa, 1880–1978, accepted at universities in the United Kingdom and Ireland.* London, 1982.
- Witherell, J. W. *The United States and Africa: guide to US official documents and government-sponsored publications on Africa, 1785–1975.* Washington, DC, 1978.

Microform

- Chadwyck-Healey, Cambridge; Somerset House, Teaneck, N.J. *African official statistical serials on microfiche.* Great Britain, Board of Trade: economic surveys 1921–1961.
- Co-operative Africana microform project (CAMP). *CAMP catalog.* Waltham, Mass., 1972.
- Easterbrook, D. L. and Lohrentz, K. P. *Africana microfilms at the E. S. Bird Library, Syracuse University. An annotated guide.* Syracuse, NY, 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Inter-Documentation, Zug (Switzerland). *Archives of the Joint International Missionary Council and of the Conference of British Missionary Societies, 1910-45. Archives of the Council for World Mission* (including those of the LMS).
- McKee, M. D. *African newspapers on microfilm*. London, 1973.
- Microform Ltd., East Ardsley, Yorkshire. *Government publications relating to Africa* (series for former British territories).
- Gold Coast records of the USPG.
- CMS *Proceedings*.
- Mengo (Uganda) *Notes*, 1900-21.
- Central Africa (UMCA), 1883-1964.
- East Africa and Rhodesia, 1924-67.
- West Africa, 1917-

Guides to non-written sources

- British Film Institute. *National Film Archive catalogue, I: Non-fiction films*. London, 1980.
- Luwel, M. 'Les Archives photographiques du MRCB à Tervuren', *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales*, 1959, n.s. 5, 4, 820-35.
- McClintock, M. H. *The Middle East and North Africa on film*. New York, 1982.
- Rabut, E. 'Les Collections photographiques de la Section Outre-mer des Archives Nationales', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1978, 65, no. 238, 104-6.
- Roberts, A. D. 'Africa on film, to 1940', *History in Africa*, in press.
- Stone, Ruth M. and Gillis, F. J. *African music and oral data: a catalog of field recordings, 1902-1975*. Bloomington and London, 1976.
- Tracey, H. *Catalogue: the Sound of Africa series*. Roodepoort, Tvl., 1973. 2 vols.
- UNESCO. Comité du film ethnographique. *Premier catalogue des films ethnographiques sur l'Afrique Noire*. New York, 1967.

Reference and collective works

- Battle, V. M. and Lyons, C. H. eds. *Essays on the history of African education*. New York, 1970.
- Birmingham, David and Martin, Phyllis M. eds. *History of Central Africa*, vol. II. London, 1983.
- Boahen, A. A. ed. *Unesco history of Africa*, vol. VII: *Africa under foreign domination, 1880-1935*. Paris, London and Berkeley, 1985.
- Brown, Godfrey N. and Hiskett, M. eds. *Conflict and harmony in education in tropical Africa*. London, 1975.
- [Brunschwig, H.] *Études africaines offertes à Henri Brunschwig*. Paris, 1983.
- Buell, R. L. *The native problem in Africa*. New York, 1928. 2 vols.
- Duignan, P. and Gann, L. H. *The United States and Africa*. Cambridge, 1985.
- Encyclopaedia Africana. *Dictionary of African biography*, vol. 1: *Ethiopia-Ghana*. New York, 1977; vol. II: *Sierra Leone-Zaire*. Algonac, Michigan, 1979.
- Page, J. D. *An atlas of African history*. 2nd ed. London, 1978.
- Fetter, B. ed. *Colonial rule in Africa: readings from primary sources*. Madison, 1979.

GENERAL

- Gann, L. H. and Duignan, P. eds. *The history and politics of colonialism 1870-1914* (*Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, vol. 1). Cambridge, 1969.
- The history and politics of colonialism 1914-1960* (*Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, vol. II). Cambridge, 1970.
- African proconsuls*. New York and Stanford, 1978.
- Gifford, P. and Louis, W. R. eds. *Britain and Germany in Africa*. New Haven, 1967.
- France and Britain in Africa*. New Haven, 1971.
- Great Britain: Foreign Office (Historical Section). *Peace handbooks*, vols. 15-20, nos. 90-130. London, 1920.
- Hailey, Lord. *An African survey. A study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara*. London, 1938.
- Jones, David. *The time shrinkers: the development of civil aviation between Britain and Africa*. London, 1971.
- Julien, C.-A. et al. *Les Africains*. Paris, 1977-8. 12 vols.
- Light, R. V. *Focus on Africa* (photographs by Mary Light). New York, 1941.
- Lipschutz, M. R. and Rasmussen, R. K. *Dictionary of African historical biography*. London, 1978.
- Lucas, C. P. *The Empire at war*, vol. IV. London, n.d. [1925].
- McKinley, E. H. *The lure of Africa. American interests in tropical Africa 1919-1939*. Indianapolis and New York, 1974.
- Martens, O. and Karstedt, O. *The African handbook: a guide to West and South and East Africa... for the German African lines*. 2nd ed. London, 1938.
- Meyer, H. H. J. *Das deutsche Kolonialreich: eine Länderkunde der deutschen Schutzgebiete*. Leipzig, 1909-10. 2 vols.
- Rosenthal, E. *Stars and stripes in Africa*. London, 1938.
- Rotberg, R. I. and Mazrui, A. A. eds. *Protest and power in black Africa*. New York, 1970.
- Schnee, H. *Deutsches Kolonial-Lexicon*. Leipzig, 1920. 3 vols.
- Turner, V. ed. *Profiles of change: African society and colonial rule* (*Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960*, vol. III). Cambridge, 1971.

International relations

- Ageron, C.-R. 'L'Ideé d'Eurafrique et le débat colonial franco-allemand dans l'entre-deux-guerres', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 1975, 22, 3, 446-75.
- Allain, J.-C. *Agadir 1911: une crise impérialiste en Europe pour la conquête du Maroc*. Paris, 1976.
- Andrew, C. M. and Kanya-Forstner, A. S. *France overseas: the Great War and the climax of French imperial expansion*. London, 1981.
- Ayache, G. 'Les Implications internationales de la Guerre du Rif (1921-1926)', *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 1974, 15. Reprinted in G. Ayache, *Études d'histoire marocaine*. Rabat, 1979.
- Baer, G. W. *The coming of the Italo-Ethiopian war*. Cambridge, Mass. and Oxford, 1967.
- Test case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations*. Stanford, 1976.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barlow, I. C. *The Agadir crisis*. Chapel Hill, 1940.
- Barracrough, G. *From Agadir to Armageddon: anatomy of a crisis*. London, 1982.
- Beer, G. L. *African questions at the Peace Conference*. New York, 1923.
- Beloff, M. *Imperial sunset*, vol. 1. *Britain's liberal empire, 1897-1921*. London, 1969.
- Bessis, J. *La Méditerranée fasciste: l'Italie Mussolinienne et la Tunisie*. Paris, 1981.
- Bono, Salvatore. *Le Frontiere in Africa dalla spartizione coloniale alle vicende piu' recenti (1884-1971)*. Milan, 1972.
- Bosworth, R. J. B. *Italy, the least of the Great Powers: Italian foreign policy before the First World War*. Cambridge, 1979.
- Brownlie, I. *African boundaries: a legal and diplomatic encyclopaedia*. London, 1979.
- Buccianti, G. *L'Egemonia sull'Etiopia (1918-1923). Lo scontro diplomatico tra Italia, Francia e Inghilterra*. Milan, 1977.
- Caplan, A. S. 'British policy towards Ethiopia 1909 to 1919'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1971.
- Caroselli, F. S. *L'Africa nella guerra e nella pace d'Europa, 1911-19*. Milan, 1918.
- Cole, S. M. 'Secret diplomacy and the Cyrenaican settlement of 1917', *Journal of Italian History*, 1979, 2, 2, 258-80.
- Cookey, S. J. S. *Britain and the Congo question, 1885-1913*. London, 1968.
- Costanzo, G. A. *La Politica italiana per l'Africa orientale*. vol. 1. 1914-1919. Rome, 1957.
- Crozier, A. J. 'Imperial decline and the colonial question in Anglo-German relations 1919-39', *European Studies Review*, 1981, 11, 2, 207-42.
- 'The colonial question in Anglo-German relations, 1933-39'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983.
- Curry, G. 'Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts and the Versailles settlement'. *American Historical Review*, 1961, 66, 4, 968-86.
- Darwin, John. 'Imperialism in decline? Tendencies in British imperial policy between the wars', *Historical Journal*, 1980, 23, 3, 657-79.
- Ekoko, A. E. 'British defence policy in Western Africa, 1878-1914'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1976.
- 'The British attitude towards Germany's colonial irredentism in Africa in the inter-war years', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1979, 14, 2, 287-307.
- Gallagher, John. *The decline, revival and fall of the British Empire*. Cambridge, 1982.
- Hamilton, D. 'Ethiopia's frontiers: the boundary agreements and their demarcation, 1896-1956'. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1974.
- Hardie, F. *The Abyssinian crisis*. London, 1974.
- Harris, Brice, Jr. *The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis*. Stanford, 1964.
- Hatton, P. H. S. 'Harcourt and Solf: the search for an Anglo-German understanding through Africa, 1912-14', *European Studies Review*, 1971, 1, 2, 123-45.
- Hess, R. 'Italy and Africa: colonial ambitions in the First World War', *Journal of African History*, 1963, 4, 1, 105-26.
- Iadarola, A. 'Prolegomena to the Ethiopian crisis: Anglo-Italian relations towards Ethiopia, 1923-1934'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Georgetown, 1975.

- Jentgen, P. *Les Frontières du Congo belge*. Brussels, 1952.
- Keefer, E. C. 'Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Tripartite Treaty of 1906', *Albion* (Boone, NC), 1981, 13, 4, 364-80.
- Langhorne, R. T. B. 'The Anglo-German negotiations concerning the future of the Portuguese colonies in Africa', *Historical Journal*, 1973, 16, 2, 361-87.
- Laurens, F. D. *France and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, 1935-1936*. The Hague and Paris, 1967.
- Logan, Rayford W. *The operation of the mandate system in Africa, 1919-1927*. Washington, DC, 1942.
- The African mandates in world politics*. Washington, DC, 1948.
- Louis, W. Roger. 'The United States and the African Peace Settlement of 1919: the pilgrimage of George Louis Beer', *Journal of African History*, 1963, 4, 413-33.
- 'African origins of the mandates idea', *International Organisation*, 1965, 19, 1, 20-36.
- Great Britain and Germany's lost colonies, 1914-1919*. Oxford, 1967.
- 'Colonial appeasement, 1936-1938', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, 1971, 49, 4, 1175-91.
- McCormack, R. L. 'Imperial mission: the air route to Cape Town, 1918-32', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1974, 9, 4, 77-97.
- 'Airlines and empires: Great Britain and the "Scramble for Africa", 1919-1932', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1976, 10, 1, 87-105.
- McEwen, A. C. *International boundaries of East Africa*. Oxford, 1971.
- Mack Smith, D. *Mussolini's Roman empire*. London and New York, 1976.
- Miège, J.-L. *L'Impérialisme colonial italien de 1870 à nos jours*. Paris, 1968.
- Osuntokun, J. 'Anglo-Spanish relations in West Africa during the First World War', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1974, 7, 2, 291-301.
- Parsons, F. V. *The origins of the Morocco question, 1880-1900*. London, 1976.
- Pick, F. W. *Searchlight on German Africa: the diaries and papers of Dr W. Ch. Regdanz*. London, 1939.
- Rainero, R. *La Rivendicazione fascista sulla Tunisia*. Milan, 1978.
- Rivet, D. 'Mines et politique au Maroc, 1907-1914', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 1979, 26, 549-78.
- Robertson, E. M. *Mussolini as empire-builder. Europe and Africa 1932-36*. London, 1977.
- Robertson, J. C. 'British policy in East Africa [sc. Ethiopia], March 1891 to May 1935', *English Historical Review*, 1978, 93, 835-44.
- Spencer, J. H. 'The Italo-Ethiopian dispute and the League of Nations', *American Journal of International Law*, 1937, 16, 614-41.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. (for Royal Institute of International Affairs). *Survey of international affairs, 1920-23, 1924, 1929*. London, 1927, 1928, 1930.
- Survey of international affairs, 1935*, vol. 11: *Abyssinia and Italy*. London, 1936.
- Vincent Smith, J. D. 'Britain, Portugal, and the First World War, 1914-16', *European Studies Review*, 1974, 4, 3, 207-38.
- 'The Anglo-German negotiations over the Portuguese colonies in Africa, 1911-1914', *Historical Journal*, 1974, 17, 4, 620-9.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'The Portuguese Republic and Britain, 1910-1914', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 10, 1975, 4, 707-27.
- Vogel, R. *A breviate of British diplomatic Blue Books 1919-1939*. Montreal, 1963.
- Waley, Daniel. *British public opinion and the Abyssinian war 1935-6*. London, 1975.
- Watt, D. C. 'South African attempts to mediate between Britain and Germany, 1935-1938'; in Bourne, K. and Watt, D. C. eds. *Studies in international history*, pp. 402-22. Hamden, Conn., 1967.
- Wilkin, David. 'Refugees and British administration policy in northern Kenya, 1936-1938', *African Affairs*, 1980, 79, no. 317, 510-30.
- Willequet, J. *Le Congo belge et la Weltpolitik, 1894-1914*. Brussels, 1962.
- Wright, P. Q. *Mandates under the League of Nations*. Chicago, 1930.
- Zaghi, C. *L'Africa nella coscienza europea e l'imperialismo italiano*. Naples, 1973.

I. THE IMPERIAL MIND

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Amery, L. S. *The German colonial claim*. London, 1939.
- My political life*, vol. 11. *War and peace, 1914-1929*. London, 1953.
- The Leo Amery Diaries*, vol. 1. 1896-1929. ed. J. Barnes and D. Nicholson. London, 1980.
- Barnes, L. *The duty of empire*. London, 1935.
- Empire or democracy?* London, 1939.
- Bertram, A. *The Colonial Service*. Cambridge, 1930.
- Buell, R. I.. *The native problem in Africa*. New York, 1928. 2 vols.
- Cendrars, B. *Anthologie nègre*. Paris, 1921. English tr. New York, 1927.
- Cesari, C. *L'Istituto coloniale fascista: a trenta anni dalla sua costituzione*. Rome, 1936.
- Colonial Office List*. London, annual.
- Cunard, N. ed. *Negro*. London, 1934. Reprinted New York, 1969.
- Delafosse, M. *Les Noirs de l'Afrique*. Paris, 1921. *Les civilisations négro-africaines*. Paris, 1925.
- Much of both tr. F. Fligelman in *The Negroes of Africa*, Washington, DC, 1931. (Reissued Port Washington, NY, 1968).
- Dumbrell, H. ed. *Letters to African teachers*. London, 1935.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. *Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande*. Oxford, 1937.
- Farson, Negley. *Behind God's back*. London, 1940.
- Fiddes, G. V. *The Dominions and Colonial Offices*. London, 1926.
- Frobenius, L. *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas*. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1933, 2nd ed. Zurich, 1954. French tr. Paris, 1933.
- Leo Frobenius: an anthology* ed. E. Haberland. Wiesbaden, 1973.
- Furse, Ralph. *Ancuparius. Recollections of a recruiting officer*. London, 1962.
- Hailey, Lord. 'Nationalism in Africa', *Journal of the Royal African Society*, 1936, 36, no. 143, 134-47.
- An African survey. A study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sabara*. London, 1938.

1. THE IMPERIAL MIND

- Hussey, E. R. J. *Tropical Africa, 1908-1944: memoirs of a period*. London, 1959.
 Institut Colonial International. *Comptes rendus des séances*. Brussels, 1894-1939 (irregular).
Annuaire de documentation coloniale comparée. Brussels, 1928-1938.
Recueil international de législation coloniale. Brussels, 1911-
Bibliothèque coloniale internationale. Brussels, 1895- [series of compendia on various topics].
- Jeffries, C. *The colonial empire and its civil service*. Cambridge, 1938.
The Colonial Office. London, 1956.
- Johnston, H. H. *The black man's part in the war*. London, 1917.
 'The importance of Africa', *Journal of the African Society*, 1918, 17, no. 67, 177-198.
 'The Africa of the immediate future', *Journal of the African Society*, 1919, 18, no. 71, 161-82.
- Jung, C. G. *Memories, dreams, reflections*. ed. A. Jaffé. London, 1963.
- Lugard, F. D. *The dual mandate in British tropical Africa*. London, 1922.
- Macmillan, W. M. *Africa emergent: a study of social, political and economic trends in British Africa*. London, 1938.
- Mair, L. *Native policies in Africa*. London, 1936.
- Malinowski, B. 'The rationalization of anthropology and administration', *Africa*, 1930, 3, 4, 405-29.
- Mayhew, A. I. *Education in the colonial empire*. London, 1938.
- Melland, F. H. and Young, T. Cullen. *African dilemma*. London, 1937.
- Morel, E. D. *The black man's burden*. Manchester and London, 1920.
- Murray, A. V. *The school in the bush: a critical study of the theory and practice of native education in Africa*. London, 1929. 2nd ed. 1938.
- Notcutt, L. A. and Latham, G. C. eds. *The African and the cinema*. London, 1937.
- Oldham, J. H. and Gibson, B. D. *The remaking of man in Africa*. London, 1931.
- Olivier, S. *White capital and coloured labour*. London, 1906. 2nd ed. 1929.
The anatomy of African misery. London, 1927.
- Orde Browne, G. St J. 'British justice and the African', *Journal of the African Society*, 1933, 32, nos. 127-8, 148-59, 280-93.
- Parkinson, C. *The Colonial Office from within, 1909-1945*. London, 1947.
- Perham, M. *Colonial sequence, 1930-1949*. London, 1967.
- Royal Institute of International Affairs. *The colonial problem*. London, 1937.
- Scanlon, D. G. ed. *Traditions of African education*. New York, 1964.
- Schlunk, M. *Die Schulen für Eingeborene in der deutschen Schutzgebieten am 1 Juni 1911*. Hamburg, 1914.
- Schuster, G. *Private work and public causes*. Cowbridge, Glamorgan, 1979.
- Seligman, C. G. *The races of Africa*. London, 1930.
- Smith, Edwin W. *The golden stool. Some aspects of the conflicts of cultures in modern Africa*. London, 1926.
 'Africa: what do we know of it?' *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 1935, 45, 1-81.
- South African Native Races Committee. *The South African natives: their progress and present conditions*. London, 1908.
- Steer, G. L. *Judgment on German Africa*. London, 1939.
- Stigand, C. H. *Administration in tropical Africa*. London, 1914.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Stuemer, W. von and Duems, E. *Fünfzig Jahre deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft 1882-1932*. Berlin, 1932.
- Thwaite, D. *The seething African pot: a study of black nationalism 1882-1935*. London, 1936.
- Westermann, D. *The African today and tomorrow*. London, 1934.
ed. *Beiträge zur deutschen Kolonialfrage*. Berlin, 1937.
- Woolf, L. *Empire and commerce in Africa*. London, 1920.
- Worthington, E. B. *Science in Africa. A review of scientific research relating to tropical and southern Africa*. London, 1938.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Allott, A. N. *Essays in African law*. London, 1960.
- Asad, T. ed. *Anthropology and the colonial encounter*. London, 1973.
- Ashby, E. *Universities: British, Indian, African*. London, 1966.
- Baldock, R. 'Colonial governors and the Colonial Office: a study of British policy in tropical Africa, 1918-1925', Ph.D. thesis, University of Bristol, 1978.
- Benians, E. A., Butler, J. R. M. and Carrington, C. E. eds. *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, vol. III. *The Empire-Commonwealth, 1870-1919*. Cambridge, 1959.
- Berman, E. H. 'Educational colonialism in Africa: the role of American foundations, 1910-1945', in Arnove, R. F. ed. *Philanthropy and cultural imperialism: the foundations at home and abroad*. pp. 179-201. Boston, Mass., 1980.
- Briggs, A. *The history of broadcasting in the United Kingdom*, vol. II. *The golden age of wireless*. London, 1965.
- Cole, D. T. 'The history of African linguistics to 1945', *Current Trends in Linguistics*, 1971, 7, 1-29.
- Cross, J. A. *Lord Swinton*. Oxford, 1982.
- Easterbrook, D. L. *Africana book reviews 1885-1945*. Boston, Mass., 1979.
- Echeruo, M. J. C. *Joyce Cary and the novel of Africa*. London, 1973.
- Fage, J. D. 'The prehistory of African history', *Paideuma* (Frankfurt), 1973-74, 19-20, 146-61. Reprinted in UNESCO *General history of Africa*, vol. 1, pp. 25-43. Paris, 1980.
- Forde, Daryll. 'Anthropology and the development of African studies', *Africa*, 1967, 37, 4, 389-405.
- Gann, L. H. and Duignan, P. *The rulers of German Africa, 1884-1914*. Stanford, 1977.
The rulers of British Africa, 1870-1914. Stanford, 1978.
- Garner, J. *The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68*. London, 1978.
- Goodenow, R. K. 'To build a new world: toward two case studies on transfer in the twentieth century', *Compare*, 1983, 13, 1, 43-59.
- Gupta, P. S. *Imperialism and the British Labour movement, 1914-1964*. London, 1975.
- Hargreaves, J. D. 'History: African and contemporary', in Hargreaves, J. D. *The end of colonial rule in West Africa*, pp. 112-22. London, 1979.
- Hatton, P. H. S. 'British colonial policy in Africa, 1910-1914'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1971.

I. THE IMPERIAL MIND

- Hendrix, Melvin K. *An international bibliography of African lexicons*. Metuchen, NJ, 1982.
- Hetherington, P. *British paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940*. London, 1978.
- Heussler, R. *Yesterday's rulers. The making of the British colonial service*. Syracuse and London, 1963.
- Hildebrand, Klaus. *Vom Reich zum Weltreich: Hitler, NSDAP und Koloniale Frage, 1919-45*. Munich, 1968.
- Howe, Susanne. *Novels of empire*. New York, 1949.
- Hughes, C. and Nicolson, I. F. 'A provenance of proconsuls: British colonial governors, 1900-1960', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1977, 4, 1, 77-106.
- Hyam, R. *Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office*. London, 1968.
- 'The Colonial Office mind 1900-1914', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1979, 8, 1, 30-55.
- Ita, J. M. 'Frobenius, Senghor and the image of Africa', in Horton, R. and Finnegan, R. eds. *Modes of thought*, pp. 306-36. London, 1973.
- Killam, G. D. *Africa in English fiction, 1874-1939*. Ibadan, 1968.
- Killingray, D. 'The idea of a British imperial African army', *Journal of African History*, 1979, 20, 3, 421-36.
- 'British airpower in colonial Africa', *Journal of African History*, 1984, 25, 4.
- Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. 'The progress of pro-consuls: advancement and migration among the colonial governors of British African territories, 1900-1965', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1979, 7, 2, 180-212.
- 'The thin white line: the size of the British Colonial Service in Africa', *African Affairs*, 1980, 79, no. 314, 25-44.
- A biographical dictionary of the British colonial governor*, vol. 1. *Africa*. Brighton, 1980.
- Kuma N'Dumbe, A. *Hitler voulait l'Afrique. Les plans secrets pour une Afrique fasciste, 1933-1945*. Paris, 1980.
- Kuper, Adam. *Anthropologists and anthropology: the British school 1922-1972*. London, 1973.
- Laude, J. *La Peinture française, 1905-14, et 'l'art nègre'*. Paris, 1968. 2 vols.
- Low, D. A. *Lion rampant: essays in the study of British imperialism*. London, 1973.
- Low, Rachael. *The history of the British film 1929-1939: films of comment and persuasion of the 1930s*. London, 1979.
- Lyons, C. H. *To wash an Aethiop white: British ideas about black educability, 1530-1960*. New York, 1975.
- McCaskie, T. C. 'R. S. Rattray and the construction of Asante history: an appraisal', *History in Africa*, 1983, 10, 187-206.
- Mackenzie, A. J. 'British Marxists and the Empire: anti-imperialist theory and practice, 1920-1945'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1979.
- Mackenzie, J. M. *Propaganda and empire*. Manchester, 1985.
- Maegraith, B. G. 'A history of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine', *Medical History*, 1972, 16, 360-8.
- Mahood, M. M. *Joyce Cary's Africa*. London, 1964.
- Manson-Bahr, P. *History of the School of Tropical Medicine in London (1899-1949)*. London, 1956.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Marinucci, C. and Columbano, T. *Italia in Africa: il governo dei territori oltremare: gli organi centrali; il personale civile*. Rome, 1958.
- Marlowe, J. *Milner: apostle of empire*. London, 1976.
- Masefield, G. B. *A history of the Colonial Agricultural Service*. Oxford, 1972.
- Milbury-Steen, S. L. *European and African stereotypes in twentieth-century fiction*. London, 1980.
- Morris, H. F. 'A history of the adoption of codes of criminal law and procedure in British colonial Africa, 1876-1935', *Journal of African Law*, 1974, 18, 6-23.
- 'The development of statutory marriage law in twentieth-century British colonial Africa', *Journal of African Law*, 1979, 23, 1, 37-64.
- Newbury, Gertrude and Colin. 'Labour charters and labour markets: the ILO and Africa in the inter-war period', *Journal of African Studies* (Los Angeles), 1976, 3, 3, 211-27.
- Nwezeh, E. C. *Africa in French and German fiction (1911-1933)*. Ile-Ife, 1978.
- Pearce, R. D. *The turning point in Africa. British colonial policy 1938-48*. London, 1982.
- Ranger, T. O. 'The invention of tradition in colonial Africa', in Hobsbawm, E. and Ranger, T. O. eds. *The invention of tradition*, pp. 211-62. Cambridge, 1983.
- Reese, T. R. *The history of the Royal Commonwealth Society, 1868-1968*. London, 1968.
- Richards, Jeffrey, '"Patriotism with profit": British imperial cinema in the 1930s', in Curran, J. and Porter, V. eds. *British cinema history*, pp. 129-43, 344-8. London, 1983.
- Ridley, Hugh. *Images of imperial rule*. Beckenham, 1983.
- Roberts, A. D. 'The earlier historiography of colonial Africa', *History in Africa*, 1978, 5, 153-67.
- Roberts, B. C. *Labour in the tropical territories of the Commonwealth*. London, 1964.
- Robinson, Kenneth. *The dilemmas of trusteeship*. London, 1965.
- 'Experts, colonialists and Africanists', in Stone, J. C. ed. *Experts in Africa*, pp. 55-74. Aberdeen, 1980.
- Robinson, K. and Madden, F. eds. *Essays in imperial government presented to Margery Perham*. Oxford, 1963.
- Robinson, Ronald. 'The moral disarmament of African empire 1919-1947', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1979, 8, 1, 86-104.
- Schiefel, W. *Bernhard Dernburg 1865-1937*. Zurich, n.d. [?1974].
- Schmokel, W. *Dream of empire: German colonialism, 1919-1945*. New Haven, 1964.
- Smith, Woodruff D. *The German colonial empire*. Chapel Hill, 1978.
- Smyth, Rosaleen. 'The development of British colonial film policy, 1927-1939, with special reference to East and Central Africa'. *Journal of African History*, 1979, 20, 3, 437-50.
- Stoecker, H. ed. *Drang nach Afrika*. Berlin, 1977.
- Tarrant, G. D. 'The Colonial Office and the labour question in the dependencies in the inter-war years'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1977.
- Tinker, H. *Separate and unequal. India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth 1920-1950*. London, 1976.

1. THE IMPERIAL MIND

- Willan, B. P. 'The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society and the South African Natives' Land Act of 1913', *Journal of African History*, 1979, 20, 1, 83–102.
- Winter, J. C. *Bruno Gutmann, 1876–1966. A German approach to social anthropology*. Oxford, 1979.
- Worboys, M. 'Science and British colonial imperialism, 1895–1940'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Sussex, 1980.
- Zwernemann, J. *Culture history and African anthropology: a century of research in Germany and Austria*. Uppsala, 1983.

2. ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC HISTORY

- Abbott, George C. 'British colonial aid policy during the 1930s', *Canadian Journal of History*, 1970, 5, 1, 73–89.
- 'A re-examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act', *Economic History Review*, 1971, 2nd ser., 4, 1, 68–81.
- Albion, R. G. *Seaports south of the Sahara: the achievements of an American steamship service*. New York, 1959.
- Alford, B. W. E. and Harvey, C. E. 'Copperbelt merger: the formation of the Rhokana Corporation, 1930–1932', *Business History Review*, 1980, 54, 3, 330–58.
- Allan, W. *The African husbandman*. Edinburgh, 1965.
- Arndt, E. H. D. *Banking and currency development in South Africa, 1652–1927*. Cape Town, 1928.
- Arrighi, G. 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianisation of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', *Journal of Development Studies*, 1970, 6, 3, 197–234.
- Bauer, P. T. *West African trade: a study of competition, oligopoly and monopoly in a changing economy*. Cambridge, 1954.
- Berg, E. J. 'Backward-sloping supply functions in dual economies – the Africa case', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 1961, 75, 3, 468–92.
- 'The development of a labour force in sub-Saharan Africa', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 1965, 13, 4, 394–412.
- Biebuyck, D. ed. *African agrarian systems*. London, 1963.
- Clark, G. *The balance sheets of imperialism: facts and figures on colonies*. New York, 1936.
- Constantine, S. *The making of British colonial development policy, 1914–1940*. London, 1984.
- Crossley, J. and Blandford, J. *The DCO Story*. London, 1975.
- Davies, P. N. *The trade-makers; Elder Dempster in West Africa, 1852–1972*. London, 1973.
- Drummond, Ian M. *British economic policy and the empire, 1919–1939*. London, 1972.
- The floating pound and the sterling area, 1931–1939*. Cambridge, 1981.
- Duignan, P. and Gann, L. H. eds. *The economics of colonialism (Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960, vol. iv)*. Cambridge, 1975.
- Edinburgh University. Centre of African Studies. *African historical demography*, vol. 1, 1977; vol. 11, 1981.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ehrlich, C. 'Building and caretaking: economic policy in British tropical Africa, 1890-1960', *Economic History Review*, 1973, 26, 4, 649-62.
- Elkan, W. *Migrants and proletarians*. London, 1960.
- Feierman, S. *Health and society in Africa: a working bibliography*. Waltham, Mass., 1979.
- Fieldhouse, D. K. *Unilever overseas: the anatomy of a multinational, 1895-1965*. London, 1978.
- Ford, John. *The role of the trypanosomiasis in African ecology*. Oxford, 1971.
- Frankel, S. H. *Capital investment in Africa*. London, 1938.
The economic impact on underdeveloped societies. Oxford, 1953.
The tyranny of economic paternalism in Africa: a study of frontier mentality, 1860-1960. Johannesburg, 1960.
- Fry, R. H. *Bankers in West Africa*. London, 1976.
- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Dept). *Handbook of railways in Africa*. London, 1919, declassified in 1942. CB 910.
- Great Britain: Board of Trade. *Statistical abstract for the British Empire*. London.
- Great Britain: Colonial Office. *An economic survey of the colonial territories/empire*. London, 1932, 1933, 1935, 1936, 1937.
- Great Britain: Department of Overseas Trade. *Reports on the economic conditions of...* [by commercial secretaries of embassies or consulates]. 1921- . Irregular; most African countries given at least one report in period, except for: French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, Sudan. Microform: Chadwyck-Healey Ltd.
- Greaves, I. C. *Modern production among backward peoples*. London, 1935.
- Gregori, T. R. de. *Technology and the economic development of the tropical African frontier*. Cleveland, 1965.
- Gregory, J. W., Cordell, D. D. and Gervais, R. *African historical demography: a multidisciplinary bibliography*. Los Angeles, 1983.
- Gregory, T. *Ernest Oppenheimer and the economic development of southern Africa*. London, 1962.
- Hailey, Lord. *An African survey. A study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara*. London, 1938.
- Hammond, R. J. 'Economic imperialism, sidelights on a stereotype', *Journal of Economic History*, 1961, 21, 4, 582-98.
- Hancock, W. K. *Survey of British Commonwealth affairs*, vol. II. *Problems of economic policy. 1918-1939* (2 parts). London, 1942.
- Hartwig, G. W. and Patterson, K. D. eds. *Disease in African history: an introductory survey and case studies*. Durham, NC, 1978.
- Hazlewood, A. 'Trade balances and statutory marketing in primary export economies', *Economic Journal*, 1957, 67, 1, 74-82.
- Henry, J. A. *The first hundred years of the Standard Bank*. ed. H. A. Siepmann. London, 1963.
- Hogendorn, J. S. and Gemery, H. A. 'Cash cropping, currency acquisition and seigniorage in West Africa, 1923-1950', *African Economic History*, 1982, 11, 15-27.
- Hopkins, A. G. 'The creation of a colonial monetary system: the origins of the West African Currency Board', *African Historical Studies*, 1970, 3, 1, 101-32.

2. ECONOMIC HISTORY

- An economic history of West Africa*. London, 1973.
- 'On importing André Gunder Frank into Africa', *African Economic History Review*, 1975, 2, 13-21.
- 'Imperial business in Africa, part 1. Sources; part 11. Interpretations', *Journal of African History*, 1976, 17, 1-2, 29-48 and 267-90.
- Iliffe, J. *The emergence of African capitalism*. London, 1983.
- Janzen, J. M. and Feierman, S. eds. *The social history of disease and medicine in Africa*. Special issue of *Social Science and Medicine*, part B, 'Medical anthropology', 1979, 13B, 4.
- Johnston, B. F. *The staple food economies of western tropical Africa*. Stanford, 1958.
- Jones, W. O. *Manioc in Africa*. Stanford, 1959.
- Kamarck, A. *The economics of African development*. New York, 1967.
- Kilby, P. 'African labour productivity reconsidered', *Economic Journal*, 1961, 71, 2, 273-91.
- 'Backward-bending African labour supply curves - a reply', *Economic Journal*, 1965, 75, 3, 637-41.
- Killingray, D. 'The Empire Resources Development Committee and West Africa 1916-20', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1982, 10, 2, 194-210.
- Kock, G. de. *A history of the South African Reserve Bank: 1920-1952*. Pretoria, 1954.
- Kuczynski, R. R. *A demographic survey of the British colonial empire*. vols. 1 and 11. London, 1948-9.
- League of Nations. *International statistical yearbooks*. 1926-27; 1929; 1930-44 (*Stat. yrbk. L of N*); 1931-8 (*International Trade Statistics*).
- Leubuscher, C. 'Marketing schemes for native-grown produce in African territories', *Africa*, 1939, 12, 2, 163-87.
- The West African shipping trade, 1909-1959*. Leiden, 1963.
- Lewis, W. A. *Economic survey, 1919-1939*. London, 1949.
- 'Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour', *Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies*, 1954, 22, 139-91.
- ed. *Aspects of tropical trade, 1883-1965*. Uppsala, 1969.
- Tropical development, 1880-1913*. London, 1970.
- Growth and fluctuations, 1880-1913*. London, 1978.
- McCarthy, D. M. P. 'Media as ends: money and the underdevelopment of Tanganyika to 1940', *Journal of Economic History*, 1976, 36, 3, 645-62.
- Meek, C. K. *Land law and custom in the colonies*. London, 1946.
- Meredith, D. 'The British Government and colonial economic policy, 1919-39', *Economic History Review*, 1975, 28, 3, 484-99.
- Meyer, F. V. *Britain's colonies in world trade*. London, 1948.
- Miracle, M. P. *Maize in tropical Africa*. Madison, 1966.
- Mitchell, B. R. *International historical statistics: Africa and Asia*. London, 1982.
- Morgan, D. J. *The official history of colonial development*, vol. 1. *The origins of British aid policy, 1924-1945*. London, 1980.
- Munro, J. Forbes. *Africa and the international economy, 1800-1960*. London, 1976.
- Britain in tropical Africa, 1880-1960*. London, 1984.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Neumark, S. D. *Foreign trade and economic development in Africa*. Stanford, 1964.
- Newlyn, W. T. and Rowan, D. C. *Money and banking in British colonial Africa*. Oxford, 1954.
- Ofonagoro, W. I. 'From traditional to British currency in southern Nigeria: analysis of a currency revolution, 1880-1948', *Journal of Economic History*, 1979, 39, 3, 623-54.
- Orde Browne, G. St J. *The African labourer*. London, 1933.
- Palmer, Robin and Parsons, Q. N. eds. *The roots of rural poverty in central and southern Africa*. London, 1977.
- Pan, Lynn. *Alcohol in colonial Africa*. Uppsala, 1975.
- Patterson, K. D. 'Disease and medicine in African history: a bibliographical essay', *History in Africa*, 1974, 1, 141-8.
- Infectious diseases in twentieth-century Africa, a bibliography of their distribution and consequences*. Waltham, Mass., 1979.
- Patterson, K. D. and Pyle, G. F. 'The spread of influenza in sub-Saharan Africa 1918-19: a geographical analysis', *Social Science and Medicine*, 1983, 17, no. 17, 1299-1307.
- Pedler, F. *The lion and the unicorn in Africa*. London, 1974.
- Perham, M. ed. *The economics of a tropical dependency*, vol. 1. *The native economies of Nigeria* (by C. D. Forde and R. Scott). London, 1946; vol. II. *Mining, commerce and finance in Nigeria* (by P. A. Bower, A. J. Brown, C. Leubuscher, J. Mars and A. Pim). London, 1948.
- Pim, A. *Colonial agricultural production*. London, 1946.
- Read, M. 'Migrant labour in Africa and its effects on tribal life', *International Labour Review*, 1942, 45, 6, 605-31.
- Rotberg, R. I. ed. *Imperialism, colonialism and hunger: east and central Africa*. Lexington and Toronto, 1983.
- Rowe, J. W. F. *Markets and men: a study of artificial control schemes in some primary industries*. Cambridge, 1936.
- Sabben-Clare, E. E., Bradley, D. J. and Kirkwood, K. eds. *Health in tropical Africa during the colonial period*. Oxford, 1980.
- Sayers, R. S. ed. *Banking in the British Commonwealth*. Oxford, 1952.
- Stahl, K. M. *The metropolitan organisation of British colonial trade*. London, 1951.
- Tosh, J. 'The cash-crop revolution in tropical Africa: an agricultural reappraisal', *African Affairs*, 1980, 79, no. 314, 79-94.
- Wardle, W. A. 'A history of the British Cotton Growing Association, with special reference to its activities in Africa'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1980.
- Whitford, H. N. and Anthony, A. *Rubber production in Africa*. Washington, DC, 1926.
- Wickizer, V. D. *Coffee, tea and cocoa: an economic and political analysis*. Stanford, 1951.
- Wilson, C. *The history of Unilever*. London, 1954. 2 vols.
- Yates, P. L. *Commodity control*. London, 1943.

3. CHRISTIANITY

3. CHRISTIANITY

- Ajayi, J. F. A. *Christian missions in Nigeria 1841-1891: the making of a new elite*. London, 1965.
- Alladaye, T. 'Les Missionnaires catholiques au Dahomey, à l'époque coloniale, 1905-1957'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1978.
- Anderson, G. H. ed. *The theology of the Christian mission*. Nashville, 1961.
- Anderson, J. *The struggle for the school: the interaction of missionary, colonial government and nationalist enterprise in the development of formal education in Kenya*. London, 1970.
- Andersson, E. *Churches at the grass-roots. A study in Congo-Brazzaville*. London, 1968.
- Messianic popular movements in the Lower Congo*. Uppsala, 1958.
- Anon. *Madagascar for Christ*. Being a joint report of simultaneous deputations from the London Missionary Society, the Friends' Foreign Mission Association and the Paris Missionary Society, to Madagascar, July to October, 1913. London and Paris, 1913.
- Arén, G. *Evangelical pioneers in Ethiopia. Origins of the evangelical church Mekane Yesus*. Stockholm and Addis Ababa, 1978.
- Ayandele, E. A. *The missionary impact on modern Nigeria 1842-1914*. London, 1966.
- Holy Johnson: pioneer of African nationalism, 1836-1917*. London, 1970.
- 'The ideological ferment in Ijebuland, 1892-1943', *African Notes* (Ibadan), 1970, 5, 3, 17-40.
- Baëta, C. G. *Prophetism in Ghana*. London, 1962.
- ed. *Christianity in tropical Africa*. London, 1968.
- Barrett, D. B. *Schism and renewal in Africa: an analysis of six thousand contemporary religious movements*. Nairobi, 1968.
- 'A.D. 2000: 350 million Christians in Africa', *International Review of Missions*, 1970, 59, 1, 39-54.
- Bartels, F. L. *The roots of Ghana Methodism*. Cambridge, 1965.
- Beach, H. P. and Fahs, C. H. *World missionary atlas*. New York, 1925.
- Bée, M. 'La Christianisation de la Basse Côte d'Ivoire', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1975, 62, no. 229, 640-73.
- Berger, Heinrich. *Mission und Kolonialpolitik. Die Katholische Mission in Kamerun während der deutschen Kolonialzeit*. Immensee, 1978.
- Berry, L. L. *A century of missions of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, 1840-1940*. New York, 1942.
- Bhebe, N. *Christianity and traditional religion in western Zimbabwe, 1859-1923*. London, 1979.
- Bibliografia missionaria*. Rome, 1933-.
- Bibliotheca missionum*. ed. R. Streit, J. Dindinger, J. Rommerskirchen, J. Metzler. 18-20, Freiburg, 1953-4; 22-3, Rome, Freiburg, Vienna, 1963-4.
- Binchy, D. A. *Church and state in Fascist Italy*. London, 1941.
- Blanc, R., Blocher, J. and Kruger, E. *Histoire des missions protestantes françaises*. Flavion (Belgium), 1970.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Boer, J. H. *Missionary messengers of liberation in a colonial context: a case study of the Sudan United Mission*. Amsterdam, 1979.
- Bolink, P. *Towards church union in Zambia*. Franeker, 1967.
- Bontinck, F. 'Donzwau Nlemvo (c. 1871-1938) et la bible kikongo', *Revue africaine de théologie*, 1978, 2, 3, 5-32.
- Bouchaud, J. *Monseigneur Pierre Bonneau, Evêque de Douala*. Douala, 1969.
- Bouche, Denise. *Les Villages de liberté en Afrique noire française, 1887-1910*. Paris, 1968.
- Boudou, A. *Les Jésuites à Madagascar au xixe siècle*. Paris, 1942. 2 vols.
- Braekman, E. M. *Histoire du protestantisme au Congo*. Brussels, 1961.
- Brandel-Syrier, M. *Black woman in search of God*. London, 1962.
- Brásio, A. *História e missiologia inéditos e esparos*. Luanda, 1973.
- Breidenbach, P. S. 'Maame Harris Grace Tani and Papa Kwesi John Nackabah: Independent Church leaders in the Gold Coast, 1914-1958', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1979, 12, 4, 581-614.
- Brown, W. E. *The Catholic Church in South Africa*. London, 1960.
- Bureau, R. *Ethno-sociologie religieuse des Duala et apparentés*. Yaoundé, 1962.
- 'Le Prophète Harris et la religion Harriste en Côte d'Ivoire', *Annales de l'Université d'Abidjan*, 1971, 3, 31-196.
- Cason, J. W. 'The growth of Christianity in the Liberian environment'. Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1962.
- Cooke, C. M. 'The Roman Catholic mission in Calabar 1903-1960'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1977.
- Cotterell, F. P. *Born at midnight*. Chicago, 1973.
- Craig, C. S. *The archives of the Council for World Mission (incorporating the London Missionary Society): an outline guide*. London, 1973.
- Crampton, E. P. T. *Christianity in Northern Nigeria*. Zaria, 1975.
- Cross, S. 'The Watch Tower movement in South-Central Africa, 1908-1945'. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1973.
- Dachs, A. J. and Rea, W. F. *The Catholic Church and Zimbabwe 1879-1979*. Gwelo, 1979.
- Dancel, M. L. *Old and new in southern Shona independent churches*. The Hague, 1971, 1974. 2 vols.
- Debrunner, H. W. *A church between colonial powers: a study of the Church in Togo*. London, 1965.
- A history of Christianity in Ghana*. Accra, 1967.
- De Craemer, W. 'The Congo/Zaire archives of the northern (Flemish) Belgian Jesuit province in Brussels, Belgium', *History in Africa*, 1977, 4, 287-90.
- Delacroix, S. ed. *Histoire universelle des missions catholiques*, vols. III and IV. Paris, 1956, 1959.
- Denis, L. *Les Jésuites belges au Kwango, 1893-1943*. Brussels, 1945.
- Der, B. 'Church-state relations in northern Ghana, 1906-1940', *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 1974, 15, 1, 41-61.
- Dillon-Malone, C. M. *The Korsten basketmakers*. Lusaka, 1978.
- Dwane, S. 'Christianity in relation to Xhosa religion'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1979.

3. CHRISTIANITY

- Eggert, Johanna. *Missionschule und sozialer Wandel in Ostafrika: der Beitrag der deutschen evangelischen Missionsgesellschaften zur Entwicklung des Schulwesens in Tanganyika, 1891–1939*. Bielefeld, 1970.
- Ekechi, F. K. *Missionary enterprise and rivalry in Igboland 1857–1914*. London, 1971.
- Ellenberger, V. *A century of mission work in Basutoland (1833–1933)*. tr. E. M. Ellenberger, Morija, 1938.
- Engel, L. *Kolonialismus und Nationalismus im deutschen Protestantismus in Namibia 1907 bis 1945*. Berne, 1976.
- Fisher, H. J. 'Conversion reconsidered: some historical aspects of religious conversion in Black Africa', *Africa*, 1973, 43, 1, 27–40.
- Fusero, C. *Antonio Vignato nell'Africa di ieri*. Bologna, 1970.
- Gabriel, M. N. *Angola: cinco séculos de cristianismo*. Queluz, n.d. [c. 1983].
- Gairdner, W. H. T. *Edinburgh 1910*. Edinburgh, 1910.
- Gale, H. P. *Uganda and the Mill Hill Fathers*. London, 1959.
- Garvey, B. 'The development of the White Fathers' mission among the Bemba-speaking peoples, 1891–1964'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1974.
- 'Bemba chiefs and Catholic missions, 1898–1935', *Journal of African History*, 1977, 18, 3, 411–26.
- Geuns, A. 'Bibliographie commentée du prophétisme kongo', *Cahiers du CEDAF*, 1973, 7, 2–81.
- Gow, B. A. *Madagascar and the Protestant impact*. London, 1979.
- Graham, Sonia F. *Government and mission education in Northern Nigeria, 1900–1919*. Ibadan, 1966.
- Graton, J. 'The relationship of the African Inland Mission and its national church in Kenya between 1895 and 1971'. Ph.D. thesis, University of New York, 1974.
- Grau, E. E. 'The Evangelical Presbyterian Church (Ghana and Togo) 1914–1946'. Ph.D. thesis, Hartford Seminary Foundation, 1964.
- Greaves, L. B. *Carey Francis of Kenya*. London, 1969.
- Greschat, H. J. *Kitawala. Ursprung, Ausbreitung und Religion der Watch-Tower-Bewegung in Zentralafrika*. Marburg, 1967.
- Grimley, J. B. and Robinson, G. E. *Church growth in central and southern Nigeria*. Ann Arbor, 1966.
- Groves, C. P. *The planting of Christianity in Africa*, vols. III and IV. London, 1955, 1958.
- Haliburton, G. M. *The Prophet Harris*. London, 1971.
- Hallden, E. *The culture policy of the Basel mission in the Cameroons, 1886–1905*. Uppsala, 1968.
- Hansen, H. B. *Mission, church and state in a colonial setting: Uganda, 1890–c. 1925*. London, 1984.
- Hardy, G. *Un apôtre d'aujourd'hui. Le R. P. Aupiais*. Paris, 1949.
- Hastings, A. *Mission and ministry*. London, 1971.
- A history of African Christianity 1950–1975*. Cambridge, 1979.
- Hebga, M. ed. *Croyance et guérison*. Yaoundé, 1973.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Heenan, J. C. *Cardinal Hinsley*. London, 1944.
- Hellberg, C. J. *Missions on a colonial frontier west of Lake Victoria*. tr. E. Sharpe. Lund, 1965.
- Heremans, R. *L'Éducation dans les missions des Pères Blancs en Afrique Centrale (1879-1914)*. Brussels, 1983.
- Hewat, E. G. K. *Vision and achievement, 1796-1956: a history of the foreign mission of the churches united in the Church of Scotland*. London, 1960.
- Hewitt, Gordon. *The problems of success. A history of the Church Missionary Society 1910-1942*, vol. 1. London, 1971.
- Hogan, E. M. 'The Society of African Missions in Ireland (1877-1916)'. M.A. thesis, University College of Cork, 1973.
- Hogg, W. R. *Ecumenical foundations: a history of the International Missionary Council and its nineteenth-century background*. New York, 1952.
- Horton, R. 'African conversion', *Africa*, 1971, 41, 2, 85-108.
- International Missionary Council. *Tamparam Madras Series*, vols. I-VII. London, 1939.
- Isichei, E. *Entirely for God: the life of Michael Iwene Tansi*. Ibadan and London, 1980.
- Jacobs, Sylvia M. ed. *Black Americans and the missionary movement in Africa*. Westport, Conn. and London, 1982.
- Janzen, J. M. and MacGaffey, W. *An anthology of Kongo religion: primary texts from Lower Zaïre*. Lawrence, Kansas, 1974.
- Jenkins, P. 'The archival collections in the mission house in Basel, with special reference to Africa', *Mitteilungen der Basler Afrika Bibliographien*, 1973, no. 9, 9-24.
- 'The Anglican Church in Ghana, 1905-1924', *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 1974, 15, 1, 23-39; 2, 177-200.
- Johnson, W. R. *Worship and freedom. A black American church in Zambia*. London, 1977.
- Jones, T. Jesse. *Education in Africa: a study of West, South and Equatorial Africa*. Report of the Phelps-Stokes Commission on African Education. New York and London, 1922.
- Education in Africa: a study of East, Central and South Africa by the second African Education Commission under the auspices of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, in cooperation with the International Education Board*. New York and London, n.d. [1924].
- Jordan, John P. *Bishop Shanahan of southern Nigeria*. Dublin, 1949.
- Keen, R. *A survey of the archives of selected missionary societies*. London, 1968.
- Kieran, J. A. 'Some Roman Catholic missionary attitudes to Africans in nineteenth-century East Africa', *Race*, 1969, 10, 3, 341-59.
- Koerner, F. 'L'Échec de l'éthiopisme dans les églises protestantes Malgaches', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1971, 58, no. 211, 215-38.
- Koren, H. J. *The Spiritans: a history of the Congregation of the Holy Ghost*. Pittsburgh, 1958.
- Kratz, M. *La Mission des Rédemptoristes belges au Bas-Congo: la période des semailles, 1899-1920*. Brussels, 1970.

3. CHRISTIANITY

- Lagergren, D. *Mission and state in the Congo*. Uppsala, 1970.
- Lantum, D. N. 'The advent of Christianity in Nso, 1900-1923', *Cameroun Historical Review*, 1971, 1, 83-93.
- Linden, I. *Catholics, peasants, and Chewa resistance in Nyasaland 1889-1939*. London, 1974.
- Church and revolution in Rwanda*. Manchester, 1977.
- Lonsdale, J. M. 'European attitudes and African pressures: missions and government in Kenya between the wars', *Race*, 1968-9, 10, 141-51.
- Lopes, F. F. *Missões franciscanas em Moçambique, 1898-1970*. Braga, 1972.
- Loth, H. *Die christliche Mission in Südwestafrika*. East Berlin, 1963.
- McCracken, J. *Politics and Christianity in Malawi 1875-1940: the impact of the Livingstonia Mission in the Northern Province*. Cambridge, 1977.
- McIntosh, B. G. 'The Scottish Mission in Kenya, 1891-1923'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1969.
- Macpherson, R. *The Presbyterian Church in Kenya*. Nairobi, 1970.
- Markowitz, M. D. *Cross and sword. The political role of Christian missions in the Belgian Congo, 1908-1960*. Stanford, 1973.
- Martin, M.-L. *Kimbangu*. Oxford, 1975.
- Mbiti, J. S. *New Testament eschatology in an African background*. London, 1971.
- Mecus, F. de. and Steenberghen, D. R. *Les Missions religieuses au Congo belge*. Antwerp, 1947.
- Metzler, J. ed. *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum 1622-1972*, vol. III, 1815-1972. Rome, 1975.
- Mikré-Sellassie, Gabre Ammanuel. 'Church and missions in Ethiopia in relation to the Italian war and occupation and the Second World War'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1976.
- Mills, W. G. 'The role of African clergy in the reorientation of Xhosa society to the plural society in the Cape colony, 1850-1915'. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1975.
- Mitchell, R. C. and Turner, H. W. eds. *A comprehensive bibliography of modern African religious movements*. Evanston, 1966.
- Mobley, H. W. *The Ghanaian's image of the missionary: an analysis of the published critiques of Christian missionaries by Ghanaians, 1897-1965*. Leiden, 1970.
- Mondain, G. *Un siècle de mission protestante à Madagascar*. Paris, 1948.
- Monticone, Mgr G. et al. eds. *Guida delle Missioni Cattoliche, Redatta sotto gli auspici della Sacra Congregazione di Propaganda Fide*. Rome, 1934.
- Moreira, E. *Portuguese East Africa: a study of its religious needs*. London, 1936.
- Müller, K. *Geschichte der katholischen Kirche in Togo*. Steyl, 1958.
- Mumbanza mwa Bawele. 'La Contribution des Zaïrois à l'oeuvre d'évangélisation et à la prospérité des établissements missionnaires. La mission catholique de Libanda (1933-1960)', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1974, 6, 225-74.
- Munanyi Muntu-Monji. 'Le Mouvement kimbanguiste dans le Haut-Kasai (1921-1950)'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Aix-en-Provence, 1974-5.
- Murphree, M. *Christianity and the Shona*. London, 1969.
- Murray, J. 'The Church Missionary Society and the "female circumcision"'

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- issue in Kenya, 1929-1932', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 1976, 8, 2, 92-104.
- Nembro, M. da. *La missione dei Minori Cappuccini in Eritrea (1894-1952)*. Rome, 1953.
- Ngongo, L. *Histoire des forces religieuses au Cameroun de la 1^{re} guerre mondiale à l'indépendance*. Paris, 1982.
- Nolan, F. P. 'History of the catechist in eastern Africa', in Shorter, A. and Kataza, E. eds. *Missionaries to yourselves: African catechists today*, pp. 1-28. London, 1972.
- 'Christianity in Unyamwezi, 1878-1928'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1977.
- Oldham, J. H. *Christianity and the race problem*. London, 1925.
- Oliver, R. *The missionary factor in East Africa*. London, 1952.
- Parsons, R. T. *The churches and Ghana society, 1918-1955*. Leiden, 1963.
- ed. *Windows on Africa: a symposium*. Leiden, 1971.
- Paulme, D. 'Une religion syncrétique en Côte d'Ivoire: le culte *déïma*', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1962, 3, no. 9, 5-90.
- Pauw, B. A. *Christianity and Xhosa tradition*. Cape Town, 1975.
- Peel, J. D. Y. *Aladura: a religious movement among the Yoruba*. London, 1968.
- Perrin Jassy, M.-F. *La Communauté de base dans les églises africaines*. Bandundu, 1970. English tr. New York, 1973.
- Peterson, J. *Province of freedom: a history of Sierra Leone, 1787-1870*. London, 1969.
- Pirotte, J. *Périodiques missionnaires belges d'expression française. Reflets de cinquante années d'évolution d'une mentalité, 1889-1940*. Louvain, 1973.
- Pirouet, M. L. *Black evangelists. The spread of Christianity in Uganda 1891-1914*. London, 1978.
- 'East African Christians and World War I', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 117-30.
- Ranger, T. O. 'Christian independency in Tanzania', in Barrett, D. B. ed. *African initiatives in religion*, pp. 122-45. Nairobi, 1971.
- Ranger, T. O. and Kimambo, I. eds. *The historical study of African religion*. London, 1972.
- Ranger, T. O. and Weller, J. eds. *Themes in the Christian history of Central Africa*. London, 1975.
- Raskin, A. 'The archives of the Congregation of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (CICM)', *History in Africa*, 1977, 4, 299-304.
- Raymaekers, P. 'Histoire de Simon Kimbangu, prophète d'après les écrivains Nfinangani et Nzungu, 1921', *Archives de Sociologie des Religions*, 1971, 31, 7-49.
- Raymaekers, P. and Desroche, H. *L'Administration et le sacré. Discours religieux et parcours politiques en Afrique centrale, 1921-1957*. Brussels, 1983.
- Renault, F. *Lavigerie, l'esclavage Africain et l'Europe, 1868-1892*. Paris, 1971. 2 vols.
- Rennie, J. K. 'Christianity, colonialism and the origins of nationalism among the Ndaus of Southern Rhodesia 1890-1935'. Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1973.
- Rhodes, A. *The Vatican in the age of the dictators*. London, 1973.

3. CHRISTIANITY

- Robins, C. 'Tukutendereza: a study of social change and sectarian withdrawal in the Balokole revival of Uganda'. Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1975.
- Roe, J. M. *A history of the British and Foreign Bible Society 1905-1954*. London, 1965.
- Rotberg, R. I. *Christian missionaries and the creation of Northern Rhodesia, 1880-1924*. Princeton, 1965.
- Sangree, W. H. *Age, prayer and politics in Tiriki, Kenya*. London, 1966.
- Sartorius, J. *Staat und Kirchen im francophonen Schwarzafrika und auf Madagaskar*. Munich, 1973.
- Scanlon, D. G. ed. *Church, state and education in Africa*. New York, 1966.
- Schlosser, K. *Eingeborenkirchen in Süd- und Süd-westafrika*. Kiel, 1958.
- Schweitzer, A. *On the edge of the primeval forest*. London, 1922.
- Setiloane, G. M. *The image of God among the Sotho-Tswana*. Rotterdam, 1976.
- Shaloff, S. *Reform in Leopold's Congo*. Richmond, 1970.
- Shank, D. A. 'A prophet of modern times: the thought of William Wade Harris, West African precursor of the reign of Christ'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1980.
- Shenk, C. E. 'The development of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and its relationship with the Ethiopian government from 1930 to 1970'. Ph.D. thesis, University of New York, 1972.
- Shepherd, R. H. W. *Lovedale, South Africa, 1824-1955*. Lovedale, 1971.
- Shepperson, G. A. and Price, T. *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the origins, setting and significance of the Nyasaland native rising of 1915*. Edinburgh, 1958.
- Sicard, S. von. *The Lutheran Church on the coast of Tanzania 1887-1914*. Lund, 1970.
- Sithole, N. *African nationalism*. Cape Town, 1959.
- Slade, R. N. *English-speaking missions in the Congo Independent State (1878-1908)*. Brussels, 1959.
- Smith, H. M. *Frank, Bishop of Zanzibar*. London, 1926.
- Smith, N. *The Presbyterian Church of Ghana, 1835-1960*. Accra, 1966.
- Soremekun, F. 'Religion and politics in Angola: the American Board missions and the Portuguese government, 1880-1922', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1971, II, no. 43, 341-77.
- Storme, M. *Het ontstaan van de Kasai-missie*. Brussels, 1961.
- Pater Cambier en de Stichting van de Kasai-missie*. Brussels, 1964.
- Konflikt in de Kasai-missie*. Brussels, 1965.
- Strassberger, E. *Ecumenism in South Africa, 1936-1960*. Johannesburg, 1974.
- Strayer, R. W. 'Mission history in Africa: new perspectives on an encounter', *African Studies Review*, 1976, 19, 1, 1-15.
- The making of mission communities in East Africa; Anglicans and Africans in colonial Kenya, 1875-1935*. London, 1978.
- Stuart, R. G. 'Christianity and the Chewa: the Anglican case, 1885-1950'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1974.
- Sundkler, B. *Bantu prophets in South Africa*. London, 1948. 2nd ed. 1961.
- The Christian ministry in Africa*. Uppsala, 1960.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Zulu Zion and some Swazi Zionists*. Uppsala, 1976.
- Bara Bukoba: church and community in Tanzania*. London, 1980.
- Tasie, G. O. M. *Christian missionary enterprise in the Niger Delta 1864-1918*. Leiden, 1978.
- Taylor, J. V. *The growth of the church in Buganda*. London, 1958.
- Taylor, J. V. and Lehmann, D. *Christians of the Copperbelt*. London, 1961.
- Thiel, J. F. *La Situation religieuse des Mbiem*. Bandundu, 1972.
- Thompson, T. J. 'Fraser and the Ngoni: a study of the growth of Christianity among the Ngoni of northern Malawi, 1878-1933'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1980.
- Tragella, G. B. *Pio XI, Papa Missionaria*. Milan, 1930.
- Tucker, J. T. *Angola: the land of the blacksmith prince*. London, 1933.
- Tuma, A. D. T. *Building a Ugandan church: African participation in church growth and expansion in Busoga, 1891-1940*. Nairobi, 1980.
- Turner, H. W. *History of an African Independent Church*, vol. 1. *The Church of the Lord (Aladura)*; vol. 11. *The life and faith of the Church of the Lord (Aladura)*. Oxford, 1967.
- Bibliography of new religious movements in primal societies*, vol. 1. *Black Africa*. Boston, 1977.
- Ustorff, W. *Africanische Initiative. Das active Leiden des Propheten Simon Kimbangu*. Berne, 1975.
- van Slageren, J. *Les origines de l'Église évangélique du Cameroun*. Yaoundé, 1972.
- Vidal, H. *La Séparation des églises et l'état à Madagascar 1861-1968*. Paris, 1970.
- Vignato, A. 'Note storica sulla Missione d'Uganda', *Bollettino della Congregazione dei figli del sacro cuore*. December, 1950.
- Villemagne, E. M. de. 'La Congrégation du Saint Esprit et l'oeuvre des missions catholiques en AEF (1839-1939/40)'. Thesis, University of Paris, 1965.
- Vries, J. L. de. *Mission and colonialism in Namibia*. Johannesburg, 1978.
- Waliggo, J. M. 'The Catholic Church in the Budda Province of Buganda, 1879-1925'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1976.
- Walls, A. F. ed. 'Bibliography of the Society for African Church History', Part 1. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 1967, 1, 46-94.
- Wanyoike, E. N. *An African pastor*. Nairobi, 1974.
- Ward, Kevin. 'The development of Protestant Christianity in Kenya, 1910-40'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1976.
- Waugh, E. A. St. J. *Ronald Knox*. London, 1959.
- Webster, J. B. *The African churches among the Yoruba, 1888-1922*. Oxford, 1964.
- Welbourn, F. B. *East African rebels*. London, 1961.
- Welbourn, F. B. and Ogot, B. A. *A place to feel at home: a study of two independent churches in western Kenya*. London, 1966.
- Welch, A. W. 'Colonial stepchildren: Catholic and Methodist missionaries in the Ivory Coast, 1895-1939'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1979.
- Wilson, Monica. *Rituals of kinship among the Nyakyusa*. London, 1957.
- Communal rituals of the Nyakyusa*. London, 1959.
- Witte, Jehan de. *Monseigneur Augouard: sa vie*. Paris, 1924.

4. ISLAM

- World Missionary Conference, 1910. *The Reports of Commissions 1-7*.
Edinburgh, n.d.
- Wright, Marcia. *German missions in Tanganyika 1891-1941*. Oxford, 1971.

4. ISLAM

- Abun-Nasr, J. M. *The Tijaniyya. A Sufi order in the modern world*. London, 1965.
- Allen, J. W. T. *The Swahili and Arabic manuscripts and tapes in the library of the University College, Dar-es-Salaam: a catalogue*. Leiden, 1970.
- Anderson, J. N. D. *Islamic Law in Africa*. London, 1955, reprinted 1970.
- André, P. J. *L'Islam noir*. Paris, 1924.
- Contribution à l'étude des confréries religieuses*. Algiers, 1956.
- Arnaud, R. 'L'Islam et la politique musulmane française en Afrique', *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française, Renseignements Coloniaux*, 1912, 4, 2-30, 115-27, 142-54.
- Audouin, J. and Deniel, R. *L'Islam en Haute-Volta à l'époque coloniale*. Abidjan, 1975.
- Aziz, Esmail. 'Towards a history of Islam in East Africa', *Kenya Historical Review*, 1975, 3, 1, 147-58.
- Becker, C. H. 'Materials for the understanding of Islam in German East Africa', ed. and tr. B. G. Martin, *Tanzania Notes and Records*, 1968, 68, 31-61. German original in *Der Islam*, 1911, 2, 1-48.
- Birks, J. S. *Across the Savannas to Mecca. The overland pilgrimage route from West Africa*. London, 1978.
- Bravmann, R. A. *Islam and tribal art in West Africa*. Cambridge, 1974.
- Brenner, L. *West African Sufi: the religious heritage and spiritual search of Cerno Bokar Saalif Taal*. London, 1984.
- Chailley, M. et al. *Notes et études sur l'Islam en Afrique noire*. Paris, 1962.
- Clarke, Peter B. 'Islamic millenarianism in West Africa: a revolutionary ideology?', *Religious Studies*, 1980, 16, 317-39.
- West Africa and Islam*. London, 1982.
- Copans, J. *Les Marabouts de l'Arachide*. Paris, 1980.
- Cruise O'Brien, D. 'Towards an "Islamic policy" in French West Africa, 1854-1914', *Journal of African History*, 1967, 8, 2, 303-16.
- The Mourides of Senegal*. Oxford, 1971.
- Saints and politicians: essays in the organisation of a Senegalese peasant society*. London, 1975.
- Crummey, D. 'Shaikh Zākaryas: an Ethiopian prophet', *Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, 1972, 10, 1, 55-66.
- Diallo, Thierno et al. *Catalogue des manuscrits de l'IFAN*. Dakar, 1966.
- Diop, Momar Coumba. 'La Littérature mouride. Essai d'analyse thématique', *Bulletin de l'IFAN*, 1979, B, 41, 398-439.
- Drague, G. *Esquisse d'histoire religieuse du Maroc: confréries et zaouias*. Paris, 1951.
- Dumont, Fernand. *La Pensée religieuse d'Amadou Bamba, fondateur du mouridisme sénégalais*. Dakar-Abidjan, 1975.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*. Oxford, 1954.
- Fisher, Humphrey J. 'Early Muslim - Western education in West Africa', *Muslim World*, 1961, 51, 4, 288-98.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahmadiyya: a study in contemporary Islam on the West African coast.* London, 1963.
- Gbadamosi, T. G. O. 'The establishment of Western education among Muslims in Nigeria, 1896-1926', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1967, 4, 1, 89-115.
- The growth of Islam among the Yoruba, 1841-1908.* London, 1978.
- Gouilly, Alphonse. *L'Islam dans l'Afrique occidentale française.* Paris, 1952.
- Greenstein, R. 'The Nyasaland government's policy toward African Muslims, 1900-1925', in Macdonald, R. J. ed. *From Nyasaland to Malawi*, pp. 144-68. Nairobi, 1975.
- Hampson, R. M. *Islam in South Africa. A bibliography.* Cape Town, 1964.
- Hiskett, M. *A history of Hausa Islamic verse.* London, 1975.
- 'The "community of grace" and its opponents, the "rejectors": a debate about theology and mysticism in Muslim West Africa with special reference to its Hausa expression', *African Language Studies*, 1980, 17, 99-140.
- Hourani, A. *Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1798-1939.* London, 1962.
- Kerr, Malcolm H. *Islamic reform: the political and legal theories of Muhammad 'Abdub and Rashid Ridā.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966.
- Lewis, I. M. 'Sufism in Somaliland: a study of tribal Islam', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 1955, 17, 3, 581-602; 1956, 18, 1, 145-60. ed. *Islam in tropical Africa.* London, 1966.
- Martin, B. G. 'Muslim politics and resistance to colonial rule: Shaykh Uways Bin Muhammad Al-Barawi and the Qadiriyya brotherhood in East Africa', *Journal of African History*, 1969, 10, 3, 471-86.
- Massignon, L. 'Une Bibliothèque saharienne: la bibliothèque du Cheikh Sidia au Sahara', *Revue du monde musulman*, 1909, 8, 7-8, 409-18.
- Mohammed, Abdullahi and Hay, Richard, Jr. 'Analysis of a West African Islamic library: the Falke collection', in Mittman, Benjamin and Borman, Lorraine, eds. *Personalized data base systems*, pp. 75-94. Los Angeles, 1975.
- Moreau, R. L. *Africains musulmans, des communautés en mouvement.* Paris, 1982.
- Nimtz, A. H. 'Islam in Tanzania: a bibliography', *Tanzania Notes and Records*, 1973, 72, 51-74.
- Islam and politics in East Africa: the Sufi order in Tanzania.* Minneapolis, 1980.
- Paden, John N. *Religion and political culture in Kano.* Los Angeles, 1973.
- Pearson, J. D. *Index Islamicus, 1906-1955.* Cambridge, 1958; supplements for 1956-60, 1962; 1961-5, 1967; 1966-70, London, 1972; 1971-5, 1977; 1976-80, 1983.
- Rossie, J. P. 'Bibliographie commentée de la communauté musulmane au Zaïre des origines à 1975', *Cahiers du CEDAF*, 1976, 6, 2-38.
- Ryan, P. J. *Imale: Yoruba participation in the Muslim tradition.* Missoula, 1978.
- Saad, E. N. 'The Paden collection of Arabic materials from Kano', *History in Africa*, 1980, 7, 369-72.
- Samb, Amar. 'Influence de l'Islam sur la littérature "wolof"', *Bulletin d'IFAN*, 1968, B, 30, 628-41.
- Essai sur la contribution du Sénégal à la littérature d'expression arabe.* Dakar, 1972.
- Sanneh, Lamine O. *The Jahanke. The history of an Islamic clerical people of the Senegambia.* London, 1979.

4 ISLAM

- Schacht, Joseph. 'Islam in Northern Nigeria', *Studia Islamica*, 1957, 8, 123–46.
 'Notes on Islam in East Africa', *Studia Islamica*, 1965, 23, 91–136.
- Sy, Cheikh Tidiane. *La Confrérie sénégalaise des Mourides*. Paris, 1969.
- Tahir, Ibrahim. 'Scholars, Sufis, saints and capitalists in Kano, 1904–74: pattern of a bourgeois revolution in an Islamic society'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1975.
- Tomlinson, T. J. F. *History of Islamic political propaganda in Nigeria*. London, 1927.
- Traore, A. *Cheikh Hamaboullab. Homme de foi et résistant*. Paris, 1983.
- Triaud, J.-L. 'Lignes de force de la pénétration islamique en Côte d'Ivoire', *Revue des études islamiques*, 1974, 42, 1, 123–60.
 'La Question musulmane en Côte d'Ivoire (1892–1939)', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1974, 61, no. 225, 542–71.
 'Un cas de passage collectif à l'Islam en basse Côte d'Ivoire au début du siècle: le village d'Ahua', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1974, 14, no. 54, 317–37.
- Trimingham, J. S. *Islam in Ethiopia*. Oxford, 1952.
Islam in West Africa. London, 1959.
History of Islam in West Africa. London, 1962.
Islam in East Africa. Oxford, 1964.
- Ubah, C. N. 'Islamic legal system and the westernization process in the Nigerian emirates', *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law*, 1982, 20, 1, 69–93.
- Wintoki, E. E. 'Ahmadiyya movement in Islam: a bibliography (with special reference to the Nigerian situation)'. Ibadan, 1974.
- Works, John, Jr. *Pilgrims in a strange land. Hausa communities in Chad*. New York, 1976.
- el-Zein, Abdul Hamid M. *The sacred meadows: a structural analysis of religious symbolism in an East African town*. Evanston, 1974.
- Zoghby, S. M. *Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. A partially annotated guide*. Washington, DC, 1978.
- Ziadeh, N. A. *Sanūsiyah: a study of a revivalist movement in Islam*. Leiden, 1958.

5. AFRICAN CROSS-CURRENTS

PRIMARY SOURCES

- Dathorne, O. R. and Feuser, W. eds. *Africa in prose*. Harmondsworth, 1969.
- Garvey, M. *Marcus Garvey and the vision of Africa*. ed. J. H. Clarke with Amy J. Garvey. New York, 1974.
- Hill, R. A. ed. *The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association papers* (to August 1921). Berkeley et alibi, 1983, 1985. 3 vols.
- Langley, J. A. *Ideologies of liberation in black Africa, 1856–1970*. London, 1979.
- Makonnen, T. Ras. *Pan-Africanism from within*. ed. K. King. Nairobi, 1973.
- Matthews, Z. K. *Freedom for my people: the autobiography of Z. K. Matthews. Southern Africa 1901 to 1968*. Ed., with a memoir, by Monica Wilson. London and Cape Town, 1981.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Nkrumah, K. *Ghana: the autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*. London, 1957.
 Padmore, G. *The life and struggles of Negro toilers*. London, 1931.
How Britain rules Africa. London, 1936.
Africa and world peace. London, 1937.
 Pankhurst, R. 'An early Somali autobiography', *Africa* (Rome), 1977, 32, 2, 159-76; 3, 355-84.
 Perham, M. ed. *Ten Africans*. London, 1936. Reprinted 1963.
 Scholes, T. E. S. *Glimpses of the ages, or the 'superior' and 'inferior' races so-called, discussed in the light of science and history*. London, 1905, 1908. 2 vols.
 Westermann, D. ed. *Afrikaner erzählen ihr Leben*. Essen, 1938. French tr. by L. Homburger. Paris, 1943.

French-speaking Africa

- Couchoro, F. *L'Esclave*. Paris, 1929.
 Diallo, Bakari. *Force bonté*. Paris, 1926.
 Dim Delobsom, A. A. *L'Empire du Mogho-Naba. Coutumes des Mossi de la Haute-Volta*. Paris, 1932.
 Diop, O. S. *Karim*. Paris, 1935.
 Dugué-Clédor, A. *La Bataille de Guilé*. St Louis, 1931.
 Éboué, F. *Les Peuples de l'Oubangui-Chari*. Paris, 1933.
 Guèye, Lamine. 'De la situation politique des Sénégalais originaires des communes de plein exercice'. Thesis for Doctorat d'État, University of Paris, 1921.
 Hazoumé, P. *Le Pacte de sang au Dahomey*. Paris, 1937.
Doguicimi. Paris, 1938.
 Houénou, K. Tovalou. *L'Involution des métamorphoses et des métempsychoses de l'univers*, vol. 1. Paris, n.d. [1921].
 Mademba, Capt. Abd el Kader. *Au Sénégal et au Soudan français*. Paris, 1931.
 Mamby Sidibé. 'La Famille chez les Foulé du Birgo, du Fouladougou Arbala et du Fouladougou Saboula (Cercle de Kita, Soudan français)'. *Bulletin du comité d'études historiques et scientifiques de l'AOF*, 1935, 18, 4, 462-539.
 Maran, R. *Batouala*. Paris, 1921. English tr. New York and London, 1922.
Djouma, chien de brousse. Paris, 1927.
 M'Ba, L. 'Essai de droit coutumier pahouin', *Bulletin de la Société de Recherches Congolaises*, 1938, 25, 1, 5-51.
 Moumé-Etia, I. *Dictionnaire du langage franco-douala*. Clermont-Ferrand, 1928.
 Moussa Travélé. *Petit dictionnaire français-bambara et bambara-français*. Paris, 1913.
 Njoya, Sultan. *Histoire et coutumes des Bamun*. tr. H. Martin. Douala, 1952.
 Norris, H. T. *Sahara myth and saga*. Oxford, 1972.
 Quenum, M. *Au pays des Fons*. Paris, 1938.
 Raponda-Walker, A. *Dictionnaire mpongwe-français*. Metz, 1934.
Essai de grammaire tsogo. Brazzaville, 1937.
 Senghor, Lamine. *La Violation d'un pays*. Paris, n.d.
 Senghor, Léopold S. *Négritude et humanisme*. Paris, 1964.

5. AFRICAN CROSS-CURRENTS

British West Africa

- Ajisafe, A. K. *The laws and customs of the Yoruba*. Lagos, 1924.
- Amu, E. *Twenty-five African songs in the Twi language*. London, n.d. [1932].
- Attoh-Ahuma, S. R. B. *Memoirs of West African celebrities. Europe, &c. (1700-1850), with special reference to the Gold Coast*. Liverpool, 1905.
- The Gold Coast nation and national consciousness*. Liverpool, 1911.
- Awoonor-Renner, B. *This Africa*. London, 1943.
- Azikiwe, N. *Liberia in world politics*. London, 1934.
- Renascent Africa*. Lagos, 1937. Reprinted London, 1968.
- Blyden, E. W. *African life and customs*. London, 1908.
- Campbell, J. G. *Observations on some topics 1913-1917, during the administration of Sir Frederick Lugard*. Lagos, 1918.
- Casely Hayford, J. E. *Ethiopia unbound: studies in race emancipation*. London, 1911. Reprinted New York, 1969.
- The truth about the West African land question*. London, 1913.
- United West Africa*. London, 1919.
- West African leadership: public speeches (1913-1930)...delivered by the Hon. J. E. Casely Hayford*. ed. M. J. Sampson. Ilfracombe, n.d., reprinted 1969.
- Danquah, J. B. *The Akim Abuakwa handbook, compiled at the request of the Hon. Nana Sir Ofori Atta, KBE, MLC*. London, 1928.
- Cases in Akan law: decisions delivered by the Hon. Nana Sir Ofori Atta, KBE, Paramount Chief of Akim Abuakwa*. London, 1928.
- Gold Coast: Akan laws and customs and the Akim Abuakwa constitution*. London, 1928.
- Liberty of the subject. A monograph on the Gold Coast cocoa hold-up and boycott of foreign goods, 1937-8*. Kibi, Gold Coast, n.d. [1938].
- Delano, I. *The soul of Nigeria*. London, 1937.
- Deniga, Adeoye. *The Nigerian Who's Who*. Lagos, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1933.
- Egharevba, J. V. *A short history of Benin*. Lagos, 1934. 3rd ed. Ibadan, 1960.
- Fadipe, N. A. *The sociology of the Yoruba*. ed. F. O. and O. O. Okediji. Ibadan, 1970.
- Graft Johnson, J. W. de. *Towards nationhood in West Africa*. London, 1928. 2nd ed. 1971.
- Historical geography of the Gold Coast*. London, n.d. [1929].
- Hutchison, C. F. *The pen pictures of modern Africans and African celebrities*. London, n.d. [c. 1930].
- Johnson, Samuel. *The history of the Yorubas*. London, 1921.
- Mensah, Sarbah, J. *Fanti national constitution. A short treatise on the constitution and government of the Fanti, Asanti and other Akan tribes of West Africa*. London, 1906. 2nd ed. 1968.
- Sampson, M. J. *Gold Coast men of affairs*. London, 1937. Reprinted 1969.
- Solanke, L. *United West Africa (or Africa) at the bar of the family of nations*. London, 1927. Reprinted 1969.
- Tamakloe, E. F. *A brief history of the Dagbamba people*. Accra, 1931.
- Dagomba (Dagbane) dictionary and grammar*. Accra, 1941.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Southern Africa

- Assis Junior, António de. *O Segredo da morta. Romance de costumes angolenses*. Luanda, 1934.
- Couzens, T. and Patel, E. eds. *The return of the Amasi bird. Black South African poetry 1891-1981*. Johannesburg, 1982.
- Dhlomo, H. I. E. *Collected works*. ed. T. Couzens and N. Visser. Johannesburg, 1985.
- Dhlomo, R. R. R. *An African tragedy*. Lovedale, 1928.
- Jabavu, D. D. T. *The black problem*. Lovedale, 1921. 2nd ed.
The life of John Tengo Jabavu. Lovedale, 1922.
The segregation fallacy and other papers. Lovedale, 1928.
- Mancoe, John. *The Bloemfontein Bantu and Coloured people's directory*. Bloemfontein, 1934.
- Mofolo, T. *Chaka: an historical romance*. tr. F. H. Dutton. London, 1931.
- Molema, S. M. *The Bantu past and present: an ethnographical and historical study of the native races of South Africa*. Edinburgh, 1920.
- Nzula, A., Potekhin, I. I. and Zusmanovich, A. Z. *Forced labour in colonial Africa*. ed. R. Cohen. London, 1979.
- Plaatje, S. T. *Native life in South Africa*. London, 1916, 2nd ed. Johannesburg, 1982.
Mhudi: an epic of native life a hundred years ago. Lovedale, 1930. 2nd ed. with introduction by T. Couzens. Johannesburg, 1975, London, 1978.
- Schapera, I. *Praise poems of Tswana chiefs*. Oxford, 1965.
- Skota, T. D. Mveli. *The African yearly register, being an illustrated national biographical dictionary (Who's Who) of black folks in Africa*. Johannesburg, n.d. [1930]. 2nd ed. 1932.
- Soga, J. H. *The south-eastern Bantu*. Johannesburg, 1930.
Ama-Xosa life and customs. London, 1932.

East and Central Africa

- Abdallah, Y. B. *The Yaos. Chiikala cha Wayao*. tr. and ed. M. Sanderson. Zomba, 1919. 2nd ed. London, 1973.
- Abdul Karim bin Jamaliddini. *Utenzi wa vita vya Maji-Maji*. tr. W. H. Whiteley. Supplement to the *Journal of the East African Swahili Committee*, 1957, no. 27.
- Chibambo, Y. M. *My Ngoni of Nyasaland*. tr. C. Stuart. London, 1942.
- Kagwa, Sir Apolo. *The kings of Buganda*. tr. M. S. M. Kiwanuka. Nairobi, 1971, from *Basekabaka be Buganda*, 2nd ed. London and Kampala, 1912.
The customs of the Baganda. tr. E. B. Kalibala, ed. M. Mandelbaum. New York, 1934, from *Mpisa za Baganda*. Kampala, 1907.
- Kayamba, M. *African problems*. London, 1948.
- Kenyatta, J. *Facing Mount Kenya*. London, 1938.
- Mockerie, P. G. *An African speaks for his people*. London, 1934.
- Mwase, G. S. *Strike a blow and die. A narrative of race relations in colonial Africa*. ed. R. I. Rotberg. Cambridge, Mass., 1967. London, 1975.

5. AFRICAN CROSS-CURRENTS

- Ntara, S. Y. *Man of Africa*, tr. T. Cullen Young. London, 1934.
 Nyabongo, A. K. *Africa answers back*. London, 1936.
 'Religious practices and beliefs of Uganda'. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1939.

North-East Africa

- Afewerq Gebre Iyesus. *Ityopya: guide du voyageur en Abyssinie*. Rome, 1908.
 Andrzejewski, B. W. and Lewis, I. M. eds. *Somali poetry: an introduction*. Oxford, 1964.
 Asfa Yilma. *Haile Selassie Emperor of Ethiopia with a brief account of the history of Ethiopia including the origins of the present struggle, and a description of the country and its peoples*. London, n.d. [1936].
 Duse Mohamed. *In the land of the pharaohs. A short history of Egypt from the fall of Ismail to the assassination of Boutros Pasha*. London, 1911.
 Eadie, J. I. ed. and tr. *An Amharic reader*. Cambridge, 1924.
 Fusella, L. tr. 'Menilek e l'Etiopia in un testo del Bāykadāñ', *Annali dell'Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli*, 1952, 4, 119–43.
 Melaku Beyene, ed. *The march of black men – Ethiopia leads: official report of the present state of affairs and prospects. An authentic account of the determined fight of the Ethiopian people for their independence*. New York, 1939.
 Work, Ernest. *Ethiopia: a pawn in European diplomacy*. New York, 1935.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Adedeji, J. A. 'The church and the emergence of the Nigerian theatre' [1866–1945], *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1971, 6, 1, 25–45; 1973, 6, 4, 387–96.
 Asante, S. K. B. *Pan-African protest: West Africa and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, 1934–1941*. London, 1977.
 Biebuyck, D. 'Effects on Lega art of the outlawing of the Bwami Association' in Okpaku, J. ed. *New African literature and the arts*, vol. 1, pp. 340–52. New York, 1970.
 Blair, Dorothy S. *African literature in French. A history of creative writing in French from West and Equatorial Africa*. Cambridge, 1976.
 Bond, H. M. *Education for freedom. A history of Lincoln University, Pennsylvania*. Lincoln, Pa., 1976.
 Bunting, Brian. *Moses Kotane: South African revolutionary*. London, 1975.
 Carroll, K. C. *Yoruba religious carving*. London, 1967.
 Collins, E. J. 'Comic opera in Ghana', *African Arts* (Los Angeles), 1976, 9, 2, 50–7.
 'Ghanaian high-life', *African Arts*, 1976, 10, 1, 62–8, 100.
 'Post-war popular band music in West Africa', *African Arts*, 1977, 10, 3, 53–60.
 Coplan, D. *In Township Tonight! South Africa's black music and theatre*. London, 1986.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cornevin, R. *Littératures d'Afrique noire de langue française*. Paris, 1976.
- Couzens, T. J. 'The social ethos of black writing in South Africa, 1920-1950', in Heywood, C. ed. *Aspects of South African literature*, pp. 66-81. London, 1976.
- 'The new African: Herbert Dhlomo and black South African literature in English, 1857-1956'. Ph.D. thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1980.
- 'An introduction to the history of football in South Africa', in Bozzoli, B. ed. *Town and countryside in the Transvaal*, pp. 198-214. Johannesburg, 1983.
- Cronon, E. D. *Black Moses: the story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association*. Madison, 1955. 2nd ed. 1969.
- Darch, C. and Littlejohn, G. 'Endre Sik and the development of African studies in the USSR: a study agenda from 1929', *History in Africa*, 1983, 10, 79-108.
- Duffield, I. 'The business activities of Duse Mohammad Ali: an example of the economic dimension of Pan-Africanism, 1912-1945', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1969, 4, 4, 571-600.
- 'Pan-Africanism, rational and irrational', *Journal of African History*, 1977, 18, 4, 597-620.
- Elkan, W. 'The East African trade in woodcarvings', *Africa*, 1958, 27, 4, 314-23.
- Esedebe, P. O. *Pan-Africanism: the idea and movement, 1776-1963*. Washington, DC, 1982.
- Filesi, T. 'Il Movimento Pan-Negro e la politica coloniale italiana nel 1920-1923', *Africa* (Rome), 1975, 30, 2, 159-97.
- Geiss, I. *The Pan-African movement*. tr. A. Keep. London, 1974.
- Gérard, A. S. *Four African literatures: Xhosa, Sotho, Zulu, Amharic*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1971.
- African language literatures*. Harlow, 1982.
- Goody, J. 'Restricted literacy in northern Ghana', in Goody, J. and Watt, I. eds. *Literacy in Traditional Society*, pp. 199-264. Cambridge, 1968.
- Hamilton, Russell G. *Voices from an empire. A history of Afro-Portuguese literature*. Minneapolis, 1975.
- Harlan, L. R. 'Booker T. Washington and the white man's burden', *American Historical Review*, 1966, 71, 2, 441-67.
- Hay, M. J. and Wright, M. eds. *African women and the law: historical perspectives*. Boston, 1982.
- Herdeck, D. E. *African authors. A companion to black African writing 1300-1973*. Washington, DC, 1973.
- Hooker, J. R. *Black revolutionary: George Padmore's path from Communism to Pan-Africanism*. London, 1967.
- Howell, J. B. 'Sources for African newspapers: a reference guide', *Généve-Afrique*, 1983, 21, 1, 128-38.
- Huggins, N. I. *Harlem renaissance*. New York, 1971.
- Hymans, J. L. *Léopold Sédar Senghor: an intellectual biography*. Edinburgh, 1971.
- Jacobs, Sylvia M. *The African nexus. Black American perspectives on the European partitioning of Africa 1880-1920*. Westport, Conn., 1981.

5. AFRICAN CROSS-CURRENTS

- Jadot, J.-M. *Les Écrivains africains du Congo belge et du Ruanda-Urundi*. Brussels, 1959.
- Jahn, J. and Dressler, C. P. *Bibliography of creative African writing*. Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1971.
- Jans, P. 'Essai de musique religieuse pour indigènes dans le vicariat apostolique de Coquilhatville', *Aequatoria*, 1956, 19, 1, 1-16.
- Johns, S. 'The Comintern, South Africa and the black diaspora', *Review of Politics*, 1975, 37, 2, 200-34.
- 'The birth of the Communist Party of South Africa', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1976, 9, 3, 371-400.
- Jones, A. M. 'African music: the *nganda* dance', *African Studies*, 1945, 4, 4, 180-8.
- Jordan, A. C. *Towards an African literature: the emergence of literary form in Xhosa*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972.
- July, R. W. *The origins of modern African thought: its development in West Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*. New York, 1967. London, 1968.
- Kane, T. L. *Ethiopian literature in Amharic*. Wiesbaden, 1975.
- Kesteloot, L. *Les Écrivains noirs de langue française: naissance d'une littérature*. Brussels, 1963. English tr. Philadelphia, 1974.
- King, Kenneth J. 'James E. K. Aggrey: collaborator, nationalist, Pan-African', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1969, 3, 3, 511-30.
- Pan-Africanism and education. A study of race philanthropy and education in the southern states of America and East Africa*. Oxford, 1971.
- Langley, J. A. *Pan-Africanism and nationalism in West Africa, 1900-1945*. Oxford, 1973.
- Law, Robin. 'Early Yoruba historiography', *History in Africa*, 1976, 3, 69-89.
- 'A pioneer of Yoruba studies: Moses Lijadu (1862-1926)', in Olusanya, G. O. ed. *Studies in Yoruba history and culture*, pp. 108-15. Ibadan, 1983.
- Little, K. *Negroes in Britain*. London, 1947. 2nd ed. 1972.
- Molvaer, R. K. *Tradition and change in Ethiopia. Social and cultural life as reflected in Amharic fictional literature c. 1930-1974*. Leiden, 1980.
- Mount, M. W. *African art. The years since 1920*. Bloomington, 1973.
- Murray-Brown, J. *Kenya*. London, 1972.
- Mwakasak, C. S. 'Trends and development in the oral poetry of the Banyakyusa in this century', *Umma* (Dar es Salaam and Nairobi), 1975, 5, 1, 35-47.
- Nketia, J. H. K. 'Modern trends in Ghana music', *African Music*, 1957, 1, 4, 13-17.
- Opland, J. *Xhosa oral poetry*. Cambridge, 1983.
- Page, M. E. ed. *Black men in a white man's war*. Forthcoming.
- Partington, P. G. *W. E. B. DuBois: a bibliography of his published writings*. Whittier, Calif., 1977.
- Peires, J. 'The Lovedale Press: literature for the Bantu revisited', *History in Africa*, 1979, 6, 155-75.
- Périer, G.-D. 'L'Art vivant des noirs du Congo belge', *Artes Africanæ* (Brussels), 1936, nos. 2-3, 1-13.
- 'L'Évolution de l'art du Congo belge et du Ruanda-Urundi sous l'influence

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- de la colonisation belge', in *Les Arts au Congo Belge et au Ruanda-Urundi*, pp. 55-62. Brussels, 1950.
- Ralston, R. D. 'American episodes in the making of an African leader: a case study of Aldred B. Xuma (1893-1962)', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1973, 6, 1, 72-93.
- Ranger, T. O. *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa, 1890-1970: the beni ngoma*. London, 1975.
- Roelker, J. R. *Mathu of Kenya. A political study*. Stanford, 1976.
- Ross, R. A. 'Black Americans and Italo-Ethiopian relief 1935-1936', *Ethiopia Observer*, 1972, 15, 2, 122-31.
- 'Black Americans and Haiti, Liberia, the Virgin Islands, and Ethiopia, 1929-1936'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1975.
- Rowe, J. 'Myth, memoir and moral admonition: Luganda historical writing 1893-1969', *Uganda Journal*, 1969, 33, 1-2, 17-40, 217-19.
- Said Samatar. *Oral poetry and Somali nationalism: the case of Sayyid Maḥammad 'Abdille Hasan*. Cambridge, 1982.
- Savage, D. C. 'Jomo Kenyatta, Malcolm MacDonald and the Colonial Office, 1938-9. Some documents from the PRO', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1970, 3, 3, 615-32.
- Scott, W. R. 'A study of Afro-American and Ethiopian relations: 1896-1941'. Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1971.
- 'Malaku E. Bayen: Ethiopian emissary to black America (1935-1936)', *Ethiopia Observer*, 1972, 15, 2, 132-8.
- 'Colonel John C. Robinson: the Brown Condor of Ethiopia', *Pan-African Journal*, 1972, 5, 1, 59-69.
- Shepperson, G. A. 'Notes on American Negro influences on the emergence of African nationalism', *Journal of African History*, 1960, 1, 2, 299-312.
- 'The African abroad or the African diaspora', in Ranger, T. O. ed. *Emerging themes in African history*, pp. 152-76. Nairobi, 1968.
- 'The Afro-American contribution to African studies', *Journal of American Studies*, 1974, 8, 3, 281-301.
- Short, Philip. *Banda*. London, 1974.
- Smith, E. W. *Aggrey of Africa*. London, 1929.
- Sutherland, Efua. *The story of Bob Johnson, Ghana's ace comedian*. Accra, 1970.
- Tracey, H. *Chopi musicians: their music, poetry and instruments*. London, 1948.
- Twaddle, M. J. 'On Ganda historiography', *History in Africa*, 1974, 1, 85-100.
- Vail, Leroy and White, Landeg. 'Plantation protest: the history of a Mozambican song', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1978, 5, 1, 1-25.
- 'Forms of resistance: songs of perceptions of power in colonial Mozambique', *American Historical Review*, 1983, 88, 3, 883-919.
- Vansina, J. *Art history in Africa: an introduction to method*. Harlow, 1984.
- Weisbord, R. G. *Ebony kinship: Africa, Africans and the Afro-American*. Westport, Conn., 1973.
- Willan, B. P. *Sol Plaatje: South African nationalist, 1876-1932*. London, 1984.
- Willett, F. *African art*. London, 1971.
- Wilson, E. T. *Russia and black Africa before World War II*. New York, 1974.

6. THE MAGHRIB

6. THE MAGHRIB

General

- Abun-Nasr, J. M. *A history of the Maghrib*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, 1975.
- Allal el-Fassi. *The independence movement in Arab North Africa*. Washington, DC, 1954.
- Amin, S. *The Maghreb in the modern world*. London, 1970.
- Barbour, N. ed. *A survey of North West Africa (the Maghrib)*. Oxford, 1959.
- Béguin, F. *Arabisances: décor architectural et tracé urbain en Afrique du Nord, 1830-1950*. Paris, 1983.
- Bernard, A. *L'Afrique du Nord pendant la guerre*. Paris and New Haven, 1927.
- Berque, J. *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres*. 2nd ed. Paris, 1970. English tr. *French North Africa*. London, 1967.
- Betts, R. F. 'The architecture of French African empire: a neglected history', in *Études africaines offertes à Henri Brunschwig*, pp. 307-15. Paris, 1983.
- Brett, M. 'The colonial period in the Maghrib and its aftermath: the present state of historical writing', *Journal of African History*, 1976, 17, 2, 291-305.
- Capot-Rey, R. *Le Sahara français*. Paris, 1953.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. ed. *L'Afrique et la Crise de 1930 (1924-1938)*. Paris, 1976. (*Revue française d'histoire d'outre mer*, 63, nos. 232-3, 375-784.)
- De Leone, E. *La Colonizzazione dell'Africa del Nord*. Padova, 1957, 1960. 2 vols.
- Despois, J. *L'Afrique du Nord*. 1st, 2nd, 3rd eds. Paris, 1949, 1958, 1964.
- Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 2nd ed. Leiden and London, 1955-.
- Encyclopédie de l'empire français. *Encyclopédie coloniale et maritime*. ed. E. Guernier. Paris. *Algérie et Sahara*, 1948. 2 vols.; *Le Maroc*, 4th ed. 1947; *La Tunisie*, 2nd ed. 1947.
- Giglio, C. ed. *Inventario delle fonti manoscritte relative alla storia dell'Africa del Nord esistenti in Italia*, vol. 1. *Gli archivi storici del soppresso Ministero dell'Africa Italiana e del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, dalle origini al 1922*. Leiden, 1971; vol. II. *Gli archivi storici del Ministero della Difesa, dalle origini al 1922*. Leiden, 1972.
- Girault, A. *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*. Paris. *L'Algérie*. 7th ed. Revised L. Milliot, 1938; *La Tunisie et le Maroc*. 6th ed. Revised L. Milliot, 1936.
- Grimwood-Jones, D., Hopwood, D. and Pearson, J. D. eds. *Arab Islamic bibliography*. Hassocks, Sussex and Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1977.
- Guernier, E. *La Berbérie, l'Islam et la France*. Paris, 1950. 2 vols.
- Hardy, G. *Histoire sociale de la colonisation française*. Paris, 1953.
- Hermassi, E. *Leadership and national development in North Africa*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1973.
- Issawi, C. *An economic history of the Middle East and North Africa*. New York and London, 1982.
- Julien, C.-A. *L'Afrique du Nord en marche*. 3rd ed. Paris, 1972.
- Julien, C.-A. et al. eds. *Les Africains*. Paris, 1977-8. 12 vols.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Knapp, W. ed. *North West Africa: a political and economic survey*. 3rd ed. Oxford, 1977.
- Le Tourneau, R. *Évolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord musulmane, 1920-1961*. Paris, 1962.
- Liauzu, D. *Aux origines des tiers-mondismes: colonisés et anticolonialistes en France (1919-1939)*. Paris, 1982.
- Matthews, Noel and Wainwright, M. D. *A guide to manuscripts and documents in the British Isles relating to the Middle East and North Africa*. Oxford, 1980.
- Memmi, A. ed. *Anthologie des écrivains français du Maghreb*. Paris, 1965.
- Miège, J.-L. *L'Imperialisme colonial italien de 1870 à nos jours*. Paris, 1968.
- Ministère de la Guerre (État-Major de l'Armée, Service Historique). *L'Afrique française du Nord. Bibliographie militaire des ouvrages français ou traduits en français des articles des principales revues françaises relatifs à l'Algérie, à la Tunisie et au Maroc de 1830 à 1926*. Paris, 1930-35. Reprinted 1972. 2 vols.
- Montherlant, H. de. *La Rose de sable*. Paris, 1968.
- Nouschi, A. 'La Politique coloniale du front populaire. Le Maghreb', *Les Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1978, 27, nos. 109-10, 143-60.
- Pearson, J. D. *Index Islamicus, 1906-1955*. Cambridge, 1958; supplements for 1956-60, 1962; 1961-5, 1967; 1966-70, London, 1972; 1971-5, 1977; 1976-80, 1983.
- Pessah Shinar. *Essai de bibliographie sélective et annotée sur l'Islam maghrébin contemporain. Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Libye (1830-1978)*. Paris, 1983.
- Roberts, S. H. *The history of French colonial policy, 1870-1925*. London, 1929. Reprinted 1963.
- Zangar, S. 'Les Socialistes et les questions arabes au lendemain de la première guerre mondiale', *Les Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1980, 28, nos. 113-14, 77-116.

Algeria

- Ageron, C.-R. *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*. Paris, 1964.
- Les Algériens musulmans et la France, 1870-1919*. Paris, 1968. 2 vols.
- 'Le Premier Vote de l'Algérie musulmane: les élections du collège musulman algérien en 1919-1920', *Revue d'histoire et de civilisation du Maghreb*, 1970, 8, 97-109.
- Politiques coloniales au Maghreb*. Paris, 1972.
- 'Une émeute anti-juive à Constantine (août 1934)', *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 1973, 13-14, 23-40.
- 'Ferhât 'Abbās et l'évolution politique de l'Algérie musulmane pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1975, 2, no. 3, 125-44.
- Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine*, vol. II. 1871-1954. Paris, 1979.
- 'Sur l'année politique algérienne, 1936', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1979, 6, nos. 15-16, 5-33.
- Arnaudière, F. *Histoire de l'opéra d'Alger*. Algiers, 1941.
- Benachenhou, A. *Formation du sous-développement en Algérie*. Algiers, 1976.
- Bernard, A. *L'Algérie*. Paris, 1929.
- Bodley, R. V. C. *Algeria from within*. London, n.d. [1926?].

6. THE MAGHRIB

- Bourdieu, P. *Sociologie de l'Algérie*. Paris, 1958. English tr. *The Algerians*. Boston, 1962.
- Cahiers du centenaire de l'Algérie*, Les. 12 parts, various authors. Paris, 1930.
- Charnay, J.-P. *La Vie musulmane en Algérie d'après la jurisprudence de la première moitié du xxe siècle*. Paris, 1965.
- Christelow, A. 'Algerian Islam in a time of transition', *Maghreb Review*, 1983, 8, 5-6, 124-30.
- Confer, V. *France and Algeria: the problem of civil and political reform, 1870-1920*. Syracuse, NY, 1966.
- Déjeux, J. *La Littérature algérienne contemporaine*. Paris, 1975.
- Bibliographie de la littérature 'algérienne' des français: bibliographie de romans, récits, etc., par des français inspirés par l'Algérie*. Paris, 1978.
- Demontès, V. *L'Algérie pendant ces dix-huit mois de guerre*. Algiers, 1916.
- Extract from *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger et de l'Afrique du Nord*.
- L'Algérie économique*. Algiers, 1922-30. 6 vols.
- Gautier, E.-F. *Un siècle de colonisation: études au microscope*. Paris, 1930.
- Gouvernement-général de l'Algérie (Commissariat général du Centenaire). *Les Territoires du Sud de l'Algérie*. Algiers, 1930. 4 vols.
- Exposé de la situation générale des territoires du Sud de l'Algérie de 1930 à 1946*. Algiers, 1947.
- Grant, C. F. and Grant, L. *'Twixt sand and sea*. London, n.d. [1912].
- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division). *Algeria*. London, 1942-4. 2 vols.
- Johnson, Douglas. 'Algeria: some problems of modern history', *Journal of African History*, 1964, 5, 2, 221-42.
- Kaddache, M. *La Vie politique à Alger de 1919 à 1939*. Algiers, 1970.
- 'L'Emir Khaled: jeune étudiant et officier', *Revue d'histoire et de civilisation du Maghreb*, 1973, 10, 102-7.
- Histoire du nationalisme algérien, 1919-1951*. Algiers, 1980-1. 2 vols.
- Koerner, F. 'L'Extrême Droite en Oranie (1936-1940)', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 1973, 20, 4, 568-94.
- Lacheraf, M. *L'Algérie: nation et société*. Paris, 1969.
- Landau, J. M. 'Some Soviet works on Algeria', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1981, 17, 408-12.
- Lawless, R. I. and Blake, G. H. *Tlemcen: continuity and change in an Algerian Islamic town*. London and New York, 1976.
- Lee, R. D. 'Regional politics in a unitary system: colonial Algeria, 1920-1954'. Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1972.
- Mahsas, A. *Le Mouvement révolutionnaire en Algérie de la 1^{re} guerre mondiale à 1954*. Paris, 1979.
- Martin, C. *Histoire de l'Algérie française, 1830-1962*. Paris, 1963.
- Memmi, A. *La Poésie algérienne de 1830 à nos jours. Approches socio-historiques*. Paris, 1963.
- Merad, A. 'La Formation de la presse musulmane en Algérie (1919-1939)', *Revue de l'Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes* (Tunis), 1964, 105, 1, 9-29.
- Le Réformisme musulman en Algérie de 1925 à 1940*. Paris and The Hague, 1967.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Islam et nationalisme arabe en Algérie à la veille de la première guerre mondiale', *Oriente moderno*, 1969, 49, 4-5, 213-22.
- Messali Hadj. *Les Mémoires de Messali Hadj*. Paris, 1982.
- Meynier, G. 'Les Algériens en France, 1914-1918', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1976, 3, no. 5, 49-58.
- L'Algérie révélée: la guerre de 1914-1918 et le premier quart du xxe siècle*. Geneva, 1981.
- Mouton, M. R. 'L'Algérie devant le parlement français de 1935 à 1938', *Revue française de science politique*, 1962, 12, 1, 93-128.
- Musso, F. *L'Algérie des souvenirs*. Paris, 1976.
- Nouschi, A. *Enquête sur le niveau de vie des populations rurales Constantinoises de la conquête jusqu'en 1919*. Paris, 1961.
- La Naissance du nationalisme algérien, 1914-1954*. Paris, 1962.
- Ohneck, W. *Die französische Algerienpolitik von 1919-1939*. Cologne, 1967.
- Richardson, M. L. 'French Algeria between the wars: nationalism and colonial reform, 1919-1939'. Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1975.
- Sivan, E. *Communisme et nationalisme en Algérie*. Paris, 1976.
- 'L'Etoile nord-africaine and the genesis of Algerian nationalism', *Maghreb Review*, 1978, 3, 5-6, 17-22.
- Sivers, P. von. 'Algerian landownership and rural leadership, 1860-1914: a quantitative approach', *Maghreb Review*, 1979, 4, 2, 58-62.
- 'Indigenous administrators in Algeria, 1846-1914: manipulation and manipulators', *Maghreb Review*, 1982, 7, 5-6, 116-21.
- Tlili, B. 'La Fédération socialiste d'Oranie au lendemain de la Grande Guerre (1929-1934)', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1981, 29, nos. 115-16, 101-210.
- Vatin, J.-C. *L'Algérie politique: histoire et société*. Paris, 1974.
- Zagoria, J. D. 'The rise and fall of the movement of Messali Hadj in Algeria, 1924-1954'. Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1973.

Tunisia

- Bourguiba, Habib. *La Tunisie et la France*. Paris, 1954.
- Articles de presse, 1929-1934*. Tunis, 1967.
- Cannon, B. D. 'Administrative and economic regionalism in Tunisian oleiculture: the Idrat al Ghabah experiment, 1870-1914', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1978, 11, 4, 585-628.
- 'The Beylical Habus Council and suburban development: Tunis, 1881-1914', *Maghreb Review*, 1982, 7, 1-2, 32-40.
- 'Cave'. *Les Problèmes tunisiens après 1921*. Paris, 1929.
- Cohen-Hadria, E. C.-H. *La Tunisie: du protectorat à l'indépendance. Souvenir d'un témoin socialiste*. Nice, 1976.
- Demontès, V. *La Tunisie pendant la guerre*. Algiers, 1916. Extract from *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie d'Alger et de l'Afrique du Nord*.
- Despois, J. *La Tunisie*. Paris, 1930.
- Garas, F. *Bourguiba et la naissance d'une nation*. Paris, 1956.
- Goldstein, D. *Libération ou annexion: aux chemins croisés de l'histoire tunisienne, 1914-1922*. Tunis, 1978.
- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division). *Tunisia*. London, 1945.

6. THE MAGHRIB

- Green, A. H. *The Tunisian ulama, 1873-1915*. Leiden, 1978.
- Kassab, A. *Histoire de la Tunisie*, vol. iv. *L'Époque contemporaine*. Tunis, 1976.
- L'Évolution de la vie rurale dans les régions de la Moyenne Medjerda et de Béja-Mateur*. Tunis, 1979.
- Kraïem, M. 'La Question de droit syndicale en Tunisie (1881-1932)', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1975, 2, 3, 27-44.
- 'Le Parti réformiste tunisien (1920-1926)', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1975, 2, no. 3, 150-62.
- Nationalisme et syndicalisme en Tunisie (1919-1929)*. Tunis, 1976.
- 'La Fédération socialiste de Tunisie et le mouvement national entre les deux guerres', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1976, 3, 5, 5-26.
- 'Le Parti communiste tunisien dans les années trente', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1981, 8, nos. 21-22, 7-23.
- 'Les Événements de Metlaoui et de M'Dhila de mars 1937', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1981, 8, nos. 23-24, 221-42.
- Kraïem, M. and Sammut, C. 'Mouvement national et mouvement ouvrier dans un milieu colonial (ex: la Tunisie)', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1979, 6, nos. 13-14, 69-94.
- Landau, J. M. 'Soviet works on Tunisia', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1980, 16, 3, 267-70.
- Lejri, M.-S. *Evolution du mouvement national des origines à la deuxième guerre mondiale*. Tunis, 1974. 2 vols.
- 'Situation coloniale et opinion publique: petits blancs et socialistes pendant trente ans de luttes électorales', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1974, 22, nos. 87-8, 41-92.
- Liauzu, C. 'La Presse ouvrière européenne en Tunisie (1881-1939)', *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 1970, 933-55.
- 'Des précurseurs du mouvement ouvrier: Les libertaires en Tunisie à la fin du xix^e siècle', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1973, 21, nos. 81-2, 153-82.
- 'Les Traminots de Tunis du début du siècle à la deuxième guerre mondiale', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1975, 23, nos. 89-90, 141-90; nos. 91-2, 235-82.
- Salariat et mouvement ouvrier en Tunisie: crises et mutations, 1931-1939*. Paris, 1978.
- Mahjoubi, A. 'Le Cartel des Gauches en France et le mouvement national tunisien', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1976, 24, nos. 95-6, 187-214.
- 'Les Réformes de 1922 et le mouvement national tunisien', *Revue tunisienne de sciences sociales*, 1976, 13, no. 45, 99-139.
- Montety, H. de. 'Old families and new elites in Tunisia', in Zartman, I. W. ed. *Man, state and society in the contemporary Maghrib*. London, 1973.
- Mouvement national tunisien. *Histoire du mouvement national tunisien, 1934-1956*. Tunis, 1969-79. 15 vols.
- Nouschi, A. 'La Crise de 1930 en Tunisie et les débuts du Neó-Destour', *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 1970, 8, 113-23.
- Plissard, R. *La Condition des travailleurs de l'industrie minière en Tunisie, 1936-39*. Lille, 1972. Thesis for University of Strasbourg, 1971.
- Poncet, J. *La Colonisation et l'agriculture européenne en Tunisie depuis 1881*. Paris and The Hague, 1961.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Rachid, Driss. 'Souvenirs des années 1934-1939', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1978, 26, nos. 101-2, 287-302.
- 'La Tunisie au début de la seconde guerre mondiale (1939-1940)', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1979, 27, nos. 107-8, 213-75.
- Rainero, R. 'L'Émigration ouvrière italienne dans le Maghreb et les répercussions algériennes après la constitution du comité d'entraide des mineurs italiens du groupe de "Il Minatore" (1907)', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1981, 29, nos. 115-16, 83-99.
- Résidence générale de la République française en Tunisie. *Notice générale sur la Tunisie (1881-1921)*. Toulouse, 1922.
- 'Rodd-Balek'. *La Tunisie après la guerre (1919-1921): problèmes politiques*. Paris, 1922.
- Sammout, C. 'La Situation du prolétariat dans une entreprise coloniale française en Tunisie: la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer et Phosphates de Gafsa', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1977, 4, no. 9, 350-9.
- 'L'Action des Jeunes-Tunisiens: réformes d'assimilation ou nationalisme d'émancipation?', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1978, 5, nos. 10-11, 67-153.
- Review of Kraïem, *Nationalisme et syndicalisme en Tunisie (1919-1929)*, *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1978, 5, nos. 10-11, 203-13.
- Scemama, R. *La Tunisie agricole et rurale et l'oeuvre de la France*. Paris, 1938.
- Taalbi, A. *La Tunisie martyre: ses revendications*. Paris, 1920.
- Tlili, B. 'Problématique des processus de formation des faits nationaux et des idéologies nationalistes dans le monde islamo-méditerranéen de l'entre-deux-guerres (1919-1930). L'exemple de la Tunisie', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1973, 21, nos. 81-2, 183-221.
- 'La Réorganisation de la justice tunisienne au sortir de la Grande Guerre (1921-1924): réforme ou réajustement de la souveraineté française?', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1976, 24, nos. 95-6, 147-86.
- 'La Fédération socialiste et la "Tunisie-Martyre" (1919-1925)', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1977, 25, nos. 99-100, 139-209.
- Crises et mutations dans le monde islamo-méditerranéen contemporain (1907-1918)*. Tunis, 1978. 2 vols.
- 'Du front antifasciste et antihitlérien de Tunisie. Le groupement *Il Giornale* (1939)', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1979, 27, nos. 109-10, 163-300.
- 'La Fédération radicale-socialiste de Tunisie à la veille de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale (1937-1938)', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1980, 28, nos. 111-12, 75-202.
- 'Des rapports entre le Parti libéral et constitutionnaliste tunisien et la Confédération générale tunisienne de travail (1924-1925)', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1980, 28, nos. 113-14, 115-64.
- Ziadeh, N. A. *The origins of nationalism in Tunisia*. Beirut, 1962.

Morocco

- Abu-Lughod, J. L. *Rabat: urban apartheid in Morocco*. Princeton, 1980.
- Abun-Nasr, J. M. 'The Salafiyya movement in Morocco: the religious bases of the Moroccan nationalist movement', in Hourani, A. ed. *St Antony's Papers, Middle Eastern Affairs*, no. 3, pp. 90-105. London, 1963.

6. THE MAGHRIB

- Adam, A. *Casablanca: essai sur la transformation de la société marocaine en contact de l'Occident*. Paris, 1968. 2 vols.
- Ayache, A. *Le Maroc. Bilan d'une colonisation*. Paris, 1956.
- Le Mouvement syndical au Maroc*, vol. 1. 1919–1942. Paris, 1982.
- Ayache, G. *Études d'histoire marocaine*. Rabat, 1979.
- Bernard, A. *Le Maroc*. Paris, 1931.
- Bidwell, R. *Morocco under colonial rule*. London, 1973.
- Boutin, F. *L'Expansion commerciale du Maroc*. Paris, 1928.
- Brémard, F. *L'Organisation régionale du Maroc*. Paris, 1949.
- Brignon, J. et al. *Histoire du Maroc*. Casablanca, 1968.
- Brown, K. L. *People of Salé. Tradition and change in a Moroccan city, 1830–1930*. Manchester, 1976.
- Burke, E. *Prelude to protectorate in Morocco*. Chicago, 1976.
- Colloque internationale d'études historiques et sociologiques, 18–20 janvier 1973. *Actes. Abdel-Krim et la république du Rif*. Paris, 1976.
- Dunn, Ross E. *Resistance in the desert: Moroccan responses to French imperialism, 1881–1912*. London and Madison, 1977.
- 'Bū Himāra's European connexion: the commercial relations of a Moroccan warlord', *Journal of African History*, 1980, 21, 2, 235–53.
- Fleming, S. E. 'Primo de Rivera and Abd-el-Krim: the struggle in Spanish Morocco, 1923–27'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974.
- 'Spanish Morocco and the *Alzamiento Nacional*, 1936–1939: the military, economic and political mobilization of a protectorate', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1982, 9, nos. 27–8, 225–36.
- Gallissot, R. *Le patronat européen au Maroc (1931–1942)*. Rabat, 1964.
- García Figueras, T. *España y su protectorado en Marruecos, 1912–1956*. Madrid, 1957.
- La Accion africana de España entorno al 98 (1860–1912)*, vol. II. Madrid, 1966.
- Gaudio, A. *Allal el-Fassi ou l'histoire de l'Istiqlal*. Paris, 1972.
- Gellner, E. and Micaud, C. eds. *Arabs and Berbers*. London, 1972.
- Goulven, J. *Traité d'économie et de législation marocaines*. Paris, 1921. 2 vols.
- Graux, Lucien. *Le Maroc économique*. Paris, 1928.
- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division). *Morocco*. London, 1941–2. 2 vols.
- Halstead, J. P. *Rebirth of a nation: the origins and rise of Moroccan nationalism, 1912–1944*. Cambridge, Mass., 1967.
- Hardy, G. *Le Maroc*. Paris, 1930.
- Harris, W. *Morocco that was*. London, 1921. Reprinted 1983.
- Hoisington, W. A. *The Casablanca connection: French colonial policy, 1936–1943*. Chapel Hill, 1984.
- Hoover, E. T. 'Among competing worlds: the Rehamna of Morocco on the eve of French conquest'. Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1978.
- Ihraï-Aouchar, A. 'La Presse nationaliste et le régime du Protectorat au Maroc dans l'entre-deux-guerres', *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 1982, 34, 91–104.
- Joffé, É. G. H. 'Local society in Morocco on the eve of European occupation. The southern Jbala in 1911', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1982, 11, nos. 25–6, 51–64.
- Julien, C.-A. *Le Maroc face aux impérialismes 1415–1956*. Paris, 1978.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Landau, J. M. 'Some East European works on Morocco', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1982, 18, 116–20.
- Le Tourneau, R. *Fès avant le Protectorat*. Casablanca and Paris, 1949.
- Maxwell, Gavin. *Lords of the Atlas: the rise and fall of the house of Glaoua, 1893–1956*. London, 1966.
- Mission scientifique au Maroc. *Villes et tribus du Maroc*. Documents publiés sous les auspices de la Résidence générale. Paris, 1915–1932. 10 vols.
- Montagne, R. *Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc*. Paris, 1930. ed. *La Naissance du prolétariat marocain*. Paris, 1951.
- Morales Lezcano, V. *El Colonialismo hispano-francés en Marruecos (1898–1927)*. Madrid, 1976.
- O'Connor, V. C. Scott. *A vision of Morocco*. London, 1923.
- Pennell, C. R. 'A country with a government and a flag': the Rif war in Morocco 1921–1926. London, 1985.
- “‘I wish to live peacefully in my house’ – a Moroccan caid and his reaction to colonialism”, *Maghreb Review*, 1981, 6, 3–4, 49–54.
- Résidence générale de la république française au Maroc. *La Renaissance du Maroc: dix ans de protectorat*. Rabat, 1922.
- Rivet, D. 'Ethnographie et conquête du Moyen-Atlas 1912–31', in Nordman, D. and Raison, J.-P. eds. *Sciences de l'homme et conquête coloniale. Constitution et usage des sciences humaines en Afrique, XIXe–XXe siècles*, pp. 159–79. Paris, 1980.
- Scham, A. *Lyautey in Morocco: protectorate administration, 1912–1925*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970.
- Seddon, D. *Moroccan peasants: a century of change in the eastern Rif, 1870–1970*. Folkestone, 1981.
- Slavin, D. H. 'Anticolonialism and the French Left: opposition to the Rif War 1925–1926 (Morocco)'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Virginia, 1982.
- Spillmann, G. *Les Aït Atta du Sahara et la pacification du Draa*. Rabat, 1936.
- Stewart, C. F. *The economy of Morocco, 1912–1962*. Cambridge, Mass., 1964.
- Terrasse, H. *Histoire du Maroc des origines à l'établissement du protectorat français*. Casablanca, 1949–50. 2 vols.
- Trout, F. E. *Morocco's Saharan frontiers*. Geneva, 1969.
- Vinogradov, A. R. *The Aït Ndbir of Morocco: a study of the social transformation of a Berber tribe*. Ann Arbor, 1975.
- Waterbury, J. *North for the trade: the life and times of a Berber merchant*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972.
- Woolman, D. S. *Rebels in the Rif*. Stanford, 1968.

Libya

- Ballico, P. and Palloni, G. *L'Opera di avvaloramento agricolo e zootecnico della Tripolitania e della Cirenaica*. Rome, 1971.
- Barbar, A. M. 'The Tarabulus (Libyan) resistance to the Italian invasion: 1911–1920'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1980.
- Cachia, A. J. *Libya under the second Ottoman occupation (1835–1911)*. Tripoli, 1945.
- Denti di Pirajno, A. *A cure for serpents: a doctor in Africa*. tr. K. Naylor. London, 1955.

6. THE MAGHRIB

- Despois, J. *La Colonisation italienne en Libye*. Paris, 1935.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. F. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*. Oxford, 1948.
- Forbes, Rosita. *The secret of the Sahara: Kufara*. London, 1921.
- Graziani, R. *Cirenaica pacificata*. Milan, 1932.
- Pace Romana in Libia*. Milan, 1937.
- Griffin, E. H. *Adventures in Tripoli: a doctor in the desert*. London, 1924.
- Hill, R. W. *A bibliography of Libya*. University of Durham, Dept. of Geography, 1959.
- Holmboe, K. *Desert encounter. An adventurous journey through Italian Africa*. tr. H. Holbek. London, 1936.
- Joffé, E. G. H. and McLachlan, K. eds. *Social and economic development of Libya*. Wisbech, 1982.
- Johnson, D. L. *Jabal al-Akhdar, Cyrenaica*. University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Chicago, 1973.
- Kraïem, M. 'La Question de l'annexion italienne de la Libye', *Revue d'histoire maghrébine*, 1976, 3, no. 5, 157-79.
- Landau, J. M. 'Some Russian publications on Libya', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1979, 15, 280-2.
- Malgeri, F. *La Guerra libica (1911-1912)*. Rome, 1970.
- Moore, M. *The fourth shore: Italy's mass colonisation of Libya*. London, 1940.
- Rainero, R. 'La Capture, l'exécution d'Omar El-Mukhtar et la fin de la guérilla libyenne', *Cahiers de Tunisie*, 1980, 28, nos. 111-12, 59-74.
- Schlüter, H. *Index Libycus*. Boston, Mass., 1972-81. 3 vols.
- Segré, C. C. *Fourth shore: the Italian colonisation of Libya*. Chicago and London, 1974.
- Steer, G. L. *A date in the desert*. London, 1939.
- Wright, J. *Libya*. London, 1969.
- Zoli, C. *Espansione coloniale italiana (1922-1937)*. Rome, 1949.

Spanish Sahara

- Baroja, J. Caro. *Estudios Saharianos*. Madrid, 1955.
- García Figueras, T. *Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, Ifni, Sahara. La acción de España en la costa occidental de Africa*. Madrid, 1941.
- Hodges, Tony. *Historical dictionary of Western Sahara*. Metuchen, NJ and London, 1982.
- Mercer, J. *Spanish Sahara*. London, 1976.
- Rezette, R. *The Western Sahara and the frontiers of Morocco*. Paris, 1975.
- Thompson, V. and Adloff, R. *The Western Saharans*. London, 1980.

7. FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

Political and cultural

- Ageron, C.-R. 'Les Colonies devant l'opinion publique française, 1919-1939', *Cahiers de l'Institut d'histoire de la Presse et de l'Opinion* (Tours), 1973, 1, 1-40.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'La Perception de la puissance française en 1938-1939: le mythe impérial', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1982, 69, no. 254, 7-22.
- Andrew, C. M. and Kanya-Forstner, A. S. 'The French "Colonial Party": its composition, aims and influence, 1885-1914', *Historical Journal*, 1971, 14, 1, 99-128.
- 'The *Groupe Colonial* in the French Chamber of Deputies, 1892-1932', *Historical Journal*, 1974, 17, 4, 837-66.
- 'French business and the French colonialists', *Historical Journal*, 1976, 19, 4, 981-1000.
- France overseas: the Great War and the climax of French imperial expansion*. London, 1981.
- Andrew, C. M., Grupp, P. and Kanya-Forstner, A. S. 'Le Mouvement colonial français et ses principales personnalités, 1890-1914', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1975, 62, no. 229, 640-73.
- Astier Loutfi, M. *Littérature et colonialisme. L'expansion coloniale vue dans la littérature romanesque française, 1871-1914*. Paris, 1971.
- Betts, R. F. *Assimilation and association in French colonial theory (1891-1914)*. New York, 1961.
- Tricolneur: the French overseas empire*. London and New York, 1978.
- Bouche, D. *Les Villages de liberté en Afrique noire française (1887-1910)*. Paris and The Hague, 1968.
- Brunschwig, H. *Mythes et réalités de l'impérialisme colonial français 1871-1914*. Paris, 1960. English tr. London, 1966.
- Noirs et Blancs dans l'Afrique noire française, ou comment le colonisé devient colonisateur (1870-1914)*. Paris, 1983.
- Buell, R. L. *The native problem in Africa*. New York, 1928. 2 vols.
- Cairns, M. C. 'The African colonial society in French colonial novels', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1969, 9, no. 34, 175-93.
- Clayton, A. 'The French military in Africa, 1830-1962'. Forthcoming.
- Cohen, W. B. *Rulers of empire: the French colonial service in Africa*. Stanford, 1971.
- 'The colonial policy of the Popular Front', *French Historical Studies*, 1972, 7, 3, 368-93.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. 'La Mise en dépendance de l'Afrique noire. Essai de périodisation, 1800-1970', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1976, 16, nos. 61-62, 7-58.
- 'Colonisation ou impérialisme: la politique de la France entre les deux guerres', *Le mouvement social*, 1979, no. 107, 51-76.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. and Moniot, H. *L'Afrique noire de 1800 à nos jours*. Paris, 1974.
- Delafosse, L. *Maurice Delafosse: le Berrichon conquis par l'Afrique*. Paris, 1976.
- Deschamps, H. 'Et maintenant, Lord Lugard?', *Africa*, 1963, 33, 4, 293-306.
- Roi de la brousse. Mémoires d'autres mondes*. Paris, 1975.
- Encyclopédie de l'empire français. *Encyclopédie colonial et maritime*. ed. E. Guernier. Paris. *Afrique Occidentale Française*, 1949, 2 vols; *Afrique Equatoriale Française*, 1950; *Cameroun-Togo*, 1951.
- Fanoudh-Sieffer, C. *Le Mythe du Nègre et de l'Afrique noire dans la littérature française (de 1800 à la 2e guerre mondiale)*. Paris, 1968.

7. FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

- Gifford, P. and Louis, W. R. eds. *France and Britain in Africa*. New Haven, 1971.
- Girardet, Raoul. *L'Idée coloniale en France, de 1871 à 1962*. Paris, 1972.
- Girault, A. *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*. Paris. 3rd ed. 1907–8; 4th ed. 1921; 5th ed. 1929–32.
- Gouzien, P. 'La Pandémie grippale de 1918–1919 dans les colonies françaises', *Bulletin mensuel de l'Office International d'Hygiène Publique*, 1920, 12, 686–724.
- Huot, M. et al. 'L'Épidémie d'influenza de 1918–1919 dans les colonies françaises (suite)', *Annales de médecine et de pharmacie coloniales*, 1921, 19, 443–78.
- Lebel, R. L. *L'Afrique occidentale dans la littérature française depuis 1870*. Paris, 1925.
- Histoire de la littérature coloniale en France*. Paris, 1931.
- Le Coeur, C. *Mission au Tibesti: carnets de route, 1933–1934*. ed. M. Le Coeur. Paris, 1969.
- Leiris, M. *L'Afrique fantôme*. Paris, 1934.
- Mangin, C. *La Force noire*. Paris, 1910.
- Marks, Sally. 'Black watch on the Rhine: a study in propaganda, prejudice and prurience', *European Studies Review*, 1983, 13, 3, 297–333.
- Marseille, M. 'La Conférence des gouverneurs généraux des colonies (novembre 1936)', *Le mouvement social*, 1977, no. 101, 61–84.
- Merlo, J. 'Sources populaires de l'idéologie de l'indépendance en Afrique noire: mythes africains de la colonisation'. Thèse de 3e cycle, École pratique des hautes études, Paris, 1967.
- Michel, M. 'La Genèse du recrutement de 1918 en Afrique noire française', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1971, 58, no. 213, 433–50.
- 'Un mythe: la "Force noire" avant 1914', *Relations internationales*, 1974, 2, 83–90.
- 'Un programme réformiste en 1919: Maurice Delafosse et la "politique indigène"', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1975, 15, no. 58, 313–27.
- 'La Puissance par l'empire: note sur la perception du facteur impérial dans l'élaboration de la défense nationale (1936–1938)', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1982, 69, no. 254, 35–46.
- Moneta, J. *Le PCF et la question coloniale, 1920–1965*. Paris, 1971.
- Nazi Boni, *Histoire synthétique de l'Afrique résistante*. Paris, 1972.
- Nelson, K. L. 'The black horror on the Rhine: race as a factor in post-world War I diplomacy', *Journal of Modern History*, 1970, 42, 4, 606–27.
- O'Melia, R. E. 'French communists and colonial revolutionaries: the colonial section of the French Communist Party, 1921–1926'. Ph.D. thesis, City University of New York, 1980.
- Persell, S. M. *The French colonial lobby, 1889–1938*. Stanford, 1983.
- Rabut, E. 'Le Mythe parisien de la mise en valeur des colonies africaines à l'aube du XXe siècle: la commission des concessions coloniales, 1898–1912', *Journal of African History*, 1979, 20, 2, 271–87.
- Rigollot, D. C. 'L'École Coloniale 1885–1939'. Mémoire. Paris, École des Sciences Politiques, 1970.
- Roberts, S. H. *The history of French colonial policy*. London, 1929. Reprinted 1963.
- Rolland, L. and Lampué, P. *Précis de législation coloniale*. Paris, 1940.
- Sagna Olivier. 'Lamine Senghor'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1982.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Sow, Ndeye. 'Les Organisations nègres et l'action anticoloniale dans l'entre-deux-guerres (1920-1940)'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-I, 1978.
- Steins, M. *Das Bild des Schwarzen in der europäischen Kolonialliteratur 1870-1918*. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1972.
- Suret-Canale, J. *Afrique noire*, vol. II. *L'Ère coloniale, 1900-1940*. Paris, 1964. *French colonialism in tropical Africa, 1900-1945*. tr. T. Gottheiner. London, 1971.
- 'A propos de Vigné d'Octon: peut-on parler d'anticolonialisme avant 1914', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1978, 18, nos. 69-70, 233-9.
- Sy, Papa I. 'Tiemoko Garan Kouyate et l'action anti-coloniale de l'entre-deux-guerres'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1978.
- Thomas, R. 'La Politique socialiste et le problème colonial de 1905 à 1920', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1960, 47, no. 167, 213-45.
- Traillon, J. L. G. *Bibliographie critique de l'Afrique française*. Paris, 1936.

Economic

- Anon. *L'Alimentation dans les colonies françaises*. Paris, 1933.
- Bertin, A. *Missions d'études forestières envoyées dans les colonies françaises*, vol. I. *Côte d'Ivoire*; vol. II. *Gabon*; vol. III. *La Question forestière coloniale*; vol. IV. *Cameroun*. Paris, 1918-20. 2nd ed. 1929.
- Bobrie, F. 'Finances publiques et conquête coloniale: le coût budgétaire de l'expansion française entre 1850 et 1913', *Annales*, 1976, 6, 1225-44.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. 'L'Impérialisme français en Afrique noire. Idéologie impériale et politique d'équipement 1924-1975', *Relations internationales*, 1976, 7, 261-82.
- ed. *L'Afrique et la crise de 1930 (1924-1938)*. Paris, 1976. (*Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 63, nos. 232-3, 375-784.)
- 'Mutation de l'impérialisme colonial français dans les années 30', *African Economic History*, 1977, 4, 103-52.
- 'Fondements et continuité de l'impérialisme colonial français sur l'exemple africain, 1920-1946', *Connaissance du Tiers-Monde*, 1978, 10/18, 215-48.
- Dresch, J. 'Les Investissements en Afrique noire', *Présence africaine*, 1952, 13, 232-41.
- Durand, H. *Essai sur la conjoncture de l'Afrique noire*. Paris, 1957.
- Hopkins, A. G. *An economic history of West Africa*. London, 1973.
- Marseille, J. 'L'Investissement français dans l'empire colonial. L'enquête du gouvernement de Vichy (1943)', *Revue historique*, 1974, no. 512, 409-32.
- 'L'industrie cotonnière française et l'impérialisme colonial', *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale*, 1975, 2-3, 386-412.
- 'Le Commerce entre la France et son empire de 1880 à 1913', *Relations internationales*, 1976, 6, 145-60.
- 'La Politique métropolitaine d'investissements coloniaux dans l'entre-deux-guerres', in Lévy-Leboyer, M. ed. *La Position internationale de la France*, pp. 387-98. Paris, 1977.
- Empire colonial et capitalisme français: histoire d'un divorce [1890-1960]*. Paris, 1984.

7. FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

- Mercier, R. *Le Travail obligatoire dans les colonies africaines*. Paris, 1933.
Poquin, J. J. *Les Relations économiques extérieures des pays d'Afrique noire de l'union française, 1925-1955*. Paris, 1957.
Sarraut, A. *La Mise en valeur des colonies françaises*. Paris, 1923.

FRENCH WEST AFRICA

General

- Almeida Topor, H. de. 'Recherches sur l'évolution du travail salarié en AOF pendant la crise économique de 1930-36', *Cahiers d'études africaines* 1976, 16, nos. 61-2, 103-18.
Balesi, C. J. *From adversaries to comrades in arms: West Africans and the French military, 1885-1918*. Waltham, Mass., 1979.
Bernard-Duquenot, N. 'Le Front Populaire et le problème des prestations en AOF', *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, 1976, 16, nos. 61-2, 159-72.
Bouche, D. *L'Enseignement dans les territoires français de l'Afrique occidentale de 1817 à 1920*. Paris, 1975. 2 vols.
Boyer, M. *Les Sociétés indigènes de prévoyance, de secours et de prêts mutuels agricoles en AOF*. Paris, 1935.
Chailley, M. *Histoire de l'Afrique occidentale française*. Paris, 1968.
Charpy, J. *Répertoire Général des Archives, Gouvernement Général de l'AOF*. Rufisque, 1955-8. Series D-H, T.
Comité d'Études Historiques et Scientifiques de l'AOF. *Coutumiers juridiques de l'AOF*. Paris, 1939. 3 vols.
Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. 'L'impact des intérêts coloniaux: SCOA et CFAO dans l'Ouest africain 1910-1965', *Journal of African History*, 1975, 16, 4, 595-622.
'A propos des investissements français outre-mer: l'exemple de l'Ouest africain, 1910-1965', in Lévy-Leboyer, M. ed. *La Position internationale de la France*, pp. 413-26. Paris, 1977.
Cosnier, H. *L'ouest africain français, ses ressources agricoles, son organisation économique*. Paris, 1921.
Crowder, M. 'The 1914-1918 European war and West Africa', in Ajayi, J. F. A. and Crowder, M. eds. *History of West Africa*, vol. 11, 484-513. London, 1973.
Delafosse, M. 'L'Afrique occidentale française (1904-1930)', in Hanotaux, G. and Martineau, A. eds. *Histoire des colonies françaises*, IV. pp. 319-56. Paris, 1931.
Delavignette, R. 'Van Vollenhoven', in Delavignette, R. and Julien, C. A. eds. *Les Constructeurs de la France d'outre-mer*, pp. 421-58. Paris, 1946.
Les Vrais Chefs de l'Empire. Paris, 1939. Republished as *Service africain*, Paris, 1946; tr. as *Freedom and authority in French West Africa*. London, 1950.
Demaision, D. 'Le Régime foncier coutumier des autochtones en AOF', *Revue juridique et politique de l'Union Française*, 1956, 2, 257-98.
'Le Régime de l'immatriculation foncière en AOF', *Revue juridique et politique de l'Union Française*, 1956, 2, 421-79.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Echenberg, M.-J. 'Paying the blood tax: military conscription in French West Africa, 1914-1929', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1975, 9, 2, 171-92.
- 'Les migrations militaires en Afrique occidentale française, 1900-1945', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1980, 14, 3, 429-50.
- Faur, J. C. 'La Mise en valeur ferroviaire de l'AOF (1880-1939)'. Thesis, Paris: Sorbonne, 1969.
- Forgeron, J. B. *Le Protectorat en Afrique occidentale française et les chefs indigènes*. Bordeaux, 1920.
- Gorer, G. *Africa dances*. London, 1935.
- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division). *French West Africa*, vol. 1: *The federation*. London, 1943; vol. 11. *The colonies*, 1944.
- Hargreaves, J. D. *West Africa: the former French states*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967.
- ed. *France and West Africa: an anthology of documents*. London, 1969.
- Hugues, L. *Droit foncier indigène en AOF*. Paris, 1919.
- Joucla, E. A. *Bibliographie de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*. Paris, 1937.
- Kelly, G. P. 'Interwar schools and the development of African history in French West Africa', *History in Africa*, 1983, 10, 163-85.
- Labouret, H. *À la recherche d'une politique indigène dans l'Ouest africain*. Paris, 1931.
- Paysans d'Afrique occidentale*. Paris, 1941.
- Laurens-Berge, A. 'La SCOA, 1900-1940'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1974.
- Maack, M. N. 'The AOF archives and the study of African history', *Bulletin de l'IFAN*, 1980 B, 42, 277-98.
- Mangeot, Général. *La Vie ardente de van Vollenhoven*. Paris, 1943.
- Mangolte, J. 'Le Chemin de fer de Konakry au Niger (1890-1914)', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1968, 55, no. 198, 37-105.
- Mathis, C. *L'Oeuvre des pastoriens en Afrique noire*, AOF. Paris, 1946.
- Michel, Marc. 'Le recrutement des tirailleurs en AOF pendant la première guerre mondiale: essai de bilan statistique', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1973, 60, no. 221, 644-60.
- L'Appel à l'Afrique. Contributions et réactions à l'effort de guerre en AOF 1914-1919*. Paris, 1982.
- Moreau, P. *Les Indigènes d'AOF. Leur condition politique et économique*. Paris, 1938.
- Mumford, W. B. and Orde Browne, G. St J. *Africans learn to be French*. London, n.d. [1936].
- Robert, André. *L'Évolution des coutumes de l'ouest africain et la législation française*. Paris, 1955.
- Sabatier, P. R. '"Elite" education in French West Africa: the era of limits, 1903-1945', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1978, 11, 2, 247-66.
- Spiegler, J. S. 'Aspects of nationalist thought among French-speaking West Africans, 1921-1939'. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1968.
- Spittler, G. *Verwaltung in einem afrikanischen-Bauernstaat. Das koloniale französisch-Westafrika (1919-1939)*. Wiesbaden, 1981.
- Thompson, V. and Adloff, R. *French West Africa*. London, 1958.

7. FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

[van Vollenhoven] *Une âme de chef. Le gouverneur général Van Vollenhoven*. Paris, 1920.

Vassal, J. 'La Maladie du sommeil en AOF', *Bulletin de la Société de Pathologie exotique*, 1924, 9, 727-54.

Dahomey

Almeida Topor, H. d'. 'Les Populations dahoméennes et le recrutement militaire pendant la première guerre mondiale', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1973, 60, no. 219, 196-238.

Anignikin, Sylvain. 'Les Origines du mouvement national au Dahomey, 1900-1939'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1981.

Asiwaju, A. I. *Western Yorubaland under European rule 1889-1945: a comparative analysis of French and British colonialism*. London, 1976.

Ballard, J. A. 'Les Incidents de 1923 à Porto Novo', *Études dahoméennes*, 1965, 5, 69-87.

'The Porto-Novo incidents of 1923', *Odu*, 1965, 2, 52-75.

Cocou, A. 'Les Travailleurs du chemin de fer au Dahomey sous la colonisation des origines à 1952'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1977.

Codo Coffi, B. 'La Presse dahoméenne face aux évolués: *La Voix du Dahomey*, 1927-1957'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1978.

Cornevin, R. *Histoire du Dahomey*. Paris, 1962.

Domingo, D. S. 'La Politique sanitaire coloniale de la France au Dahomey, 1914-1940'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1975.

Garcia, L. 'Les Mouvements de résistance au Dahomey (1914-1917)', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1970, 10, no. 37, 144-78.

'L'Organisation de l'instruction publique au Dahomey, 1894-1920', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1971, 11, no. 41, 59-100.

Lokossou, C. 'La Presse au Dahomey, 1894-1960. Évolution et réaction face à l'administration coloniale'. Thèse de 3e cycle, Paris, EHESS, 1976.

Lombard, J. *Autorités traditionnelles et pouvoirs européens en Afrique noire. Le déclin d'une aristocratie sous le régime colonial*. Paris, 1967.

Manning, P. *Slavery, colonialism and economic growth in Dahomey, 1640-1960*. Cambridge, 1982.

Moseley, K. P. 'Indigenous and external factors in colonial politics: southern Dahomey to 1939'. Ph.D. thesis, Colombia University, 1975.

Pinçon, R. G. 'L'Intégration du protectorat de Porto-Novo à la colonie du Dahomey (1880-1914)'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1978.

Suret-Canale, J. 'Un pionnier méconnu du mouvement démocratique et national en Afrique: Louis Hunkanin', *Études dahoméennes*, 1964, 3, 5-30.

Tardits, C. *Porto-Novo. Les nouvelles générations africaines entre leurs traditions et l'Occident*. Paris and The Hague, 1958.

Guinée

Brouwer, K. 'Introduction et progression d'une culture marchande en Guinée française: les plantations de bananes, 1920-1947'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1975.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Donkouré, M. 'Histoire de l'enseignement missionnaire en Guinée, 1875-1940'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1976.
- Summers, A. and Johnson, R. W. 'World War I conscription and social change in Guinea', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 25-38.
- Trentadue, M. 'Mouvements commerciaux et évolution économique de la Guinée française, 1928-1938': 'La Société guinéenne dans la crise de 1930: fiscalité et pouvoir d'achat', in Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. ed. *L'Afrique et la crise*, pp. 575-89, 628-39. Paris, 1976.

Ivory Coast

- Allangba, Hervé. 'La Langue d'Esopo: l'enseignement public en Côte d'Ivoire de 1911 à 1946'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1982.
- Amon d'Aby, F. J. *Le Problème des chefferies traditionnelles en Côte d'Ivoire*. Abidjan, 1968.
- Angoulvant, G. *La Pacification de la Côte d'Ivoire, 1908-1915: méthodes et résultats*. Paris, 1916.
- Asiwaju, A. I. 'Migrations as revolt: the example of the Ivory Coast and the Upper Volta before 1945', *Journal of African History*, 1976, 17, 4, 577-94.
- Chériff, M. 'L'Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire (Haut Carvally) et la pénétration française, 1896-1920'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Lille, 1973.
- Domergue, D. 'La Côte d'Ivoire de 1912 à 1920. Influence de la première guerre mondiale sur l'évolution politique, économique et sociale', *Annales de l'Université d'Abidjan*, 1976, 4, 1, 35-60.
- 'La Côte d'Ivoire: essai de démographie historique, 1909-1945', in Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, *African Historical Demography*, pp. 295-330. Edinburgh, 1977.
- 'La Lutte contre la trypanosomiasse en Côte d'Ivoire, 1900-1945', *Journal of African History*, 1981, 22, 1, 63-72.
- Domergue-Cloarec, D. 'Les Vingt Premières Années de l'action sanitaire en Côte d'Ivoire, 1904-1925', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1978, 65, no. 238, 40-63.
- Janvier, G. *Bibliographie de la Côte d'Ivoire*. Abidjan, 1973. 4 vols.
- Kipré, P. 'La Crise économique dans les centres urbains en Côte d'Ivoire, 1930-1935', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1976, 16, nos. 61-2, 119-46.
- 'Histoire des petits centres de colonisation en Côte d'Ivoire, 1890-1945'. Thèse d'État, University of Paris-VII, 1981 (publ. Abidjan, 1985).
- Lomme, L. 'Le Front populaire en Côte d'Ivoire'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1977.
- Picciola, A. 'Quelques aspects de la Côte d'Ivoire en 1919', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1973, 13, no. 50, 239-74.
- Semi-Bi, Z. 'La Politique coloniale des travaux publics en Côte d'Ivoire, 1900-1940', *Annales de l'Université d'Abidjan*, 1973-4, 1.
- 'L'Infrastructure routière et ferroviaire coloniale: source de mutations sociales et psychologiques: le cas de la Côte d'Ivoire, 1900-1940', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1976, 16, nos. 61-2, 147-58.

7 FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

'Équipement public et changements sociaux en Côte d'Ivoire, 1930-1957'.

Thèse d'État, University of Paris-VII, 1981.

Simon, Marc. *Souvenirs de brousse, 1905-1918*. Paris, 1965.

Tiacoh, C. 'La crise de 1930 et ses conséquences sur la Côte d'Ivoire, 1928-1938'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1977.

Tirefort, A. 'Le Bon Temps. Approche de la société coloniale en Basse Côte d'Ivoire (1920-1940)'. Thèse de 3e cycle, EHESS, Paris, 1979.

Weiskel, Timothy C. *French colonial rule and the Baule peoples: resistance and collaboration 1889-1911*. Oxford, 1980.

Wondji, C. 'La Côte d'Ivoire occidentale, période de pénétration pacifique, 1890-1908', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1963, 50, nos. 180-1, 346-81.

Yaya d'Alepe. 'Une économie coloniale de transition: Côte d'Ivoire, 1843-1919'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1979.

Mauritania

Ba, A. I. 'Les mauritaniens face à la pénétration française, de 1900 à la première guerre mondiale'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1975.

Désiré-Vuillemin, Geneviève. *Contribution à l'histoire de la Mauritanie de 1900 à 1934*. Dakar, 1962.

Niger

Baier, S. 'Trans-Saharan trade and the Sahel: Damergu, 1870-1930', *Journal of African History*, 1977, 18, 1, 37-60.

An economic history of central Niger. Oxford, 1980.

Bourgeot, André. 'Les Échanges trans-sahariens, la Senusya et les révoltes twareg de 1916-17', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1978, 18, nos. 1-2, 159-85.

Fuglestad, F. 'Les Révoltes des Touareg du Niger (1916-17)', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1973, 13, no. 49, 82-120.

'La Grande Famine de 1931 dans l'ouest nigérien', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1974, 61, no. 222, 18-33.

A history of Niger 1850-1960. Cambridge, 1983.

Idrissa, K. 'Guerres et sociétés. Les populations du Niger occidental au XIXe siècle et leurs réactions face à la colonisation, 1896-1906'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1979.

Olivier de Sardan, J. P. *Quand nos pères étaient captifs... Récits paysans du Niger*. Paris, 1976.

Piault, M. H. *Histoire Mawri*. Paris, 1970.

Salifou, A. *Kaoussan ou la révolte senoussiste*. Niamey, 1973.

'Colonisation et sociétés traditionnelles au Niger de la fin du XIXe siècle au début de la 2e guerre mondiale'. Thèse d'État, University of Toulouse, 1977.

Séré de Rivières, E. *Histoire du Niger*. Paris, 1965.

Triaud, J.-L. 'Un épisode oublié de la guerre de Kaossen, la lettre des savants et des notables musulmans d'Agades au colonel Mourin (1917)', *Annales de l'Université de Niamey*, 1978, 1, 263-71.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Senegal

- Auchnie, A. J. 'The *commandement indigène* in Senegal, 1919-1947'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983.
- Bernard-Duquenet, N. 'Le Sénégal et le Front populaire'. Thèse de 3^e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1976.
- 'Les Débuts du syndicalisme au Sénégal au temps du Front populaire', *Le mouvement social*, 1977, no. 101, 37-60.
- Betts, R. F. 'The establishment of the Medina in Dakar, Senegal, 1914', *Africa*, 1971, 41, 2, 143-52.
- Boulègue, M. 'La presse au Sénégal avant 1939: bibliographie', *Bulletin de l'IFAN*, 1965, B, 27, 3-4, 715-54.
- Cissojho, B. 'La Vie politique dans les quatre communes du Sénégal entre les deux guerres'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1979.
- Colvin, L. G. *Historical dictionary of Senegal*. Metuchen, NJ, 1981.
- Crowder, M. *Senegal. A study of French assimilation policy*, London, 1962.
- Fall, B. 'Le Travail forcé au Sénégal, 1900-1946'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Dakar, 1977.
- Fall, Papa Amadu. 'Industrialisation et mutations sociales en AOF: le cas du Sénégal, 1920-1946'. Thèse de 3^e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1981.
- Guèye, Lamine. *Itinéraire africain*. Paris, 1966.
- Johnson, G. Wesley. *The emergence of black politics in Senegal: the struggle for power in the four communes, 1900-1920*. Stanford, 1971.
- 'The Senegalese urban elite, 1900-1945', in Curtin, P. D. ed. *Africa and the West*, pp. 139-87. Madison, 1972.
- Klein, M. A. *Islam and imperialism in Senegal. Sine-Saloum, 1847-1914*. Stanford, 1968.
- Lakroum, M. *Le Travail inégal. Paysans et salariés sénégalais face à la crise des années 30*. Paris, 1982.
- Mbodj, M. 'Un exemple d'économie coloniale, le Sine-Saloum (Sénégal) de 1887 à 1940: culture arachidière et mutation sociale'. Thèse de 3^e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1978.
- M'Bokolo, E. 'Peste et société urbaine à Dakar: l'épidémie de 1914', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1982, 22, no. 85, 13-46.
- Mersadier, Yves. 'La Crise de l'arachide sénégalaise au début des années trente', *Bulletin de l'IFAN*, 1966, B, 28, 826-77.
- Michel, M. 'Citoyenneté et service militaire dans les quatre communes du Sénégal', in *Perspectives nouvelles sur le passé de l'Afrique noire et de Madagascar: mélanges offerts à Hubert Deschamps*, pp. 300-14. Paris, 1974.
- N'Jazzy, S. 'Les Chemins de fer au Sénégal, 1907-1933'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Dakar, 1977.
- Person, Y. 'Le Front populaire au Sénégal (mai 1936-octobre 1938)', *Le mouvement social*, 1979, no. 101, 76-101.
- Roche, C. *Conquête et résistance des peuples de Casamance, 1850-1920*. Dakar, 1976.
- Seck, A. *Dakar, métropole ouest-africaine*. Dakar, 1970.
- Snyder, F. G. *Capitalism and legal change. An African transformation*. New York and London, 1981.

7. FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

- Sow, A. 'Les Sociétés indigènes de prévoyance entre les deux guerres au Sénégal, 1909-1946'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Dakar, 1983.
- Thiam, I. D. 'Galandou Diouf et le Front populaire', *Bulletin de l'IFAN*, 1976, B, 38, no. 3, 592-618.
- 'Les Origines du mouvement syndical sénégalais. La grève des cheminots du Dakar-Saint-Louis du 13 au 15 avril 1919', *Annales de la Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines de Dakar*, 1977, 7, 210-39.
- 'L'Évolution politique et syndicale du Sénégal de 1840 à 1936'. Thèse d'état, University of Paris-I, 1983.
- Vanhaeverbeke, A. *Rémunération du travail et commerce extérieur. Essor d'une économie paysanne exportatrice et termes de l'échange des producteurs d'arachides au Sénégal*. Louvain, 1970.
- Welé, Alassane, 'L'Enseignement public au Sénégal entre les deux guerres'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Dakar, 1981.
- Zucarelli, F. 'De la chefferie traditionnelle au canton: évolution du canton colonial au Sénégal, 1855-1960', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1973, 13, no. 50, 213-38.

Soudan

- Hampaté Bâ, Amadou. *L'Étrange destin de Wangrin ou les roueries d'un interprète africain*. Paris, 1973.
- Harding, L. 'Les Écoles des Pères Blancs au Soudan français', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1971, 11, no. 41, 101-28.
- Magasa, Amidou. *Papa Commandant a jeté un grand filet devant nous: les exploités des rives du Niger, 1902-1962*. Paris, 1978.

Togo

- Cornevin, R. *Histoire du Togo*. Paris, 1959.
- Guillaneuf, R. 'La Presse au Togo, 1911-1966'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-I, 1970.
- Péchoux, L. *Le Mandat français sur les Togo*. Paris, 1939.

Upper Volta

- Cordell, D. D. and Gregory, J. W. 'Labor reservoirs and population: French colonial strategies in Koudougou, Upper Volta, 1914 to 1939', *Journal of African History*, 1982, 23, 1, 205-24.
- Delavignette, R. *Paysans noirs*. Paris, 1931.
- Duperray, A. M. *Les Gourounsi de Haute-Volta: conquête et colonisation, 1896-1933*. Stuttgart, 1984.
- Hébert, J. 'Révolte en Haute-Volta de 1914 à 1918', *Notes et documents voltaïques*, 1970, 3, no. 4, 373-89.
- Marchal, J. Y. ed. *Chronique d'un cercle de l'AOF: Ouahigouya (Haute-Volta) 1908-1941*. Paris, 1980.
- Skinner, E. P. *The Mossi of Upper Volta: the political development of a Sudanese people*. Stanford, 1964.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA

General

- Austen, R. A. and Headrick, R. 'Equatorial Africa under colonial rule', in Birmingham, D. and Martin, P. M. eds. *History of Central Africa*, II, pp. 27-94. London, 1983.
- Bruel, G. *L'Afrique équatoriale française*. Paris, 1918 (*La France équatoriale africaine*, 1935).
- Burnham, P. and Christensen, T. 'Karnu's message and the "War of the Hoe Handle"', *Africa*, 1983, 53, 4, 3-22.
- Chadourne, J. M. *André Gide et l'Afrique*. Paris, 1968.
- Crémieu-Alcan, E. *L'AEF et l'AOF de grand-papa*. Paris, 1970.
- Denis, M. *Histoire militaire de l'AEF*. Paris, 1931.
- Gide, A. *Voyage au Congo: carnets de route*. Paris, 1927.
- Le Retour du Tchad: suite du voyage au Congo*. Paris, 1928.
- Travels in the Congo*. tr. D. Bussy. New York and London, 1929.
- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division). *French Equatorial Africa*. London, 1942.
- Londres, A. *Terre d'ébène: la traite des noirs*. Paris, 1929.
- Maurette, F. 'Afrique équatoriale, orientale et australe [Madagascar]', *Géographie universelle*, 1938, 12, 342-75.
- Michaud, G. *Gide et l'Afrique*. Paris, 1961.
- Michel, M. 'Les Débuts du soulèvement de la Haute Sangha en 1928', *Annales du Centre d'Enseignement Supérieur de Brazzaville*, 1966, 2, 33-49.
- Nzabakomada, R. 'La Révolte Kongo-Warra, 1928-1932. Un Chapitre de la résistance anticoloniale en AEF'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1975.
- Reste, J. F. *Action économique et sociale en AEF, 1936-38*. Brazzaville, n.d.
- Sautter, G. *De l'Atlantique au fleuve Congo. Une géographie du sous-peuplement. République du Congo, République gabonaise*. Paris and The Hague, 1966.
- Terrier, A. 'L'Afrique équatoriale française, 1900-1930', in Hanotaux, G. and Martineau, A. eds. *Histoire des colonies françaises*, IV, pp. 535-76. Paris, 1931.
- Thompson, V. and Adloff, R. *The emerging states of French Equatorial Africa*. Stanford and London, 1960.

Cameroun

- Burnham, P. "'Regroupement" and mobile societies: two Cameroon cases', *Journal of African History*, 1975, 16, 4, 577-94.
- Céline, L.-F. *Voyage au bout de la nuit*. Paris, 1932.
- Chatap, O. 'Le Travail salarié au Cameroun, 1920-1940'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1976.
- Chaleur, P. *L'Oeuvre française au Cameroun*. Yaoundé, 1956.
- Derrick, J. 'The "Germanophone" elite of Douala under the French mandate', *Journal of African History*, 1980, 21, 2, 255-67.

7. FRENCH BLACK AFRICA

- Guyot, J. I. 'The food economy and French colonial rule in central Cameroun', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 4, 577-98.
- 'The depression and the administration in South-Central Cameroun', *African Economic History*, 1981, 10, 67-79.
- Joseph, R. 'The German question in French Cameroun, 1919-1939', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1974, 17, 65-90.
- Kaptue, Léon. 'L'Administration coloniale et la circulation des indigènes au Cameroun: le laisser-passer, 1923-46', *Afrika Zamani* (Yaoundé), 1979, 10-11, 160-84.
- Koufan, J. 'Travail forcé et migrations au Cameroun: le cas des Yambassa dans l'entre deux guerres, 1918-1946'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1979.
- Kouo, Félix. 'Les Répercussions de la crise économique de 1929 au Cameroun', *Afrika Zamani* (Yaoundé), 1979, 10-11, 100-31.
- Krauss, H. *Die moderne Bodengesetzgebung in Kamerun, 1884-1964*. Berlin, 1966.
- Le Vine, V. T. *The Cameroons: from mandate to independence*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964.
- Mveng, E. *Histoire du Cameroun*. Paris, 1963.
- Mvondo Nyina, B. 'L'Enseignement dans la politique coloniale française au Cameroun de 1916 à 1938', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1976, 8, 199-213.
- Ngandé, S. 'Le Kamerun et la France dans la première guerre mondiale, 1914-1922'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1976.
- Owona, A. 'À l'aube du nationalisme camerounais: la curieuse figure de Vincent Gauty', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1969, 56, no. 204, 199-235.
- Quinn, F. 'Changes in Beti society, 1887-1960'. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970.
- 'An African reaction to World War I: the Beti of Cameroun', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1973, 13, no. 52, 722-31.
- Soulillou, J. *Douala. Un siècle en images*. Paris, 1983.
- Tchoualle, T. T. 'La France au Cameroun entre les deux guerres'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1976.

Chad

- Julien, Capt. 'Mohamed Es Senousi et ses états', *Bulletin de la société de recherches congolaises*, 1925-9, 7, 104-77; 8, 55-122; 9, 49-96; 10, 45-88.
- Le Cornec, J. *Histoire politique au Tchad de 1900 à 1962*. Paris, 1963.
- Moukhtar-Bachar-Moukhtar. 'Le Ouaddaï de 1850 à 1920'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1978.
- 'Aux confins des États: les peuples du Tchad oriental 1910-1960'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1982.
- Moussabou, V. B. 'La Colonisation agricole du Niari, 1935-1965'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1976.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Moyen-Congo

- Aïssi, A. 'La Politique indigène au Congo'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Toulouse, 1978.
- Augouard, Mgr. 44 *Années au Congo: lettres de Mgr Augouard, 1905-1921*. Evreux, 1934.
- Bafouetela, R. 'La Politique indigène de la France au Moyen-Congo, 1886-1930'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1974.
- Boussoukou-Boumba, 'L'Évolution politique et économique des Bakougnis du Congo, 1910-1941'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1977.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. *Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires, 1898-1930*. Paris and The Hague, 1972.
- Frey, R. 'Brazzaville', *Encyclopédie mensuelle d'outre-mer*, 1954, nos. 48-9, 17-138.
- Kinata Côte, 'Les Bakongo du Mbula Ntangu: évolution économique et sociale, 1896-1942'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1980.
- Koumba-Bayengoula, A. 'Démographie historique du Congo, 1876-1950'. Mémoire de maîtrise, University of Paris-VII, 1978.
- Martin, G. et al. *Rapport de la mission d'études de la maladie du sommeil au Congo français, 1906-1908*. Paris, 1909.
- Mazenot, G. *La Likouala-Mossaka. Histoire de la pénétration du Haut-Congo (1878-1920)*. Paris and The Hague, 1970.
- Ndinga-Bo, A. 'Histoire du cuivre au Congo des origines à 1935'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1979.
- Rey, P. P. *Colonialisme, néo-colonialisme et transition au capitalisme. Exemple de la 'Comilog' au Congo-Brazzaville*. Paris, 1971.
- Robineau, C. 'Contribution à l'histoire du Congo: la domination européenne et l'exemple de Souanké (1900-1960)', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1967, 7, no. 26, 300-44.
- Sautter, G. 'Notes sur la construction du chemin de fer Congo-Océan (1921-1934)', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1967, 7, no. 26, 219-99.
- Sinda, M. *Le Messianisme congolais*. Paris, 1972.
- Soret, M. *Histoire du Congo, capitale Brazzaville*. Paris, 1978.

Gabon

- Berre, R. 'L'Extension du pouvoir colonial français à l'intérieur du Gabon (1883-1914)'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-I, 1979.
- Deschamps, H. *Tradition orale et archives au Gabon*. Paris, 1962.
- Fernandez, J. W. *Bwiti. An ethnography of the religious imagination in Africa*. Princeton, 1982.
- Gardinier, D. E. *Historical dictionary of Gabon*. Metuchen, NJ, 1981.
- Mangongo Nzambi, 'La Pénétration française et l'organisation administrative du Nord Gabon'. Thèse de 3e cycle, Paris: École Pratique des Hautes Études, 1968.
- N'doume Assebe, J. 'L'Enseignement missionnaire au Gabon, 1842-1960'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-I, 1979.
- Pambo-Loueya, Félix. 'La Colonie du Gabon de 1914 à 1939. Étude économique et sociale, 1920-1946'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Paris-VII, 1981.

7. MADAGASCAR

Ubangi-Shari

- Dampierre, E. de. *Un ancien royaume Bandia du Haut-Oubangui*. Paris, 1967.
 Kalck, P. 'Histoire centrafricaine des origines à nos jours'. Thèse d'État, University of Paris-I, 1970.
Histoire de la république centrafricaine. Paris, 1974.
 Weinstein, G. 'Félix Eboué and the chiefs: perceptions of power in early Oubangui-Chari', *Journal of African History*, 1970, II, 1, 107-26.
Éboué. New York, 1972.

MADAGASCAR

- Boiteau, P. *Contribution à l'histoire de la nation malgache*. Paris, 1958.
 Brown, Mervyn. *Madagascar rediscovered: a history from early times to independence*. London, 1978.
 Chevalier, L. *Madagascar: populations et ressources*. Paris, 1952.
 Condominas, G. *Fokonolona et collectivités rurales en Imerina*. Paris, 1960.
 Dama-Ntsoha, *Histoire politique et religieuse des Malgaches*. Paris, 1952.
 Decary, R. *L'Androy, essai de monographie régionale*. Paris, 1933. 2 vols.
 Délelée-Desloges, M. 'Madagascar depuis 1906', in Hanotaux, G. and Martineau, A. eds. *Histoire des colonies françaises*, vol. VI, pp. 231-79. Paris, 1930.
Madagascar et dépendances. Paris, 1931.
 Deschamps, H. *Les Antaisaka, géographie humaine, coutumes et histoire*. Paris, 1937.
Les Malgaches du Sud-Est. Paris, 1959.
Les Migrations intérieures à Madagascar. Paris, 1959.
Histoire de Madagascar. Paris, 1960. 4th ed. 1972.
 Domenichini, J.-P. 'Jean Ralaimongo (1884-1943)', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1969, 56, no. 204, 236-87.
 Encyclopédie de l'empire français. *Encyclopédie coloniale et maritime. Madagascar*, ed. M. de Coppet. Paris, 1947. 2 vols.
 Esoavelomandroso, F. V. 'Les Sadiavahe: essai d'interprétation d'une révolte dans le Sud (1915-1917)', *Omaly sy Anio*, 1975, nos. 1-2, 139-71.
 'Langue, culture et colonisation à Madagascar: malgache et française dans l'enseignement officiel (1916-1940)', *Omaly sy Anio*, 1976, nos. 3-4, 105-65.
 'De la peste maladie à la "peste politique" ... (1921-1936)', *Omaly sy Anio*, 1980, no. 11, 49-110.
 Fauchère, A. *La Mise en valeur des nos territoires coloniaux. Problèmes spéciaux à Madagascar*. Paris, 1917.
 Fauroux, E. 'La Formation Sakalava ou l'histoire d'une articulation ratée'. Thèse, University of Paris-Nanterre, 1975.
 Fenard, G. *Les Indigènes fonctionnaires à Madagascar*. Paris, 1939.
 Feugeas, Y. *Le Marché du riz pendant la période coloniale à Madagascar (1905-1940)*. Antananarivo, 1979.
 Fontvieille, J. *Bibliographie de Madagascar, 1956-1963*. Tananarive, n.d.
 Fremigacci, J. 'Mise en valeur coloniale et travail forcé: la construction du chemin de fer Tananarive-Antsirabe (1911-1923)', *Omaly sy Anio*, 1975, nos. 1-2, 75-137.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Ordre économique colonial et exploitation de l'indigène: petits colons et forgerons Betsiles (1900-1923)', *Terre malgache*, 1975, 17, 65-107.
- 'L'Administration coloniale: les aspects oppressifs', *Omaly sy Anio*, 1978, nos. 7-8, 209-38.
- Garbit, H. *L'Effort de Madagascar pendant la guerre*. Paris, 1919.
- Gayet, G. *La Circulation monétaire et le crédit à Madagascar*. Paris, 1923.
- Gontard, M. *Madagascar pendant la 1^{re} guerre mondiale*. Tananarive, 1969.
- Grandidier, G. *Bibliographie de Madagascar*, vol. II. 1904-1933. Paris, 1935; vol. III. 1934-1955. Tananarive, 1957.
- Isnard, H. *Madagascar*. Paris, 1955.
- Jacob, G. and Koerner, F. 'Economie de traite et bluff colonial: la Compagnie occidentale de Madagascar (1895-1934)', *Revue historique*, 1972, 248, no. 504, 333-66.
- Kent, R. *From Madagascar to the Malagasy Republic*. London, 1962.
- Koerner, F. 'Le Front populaire et la question coloniale à Madagascar. L'année 1936', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1974, 61, no. 224, 436-54.
- Linton, R. *The Tanala, a hill tribe of Madagascar*. Chicago, 1933.
- Loisy, X. *Madagascar, étude économique*. Paris, 1914.
- Mannoni, O. *Psychologie de la colonisation*. Paris, 1950. tr. P. Powesland, *Prospero and Caliban*. New York, 1956.
- Marcuse, Walter D. *Through western Madagascar*. London, 1914.
- Massiot, M. *L'Administration publique à Madagascar... de 1896 à 1958*. Paris, 1971.
- Molet, L. *Le Boeuf dans l'Ankaizina*. Tananarive, 1953.
- Olivier, M. *Six ans de politique sociale à Madagascar*. Paris, 1931.
- Poitelon, J.-C., Razafintsalama, G. and Randrianarivelo, R. *Périodiques malgaches*. Paris, 1970.
- Prunières, A. *Madagascar et la crise*. Paris, 1935.
- Rabemananjara, J. *Témoignage malgache et colonialisme*. Paris, 1956.
- Les Fondements culturels du nationalisme malgache*. Paris, 1958.
- Nationalisme et problèmes malgaches*. Paris, 1958.
- Rabemanajara, R. W. *Histoire de la nation malgache*. Paris, 1952.
- Raison-Jourde, F. ed. *Les Souverains de Madagascar*. Paris, 1983.
- Rajemisa-Raolison, *Dictionnaire historique et géographique de Madagascar*. Fianarantsoa, 1966.
- Ralaimihoatra, E. *Histoire de la Madagascar*, vol. II. 20^e siècle. Tananarive, 1966.
- Razoharinoro-Randriamboavonjy. *Table systématique du bulletin économique de Madagascar, 1901-1938*. Tananarive, 1972.
- Richard, C. 'Le Gouvernement de Victor Augagneur à Madagascar, 1905-1910'. Thèse de 3^e cycle, University of Paris, 1969.
- Robequain, C. *Madagascar et les bases dispersées de l'Union française*. Paris, 1958.
- Rusillon, H. *Un petit continent, Madagascar*. Paris, 1933.
- Sautter, G. et al. *Changements sociaux dans l'ouest malgache*. Paris, 1980.
- Schlemmer, B. *Le Menabe: histoire d'une colonisation*. Paris, 1983.
- Slawewski, L. M. S. *French policy towards the Chinese in Madagascar*. Hamden, Conn., 1971.
- Solohery Ranarison, Beby Denise. 'Le Mouvement des idées à travers les

8. BRITISH WEST AFRICA

- périodiques protestants en langue malgache de 1929 à 1945'. Thèse de 3e cycle, University of Strasbourg, 1976.
- Thompson, V. and Adloff, R. *The Malagasy Republic*. Stanford, 1965.
- Tronchon, J. 'Ravoahangy', in Julien, C.-A. et al. *Les Africains*, vol. 1, pp. 231-48. Paris, 1977.
- You, A. *Madagascar, colonie française 1896-1930*. Paris, 1931.

8. BRITISH WEST AFRICA

General

- Ajayi, J. F. A. and Crowder, M. eds. *History of West Africa*, vol. II. London, 1974.
- Asante, S. K. B. *Pan-African protest: West Africa and the Italo-Ethiopian crisis, 1934-1941*. London, 1977.
- Bowden, J. H. 'Development and control in British colonial policy, with reference to Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 1935-1948'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1980.
- Crowder, M. *West Africa under colonial rule*. London, 1968.
- Crowder, M. and Ikime, O. eds. *West African chiefs: their changing status under colonial rule and independence*. New York, 1970.
- Faulkner, O. T. and Mackie, J. R. *West African agriculture*. Cambridge, 1933.
- Greenhalgh, P. *An economic history of the West African diamond industry*. Manchester, 1985.
- Hailey, Lord. *Native administration in British African territories*. Part III. *West Africa: Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Gambia*. London, 1951.
- Haywood, A. and Clarke, F. A. S. *The history of the Royal West African Frontier Force*. Aldershot, 1964.
- Hilliard, F. H. *A short history of education in British West Africa*. London, 1957.
- Hopkins, A. G. 'Economic aspects of political movements in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 1918-1939', *Journal of African History*, 1966, 7, 1, 133-52.
- An economic history of West Africa*. London, 1973.
- July, R. W. *The origins of modern African thought: its development in West Africa during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*. New York, 1967. London, 1968.
- Killingray, D. and Matthews, J. 'Beasts of burden; British West African carriers in the First World War', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1979, 13, 1, 5-24.
- Kuczynski, R. R. *A demographic survey of the British colonial empire*, vol. 1. *West Africa*. London, 1948.
- Langley, J. A. *Pan-Africanism and nationalism in West Africa, 1900-1945*. Oxford, 1973.
- Lethbridge, A. *West Africa the elusive*. London, 1921.
- Macmillan, A. *The red book of West Africa*. London, 1920. Reprinted 1968.
- McPhee, A. *The economic revolution in British West Africa*. London, 1926. Reprinted 1971.
- Munro, J. Forbes. 'Monopolists and speculators: British investment in West African rubber, 1905-1914', *Journal of African History*, 1981, 22, 2, 263-78.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Newbury, C. W. *British policy towards West Africa: select documents 1875-1914*. Oxford, 1971.
- Okonkwo, R. L. 'The Garvey movement in British West Africa', *Journal of African History*, 1980, 21, 1, 105-17.
- Simms, Ruth. *Urbanization in West Africa; a review of the literature*. Evanston, 1965.
- Tettey, C. *Medicine in British West Africa, 1880-1965: an annotated bibliography*. Accra, 1975.

Nigeria

- Achebe, C. *Arrow of God*. London, 1964.
- Adedeye, S. O. *The co-operative movement in Nigeria: yesterday, today and tomorrow*. Göttingen, 1978.
- Adeleye, R. O. 'Mahdist triumph and British revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru, 1906', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1972, 6, 2, 193-214.
- Adewoye, O. 'The Tijani land case (1915-1921): a study in British colonial justice', *Odu*, 1976, 13, 21-39.
- The judicial system in southern Nigeria, 1854-1954*. London, 1977.
- The legal profession in Nigeria, 1865-1962*. Ibadan, 1977.
- Afigbo, A. E. *The warrant chiefs: indirect rule in Southern Nigeria, 1891-1929*. London, 1972.
- Ropes of sand. Studies in Igbo history and culture*. Ibadan, 1981.
- Aguolu, C. C. *Nigeria: a comprehensive bibliography in the humanities and social sciences, 1900-1971*. Boston, 1973.
- Akiga. *Akiga's story*. tr. R. East. London, 1939.
- Akinsemoyin, K. and Vaughan-Richards, A. *Building Lagos*. Jersey, 1976.
- Allen, A. R. 'The effects of the slump on education in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria (1929-1939)', *Savanna*, 1974, 3, 2, 197-207.
- Asiwaju, A. I. *Western Yorubaland under European rule, 1889-1945: a comparative analysis of French and British colonialism*. London, 1976.
- Atanda, J. A. 'The Iseyin-Okeiho rising of 1916: an example of socio-political conflict in colonial Nigeria', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1969, 4, 4, 497-514.
- The new Oyo empire: indirect rule and change in western Nigeria, 1894-1934*. London, 1973.
- Ausman, J. L. 'The disturbances in Abeokuta in 1918', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1971, 5, 1, 45-60.
- Awolowo, O. *Awo: the autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo*. Cambridge, 1960.
- Azikiwe, N. *My odyssey. An autobiography*. London, 1970.
- Barrett, J. 'Rank and file of the colonial army of Nigeria, 1914-1918', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1977, 15, 1, 105-15.
- Baum, E. *A comprehensive periodical bibliography on Nigeria, 1960-1970*. Athens, Ohio, 1975.
- Berry, Sara S. *Cocoa, custom and socio-economic change in rural western Nigeria*. Oxford, 1975.
- Bradbury, R. E. 'Continuities and discontinuities in pre-colonial and colonial

8. BRITISH WEST AFRICA

- Benin politics (1897–1951)', in Lewis, I. M. ed. *History and Social Anthropology*, pp. 193–252. London, 1968.
- Carland, J. M. *The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898–1914*. London, 1985.
- 'Enterprise and empire: officials, entrepreneurs and the search for petroleum in Southern Nigeria, 1906–1914', *International History Review*, 1982, 4, 2, 191–206.
- Cole, P. *Modern and traditional elites in the politics of Lagos*. Cambridge, 1975.
- Coleman, J. S. *Nigeria: background to nationalism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958.
- Cowley, E. J. 'Development of the cotton growing industry in Nigeria with special reference to the work of the British Cotton Growing Association', *Empire Cotton Growing Review*, 1966, 43, 169–95.
- Crocker, W. R. *Nigeria: a critique of British colonial administration*. London, 1936.
- Crowder, M. *Revolt in Bussa: a study of British 'Native administration' in Nigerian Borgu, 1902–1945*. London, 1973.
- Dorward, D. C. 'The development of the British colonial administration among the Tiv, 1900–1949', *African Affairs*, 1969, 68, no. 273, 316–33.
- 'Ethnography and administration: a study of Anglo-Tiv "working misunderstanding"', *Journal of African History*, 1974, 15, 3, 457–77.
- 'An unknown Nigerian export: Tiv benniseed production, 1900–1960', *Journal of African History*, 1975, 16, 3, 431–59.
- Duffield, I. 'John Eldred Taylor and West African opposition to indirect rule in Nigeria', *African Affairs*, 1971, 70, no. 280, 252–68.
- Ekechi, F. K. 'Aspects of palm oil trade at Oguta (Eastern Nigeria), 1900–1950', *African Economic History*, 1981, 10, 35–65.
- Ekundare, R. O. *An economic history of Nigeria, 1860–1960*. London, 1973.
- Fajana, A. 'Dr Henry Carr's philosophy of education – an assessment', *Odu*, 1972, 7, 28–48.
- 'The Nigerian Union of Teachers: a decade of growth, 1931–1940', *Nigeria Magazine*, 1974, no. 111, 79–89.
- Fika, Adamu M. *The Kano civil war and British over-rule, 1882–1940*. Ibadan, 1978.
- Freund, Bill. *Capital and labour in the Nigerian tin mines*. London, 1981.
- Gailey, H. A. *Sir Donald Cameron, Colonial Governor*. Stanford, 1974.
- Lugard and the Abeokuta uprising: the demise of Egba independence*. London, 1982.
- Gutkind, P. C. W., Cohen, R. and Copans, J. eds. *African labor history*. Beverly Hills and London, 1978.
- Hay, A. M. 'The development of road transport in Nigeria, 1900–1940', *Journal of Transport History*, n.s., 1971, 1, 95–107.
- Helleiner, G. K. *Peasant agriculture, government and economic growth in Nigeria*. Homewood, Ill., 1966.
- Heussler, R. *The British in Northern Nigeria*. London, 1968.
- Hogendorn, J. S. *Nigerian groundnut exports: origins and early development*. Zaria, 1979.
- Home, R. K. 'Town planning, segregation and indirect rule in colonial Nigeria', *Third World Planning Review* (Liverpool), 1983, 5, 2, 165–75.
- Hopkins, A. G. 'Innovation in a colonial context: African origins of the

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Nigerian cocoa-farming industry, 1880–1920', in Dewey, C. and Hopkins, A. G. eds. *The imperial impact: studies in the economic history of Africa and India*, pp. 83–96. London, 1977.
- 'Peter Thomas', in Julien, C.-A. et al. eds. *Les Africains*, vol. 9, pp. 301–29. Paris, 1978.
- Ifeka-Moller, C. 'Female militancy and colonial revolt: the Women's War of 1929, eastern Nigeria', in Ardener, S. ed. *Perceiving Women*, pp. 127–57. London, 1975.
- Igbafe, P. A. 'Western Ibo society and its resistance to British rule: the Ekumeku movement, 1898–1911', *Journal of African History*, 1971, 12, 3, 441–59.
- Benin under British administration: the impact of colonial rule on an African kingdom, 1897–1938*. London, 1979.
- Ikime, O. *Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri–Urhobo relations and the European presence, 1884–1936*. London, 1969.
- 'The British and native administration finance in Northern Nigeria, 1900–1934', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1975, 7, 4, 673–92.
- Ita, N. O. *Bibliography of Nigeria: a survey of anthropological and linguistic writing from the earliest times to 1966*. London, 1971.
- Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. ed. *The principles of native administration in Nigeria: selected documents, 1900–1947*. London, 1965.
- ed. *Gazetteers of the northern provinces of Nigeria*. London, 1972. 4 vols.
- Leith-Ross, S. *Stepping-stones. Memoirs of colonial Nigeria 1907–1960*. London, 1983.
- Lockwood, S. B. *Nigeria: a guide to official publications*. Washington, DC, 1966.
- Mann, K. *Marrying well: marriage, status and social change among the educated elite in colonial Lagos*. Cambridge, 1985.
- Martin, S. M. 'The history of the oil-palm industry in south-eastern Nigeria: the case of the Ngwa region, 1891–1929'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1984.
- Matthews, J. K. 'Clock towers for the colonized: demobilization of the Nigerian military and the readjustment of its veterans to civilian life, 1918–25', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1981, 14, 2, 254–71.
- Mba, N. *Nigerian women mobilized: women's political activity in southern Nigeria, 1900–1965*. Berkeley, 1982.
- Meredith, D. 'Government and the decline of the Nigerian oil-palm export industry, 1919–1939', *Journal of African History*, 1984, 25, 3, 311–29.
- Mohammed, H. E. 'Colonial urban planning policy and the disintegration of Kano's physical structure', *Kano studies*, 1980, n.s., 2, 1, 174–84.
- Morel, E. D. *Nigeria. Its peoples and its problems*. London, 1911. Reprinted 1967.
- Morrison, J. H. 'Early tin production and Nigerian labour on the Jos Plateau, 1906–1921', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1977, 11, 2, 205–16.
- Newbury, C. W. 'Trade and technology in West Africa: the case of the Niger Company, 1900–1920', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 4, 551–75.
- Nicolson, I. F. *The administration of Nigeria, 1900 to 1960: men, methods and myths*. Oxford, 1969.

8. BRITISH WEST AFRICA

- Njoku, O. N. 'Development of roads and road transport in southeastern Nigeria, 1903-1939', *Journal of African Studies*, 1978, 5, 4, 471-97.
- Nwora, D. K. 'The West African operations of the British Cotton Growing Association, 1904-1914', *African Historical Studies*, 1971, 4, 2, 315-30.
- Ofonagoro, W. I. *Trade and imperialism in southern Nigeria, 1881-1929*. New York, 1979.
- Okafor-Omalu, Dilim. *A Nigerian villager in two worlds*. London, 1965.
- O'kwu, V. G. 'The establishment of colonial administration in Idomaland, 1921-1930', *Savanna*, 1976, 5, 1, 29-44.
- Olusanya, G. O. 'Julius Ojo-Cole: a neglected Nigerian nationalist and educationist', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1973, 7, 1, 91-101.
- Ombu, J. A. *Niger Delta studies, 1627-1967: a bibliography*. Ibadan, 1970.
- Omorewa, M. 'The adaptation question in Nigerian education, 1916-1936'. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1976, 8, 3, 93-119.
- Omu, F. I. A. *Press and politics in Nigeria, 1880-1937*. London, 1978.
- Orimalade, O. O. *Bibliography on labour in Nigeria, 1910-1970*. Lagos, 1974.
- Osoba, S. O. 'The phenomenon of labour migration in the era of British colonial rule: a neglected aspect of Nigeria's social history', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1969, 4, 4, 515-38.
- Osuntokun, A. *Nigeria in the First World War*. London, 1979.
- Oyemakinde, J. O. 'A history of indigenous labour on the Nigerian railways, 1895-1945'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Ibadan, 1970.
- Oyemakinde, W. 'Railway construction and operations in Nigeria, 1895-1911: labour problems and socio-economic impact', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1974, 7, 2, 303-24.
- Peel, J. D. Y. *Ijeshas and Nigerians. The incorporation of a Yoruba kingdom 1890s-1970s*. Cambridge, 1983.
- Perham, M. *Native administration in Nigeria*. London, 1937. 2nd ed. 1962.
- ed. *The economics of a tropical dependency*. vol. 1. *The native economies of Nigeria* (by C. D. Forde and R. Scott). London, 1946; vol. II. *Mining, commerce and finance in Nigeria* (by P. A. Bower, A. J. Brown, C. Leubuscher, J. Mars and A. Pim). London, 1948.
- Lugard: the years of authority, 1898-1945*. London, 1960.
- West African passage. A journey through Nigeria, Chad and the Cameroons*. London, 1983.
- Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts. *Reports on papers...relating to the [Royal] Niger Company Limited, 1887-1932*. London, 1981.
- Schram, R. *A history of the Nigerian health service*. Ibadan, 1971.
- Smith, Mary F. *Baba of Karo*. London, 1954.
- Smith, M. G. *Government in Zazzau: a study of government in the Hausa chiefdom of Zaria in Northern Nigeria from 1800 to 1950*. London, 1960.
- The affairs of Daura: history and change in a Hausa state, 1800-1958*. Berkeley, 1978.
- Talbot, P. Amaury. *The peoples of southern Nigeria*. London, 1926. 4 vols.
- Tamuno, T. N. *Nigeria and elective representation, 1923-1947*. London and Ibadan, 1966.
- 'Separatist agitation in Nigeria since 1914', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1970, 8, 4, 563-84.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- The police in modern Nigeria, 1861–1965*. Ibadan, 1970.
- The evolution of the Nigerian state: the southern phase, 1898–1914*. London, 1972.
- Herbert Macaulay, *Nigerian patriot*. London, 1975.
- Temple, C. L. *Native races and their rulers: sketches and studies of official life and administrative problems in Nigeria*. Cape Town, 1918.
- Tibenderana, P. K. 'The emirs and the spread of Western education in Northern Nigeria, 1900–1946', *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 4, 517–34.
- Usoro, E. J. *The Nigerian oil palm industry: government policy and export production, 1906–1965*. Ibadan, 1974.
- Van Allen, J. "'Sitting on a man": colonialism and the lost political institutions of Igbo women', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1972, 6, 2, 165–81.
- "'Aba riots" or Igbo "women's war"? Ideology, stratification, and the invisibility of women', in Hafkin, N. J. and Bay, E. G. eds. *Women in Africa: studies in social and economic change*, pp. 59–85. Stanford, 1976.
- Walker, Gilbert. *Traffic and transport in Nigeria*. London, 1959.
- Wheare, J. *The Nigerian legislative council*. London, 1950.
- White, Jeremy. *Central administration in Nigeria, 1914–1948*. London, 1981.
- Wolpe, H. *Urban politics in Nigeria: a study of Port Harcourt*. Berkeley, 1974.

Gold Coast

- Afre, S. A. *Ashanti region of Ghana: an annotated bibliography from earliest times to 1973*. Boston, 1975.
- Agbodeka, F. 'Sir Gordon Guggisberg's contribution to the development of the Gold Coast, 1919–1927', *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, 1972, 13, 1, 51–64.
- Agyei, C. O. *References to the political history of Ghana, 1928–1957*. Legon, 1966.
- Arkaifie, R. *Bibliography of the Ewes*. Cape Coast, 1976.
- Asante, S. K. B. 'The politics of confrontation: the case of Kobina Sekyi and the colonial system in Ghana', *Universitas*, 1977, 6, 2, 15–38.
- Bening, R. B. 'Administration and development in northern Ghana, 1898–1931', *Ghana Social Science Journal*, 1977, 4, 2, 58–76.
- Bourret, F. M. *The Gold Coast: a survey of the Gold Coast and British Togoland, 1919–1946*. Stanford, 1949. 3rd ed. 1960.
- Busia, K. A. *The position of the chief in the modern political system of Ashanti*. London, 1951.
- Cardinall, A. W. *A bibliography of the Gold Coast*. Accra, 1932.
- Cox-George, N. A. *Studies in finance and development: the Gold Coast (Ghana) experience 1914–1950*. London, 1973.
- Crisp, Jeff. *The story of an African working class. Ghanaian miners' struggles, 1870–1980*. London, 1984.
- Denzer, L. 'I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth League: a case study in West African political radicalism'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1977.
- Der, B. 'Colonial land policy in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1900–1957', *Universitas*, 1975, 4, 2, 127–42.

8. BRITISH WEST AFRICA

- Dumett, R. E. 'Survey of research materials available in the National Archives of Ghana', *Mitteilungen der Basler Afrika Bibliographien*, 1974, no. 11.
- 'Obstacles to government-assisted agricultural development in West Africa: cotton-growing experimentation in Ghana in the early twentieth century', *Agricultural History Review*, 1975, 23, 156-72.
- Edsman, B. M. *Lawyers in Gold Coast politics, c. 1900-1945*. Uppsala, 1979.
- Ehrler, F. *Handelskonflikte zwischen europäischen Firmen und einheimischen Produzenten in British Westafrika: die 'Cocoa-hold-ups' in der Zwischenkriegszeit*. Zurich, 1977.
- Ekwelie, S. A. 'Ghana: legal control of the nationalist press, 1880-1950', *Transafrican Journal of History*, 1976, 5, 2, 148-60.
- Ephson, I. S. *Gallery of Gold Coast celebrities 1632-1958*. Accra, 1969-73.
- Foster, P. *Education and social change in Ghana*. London, 1965.
- Gannon, M. 'The Basle Mission Trading Company and British colonial policy in the Gold Coast, 1918-1928', *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 4, 503-15.
- Gould, P. *The development of the transportation pattern in Ghana*. Evanston, 1960.
- Gunnarsson, C. *The Gold Coast cocoa industry, 1900-1939: production, prices and structural change*. Lund, 1978.
- Henige, D. P. 'The National Archives of Ghana: a synopsis of holdings', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1973, 6, 3, 475-86.
- Hill, Polly. *The migrant cocoa-farmers of southern Ghana: a study in rural capitalism*. Cambridge, 1963.
- Howard, R. *Colonialism and underdevelopment in Ghana*. London, 1978.
- Johnson, A. F. *A bibliography of Ghana, 1930-1961*. Evanston, 1964.
- Jones-Quartey, K. A. B. *A summary history of the Ghana press 1822-1960*. Accra, 1974.
- Kay, G. B. and Hymer, S. eds. *The political economy of colonialism in Ghana: a collection of documents and statistics, 1900-1960*. Cambridge, 1972.
- Killingray, D. 'Repercussions of World War I in the Gold Coast', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 39-59.
- 'The colonial army in the Gold Coast: official policy and local response, 1890-1947'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1982.
- Kimble, D. *A political history of Ghana: the rise of Gold Coast nationalism, 1850-1928*. Oxford, 1963.
- Kuklick, H. *The imperial bureaucrat: the colonial administrative service in the Gold Coast 1920-1939*. Stanford, 1979.
- Lucas, C. P. *The Gold Coast and the war*. London, 1920.
- Maxwell, J. ed. *The Gold Coast handbook*. Accra, 1923. 3rd ed. 1928.
- Meredith, D. 'The construction of Takoradi harbour in the Gold Coast, 1919 to 1930: a case study in colonial development and administration', *Transafrican Journal of History*, 1976, 5, 1, 134-49.
- Metcalf, G. E. *Great Britain and Ghana: documents of Ghana history, 1807-1957*. London, 1964.
- Milburn, Josephine. 'The 1938 Gold Coast cocoa crisis: British business and the Colonial Office', *African Historical Studies*, 1970, 3, 1, 57-74.
- Miles, J. 'Cocoa marketing in the Gold Coast and the African producer, 1919-1939'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1978.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Rural protest in the Gold Coast: the cocoa hold-ups, 1908-1938', in Dewey, C. and Hopkins, A. G. eds. *The imperial impact: studies in the economic history of Africa and India*, pp. 152-70. London, 1978.
- Patterson, K. D. 'The veterinary department and the animal industry in the Gold Coast, 1909-1955', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1980, 13, 3, 457-91.
- Health in colonial Ghana: disease, medicine and socio-economic change, 1900-1955*. Waltham, Mass., 1981.
- 'The influenza epidemic of 1918-19 in the Gold Coast', *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 4, 485-502.
- Priestley, M. 'The Gold Coast select committee on estimates: 1913-1950', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1973, 6, 4, 543-64.
- Roberts, P. A. 'The Sefwi Wiawso riot of 1935: the deposition of an omanehene in the Gold Coast', *Africa*, 1983, 53, 2, 25-46.
- Rohdie, S. 'The Gold Coast aborigines abroad', *Journal of African History*, 1965, 6, 3, 389-411.
- Scott, D. *Epidemic disease in Ghana, 1901-1960*. London, 1965.
- Sederberg, P. C. 'The Gold Coast under colonial rule: an expenditure analysis', *African Studies Review*, 1971, 14, 2, 179-204.
- Shaloff, S. 'Press controls and sedition proceedings in the Gold Coast, 1933-1939', *African Affairs*, 1972, 71, no. 284, 241-63.
- 'The income tax, indirect rule and the depression: the Gold Coast riots of 1931', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1974, 14, no. 54, 359-76.
- 'The Cape Coast Asafo Company riot of 1932', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1974, 7, 4, 591-607.
- 'The Africanization controversy in the Gold Coast, 1926-1946', *African Studies Review*, 1974, 17, 3, 493-504.
- Simensen, J. 'Rural mass action in the context of anti-colonial protest: the Asafo movement of Akim Abuakwa, Ghana', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1974, 8, 1, 25-41.
- 'The Asafo of Kwahu, Ghana: a mass movement for local reform under colonial rule', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1975, 8, 3, 383-406.
- Southall, R. J. 'Cadbury on the Gold Coast, 1907-1938. The dilemma of the "model firm" in a colonial economy'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1975.
- 'Farmers, traders and brokers in the Gold Coast cocoa economy', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1978, 12, 2, 185-211.
- Spitzer, L. and L. Denzer. 'I. T. A. Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth League', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1973, 6, 3-4, 413-52, 565-601.
- Staniland, M. *The lions of Dagbon: political change in northern Ghana*. Cambridge, 1975.
- Szereszewski, R. *Structural changes in the economy of Ghana, 1891-1911*. London, 1965.
- Thomas, R. G. 'Forced labour in British West Africa: the case of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, 1906-1927', *Journal of African History*, 1973, 14, 1, 79-103.

- 'Education in northern Ghana, 1906-1940; a study in colonial paradox', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1975, 7, 3, 427-67.
- 'Military recruitment in the Gold Coast during the First World War', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1975, 15, no. 57, 57-83.
- 'The 1916 Bongo "riots" and their background: aspects of colonial administration and African response in eastern upper Ghana', *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 1, 57-75.
- Tordoff, W. *Ashanti under the Prempehs, 1888-1935*. London, 1965.
- Twumasi, Y. 'Press freedom and nationalism under colonial rule in the Gold Coast (Ghana)', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1974, 7, 3, 499-520.
- 'J. B. Danquah', *African Affairs*, 1978, 77, no. 306, 73-88.
- Wight, M. *The Gold Coast legislative council*. London, 1947.
- Witherell, J. W. and Lockwood, S. B. *Ghana: A guide to research publications, 1871-1968*. Washington, DC, 1969.
- Wraith, R. E. *Guggisberg*. London, 1967.

Sierra Leone

- Abraham, A. *Mende government and politics under colonial rule*. Oxford, 1978.
- Amolo, M. 'Sierra Leone and British colonial labour policy, 1930-1945'. Ph.D. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1978.
- Conway, H. E. 'Labour protest activity in Sierra Leone during the early part of the twentieth century', *Labour History*, 1968, 15, 49-63.
- Cox-George, N. A. *Finance and development in West Africa: the Sierra Leone experience*. London, 1961.
- Denzer, L. 'Wallace-Johnson and the Sierra Leone labor crisis of 1939', *African Studies Review*, 1982, 25, 2-3, 159-83.
- Goddard, T. N. ed. *The handbook of Sierra Leone*. London, 1925.
- Harrell-Bond, B. E., Howard, A. M. and Skinner, D. E. *Community leadership and the transformation of Freetown (1801-1976)*. The Hague, 1978.
- Howard, A. M. 'A survey of district and provincial archives, Northern Province, Sierra Leone', *Sierra Leone Studies*, n.s., 1966, 19, 124-45.
- Kaniki, M. H. Y. 'Attitudes and reactions toward the Lebanese in Sierra Leone during the colonial period', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1973, 7, 1, 97-111.
- 'Economic change in Sierra Leone during the 1930s', *Transafrican Journal of History*, 1973, 3, 72-95.
- Kilson, M. *Political change in a West African state: a study of the modernization process in Sierra Leone*. New York, 1969.
- Laan, H. L. van der. *The Lebanese traders in Sierra Leone*. The Hague, 1975.
- Luke, H. C. *A bibliography of Sierra Leone*. 2nd ed. London, 1925.
- Makannah, T. J. 'Growth without development: an economic history of the Sierra Leone palm kernel sector, 1900-1940', *African Research Bulletin* (Freetown), 1975, 6, 1, 37-51.
- Sibanda, M. J. M. 'Colonial policy and development in north-west Sierra Leone, 1896-1939'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1978.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Spitzer, L. *The Creoles of Sierra Leone: response to colonialism, 1870-1945*. Madison, 1974.
- Sumner, D. L. *Education in Sierra Leone*. Freetown, 1963.
- Walker, Audrey A. *Official publications of Sierra Leone and Gambia*. Washington, DC, 1963.
- Williams, Geoffrey J. *A bibliography of Sierra Leone, 1925-1967*. New York, 1970.

Gambia

- Gailey, H. A. 'A note on the Gambia archives', *African Studies Bulletin*, 1968, 11, 312-13.
- Gamble, David P. with Louise Sperling. *A general bibliography of the Gambia*. Boston, 1979.
- Hatton, P. H. S. 'The Gambia, the Colonial Office, and the opening months of the First World War', *Journal of African History*, 1966, 7, 1, 123-31.
- Jeng, A. A. O. 'An economic history of the Gambian groundnut industry, 1830-1924'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Birmingham, 1979.

GERMAN WEST AFRICA

General

- Kuczynski, R. R. *The Cameroons and Togoland: a demographic survey*. London, 1939.
- Moberly, F. J. *History of the Great War based on official documents: military operations, Togoland and the Cameroons, 1914-1916*. London, 1931.

Kamerun

- Austen, R. A. 'Duala versus Germans in Cameroon: economic dimensions of a political conflict', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1977, 64, no. 237, 477-97.
- De Lancey, M. W. and V. H. *A bibliography of Cameroon*. New York, 1975.
- Eyongetah, T. and Brain, R. *A history of the Cameroon*. London, 1974.
- Hausen, K. *Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika. Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kolonialverwaltung in Kamerun vor 1914*. Zurich and Freiburg, 1970.
- Michel, M. 'Les Plantations allemandes du Mont Cameroun (1885-1914)', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1969, 57, no. 207, 183-213.
- Mohammadou, E. *Catalogue des archives coloniales allemandes du Cameroun*, vol. 1. *Le Service des Archives Nationale de Yaoundé*. Tokyo, 1978.
- Mveng, E. *Histoire du Cameroun*. Paris, 1963.
- Osuntokun, A. 'Anglo-French occupation and the provisional partition of the Cameroons, 1914-1916', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1975, 7, 4, 647-56.
- 'Great Britain and the final partition of the Cameroons, 1916-1922', *Nigerian Journal of International Affairs*, 1976, 2, 1/2, 36-49.

8. BRITISH AND GERMAN WEST AFRICA

- Quinn, F. 'The Beti and the Germans (1887–1916)', *Afrika und Übersee*, 1972, 56, 1/2, 119–30; 3, 200–14.
- 'Charles Atangana of Yaounde', *Journal of African History*, 1980, 21, 4, 485–95.
- Ritzenthaler, P. *The Fon of Bafut*. New York, 1966.
- Rudin, H. R. *Germans in the Cameroons, 1884–1914*. London, 1938.
- Rüger, A. 'Die Duala und die Kolonialmacht 1884–1914: eine Studie über die historischen Ursprünge des Afrikanischen Anti-Kolonialismus', in Stoecker, H. ed. *Kamerun unter Deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*, vol. II, pp. 183–257. Berlin, 1968.
- Wirz, A. *Vom Sklavenhandel zum kolonialen Handel: Wirtschaftsräume und Wirtschaftsformen in Kamerun vor 1914*. Zurich and Freiburg, 1974.

Togo

- Amenumey, D. E. K. 'German administration in southern Togo', *Journal of African History*, 1969, 10, 4, 623–39.
- Cornevin, R. *Histoire du Togo*. Paris, 1969.
- Darkoh, M. B. K. 'Togoland under the Germans: thirty years of economic development, 1889–1914', *Nigerian Geographical Journal*, 1967, 10, 2, 107–22; 1968, 11, 2, 153–68.
- Knoll, A. J. *Togo under imperial Germany, 1884–1914*. Stanford, 1978.
- Zielnica, K. *Bibliographie der Ewe in Westafrika*. Vienna, 1976.

LIBERIA

- Akingbade, H. 'Liberia and the First World War, 1914–1926', *Current Bibliography of African Affairs*, 1977/8, 10, 3, 243–58.
- Akpan, M. B. 'Black imperialism: Americo-Liberian rule over the African peoples of Liberia, 1841–1964', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1973, 7, 2, 217–36.
- 'Liberia and the Universal Negro Improvement Association: the background to the abortion of Garvey's scheme for African colonization', *Journal of African History*, 1973, 14, 1, 105–27.
- Brown, G. W. *The economic history of Liberia*. Washington, DC, 1941.
- Buell, R. L. *Liberia: a century of survival, 1847–1947*. Philadelphia, 1948.
- Chalk, F. 'The anatomy of an investment: Firestone's 1927 loan to Liberia', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1967, 1, 1, 12–32.
- Chaudhuri, J. P. 'British reactions to the Firestone investment in Liberia', *Liberian Studies Journal*, 1972–4, 5, 1, 25–46.
- Davis, R. W. 'The Liberian struggle for authority on the Kru Coast', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1975, 8, 2, 222–65.
- Foley, D. 'Liberia's archival collection', *African Studies Bulletin*, 1968, 11, 217–20.
- Freeman, H. B. 'The Gola War of 1918: background and opening events', *University of Liberia Journal*, 1967, 7, 2, 59–62.
- Greene, Graham. *Journey without maps*. London, 1936.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Haliburton, G. M. 'The prophet Harris and the Grebo rising of 1910', *Liberian Studies Journal*, 1970-1, 3, 1, 31-9.
- Holsoe, S. E. 'A bibliography of Liberian government documents', *African Studies Bulletin*, 1968, 11, 39-62, 149-94.
- A bibliography on Liberia*, vols. 1, II. Newark, Delaware, 1971, 1976.
- Liebenow, J. G. *Liberia: the evolution of privilege*. Ithaca, 1969.
- Schmokel, W. W. 'The United States and the crisis of Liberia independence, 1929-1934', *Boston University Papers on Africa*, 1966, 2, 303-37.
- 'The German factor in Liberia's foreign relations', *Liberian Studies Journal*, 1976-7, 7, 1, 27-42.
- Schwab, G. and Harley, G. W. *Tribes of the Liberian hinterland*. Cambridge, Mass., 1947.
- Sibley, J. L. and Westermann, D. *Liberia - old and new. A study of its social and economic background with possibilities of development*. London, n.d. [?1928].
- Strong, R. P. ed. *The African Republic of Liberia and the Belgian Congo*. Cambridge, Mass., 1930. 2 vols.
- Sundiata, I. K. *Black scandal. America and the Liberian labour crisis, 1929-1936*. Philadelphia, 1980.
- Uhomoibhi, M. I. 'Imperial and League intervention in Sierra Leone and Liberia: boundaries, finance and labour, 1890-1936'. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1983.

9. BELGIAN AFRICA

The Belgian Congo

- Anet, H. *En éclairneur: voyage d'étude au Congo belge*. Brussels, 1913.
- Anstey, R. *King Leopold's legacy. The Congo under Belgian rule*. London, 1966.
- ARSOM (Académie Royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer). *Livre blanc. Apport scientifique de la Belgique au développement de l'Afrique centrale*. Brussels, 1962. 3 vols.
- Biographie coloniale belge (Biographie belge d'outre-mer)*. Brussels, 1948-67. 6 vols.
- Bakonzi, Agayo. 'The gold mines of Kilo-Moto in north-eastern Zaire, 1905-1960'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1982.
- Bartier, J. et al. *Histoire de la Belgique contemporaine, 1914-1970*. Brussels, 1975.
- Baudhouin, F. *Histoire économique de la Belgique, 1914-1939*. Brussels, 1946. 2 vols.
- Baumer, G. *Les Centres indigènes extra-coutumiers du Congo belge*. Paris, 1939.
- Belgium. Ministère de la Défense Nationale. *Les Campagnes coloniales belges, 1914-1918*. Brussels, 1925-32. 3 vols.
- Berlage, J. *Répertoire de la presse du Congo Belge (1884-1958) et du Ruanda-Urundi (1920-1958)*. Brussels, 1959.
- Bishikwabo, Chubaka, 'Deux chefs du Bushi sous le régime colonial: Kabare et Ngweshe (1912-1960)', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1975, 7, 89-111.
- Bontinck, F. 'Mfumu Paul Panda Farnana, 1888-1930. Premier (?) nationaliste congolais', in Mudimbe, V. Y. ed. *La Dépendance de l'Afrique et les moyens d'y remédier*, pp. 591-610. Paris, 1980.

9. BELGIAN AFRICA

- Bourgeois, R. *Mémoires d'un administrateur*. Tervuren, 1983.
- Bulletin agricole du Congo belge et du Ruanda-Urundi (1910-1961)*. Volume jubilaire de 1960. Brussels, 1960.
- Bustin, E. 'Congo-Kinshasa. Guide bibliographique', *Cahiers du CEDAf*, 1971, 3-4.
- Lunda under Belgian rule. The politics of ethnicity*. Cambridge, Mass., 1975.
- Chalux (R. de Châtelux). *Un an au Congo belge*. Brussels, 1925.
- Cornet, R. J. *Elisabethville, 1911-1961*. Brussels, 1961.
- Les Phares verts*. Brussels, 1965.
- Bwana Muganga. Hommes en blanc en Afrique noire*. Brussels, 1971.
- Cornevin, R. *Histoire du Congo: Léopoldville-Kinshassa*. 3rd ed. Paris, 1970.
- Daye, P. *L'Empire colonial belge*. Brussels and Paris, 1923.
- Delcommune, A. *L'Avenir du Congo belge menacé... Le mal. Le remède*. Brussels, 1919.
- Dellicour, G. *Les Premières Années de la cour d'appel à Elisabethville, 1910-1920*. Brussels, 1938.
- Depelchin, J. 'From pre-capitalism to imperialism: a history of social formations in eastern Zaire (Uvira territory, c. 1880-1965)'. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1974.
- Dickerman, Carol and Northrup, David. 'Africanist archival research in Brussels', *History in Africa*, 1982, 9, 359-65.
- Dimandja, L. 'Le Pays du Katoko-Kombe à l'époque coloniale (1904-1945)'. Ph.D. thesis, Catholic University of Louvain, 1974.
- 'Les Réseaux scolaires méthodistes au Shaba (Katanga) et au Kasai sous la période coloniale (1910-1960)', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1976, 8, 55-86.
- Dubois, A. and Duren, A. 'Soixante ans d'organisation médicale au Congo belge', in *Liber Jubilaris A. Rodbain*, pp. 1-36. Brussels, 1947.
- Encyclopédie du Congo Belge*. Brussels, 1950-2. 3 vols.
- Essor économique belge. Expansion coloniale*. Brussels, 1932. 2 vols.
- Feltz, G. 'École rurale et expansion missionnaire au Shaba, 1885-1939', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1976, 8, 9-53.
- Fetter, B. 'L'Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, 1920-1940: la naissance d'une sous-culture totalitaire', *Cahiers du CEDAf*, 1973, 6.
- 'African associations in Elisabethville, 1910-35: their origins and development', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1974, 6, 205-23.
- The creation of Elisabethville, 1910-1940*. Stanford, 1976.
- Flament, F. et al. *La Force Publique de sa naissance à 1914*. Brussels, 1952.
- Frank, L. ed. *Études de colonisation comparée*, vol. 1. Brussels, 1924.
- ed. *Le Congo belge*. Brussels, 1930. 2 vols.
- Gann, L. H. and Duignan, P. *The rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884-1914*. Princeton, 1978.
- George, F. and Gouverneur, J. 'Les Transformations techniques et l'évolution des coefficients de fabrication à l'Union Minière du Haut-Katanga de 1910 à 1965', *Cultures et Développement*, 1969-70, 2, 53-100.
- Gouverneur, J. *Productivity and factor proportions in less developed countries: the case of industrial firms in the Congo*. Oxford, 1971.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division). *A manual of the Belgian Congo*. London, 1919; declassified, 1942 (I.D. 1213).
- The Belgian Congo*. London, 1944.
- Grévisse, F. *La Grande Pitié des juridictions indigènes*. Brussels, 1949.
- Le Centre extra-contumier d'Elisabethville*. Brussels, 1951.
- Guebels, L. *Aperçu rétrospectif des travaux de la Commission permanente pour la protection des indigènes, d'après les rapports des sessions*. Elisabethville, 1949.
- Harms, R. 'Some archives in the Bandundu and Equateur regions of Zaïre', *History in Africa*, 1977, 4, 291–8.
- Heyse, T. *Le Régime du Travail au Congo belge*. 2nd ed. Brussels, 1924.
- Congo Belge et Ruanda-Urundi. Notes de droit publique et commentaires de la Charte Coloniale*. 19 fascicules. Brussels, 1952–7.
- Higginson, J. E. 'The making of an African working class: the Union Minière du Haut Katanga and the African mine workers, 1907–1945'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1979.
- Hostelet, G. *L'Oeuvre civilisatrice de la Belgique au Congo de 1885 à 1953*. Brussels, 1954. 2 vols.
- Hutchinson, R. and Martelli, G. *Robert's people. The life of Sir Robert Williams, 1860–1938*. London, 1971.
- Huybrechts, A. *Transports et structures de développement au Congo. Étude du progrès économique de 1900 à 1970*. Paris, 1970.
- Jadot, J.-M. *Blancs et noirs au Congo belge*. Brussels, 1929.
- 'Le Cinéma au Congo belge', *Bulletin des séances à l'IRCB*, 1949, 20, 2, 407–37.
- Jewsiewicki, B. 'Histoire de l'agriculture africaine dans l'ancienne province de Katanga (1919–1940)', *Enquêtes et documents d'histoire africaine*, 1975, 1, 55–114.
- 'La Contestation sociale et la naissance du prolétariat au Zaïre au cours de la première moitié du XXe s.', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1976, 10, 1, 47–70.
- 'L'Expérience de l'État-Providence en Afrique noire', *Historical Reflexions*, 1976, 3, 2, 79–103.
- 'The great depression and the making of the colonial economic system in the Belgian Congo', *African Economic History*, 1977, 4, 153–76.
- 'Le Colonat agricole européen au Congo-belge, 1910–1960: questions politiques économiques', *Journal of African History*, 1979, 20, 4, 559–71.
- 'Les Archives administratives zaïroises de l'époque coloniale', *Annales aequatoria* (Mbandaka), 1980, 1, 1, 169–84.
- Joset, P. E. *Sociétés secrètes des hommes-léopards en Afrique noire*. Paris, 1955.
- Joye, P. and Lewin, R. *Les Trusts au Congo*. Brussels, 1961.
- Katzenellenbogen, S. E. *Railways and the copper mines of Katanga*. Oxford, 1973.
- Lederer, A. *Histoire de la navigation au Congo*. Tervuren, 1965.
- Leener, G. de *Le Commerce au Katanga. Influences belges et étrangères*. Brussels, 1911.
- Lippens, M. *Notes sur le gouvernement du Congo, 1921–1922*. Ghent, 1923.
- Iutumba-lu-wilu, *Histoire du Zaïre. L'administration centrale du Ministère belge des Colonies (1908–1940). Structures et fonctionnement*. Kinshasa, 1972.

9. BELGIAN AFRICA

- Luwel, M. 'Les Archives historiques du Musée Royal du Congo belge à Tervuren', *Bulletin de l'IRCB.*, 1954, 25, 2, 799–821.
- Le Congo belge en cartes postales anciennes.* Zaltbommel, 1972.
- Lux, A. *La Marché du travail en Afrique centrale.* Louvain, 1964.
- Lyons, M. "'Death camps" in the Congo: sleeping sickness quarantine, 1903–1910', *Journal of African History*, 1985, 26, 1.
- MacGaffey, W. *Custom and government in the Lower Congo.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970.
- Magotte, J. *Les Circonscriptions indigènes.* Verviers, 1938.
- Marcosson, I. F. *An African adventure.* New York and London, 1921.
- Merlier, M. *Le Congo, de la colonisation à l'indépendance.* Paris, 1962.
- Miracle, M. P. 'Trade and economic change in Katanga, 1850–1959', in McCall, D. F. ed. *Western African History*, pp. 214–58. New York, 1969.
- Agriculture in the Congo basin.* Madison, 1967.
- Montpellier d'Annevoie, M. de. *Deux ans au Katanga.* Brussels, 1921.
- Mottoulle, L. *Contribution à l'étude du déterminisme fonctionnel de l'industrie dans l'éducation de l'indigène congolais.* Brussels, 1934.
- Politique sociale de l'UMHK pour sa main-d'oeuvre indigène et ses résultats au cours de vingt années d'application.* Brussels, 1946.
- Moulaert, G. *La Compagne du Tanganika 1916–1917.* Brussels, 1934.
- Vingt années à Kilo-Moto, 1920–1940.* Brussels, 1950.
- Mulambu-Mbuvuluya, 'Le Régime des cultures obligatoires et le radicalisme rural au Zaïre (1917–1960)'. Thesis, University of Brussels, 1974.
- 'Cultures obligatoires et colonisation dans l'ex-Congo belge', *Cahiers du CEDAF*, 1974, 6–7.
- Muller, Emmanuel. *Les Troupes du Katanga et les campagnes d'Afrique, 1914–1918.* Brussels, 1937.
- Mumbanza mwa Bawele. 'Les Ngombe de l'Equateur. Histoire d'une identité', *Zaire-Afrique*, 1978, 18, 229–49.
- Nicolai, H. *Le Kwilu.* Brussels, 1963.
- Peemans, F. and Lefevre, P. 'Les Sociétés coloniales belges: archives et données bibliographiques (1885–1960)', *Cahiers du CEDAF*, 1980, 4–5.
- Peemans, J.-P. *Diffusion du progrès et convergence des prix. Congo-Belgique, 1900–1960.* Louvain, 1970.
- Périer, G.-D. *Petite histoire des lettres coloniales de Belgique.* 2nd ed. Brussels, 1944.
- Perrings, C. A. "'Good lawyers but poor workers": recruited Angolan labour in the copper mines of Katanga, 1917–1921', *Journal of African History*, 1977, 18, 2, 237–59.
- Black mineworkers in Central Africa.* London, 1978.
- Putte, M. van de. *Le Congo belge et la politique de conjoncture.* Brussels, 1946.
- Reberieux, M. 'Les Conflicts de tendances dans le parti ouvrier belge au moment de la "reprise" du Congo', *Le mouvement social*, 1963, no. 45, 110–19.
- Reefe, T. Q. 'Some archives of Shaba region, Republic of Zaïre', *History in Africa*, 1976, 3, 185–92.
- Ryckmans, P. *Allo! Congo! chroniques radiophoniques.* Brussels, n.d. [1934].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Sabakinu, Kivilu. 'Les Sources de l'histoire démographique du Zaïre', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1974, 6, 119-36.
- 'Histoire de la population et des conditions de vie à Matadi de 1890 à 1959'. Ph.D. thesis, National University of Zaïre, 1981.
- Saint-Moulin, L. de 'Histoire des villes du Zaïre: notions et perspectives fondamentales', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1974, 6, 137-67.
- Salmon, P. *La Dernière Insurrection de Mopoe Bangezegino (1916)*. Brussels, 1969.
- Schwetz, J. *L'Évolution de la médecine au Congo belge*. Brussels, 1946.
- Segaert, H. *Un terme au Congo belge. Notes sur la vie coloniale, 1916-1918*. Brussels, 1919.
- Sikitele, Gize. 'Les Racines de la révolte Pende de 1931', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1973, 5, 99-153.
- Smith, R. E. 'L'Administration coloniale et les villageois. Les Yansi du nord du Bulungu, 1920-1940 (Zaïre)', *Cahiers du CEDAF*, 1973, 3.
- Sourdillat, J. *Les Chefferies du Congo belge*. Paris, 1940.
- Springer, J. E. *Pioneering in the Congo*. New York and Cincinnati, 1916.
- Stengers, J. *Combien le Congo a-t-il coûté à la Belgique?* Brussels, 1957.
- Belgique et Congo: l'élaboration de la Charte Coloniale*. Brussels, 1963.
- 'Belgian historiography since 1945', in Emmer, P. C. and Wesseling, H. L. eds. *Reappraisals in Overseas History*, pp. 161-81. Leiden, 1979.
- Straeten, E. van der. *Jules Cousin, pionnier, chef d'entreprise et homme du bien (1884-1965)*. Brussels, 1969.
- Tshimanga wa Tshibangu. *Histoire du Zaïre*. Bukavu, 1976.
- Tshundolela Epanya. 'Politique coloniale, économie capitaliste et sous-développement au Congo belge: cas du Kasai (1920-1959)'. Ph.D. thesis, National University of Zaïre, 1980.
- Turnbull, C. *The lonely African*. London, 1963.
- Turner, T. 'La Politique indigène du Congo belge. Le cas du Sankuru', *Cahiers du CEDAF*, 1973, 1.
- Vanderlinden, J. 'Deux aspects des finances publiques coloniales', *ARSOM, Bulletin des séances*, 1977, 3, 240-78.
- Vandewalle, G. *De conjoncturele evolutie in Kongo en Ruanda-Urundi van 1920 tot 1939, en van 1949 tot 1958*. Ghent, 1966.
- van Grieken-Taverniers, M. *La Colonisation belge en Afrique centrale: Guide des Archives africaines du Ministère des Affaires Africaines 1885-1962*. Brussels, n.d. (1981).
- Vanhove, J. *Histoire du ministère des colonies*. Brussels, 1968.
- Vansina, J. 'Du Royaume Kuba au territoire des Bakuba', *Études congolaises*, 1969, 12, 2, 3-54.
- 'Les Mouvements religieux Kuba (Kasai) à l'époque coloniale', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1971, 2, 155-87.
- 'Les Kuba et l'administration territoriale de 1919 à 1960', *Cultures et développement*, 1972, 4, 2, 275-325.
- 'Lukoshi/Lupambula: histoire d'un culte religieux dans les régions du Kasai et du Kwango (1920-1970)', *Études d'histoire africaine*, 1973, 5, 51-97.

9. BELGIAN AFRICA

- Vellut, J.-L. *Guide de l'étudiant en histoire du Zaïre*. Kinshasa, 1974.
- 'Sources écrites africaines pour l'histoire de l'Afrique centrale (des débuts à 1950)', *Likundoli. Archives et Documents*, 1974, 2, 2, 61-93.
- 'La Zaïre à la périphérie du capitalisme: quelques perspectives historiques', *Enquêtes et documents d'histoire africaine*, 1975, 1, 114-51.
- Verbeek, L. *Mouvements religieux dans la région de Sakanian (1925-1931). Documents inédits*. Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983.
- Verhaegen, B. ed. *Kisangani 1876-1976. Histoire d'une ville*. Kinshasa, 1975.
- 'L'Histoire au Zaïre: enseignement, recherches, publications', *Revue belge d'histoire contemporaine*, 1977, 8, 1-2, 291-314.
- Walraet, M. *Bibliographie du Katanga*. Brussels, 1954-1960. 3 vols.
- Wauters, Arthur. *D'Anvers à Bruxelles via le Lac Kivu: le Congo vu par un socialiste*. Brussels, 1929.
- Wauters, J. *Le Congo au travail*. Brussels, 1924.
- Whymys, L. *Léopoldville, son histoire, 1881-1956*. Brussels, 1956.
- Yates, B. A. 'The origins of language policy in Zaïre', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1980, 18, 2, 257-79.

Ruanda-Urundi

- Briey, R. de. 'Musinga', *Congo*, 1920, 1, 1-23.
- Chrétien, J.-P. 'Une Révolte au Burundi en 1934. Les racines traditionnelles de l'hostilité à la colonisation', *Annales*, 1970, 25, 2, 1678-1717.
- 'Des Sedentaires devenus migrants: les motifs de départs des Burundais et des Rwandais vers l'Uganda (1920-1960)', *Cultures et développement*, 1978, 10, 1, 71-101.
- 'Vocabulaire et concepts tirés de la féodalité occidentale et administration indirecte en Afrique Orientale', in Nordman, D. and Raison, J.-P. eds. *Sciences de l'homme et conquête coloniale*, pp. 47-64. Paris, 1980.
- Clément, J. R. *Essai de bibliographie du Ruanda-Urundi*. Bujumbura, 1959.
- Codère, H. *The biography of an African society: Rwanda 1900-1960, based on forty-eight Rwandan autobiographies*. Tervuren, 1973.
- Collart, R. and Celis, G. *Burundi: trente ans d'histoire en photos, 1900-1930*. Brussels, n.d. (c. 1982).
- Des Forges, A. 'Kings without crowns: the White Fathers in Ruanda', in McCall, D. F. et al. eds. *Eastern African history*, pp. 176-207. Boston, 1967.
- 'Defeat is the only bad news: Rwanda under Musiinga, 1896-1931'. Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1972.
- Gahama, J. *Le Burundi sous administration belge: la période du mandat, 1919-1939*. Paris, 1983.
- Greenland, J. 'Western education in Burundi, 1916-1973: the consequences of instrumentalism', *Cahiers du CEDAf*, 1980, 2-3.
- Hertefeldt, M. de and Lame, D. de. *Société, culture et histoire du Rwanda: une bibliographie analytique 1894-1980*. Tervuren, 1983.
- Jentgen, P. *Les Frontières du Ruanda-Urundi et le régime international de tutelle*. Brussels, 1959.
- Lacger, L. de. *Ruanda. II: Le Ruanda moderne*. Namur, 1939.
- Lemarchand, R. *Rwanda and Burundi*. London, 1970.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Linden, I. *Church and revolution in Rwanda*. Manchester, 1977.
- Lugan, B. 'Causes et effets de la famine Rumanura au Rwanda, 1916-1918', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1976, 10, 2, 347-56.
- Newbury, M. C. 'The cohesion of oppression: a century of clientship in Kinyaga, Rwanda'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1975.
- Shantz, H. L. 'Urundi: territory and people', *Geographical Review*, 1922, 12, 329-59.
- Vanhove, J. 'Les Juridictions indigènes au Ruanda', *Congo*, 1939, 1, 2-16.
- Walraet, M. *Les Sciences au Rwanda, 1894-1965*. Brussels, 1966.
- Weinstein, W. *Historical dictionary of Burundi*. Metuchen, NJ, 1976.

10. PORTUGUESE AFRICA

Portugal and Africa: General

- Andrade, A. A. Freire de. *Rapport présenté au Ministre des Colonies à propos du livre 'Portuguese Slavery' du missionnaire John Harris*. Lisbon, 1914.
- Bloom, M. T. *The man who stole Portugal*. New York, 1966. London, 1967.
- Böhm, E. *La Mise en valeur des colonies portugaises*. Paris, n.d. [1933].
- Clarence-Smith, G. *The third Portuguese empire, 1825-1975*. Manchester, 1985.
- Duffy, J. *Portuguese Africa*. Cambridge, Mass., 1959.
- A question of slavery. Labour policies in Portuguese Africa and the British protest, 1850-1920*. Oxford, 1967.
- Gallagher, Tom. *Portugal: a twentieth-century interpretation*. Manchester, 1983.
- Gaspar, J. M. 'A colonização branca em Angola e Mozambique', *Estudos de ciências políticas e sociais*, 1958, 7 (Colóquios de política ultramarina internacionalmente relevante), 33-53.
- Gibson, M. J. *Portuguese Africa: a guide to official publications*. Washington, DC, 1967.
- Gonçalves, J. *Bibliografia do Ultramar português existente na Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*. Lisbon, 1963.
- Great Britain: Department of Overseas Trade. *Reports on economic conditions* [title varies]... *Angola*, 1923, 1925, 1929, 1932, 1934, 1937; *Portuguese East Africa*, 1921, 1927, 1929, 1932, 1935, 1938.
- Great Britain: Foreign Office (Historical Section). *Peace handbooks*, vol. 19 (nos. 115-21). *Portuguese possessions*. London, 1920.
- Harris, J. H. *Portuguese slavery: Britain's dilemma*. London, 1913.
- Kay, H. *Salazar and modern Portugal*. London, 1970.
- Marques, A. H. de Oliveira. *History of Portugal*. New York, 1972. 2 vols.
- Moser, G. M. *A tentative Portuguese-African bibliography: Portuguese literature in Africa and African literature in the Portuguese language*. University Park, Pa., 1970.
- Newitt, M. D. D. *Portugal in Africa: the last hundred years*. London, 1981.
- Paixão, B. *Cem anos do Banco Nacional Ultramarino na vida portuguesa 1864-1964*. Lisbon, 1964.
- Robinson, R. A. H. *Contemporary Portugal: a history*. London, 1979.
- Ross, E. A. *Report on employment of native labour in Portuguese Africa*. New York, 1925.

10. PORTUGUESE AFRICA

- Smith, A. K. 'Antonio Salazar and the reversal of Portuguese colonial policy', *Journal of African History*, 1974, 15, 4, 653-67.
- Vasconcellos, E. J. de Carvalho e. *As colónias portuguesas. Geografia física, económica e política*. 3rd ed. Lisbon, 1921.
- Vilhena, E. J. de. *Questões coloniais: discursos e artigos*. Lisbon, 1910. 2 vols.
- Wheeler, D. L. *Republican Portugal: a political history 1910-1926*. Madison, 1978.

Angola

- Almeida, J. de. *Sul d'Angola*. Lisbon, 1912.
- Barns, T. A. *Angolan sketches*. London, 1928.
- Bender, G. J. *Angola under the Portuguese*. London, 1978.
- Birmingham, D. 'Themes and resources of Angolan history', *African Affairs*, 1974, 73, no. 291, 188-203.
- Cadbury, W. A. *Labour in Portuguese West Africa*. London, 1910.
- Carreira, A. *Angola: da escravatura ao trabalho livre. Subsídios para a história demográfica do século XVI até à independência*. Lisbon, 1977.
- Castro, J. V. de. *A campanha do Cuamato em 1907*. Luanda, 1908.
- Chilcote, R. H. ed. *Protest and resistance in Angola and Brazil*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972.
- Childs, G. M. *Umbundu kinship and character*. Oxford, 1949.
- Clarence-Smith, W. G. *Slaves, peasants and capitalists in southern Angola, 1840-1926*. Cambridge, 1979.
- 'The myth of uneconomic imperialism: the Portuguese in Angola, 1836-1926', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1979, 5, 2, 165-80.
- Couceiro, H. de P. *Angola: dois anos de governo*. Lisbon, 1910.
- Coutinho, J. de A. *A questão do álcool de Angola*. Lisbon, 1910.
- Cunha Leal, F. P. da. *Calígula em Angola*. Lisbon, 1924.
- Dias, Jill R. 'Famine and disease in the history of Angola, c. 1830-1930', *Journal of African History*, 1981, 22, 3, 349-78.
- Eça, A. Pereira de. *Campanha do sul de Angola em 1915*. Lisbon, 1923.
- Egerton, F. C. C. *Angola in perspective*. London, 1957.
- Faro, J. de Sousa e. *Angola como eu a vi em 1930-1931*. Lisbon, 1932.
- Felgas, H. E. *História do Congo Portugues*. Carmona, 1958.
- Galvão, H. *Angola: para uma nova política*, vol. 1. Lisbon, 1937.
- Gowan, S. J. *Portuguese-speaking Africa 1900-1979: a select bibliography*, vol. 1. *Angola*. Braamfontein, 1982.
- Graham, R. H. C. *Under seven Congo kings*. London, 1930.
- Henderson, L. W. *Angola: five centuries of conflict*. Ithaca, NY and London, 1979.
- Jessen, O. *Reisen und Forschungen in Angola*. Berlin, 1936.
- Lefebvre, G. *L'Angola, son histoire, son économie*. Liège, 1947.
- Lima, A. A. Lisboa de. *L'Angola et la crise*. [Report to International Colonial Institute, Lisbon, 1933.] Brussels, 1933.
- Lopo, J. de Castro. *Jornalismo de Angola. Subsídios para a sua história*. Luanda, 1964.
- Marquardsen, H. *Angola*. Berlin, 1920. 2nd ed. revised by A. Stahl. Berlin, 1928.
- Martin, Phyllis M. *Historical dictionary of Angola*. Metuchen, NY, 1980.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Matos, J. M. R. Norton de. *A situação financeira e económica da província de Angola*. Lisbon, 1914.
A província de Angola. Oporto, 1926.
Memorias e trabalhos da minha vida. Lisbon, 1944. 3 vols.
 Monteiro, A. *O problema das transferências de Angola*. Lisbon, 1931.
 Muralha, P. *Terras de Africa. São Tomé e Angola*. Lisbon n.d. [1925].
 Nevinson, H. W. *A modern slavery*. London, 1906.
 Péliissier, R. 'Campagnes militaires au Sud-Angola (1885-1915)', *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 1969, 9, no. 33, 54-123.
 'Mandume (c. 1890-1917) et la résistance ovambo au colonialisme portugais en Angola', in Julien, C.-A. et al. eds. *Les Africains*, vol. 8, pp. 205-35. Paris, 1977.
Les Guerres grises. Résistance et révoltes en Angola (1845-1941). Orgeval, 1977.
La Colonie du Minotaure. Nationalismes et révoltes en Angola (1926-1961). Orgeval, 1978.
 Pinto, J. Ferreira. *Angola: notas e comentários dum colono*. Lisbon, 1926.
 Roçadas, A. *Relatório sobre as operações no sul de Angola em 1914*. Lisbon, 1919.
 Samuels, M. A. *Education in Angola 1878-1914*. New York, 1970.
 Statham, J. C. B. *Through Angola, a coming colony*. Edinburgh, 1922.
 Teixeira, A. de Almeida. *Angola intangível. Notas e comentários*. Oporto, 1934.
 Wheeler, D. L. and Péliissier, R. *Angola*. London, 1971.

Mozambique

- Almeida, A. Chavez de. *O problema da Africa oriental Portuguesa*. Lisbon, 1932. 2 vols.
 Alvares, P. A. 'O Regime dos prazos da Zambezia', *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*, 1916, 34, 137-213.
 Amorim, P. Massano de. *Relatório sobre a ocupação de Angoche*. Lourenço Marques, 1911.
 Andrade, A. A. Freire de. *Relatórios sobre Moçambique*. Lourenço Marques, 1907-10, 5 vols.
 Camacho, Brito. *Moçambique: problemas coloniais*. Lisbon, 1926.
 Capela, J. *O vinho para o preto. Notas e textos sobre a exportação do vinho para Africa*. Porto, 1973.
O movimento operário em Lourenço Marques, 1910-1927. In press.
 Costa, M. *Bibliografia geral de Moçambique*. Lisbon, 1946.
 Cruz, D. da. *Em terras de Gaza*. Oporto, 1910.
 Dias, R. N. *A imprensa periódica em Moçambique, 1854-1954: coordenação e notas*. Lourenço Marques, 1956.
 Durão, D. de Portugal. 'O distrito de Quelimane', *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*, 1914, 32, 5-6, 139-89.
 Eidelberg, P. G. 'The breakdown of the 1922 Lourenço Marques port and railways negotiations', *South African Historical Journal*, 1976, 8, 104-18.
 Friedland, E. A. 'Mozambican nationalist resistance, 1920-1949', *Afrika Zamani*, 1978, 8-9, 156-72.
 Galligan, T. 'The Nguru penetration into Nyasaland', in Macdonald, R. J. ed. *From Nyasaland to Malawi*, pp. 108-23. Nairobi, 1975.

10. PORTUGUESE AFRICA

- Gowan, S. J. *Portuguese-speaking Africa 1900-1979: a select bibliography*, vol. II. *Mozambique*. Braamfontein, 1982.
- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division). *Handbook of Portuguese Nyasaland*. London, 1920.
- A manual of Portuguese East Africa*. London, 1920.
- Harries, P. 'The anthropologist as historian and liberal: H.-A. Junod and the Thonga', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1981, 8, 1, 37-50.
- Isaacman, A. F. *The tradition of resistance in Mozambique*. London, 1976.
- Isaacman, A. and B. *Mozambique. From colonialism to revolution, 1900-1982*. Aldershot, 1983.
- Junod, H. 'Le Mouvement de Mourimi: un réveil au sein de l'animisme Thonga', *Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique*, 1924, 21, 865-82.
- Katzenellenbogen, S. E. *South Africa and southern Mozambique: railways, labour and trade*. Manchester, 1982.
- Lima, A. Pereira de. *Edifícios históricos de Lourenço Marques*. Lourenço Marques, 1966.
- História dos caminhos de ferro de Moçambique*. Lourenço Marques, 1971.
- Lobato, A. Lourenço Marques, *Xilunguine. Biografia da cidade*. Lisbon, 1970.
- Lyne, R. N. *Mozambique: its agricultural development*. London, 1913.
- Machado, A. J. de M. *Entre os Macuas de Angoche. Historiando Moçambique*. Lisbon, 1970.
- Macmillan, Allister. *Eastern Africa and Rhodesia*. London, 1930.
- Martins, E. A. Azambuja. *Nevala: expedição a Moçambique*. Famalição, 1935.
- Maugham, R. C. F. *Zambezia*. London, 1910.
- Moura, J. V.-B. Carneira de. *Os últimos anos da monarquia e os primeiros da república em Moçambique*. Lourenço Marques, 1965.
- Muralha, P. *Terras de Africa. Moçambique e Rand*. Lisbon, n.d. [1926].
- Neil-Fomlinson, B. 'The Nyassa chartered company, 1891-1929', *Journal of African History*, 1977, 18, 1, 109-28.
- Pélissier, R. *Naissance du Mozambique: résistance et révoltes anti-coloniales (1854-1918)*. Orgeval, 1984, 2 vols.
- Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. 'A history of African labor in Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, 1877 to 1950'. Ph.D. thesis, Boston University, 1982.
- Ranger, T. O. 'Revolt in Portuguese East Africa', *St Antony's Papers*, no. 15, pp. 54-80. London, 1963.
- Rita-Ferreira, A. *Bibliografia etnológica de Moçambique*. Lisbon, 1962.
- O Movimento migratório de trabalhadores entre Moçambique e a Africa do Sul*. Lisbon, 1963.
- Rufino, J. dos Santos. *Albuns fotográficos e descritivos da Colónia de Moçambique*. Hamburg, 1929.
- Saldanha, E. d'Almeida. *Questões Nacionais: o Sul do Save*. Lisbon, 1928.
- Moçambique perante Genebra*. Oporto, 1931.
- Silva, H. Correa da. *A questão do porto da Beira*. Lisbon, 1927.
- Vail, H. Leroy. 'Mozambique's chartered companies: the rule of the feeble', *Journal of African History*, 1976, 17, 3, 389-416.
- Vail, H. Leroy and White, Landeg. *Capitalism and colonialism in Mozambique. A study of Quelimane district*. London, 1985.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

'Tawani Machambero!: forced cotton and rice growing on the Zambesi',
Journal of African History, 1978, 19, 2, 239-63.

Guiné, Cape Verde Islands and São Tomé

- Barreto, J. *História da Guiné 1414-1918*. London, 1938.
 Brito, E. *A população de Cabo Verde no século xx*. Lisbon, 1963.
 Carreira, A. *Migrações nas Ilhas do Cabo Verde*. Lisbon, 1977. tr. and ed. C. Fyfe,
The People of the Cape Verde Islands. Exploitation and Emigration. London,
 1983.
Estudos de economia caboverdiana. Lisbon, 1982.
 Castro, A. A. G. de Morais e. *Anuário da província da Guiné do ano de 1925*.
 Bolama, 1925.
 Costa, B. F. Bruto da. *Vinte e três anos ao serviço do país no combate às doenças em*
Africa. Lisbon, 1939.
 Cunningham, J. 'The colonial period in Guiné', *Tarikh*, 1980, 6, 4, 31-46.
 Lyall, A. L. *Black and white make brown. An account of a journey to the Cape Verde*
islands and Portuguese Guinea. London, 1938.
 McCarthy, J. M. *Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands. A comprehensive biblio-*
graphy. New York, 1977.
 Pinto, J. Teixeira. *A ocupação militar da Guiné*. Lisbon, 1936.
 Tenreiro, F. *A Ilha de São Tomé (estudo geográfico)*. Lisbon, 1961.

Spanish Equatorial Guinea

- Great Britain: Foreign Office (Historical Section). *Peace handbooks*, vol. 20, no.
 125. *Spanish Guinea*. London, 1920.
 Liniger-Goumaz, M. *Guinea Equatorial: bibliografia general*. Berne, 1974.
Historical dictionary of Equatorial Guinea. Metuchen, NJ, 1979.
 Ndongo Bidyogo, Donato. *História y tragedia de Guinea Ecuatorial*. Madrid, 1977.
 Osuntokun, A. *Equatorial Guinea - Nigerian relations: the diplomacy of labour*.
 Ibadan, 1978.
 Péliissier, R. *Los Territorios españoles de Africa*. Madrid, 1964.
 'Fernando Poo: un archipel hispano-guinéen', *Revue française d'études*
politiques africaines, 1968, no. 33, 80-102.
 Sundiata, I. K. 'Prelude to scandal: Liberia and Fernando Poo, 1880-1930',
Journal of African History, 1974, 15, 1, 97-112.
 Unzueta y Yuste, Abelardo de. *Guinea continental española*. Madrid, 1944.
Islas de Golfo de Guinea (Elobeyes, Corisco, Annobón, Príncipe y Santo Tomé).
 Madrid, 1945.
Geografía histórica de la isla de Fernando Poo. Madrid, 1947.

11. SOUTHERN AFRICA

South Africa

- Adler, T. 'Lithuania's diaspora: the Johannesburg Jewish workers' club,
 1928-1948', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1979, 6, 1, 70-92.

II. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- Archer, R. and Bouillon, A. *The South African game. Sport and racism*. London, 1982.
- Ballinger, M. *From union to apartheid*. London, 1969.
- Beinart, W. *The political economy of Pondoland, 1860-1930*. Cambridge, 1982.
- Beinart, W. and Bundy, C. *Hidden struggles in rural South Africa*. London, 1986.
- Benjamin, A. *Lost Johannesburg*. Johannesburg, 1979.
- Bisset, M. and Smith, P. F. *The digest of South African case law*. Cape Town, -1921, 6 vols.; 1922-33, 2 vols.; 1934-45, 2 vols.
- Bouch, R. 'Farming and politics in the Karroo and Eastern Cape, 1910-1924', *South African Historical Journal*, 1980, 12, 48-64.
- Bozzoli, B. ed. *Labour, townships and protest*. Johannesburg, 1979.
- The political nature of a ruling class: capital and ideology in South Africa, 1890-1933*. London, 1981.
- ed. *Town and countryside in the Transvaal*. Johannesburg, 1983.
- Bradford, H. 'Mass movements and the petty bourgeoisie: the social origins of ICU leadership, 1924-1929', *Journal of African History*, 1984, 25, 3.
- Brits, J. P. Tielman Roos. *Sy rol in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek, 1907-1935*. Pretoria, 1979.
- Brookes, E. H. *A South African pilgrimage*. Johannesburg, 1977.
- Brown, A. C. *A history of scientific endeavour in South Africa*. Cape Town, 1977.
- Bundy, Colin. *The rise and fall of the South African peasantry*. London, 1978.
- Carnegie Commission. *Report on the poor white problem in South Africa*. Stellenbosch, 1932. 5 vols.
- Cartwright, A. P. *The dynamite company: the story of African explosives and Chemical Industries Limited*. Cape Town, 1964.
- Gold paved the way: the story of the Gold Fields group of companies*. London, 1967.
- Golden age: the story of the industrialisation of South Africa and... the Corner House group of companies 1910-1967*. Cape Town, 1968.
- Cell, John W. *The highest stage of white supremacy: the origins of segregation in South Africa and the American south*. Cambridge, 1982.
- Chanock, M. L. *Unconsummated union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900-45*. Manchester, 1977.
- Chapman, M. ed. *A century of South African poetry*. Johannesburg, 1981.
- Christie, R. *Electricity, industry and class in South Africa*. London, 1984.
- Coka, G. 'The story of Gilbert Coka', in Perham, M. ed. *Ten Africans*, pp. 273-321. London, 1936. Reprinted 1963.
- Corder, H. *Judges at work... 1910-50*. Cape Town, 1984.
- Creswell, M. *An epoch of the political history of South Africa in the life of Frederick Hugh Page Creswell*. Cape Town, 1956.
- Cunningham, Anna M. *Guide to the archives and papers of the Library of the University of the Witwatersrand*. 3rd ed. Johannesburg, 1975. *Cumulative supplement, 1975-1979*. Johannesburg, 1979.
- Cutten, T. E. G. *A history of the press in South Africa*. Cape Town, 1935.
- Davenport, T. R. H. 'The triumph of Colonel Stallard: the transformation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act between 1923 and 1937', *South African Historical Journal*, 1970, 2, 77-96.
- South Africa: a modern history*. London, 1977.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Davies, Robert. *Capital, state and white labour in South Africa, 1900–1960*. Brighton, 1979.
- Doxey, G. V. *The industrial colour bar in South Africa*. Cape Town, 1961.
- Dugard, J. *Human rights and the South African legal order*. Princeton, 1978.
- Edgar, R. 'The Prophet Motive: Enoch Mgijima, the Israelites and the background to the Bulhoek massacre', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1982, 15, 3, 401–22.
- Frack, I. *A South African doctor looks backwards – and forward*. Cape Town, 1943.
- Frankel, S. H. *Co-operation and competition in the marketing of maize in South Africa*. London, 1926.
- The railway policy of South Africa*. Johannesburg, 1928.
- Capital investment in Africa*. London, 1938.
- Investment and the relation to equity capital in the South African gold mining industry, 1887–1965*. Oxford, 1967.
- Fransen, H. *Three centuries of South African art: fine art, architecture, applied arts*. Johannesburg and Cape Town, 1982.
- Fraser, M. and Jeeves, A. eds. *All that glittered: the selected correspondence of Lionel Phillips 1890–1924*. Cape Town, 1979.
- Gaitskell, Deborah. "'Christian compounds for girls": Church hostels for African women in Johannesburg, 1907–1970', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1979, 6, 1, 44–69.
- 'Housewives, maids or mothers: some contradictions of domesticity for Christian women in Johannesburg, 1903–39', *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 2, 241–56.
- Gandhi, M. K. tr. V. G. Desai. *Satyagraha in South Africa*. Ahmedabad, 1928. 2nd ed. 1950.
- Garson, N. G. 'South Africa and World War I', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1979, 8, 1, 68–85.
- General Staff: Defence Headquarters, Pretoria. *The Union of South Africa and the Great War, 1914–1918. Official history*. Pretoria, 1924.
- Geyser, O. et al. *Die Nasionale Party*, vol. 1. ed. O. Geyser and A. H. Marais. *Agtermud, Stigting en Konsolidasie*. Pretoria and Cape Town, n.d. [1975]; vol. 11. ed. J. H. Le Roux and P. W. Coetzer. *Die Eerste Bemindsjare 1924–1934*. Part 1, Bloemfontein, 1980. Part 2, Bloemfontein, 1982.
- Geyser, O., Coetzer, P. W. and Le Roux, J. H. *Bibliographies on South African political history*, vol. 1. *Register of private document collections on the political history of South Africa since 1902*. Boston, 1979; vol. 11. *General sources of South African Political History since 1902*. Boston, 1979; vol. 111. *Index to periodical articles on South African political and social history since 1902*. Boston, 1982.
- Gluckman, M. *Analysis of a social situation in modern Zululand*, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper no. 28. Manchester, 1958; reprinted 1968. First printed in *Bantu Studies*, 1940, and *African Studies*, 1942.
- Gregory, T. *Ernest Oppenheimer and the economic development of Southern Africa*. Cape Town, 1962.
- Greyling, J. J. C. and Miskin, J. *Bibliography on Indians in South Africa*. Durban, 1976.

11. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- Grundy, K. W. *Soldiers without politics. Blacks in the South African armed forces.* Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1983.
- Gutsche, T. *The history and social significance of motion pictures in South Africa, 1895–1940.* Cape Town, 1972.
- Hahlo, H. R. and Kahn, E. *The Union of South Africa: the development of its laws and constitution.* London, 1960.
- Hancock, W. K. *Survey of British Commonwealth affairs*, vol. 1. *Problems of nationality, 1918–1936.* London, 1937; vol. 11. *Problems of economic policy 1918–1939*, part 2, ch. 1 'Evolution of the settlers' frontier, southern Africa'. London, 1942.
- Smuts. The sanguine years, 1870–1919.* Cambridge, 1962.
- Smuts. The fields of force, 1919–1950.* Cambridge, 1968.
- Hellmann, E. Rooiyard. *A sociological survey of an urban native slum-yard.* [1934]. Rhodes-Livingstone Paper no. 13. London, 1948. Reprinted Manchester, 1969.
- ed. *Handbook on race relations in South Africa.* Cape Town, 1949.
- Hemson, David. 'Class consciousness and migrant workers: the dockworkers of Durban, 1870–1974'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Warwick, 1980.
- Herbert, G. *Martienssen and the international style. The modern movement in South African architecture.* Cape Town and Rotterdam, 1975.
- Hexham, I. *The irony of apartheid: the struggle for national independence of Afrikaner Calvinism against British imperialism.* New York, 1981.
- Hobart Houghton, D. and Dagut, J. *Source material on the South African economy: 1860–1970*, vol. 11 (1899–1919); vol. 111 (1920–1970). Cape Town, 1972, 1973.
- Hoernlé, R. F. A. *South African native policy and the liberal spirit.* Cape Town, 1939.
- Holland, R. F. *Britain and the Commonwealth alliance, 1918–1939.* London, 1981.
- Humphriss, D. and Thomas, D. *Benoni son of my sorrow: the social, political and economic history of a South African goldmining town.* Benoni, 1968.
- Hunter, M. *Reaction to conquest.* London, 1936.
- Hyam, R. *The failure of South African expansion, 1908–1948.* London, 1972.
- Innes, D. *Anglo American and the rise of modern South Africa.* London, 1984.
- Jingoes, S. J. *A chief is a chief by the people*, eds. J. and C. Perry. London, 1975.
- Johnstone, F. *Class, race and gold: a study of class relations and racial discrimination in South Africa.* London, 1976.
- Jones, R. A. and Griffiths, H. R. *Labour legislation in South Africa.* Johannesburg, 1980.
- Kadalie, C. *My life and the ICU*, ed. S. Trapido. London, 1970.
- Kallaway, P. 'F. S. Malan, the Cape liberal tradition and South African politics, 1903–1924', *Journal of African History*, 1974, 15, 1, 113–29.
- ed. *Apartheid and education. The education of black South Africans.* Johannesburg, 1984.
- Kalley, J. A. *The Transkei region of southern Africa, 1877–1978: an annotated bibliography.* Boston, 1980.
- Kaplan, D. E. 'The politics of industrial protection in South Africa, 1910–1939', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1976, 3, 1, 70–91.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Karis, T. and Carter, G. M. eds. *From protest to challenge: a documentary history of African politics in South Africa*, vol. 1. *Protest and hope, 1882-1934*, ed. S. Johns, Stanford, 1972; vol. 11. *Hope and challenge, 1935-1952*, ed. T. Karis, Stanford, 1973; vol. 1v. *Political profiles, 1882-1964*, by G. M. Gerhart and T. Karis, Stanford, 1977.
- Katz, E. N. *A trade union aristocracy: a history of white workers in the Transvaal and the general strike of 1913*. Johannesburg, 1976.
- Katzen, L. *Gold and the South African economy: the influence of the gold mining industry on business cycles and economic growth in South Africa, 1886-1961*. Cape Town, 1964.
- Keiser, R. D. 'The South African governor-general, 1910-1919'. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1975.
- 'The South African Indians' challenge to the Union and Imperial governments, 1910-1919', *South African Historical Journal*, 1981, 13, 78-95.
- Kentridge, Morris. *I recall*. Johannesburg, 1959.
- Kerr, A. *Fort Hare, 1915-1948*. London, 1968.
- Kienzle, W. 'German-South African trade relations in the Nazi era', *African Affairs*, 1979, 78, no. 310, 81-90.
- Kiewiet, C. W. de. *A history of South Africa: social and economic*. London, 1941.
- Kock, W. J. de. et al. eds. *Dictionary of South African biography*. Cape Town, 1968-1981. 4 vols.
- Krüger, D. W. ed. *South African parties and policies, 1910-1960: a select source book*. Cape Town, 1960.
- Lacey, M. *Working for Boroko: the origins of a coercive labour system in South Africa*. Johannesburg, 1981.
- Lass, H. D. *Nationale Integration in Südafrika: Die Rolle der Parteien zwischen den Jahren 1922 und 1934*. Hamburg, 1969.
- Legassick, M. 'South Africa: forced labor, industrialization, and racial differentiation', in Harris, R. ed. *The political economy of Africa*, pp. 227-70. New York, 1975.
- 'Race, industrialization and social change in South Africa: the case of R. F. A. Hoernlé', *African Affairs*, 1976, 75, no. 299, 224-39.
- Leubuscher, C. *Der südafrikanische Eingeborene als Industriearbeiter und als Stadtbewohner*. Jena, 1931.
- Lewin, J. *Studies in African native law*. Oxford, 1947. Reprinted Philadelphia, 1971.
- Lewis, Jon. *Industrialisation and Trade Union organisation in South Africa, 1924-1955: the rise and fall of the South African Trades and Labour Council*. Cambridge, 1984.
- Macmillan, Allister. *The Golden City: Johannesburg*. London, n.d. [1933].
Environs of the Golden City and Pretoria. Cape Town, n.d. [1936].
Durban past and present. Durban, n.d. [1936].
Homes of the Golden City. Cape Town, 1948.
- Macmillan, W. M. *The South African agrarian problem*. Johannesburg, 1919.
Complex South Africa. London, 1930.
My South African years. Cape Town, 1975.

II. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- Mahabane, Z. R. *The good fight. Selected speeches of Rev. Zaccheus R. Mahabane*. Evanston, n.d. [c. 1965].
- Malan, J. P. ed. *South African music encyclopaedia*. Cape Town, 1979–85. 4 vols.
- Malan, M. P. A. *Die Nasionale Party van Suid Afrika, 1914–1964: sy stryd en sy prestasies*. Cape Town, 1964.
- Malherbe, E. G. *Education in South Africa*, vol. 1. (1652–1922). Cape Town, 1925; vol. II. (1923–1975). Cape Town, 1977.
- Mansergh, N. *Survey of British Commonwealth affairs: problems of external policy, 1931–1939*. London, 1952.
- ed. *Documents and speeches on British Commonwealth affairs, 1931–1952*. London, 1953.
- Marks, Shula. 'The ambiguities of dependence: John L. Dube of Natal', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1975, 1, 2, 162–80.
- 'Natal, the Zulu royal family and the ideology of segregation', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1978, 4, 2, 172–94.
- Marks, Shula, and Rathbone, Richard, eds. *Industrialisation and social change in South Africa: essays on African class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870–1930*. London, 1982.
- Maud, J. P. R. *City government – the Johannesburg experiment*. Oxford, 1938.
- Merriman, J. X. *Selections from the correspondence of J. X. Merriman*. ed. P. Lewsen. Vol. IV. (1905–24). Cape Town, 1969.
- Moodie, T. D. *The rise of Afrikanerdom. Power, apartheid and the Afrikaner civil religion*. Berkeley, 1975.
- Morris, M. 'The development of capitalism in South African agriculture: class struggle in the countryside', *Economy and Society*, 1976, 5, 3, 292–343.
- Muller, C. F. J., Jaarsveld, F. A. van, Wijk, T. van and Boucher, M. *South African history and historians – a bibliography*. Pretoria, 1979.
- Murray, B. K. *Wits: the early years. A history of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, and its precursors, 1896–1939*. Johannesburg, 1982.
- Musiker, R. *South Africa*. World Bibliographical Series, vol. 7. Oxford and Santa Barbara, 1980.
- Nicholls, G. Heaton. *South Africa in my time*. London, 1961.
- Nicol, Martin. 'Riches from rags: bosses and Unions in the Cape clothing industry 1926–1937', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1983, 9, 2, 239–57.
- Oberholster, A. G. *Die Mynwerkerstaking. Witwatersrand, 1922*. Pretoria, 1982.
- O'Meara, Dan. *Volkskapitalisme. Class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism, 1934–1948*. Cambridge, 1983.
- Pachai, B. *The international aspects of the South African Indian question, 1860–1971*. Cape Town, 1971.
- ed. *South Africa's Indians: the evolution of a minority*. Washington, DC, 1979.
- Paton, A. Hofmeyr. Cape Town, 1964.
- Towards the mountain: an autobiography*. Oxford, 1981.
- Perham, M. *African apprenticeship*. London, 1974.
- Phillips, R. E. *The Bantu in the city*. Lovedale, 1938.
- Pienaar, S. W. and Scholtz, J. J. J. eds. *Glo in u Volk: Dr. B. F. Malan as Redenaar, 1908–1954*. Cape Town, 1964.
- Pirow, O. J. B. M. *Hertzog*. Cape Town, n.d. [1958].
- Pollak, O. B. and K. *Theses and dissertations on southern Africa*. Boston, 1976.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Reyher, R. H. *Zulu woman*. New York, 1948.
- Rich, P. *White power and the liberal conscience: racial segregation and South African liberalism, 1921–1960*. Manchester, 1984.
- Richards, C. S. *The iron and steel industry in South Africa*. Johannesburg, 1940.
- Roberts, A. A. *A South African legal bibliography*. Pretoria, 1942.
- Rogers, H. *Native administration in the Union of South Africa*. Johannesburg, 1933.
- Rose, B. W. and Tunmer, R. eds. *Documents in South African education*. Johannesburg, 1975.
- Rose Innes, J. *James Rose Innes, Chief Justice of South Africa, 1914–1927: autobiography*. ed. B. A. Tindall. Cape Town, 1949.
- Rosenthal, E. *You have been listening... the early history of radio in South Africa*. Cape Town, 1974.
- Roux, E. S. P. *Bunting: a political biography, 1873–1936*. Cape Town, 1944.
- Time longer than rope*. London, 1948. Madison, 1964.
- Sachs, A. *Justice in South Africa*. London, 1973.
- Sachs, W. *Black Hamlet*. London, 1937.
- Saker, H. *The South African flag controversy, 1925–1928*. Cape Town, 1980.
- Saunders, C. C. *Historical dictionary of South Africa*. Metuchen, NY, 1983.
- Schapera, I. ed. *Western civilisation and the natives of South Africa: studies in culture contact*. London, 1934.
- Select bibliography of South African native life and problems*. London, 1941.
- Schumann, C. G. W. *Structural changes and business cycles in South Africa*. London, 1938.
- Searle, C. *The history of the development of nursing in South Africa, 1652–1960*. Cape Town, 1965.
- Shimoni, G. *Jews and Zionism: the South African experience (1910–1967)*. Cape Town, 1980.
- Simkins, C. 'Agricultural production in the African reserves', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1981, 7, 2, 256–83.
- Simons, H. J. 'The criminal law and its administration in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya', Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of London, 1936.
- African women: their legal status in South Africa*. London, 1968.
- Simons, H. J. and R. E. *Class and colour in South Africa 1850–1950*. Harmondsworth, 1969.
- Smuts, J. C. *Africa and some world problems*. Oxford, 1930.
- Selections from the Smuts Papers*, vols. III, IV. (1910–1919), eds. W. K. Hancock and J. van der Poel. Cambridge, 1966; vols. V, VI (1919–1945), ed. J. van der Poel. Cambridge, 1973.
- South African Library, Cape Town, ed. *A South African bibliography to the year 1925*. Cape Town, 1979. 4 vols.
- Stevens, R. P. *Weizmann and Smuts*. Khartoum, 1975.
- Stultz, N. M. *Afrikaner politics in South Africa, 1934–1948*. Berkeley, 1974.
- Sundkler, B. *Bantu prophets in South Africa*. London, 1948. 2nd ed. 1961.
- Swan, M. J. *Gandhi: the South African experience*. Johannesburg, 1985.
- Switzer, L. and D. *The black press in South Africa and Lesotho: a descriptive guide to African, Coloured and Indian newspapers, newsletters and magazines, 1836–1976*. Boston, Mass., 1979.

11. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- Tatz, C. M. *Shadow and substance in South Africa: a study in land and franchise policies affecting Africans, 1910–1960*. Pietermaritzburg, 1962.
- Tyrrell-Glynn, W. *A guide to the South African manuscript collections in the South African Library, Cape Town*. Cape Town, 1976.
- Union of South Africa (Bureau of Census and Statistics). *Union statistics for fifty years, 1910–1960*. Pretoria, 1960.
- Union of South Africa (Union Office of Census and Statistics). *Official year book of the Union and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland*. No. 22–1941. Pretoria, 1941.
- van der Horst, S. *Native labour in South Africa*. Cape Town, 1942. Reprinted London, 1971.
- van Onselen, C. *Studies in the social and economic history of the Witwatersrand, 1886–1914*, vol. I. *New Babylon*; vol. II. *New Nineveh*. Harlow, 1982.
- Wade, M. 'Myth, truth and the South African reality in the fiction of Sarah Gertrude Millin', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1974, I, 1, 91–108.
- Walker, Cheryl. *The woman's suffrage movement in South Africa*. Cape Town, 1979.
- Women and resistance in South Africa*. London, 1983.
- Walker, I. L. and Weinbren, B. *2000 casualties: a history of the trade unions and the labour movement in the Union of South Africa*. Johannesburg, 1961.
- Walshe, A. P. *The rise of African nationalism in South Africa: the African National Congress, 1912–1952*. London, 1971.
- Warner, H. W. *A digest of South African native civil case law 1894–1957*. Cape Town, Wynberg and Johannesburg, 1961.
- Webster, E. ed. *Essays in southern African labour history*. Johannesburg, 1978.
- Whitfield, G. M. B. *South African native law*. Cape Town and Johannesburg, 1930. 2nd ed. 1948.
- Wickins, P. L. *The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa*, Cape Town, 1978.
- Willan, B. P. 'The South African native labour contingent, 1916–1918', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 61–86.
- The Southern African materials project, 1973–1976*, ed. P. Larby. London, 1980.
- Sol Plaatje: South African nationalist, 1876–1932*. London, 1984.
- Wilson, F. *Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 1911–1969*. Cambridge, 1972.
- Wilson, F. and Perrot, D. eds. *Outlook on a century: South Africa, 1870–1970*. Lovedale, 1973.
- Wilson, M. and Thompson, L. M. eds. *The Oxford history of South Africa*, vol. II. *South Africa 1870–1966*. Oxford, 1971.
- Wynne, S. G. *South African political materials: a catalogue of the Carter-Karis collection*. Bloomington, 1977.
- Yudelman, David. *The emergence of modern South Africa: state, capital, and the incorporation of organised labour on the South African gold fields, 1902–1939*. Westport, Conn., 1982.

South West Africa

- Bley, H. *Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika*. Hamburg, 1968. tr. H. Ridley, *South-West Africa under German Rule, 1894–1914*. London, 1971.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Braum, R. L. ed. *Southwest Africa under mandate. Documents...1919-1929*. Salisbury, NC, 1976.
- Clarence-Smith, W. G. and Moorsom, R. 'Underdevelopment and class formation in Ovamboland, 1845-1915', *Journal of African History*, 1975, 16, 3, 365-81.
- Cockram, G. M. *South West African mandate*. Cape Town, 1976.
- Dale, R. 'The ambiguities of self-determination for South West Africa, 1918-1939', *Plural Societies*, 1974, 5, 1, 29-57.
- Dreschler, H. *Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft: der Kampf der Herero und Nama gegen den deutschen Imperialismus (1884-1915)*. Berlin, 1966. tr. H. Zöllner, 'Let us die fighting': the struggle of the Herero and Nama against German imperialism (1884-1915). London, 1981.
- Dugard, J. *The South West Africa/Namibia dispute*. Berkeley, 1973.
- Eriksen, T. L. with Moorsom, R. *The political economy of Namibia: an annotated critical bibliography*. Uppsala, 1985.
- Freislich, R. *The last tribal war*. Cape Town, 1964.
- Goldblatt, I. *The history of South West Africa*. Johannesburg, 1971.
- Hardinge, R. *South African Cinderella: a trek through ex-German South-West Africa*. London, 1937.
- Krogh, D. C. 'The national income and expenditure of South West Africa (1920-1950)', *South African Journal of Economics*, 1960, 28, 1, 3-22.
- Levinson, D. *Diamonds in the desert. The story of August Stanch and his times*. Cape Town, 1983.
- Moorsom, R. 'Underdevelopment, contract labour and worker consciousness in Namibia 1915-1972', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1977, 4, 1, 52-87.
- Pearson, P. 'The Rehoboth rebellion', in Bonner, P. ed., *Working papers in Southern African Studies*, pp. 31-51. Johannesburg, 1981.
- Seitz, T. *Vom Aufstieg und Niederbruch deutscher Kolonialmacht*. Karlsruhe, 1927-9. 3 vols.
- Smith, I. C. 'J. C. Smuts' role in the establishment of the League of Nations and the mandate for South West Africa', *South African Historical Journal*, 1973, 5, 94-104.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. *Survey of international affairs, 1929*. London, 1930.
- Waldt, F. de. ed. *Native uprisings in Southwest Africa: documents [1922, 1925]*. Salisbury, NC, 1976.

The High Commission Territories

- Ashton, H. *The Basuto*. London, 1952. 2nd ed. 1967.
- Barnes, L. *The new Boer War*. London, 1932.
- Benson, M. *Tshekedi Khama*. London, 1960.
- Crush, J. 'The colonial division of space: the significance of the Swaziland land partition', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1980, 12, 1, 71-86.
- Hailey, Lord. *Native administration in the British African territories*. Part v. *The*

II. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- High Commission Territories: Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland.* London, 1953.
- Haliburton, G. *Historical dictionary of Lesotho.* Metuchen, NJ and London, 1977.
- Halpern, J. *South Africa's hostages.* Harmondsworth, 1965.
- Kuczynski, R. R. *A demographic survey of the British colonial empire*, vol. II. *High Commission Territories, East Africa...* London, 1949.
- Kuper, Hilda. *Sobhuza II. Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland.* London, 1978.
- Nyeko, B. *Swaziland.* World Bibliographical Series, vol. 24. Oxford and Santa Barbara, 1982.
- Packard, R. 'Maize, cattle and mosquitoes: the political economy of colonial Swaziland', *Journal of African History*, 1984, 25, 2, 189–212.
- Parsons, Q. N. 'The economic history of Khama's country in Botswana, 1844–1930', in Palmer, R. and Parsons, N. eds. *The roots of rural poverty*, pp. 113–43. London, 1971.
- '"Khama & Co." and the Jousse trouble, 1910–1916', *Journal of African History*, 1975, 16, 3, 383–408.
- 'The High Commission Territories, 1909–1964: a bibliography', *Mohlomi* (Roma, Lesotho), 1976, 1, 96–106.
- Perham, M. F. and Curtis, L. *The protectorates of South Africa: the question of their transfer to the Union.* London, 1935.
- Schapera, I. *Migrant labour and tribal life: a study of conditions in the Bechuanaland Protectorate.* London, 1947.
- Tribal innovators. Tswana chiefs and social change, 1795–1940.* London, 1970.
- Willet, Shelagh M. and Ambrose, David. *Lesotho: a comprehensive bibliography.* World Bibliographical Series, vol. 3. Oxford and Santa Barbara, 1980.

12. BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

- Birmingham, David and Martin, Phyllis M. eds. *History of Central Africa*, vol. II. London, 1983.
- Fetter, B. *Colonial rule and regional imbalance in central Africa.* Boulder, Col., 1983.
- Gray, Richard. *The two nations. Aspects of race relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland.* London, 1960.
- Hailey, Lord, *Native administration in the British African territories*, part II. *Central Africa: Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia.* London, 1950.
- Hooker, J. R. 'Welfare associations and other instruments of accommodation in the Rhodesias between the world wars', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1966, 9, 1, 51–63.
- Isaacman, A. and B. 'Resistance and collaboration in southern and central Africa, c. 1850–1920', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1977, 10, 1, 31–62.
- Macmillan, Allister. *Rhodesia and eastern Africa.* London, 1931.
- Palmer, Robin, and Parsons, Neil, eds. *The roots of rural poverty in central and southern Africa.* London, 1977.
- Ranger, T. O. 'Mchape and the study of witchcraft eradication'. Unpublished paper: Conference on the History of Central African Religious Systems. Lusaka, 1972.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Reflections on peasant research in central and southern Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1978, 5, 1, 99-133.
- Rotberg, R. I. *The rise of nationalism in Central Africa: the making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964*. Cambridge, Mass., 1966.
- Shepperson, George. 'The politics of African church separatist movements in British Central Africa 1892-1916', *Africa*, 1954, 24, 3, 233-46.

Southern Rhodesia

- Arrighi, G. *The political economy of Rhodesia*. The Hague, 1967.
- 'Labour supplies in historical perspective: a study of the proletarianisation of the African peasantry in Rhodesia', in Arrighi, G. and Saul, J. S. *Essays on the political economy of Africa*, pp. 180-234. New York and London, 1973.
- Atkinson, Norman D. *Teaching Rhodesians: a history of educational policy in Rhodesia*. Salisbury, 1971.
- Baxter, T. W. *A guide to the public records of Southern Rhodesia under the regime of the British South Africa Company, 1890-1923*. 2nd ed. Salisbury, 1969.
- Baxter, T. W. and Burke, E. E. *Guide to the historical manuscripts in the National Archives of Rhodesia*. Salisbury, 1970.
- Baxter, T. W. and Turner, R. W. S. *Rhodesian epic*. Cape Town, 1966.
- Blake, Robert. *A history of Rhodesia*. London, 1977.
- Bowen, D. J. *Gold mines of Rhodesia, 1890-1980*. Salisbury, n.d. [1981].
- Chanock, Martin. *Unconsummated union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa 1900-45*. Manchester, 1977.
- Clements, F. and Harben, E. *Leaf of gold: the story of Rhodesian tobacco*. London, 1962.
- Croxtan, A. H. *Railways of Rhodesia*. Newton Abbot, 1973.
- Edwards, J. A. 'Southern Rhodesia: the response to adversity, 1935-39'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1978.
- Gale, W. D. *The Rhodesian press*. Salisbury, 1963.
- Gann, L. H. *A history of Southern Rhodesia: early days to 1934*. London, 1965.
- Gann, L. H. and Gelfand, M. *Huggins of Rhodesia*. London, 1964.
- Gelfand, Michael. *A service to the sick: a history of the health services for Africans in Southern Rhodesia (1890-1953)*. Gwelo, 1976.
- Gibbs, Peter. *The history of the British South Africa police*, vol. II. *The right of the line*. Salisbury, 1974.
- Henderson, Ian. 'White populism in Southern Rhodesia', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1972, 14, 4, 387-99.
- Hodder-Williams, R. *White farmers in Rhodesia, 1890-1965. A history of the Marandellas district*. London, 1984.
- Hummel, H. C. 'Sir Charles Coghlan', *South African Historical Journal*, 1977, 9, 59-79.
- Keyter, C. F. *Maize control in Southern Rhodesia: the African contribution to white survival*. Central African Historical Association, Local Series 34. Salisbury, 1978.
- Kosmin, B. A. *Majuta: a history of the Jewish community in Zimbabwe*. Gwelo, 1981.

12. BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

- Lee, Elaine. 'The trade union movement in Rhodesia, 1910-24', *Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, 1974, 8, 4, 215-37.
- Leys, C. *European politics in Southern Rhodesia*. Oxford, 1959.
- Machingaidze, V. 'The development of capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia, with particular reference to the role of the state, 1908-1939'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1980.
- Mackenzie, J. M. 'Southern Rhodesia and responsible government', *Rhodesian History*, 1978, 9, 23-40.
- Maclean, Joy. *The guardians: the story of Rhodesia's outposts*. Bulawayo, 1974.
- Makambe, E. P. 'The Nyasaland African labour "ulendos" to Southern Rhodesia... 1903-1923', *African Affairs*, 1980, 79, no. 317, 548-66.
- Mazikana, P. C. and Johnstone, I. J. *Zimbabwe epic*. ed. R. G. S. Douglas. Harare, 1982.
- Mittlebeeler, E. V. *African custom and Western law: the development of the Rhodesian criminal law for Africans*. New York and London, 1976.
- Mosley, P. *The settler economies. Studies in the economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1963*. Cambridge, 1983.
- Murray, D. J. *The governmental system in Southern Rhodesia*. Oxford, 1970.
- Palley, Claire. *The constitutional history and law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965*. Oxford, 1966.
- Palmer, Robin. *Land and racial domination in Rhodesia*. London, 1977.
- Phimister, I. R. 'The "Spanish" influenza pandemic of 1918 and its impact on the Southern Rhodesian mining industry', *Central African Journal of Medicine*, 1973, 19, 7, 143-8.
- 'Gold mining in Southern Rhodesia 1919-53', *Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, 1976, 10, 1, 21-44.
- 'The reconstruction of the Southern Rhodesian gold mining industry, 1903-10', *Economic History Review*, 1976, 2nd ser., 29, 3, 465-81.
- 'White miners in historical perspective: Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1953', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1977, 3, 2, 187-206.
- 'Meat and monopolies: beef cattle in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1938', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 3, 391-414.
- 'Accommodating imperialism: the compromise of the settler state in Southern Rhodesia, 1923-1929', *Journal of African History*, 1984, 25, 2.
- Phimister, I. R. and van Onselen, C. 'The political economy of tribal animosity: a case study of the 1929 Bulawayo location "faction fight"', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1979, 6, 1, 1-43.
- Pichanick, J., Chennello, A. J. and Rix, L. B. *Rhodesian literature in English: a bibliography (1897-1974/5)*. Gwelo, 1977.
- Pollak, O. B. and K. *Rhodesia/Zimbabwe: an international bibliography*. Boston, Mass., 1977.
- Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*. World Bibliographical Series, vol. 4. Oxford and Santa Barbara, 1979.
- Ranger, T. O. *The African voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930*. London, 1970.
- 'Literature and political economy: Arthur Shearly Cripps and the Makoni labour crisis of 1911', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1982, 9, 1, 33-53.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Rasmussen, R. K. *Historical dictionary of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia*. Metuchen, NJ, 1979.
- Rennie, J. K. 'White farmers, black tenants and landlord legislation: Southern Rhodesia 1890-1930', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1978, 5, 1, 86-98.
- Richards, Hylda. *Next year will be better*. London, 1952. Reprinted Bulawayo, 1975.
- Rolin, Henri. *Les Lois et l'administration de la Rhodésie*. Brussels and Paris, 1913. tr. D. Kirkwood. *Rolin's Rhodesia*. Bulawayo, 1978.
- Southern Rhodesia Government: Department of Statistics. *Statistical yearbook*, 1938.
- Steere, D. V. *God's irregular: Arthur Shearly Cripps*. London, 1973.
- Tanser, G. H. *A sequence of time. The story of Salisbury, Rhodesia, 1900 to 1914*. Salisbury, 1974.
- Tawse-Jollie, Ethel. *The real Rhodesia*. London, 1924.
- Vambe, Lawrence. *An ill-fated people*. London, 1972.
- From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*. London, 1976.
- van Onselen, C. *Chibaro. African mine labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933*. London, 1976.
- van Onselen, C. and Phimister, I. R. *Studies in the history of African mine labour in colonial Zimbabwe*. Gwelo, 1978.
- Walker, Audrey A. *The Rhodesias and Nyasaland: a guide to official publications*. Washington, DC, 1965.
- Warhurst, P. R. 'Rhodesian-South African relations, 1900-23', *South African Historical Journal*, 1971, 3, 93-108.
- Weinmann, H. *Agricultural research and development in Southern Rhodesia... 1890-1923, 1924-50*. Salisbury, 1972, 1975.
- Wetherell, H. I. 'The Rhodesias and amalgamation: settler sub-imperialism and the imperial response, 1914-48'. D.Phil. thesis, University of Rhodesia, 1977.
- Willson, F. M. G. and Passmore, G. C. *Catalogue of the parliamentary papers of Southern Rhodesia, 1899-1953*. Salisbury, 1965.
- Holders of administrative and ministerial office 1894-1964, and members of the legislative council 1899-1923, and the legislative assembly 1924-1964*. Salisbury, 1966.
- Zachrisson, P. *An African area in change. Belingwe, 1894-1946*. Gothenburg, 1978.

Northern Rhodesia

- Baldwin, Robert E. *Economic development and export growth: a study of Northern Rhodesia, 1920-1960*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966.
- Bancroft, J. A. *Mining in Northern Rhodesia*. London, 1961.
- Barnes, J. A. *Politics in a changing society: a political history of the Fort Jameson Ngoni*. Cape Town, 1954. Manchester, 1967.
- Berger, Elena L. *Labour, race and colonial rule: the Copperbelt from 1924 to independence*. Oxford, 1974.

12. BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

- Caplan, G. L. *The elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969. A political history of Zambia's Western Province*. London, 1970.
- Coleman, F. L. *The Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, 1899-1962*. Manchester, 1971.
- Coombe, Trevor. 'The origins of secondary education in Zambia', *African Social Research*, 1967-8, 3, 173-205; 4, 283-315; 5, 365-405.
- Cunningham, Simon. *The copper industry in Zambia*. New York, 1981.
- Davidson, J. W. *The Northern Rhodesia legislative council*. London, 1948.
- Davis, J. Merle. ed. *Modern industry and the African*. London, 1933.
- Dixon-Fyle, Mac. 'Agricultural improvement and political protest on the Tonga Plateau, Northern Rhodesia', *Journal of African History*, 1977, 18, 4, 579-96.
- Epstein, A. L. *Politics in an urban African community*. Manchester, 1958.
- Gann, L. H. *The birth of a plural society: the development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company 1894-1914*. Manchester, 1958.
- A history of Northern Rhodesia: early days to 1953*. London, 1964.
- Gelfand, Michael. *Northern Rhodesia in the days of the Charter*. Oxford, 1961.
- Graham, I. M. and Halwindi, B. C. *Guide to the public archives of Zambia*, vol. 1. 1895-1940. Lusaka, 1970.
- Hellen, J. A. *Rural economic development in Zambia, 1890-1964*. Munich, London and New York, 1968.
- Henderson, Ian. 'Early African leadership: the Copperbelt disturbances of 1935 and 1940', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1975, 2, 83-97.
- Hermite, Eugene. 'An economic history of Barotseland, 1800-1940'. Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1974.
- Kanduza, A. 'The tobacco industry in Northern Rhodesia, 1912-1938', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1983, 16, 2, 201-29.
- Kanganja, J. L. 'Courts and judges in Zambia: the evolution of the modern judicial system'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1980.
- Meebelo, Henry S. *Reaction to colonialism. A prelude to the politics of independence in northern Zambia, 1893-1939*. Manchester, 1971.
- Musambachime, M. C. 'The social and economic effects of sleeping sickness in Mweru-Luapula, 1906-22', *African Economic History*, 1981, 10, 151-73.
- Perrings, C. A. 'Consciousness, conflict and proletarianization: an assessment of the 1935 mineworkers' strike on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1977, 4, 1, 31-51.
- Pim, A. W. and Milligan, S. *Report of the commission appointed to enquire into the financial and economic position of Northern Rhodesia*. Colonial No. 145. London, 1938.
- Ranger, T. O. 'Nationality and nationalism: the case of Barotseland', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 1968, 4, 2, 227-46.
- 'Making Northern Rhodesia imperial: variations on a royal theme, 1924-1938', *African Affairs*, 1980, 79, no. 316, 349-73.
- Rau, W. 'Mpezeni's Ngoni of eastern Zambia, 1870-1920'. Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1974.
- A bibliography of pre-independence Zambia: the social sciences*. Boston, Mass., 1978.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Rennie, J. K. *Catalogue of unpublished materials in Zambia*. Lusaka, 1978.
- Richards, A. I. *Land, labour and diet in Northern Rhodesia*. London, 1939.
- Roberts, A. D. *A history of Zambia*. London, 1976.
- Rotberg, Robert I. *Black heart: Gore-Browne and the politics of multiracial Zambia*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977.
- Slinn, P. 'Commercial concessions and politics during the colonial period: the role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia, 1890-1964', *African Affairs*, 1971, 70, 281, 365-84.
- 'The mining ordinance of Northern Rhodesia: a legislative history 1924-1958', *Journal of African Law*, 1979, 23, 1, 84-106.
- Smyth, Rosaleen. 'The development of government propaganda in Northern Rhodesia up to 1953'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983.
- Snelson, P. *Educational development in Northern Rhodesia, 1883-1945*. Lusaka, 1974.
- Tapson, Winifred. *Old timer*. Cape Town, 1957.
- Vail, H. Leroy. 'Ecology and history: the example of eastern Zambia', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1977, 3, 2, 129-55.
- van Binsbergen, W. M. J. *Religious change in Zambia: exploratory studies*. Haarlem, 1983.
- Vickery, K. P. 'The making of a peasantry: imperialism and the Tonga plateau economy, 1890-1936', Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1978.
- Watson, William. *Tribal cohesion in a money economy*. Manchester, 1958.
- Yorke, E. J. 'A crisis of colonial control: war and authority in Northern Rhodesia 1914-19'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1983.

Nyasaland

- Bandawe, Lewis Mataka. *Memoirs of a Malawian*, ed. and intr. B. Pachai. Blantyre, 1971.
- Barnekov, T. K. *An inquiry into the development of native administration in Nyasaland, 1888-1937*. Syracuse, NY, 1967.
- Boeder, R. B. 'Malawians abroad. The history of labour emigration from Malawi to its neighbors, 1890 to the present'. Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State University, 1974.
- Malawi*. World Bibliographical Series, vol. 8. Oxford and Santa Barbara, 1979.
- Chanock, M. L. 'The political economy of independent agriculture in colonial Malawi: the Great War to the Great Depression', *Journal of Social Science* (University of Malawi), 1972, 1, 113-29.
- 'Ambiguities in the Malawian political tradition', *African Affairs*, 1975, 74, no. 296, 326-46.
- Law, custom and social order: the colonial experience in Malawi and Zambia*. Cambridge, 1985.
- Dean, E. *The supply responses of African farmers. Theory and measurement in Malawi*. Amsterdam, 1966.
- Gelfand, Michael. *Lakeside Pioneers: socio-medical study of Nyasaland (1875-1920)*. Oxford, 1964.

12. BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA

- Guingand, Francis de. *African assignment*. London, 1953.
- Linden, Ian. *Catholics, peasants and Chewa resistance in Nyasaland 1889-1939*. London, 1974.
- Linden, Ian and Jane. 'John Chilembwe and the "New Jerusalem"', *Journal of African History*, 1971, 12, 4, 629-51.
- Lohrentz, K. P. 'Joseph Booth, Charles Domingo and the Seventh Day Baptists in Northern Nyasaland, 1910-12', *Journal of African History*, 1971, 12, 3, 461-80.
- McCracken, J. *Politics and Christianity in Malawi 1875-1940: the impact of the Livingstonia Mission in the Northern Province*. Cambridge, 1977.
- 'Underdevelopment in Malawi: the missionary contribution', *African Affairs*, 1977, 76, no. 303, 195-209.
- 'Experts and expertise in colonial Malawi', *African Affairs*, 1982, 81, 322, 101-16.
- 'Planters, peasants and the colonial state: the impact of the native tobacco board in the Central Province of Malawi', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1983, 9, 2, 172-92.
- Macdonald, Roderick J. ed. *From Nyasaland to Malawi: studies in colonial history*. Nairobi, 1975.
- Mandala, E. 'Peasant cotton agriculture, gender and inter-generational relationships: the lower Tchiri (Shire) valley of Malawi, 1906-1940', *African Studies Review* (East Lansing, Michigan), 1982, 25, 2-3, 27-44.
- Nyasaland Government. *Report of the committee appointed by H.E. the Governor to enquire into emigrant labour, 1935*. Zomba, 1936.
- Pachai, B. ed. *The early history of Malawi*. London, 1972.
- Malawi: the history of the nation*. London, 1973.
- Land and politics in Malawi, 1875-1975*. Kingston, Ontario, 1978.
- Page, M. E. 'The war of Thangata: Nyasaland and the East African campaign, 1914-1919', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 87-100.
- 'The Great War and Chewa society in Malawi', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1980, 6, 2, 171-82.
- Phiri, D. D. *Malawians to remember: John Chilembwe*. Lilongwe, 1976.
- Phiri, K. M. 'Afro-American influence in colonial Malawi, 1891-1945', in Harris, J. E. ed. *Global dimensions of the African diaspora*, pp. 250-67. Washington, DC, 1982.
- Read, Margaret. 'Migrant labour in Africa and its effects on tribal life'. *International Labour Review*, 1942, 45, 6, 605-31.
- Shepperson, G. A. 'Nyasaland and the millennium', in Thrupp, S. ed. *Millennial dreams in action*, pp. 144-59. The Hague, 1962.
- Shepperson, G. A. and Price, T. *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the origins, setting and significance of the Nyasaland native rising of 1915*. Edinburgh, 1958.
- Tangri, R. 'Inter-war "Native Associations" and the formation of the Nyasaland African Congress', *Transafrican Journal of History*, 1971, 1, 84-102.
- 'Colonial and settler pressures and the African move to the politics of representation and union in Nyasaland', *Journal of African History*, 1972, 13, 2, 291-304.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Vail, H. Leroy. 'The making of an imperial slum: Nyasaland and its railways, 1895-1935', *Journal of African History*, 1975, 16, 1, 89-112.
- 'Ethnicity, language and national unity: the case of Malawi', in Bonner, P. ed. *Working papers in Southern African Studies*, pp. 121-63. Johannesburg, 1981.
- van Velsen, J. 'Some early pressure groups in Malawi', in Stokes, E. and Brown, R. eds. *The Zambesian past: studies in Central African history*, pp. 376-412. Manchester, 1966.
- Vaughan, M. 'Food production and family labour in southern Malawi: the Shire highlands and upper Shire valley in the early colonial period', *Journal of African History*, 1982, 23, 3, 351-64.
- 'Idioms of madness: Zomba lunatic asylum, Nyasaland, in the colonial period', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 1983, 9, 2, 218-38.
- Wanda, B. P. 'Colonialism, nationalism and tradition. The evolution and development of the legal system of Malawi'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1979.

13. EAST AFRICA

- Anderson, D. 'The colonial state and soil conservation in East Africa during the 1930s', *African Affairs*, 1984, 83, no. 332, 321-43.
- Baumhögger, G. *Dominanz oder Kooperation. Die Entwicklung der regionalen Integration in Ostafrika*. Hamburg, 1978.
- Beck, A. *A history of the British medical administration of East Africa, 1900-1950*. Cambridge, Mass., 1970.
- Boell, L. *Die Operationen in Ostafrika*. Hamburg, 1951.
- Brett, E. A. *Colonialism and underdevelopment in East Africa: the politics of economic change, 1919-39*. London, 1973.
- Dundas, C. *African crossroads*. London, 1955.
- East African Standard*. *The East African red book, 1925-26*. Nairobi and Mombasa, 1925.
- Furley, O. W. and Watson, T. *A history of education in East Africa*. New York, 1978.
- Goldthorpe, J. E. *An African elite: Makerere College students 1922-1960*. Nairobi, 1965.
- Gregory, R. G. *Sidney Webb and East Africa*. Berkeley, 1962.
- India and East Africa: a history of race relations within the British Empire, 1890-1939*. Oxford, 1971.
- Gulliver, P. H. ed. *Tradition and transition in East Africa*. London, 1969.
- Hailey, Lord. *Native administration in the British African territories*. Part 1. *East Africa: Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika*. London, 1950.
- Harlow, V. and Chilver, E. M. eds. *History of East Africa*, vol. II. Oxford, 1965.
- Hill, M. F. *Permanent way*, vol. 1. *The story of the Kenya and Uganda railway*. Nairobi, 1949; vol. II. *The story of the Tanganyika railways*. Nairobi, 1957.
- Hodges, G. W. T. 'African manpower statistics for the British forces in East Africa, 1914-1918', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 1, 101-16.
- Hordern, C. and Stacke, F. M. *Military operations: East Africa*, vol. 1. (1914-1916). London, 1941.

13. EAST AFRICA

- Huxley, Julian S. *Africa view*. London, 1931.
- King, Kenneth J. *Pan-Africanism and education. A study of race philanthropy and education in the southern states of America and East Africa*. Oxford, 1971.
- Lonsdale, J. M. 'Some origins of nationalism in East Africa', *Journal of African History*, 1968, 9, 1, 119-46.
- Low, D. A. and Smith, Alison. eds. *History of East Africa*, vol. III. Oxford, 1976.
- Lury, D. A. 'African population estimates: back projections of recent census results', *Economic and Statistical Review*, 1965, 16, viii-xii.
- Macmillan, Allister. *Eastern Africa and Rhodesia*. London, 1930.
- Mangat, J. S. *A history of the Asians in East Africa, c. 1886-1945*. Oxford, 1969.
- Meinertzhagen, R. *Army diary 1899-1926*. Edinburgh and London, 1960.
- Mitchell, P. *African afterthoughts*. London, 1954.
- Morris, H. F. and Read, J. S. *Indirect rule and the search for justice. Essays in East African legal history*. Oxford, 1972.
- Mosley, L. *Duel for Kilimanjaro*. London, 1963.
- Moyse-Bartlett, H. *The King's African Rifles*. Aldershot, 1957.
- Munro, J. F. 'British rubber companies in East Africa before the First World War', *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 3, 369-79.
- Ogot, B. A. ed. *War and society in Africa*. London, 1972.
- Perham, M. *East African journey. Kenya and Tanganyika 1929-30*. London, 1976.
- Rai, K. *Indians and British colonialism in East Africa, 1883-1939*. Patna, 1979.
- Ranger, T. O. 'African attempts to control education in East and Central Africa, 1900-1939', *Past and Present*, 1965, 32, 57-85.
- Dance and society in Eastern Africa, 1890-1970. The beni ngoma*. London, 1975.
- Stahl, K. *The metropolitan organisation of British colonial trade*. London, 1951.
- Whiteley, W. H. *Swahili: the rise of a national language*. London, 1969.

German East Africa

(Some works which also refer to Tanganyika are listed here.)

- Austen, R. A. *Northwest Tanzania under German and British rule 1889-1939*. New Haven, 1968.
- Bald, D. *Deutsch-Ostafrika 1900-1914*. Munich, 1970.
- Bald, D. and G. *Das Forschungsinstitut AMANI. Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft in der deutschen Kolonialpolitik*. Munich, 1972.
- Brumfit, Ann. 'The rise and development of a language policy in German East Africa', *Sprache und Geschichte in Afrika*, 1980, 2, 219-331.
- Byern, G. von. *Shamba, Mpori und Bahari, Ostafrikanische Momentbilder*. Leipzig, 1916.
- Chrétien, J.-P. 'La Révolte de Ndungutse (1912). Forces traditionnelles et pression coloniale au Rwanda allemand', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1972, 59, no. 217, 645-80.
- Ekemode, G. O. 'German rule in north-east Tanzania, 1885-1914'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1973.
- Götzen, G. A. Graf von. *Deutsch-Ostafrika im Aufstand 1905-06*. Berlin, 1909.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Gwassa, G. C. K. and Iliffe, J. eds. *Records of the Maji Maji rising*, part 1. Nairobi, 1968.
- Iliffe, J. *Tanganyika under German rule, 1905–1912*. Cambridge, 1969.
- Kjekshus, H. *Ecology control and economic development in East African history: the case of Tanganyika 1850–1950*. London, 1977.
- Kootz-Kretschmer, E. *Die Safwa*. Berlin, 1926–1929. 3 vols.
- Larson, L. E. 'A history of the Mahenge (Ulanga) district, c. 1860–1957'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1976.
- Lettow-Vorbeck, P. von. *My reminiscences of East Africa*. London, n.d. [1920].
- Louis, W. Roger. *Ruanda-Urundi, 1884–1919*. Oxford, 1963.
- Lugan, B. 'Le Commerce de traite au Rwanda sous le régime allemand (1896–1916)', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1977, 11, 2, 235–68.
- Methner, W. *Unter drei Gouverneuren* [Götzen-Rechenberg-Schnee]. Breslau, 1938.
- Pipping-Van Hulten, I. *An episode of colonial history: the German press in Tanzania 1901–1914*. Uppsala, 1974.
- Prüsse, A. *Zwanzig Jahre Ansiedler in Deutsch-Ostafrika*. Stuttgart, 1929.
- Ryckmans, P. *Une page d'histoire coloniale. L'occupation allemande dans l'Urundi*. Brussels, 1953.
- Schnee, H. *Deutsch-Ostafrika im Weltkrieg: wie wir lebten und kämpften*. Leipzig, 1919.
- Als letzter Gouverneur in Deutsch-Ostafrika. Erinnerungen*. Heidelberg, 1964.
- Shorter, A. E. M. *Chiefship in western Tanzania: a political history of the Kimbu*. Oxford, 1972.
- Tanzania National Archives. *Guide to the German records*. 2 vols. Dar es Salaam and Marburg, 1973.
- Tetzlaff, R. *Koloniale Entwicklung und Ausbeutung: Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Deutsch-Ostafrikas 1885–1914*. Berlin, 1970.
- Weule, K. *Native life in East Africa*. tr. A. Werner. London, 1909.

Tanganyika

- Heussler, R. *British Tanganyika: an essay and documents on district administration*. Durham, NC, 1971.
- Hinnenberg, W. 'Die deutschen Bestrebungen zur wirtschaftlichen Durchdringung Tanganyikas 1925 bis 1933'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Hamburg, 1972.
- Iliffe, J. ed. *Modern Tanzanians*. Nairobi, 1973.
- A modern history of Tanganyika*. Cambridge, 1979.
- Kaniki, M. and Gwassa, G. C. K. eds. *Tanzania under colonial rule*. London, 1979.
- Kayamba, M. 'The story of Martin Kayamba Mdumi, MBE', in Perham, M. ed. *Ten Africans*, pp. 173–272. London, 1936. Reprinted 1963.
- Leubuscher, C. *Tanganyika Territory: a study of economic policy under mandate*. London, 1944.
- Liebenow, J. G. *Colonial rule and political development in Tanzania: the case of Makonde*. Evanston, 1971.

- Lumley, E. K. *Forgotten mandate: a British district officer in Tanganyika*. Hamden, Conn., 1976.
- McCarthy, D. M. P. *Colonial bureaucracy and creating underdevelopment: Tanganyika 1919-1940*. Ames, Iowa, 1982.
- Moffett, J. P. ed. *Tanganyika: a review of its resources and their development*. Dar es Salaam, 1955.
- ed. *Handbook of Tanganyika*. 2nd ed. Dar es Salaam, 1958.
- Morris-Hale, W. *British administration in Tanganyika from 1920 to 1945, with special reference to the preparation of Africans for administrative positions*. Geneva, 1969.
- Ranger, T. O. 'Godly medicine: the ambiguities of medical mission in south-east Tanzania, 1900-1945', *Social Science and Medicine*, 1981, 15B, 261-77.
- Rogers, S. G. 'The Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association: administrative responses to Chagga initiatives in the 1920s', *Transafrican Journal of History*, 1974, 4, 94-114.
- Shivji, I. G. 'Semi-proletarian labour and the use of penal sanctions in the labour law of colonial Tanganyika (1920-1938)', in Sumner, C. ed. *Crime, justice and underdevelopment*, pp. 40-60. London, 1982.
- Sweet, C. Louise. 'Inventing crime: British colonial land policy in Tanganyika', in Sumner, C. ed. *Crime, justice and underdevelopment*, pp. 61-89. London, 1982.
- Walji, S. R. 'A history of the Ismaili community in Tanzania'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1974.
- Westcott, N. J. 'An East African radical: the life of Erica Fiah', *Journal of African History*, 1981, 22, 1, 85-101.
- Wilson, Monica. *For men and elders. Change in the relations of generations and of men and women among the Nyakyusa-Ngonde people 1875-1971*. London, 1978.

Kenya

- Anderson, D. M. 'Herder, settler and colonial rule: a history of the peoples of the Baringo plains, Kenya, c. 1890 to 1940'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1982.
- Berman, B. J. and Lonsdale, J. M. 'Crises of accumulation, coercion and the colonial state: the development of the labour control system in Kenya, 1919-1929', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1980, 14, 1, 37-54.
- Blixen, Karen. *Isak Dinesen: letters from Africa 1914-1931*. ed. F. Lasson. London, 1981.
- Brantley, Cynthia. *The Giriama and colonial resistance in Kenya, 1800-1920*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1981.
- Bujra, J. M. 'Women "entrepreneurs" of early Nairobi', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 1975, 9, 2, 213-34.
- Carman, J. A. *A medical history of the colony and protectorate of Kenya: a personal memoir*. London, 1976.
- Carnegie, V. M. *A Kenyan farm diary*. Edinburgh and London, 1930.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cell, John W. ed. and intr. *By Kenya possessed: the correspondence of Norman Leys and J. H. Oldham, 1918-1926*. Chicago and London, 1976.
- Clayton, A. and Savage, D. C. *Government and labour in Kenya 1895-1963*. London, 1974.
- Coldham, S. 'Colonial policy and the Highlands of Kenya, 1934-1944', *Journal of African Law*, 1979, 23, 1, 65-83.
- Coray, M. S. 'The Kenya Land Commission and the Kikuyu of Kiambu', *Agricultural History* (Washington), 1978, 52, 1, 179-93.
- Ellis, D. 'The Nandi protest of 1923 in the context of African resistance to colonial rule in Kenya', *Journal of African History*, 1976, 17, 4, 555-75.
- Fearn, H. 'The gold-mining era in Kenya colony', *Journal of Tropical Geography*, 1958, 11, 43-58.
- An African economy. A study of the economic development of the Nyanza Province of Kenya 1903-1953*. London, 1961.
- Feldman, D. M. 'Christians and politics: the origins of the Kikuyu Central Association in northern Murang'a, 1890-1930'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1979.
- Frontera, A. E. *Persistence and change: a history of Taveta*. Waltham, Mass., 1978.
- Ghai, Y. and McAuslan, J. P. W. B. *Public law and political change in Kenya*. London, 1970.
- Gorman, T. P. 'The development of language policy in Kenya, with particular reference to the educational system', in Whiteley, W. H. ed. *Language in Kenya*, pp. 397-453. Nairobi, 1974.
- Gregory, R. G., Maxon, R. and Spencer, L. *A guide to the Kenya National Archives*. Syracuse, 1968.
- Hay, M. J. 'Luo women and economic change during the colonial period', in Hafkin, N. J. and Bay, E. G. eds. *Women in Africa*, pp. 87-109. Stanford, 1976.
- Huxley, Elspeth. *White man's country: Lord Delamere and the making of Kenya*. London, 1935.
- ed. *Nellie: Letters from Africa*. London, 1980.
- Huxley, Elspeth and Curtis, Arnold. *Pioneers' Scrapbook. Reminiscences of Kenya 1890 to 1968*. London, 1980.
- Kanogo, Tabitha M. J. 'The political economy of Kikuyu movement in the Rift Valley, 1900-63: the case of Nakuru district'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Nairobi, 1979.
- Kindy, H. *Life and politics in Mombasa*. Nairobi, 1972.
- King, Kenneth J. 'The Kenya Maasai and the protest phenomenon, 1900-1960', *Journal of African History*, 1971, 12, 1, 117-37.
- King, Kenneth J. and Salim, A. eds. *Kenya historical biographies*. Nairobi, 1971.
- Kipkorir, B. E. 'The Alliance High School and the origins of the Kenya African elite 1926-1962'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1970.
- ed. *Biographical essays on imperialism and collaboration in colonial Kenya*. Nairobi, 1980.
- Kitching, Gavin. *Class and economic change in Kenya: the making of an African petite-bourgeoisie 1905-1970*. New Haven, 1980.

13. EAST AFRICA

- Lamphear, J. 'Aspects of Turkana leadership during the era of primary resistance', *Journal of African History*, 1976, 17, 2, 225-43.
- Leys, N. *Kenya*. London, 1924.
- Lonsdale, J. M. and Berman, B. 'Coping with the contradictions: the development of the colonial state in Kenya, 1895-1914', *Journal of African History*, 1979, 20, 4, 487-506.
- Mosley, P. *The settler economies. Studies in the economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1963*. Cambridge, 1983.
- Mungeam, G. H. *British rule in Kenya 1895-1912*. Oxford, 1966.
- Kenya: *select historical documents 1884-1923*. Nairobi, 1978.
- Munro, J. F. *Colonial rule and the Kamba*. Oxford, 1975.
- Murray, N. U. 'Archdeacon W. E. Owen: missionary as propagandist', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1982, 15, 4, 653-70.
- Newman, J. R. *The Ukamba Members Association*. Nairobi, 1974.
- Ogot, B. A. ed. *Hadith*, 3-7. Nairobi, 1971-2, 1975-6, 1979.
- Ojuka, A. and Ochieng', W. eds. *Politics and leadership in Africa*. Nairobi, 1975.
- Redley, M. G. 'The politics of predicament: the white community in Kenya 1918-32'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1977.
- Rosberg, C. G. and Nottingham, J. *The myth of 'Mau Mau': nationalism in Kenya*. New York, 1966.
- Ross, W. McGregor. *Kenya from within*. London, 1927.
- Salim, A. I. *The Swahili-speaking peoples of Kenya's coast 1895-1965*. Nairobi, 1973.
- Savage, D. C. and Munro, J. F. 'Carrier corps recruitment in the British East Africa Protectorate, 1914-1918', *Journal of African History*, 1966, 7, 2, 313-42.
- Schilling, D. G. 'Local native councils and the politics of education in Kenya 1925-39', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1976, 9, 2, 218-47.
- Simpson, Alyse. *The land that never was*. London, 1937.
- Soff, H. G. 'Indian influence on Kenya's Nyanza Province, 1900-1925', *Journal of Indian History*, 1968, 46, 3, 369-86.
- Sorrenson, M. P. K. *Origins of European settlement in Kenya*. Nairobi, 1968.
- Spencer, I. R. G. 'The first assault on Indian ascendancy: Indian traders in the Kenya reserves, 1895-1929', *African Affairs*, 1981, 80, no. 320, 327-43.
- Stichter, Sharon. *Migrant labour in Kenya: capitalism and African response, 1895-1975*. London, 1981.
- Strobel, Margaret. *Muslim women in Mombasa, 1890-1975*. New Haven, 1979.
- Swainson, Nicola. *The development of corporate capitalism in Kenya, 1918-1977*. London, 1980.
- Thuku, H. *Harry Thuku. An autobiography*. Nairobi, 1970.
- Tignor, R. L. *The colonial transformation of Kenya. The Kamba, Kikuyu and Maasai from 1900 to 1939*. Princeton, 1976.
- Turton, E. R. 'The impact of Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the East African Protectorate', *Journal of African History*, 1969, 10, 4, 641-57.
- 'The Isaq Somali diaspora and poll-tax agitation in Kenya, 1936-41', *African Affairs*, 1974, 73, no. 292, 325-46.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- van Zwaneberg, R. M. A. 'History and theory of urban poverty in Nairobi: the problem of slum development', *Journal of Eastern African Research and Development*, 1972, 2, 2, 165-203.
- Colonial capitalism and labour in Kenya 1919-1939*. Nairobi, 1975.
- Webster, J. B. *et al. A bibliography on Kenya*. Syracuse, 1967.
- Weigt, E. 'Die Kolonisation Kenias', *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Leipzig*, 1930-1, 51, 25-123.
- White, Luise. 'A colonial state and an African petty bourgeoisie: prostitution, property and class struggle in Nairobi, 1936-1940', in Cooper, F. ed. *Struggle for the city: migrant labor, capital and the state in urban Africa*, pp. 167-94. Beverly Hills, 1983.
- Wolf, J. B. 'Asian and African recruitment in the Kenya police, 1920-1950', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1973, 6, 3, 401-12.
- Wrigley, C. C. 'Kenya: the patterns of economic life, 1902-1945', in Harlow and Chilver, *History of East Africa*, II, pp. 209-64.
- Wylie, D. 'Confrontation over Kenya: the Colonial Office and its critics 1918-1940', *Journal of African History*, 1977, 18, 3, 427-47.
- Yoshida, M. 'The protected development of European agriculture in Kenya before the Second World War', *East African Journal of Rural Development*, 1969, 2, 2, 76-102.

Uganda

- Barber, J. *Imperial frontier: a study of relations between the British and the pastoral tribes of north-east Uganda*. Nairobi, 1968.
- Bell, H. H. J. *Glimpses of a governor's life, from diaries, letters and memoranda*. London, 1946.
- Carter, Fay V. 'Education in Uganda, 1894-1945'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1967.
- Cook, A. R. *Uganda memories 1897-1940*. Kampala, 1945.
- Doornbos, M. *Not all the king's men. Inequality as a political instrument in Ankole, Uganda*. The Hague, 1978.
- Dunbar, A. R. *A history of Bunyoro-Kitara*. Nairobi, 1965.
- Ehrlich, C. 'The Uganda economy, 1903-1945', in Harlow and Chilver, *History of East Africa*, II, 395-475.
- Gutkind, P. C. W. *The royal capital of Buganda*. The Hague, 1963.
- Ingham, K. *The kingdom of Toro in Uganda*. London, 1975.
- Jamal, V. 'Asians in Uganda, 1880-1972: inequality and expulsion', *Economic History Review*, 1976, 606-16.
- King, A. 'The Yakan cult and Lugbara response to colonial rule', *Azania*, 1970, 5, 1-25.
- Low, D. A. *The mind of Buganda: documents of the modern history of an African kingdom*. London, 1971.
- Low, D. A. and Pratt, R. C. *Buganda and British over-rule, 1900-1955*. London, 1960.
- McGregor, G. P. *King's College, Budo: the first sixty years*. Nairobi, 1967.
- Mamdani, M. *Politics and class formation in Uganda*. New York and London, 1976.

13. EAST AFRICA

- Morris, H. F. 'Sir Philip Mitchell and "protected rule" in Buganda', *Journal of African History*, 1972, 13, 2, 305-23.
- Morris, H. F. and Read, J. S. *Uganda: the development of its laws and constitution*. London, 1966.
- Motani, N. A. *On His Majesty's Service in Uganda: the origins of Uganda's African civil service, 1912-1940*. Syracuse, NY, 1977.
- 'Makerere College, 1922-1940: a study in colonial rule and educational retardation', *African Affairs*, 1979, 78, no. 312, 357-69.
- Nayenga, P. F. B. 'Chiefs and the "land question" in Busoga district, Uganda, 1895-1936', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1979, 12, 2, 183-209.
- 'Commercial cotton growing in Busoga District, Uganda, 1905-23', *African Economic History*, 1981, 10, 175-95.
- Oded, A. 'The Bayudaya of Uganda: a portrait of an African Jewish community', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 1974, 6, 3, 167-86.
- Powesland, P. G. *Economic policy and labour: a study in Uganda's economic history*, ed. W. Elkan. Kampala, 1957.
- Richards, A. I. ed. *Economic development and tribal change: a study of immigrant labour in Buganda*. Cambridge, 1954. 2nd ed. Nairobi, 1973.
- Roberts, A. D. 'The sub-imperialism of the Baganda', *Journal of African History*, 1962, 3, 3, 435-50.
- Scotton, J. F. 'The first African press in East Africa: protest and nationalism in Uganda in the 1920s', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1973, 6, 2, 211-28.
- Soff, H. G. 'Sleeping sickness in the Lake Victoria region of British East Africa, 1900-1915', *African Historical Studies*, 1969, 2, 2, 255-68.
- Taylor, T. F. 'The struggle for economic control of Uganda, 1919-1922: formulation of an economic policy', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1978, 11, 1, 1-31.
- Thomas, H. B. and Scott, R. *Uganda*. London, 1935.
- Thomas, H. B. and Spencer, A. E. *A History of Uganda land and surveys*. Entebbe, 1938.
- Tosh, J. 'Small-scale resistance in Uganda: the Lango "Rising" at Adwari in 1919', *Azania*, 1974, 9, 51-64.
- Clan leaders and colonial chiefs in Lango*. Oxford, 1978.
- 'Lango agriculture during the early colonial period: land and labour in a cash-crop economy', *Journal of African History*, 1978, 19, 3, 415-39.
- Tothill, J. D. ed. *Agriculture in Uganda*. Oxford, 1940.
- Turyahikayo-Rugema, B. 'The British imposition of colonial rule on Uganda: the Baganda agents in Kigezi (1908-1930)', *Transafrican Journal of History*, 1976, 5, 1, 111-33.
- Twaddle, M. J. 'Politics in Bukedi, 1900-1939'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1967.
- 'The *Bakungu* chiefs of Buganda under British colonial rule, 1900-1930', *Journal of African History*, 1969, 10, 2, 309-22.
- Vail, D. J. *A history of agricultural innovation and development in Teso District, Uganda*. Syracuse, NY, 1972.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- van Zwanenberg, R. M. A. with King, A. *An economic history of Kenya and Uganda, 1800-1970*. London, 1975.
- Vincent, Joan. *Teso in transformation. The political economy of peasant and class in eastern Africa*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1982.
- West, H. W. *Land policy in Buganda*. Cambridge, 1972.
- Wrigley, C. C. *Crops and wealth in Uganda*. Kampala, 1959.

Zanzibar

- Bennett, N. R. *A history of the Arab state of Zanzibar*. London, 1978.
- The Arab state of Zanzibar: a bibliography*. Boston, 1984.
- Cooper, F. *From slaves to squatters: plantation labor and agriculture in Zanzibar and coastal Kenya, 1890-1925*. New Haven, 1980.
- Lofchie, M. *Zanzibar: background to revolution*. Princeton, 1965.

14. ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN

Ethiopia

- Addis Hiwet (pseudonym). *Ethiopia: from autocracy to revolution*. (Review of *African Political Economy*, occasional publication no. 1.) London, 1975.
- Aleme Eshete, 'Ethiopia and the Bolshevik revolution, 1917-1935', *Africa* (Rome), 1977, 32, 1, 1-28.
- Alula Hidaru and Dessalegn Rahmato, eds. *A short guide to the study of Ethiopia. A general bibliography*. Westport, Conn. and London, 1976.
- Azaïs, F. and Chambard, R. *Cinq années de recherches archéologiques en Ethiopie. Province du Harar et Ethiopie méridionale*. Paris, 1931.
- Badoglio, P. *The war in Abyssinia*. London, 1937. tr. from *La Guerra d'Etiopia*, Milan, 1936.
- Bahru Zewde, 'Relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan on the western Ethiopian frontier, 1898-1935'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1976.
- Bairu Tafla, *Ethiopia and Germany: cultural, political and economic relations, 1871-1936*. Wiesbaden, 1981.
- Barker, A. J. *The civilizing mission: the Italo-Ethiopian war, 1935-6*. London, 1968.
- Bartnicki, A. and Mantel-Niećko, J., tr. R. Richter. *Geschichte Äthiopiens (von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart)*. Berlin, 1978. 2 vols.
- Becker, Lutz. *Lion of Judah*. Compilation film, ed. D. Mingay. London and Hamburg, 1981.
- Berhanou Abbebe. *Évolution de la propriété foncière au Choa (Éthiopie) du règne de Ménélik à la constitution de 1931*. Paris, 1971.
- Boca, A. del. tr. P. D. Cummins. *The Ethiopian War 1935-41*. Chicago, 1969.
- Bongiovanni, A. *La Fine dell'impero. Africa Orientale 1940-1941*. Milan, 1974.
- Bono, E. de. tr. B. Miall. *Anno XIII: the conquest of an empire*. London, 1937.
- Borra, F. *Prologo di un conflitto. Colloqui col segretario del negus (Dicembre 1934-Ottobre 1935)*. Milan, 1965.
- Braukämper, Ulrich. *Geschichte der Hadiya Süd-Äthiopien von den Anfängen bis zur Revolution 1974*. Wiesbaden, 1980.

14. ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN

- Brotto, E. 'Il Regime delle terre nel governo del Harar', *Rivista di Diritto Coloniale*, 1939, 2-3 and 4, 349-65, 589-608. Published separately, Addis Ababa, n.d.
- Brown, C. F. *Ethiopian perspectives: a bibliographical guide to the history of Ethiopia*. Westport, Conn., 1978.
- Caulk, R. 'Armies as predators: soldiers and peasants in Ethiopia c. 1850-1935', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1978, 11, 3, 457-93.
- Cerulli, Enrico. *Etiopia occidentale: dallo scioa alla frontiera del Sudan*. Rome, 1932-33. 2 vols.
- Cheesman, R. E. *Lake Tana and the Blue Nile. An Abyssinian quest*. London, 1936.
- Coffey, T. *Lion by the tail. The story of the Italian-Ethiopian war*. London, 1974.
- Darch, C. *A Soviet view of Africa. An annotated bibliography on Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti*. Boston, 1980.
- Darley, H. and Sharp, N. A. D. *Slave trading and slave owning in Abyssinia*. London, 1922.
- Ethiopia, Ministry of Justice. *Documents on Italian war crimes submitted to the United Nations War Crimes Commission by the Imperial Ethiopian Government*. Addis Ababa, 1949-50. 2 vols.
- Gandar Dower, K. Cecil. ed. *Abyssinian patchwork, an anthology*. London, 1949.
- Garretson, P. 'A history of Addis Ababa from its foundation in 1886 to 1910'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1974.
- 'Some Amharic sources for modern Ethiopian history, 1889-1935 (with notes by Richard Pankhurst)', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 1978, 41, 2, 283-96.
- 'Ethiopia's telephone and telegraph system, 1897-1935', *Northeast African Studies*, 1980, 2, 1, 59-71.
- Frontier feudalism in northwest Ethiopia: Shaykh al-Iman 'Abd Allah of Nugara, 1901-1923', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1982, 15, 2, 261-82.
- Gidada (*Qes*). *The other side of darkness*. New York, 1972.
- Graziani, R. *Il Fronte sud*. Milan, 1938.
- Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division). *A handbook of Abyssinia*. London, 1917.
- Great Britain: Department of Overseas Trade. *Economic conditions in Ethiopia, 1929-31*. London, 1932.
- Greenfield, R. *Ethiopia. A new political history*. London, 1965.
- Guèbré Sellassié. *Chronique du règne de Ménélik II roi des rois d'Éthiopie*. tr. Tesfa Sellassie, ed. M. de Coppet. Paris, 1930-31, 2 vols. Amharic text, *Tarike Zemen ze-Dagmawi Menilek Neguse ze-Ityopya*. Addis Ababa, 1966-7.
- Hess, R. L. ed. *Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Ethiopian Studies* (Session B, April 1978). Chicago, 1979.
- Hodson, A. W. *Seven years in southern Abyssinia*. London, 1927.
- Konovaloff, F. E. *Con le armate del negus, un bianco fra i neri*. tr. S. Micciché. Bologna, 1937.
- Leiris, M. *L'Afrique fantôme*. Paris, 1934.
- Lenzi, Giulio. *Diari Africani*. Pisa, 1973.
- Lifonti, A. *Dizionario terriero* (AOI Governo del Harar). Harar, n.d. [1940].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Loepfe, W. *Alfred Ilg und die Äthiopische Eisenbahn*. Zurich, 1974.
- McCann, James. 'Ethiopia, Britain, and negotiations for the Lake Tana dam, 1922-1935', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1981, 14, 4, 667-99.
- McClellan, C. 'Reaction to Ethiopian expansion: the case of Darasa, 1895-1935'. Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State University, 1978.
- 'Perspectives on the Neftenya-Gabbar system: the Darasa, Ethiopia', *Africa* (Rome), 1978, 33, 3, 426-40.
- 'Land, labor, and coffee: the south's role in Ethiopian self-reliance, 1889-1935', *African Economic History*, 1980, 9, 69-83.
- Macfie, J. W. S. *An Ethiopian diary. A record of the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia*. Liverpool, 1936.
- Macomber, W. F. and Getachew Haile. *A catalogue of Ethiopian manuscripts microfilmed for the Ethiopian Manuscript Library, Addis Ababa and for the Monastic Manuscript Microfilm Library, Collegeville*. Collegeville, Minnesota, 1975-6, 1978-9. 4 vols.
- Mahteme Sellassie. ed. *Zegre neger (Past things)*. Addis Ababa, 1946-7 and 1969-70.
- Mantel-Niećko, Joanna. tr. K. A. Bobiński. *The role of land tenure in the system of Ethiopian imperial government in modern times*. Warsaw, 1980.
- Marcus, H. G. *The modern history of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: a select and annotated bibliography*. Stanford, 1972.
- The life and times of Menelik II. Ethiopia 1844-1913*. Oxford, 1975.
- 'The embargo on arms sales to Ethiopia, 1916-1930', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1983, 16, 2, 263-79.
- Mérab, P. E. *Impressions d'Éthiopie (L'Abyssinie sous Ménélik II)*. Paris, 1921, 1922, 1929. 3 vols.
- Montandon, G. *Au pays Ghimirra. Récit de mon voyage à travers le massif éthiopien (1909-1911)*. Paris and Neuchatel, 1913.
- Moreno, M. 'Il Regime terriero Abissino nel Galla-Sidama', *Rassegna Economica dell'Africa Italiana*, 1937, 25, 1496-1508.
- Mori, Renato. *Mussolini e la conquista dell'Etiopia*. Florence, 1978.
- Mosley, L. *Haile Selassie: the conquering lion*. London, 1964.
- Nasi, G. *Noi Italiani in Etiopia*. Rome, 1950.
- Natsoulas, T. 'The Hellenic presence in Ethiopia. A study of a European minority in Africa (1740-1936)', *Abba Salama. A Review of the Association of Ethio-Hellenic Studies* (Athens), 1977, 8, 5-230.
- Nelson, K. and Sullivan, A. eds. *John Melly of Ethiopia*. London, 1937.
- Norberg, Viveca Halldin. *Swedes in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, 1924-1952. A study in early development co-operation*. Uppsala, 1977.
- Orhonlu, C. 'Turkish archival sources on Ethiopia', in *IV Congresso Internazionale di Studi Etiopici (Roma, 10-15 aprile 1972)*, vol. 1, Sezione Storica. Rome, 1974.
- Osmanlı İmparatorluğu nun güney siyaseti. Habeş eyaleti*. (Ottoman political history: the province of Ethiopia.) Istanbul, 1974.
- Paleologos, C. *Tafari & Ci. Memorie raccolte e compilate da Aldo Cassuto*. Trieste, 1938.

14. ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN

- Pankhurst, R. *Economic history of Ethiopia 1800–1935*. Addis Ababa, 1968.
- ‘Education in Ethiopia during the Italian fascist occupation 1936–1941’, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1972, 5, 3, 361–96.
- ‘Road-building during the Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941)’, *Africa Quarterly*, 1976, 15, 3, 21–63.
- Perham, M. *The government of Ethiopia*. London, 1948. 2nd revised ed. 1969.
- Pierotti, F. *Vita in Etiopia 1940–41*. Bologna, 1959.
- Poggiali, C. *Diario Africana Orientale Italiana 15 giugno–4 ottobre 1937. Gli appunti segreti dell’inviato del ‘Corriere della Sera’*. Milan, 1971.
- Prouty, C. and Rosenfeld, E. *Historical dictionary of Ethiopia*. Metuchen, NJ, 1981.
- Quaranta, F. *Ethiopia, an empire in the making*. London, 1939.
- Rein, G. K. *Abessinien: eine Landeskunde nach Reisen und Studien in den Jahren 1907–1913*. Berlin, 1918–20. 3 vols.
- Rigotti, G. *L’Edilizia nell’Africa Orientale Italiana: la zona di Addis Abeba*. Turin, 1939.
- Rochat, G. *Militari e politici nella preparazione della campagna d’Etiopia. Studio e documenti 1932–1936*. Milan, 1971.
- Rouaud, A. ‘Les Contacts secrets italo-éthiopiens du printemps 1936 d’après les archives françaises’, *Africa* (Rome), 1982, 37, 4, 400–11.
- Rubenson, S. ed. *Proceedings of the seventh international conference of Ethiopian studies*. East Lansing, 1984.
- Sandford, Mrs D. A. ‘Ethiopia: reforms from within versus foreign control’, *International Affairs*, 1936, 15, 2, 183–201.
- Sbacchi, A. *Il Colonialismo Italiano in Etiopia, 1936–1940*. Milan, 1980.
- Ethiopia under Mussolini: Fascism and the colonial experience*. London, 1986.
- Selamu Bekele and Vanderlinden, J. ‘Introducing the Ethiopian law archives: some documents on the first Ethiopian cabinet’, *Journal of Ethiopian Law*, 1967, 4, 2, 411–31.
- Stahl, M. *Ethiopia: political contradictions in agricultural development*. Uppsala, 1974.
- Steer, G. L. *Caesar in Abyssinia*. London, 1936.
- Sealed and delivered. A book on the Abyssinian campaign*. London, 1942.
- Steffanson, B. and Starrett, R. eds. *Documents on Ethiopian politics [1910–1929]*. Salisbury, NC, 1977. 3 vols.
- Teshome Wagaw. *Educational development in Ethiopia*. Ann Arbor, 1979.
- Triulzi, A. ‘Recenti scoperte di materiale d’archivio inedito’, in *IV Congresso Internazionale di Studi Etiopici* (Roma, 10–15 aprile 1972), vol. 1, Sezione Storica. Rome, 1974.
- ‘Italian colonialism and Ethiopia’, *Journal of African History*, 1982, 23, 2, 237–43.
- Tubiana, Joseph. ed. *Modern Ethiopia: from the accession of Menelik to the present day*. Rotterdam, 1980.
- Ullendorff, E. trans. *The autobiography of Emperor Haile Sellassie I. ‘My life and Ethiopia’s progress 1892–1937’*. Oxford, 1976.
- Walker, C. H. *The Abyssinian at home*. London, 1933.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Wright, Stephen. ed. *Ethiopian incunabula*. Addis Ababa, 1967.
 Zervos, A. *L'Empire d'Éthiopie. Le miroir d'Éthiopie moderne 1906-1935*.
 Alexandria, 1936.
 Zoli, C. *Cronache Etiopiche*. Rome, 1930.
Etiopia d'oggi. Rome, 1935.

The coastal territories

- Archer, G. *Personal and historical memoirs of an East African administrator*.
 Edinburgh, 1963.
 Barile, P. *Colonizzazione fascista nella Somalia meridionale*. Rome, 1935.
 Bertin, Francine. 'L'Ougas des Issa'. *Pount*, 1968, 2, no. 5, 3-10.
 'Les Chefs Issa signataires des traités avec le gouvernement français', *Pount*,
 1973, 3, no. 12, 19-32.
 Boca, A. del. *Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale*, vol. 1. *Dall'Unità alla Marcia su
 Roma*; vol. II. *La Conquista dell'Impero*. Bari, 1976, 1979.
 Bologna, Luigi M. et al. *L'Avvaloramento agricolo e zootecnico in Eritrea, in Somalia
 e in Etiopia*. Rome, 1970.
 Caroselli, F. S. *Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia*. Rome, 1931.
 Castagno, Margaret. *Historical dictionary of Somalia*. Metuchen, NJ, 1975.
 Chailley, M. ed. E. Chedeville and R. Ferry. *Notes sur les 'Afar de la région de
 Tadjoura*. Paris and Djibouti, 1980.
 Cimmaruta, R. *Ual-Ual*. Milan, 1936.
 Clarke, W. S. 'The Republic of Djibouti - an introduction to Africa's newest
 state and a review of related literature and sources', *A Current Bibliography
 of African Affairs*, 1977-8, 10, 1, 3-31.
 Consociazione Turistica Italiana. *Guida dell'Africa. Orientale Italiana*. Milan,
 1938.
 Corni, G. ed. *Somalia Italiana*. Milan, 1937. 2 vols.
 Dalleo, P. T. 'Trade and pastoralism: economic factors in the history of the
 Somali of northeastern Kenya, 1892-1948'. Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse
 University, 1975.
 Deschamps, H. *Roi de la brousse*. Paris, 1975.
 Fatoke, S. O. 'Educational development and administrative control in British
 Somaliland', *Northeast African Studies*, 1981, 3, 3, 61-76.
 'British colonial administration of Somaliland Protectorate, 1920-1960'.
 Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois, 1982.
 Grassi, Fabio. *Le Origini dell'imperialismo italiano: il 'caso Somalo' (1896-1915)*.
 Lecce, 1980.
 Guadagni, M. 'Colonial origins of the public domain in southern Somalia
 (1892-1912)', *Journal of African Law*, 1978, 22, 1, 1-29.
*Xeerka Beeraha: Diritto fondiario somalo. Le terre agricole dal regime con-
 suetudinario e coloniale verso la riforma socialista*. Milan, 1981.
 Hersi, Ali Abdirahman. 'The Arab factor in Somali history: the origins and
 the development of Arab enterprise and cultural influences in the Somali
 peninsula'. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1977.
 Hess, R. 'The "Mad Mullah" and northern Somalia', *Journal of African History*,
 1964, 5, 3, 415-33.

14. ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN

- Italian colonialism in Somalia*. Chicago, 1966.
- 'The poor man of God: Muhammad Abdullah Hassan', in Bennett, N. R. ed. *Leadership in eastern Africa. Six political biographies*, pp. 65-108. Boston, 1968.
- Istituto Italo-Africano (Rome). *Quaderni d'informazione Somalia: Jamhuuriyadda Dimoqraadiga ee Soomaaliya*. Rome, 1975.
- Jardine, D. *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland*. London, 1923.
- Kakwenzire, P. K. 'Colonial rule in the British Somaliland protectorate, 1905-1939'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1976.
- Kassahun Checole. 'Eritrea: a preliminary bibliography', *Africana Journal*, 1975-6, 6, 4, 303-14.
- Kittermaster, H. B. 'The development of the Somali', *Journal of the African Society*, 1932, 31, no. 124, 234-44.
- Lewis, I. M. *The modern history of Somaliland: from nation to state*. London, 1965.
- Maino, C. *La Somalia e l'opera del Duca degli Abruzzi*. Rome, 1959.
- Marco, R. R. de. *The Italianization of African natives. Government native education in the Italian colonies 1890-1937*. New York, 1943.
- Martin, B. G. *Muslim brotherhoods in nineteenth-century Africa*. Cambridge, 1976.
- Martineau, A. 'Côte des Somalis', in Hanotaux, G. and Martineau, A. eds. *Histoire des colonies françaises*, iv, pp. 577-89. Paris, 1930.
- Mellana, Vincenzo. *L'Amministrazione della giustizia in Eritrea e in Somalia (1869-1936)*. Rome, 1971.
- L'Amministrazione della giustizia nell'Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI) (1936-1941)*. Rome, 1972.
- Mohamed Khalief Salad. ed. *Somalia. A bibliographical survey*. Westport, Conn. and London, 1977.
- Nadel, S. F. *Races and tribes of Eritrea*. Asmara, 1943.
- 'Land tenure on the Eritrean plateau', *Africa*, 1946, 16, 1, 1-21.
- Oberlé, Philippe. *Afars et somalis: le dossier de Djibouti*. Paris, 1971.
- Picquart, Agnès. 'Le Commerce des armes à Djibouti de 1888 à 1914', *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer*, 1971, 58, no. 213, 407-30.
- Pirone, M. *Appunti di Storia dell'Africa*, vol. 11: *Somalia*. Rome, 1961.
- Pollera, A. *Le Popolazioni indigene dell'Eritrea*. Bologna, 1935.
- Puglisi, G. *Chi è ? dell'Eritrea 1952. Dizionario biografico*. Asmara, 1952.
- Rayne, H. *Sun, sand and Somalis: leaves from the notebook of a district commissioner in British Somaliland*. London, 1921.
- Sillani, T. ed. *L'Africa Orientale Italiana e il conflitto Italo-Etiopico. Studi e documenti raccolti e ordinati da Tomaso Sillani*. Rome, 1936.
- Somali Republic, Camera di Commercio, Industria ed Agricoltura. *Bibliografica Somalia*. Mogadishu, 1958.
- Thompson, V. and Adloff, R. *Djibouti and the Horn of Africa*. Stanford, 1968.
- Vecchi di Val Cismon, C. M. de. *Orizzonti d'Impero: cinque anni in Somalia*. Milan, 1935.
- Villari, G. 'I "Gulti" della regione di Axum', *Rassegna Economica dell'Africa Italiana*, 1938, 26, 1430-44.
- Zoli, C. 'The organization of Italy's East African empire', *Foreign Affairs*, 1937, 16, 1, 80-90.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

15. EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

Egypt

- Ahmad, Jamal Mohamed. *The intellectual origins of Egyptian nationalism*. London and New York, 1960.
- Ayrout, H. H. *Moeurs et coutumes des fellahs*. Paris, 1938. English tr. Cairo, 1945.
- Baer, Gabriel. *A history of landownership in modern Egypt 1800-1950*. London, 1962.
- Berque, J. *Egypt, imperialism and revolution*. tr. Jean Stewart. London, 1972.
- Caddy, P. 'British policy and Egyptian unrest, 1914-1920'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1982.
- Colombe, Marcel. *L'Évolution de l'Égypte 1924-50*. Paris, 1951.
- Cromer, Earl of. *Modern Egypt*. London, 1908. 2 vols.
- Crouchley, A. E. *The economic development of Egypt*. London, 1938.
- Darwin, John. *Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: imperial policy in the aftermath of war, 1918-22*. London, 1981.
- Davis, Eric. *Challenging colonialism. Bank Misr and Egyptian industrialization 1920-1941*. Princeton, 1983.
- Deeb, Marius. *Party politics in Egypt: the Wafd and its rivals 1919-1939*. London, 1979.
- 'Labour and politics in Egypt, 1919-1939', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1979, 10, 2, 187-203.
- Elgood, P. G. *Egypt and the army*. London, 1924.
- Gran, Peter. 'Modern trends in Egyptian historiography: a review article', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1978, 9, 3, 367-71.
- Great Britain. Department of Overseas Trade. *Reports on economic and commercial conditions in Egypt*. London, 1921-1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1939.
- Guirguis, Helmy Tewfik Amin. *L'Effort de l'Égypte pour l'indépendance de 1922 à 1937*. Lille, 1979. 3 vols.
- Harris, C. P. *Nationalism and revolution in Egypt: the role of the Muslim Brotherhood*. The Hague, 1964.
- Holt, P. M. ed. *Political and social change in modern Egypt: historical studies from the Ottoman conquest to the United Arab Republic*. London, 1968.
- Hourani, A. *Arabic thought in the liberal age, 1798-1939*. London and New York, 1962. Reprinted, 1970.
- Hurewitz, J. C. ed. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, vol. 11, 1914-1956. Princeton, 1956.
- Issawi, Charles. *Egypt at mid-century*. London, 1954.
- Jankowski, James P. *Egypt's young rebels, 'Young Egypt': 1932-1952*. Stanford, 1975.
- Kedourie, Elie. 'Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British', *St. Antony's papers*, no. 11, *Middle Eastern affairs*, no. 2, pp. 139-60. Oxford, 1961.
- Landau, Jacob M. *Parliaments and parties in Egypt*. Tel Aviv, 1953.
- Laqueur, Walter Z. *Communism and nationalism in the Middle East*. 2nd ed. London, 1957.

15. EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

- Lloyd, Lord. *Egypt since Cromer*. London, 1933-4. 2 vols.
- Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Afaf. *Egypt's liberal experiment: 1922-1936*. London and Berkeley, 1977.
- 'The revolutionary gentlewomen in Egypt', in Beck, L. and Keddie, N. eds. *Women in the Muslim World*, pp. 261-76. Cambridge, Mass., 1978.
- Marlowe, J. *Anglo-Egyptian relations 1800-1956*. 2nd ed. London, 1965.
- Matthews, Noel and Wainwright, M. D. *A guide to manuscripts and documents in the British Isles relating to the Middle East and North Africa*. Oxford, 1980.
- Mellini, P. *Sir Eldon Gorst: the overshadowed proconsul*. Stanford, 1977.
- Mitchell, Richard P. *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*. London, 1969.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. *Britain's moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956*. London, 1963.
- Owen, E. R. J. *Cotton and the Egyptian economy, 1820-1914*. Oxford, 1969.
- 'The attitudes of British officials to the development of the Egyptian economy, 1882-1922', in Cook, M. A. ed. *Studies in the economic history of the Middle East, from the rise of Islam to the present day*, pp. 485-500. London, 1970.
- Philipp, T. 'Feminism and nationalist politics in Egypt', in Beck, L. and Keddie, N. eds. *Women in the Muslim world*, pp. 277-94. Cambridge, Mass., 1978.
- Radwan, Samir. *Capital formation in Egyptian industry and agriculture, 1882-1967*. London, 1974.
- Reid, D. M. 'Political assassination in Egypt, 1910-1954', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1982, 15, 4, 625-51.
- Richards, Alan. 'Agricultural technology and rural social classes in Egypt, 1920-1939', in Kedourie, E. and Haim, S. eds. *Modern Egypt: studies in politics and society*, pp. 56-83. London, 1980.
- Royal Institute of International Affairs. *Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951*. London, 1952.
- Russell, Sir Thomas. *Egyptian service 1902-46*. London, 1949.
- Safran, Nadav. *Egypt in search of political community*. Cambridge, Mass., 1961.
- Sauvaget, J. ed. C. Cahen. *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Orient musulman: éléments de bibliographie*. Paris, 1961. English tr. Berkeley, 1965.
- Storrs, R. *Orientations*. London, 1937.
- Terry, J. *The Wafd, 1919-1952*. London, 1982.
- Tignor, R. L. *Modernization and British colonial rule in Egypt 1882-1914*. Princeton, 1966.
- 'Economic planning and development projects in inter-war Egypt', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1977, 10, 2, 185-208.
- 'Bank Misr and foreign capitalism', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1977, 8, 2, 161-81.
- Vatikiotis, P. J. *The history of Egypt*. 2nd ed. London, 1980.
- Wavell, Viscount. *Allenby in Egypt*. London, 1943.
- Youssef, Amine. *Independent Egypt*. London, 1940.
- Zayid, Mahmoud. *Egypt's struggle for independence*. Beirut, 1965.
- Ziadeh, Farhat J. *Lawyers, the rule of law and liberalism in modern Egypt*. Stanford, 1968.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

- Abbas Ahmed Mohamed ('Abbās Aḥmad Muḥammad). *White Nile Arabs*. London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1980.
- 'Abd al-Karīm al-Sa'id. *Al-Liwā' al-Abyaḍ* (The White Flag). Khartoum, 1970.
- 'Abd al-Wahhāb 'Abd al-Raḥīm. 'An economic history of the Gezira scheme, 1900–1956'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1968.
- Abdel Rahman el Nasri ('Abd al-Raḥmān al-Naṣrī). *A bibliography of the Sudan, 1938–1958*. London, 1962.
- Abdulla el Tayib ('Abdallāh al-Ṭayyib). 'Changing customs of the riverain Sudan', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1955, 36, 2, 146–58; 1956, 37, 56–69; 1964, 45, 12–28.
- Adel Amin Beshai ('Ādil Amīn Bishai). *Export performance and economic development in Sudan, 1900–1967*. London, 1976.
- Aḥmad Khair. *Kifāh Jīl* (A generation's struggle). Cairo, 1948.
- Ahmed Abdel Rahim Nasr (Aḥmad 'Abd al-Raḥīm Naṣr). 'British policy towards Islam in the Nuba Mountains, 1920–1940', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1971, 52, 23–32.
- Ahmed Bayoumi (Aḥmad Bayūmī). *The history of the Sudan health services*. Nairobi, 1979.
- Anderson, J. N. D. 'Recent developments in Shari'a law in the Sudan', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1950, 31, 1, 82–104.
- Anon (Bell, G. and Dee, B. D.) *Sudan Political Service, 1898–1956*. With an introduction by H. A. MacMichael. Oxford, n.d. [?1958].
- Bābikr Badrī. *The memoirs of Babikr Bedri*, vol. II [1898–1929], tr. and ed. Yusuf Bedri and P. Hogg, with an introduction by G. N. Sanderson. London, 1980. (From *Ta'rīkh Hayātī*. Khartoum, 1959–61. 3 vols.)
- Bakheit, G. M. A. (Ja'far Muḥammad 'Alī Bakhīt). 'British administration and Sudanese nationalism, 1919–1939'. Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1965.
- 'The Condominium and indirect rule', in Howell, J. ed. *Local government and politics in the Sudan*, pp. 25–32. Khartoum, 1974.
- Balamoan, G. A. *Migration policies in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1884 to 1956*. Cambridge, Mass., 1976.
- Barbour, K. M. 'Population shifts and changes in Sudan since 1898', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1966, 2, 2, 98–122.
- Beshir, M. O. (Muḥammad 'Umar Bashīr). *The Southern Sudan: background to conflict*. London, 1968.
- Educational development in the Sudan, 1898–1956*. Oxford, 1969.
- Revolution and nationalism in the Sudan*. London, 1974.
- Boustead, J. E. H. *The wind of morning*. London, 1974.
- Bukhari, S. A. R. 'Military aspects of internal security in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1918–1925'. M.Phil. thesis, University of London, 1972.
- Catford, J. R. 'The introduction of cotton as a cash-crop in the Meridi region of Equatoria', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1953, 34, 2, 153–71.
- Collins, R. O. *Land beyond the rivers. The southern Sudan, 1898–1918*. New Haven and London, 1971.

15. EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

- 'The Sudan Political Service', *African Affairs*, 1972, 71, no. 284, 293–303.
Shadows in the grass. Britain in the southern Sudan, 1918–1956. New Haven and London, 1983.
- Comyn, D. C. E. ff. *Service and sport in the Sudan*. London, 1911.
- Cudsi, A. S. 'Sudanese resistance to British Rule, 1900–1920'. M.Sc. (Econ.) thesis, University of Khartoum, 1969.
- Cunnison, I. *Baggara Arabs*. Oxford, 1966.
- Currie, J. 'The educational experiment in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan', *Journal of the African Society*, 1934, 33, no. 133, 361–71; 1935, 34, no. 134, 41–59.
- Daly, M. W. *British administration and the northern Sudan, 1917–1924*. Leiden and Istanbul, 1980.
- Sudan*. World Bibliographical Series, vol. 40. Oxford and Santa Barbara, Calif., 1983.
- 'The development of the governor-generalship of the Sudan, 1899–1934', *Journal of African History*, 1983, 24, 1, 77–96.
- al-Dardīrī Muḥammad 'Uthmān. *Mudbakkirātī, 1914–58* (My reminiscences...). Khartoum, n.d. [1962].
- Darley, H. A. C. *Slaves and ivory*. London, 1926. Reprinted, Northbrook, Ill., 1972.
- Davies, R. *The camel's back. Service in the rural Sudan*. London, 1957.
- Deng, F. M. *Africans of two worlds: the Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan*. New Haven and London, 1978.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. *The Azande: history and political institutions*. Oxford, 1971.
- Feilden, R. M. *The Bahr El Ghazal Province handbook*. Khartoum, 1911.
- [Fergusson, V. H. et al.]. *The story of Fergie Bey*. London, 1930.
- Gaitskell, A. *Gezira: a story of development in the Sudan*. London, 1959.
- Grandin, N. *Le Soudan nilotique et l'administration britannique (1898–1956)*. Leiden, 1982.
- Griffiths, V. L. *An experiment in education*. London, 1953.
- Hamilton, J. A. de C. ed. *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from within*. London, 1935.
- Hargey, T. M. 'The suppression of slavery in the Sudan, 1898–1939'. D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1981.
- Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim (Ḥasan Ahmad Ibrāhīm). 'The policy of the Condominium government towards the Mahdist political prisoners, 1898–1932', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1974, 55, 33–45.
- The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, with special reference to... the Sudan*. Khartoum, 1976.
- 'The development of economic and political neo-mahdism in the Sudan, 1926–1935', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1977, 58, 1, 44–64.
- 'Mahdist risings against the Condominium government in the Sudan, 1900–1927', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1979, 12, 3, 440–71.
- Hayder Ibrahim. *The Shaiqiya. The cultural and social change [sic] of a Northern Sudanese riverain people*. Wiesbaden, 1979.
- Henderson, K. D. D. *The making of the modern Sudan. The life and letters of Sir Douglas Newbold, KBE*. London, 1953. Reprinted Westport, Conn., 1974.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- H[enderson], K. D. D and O[wen], T. R. H. eds. *Sudan verse*. London, 1963.
- Hill, R. L. *A bibliography of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, from the earliest times to 1937*. London, 1939.
- Slatin Pasha*. London, 1965.
- Sudan transport*. London, 1965.
- A biographical dictionary of the Sudan*. 2nd ed. London, 1967, of *A biographical dictionary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*. Oxford, 1951.
- Hødnebo, K. 'Cattle and flies. A study of cattle keeping in Equatoria Province, the southern Sudan, 1850-1950'. Cand-Fil. thesis, University of Bergen, 1981.
- Holt, P. M. and Daly, M. W. *The history of the Sudan from the coming of Islam to the present day*. London, 1979. 3rd ed. of P. M. Holt, *A modern history of the Sudan*. London, 1961, 1963.
- Husmann, R. *Transkulturation bei den Nuba. Ethnologische Aspekte des kulturellen Wandels in 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*. Göttingen, 1984.
- Isam Ahmad Hassoun ('Isām Aḥmad Ḥassūn). "'Western" migration and settlement in the Gezira', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1952, 33, 1, 60-112.
- Jackson, H. C. *Sudan days and ways*. London, 1954.
- Johnson, D. H. 'Colonial policy and prophets: the "Nuer settlement", 1928-9', *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford*, 1979, 10, 1, 1-20.
- 'History and prophecy among the Nuer of the southern Sudan'. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1980.
- 'Tribal boundaries and border wars: Nuer-Dinka relations in the Sobat and Zaraf Valleys, c. 1860-1976', *Journal of African History*, 1982, 23, 2, 183-203.
- Kapteijns, L. *'Madhist faith and Sudanese tradition. The history of the Masālīt Sultanate, 1870-1930*. London, 1985.
- Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. 'The Sudan Political Service: a profile in the sociology of imperialism', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1982, 15, 1, 21-48.
- McLoughlin, P. F. M. 'Economic development and the heritage of slavery in the Sudan Republic', *Africa*, 1962, 32, 4, 355-91.
- 'Labour market conditions and wages in the Gash and Tokar Deltas, 1900-1955', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1966, 47, 111-26.
- 'Labour market conditions and wages in the three towns, 1900-1950', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1970, 51, 105-18.
- MacMichael, H. A. *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*. London, 1934.
- Mahgoub Mohamed Salih (Maḥjūb Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ). 'The Sudanese press', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1965, 46, 1-7.
- Mangan, J. A. 'The education of an elite imperial administration: the Sudan political service and the British public school system', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 1982, 15, 4, 671-99.
- Maurice, G. K. 'The history of sleeping sickness in the Sudan', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1930, 13, 2, 211-45.
- Muddathir 'Abd al-Raḥīm (Muddathir Abdel-Rahim). *The development of British policy in the southern Sudan, 1899-1947*. Khartoum, 1968.
- Imperialism and nationalism in the Sudan*. Oxford, 1969.

15. EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN

- Muḥammad Aḥmad Maḥjūb and 'Abd al-Ḥalīm Muḥammad. *Mawt dunyā*. (Death of a world.) Khartoum, 1946.
- Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Shūsh. 'Some background notes on modern Sudanese Poetry', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1963, 44, 21–42.
- Nalder, L. F. *Equatorial Province handbook*, vol. 1. *Mongalla*. Khartoum, 1936.
- Nordenstam, T. *Sudanese ethnics*. Uppsala, 1968.
- O'Fahey, R. S. *State and society in Dar Fur*. London, 1980.
- Omar Mohamed Osman Abdou ('Umar Muḥammad 'Uthmān 'Abdūh). 'The development of transport and economic growth in the Sudan'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1960.
- Reining, C. C. *The Zande Scheme*. Evanston, Ill., 1966.
- Roden, D. 'The twentieth-century decline of Suakin', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1970, 51, 1–22.
- Ṣadiq al-Mahdī. ed. *Jihād fī Sabīl al-Istiqlāl* (The struggle for independence: being memoirs of 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mahdī). Khartoum, n.d. [1965].
- Salih, K. O. 'British administration in Nuba Mountains region of Sudan, 1900–1956'. Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1982.
- Sanderson, G. N. 'The modern Sudan, 1820–1956: the present position of historical studies', *Journal of African History*, 1963, 4, 3, 435–61.
- Sanderson, L. M. 'A survey of material available for the study of educational development in the modern Sudan, 1900–1963', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1963, 44, 69–81.
- 'Educational development and administrative control in the Nuba Mountains region of the Sudan', *Journal of African History*, 1963, 4, 2, 233–47.
- 'The development of girls' education in the northern Sudan, 1898–1960', *Paedagogica Historica* (Ghent), 1968, 8, 1, 120–52.
- 'Education and administrative control in colonial Sudan and Northern Nigeria', *African Affairs*, 1975, 74, no. 297, 427–41.
- Sanderson, L. M. and Sanderson, G. N. *Education, religion and politics in southern Sudan, 1899–1964*. London and Khartoum, 1981.
- Santandrea, S. *Luci e ombre dell'amministrazione Britannica nel Bahr el Ghazal (1898–1955)*. Como, 1967.
- Sevier, C. E. 'The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the southern Sudan, 1918–1939'. Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1974.
- Squires, H. C. *The Sudan medical service*. London, 1958.
- Stigand, C. H. *Equatoria. The Lado Enclave*. London, 1923. Reprinted 1968.
- Stone, J. 'The finance of government economic development in the Sudan, 1899–1913'. Duplicated typescript, Sudan Economic Institute, Khartoum, 1954. [Copy in Sudan Archive, Durham.]
- 'Sudan economic development, 1899–1913'. Duplicated typescript, Sudan Economic Institute, Khartoum, 1955. [Copy at Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Oxford.]
- Symes, G. S. *Tour of duty*. London, 1946.
- Talal Asad. 'A note on the history of the Kababish tribe', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1966, 47, 79–87.
- The Kababish Arabs*. London, 1970.
- Theobald, A. B. *Alī Dīnār, last sultan of Darfur, 1898–1916*. London, 1965.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Tosh, J. 'The economy of the southern Sudan under the British, 1898–1955', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1981, 9, 3, 275–88.
- Trimingham, J. S. *Islam in the Sudan*. London, 1949. Reprinted 1965.
- Voll, J. O. 'A history of the Khatmīyyah tariqah in the Sudan'. Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1969.
- Warburg, G. *The Sudan under Wingate*. London, 1971.
- 'Slavery and labour in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan', *Asian and African Studies: Journal of the Israel Oriental Society*, 1978, 12, 2, 221–45.
- Islam, nationalism and communism in a traditional society: the case of Sudan*. London, 1978.
- Willis, C. A. 'Religious confraternities of the Sudan', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 1921, 4, 4, 175–94.
- Wyndham, R. *The gentle savage: A Sudanese journey in the province of Bahr El Ghazal*. New York and London, 1936.